Introduction

On January 1, 1946, the Emperor of Japan denied that he was a living god. The Constitution of Japan, which was enforced on May 3, 1947, proclaimed that “sovereign power resides with the people.” While the Emperor descended from heaven to earth, the Japanese people were liberated from servitude. “Democracy” began in spite of—or strangely enough, precisely because of—the fact that Japan was still occupied by the Allied Forces. (1)

Apart from the fact that “democracy” was given from outside, there were (or have been) many big obstacles to the democratization of Japanese society which was characterized by such words as “Asiatic,” “authoritarian,” “feudalistic,” or “ultranationalistic.” Among other things, the drastic reforms in political, economic, and social spheres had to be done by the same Japanese who had been shaped by the old regime. (2)

(1) The fact that “August 15, 1945” was brought about forcibly “from outside” and that the subsequent reforms were carried out under the direction of G.H.Q. has been keenly recognized by many Japanese intellectuals as a decisively important incident for the democratization of Japanese society. See e.g., Kindai shugi, Rokusō Hidaka ed., (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1964), p. 29. Margaret A. McKeen says that “only thirty years ago the American Occupation surgically implanted democratic institutions into the Japanese body politic.” Margaret A. McKeen, “Political Socialization Through Citizens’ Movements,” in Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan, K. Steiner et al. eds., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 230.

(2) In a sense, this kind of predicament is by no means peculiar to the process of the revolutionary changes of Japanese society. Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, argues that the French people under the rule of Louis Napoleon were essentially the same as...
In this context, it is very natural that many intellectuals felt that institutional and organizational revolutions were not sufficient. In other words, they thought the emergence and development of the democratic citizen—the spiritual revolution—was the *sine qua non* before democracy could be rooted deeply into the soil of Japanese society. Tremendous energy on the part of intellectuals and of citizens as well has since been spent especially on the actualization of citizen participation in politics.

In this bibliographical essay, I want to pick up several books and articles which deal with the theory and practice of citizen participation in postwar Japanese politics. After examining their theories on an individual basis, I want to clarify what they have in common, how they differ from each other, and what light they will throw upon the development and furtherance of democracy in Japan and upon the study of this field.

Some preliminary remarks are necessary as to the selection of the literature on citizen participation in postwar Japanese politics. Phrases such as citizens' participation (shimin sanka), citizens' movement (shimin undō), or residents' participation (jūmin sanka), came into vogue in the late 60's in Japan, both in the social sciences and in an everyday life. There is, however, a tradition of democratic movements (protests) in modern Japanese history such as the Meiji restoration (Meiji ishin), the Freedom and People's rights movement (jīyū minken undō), or the Taishō democracy, to mention a few examples. In this sense, it may be fairly said, precedents for "citizen participation" can be sought even in prewar Japanese history. In this paper, however, I want to start by examining democratic theories of "postwar enlightenment" for the following reasons. First, there is a decisive difference between the prewar and the postwar democratic movements in that "democracy" is publicly (i.e., constitutively) recognized as a legitimate form of government after the Second World War while "democracy" did not enjoy such a constitutional recognition in prewar Japanese politics. Second, in order to understand clearly the significance of the appearance and development of citizen participation in the late 60's, it seems very important to confirm some basic characteristics of "postwar enlightenment," because the theory and practice of citizen participation itself can be seen in a sense as an evolution of "postwar enlightenment," and in another as a departure from it.

**Postwar Enlightenment and the Formation of Modern Man**

Our purpose in this section is not to define what "postwar enlightenment" is, but rather to elicit some salient features of it which are to have some relevance to the emergence of the movements of citizen participation. The most fruitful way to accomplish this task, I believe, is to analyze two representatives of "postwar enlightenment" ideology: Hisao Ōtsuka and Masao Maruyama. Although they differ in specialization (Ōtsuka is an eminent scholar of British economic history; Maruyama is a very famous political scientist), they share some important similarities not only in their academic method, but also in their political attitude toward the direction of democratization of postwar Japanese society. To be more specific, they each are heavily influenced by both Marx and Weber, but they seek to understand Weber "not as an alternative, but as a complement, to Marx." Thus "the Weberian theory provides one of the most important components of their analytical framework." More significantly, especially for our present purpose, the fact that they incorporate the Weberian method into their analytical framework entails also practical (i.e., political) implications for them, because they do not accept the vulgar

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materialistic view of history as determined merely by the economic structure of society, but rather they emphasize relative independence of human thought or consciousness from external conditions, as will be shown presently.

