**Summary of Doctoral Thesis and Report of Examination**

**To the Dean:**
We report the result of Examination for the Doctoral Thesis below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student I.D. No.:</th>
<th>4010S004 - 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Bernard Ong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title in Japanese:</td>
<td>ASEANの地域組織としての承認とその過程</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title in English:</td>
<td>Recognizing Regions: ASEAN's Struggle for Recognition</td>
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</tbody>
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1. **Faculty Members Involved in Oral Examination**
   ① **Chief Referee of the Screening Committee**
   - **Name:** Shujiro Urata
   - **Affiliated Institution:** GSAPS
   - **Status:** Professor
   - **Ph.D. Title Earned:** Ph.D. Stanford University

   ② **Deputy Advisor (Member of Screening Committee 1)**
   - **Name:** Takashi Terada
   - **Affiliated Institution:** Department of Political Science, Doshisha University
   - **Status:** Professor
   - **Ph.D. Title Earned:** Ph.D. Australian National University

   ③ **Member of Screening Committee 2**
   - **Name:** Hatsue Shinohara
   - **Affiliated Institution:** GSAPS
   - **Status:** Professor
   - **Ph.D. Title Earned:** Ph.D. University of Chicago

   ④ **Member of Screening Committee 3**
   - **Name:** Sachiko Hirakawa
   - **Affiliated Institution:** GSAPS
   - **Status:** Assistant Professor
   - **Ph.D. Title Earned:** Ph.D. Waseda University

   ⑤ **Member of Screening Committee 4 [if any]**
   - **Name:**
   - **Affiliated Institution:**
   - **Status:**
   - **Ph.D. Title Earned:**

2. **Date / Time:**
   - (Y)2012 / (M) 5 / (D) 11  (Time) 15:00〜16:30
   - [Period] 1st: 9:00-10:30, 2nd: 10:40-12:10, 3rd: 13:00-14:30, 4th: 14:45-16:15, 5th: 16:30-18:00, 6th: 18:15-19:45, 7th: 20:00-21:30

3. **Venue:**
   - 19-710

4. **Result:**
   - ○合/Passed・否/Failed (該当する方に○ Circle as appropriate)

5. **Attached document(s):**
   - (Approximately 4,000 characters in Japanese, or 1,500 words in English. The Doctoral Thesis title, however, must be written in both Japanese and English.)
I. Overview of the Dissertation

Does recognition matter for a region as much as it does for a state and a person? This dissertation examines the power of recognition in shaping regional cooperation. Rather than focusing on the behaviours and interactions between member states which most studies have done, the discussion introduces a recognition model to investigate how the social practices of a region with non-member entities promote regional cooperation. By viewing recognition as a tradable commodity and an independent variable, the framework illustrates how the contest for recognition permeates beyond inter-personal and inter-state interactions to include the struggle for recognition by regions. The model hypothesizes that the extent of recognition accorded to a region has an influence on its development. Drawing on newly released U.S. and Australian declassified diplomatic records, this dissertation tests out the soundness of the proposed model for the recognition of regions by analyzing ASEAN’s struggle for recognition during its formative years in the 1960-70s with major powers, including the U.S., Soviet Union, Japan, the European Economic Community, China and Australia. The findings suggest that the strengthening of a regional concept is influenced by the willingness of, and the extent to which, foreign powers recognize the entity. The central theme of this dissertation is that external recognition plays an important function in the development of a regional concept.

II. Contents of the Dissertation

Chapter 1: Overview
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
Chapter 3: Misrecognition and Non-recognition of ASEAN
Chapter 4: Australia and Japan’s Recognition of ASEAN
Chapter 5: EEC and US Recognition of ASEAN
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Chapter 1 summarizes the scholarship heretofore as regards the motivations
behind inter-state collaborations and regional institutions with a focus on regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The literature review finds that the frameworks proposed by the mainstream scholars heretofore do not adequately explain how exactly external actors have shaped ASEAN’s development, focusing instead their arguments on intra-grouping interactions whether they be based on the concepts of national interest, interdependency or norms. The rest of the chapter explains the data collection process and methodology of the dissertation before detailing how the ensuing findings contribute to the current pool of literature on regional cooperation and ASEAN. The proposed model for the recognition of regions and the archival research on newly released U.S. and Australian diplomatic cables are the two significant contributions that this dissertation has made to present scholarship in the field of regional cooperation.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework by employing current recognition theories on personhood and statehood to elucidate a recognition model for regions. The discussion begins by proposing the inclusion of “regions” as the unit of analysis in the study of regional cooperation. It also introduces “recognition” as an independent variable affecting the level of cooperation in a region, which is the dependent variable of this investigative study. By incorporating “regions” as the unit of analysis and “recognition” as the independent variable, the discussion proposes a new analytical model to interpret inter-state cooperation through institutions. The proposed model accounts for the reasons recognition is sought for by a region and offered by external actors, and how the outcome of such a contest for recognition may influence the extent of cooperation in a regional grouping. It finds that, for an aspiring region, recognition leads to material benefits and elevates status. In addition to the attainment of legal rights, recognition allows a region greater access to funding and commercial opportunities. It may also serve as a means to rectify a distorted image of the region portrayed by the international community, and reduce instances of unfair treatment by powerful states. Further, cumulative recognition increases the stability and prestige of the region. On the other hand, manipulating acts of recognition enables stronger states to maintain their preferred pattern of behaviors, dominate the region and entrench their hegemony. For powerful states, recognition policies are often affected by foreign policy considerations, domestic pressures or regional interests. These factors lead to an intense struggle for recognition between the region and the external actors. The chapter concludes by presenting the hypotheses, assumptions and expected outcomes to be examined in the rest of the dissertation. The model hypothesizes that the degree of external recognition accorded to a region directly affects the level of cooperation between member states.

