George H. Mead from Alfred Schutz’s Point of View: A Preliminary Research Report

Hisashi Nasu

1. Introduction

This essay aims to explore the relationship between the thoughts of Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead. Before entering into arguments on this theme, a methodological issue should be mentioned briefly.

The relationship between the thoughts of great scholars can be approached from the several points of view, for instance, biographical, theoretical, hermeneutical, historical, ideological, etc., which could be, in turn, grouped into objective and subjective. An approach from the objective point of view means here that the investigator examines and compares the thoughts of the scholars in terms of specific topics which the investigator chooses on the basis of one’s own interests. For this kind of investigation, the intention of the scholars to be examined is not of primary importance and can be disregarded. Such investigations lead to so-called deconstructionism in the extreme case.

An approach from the objective point of view can be adapted effectively to investigation into the relationships between the thoughts of scholars who did not recognize each other either personally or in writings, or who, at least, never referred to the works of the “partners” in one’s own work. This kind of investigation might have a possibility of extending the thoughts of the scholars to be examined beyond their original intentions.

As for the relationship between the thoughts of Schutz and Mead, several works have already dealt with the relationship between them as a main topic, and indicated their similarities and/or differences in terms of the authors’ own themes (cf., Perinbanayagam, 1975; Vaitkus, 1991; Lewis, Mclain, Weigert, 1993; Katagiri, 2004; Etzrodt, 2008). All of them can be said to take the objective point of view in the sense just mentioned above. Their approaches are undoubtedly legitimate and valid as well as most popular and I appreciate their explorations.

But this essay takes a subjective point of view, that is, Schutz’s point of view. The objective
of this research is, therefore, the works of Mead for Schutz, and the questions here are what kind of relevance the work of Mead had for Schutz, and in what ideas from Mead’s work Schutz was interested.

2. Toward the Works of G. H. Mead

Schutz in Europe had no concern with the works of Mead and of other American scholars with one exception, the works of W. James. Even in the case of James, however, he was referred only twice; one is about his term, “fist,” in Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Schutz, 1932 [2004]: 166) and another is about his term, “Fransen” [fringe], in a draft on language and the forms of life (Schutz, 1925: 231). It might be possible also to add Thomas and Znaniecki’s term, “four wishes,” but this term was just implied in his lecture at the Mises seminar without the authors’ names (Schutz, 1928-29: 77).

According to Wagner, during Schutz’s trip to the States from March to May in 1937, he recognized Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action and was heavily interested in it because it was based on Weberian sociology, in addition, his work was listed in its Bibliography as Secondary Resources relating to Max Weber. He read it in Paris (cf., Wagner, 1983: 75), and wanted to publish a “paper on my [Schutz’s] own work with a presentation and discussion of your [Parsons’] theory” (Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 97), which was not done at that time. In an essay titled “Phänomenologie und Kulturwissenschaft,” which was completed in Paris, January 1939, Parsons was referred to for the first time in Schutz’s essay as a Weberian scholar (Schutz, 1940a: 138). It was he whom Schutz wanted to meet and discuss after his transfer to the United States from Paris. They actually met each other in April, 1940 and also corresponded several times about Schutz’s review essay (cf., Schutz-Parsons, 1978).

However, according to Schutz’s Curriculum Vitae dated “March 17, 1943,” which I surmise was submitted to the New School for Social Research, it was not Parsons but Mead and James with whom Schutz wanted to deal as topics for his essays prepared at that time. He announced in the Vitae four works as “Papers in Preparation”: (1) A book called tentatively “The Social Person,” developing certain ideas brought forward in Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, (2) George H. Mead and His Theory of Sociology, (3) The Concept of Relevance, and (4) Personality and Its Time Perspectives (Based on the theories of William James) (Schutz, 1943a).

The first and the third topics had been already indicated at the end of his 1932 book as themes which awaited investigation and should be treated in future research (Schutz, 1932
[2004: 439]. These two topics can be also found in a five-page outline of his essay with the title, “Phänomenologise und Kulturwissenschaft” written in 1939 for the editor of a memorial volume to Husserl (cf., Schutz, 1939: 109). As for the fourth topic, it was not a theme that just occurred to Schutz after his transfer to the States in 1939, since Schutz had been interested in the topic of Personality as well as James’s work during his Vienna days. Schutz had already written drafts on “Personality” during his Vienna days (cf., Schutz, 1936/37). As for W. James, Schutz also read a paper on “The Relation of William James and Phenomenology” at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December 27, 1940 and published its revised version titled “William James’s Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically Interpreted” (Schutz, 1941). In contrast to these three topics, the second topic, that is, the works of G. H. Mead, is one which arose only after his transfer to the United States.