Let us begin with Hisao Ōtsuka. During the couple of years immediately following the end of the war, Ōtsuka enthusiastically advocates "the formation of modern man" and "the human basis of modernization" as an urgent step in the process of democratization. In his article, "Kindai tekiningen ruikei no sōshitsu—seijiteki shutai no kiban no mondai" (1946), Ōtsuka writes as follows:

It is absolutely imperative today that Japan’s economic and social foundations be overhauled completely along democratic lines. Both energy and initiative for democratic reconstruction, however, must be voluntary, coming from within this defeated nation. Democratization in any sphere of life if carried out simply on account of pressure and coercion by foreign military forces will inevitably produce nothing more than a paper democracy, a "dead mechanism" of democracy. In order to instill new economic life in a truly democratic environment, indigenous political forces dedicated to a thorough reformation of Japanese society must mature to the point where they can effectively coordinate and constructively orient popular energy for this vital enterprise. (3)

Although he does not dismiss the paramount importance of the material basis for democracy, Ōtsuka stresses here that a thorough reformation of Japanese society be preceded or at least accompanied by a complete reorientation of the people’s ethical outlook. He also claims that the radical change of the general value orientation, i.e., the creation of "a modern and democratic citizenry," must most effectively be done through education designed to train Japanese people "in modern, democratic patterns of conduct."

These proposals of Ōtsuka reflect his understanding about how Western democracy came into being. Out of the gradual disintegration of feudal social order in Western Europe, Ōtsuka argues, emerges a new way of life, or an "ethos" in Weberian terminology. As a prerequisite condition for the emergence of modern democracies in Western Europe, Ōtsuka especially refers to early Protestantism, to its ascetic tendencies including the concept of duty in calling. On the other hand, Ōtsuka finds several characteristics of the Japanese mentality which he believes exemplify its basic "pre-modernity," as the following citation clearly illustrates:

In the first place, Japanese have failed to demonstrate the kind of inner spontaneity that underlies the social behavior of modern men. Secondly, they have little sense of fairness or equality...that is so characteristic of modern civil society. Thirdly, they have shown only fleeting respect for the concept of rationality, the very backbone of modern science. Finally, they do not share the feelings of love and respect for the nameless masses of people, feelings which constitute the core of the "modern spirit" and which nourish a social concern for the poor and underprivileged. (4)

These characterization seem too simplistic and stereotyped from today’s vantage point of view. But they not only reflect faithfully an intellectual atmosphere of the age, but also reveal, to some extent, what Ōtsuka understands by "modernization." At any rate, the following facts should be confirmed from what has been said heretofore. First, in Ōtsuka “democratization” means “modernization.” Second, “modernization” itself is paralleled with Westernization because Western societies, especially Great Britain, provide the defeated Japan with a model of modernization. Of course, Ōtsuka does not believe it possible for Japan to imitate a Western model literally, because historical backgrounds for Western and Japanese societies are too different. But Western European societies, Ōtsuka believes, give Japan at least an "ideal type" (in Weberian phrase) for the modernization of its society. Third, Ōtsuka emphasizes the importance of the “modernization” of human thought and behavior in a very comprehensive context which involves not only the transition from feudalism to capitalism but also the transition from capitalism to socialism, (5) although he does not explicitly say so in this article.

How about an "ideal type" for modern men? Ōtsuka here too follows Max Weber who characterizes the ethos of modern Western Europe as an

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(4) Ibid., p. 3.

“ethic of inner values” and that of Asia as an “ethic of outer values.”

Thus Ōtsuka recommends that the Japanese people form a new frame of reference, i.e., “an ethic of inner values,” as the following quotation clearly shows:

Japanese people must learn to appreciate their individuality and their worth as human beings. They must become free individuals capable of creating a new social order and promoting public welfare on their own initiative, without being given an external order such as “pre-modern” natural law. An internally-fired, living democracy can emerge only out of a society of free individuals.⁶

But serious questions immediately arise. For example, is it so obvious that, given perfectly rational, autonomous people, they can build and maintain a self-contained and independent social order without any external order or objective criterion? Yet, we propose to postpone treating this question until we finish examining a similar question in the case of Masao Maruyama.

Finally, Ōtsuka emphasizes that human thought has a relative degree of independence from external conditions. In his article, “Gendai nihon no shakai ni okeru ningenteki jûkyô” (1963), for example, he writes as follows:

I was trying to find a certain relationship between people and ideas. When a particular idea proves stronger than all others in capturing the hearts and minds of people, one can say that those people have acted as a sounding board for the idea. The sounding board produces sympathetic vibrations, completing a two-way flow between vibrator and vibrated, thought and people. My real question was, and still is, the motivation of the people to respond in such a way to particular idea. The tendency right after the war was to attribute these sympathetic vibrations between men and ideas to objective, external factors such as the political and economic conditions of a certain status group, the working masses. The same tendency continuing to dominate our intellectual community today. I have never been fully convinced, however, the thought-people flow is sustained solely by external stimuli. It stands to reason that, given a commonly-shared external environment whose economic and political aspects are geographically and socially constant, the appeal, the attraction of a certain idea will depend not on external but on internal factors. The idea either succeeds or fails in penetrating popular thinking depending on the ideal (inner) interest people have developed, and the degree to which those interests are shaped.⁷

Perhaps to what extent human thought is independent from external conditions will be an open question. For our present purpose, however, it may suffice here to confirm the fact that Ōtsuka stresses relative independence of human thought or consciousness from external conditions.

