1. The Greek polis - a State or a stateless society?

During the summer of 415 BC, Athenians were in a deeply suspicious mood caused by the recent two events, the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. The more the names of the suspects who allegedly involved in the incidents were exposed, the more the citizens believed that a large scale of conspiracy against their democracy was going on. In this critical moment, the Council of Five Hundred, which was then empowered to deal with the matter, took a pre-emptive action against the conspirators. According to Andokides:

They (i.e. the Council) summoned the generals and ordered them to proclaim that the citizens resident in the city were to proceed under arms to the Agora; those between the Long Walls to the Theseion; and those in Peiraeus to the Agora of Hippodamos. The cavalrymen were to be mustered at the Anakeion by trumpet before nightfall, while the Council would take up its quarters on the Acropolis during the night, and the prytanes in the Tholos. ...¹

This ‘total mobilisation’ of Athenian citizens is often referred to as showing how small a public coercive power was available in Athens.² It is citizens themselves that were mobilised to be on guard against conspirators, not an organised police force nor standing army, because there were no such organisations. Compared to the modern State (capital ‘S’), the absence of police force is noteworthy. Sociologists and political scientists have often seen the true nature of State in coercive power. Max Weber, most typically and famously, defines the State as a political organisation whose

---

¹ Andokides 1.45, E. Maidment’s translation in Loeb Classical Library (modified). See also Thukydides 6.61.2.
administrative staff successfully uphold the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.3 It is quite natural that many ancient historians have seen a specific feature of the Greek polis in this absence of police force.4

If, then, the polis does not have one of the essential elements of the State, how should we classify it? Is it still a State, an imperfect or minimal State? Or is it something else? This is the issue which Moshe Berent has recently tackled in a series of articles.5 Starting from Weber’s (and E. Gellner’s) emphasis on violence for the concept of the State, Berent confirms that the state-coercive apparatus which was available in the polis (e.g. the Eleven in Athens) had only a rudimentary character. Thus, he argues, the polis is not a State: it is rather what anthropologists call a ‘stateless society (or community)’, which is characterised by the absence of public coercive apparatus.6 Because of the lack of police system, most of the arrests were carried out by self-help. As a result, in the polis ‘force is never public and always private’ (1996: 48). In addition, ‘the law [of the polis], in order to be law, must be identical with customs of the community’ (ibid., 47) because ‘[t]he laws have no State power behind them’ (ibid., 49). It has also no standing army (except Sparta and Athenian navy). While the State can be acknowledged to be an entity with a life of its own, the polis has only a rudimentary form of the impersonal character. The polis is a stateless society and identified with its citizens.

---

3 Weber (1968) 54 = Weber (1972) 29 ‘Staat soll ein politischer Anstaltsbetrieb heißen, wenn und insoweit sein Verwaltungsstab erfolgreich das Monopollegitimen physischen Zwanges für die Durchführung der Ordnungen in Anspruch nimmt’.
4 e.g. Finley (1983) 18; Osborne (1985) 7; Cartledge (2000) The (Greek) polis in this paper is that of the archaic and classical periods. The Hellenistic and Roman poleis are beyond the scope of the present paper.
6 ‘Stateless society’ is a category originally invented by M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard in their African Political Systems (1940) to describe societies ‘which lack government, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions -- in short which lack government-- and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status or wealth’ (1940: 5). Notice that Berent uses the model with some qualifications. Berent (1998) 345, (2000a) 262, and especially (2000b) 8-9: ‘As the polis had a much more complex political and economic structure than (tribal) acephalous societies, one could not argue that the work with a very basic and Procrustean distinction between stateless societies and State is problematic as far as the Greek polis is concerned’. On Berent’s view of the polis as not a ‘tribal society’, see also Hansen (2002) 42-44.
Berent’s view, however, has met criticism from M.H. Hansen. Giving a wide range of references from the ancient poleis to early modern (i.e. pre-nineteenth century) European countries, Hansen insists that the Greek polis should be a State. It would be convenient to sum up his argument in the following three points. First, according to Hansen, Berent oversimplifies Weber’s concept of the State: ‘[t]he monopoly of force is now universally emphasised in almost every discussion of the concept of state, but the sheer monopoly of force ... does not in itself constitute a state’ 8. When one considers whether an organisation is a State or not, all the three elements (government, territory and population) should be taken into account: no single element is sufficient. Second, it is true that ‘the polis is identified with its citizens, but it also true that it is often seen as an impersonal abstract power above both rulers and ruled’ (22). Third, the polis has a territory, body politic and government (or officials) to enforce law and order. Despite the absence of police force, administration of justice in most cases was done by officials. He concludes that the polis was definitely not a stateless community but a type of State.