Schutz had never recognized the work of Mead during his days in Europe as mentioned above, but he seemed to discover his work just after transferring to the United States in 1939. He already referred to Mead’s name and works three times in his review essay on Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action, which was written in the summer of 1940 (cf., Barber, 2004: 93). In one case, the name of Mead was just referred to among other scholars: “The because motives are grouped into systems which are treated in American literature (James, G. H. Mead, Znaniecki, Allport, Parsons himself) correctly under the caption of (social) personality” (Schutz, 1940b: 213 / 35, cf., Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 136). But in another two cases, Mead’s work was referred rather substantially and positively. In one case, Schutz referred to the three works which deal with “the problem of the time element in action,” that is, Mead’s The Philosophy of the Act and The Philosophy of the Present, and his own Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 136). In the other case, he wrote that “the foregoing [critical] remarks [on the method of behaviorism] are only partially true for the so-called behavioristic position of the great philosopher and sociologist G. H. Mead. ...An analysis of Mead’s most important theory must be reserved for another occasion” (ibid: 138).

Schutz seemed to be very interested in the works of Mead and wanted to deal with his theory of action. Schutz’s reference to the works of American scholars in his essays, especially in his earlier essays in the United States, could be considered as due to “friendly advice” from Alvin Johnson, President of the New School for Social Research. According to Maurice Natanson, Johnson advised Schutz, “Don’t try to teach our students phenomenology; they won’t take it!” and Schutz accepted this advice (cf., Natanson, 1978: xiii).

As a matter of fact, Schutz himself seemed to have become aware that American scholars,
even philosophers, were not familiar with phenomenology. Describing his preparation for a paper on James’s concept of the “stream of thought” for the meeting of American Philosophical Association held in December 1940, he wrote in November 16, 1940, to his close friend, Aron Gurwitsch, that “my main difficulty was giving some short, clear information to a public unfamiliar with phenomenology, taking familiar theories as my point of departure” (Schutz-Gurwitch, 1989: 27). It can be imagined from such evidence that his realization of the intellectual circumstances in the United States in those days led him to say at the end of his James essay that “Our aim [of this essay] was to show that phenomenology is not quite a stranger in this country” (Schutz, 1941: 13). This passage implies his impression that phenomenology had never been familiar in the United States and should be presented in terms of American literatures or American scholars.

Thus it might be concluded that Schutz’s references to the works of American scholars was merely a kind of presentational strategy for introducing phenomenology smoothly in the United States. This might hold true for some cases. So far as the works of Mead are concerned, however, this is not true. As shown above, Schutz referred to Mead in his review essay as a “great philosopher and sociologist” and his theory as “most important theory” worth being “reserved for another occasion” on which to analyze it (cf., Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 138). Such description was not diplomatic in my opinion. He was really and substantially interested in the thought of Mead. This can be demonstrated by his course materials for the Department of Sociology of the New School.

For the spring semester in 1943, Schutz gave his first lecture at the New School under the title “Introduction to Sociological Theory.” He announced that “selected papers of Cooley, Park, Thomas, Znaniecki and Young will be read” (Schutz, 1943b), and the name of Mead cannot be found in this course announcement. But for the fall semester in the same year, he gave a lecture titled “Theory of Social Action” and announced that “With continual reference to concrete problems of the social sciences, and to the writings of G. H. Mead, T. Parsons, F. Znaniecki, Pareto, and Max Weber” (Schutz, 1943c). And for the spring semester in 1944, he gave with A. Salomon a seminar titled “Philosophy and Sociology: G. H. Mead,” and announced that “The contribution of G. H. Mead to the fundamental problems of sociological theory, with special attention to the problems of the personal and social self, of intersubjectivity, and of social time” (Schutz, Salomo, 1944). Furthermore, he left numerous handwritten notes on Mead as well as many underlings and annotations on Mead’s two books.

On the basis of all the data mentioned above, it can be convincedly said that Schutz’s
intellectual interest in the works of Mead was steadily and substantially developing in those days. In addition, I want to say that his interest in Mead did not disappear even in his later years. In 1956, he wrote to Maurice Natanson that “you see, one day I shall have to write my Mead paper” (Schutz, 1956), although unfortunately this project could not be realized as his Ortega project could not be realized (cf., Nasu, 2009).