Masao Maruyama championed “the cause of an enlightened and democratic future, urging that the present transcend the past in order to create a society that should have been and ought to be.”⁸ But most of Maruyama’s statements about the democratization or modernization of Japanese society are what we might call pathological rather than physiological.⁹ They explain various obstacles in the way of a more rational order of government and of an autonomous mind (subject). Nevertheless, we can recognize Maruyama’s own “prescription” for the democratization of Japanese society: The Japanese must become the subject, not the object, of politics, by developing (or acquiring) the modern consciousness which sees the political order not as “given” like a natural order but as a human invention.¹⁰ The paradigm of nature (shizen) vs. fabrication (sakui), or more exactly, the paradigm, “from nature to fabrication,” plays a key role not only in Maruyama himself but also in the Maruyama school, one of the most domineering schools in Japanese political science, to such an extent that I want to confine myself to the problematic character of the paradigm itself in this paper.

In order to illustrate the problematic character of the paradigm, “from nature to fabrication,” let us sketch very briefly the Western view on

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⁸ Hisao Ōtsuka, “My Thinking in Retrospect,” in ibid., p. 6.
¹⁰ Masao Maruyama, “‘Dearu’ koto to ‘suru’ koto,” in Nihon no shido (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1961), pp. 153–180, for example, can be seen as a popularized version of his prescription for the democratization of postwar Japan.
nature. It is no exaggeration to say that Nature has been a sovereign problem of (political) philosophy from the very beginning of its history. What is Nature? What is the nature of a thing? If we take into consideration the too obvious fact that the human being is also a part of Nature, then the famous Socratic dictum, "Know thyself," also can be said to be another version of this fundamental question: What is the nature of myself? In other words, ever since nature has been discovered, people seem to have tried to satisfy themselves with what nature means.

The development of modern philosophy as a whole testifies to the fact that nature is still a principal problem for the human existence. Yet modernity is decisively characterized by its negative attitude toward nature, i.e., "Escape from Nature into the Ego or Will." To put it somewhat differently, nature in modernity becomes a big problem in a different sense. A brief comparison between the ancient and the modern view on nature will be very useful in this context. The ancients seem to have believed that nature indicates the end toward which human life and everything else should be directed, and under whose guidance they should be organized. People in antiquity also seem to have believed that nature and freedom are compatible. By contrast, nature is no longer what inspires human activities and opinions in modern times. Rather nature is conceived as something conditioning or determining. For example, in Kant the realm of Nature, i.e., the realm of the causation of necessity is in contradistinction to the realm of freedom. Hegel also advocates a retreat from nature as a very prerequisite condition for freedom. He argues, for instance, that choice is a minimum and determination is a maximum in a society where "nature," e.g., caste is an overwhelming factor. In short, nature now is the obstacle to freedom, and nature therefore signifies simply the object to be reconstructed (or conquered). (It should be also remembered that the state of Nature is conceived by Hobbes as bellum omnium contra omnes or homo homini lupus.) No doubt, the collapse of teleological definition of men and the world and its immediate replacement by the mechanical definition reflect this drastic change in human perspective on nature from the premodern to the modern ages. People now turn their face from nature as an end to history as a process (or "the progress toward consciousness of freedom" in Hegel's own words).

Moreover, the modern insight into the very close connection between knowledge and freedom, nay, a perfect conjunction and mutual support of reason and freedom, I believe, has much more relevance to an escape from nature. To put it in a simple form, modern philosophy, especially Hegelian philosophy, makes a claim to the effect that a human being is perfectly rational when he is perfectly free, and vice versa. What does this mean? This means that a human being is perfectly active when he is perfectly rational, and vice versa. In other words, when a human being is re-active, it is not his reason that is active, but rather it is his passion such as fear. Conversely speaking, a human being is completely passive when he is subject to, or re-active to, passion, i.e., nature. In brief, freedom and autonomy is one and the same. When a human being is autonomous in the fullest sense of the word, he is no longer dependent on external things. Thus emerges self-determination from within. The absolutization of knowledge is tantamount to the perfection of freedom. The advent and development of a typical mode of modern polity in the West, either republic or liberal democracy, can be simply regarded as a political reflection of this notion of an escape from nature.