This debate 9 is concerned with the major issue ‘What is the Greek polis?’. I myself am not now interested in whether the polis should be defined as a State or a stateless society. Nor shall I deal with the complicated matters, such as definitions of the State and stateless society. 10 What interests me is the issue of public coercive power in the polis. Since Berent’s argument is based on the absence of public coercive apparatus in the Greek polis, one of the key topics in the debate is, inevitably, about whether

---

7 Hansen (2002), the main target of which is Berent (1996).
8 Hansen (2002)26. In the following text, I quote this article by page numbers.
10 I, thus, do not discuss which concept of the State should be accepted, Berent’s or Hansen’s. I, however, point out one problem with Hansen’s way of dealing with the concept of the State. Hansen (2002: 19-21), mentioning several elements he thinks to be crucial for the concept of State (government, territory, population, body-politic, etc), examines whether each of these is valid for the concept of the polis (The same way of argument can also be seen in Hansen [1998] 117-123 where he considers whether the polis should be grouped into the State or not). But all that this sort of comparison brings to us are ‘apparent’ or ‘superficial’ similarities and differences unless we examine how those elements are interrelated with each other and how they function in their interrelations. It does not seem to me that Hansen is conscious enough of it.
or not the polis monopolises the legitimate use of violence. Here, rather than Berent’s claim, Hansen’s counterclaim that ‘the polis came fairly close to having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ (30) needs to be examined, because, if this claim is true, our understanding of the polis must be considerably changed. There are scholars who define the polis as a State, but very few who view the polis as monopolising violence. In his 2004 rejoinder, Berent tries to elaborate the concept of stateless society and criticises not only Hansen but also other ancient historians (including Finley, Hunter and Morris) who, while noting the absence of a coercive apparatus, still regards the polis as a State. But he does not engage himself in re-examining each of the examples Hansen gives for his case. So, in this paper, I shall mainly examine Hansen’s claim and his way of argument in some detail, though I do not find Berent’s argument completely persuasive. I shall show my disagreements with Berent in the course of the discussion.

The antithetical views of the polis between Hansen and Berent have been already noticed and reviewed by Faraguna (2000), whose focus is on whether the polis should be grouped as a State or a stateless community. The examination of the debate in terms of violence is still worth doing.

2. Public Coercive Power of the Polis

(1) Monopoly of the Legitimate Use of Violence

First of all, we need to clarify what it means to claim that the State monopolises legitimate use of physical force. What does Weber, for example, try to claim by his celebrated definition of State? We should notice that Weber connects the use of coercive power with maintaining social order. That is, to monopolise the legitimate use of violence means that the State (or government) exclusively holds in its own hand physical force and prevents private individuals or social groups (e.g. family, tribe) from resorting to it; by so doing the State has ‘legitimate’ power to arrest and punish wrongdoers and keeps social order within its territory as a whole.

Thus, if a State monopolises coercive power, it is the duty of the State

---

11 But some of Hansen’s claims have been persuasively countercriticised by Berent. See, for example, Berent (2004) 115-116 on Hansen’s bizarre argument (2002: 38-39) about the standing army of the polis.
12 See above n.3
(or its officials) to keep up social order. It is not true that the State always resorts to violence to maintain its domination: there are many other effective ways of upholding state domination (e.g. ideology). In everyday life, indeed, these non-violent ways are often much more useful for keeping social order than real violence, as is shown in the studies by scholars such as Althusser and Bourdieu.\(^{13}\) However, when these ways fail, the State can still resort to physical force or a threat of it to maintain its domination: without it the State does not deserve to be called a State.\(^{14}\)

Let us turn here to the Greek polis and Hansen’s claim. According to Hansen, there are ‘sources which show that in the majority of cases the polis came fairly close to having a monopoly of the legitimate use of force’ (30). Administration of justice in the polis, thus, was largely carried out by officials, and ‘an element of violence is a necessary foundation of any polis’ (31). It is true that self-help was legal in many poleis, but only in a very limited number of offences (32-34). Although apprehension of criminals was usually carried out by victims themselves, there were, in democratic Athens at least, also other ways to ask for intervention of the authorities. In addition, there is a case in which a public apparatus, like the Council, carried out inquiry into and arrest of suspects of conspiracy (34-36, see ‘Introduction’ of this paper). Imprisonment as a punishment can be confirmed in many poleis. Not only in the case of public matters but also in some private matters sentences were executed by officials. ‘[W]ith the few exceptions the polis did have a monopoly of force and the exclusive right to punish is recognised as one of the essential features of the polis’ (37).