Let me turn now to the questions: What kind of relevance had the work of Mead for Schutz? In what ideas from Mead’s work was Schutz interested? Three sources are available to address these questions. The first is his handwritten notes on Mead, which reach approximately 100 pages. They are on “What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?” (1910), “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness” (1912), “The Social Self” (1913), The Philosophy of the Present (1932), Charles Morris’ “Introduction” to Mead’s The Philosophy of the Act (1934), Samuel Strong’s “Note on G. H. Mead’s The Philosophy of the Act” (1939/40), and Alfred Clayton's “Emergent Mind and Education: A Study of G. H. Mead’s Bio-Social Behaviorism from an Educational Point of View” (1943) (Schutz Nachlass: 9727-9824). The second source is his annotations on Mead’s The Philosophy of the Present (1932) and Mind, Self, and Society (1934). In comparison with his annotations on Talcott Parsons’ Toward a General Theory of Action and Ortega y Gasset’s Man and People, there are relatively few “critical comments” and many appraisal comments on the author’s description found in his annotations on Mead’s books. I restrict myself here, however, to examine the third source, Schutz’s references to Mead.

3. Schutz’s References in his Published Essays to the Works of Mead

As mentioned above, Mead’s name can be found for the first time in Schutz’s review essay on Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action, written in 1940. From then on, Schutz constantly referred to Mead in his 13 published essays and in his 4 unfinished manuscripts which were edited and published posthumously by others.

Reading all the references of Schutz to Mead, several contexts can be identified in which Schutz referred to the work of Mead; the first is the context of behaviorism, the second is of social action, the third is of the social self, and the fourth is of structurization of the spatial field.

Schutz had already criticized behaviorism in his writings during his days in Vienna for its “fixation in conceptual form of external mode of behavior or sequences of action” (Schutz, 1932 [2004]: 362) and also for its overlooking the problem-stratum of subjective meaning (cf., Schutz,
1936: 127; see also Schutz, 1933: 91). But in these writings he did not refer to Mead in relation to behaviorism. He linked Mead to behaviorism for the first time in his review essay on Parsons’ book, in which Mead was identified, with reservations, as a behaviorist.

In this review essay, Schutz criticized behaviorism for not considering that “language, speech, verbal report, proposition, and meaning already presuppose intelligent alter egos” and for neglecting “covert behavior” (Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 45). He then attached to this passage a footnote which reads, “the forgoing remarks are only partially true for the so-called behavioristic position of the great philosopher and sociologist G. H. Mead” (ibid: 138). In another essay he went a step further and wrote, “Even an ideally refined behaviorism can, as has been pointed out for instance by George H. Mead, merely explain the behavior of the observed, not of the observing behaviorist” (Schutz, 1954: 54; see also Schutz, 1953b: 131-132). As shown clearly, he criticized behaviorism on the basis of Mead’s rather anti-behavioristic insight.

Furthermore I want to pay attention to a footnote of Schutz following a passage in his essay on multiple realities. He wrote, “it is my attainable manipulatory area which would be my actual manipulatory area if I were in his place and indeed will turn into an actual one by appropriate locomotions” and attached to it a footnote which reads that “G. H. Mead ... comes to a similar conclusion: ‘Present reality is a possibility. It is what would be if I were there rather than here’” (Schutz, 1945a: 225; cf., Schutz-Luckmann, 1978 [2003]: 89). As Wagner pointed out rightly (Wagner, 1983: 139), when Schutz wrote this footnote, he might be said to confirm that Mead himself had broken through the behaviorist dichotomy between close and distant objects.

Second, Schutz referred to Mead in the context of social action. This context includes two topics; one is about the time elements in action and the other is about the possibility of communication.

“An act is always a process in time” (Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 13). This is one of the fundamental theses for Schutz and also a starting point of his criticism of Parsons’ theory of action, because the latter did not take this element into account when he elaborated his so-called “voluntaristic action theory.” Since Mead has dealt with the time elements in action, not only physical time but also subjective time such as a “specious present” which contains elements of the past and the future, it might be easy for Schutz to consider Mead as an ally in this issue.

Concerning the possibility of communication, however, Schutz’s position on Mead is rather
ambivalent. He appreciates Mead’s endeavor to explain the origin of language by an interplay of significant gestures as a highly original one (cf., Schutz, 1951: 161). He, however, expresses his disappointment with Mead’s arguments which start from the supposition that a prelinguistic “conversation” of “attitude” is possible. He said that “he [Mead] has seen a crucial problem more clearly than others. Nevertheless, the solution he offers only appears to remove the difficulties connected with the basic issue, namely, whether the communicative process is really the foundation of all possible social relationships, or whether, on the contrary, all communication presupposes the existence of some kind of social interaction...”(ibid.). In this context, Schutz introduced an original conception of his own, a “mutual tuning-in relationship,” as a foundation of all communication.

