Government institutions have used information and communication technology (ICT) not only to improve public service delivery but also to fight against corruption on top of the concept of e-government. The value of using ICT, however, is sometimes undermined due to the lack of stimulating collaborative works. In the context of corruption, for example, while the current state of e-government enables one government to prevent and detect corruption by system-based inter-government collaborative works, it is still uncommon for a government to use this capability. This study argues that a standalone e-government limits the potential benefits which a government can derive from e-government thus, possibly, increasing the risk of corruption.

This study hypothesizes that e-government is able to reduce government vulnerability to corruption through the greater monitoring capacity of stakeholders. By being able to collaborate with stakeholders, a government has increased transparency and accountability which is followed by the extensive monitoring coverage. With the greater monitoring coverage, e-government contributes to closing the opportunity for government officers to commit corruption. Furthermore, with the extent of collaborative works with stakeholders, a government could have a wide spread of potential whistleblowers that will lead to detect corruption voluntarily. Also, the tight collaboration with other government institution will increase the capability of the government to conduct a peer-control thus strengthening the integrated and continuous monitoring. This development, in turn, places the e-government as an indispensable instrument in compensating the government vulnerability in term of reducing the opportunity for corruption.

This study contains three research activities and adopts a multi-method approach through interviews and a survey to examine the proposed hypotheses. The first activity is to conduct a quantitative analytic on secondary data from World Economic Forum’s Network Readiness Index and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The result of this activity is that government interaction to other government institution (G2G) has the least impact on corruption. In addition to that, this research found that e-participation has a role in mitigating the weakness of G2C in combating corruption. The result of the first stage then become the main topic of discussion in the second research activity.

The second activity is a qualitative study for exploring the implementation of G2G in Japanese and Indonesian government institutions. This stage used Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) Japan and Indonesia. These SAIs have similar ICT solution that represents the G2G interaction. Japan SAI has CEFIAN that accepts electronic financial data from other departments while Indonesia has e-Audit that transmit the data from other government institutions to SAI Indonesia. This study employs an interpretative approach to analyzing qualitative data obtained from interviews and discussions. Through the interviews and focus group discussion with senior auditors from both SAIs, the study concluded that G2G create a mutual control system among government institutions. The mutual control system is necessary for streamlining the confirmation process across institutions, enabling peer-control on interrelated government processes, and increasing the cost of corruption.

The last activity in this research is to conduct a quantitative analytic on primary data collected through a survey distribution. The surveys targeted the government officers with differing levels of seniority who are actively involved in the financial reporting activities and government auditing. This activity employs the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) approach for analyzing quantitative data collected from the survey. Analysis of the impact of government type; local and central government shows a statistically significant moderating effect on G2C and G2G. The results indicate that G2C is more influential in local government and G2G is more influential in central government. Analysis of the effect of government type also found no statistically significant difference in the G2B test. Also, the result also found that in G2C, participatory is more influential than substantial information. For developing G2B, fairness or equal treatment is more important than building trust. And, in G2G interaction, the ability of an institution to generate a pattern from the information gathered from other institution is more important than searching relevant information in other institution’s information system.

These findings enrich current discussion within anti-corruption strategy on the role of both transparency and accountability of government. This dissertation demonstrates that monitoring capacity is an appropriate link between government interaction with stakeholder using e-government and combating corruption through lessening the government vulnerability, a topic that is still very limited in the literature. Additionally, this dissertation identifies a strategy for developing e-government that mitigates the risk of corruption; participatory over substantial information, fairness over the trust, and the pattern identification over information seeking.

References