In order to say that ‘the polis came fairly close to having a monopoly of violence’, however, it is necessary to show that social order in the polis was maintained by that monopoly of violence, i.e. by the officials who hold exclusively the use of physical force. This is what Hansen fails to show. All Hansen demonstrates, in his ample examples, is that there are areas where public officials and apparatus were involved in administration of justice in the polis. While it is possible that the officials step in keeping up social


\(^{14}\) Weber (1972)821-822.
order, this ‘step-in’ by them does not mean that the polis ‘monopolises’ public coercive force, because they did not take an initiative in intervening in disputes or quarrels among citizens. To put it in Hunter’s words, ‘arguments were settled, violence quelled, and miscreants apprehended without the intervention of the authorities at all’.

Social order, as Hunter shows at least in the case of democratic Athens, largely maintained by self-regulations or ‘hue and cry’ by private citizens, not by public apparatus. Here it would be good to refer to the case I put in the beginning of this paper: the inquiry by the Council into and arrest of the suspects of the scandals in 415, which Hansen (34) sees as one of the examples for his case. The Council did arrest the suspects and many of them were put to death (Thukydides 6.60.4). But the whole process began with an impeachment (eisangelia) against Alkibiades by a citizen, Pythonikos, in the assembly (Andokides 1.11), not with the Council or other public apparatus.

There is another problem with Hansen’s way of argument. Hansen points out that self-help killing was restricted to a limited number of offences (adulterers, night burglars, traitors, exiles who returned without permission) and allowed only if perpetrator was caught in the act. In other cases ‘[n]o person was allowed to take the law into his own hands, and an offender had to be tried before a court appointed by the polis’ (32). But, as far as the issue of monopoly of the legitimate use of violence is concerned, what matters is not only whether self-help is restricted but also against what type of offences self-help is legally applied. In many poleis, according to Xenophon (Hieron 3.3), citizens were allowed to kill adulterers. In several poleis at least, it was legal and even encouraged to kill those suspected of conspiracy against the constitution. Both types of offences are a major

15 Hunter (1994)120.
16 It is true that no State, whether modern or not, can maintain social order without self-help. However, we should not overlook the fact that in the Greek polis in general self-help or private initiative played a more critical role for social order than in modern states.
17 Adulterers: Demosthenes 23.53; Xenophon, Hieron, 3.3; Ath.Pol.57.3. Burglars: Demosthenes 24.113. Exiles: Demosthenes 23.28. Conspirators: ML 43(Miletus); Andokides 1.96-97. cf. Lykurgos 1.124-127 (Athens); RO 49 (Amphipolis); SEG 12.87 (Athens); SEG 51.1105 (Eretria; on this text, see Knoepfler [2001] and [2002]; IK Ilion, 25 (Ilion; on this text, see Maffi [2005]).
18 This is not entirely true. See Ath.Pol.40.2 with Cohen (2005)229-235.
threat to the foundation of the polis: one is an attack on the *oikos*, the most basic social unit of the polis, the other an attack on the constitution. The polis, far from monopolising violence to defend itself, largely relies on private initiative of its citizens.

**2. Power of Officials**

As Hansen points out, we know lots of examples that laws and decrees instruct officials to implement the decisions: ‘[t]hey (i.e. officials) had the exclusive right to summon and preside over the decision-making bodies, and, most importantly, they were responsible for the carrying into effect of the decisions made by the citizens in the assembly or in the court’ (29). One of the reasons why Hansen insists on ‘stateness’ of the polis lies here: the polis has a network of officials with prerogatives to perform their duties: this means that it has a government; therefore, it must be a State. As far as our purpose is concerned, the question should be: how was it possible (or impossible) to implement their duties? Or, to put it another way, what is the relation between officials and private citizens? What is the power exercised by officials?

In this point, Berent’s argument is simple and clear. Sharing public offices in turn among citizens is one of the fundamental features of the polis. It is true in democracy in particular, but also true even in oligarchy among the full citizens who are a minority in the whole citizen body. This leads Berent to argue that there is no ruler in the polis: ‘it was indeed not governed and ungovernable’ (1996: 45). Since there is neither government nor public coercive apparatus, the law is, as Aristotle (*Politics* 1269a20-23) implies, ‘identical with the customs of the community’ (ibid., 47). ‘[F]orce is never public and always private’ (1996: 48).