The third context, the social self, is closely related to the second one, since the social self appears in social action. Schutz heavily refers to Mead in this context, but again his position on Mead is ambivalent here.

Schutz often introduced Mead’s “ingenious” concept of the “generalized other” and his distinction between the “I” and the “Me” into his own description of how I experience the other(s) as well as myself in social interaction in everyday life (cf., Schutz, 1942: 161-162; Schutz, 1945b: 216-217; Schutz, 1948: 189; Schutz, 1953a: 18-19; Schutz, 1953b: 141). He also said clearly that “Living in the vivid present in its ongoing working acts, ... the working self experiences itself as ... an undivided total self. ...But if the self in a reflective attitude turns back to the working acts performed...this unity goes to pieces. The self which performed the past acts is ...rather a partial self... This partial self is merely the taker of role or ...a Me. So far, the thesis presented in this paper converges with Mead’s analysis. And there is, furthermore, agreement with Mead’s statement that the ‘I’ gets into experience only after it has carried out the act and thus appears experientially as a part of the Me, that is, the Me appears in our experience in memory” (Schutz, 1945a: 216-217). He agreed with Mead’s description of how the social self appears or is experienced by itself as well as by the partner in social interaction in everyday life, and in this context Schutz made a departure from Husserl. In October 1952, he wrote to Gurwitch that “Husserl misunderstood the I, but the fact that he attacked the problem wrongly by no means implies that the I is a constitutum. Only one aspect, the I modo praeteritis, is a constitutum, and this is why both Scheler and also G. H. Mead...trace the various I-aspects back to its temporary structure (which I finally did too)” (Schutz-Gurwitsch, 1989: 182).

Schutz, however, referred to “G. H. Mead’s rather incomplete and inconsistent attempt to
approach these problems" (ibid.: 216), and mentioned that his own position is “not reconcilable with Mead’s theory of the social origin of the self” (ibid.: 217; italic added). He was thus not satisfied completely with Mead’s description on the origin of the social self.

The fourth context in which Schutz referred to Mead is about the structurization of the world or reality. He said that “It is the great merit of Mead to have analyzed the structurization of the reality at least of the physical thing in its relationship to human action, especially to the actual manipulation of objects with the hands. ... The theory of the predominance of the manipulatory area certainly converges with the thesis suggested by this paper, namely, that the world of our working, of bodily movements, of manipulating objects and handling things and men constitutes the specific reality of everyday life” (Schutz, 1945a: 223; cf., Schutz-Luckmann, 1978 [2003]: 77-78). He, however, continued to say that “For our purpose, however, the otherwise most important distinction between objects experienced by contact and distant objects is not of primary importance. ...this dichotomy originates in Mead’s basic behavioristic position” (ibid.)

As shown above, Schutz’s position on Mead’s work is also ambivalent in this context. He really appreciated Mead’s notion that the manipulatory area constitutes the core of reality, because he thought that the distinction between the manipulatory and distant areas is indeed of important for the analysis of the origin of objective experience (cf., ibid.: 77). But his primary concern was with the natural attitude of the wide-awake, grown-up person in everyday life. For such a concern, the distinction between these two areas is of secondary significance, since the wide-awake, grown-up person "always disposes of a stock of knowledge of previous experiences, among them the notion of distance as such and of the possibility of overcoming distance by acts of working, namely locomotions" (1945a: 223). This is the reason why Schutz said that “Mead’s distinction between the manipulative and distant zones should not be overstressed” (Schutz-Luckmann, 1978 [2003]: 77).

4. Some Comments on Schutz’s References to Mead

Description in this essay has shown through trustworthy evidence that Schutz was undoubtedly interested in the thoughts of G. H. Mead from his earlier to later days in the States, and his concerns was with Mead’s somewhat modified behavioristic stance, his conceptions of social action and communication, of the social self, and of the structurization of the reality.

One additional note should be added. Schutz said that “It is doubtless Mead’s merit to have
seen the relations between act, self, memory, time, and reality" (Schutz, 1945a: 217). This means that he thought the four contexts or issues just mentioned above are related to each other in Mead’s description and this link seemed to Schutz to be the great merit of Mead. This relation is guaranteed by action. As far as this aspect of Mead is concerned, that is, in so far as “he takes as the starting point for his analysis of the common life world action, and not perception” (Schutz, 1956; italics added), Schutz can consider him as an ally.