Finally, let us point out that in modernity there seems to be the duality which sees the overwhelming power of nature in the sphere of science and sees the utter irrelevance of nature in the sphere of politics (or morality). To be more specific, the modern age is characterized by an absolutely comprehensive scope of nature in the realm of science (theory). Modern natural science has successfully unveiled the laws (or secrets) of nature and has accomplished enormous achievements by amplifying vastly the power of nature. On the other hand, the modern age is characterized also by a vacuity or abandonment of nature in the realm of politics (prac-

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tice). We no longer base the criterion of right and wrong upon nature, but rather resign that criterion to the jurisdiction of human invention or contrivance. Thus in modernity there seems to be a huge discrepancy between theory and practice with respect to the status of nature. Of course, one might argue, there is a possible gap between theory and practice at any time and in any place. But the discrepancy we are now talking about is of paramount importance, because it emerges as an inevitable consequence of the ego-oriented philosophy. Thus we are living as if there is no single ground between *Sein* and *Sollen*, or, we are living under the impression that there are two grounds. Thus we become the investigators in the domain of science, and at the same time the creators in the domain of morality. Then very serious questions arise. For example, within that limitation, what does the integration of the two grounds mean? Can we reconcile the function of an investigator with that of a creator? Is there such a thing as a natural morality? Although these questions are enormously difficult to answer, one thing is rather evident from the above discussion: Modern (political) philosophy seems to imply that moral distinctions are invented in the light of knowledge that nature abstains from indicating moral distinctions. In other words, an invented morality (and therewith an invented politics) may be a derivation from, but not an indication of, nature.

Given this vast tradition of modern (political) philosophy, where does Masao Maruyama occupy his place? We say he occupies his place definitely somewhere in the same tendency to an escape from nature to the ego. (Maruyama proclaims that for him “the world since the Renaissance and the Reformation is a story of the revolt of man against nature.”) Maruyama’s famous paradigm, “from nature to fabrication,” then, is not immune from the problematic character of the modern Western view on nature just described above. Let me add one more obvious piece of evidence. The fact that the paradigm, “from nature to fabrication,” is deficient or at least problematic can be easily seen from the recent mushroom growth of environmental and ecological movements.

To be sure, Maruyama’s attitude toward “nature” can be said to be ambivalent, because he does not advocate the paradigm-revolution from nature to invention in the sphere of politics without reservations. Two reservations should be mentioned in this context. First, Maruyama admits that “nature” in some cases connotates norm. Second, he is very aware of the problem of the absolutization of the autonomous personality, i.e., the arbitrariness of a political ruler. Thus he cannot fail to encounter at least these two problems. First, what is the relation of nature as norm to the principle of human fabrication? Second, how can the reconciliation or integration of the conflicting views of a political order be achieved? (In a democracy the problem of the absolutization of autonomous personality is not so much the arbitrariness of a political ruler, i.e., absolutism, as the arbitrariness of all or most of citizens, i.e., anarchy.) Maruyama advocates the establishment of the “personal subject” (*jinkakuteki shutai*)—not only in the sense of the freely knowing subject (*jiyūna ninshiki shutai*), but also in the sense of the ethically responsible subject (*rinrikeina sekinin shutai*) as well as in the sense of the order-creating subject (*chitsuju no keisei no shutai*). But this advocacy remains extremely abstract, as far as Maruyama is silent about the above-mentioned two questions. It might be argued that Hegel is wrong when he glorifies the State as the embodiment of morality. It must also be said, however, that Hegel’s theoretical attempt to socialize the autonomous selves itself is not an error. By contrast, at least as far as I know, Maruyama does not explicitly show his own solution to the problem of the disintegrating effects of the liberation of personal subjects.

As we have already suggested earlier, Ōtsuka seems to have encountered a similar problem in principle. But, it seems to me, he does not solve this problem, either. Nay, he does not seem to have recognized the existence of the problem itself. He seems to convince himself that he has

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disposed of the problem by appealing to the life-style (behavioral pattern) of Robinson Crusoe written by Daniel Defoe, especially by referring to Crusoe's "economic ethos" on a lonely island.\(^{(16)}\) If this is the case, then Ōtsuka fails to distinguish a very crucial distinction between economic ethos (vocational ethics) and public morality. Or he underestimates the fact that Crusoe lives on a lonely island, i.e., without a society.

Finally, I want to comment on Maruyama's relation to Marxism. Theoretically, Maruyama has had enough of a baptism in Marxism to be unable any longer to treat "culture" and "philosophy" as self-sufficient entities, divorced from their social-historical context or from the society's class structure.\(^{(17)}\) On the other hand, like Ōtsuka, Maruyama is not necessarily satisfied with the Marxian explanation that ideologies are "ultimately" conditioned by their social infrastructure. Thus Maruyama emphasizes the importance of human perspectives (Aspektstruktur) or paradigms (Denkmodellen) which he believes play "an intermediary role between the social base and individual social or political ideas,"\(^{(18)}\) Practically, Maruyama is engaged in the activities which seek to prevent revision of the Constitution of Japan, not only against the reactionary who regard the Constitution as "too democratic," or "contrary to the tradition of Japan," but also against the leftists who consider it "bourgeois." In his view, the principles of the Constitution such as human basic rights should be "\textit{aufgehenoben} as \textit{intrinsic} values even in the higher stage of history, i.e., in a socialist society.