Hansen disagrees. To refute Berent, Hansen points out (27) that (a) there is a distinction between citizens and non-citizens in the polis, and (b) a citizen cannot rule and be ruled at the same time. At one particular point of time there is a clear distinction between those who, as officials, have power to

---

19 Finley (1982)17-23 deals with this issue from the viewpoint of legitimacy and ideology.
20 Yet he slightly changes his expression on this matter in Berent (2004),133.
21 *Politics* 1269a 20-24: ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἒσθιν οὐδὲς μόνον ἔχει πρός τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἑθος τούτο δ’ οὗ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὡστε τὸ ῥῆσις μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἔτερους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενή ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τού νόμου δύναμιν.
enforce decisions by assembly or verdict by courts, and those who are expected to obey them. Sharing offices in turn among the citizens, thus, does not immediately mean that there was neither the ruler nor the ruled. Berent’s argument that the polis was ungovernable oversimplifies the situation. In addition, Berent’s reading of Aristotle is not correct. What Aristotle says there is not that law is identical with the customs of the community but that the strength of law to make people obey it comes from longevity.\textsuperscript{22} This is not the same as saying that law is habit.

So far so good. Hansen goes on to quote another passage from the \textit{Politics} (1321b40-22a7), that the office (ἀρχή) for administration of justice (i.e. execution of punishments, recovery of debts due to the state and the custody of prisoners) is most indispensable (ἀναγκαιοτάτη). From this passage he concludes laws must be enforced and an element of violence is a necessary foundation of any polis (31).

But Hansen overlooks that Aristotle, in the same passage just mentioned above, also views the office for enforcement of law, unlike other offices, as most difficult (χαλεποτάτη).\textsuperscript{23} The office is involved ‘a good deal of odium; and unless it affords opportunities for making considerable gains, men either shrink from it or, if they accept it, are reluctant to perform their duties with the rigour the law demands’ (translation by Barker). So difficult that Aristotle proposes the task should be divided into several offices. If, as Hansen assumes, physical force is a foundation of any polis and law is enforced on this foundation, how can it be so difficult? Enforcement of law might invite odium, but the officials have power to subdue resistance because they hold coercive force. This passage is, in fact, opposed to Hansen’s view, and strongly suggests that enforcement of law is basically not based on violence.

Aristotle seems to think that the difficulty is peculiar to the offices of administration of justice, such as the Eleven in Athens. Yet we know that exaction of fines is also the task of many other offices. This implies that the
issue needs to be viewed in a broader context. Unlike their counterparts in the modern society, Greek officials, not only those who engaged in administration of justice but also those in other works, must be responsible for all of what they have done during their term. A charge can be brought against officials at the end of their term (euthyna). As Berent rightly emphasises, it is always not against the polis but the official in person that a charge is directed. Thus, although officials are entitled to perform their duties, their power automatically makes secure their performances, especially in the democracy in which they were chosen by the lottery system.

It is true that Athenians instruct their ephebes (young citizens who come of their age) to take an oath to obey their officials. This and other evidence lead Rubinstein (1998) to make her case that there is a clear distinction between officials and private citizens (idiotaï) and that the relation between them is hierarchical. Citizens are expected to obey and pay respect for laws and officials. Their relationship can be called hierarchical and, to that extent, is based on power. But the existence itself of power relations between officials and private citizens does not necessarily mean that the former 'rule' the latter. The fact that Athenians demanded that the ephebes take an oath seems to suggest that the relation between officials and private citizens was different from that between the ruler and the ruled. Rather, obedience to officials is a social norm, an ignorance of which could cause various disadvantages in social and political life.

24 Demosthenes 47 provides a suggestive example of the difficulty with exaction of fines. The speaker, newly appointed trierarchos, demands upon a certain Theophemos, who served as trierarchos in the previous year, to return the equipment of the trireme, but in vain. Again, the speaker, armed with the decree of the Council, goes to see Theophemos and makes the same demand. A quarrel between them occurs and it develops into a fistfight (31-40).


26 RO 88, 11-14: ... καὶ ἐὔμηκοδο ὁ νὲν ἄει κραινόντων ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσμῶν τῶν ἰδρυμένων καὶ οὕς ἀν τὸ λοιπὸν ἰδρύσωμαι ἐμφρόνως.

27 Suppose, for instance, the relation between the teacher and his/her pupils at school. It is based on power in the sense that the teacher can force his/her pupils to do their work and sometimes punish them. But that does not mean that the former ‘rules’ the latter.