It has been shown, however, on the basis of Schutz’s references to Mead, that his position on Mead about the four issues is ambivalent. I think it is no other than this ambivalence that made him want to write an essay on Mead.

Then, where does this ambivalence derive from? One of its grounds can be ascribed to Mead’s “contradictory” position. Schutz recognized that Mead has made a departure from Watsonian behaviorism and freed himself from a deterministic conception of action. But he also criticized him for his “(modified) behaviorism which induces him to interpret all the beforesaid phenomena [act, self, memory, time, and reality] in terms of stimulus-response” (Schutz, 1945a: 217)

Another ground for Schutz’s ambivalence can be ascribed to his own theoretical and philosophical position. Schutz is undoubtedly a Husserlian phenomenologist. He was, however, not a mere epigone of Husserl. He wrote retrospectively that “My encounter with Husserl’s philosophy was influenced ... by the fact that I had my scientific training in the social sciences and ... by my unorthodox approach to phenomenology: From the outset I was more interested in what Husserl called later on ‘phenomenology of the natural attitude’ than in the problems of ‘transcendental phenomenology’” (Schutz, 1977: 41). Owing to these conditions, he actually departed from Husserl in several points, among which two points are especially relevant to this essay: one is about the status of perception and action and the other is about the genesis of the self or conscious life.

As M. Natanson said, “modern philosophy has taken perception as the paradigmatic problem for analysis in the theory of knowledge” (Natanson, 1973: 113). This claim holds true for Husserl. Schutz already realized it, for he pointed out about Husserl that he “takes as his model of all his pertinent investigations the perception of an object in the outer world and, even more precisely, the visual perception of such an object” (Schutz, 1959: 112). Schutz’s primary concern was, however, with the social world and the social sciences. Thus, following Max Weber, he tried to elaborate an “actor-centered theory of social reality” and argued for “a reversal in philosophical direction: in the domain of the social world, not perception but action
is the central issue” (cf., Natanson, 1973: 112-113; see also Kersten, 1976: 63-64). He wrote to Gurwitsch in 1952 that “I can’t see that the reality of the world of everyday life can be grounded in its character as perceptual world ...I believe that the reality of the world of everyday life is based on its structure as the world of work [Wirkwelt]” (Schutz-Gurwitsch, 1989: 154). This perspective lead him to regard the world of everyday life as “paramount reality” (cf., Nasu, 1997: 37ff.).

It is now understandable that he considered Mead as a true ally, since he recognized that Mead took as the starting point for his analysis of the common life world action, and not perception like Weber and Parsons, and in addition, Mead dealt with the time element in action unlike Weber and Parsons. This is also the reason why he really appreciated Mead’s conception of the manipulatory area as the core of reality. Schutz thought that “the constitution of space refers back to our kinaesthetic experiences of our bodily organs of sight and touch” (Schutz, 1944: 251).

This is, however, a half story of Schutz’s ideas about reality construction. In order to understand this point, we should follow a passage extracted just before from Schutz. He continued “and our actual or virtual ability to perform the kinaesthesia of locomotion” (ibid). We, “wide-awake, grown-up” persons in the natural attitude, always dispose of “a stock of previous experiences, among them the notion of distance as such and of the possibility of overcoming distance by acts of working, namely locomotions” (Schutz, 1945a: 223). Transcendence in this sense is a constitutive element of our everyday experience. If this is the case, and if our primary concern is with the natural attitude of everyday life, Mead’s theory of predominance of the manipulatory area should be modified by reference to the phenomenological insight into the structure of “horizon.” The necessity for this modification leads Schutz to substitute “the world within one’s actual and potential reach” for Mead’s manipulatory area (cf., ibid: 224; see also Schutz, 1970: 176ff.; Schutz-Luckmann, 1978 [2003]: 71ff.).

After indicating this point, it should be re-emphasized that the manipulatory area is still now most important for everyday experience, especially for small children’s experience, because they do not dispose of a stock of previous experiences.