To summarize: Both Ōtsuka and Maruyama have theoretically contributed a great deal to the liberation of the autonomous personality (shutaiiteki jinkaku) as a prerequisite condition for the emergence of truly democratic citizenry in postwar Japan. Moreover, they provide us with the vocabulary and conceptual framework with which the succeeding generations will comprehend and discuss the potentiality and actuality of citizen participation: "ethos", "rationality", "modernization", "spontaneity", "autonomy", "voluntariness", "nature vs. fabrication", and so forth. It must also be kept in mind that their theoretical activities and specific (practical) proposals for democratization are done in their conscious—although very sympathetic—rivalry against Marxism. Finally, nevertheless, they seem to have failed to consider the very complicated relation of nature and human invention adequately enough to give us any positive guideline to socialize the emancipated selves.

\section*{Authority and Autonomy}

The citizens' movement from the 50's to the early 60's is characterized not exclusively but primarily by its grave concern with "peace". The Japanese people tried to maintain their peaceful life from both international and national threats: They sought to keep Japan from involving itself in the Cold War and to protest against the government's policy of "reverse the course." Thus the citizens' movement in those days had both an international and a national perspective. (This wide and highly political perspective is clearly contrasted with the rather narrow and local perspective of the citizens' movement after the late 60's whose main concern is every day problems such as pollution or consumers' price.) The most notable instances of peace-oriented movements are the movements to ban atomic weapons, terminate the United States-Japan Security Treaties, and to end the Vietnam War. Especially, the Anti-Security Treaty Movement of 1960 is highly appraised with regard to the emergence of the democratic citizenry in Japan. Although it failed to prevent revision of the security treaty, that movement succeeded in forcing the Kishi cabinet to withdraw. Furthermore, 4,580,000 people had participated in rallies, 4,280,000 in demonstrations, and 7,060,000 in labor-union strikes to create the largest popular movement in postwar Japan.\(^{(1)}\)

Recently, however, some scholars have been challenging the above-

mentioned characterization of the Anti-Security Treaty Movement of 1960. Michitoshi Takabatake, for example, is very critical of the democratic movements from the 50's to the early 60's. By referring especially to the "national renovationism" movement, Takabatake criticizes that it is by no means a grassroots movement in character, as the following citation unequivocally shows:

Peace movement, Anti A-bomb movement, Protect Constitution movement were first organized as mass movements on the basis of 'broad theory' which meant the alignment of all existing cultural, female, youth organizations using most abstract and ambiguous symbols. This is the extension of the way Sōhyō itself was organized almost over-night on the basis of company unions which were nothing other than the legacy of Taisei Yokusan Kai, Tennō's Rule Assistance Association. The decision of the movement was made by the active factions, sent from the Socialists and Communists, and scarcely made through the grass-roots discussions. In return, what the movement could do was, at most, ceremonial conventions and demonstrations where participants were usually recruited by quota system and paid their per diems.(2)

In other words, the citizens' movement in the era of the national renovationism was successful only in terms of the number of people whom it mobilized, but not in terms of the quality of the participants and of the decision making process.

Furthermore, as J. Victor Koschmann points out, the opposition parties themselves had become part of the "system", and the established movements they controlled were no longer flexible and responsive to minority demands or new issues. They had gradually detached themselves from the fluctuating, practical concerns of the average citizen.(4)

(2) According to Takabatake, the era of "national renovationism" began with the formation of the Sōhyō and Iwanami intellectual group towards the end of the occupation era, but rapidly grew to be a national front after the independence, when "reverse the course" movement started with the return of prewar purged politicians. This national renovationism movement was the basic factor of the formation of the fifty-five system and reached its zenith at the sixty security treaty incident. Michitoshi Takabatake, "Basic Frameworks of the Postwar Japanese Intellectual History: A Reappraisal," (Unpublished paper, March, 1983), p. 4.


It is precisely against this background of the "established" mass movements that the eruption of the more recent and autonomous citizens' movements has received wide attention by Japanese and American scholars and journalists.(5) For the purposes of clarity and convenience, I divide these new citizens' movements into two categories: Beheiren-type(6) and community-type. I consider the former in this section, the latter in the next.