28 Plato, Laws 647A in which two kinds of fear (φόβος), good and bad, are distinguished: one is to the enemies, which should be overcome; the other to bad reputation, which encourages people to do good. See also 699C and Aristotle, Politics 1331a40-b1. Perikles in Thukydides 2.37.3, too, points out that Athenian obedience to their officials comes from fear (δογμ). cf. D.L. Cairns, Aidôs (Oxford, 1993) 359, n.47.
(3) Legitimacy of the Polis and Public Power

No monopoly of legitimate use of violence. No apparatus of public coercive power. Then, should we follow Berent who claims ‘force is never public and always private’? In this point I think that Berent oversimplifies the situation and goes too far.

It is true that the recent experts of ancient Greek (more precisely Athenian) law have drawn our attention to that private enmity played a major role in the legal disputes, whether in private cases or public ones. Democratic Athens was the society where legal system was established. Even so, the Athenian lawcourt was an arena where private ‘feuding’ took place. Berent’s view seems to be supported by this academic trend.

But any execution must be done in the name of the polis. It would suffice here to remind that when Euphiletos, the speaker of Lysias 1 and cuckolded husband, killed Eratosthenes the adulterer of his wife, he claims that he said ‘it is not I who am going to kill you, but the nomos of the polis, which you transgressed and had less respect for than your pleasure’. It is impossible to confirm that Euphiletos did say these words in the scene of killing Eratosthenes. Yet it is still noteworthy that he (or Lysias) thought it necessary or effective to disguise himself as a public executioner at the court.

Thus, we should assume that in the polis there is a public power or, at least, the concept of it. Despite the absence of public coercive apparatus, how should it be possible? I suppose that the issue of legitimacy is concerned here.

Modern state government, whether democratic or not, needs a legitimacy to rule its people and persuade them to be ruled. Since the Middle Ages, legitimacy to rule has been one of the most important questions for rulers and scholars in Europe. However, interestingly and curiously enough, as Berent, referring to Finley, points out, Greeks were not interested in by what ground a ruler or a regime or constitution was regarded as

31 Having said this, I think it wrong to interpret, as G. Herman does (CQ n.s. 43[1993]: 406-419), these words as ‘a sober desire to implement civic justice’.
legitimate to rule. Berent wrongly views the Greek neglect of legitimacy in terms of the absence of public coercive apparatus (1996: 44-45). Yet that there is no public coercive apparatus in the polis does not necessarily mean that there is not any legitimacy. We should not forget that ‘they (i.e. Greeks) did not challenge the legitimacy of the city-state as the only possible political condition for the good life’.\(^{32}\) To put it another way, the polis itself represents legitimacy.

That the polis has legitimacy implies that any citizen, whether in office or not, by articulating the interest of the polis, can exercise a public power. Then, public power did not exist like a thing, nor was affixed to an apparatus or organisation. Rather, citizens ‘construct’ it by performing as an agent of the polis. This is what the institution-centred approach of both Hansen and Berent overlooks and fails to understand. The absence of public coercive apparatus does not mean the absence of (the concept of) public power. An official can exercise a coercive power, but it is not because he is an official. Unless he represents himself as an agent of public interest, he cannot exercise a coercive power.

Political activity in the polis is an attempt to construct this sort of public coercive power, and political struggle is the struggle over this power. But, what is the interest of the polis and what is not? This is always arguable. Here lies the reason for the vigorous and unstable character of the political life in the polis. Vigorous, because citizens are encouraged to involve themselves in the political debate about what the interest of the polis is (in democracy in particular). Unstable, because there is a large scope for manipulating the concept of public interest: any man who is judged to be against the public interest can be punished and, in an extreme case, put to death. A political strife in the polis can turn into a violent conflict (\textit{stasis} or civil war) and bring about a social and political disruption among the citizens. It is possible to see a cause of the unregulated character of the \textit{stasis} in the ambiguous character of public power.\(^{33}\)

\(^{32}\) Finley (1982)12.
\(^{33}\) On the \textit{stasis}, see, briefly, Cartledge (2000).
3. Conclusion

To conclude, I just repeat what I said above. Through examination of the Berent-Hansen debate, I have tried to show: 1) the Greek polis did not monopolise the legitimate use of physical force; 2) officials were entitled to perform their duty, but the relations between officials and private citizens were not those between the ruler and the ruled; 3) public coercive power was constructed by each citizens performance as an agent of the interest of the polis.
[1] ABBREVIATIONS OF TEXTS

Ath. Pol. = [Aristotle], Athenion Politeia
IG = Inscriptiones Graecae
IK = Inschriften von Kleinasien
SEG = Supplemetum Epigraphicum Graecum

[2] WORKS CITED IN ABBREVIATED FORM