There arises now the second topic which led Schutz to departure from Husserl, that is, the genesis of the social self. Following Husserl, Schutz normally starts his arguments with a wide-awake, grown-up person in the natural attitude, presupposing the conscious life of human beings as already set. Such arguments need no exploration of the genesis of the
conscious life and the self. As Schutz pointed out, Husserl had questioned about the “genesis” of the field of consciousness, but his “term ‘genesis’ refers to the process by which knowledge arises in its ‘origin-form’ of self-givenness, and has nothing to do with the factual process of meaning arising out of a definite historical subjectivity” (cf., Schutz, 1945b: 104).

Schutz undoubtedly appreciated Husserl’s exploration of this kind of “genesis” and, of course, followed it. But he might have recognized by himself that his description of everyday experience was made with reservation, since he said that “as healthy, grown-up and wide-awake human beings (we are not speaking of others) we have that knowledge” (Schutz, 1940c: 14: italic added; see also Schutz, 1943d: 72). This supplemental passage in the parentheses can be considered to imply that he might be aware of another field of research to be investigated, that is, the genesis of the social self or the conscious life from birth to grown-up and wide-awake. It is conceivable that this awareness might lead Schutz to make a departure from Husserl and turn his attention to Mead’s theory of “socialization,” formation of the “Me,” and the distinction as well as the relationship between the “I” and the “Me.”

However, Schutz wrote that his description of multiple realities was not reconcilable with Mead’s theory of the social origin of the self (cf., Schutz, 1945a: 217). Unfortunately, no statement has ever been found regarding which aspects of Mead’s theory he could not agree with. If I venture a surmise on the basis of his other descriptions especially of multiple realities and action, it is the ambiguity left in Mead’s description about the relationship between the I and the Me. Mead treated the genesis of individual consciousness within already established existing society as a socialization process. This is concerned, as it were, with ontogenetic phases of the genesis. This can cover only the genesis of the Me and leaves the genesis of the I and the relationship between the I and the Me unclear. In order to exploring these aspects, not only ontogenetic phases but also situational phases, which can cover the genesis of a particular self in relation to the actual Here and Now as an ongoing process, should be explored. The latter phases are expected to be treated more sufficiently in phenomenology, the spirit of which consists in describing phenomena honestly as they appear and develop Here and Now. Exploration of this topic needs further investigation.

5. Concluding Remarks

Schutz’s ambivalent position on Mead holds the possibility of developing a new stage in social theory, making a departure not only from social behaviorism but also philosophical phenomenology. Modification of Mead in the light of Husserl and modification of Husserl in
the light of Mead can be expected to lead an original horizon in social theory, which might be called a phenomenologically oriented sociology founded on Schutz’s insights. This is, at present, a mere expectation, which is waiting for realization in reference to other sources, that is, Schutz’s handwritten notes on Mead and his annotations in Mead’s two books as well as Schutz’s and Mead’s writings.

* An earlier version of this essay was read at the annual meeting of The Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences held at Pittsburgh, Penn., U. S. A., October 16-18. I would like to extend many thanks to Prof. Frances C. Waksler for her useful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay. I thank also Profs. Mary Rogers, Lester Embree, Michael Barber, and Gary Backhaus for their constructive comments and exciting discussions on my presentation at the meeting. This meeting was the last chance for me and our many friends to see Mary, who passed away in February the 27th, 2009. She often sent me her suggestive comments on my essays and presentations, and always encouraged me. Her last email reached me just two weeks before her dying. I would like to say Thank You, Mary, for your lasting and warmest friendship with me.

NOTES
(1) Schutz left his diary during this trip in German with the handwritten titled “Reisebeschreibungen,” a part of which Evelyn S. Lang has translated into English and will appear in Schutzian Research, Vol. 1. (Schutz, 1937 [forthcoming])
(2) This essay was translated as “Phenomenology and Social Sciences” and included in the memorial volume to E. Husserl, who passed away in April, 1938, titled Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Farber, 1940)
(3) R. Grathoff edited out the names in the round bracket and instead attached the end note to this part, in which he listed W. I. Thomas, C. H. Cooley, G. H. Mead, and G. Allport as the authors to whom “Schutz often referred in this matter” (Schutz-Parsons, 1978: 136) and edited out the names of James and Parsons without explaining the reason, in spite of their names shown both in Schutz’s handwritten draft and its typescript draft.
(4) For annotations on Parsons’ and Ortega’s books, see Nasu (2004) and Nasu (2009).
(5) Schutz’s criticism of Mead’s position for “modified behaviorism” should be reconsidered in consulting Mead’s writings as well as recent researches on Mead.

REFERENCES


Schutz, A. (1953a) "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," in CP1, pp. 3-47.


Schutz, A. (1959) "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," in CP3, pp. 92-115.