Several features of the Beheiren-type citizens' movements can be mentioned in a very general form. First, these movements are made up mainly of ordinary citizens, or men-in-the-street. Thus they do not recruit their supporters or sympathizers from the usual sources of protest in Japan—the leftist parties, radical labor unions and intellectuals, or the student movement.(7) In other words, they are characterized by non-elitism and political amateurism. Second, citizens' movements provide each of their members with an opportunity for his or her genuine self-expression as an individual human being. They value not the quantity of the members, but their quality, especially their spontaneity. They commit themselves to universal principles such as peace in preference to material gains. Third, the participants reject not only the authority of the state but also the authority of every "establishment" such as the opposition parties.(8) Instead, they seek to accomplish self-management


(6) As an anti-Vietnam War organization Beheiren (a full name: Betonamu ni Heiwa o Shimin Rengō [Peace for Vietnam! Citizens' Committee]) was founded on the day the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam began. "The wide voluntary participation of individual citizens presented a sharp contrast to the union-centered strategies of the Old Left. Beheiren quickly became the nucleus of Japan's peace movement, sponsoring numerous demonstrations and meetings ... Tokyo Beheiren offices were closed in January 1974, just one year after the Vietnam ceasefire agreement." J. Victor Koschmann, Authority and the Individual in Japan, p. 304. See also, e.g., Osamu Kuno, "Beheiren undo no hatashita imi," in Selijiteki shimin no fukken, pp. 147-161.


(8) J. Victor Koschmann, Authority and the Individual in Japan, p. 146.
Thus I shall not here examine all of these points. But I want to consider briefly the last point, i.e., the relation of authority and autonomy, because that relation seems to be not only one of the most controversial but also the most confused issues in democratic theories. I will examine Makoto Oda's view on the relation of authority and autonomy, because he was one of the opinion leaders of Beheiren.

In an essay, "Heiwa no rinri to ronri" (1968), for example, Oda asserts that their feelings of war-victims of the state have provided the Japanese with an opportunity not only to oppose to the state "which had previously symbolized absolute strength, authority, truth, and justice," but also to accept the transplantation from abroad of such universal principles as peace, democracy, freedom, and equality. But the Japanese theoretical and practical effort to pit universal principles against the authority of the state was not adequate. Oda writes as follows:

Under present circumstances universal principle and individual experience are in no way united against the state. Rather, the state is equipped as never before to embrace both universal principles and individual experience. What gives the state this capability is the ideal of democracy. But now democracy is also a form of state authority that runs counter to the principles of individual autonomy. This is not a dilemma that only the Japanese face. To the extent they have allowed democratic values to become an empty facade, all nations of the world must grapple with it. For America, it has spawned the Vietnam War.

I have had several opportunities to ask young Americans on their way to Vietnam why they have to fight. They usually answer directly, "To protect freedom." But when I explain carefully and persuasively the actual situation in Vietnam, and ask "freedom for whom? for what?" their confidence is sometimes shaken. Finally they resort to the convenient deus ex machina, which swoops majestically over important distinctions between individual identity and the state, and between state and universal truths: "It's my duty as an American."(12)

Thus Oda concludes that people must recognize the inevitable discrepancy between state principles and their own experience, and that they must seek to augment their own individuality and autonomy by adopting universal principles directly, i.e., without the intermediary of the state.(12)

Oda's view of the relation of authority and autonomy, however, is what might be called a zero-sum theory of authority. Perhaps his rejection of, or aversion to, authority comes from very sublime sources, from the loftiest inclinations of his soul. Yet I want to make three critical comments. First, theoretically, Oda's understanding of authority seems to be very shallow and too one-sided. I have no intention to refute him here. But as an evidence or support of my intuitive judgement I mention Yves R. Simon's two books, A General Theory of Authority,(13) and Philosophy of Democratic Government,(14) and Hannah Arendt's article, "What is Authority?"(15) Second, practically, it is almost impossible to expect from Oda's understanding of authority that people should try to make the government, either national or local, more responsive to their basic needs through participation in the political system. In other words, his view results only in "protest", but not in "participation". Third, Oda fails to understand that the foundations of morality are not always rationality, as the quotation (11) (on page 32 in this paper) seems to suggest. We must understand the truth of the following beautiful sentences of Yves R. Simon:

... When I am concerned with the question "What do I have to do, here and now, in the midst of this unique, unprecedented and unrenewable congeries of circumstances, in order to make a good use of my freedom, in order to preserve the good of virtue?" I know that no deduction, no induction, no argumentation, can supply the final answer. The science of ethics, i.e., the rational knowledge of morality, would supply an initial answer but not the final one. Between the last rationally established conclusion and the entirely concrete rule that action demands, there is a gap

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(11) Makoto Oda, ibid., p. 165.
(12) Makoto Oda, ibid., p. 171. See also Makoto Oda, Yonaoshi no rinri to ronri (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1972) 2 Vols.
that no argumentation can bridge. Doubt cripples action, or an uncertain rule is issued, unless the will and the heart are so dedicated to the good of virtue that their inclinations can be relied upon. The ethical man may be unable to explain why, ultimately, he comes to such a decision; he may have nothing to say, beyond mentioning an inclination to act in this way and an insuperable repugnance to act in the opposite way. That is all he needs to direct his action, but more would be needed to bring about conviction in the mind of his neighbor. Unlike scientific judgment, practical judgment, for the very reason that it is ultimately determined by the obscure forces of the appetite, does not admit of rational communication. It is, as it were, a secret.  

In our age the issue of authority has such a bad reputation that any political scientist cannot discuss it without exposing himself to suspicion and malice. Yet authority is present in all phases of social life. Citizens' movements which ignore this fundamental fact will not acquire their autonomy itself. In this sense, it is very unfortunate for the Japanese that no authoritative book on authority has ever been written by any Japanese social scientist since the end of the war.

**Industrialization and Community**

As we have already pointed out, alongside autonomous citizens' movements like Beheiren, community-based citizens' movements have spread out throughout the country since the middle of the 60's. The aim of this section is to clarify some characteristics of community-based citizens' movements. In this respect, very suggestive and informative is the following remark of Keiichi Matsushita (1971), one of the most influential theorists of citizen participation in Japan:

> The people of Japan are different from what they were ten years ago, perhaps because their patience has begun to run out. They have finally been aroused to action, not out of an overarching sense of national mission, as in the past, but by circumstances that are making certain areas of their personal lives almost unbearable. For the first time since the war they have begun to cooperate, in a very noticeable way, to do something about war and nuclear weapons, urban blight and environmental pollution in their localities. They are beginning to organize in what is loosely called *shimin undo*.

"Citizens' movements." The demands of the movements, as well as the forms they assume, are extremely diverse, each one springing from problems deeply embedded in local circumstances. Yet they all share bitter indignation at the industry-first policy held tenaciously by the government for so long, the hidden spur to Japan's high rate of economic growth, and they are all working toward implementing a policy that would give priority to the problems of daily life.  

Several features can be drawn from this observation. First of all, citizens' movements in this category are organized spontaneously in order to tackle with the daily problems (*seikatsu mondai*) in a communal life. Thus their main concerns are neither with purely political (e.g., diplomatic) problems nor with ideological problems, but rather with the "public hazards" (*kōgai*), such as environmental pollution or other local issues. Second, most of these daily problems have been caused by Japan's rapid economic growth and industrialization (urbanization). Thus the problem of pollution, for instance, has not been solved by the initiatives of political parties or of labor unions. Why? For one thing, the opposition parties themselves have not been strongly opposed to the government policy of high-rate economic growth *per se*. For another, some big labor unions have had a vested interest in common with their big businesses. Third, as Matsushita's phrase, "implementing a policy," suggests, the community-based autonomous citizens' movements are not completely hostile to authority. Rather in some way or other they seek to participate in the administrative process of local governments in order to keep them responsive.

Now I want to clarify Matsushita's view of industrialization and authority in connection with citizen participation. First, although he is

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very well aware of the adverse effects of industrialization. Matsushita emphasizes its positive contribution to the development of citizens capable of true self-government, i.e., "the expansion of leisure time and education, areas traditionally monopolized by the ruling class." "Here lies", Matsushita argues, "the importance of industry and democracy, for it was the increase in the productive capacity of industry and the democratic narrowing of the gap between classes that first placed leisure and education within reach of everyone. Leisure allows the citizen time to become involved in politics, while education gives him the means and the motivation to use his time in this way."(6) Second, unlike Makoto Oda, Matsushita holds a very pragmatic and realistic attitude toward authority. Thus he says the citizens' movements are not so much attempting to destroy the system as to implement the ideals behind the founding of the new constitution (shin kenpō) and to replace the control patterns of political leadership with citizen-oriented procedures that will lead to true participatory government.(7) Matsushita observes that already the citizens' movements have taken a step toward implementing the participatory system by helping to create numerous reform-oriented local governments (kakushin jichitai).(8) Third, Matsushita provides kakushin jichitai with a very constructive guide line for implementing policies to replace G.N.P.-oriented policies. Local governments should establish "civil minimums" in order to guarantee every citizen "the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" (Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan).(9) Matsushita claims that Japanese society now has the possibility to achieve this goal precisely because of the highly advanced stage of industrialization and urbanization.(10) Noteworthy is the fact that Matsushita here too emphasizes the positive contribution of industrialization to the development of participatory democracy in a local community.

On the other hand, Matsushita asserts that citizens' movements should maintain amateurism in politics, as the following citation clearly shows:

It is essential that the citizens' movements remain aloof from internecine party politics, regardless of local conditions, for their unique function and contribution lies in their ability to influence political development from outside the immediate, formal political process. For this reason, citizens' movements will differ structurally from professional political groups, such as the parties and the clubs that support parties. The preservation of an amateur quality will assure the citizens' movements of greater freshness and vitality than would otherwise be possible; it will allow them to continue focusing on problems more basic than structure and traditional politics.(11)

What then are the political significances of citizens' movements in Japan? Scholars' claims have ranged from the modest to the fantastic. Margaret A. Mckean classifies roughly those claims into six categories.(12) Yet the bulk of the literature on citizens' movements, she points out, "consists of semiautobiographical accounts by participants, of abstract theoretical discussions, or of individual case histories of well-known movements." In short, it consists largely of "sweeping generalizations based

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on spotty evidence and untested assertions."[13]

Thus, in several articles and a book,[14] M. A. McKeany herself seeks to provide us with "more reliable data" to evaluate the significance of citizen participation for Japanese politics. In an effort to accomplish this purpose, she has attempted to assemble a representative variety of movements and to interview individual participants about their experiences. And she poses several questions to explore the broad political importance of citizens' movements in Japan. Those questions include: Why did citizens' movements arise? Who participated? Why did the movements focus on the environmental issues? Is there something about the kinds of people involved in the movements that can help explain why they chose the particular means they did to resolve their grievances? What effects did citizens' movements have on Japanese politics? Did they succeed or fail? How did they affect their participants, their communities, local politics, and Japanese politics more generally? and so forth.

Although I must confess here that I am personally not qualified to judge whether McKeany's treatment of empirical data is adequately scientific or not, Terry Macdougall points out that McKeany's "methodology is creative but systematic and careful, yet not unprovocative, given the inherent difficulty of evaluating the political significance of some three thousand localized and ephemeral movements."[15] At any rate, I want to quote the following paragraph from one of McKeany's excellent articles as a representative of "scientifically tested" evaluations of the political significances of citizens' movements in Japan:

... CMs (i.e., citizens' movements) have mobilized a sizable sector of the ordinary public to produce a new layer of issue-oriented participant citizens. By virtue of their effect on partisan change, they have also stimulated the growth of a floating vote among their own members. Extrapolation from aggregate election data indicates that there is a relationship between CMs and the rise of a floating vote in the general population as well. Thus CMs have indirectly contributed to the increase in party competition and the emergence of new configurations of more responsive political leadership, they have contributed to a substantial increase in citizen participation and consequently to an increase in the variety, flexibility, and exchange of opinions represented in local politics, and, finally, they have shuffled and enlarged the political elite in many communities and provided for the emergence of a new common language among activists whose different political affiliations had formerly segregated them from each other. Both by socializing their own members to be skillful political actors and by legitimizing political conflict and providing a mechanism by which political decisions can accommodate greater diversity of views, CMs have done a great deal to strengthen democratic processes in Japan.[16]

Conclusion

In this bibliographical essay, I picked up several books and articles which deal with the theory and practice of citizen participation in postwar Japanese politics. If the above discussion is plausible, then this much can be safely said.

First, in spite of the diversity of the demands of citizens' movements, as well as the forms they assume, one common feature is visible in almost all movements from the end of the war to the present, i.e., the aspiration for the development of the democratic citizenry in terms of autonomy. Second, the concept of "citizen" seems to have undergone qualitative changes. The requirements for a modern citizen is very demanding in Maruyama, because he advocates the establishment of the "personal subject" (jinkatutake shudai)—not only in the sense of the freely knowing subject, but also in the sense of the ethically responsible subject as well as in the sense of the order-creating subject. On the other hand, Makoto Oda emphasizes the status of a citizen as an ordinary man (tada no hito). (Hajime Shinohara criticizes the concept of an ordinary man itself because that concept does not include those who are either mentally or physically handicapped.)[1] In other words, the concept of democratic "citizen" itself has been democratized. Furthermore, the concerns of citizens movements also have undergone qualitative changes from highly political and ideological issues to the problems of a daily life. Noteworthy is the fact that the citizens' demand for direct participation in a local govern-

ment has been brought about by the failure on the part of the existing political system (including the opposition parties) to solve the problems of a daily life caused by the adverse effects of industrialization. Third, I suggested that the relation of nature (shizen) and fabrication (sakul) in political life remains to be answered. Related to this is the question of the relation of authority and autonomy. Oda sets forth a theory of world-citizenship in which autonomous citizens adopt universal principles without the intermediary of the authority of the state. Matsushita’s view about authority, by contrast, is very pragmatic and instrumental. Fundamental questions still remain to be solved. For example, is authority necessary to make a common action possible in order to accomplish the common good? Fourth, and finally, as Mckean points out, the bulk of the literature on citizen participation in Japan is not tested by empirical data. Further efforts must be done to bridge the gap between normative theories and empirical data.

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