Chapter 3 addresses the ontological question as to whether ASEAN is a
suitable unit for analysis in terms of the extent it represented the voice of the Southeast Asian region during its formative years. It finds that the five-member grouping’s rejection of several parallel institutions, its non-support for other proposed groupings and its careful selection of ASEAN members during its formative years strengthened its positioning as the authoritative voice of Southeast Asia. The analysis describes how ASEAN deliberately curtailed the composition of its membership despite external pressures to expand the grouping and the strong interests expressed by the governments of India and Korea to join ASEAN. More significantly, the chapter also addresses the geopolitical structure which affected considerably ASEAN’s interactions with both the anti-communist powers and the communist bloc. It highlights the importance of structural changes and ideological differences which guided the calculations of ASEAN and those great powers which had a stake in the region. Here, the discussion examines how communist powers like China and Soviet Union viewed and dealt with ASEAN in relations to the grouping’s struggle for recognition. The chapter concludes by discussing the failure of ASEAN’s first attempt at seeking external recognition for the region through a proposal for a zone of neutrality. The empirical evidence reveals that foreign powers from both the communist and non-communist blocs, in particular the U.S., resisted the recognition of ASEAN to maintain their hegemony by persistently projecting an image of inferiority toward ASEAN during the grouping’s formative years. In addition to their refusal to acknowledge the zone of neutrality, the archival evidence suggests that countries like the U.S. made a considered decision not to engage ASEAN as a collective unit in international forums such as the United Nations.

Chapter 4 outlines how recognition was traded between ASEAN and Australia, and between ASEAN and Japan in the 1960-70s. Beginning with ASEAN-Australia relations, the empirical data reveals how ASEAN’s rejection of Australia’s initial request to join the grouping resulted in Canberra’s decision not to recognize ASEAN. To avoid its exclusion from regional discussions, the Australians resorted to pushing for a wider regional body, which further incurred the wrath of the ASEAN countries. This rocky start to the interaction and informal socialization process between the two sides would lay the foundation for Australia’s gradual recognition of ASEAN. The discussion also reveals how ASEAN was driven by a desire for tangible benefits in its struggle for Australia’s recognition. The ASEAN-Japan example illustrates how ASEAN’s joint economic action against Japan compelled Tokyo to change its course of not recognizing the five-nation grouping. As the proposed model suggests, an instance of unfair treatment by a non-member country toward an ASEAN member triggered a collective ASEAN response, which in turn reinforced the attitude and behaviors of member states.
toward the grouping. Specifically, it highlights Malaysia’s success in escalating Japan’s unfair industrial practice to the regional level which motivated ASEAN governments to increasingly view the grouping as a useful platform to tackle national problems. The discussion also reveals the extent to which the Southeast Asian grouping succeeded in its recognition strategy by airing the issues in the public and intensively engaging the media. These successes were critical in the development of ASEAN in that it would have a compounding effect in swaying the recognition decisions of foreign powers which had refused to recognize ASEAN.

Chapter 5 traces ASEAN’s struggle for EEC and U.S. recognition. The archival data reveals that the EEC was motivated to recognize ASEAN in an attempt to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia at a time when the U.S. was perceived to be withdrawing from the region. ASEAN, on the other hand, was struggling to secure EEC’s recognition of Southeast Asia as a collective regional bloc in order to overcome what ASEAN had deemed as unfair economic distribution by the European grouping which favored other developing regions over ASEAN. In particular, ASEAN countries were unhappy with EEC’s willingness to extend favorable trade benefits to developing regions like Africa, but refused to do the same for Southeast Asia as a region. The perceived prejudice against Southeast Asia triggered ASEAN’s demand for recognition as outlined in the proposed framework. Second, the archival results suggest that the U.S. was at first reluctant to engage ASEAN as a regional grouping through its refusal to recognize ASEAN’s political existence. To maintain its supremacy in negotiations, the U.S. preferred the bilateral approach and assessed that regional arrangements would unnecessarily hinder its foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, it withheld recognition from ASEAN so as not to legitimize the role of the grouping as a regional actor in Southeast Asia. However, EEC and Japan’s forays into Southeast Asia, in particular the European grouping’s willingness to extend recognition to ASEAN, began to change U.S. recognition policy toward ASEAN. The archives also reveal that while ASEAN valued U.S. recognition in that it would raise the status and prestige for the region, the grouping repeatedly highlighted to the U.S. government the importance of equality and fairness in the latter’s dealings with ASEAN. On another front, the discussion details how the degree of external recognition also had a negative impact on ASEAN states’ commitment toward the grouping. U.S. “incomplete” recognition of ASEAN by its withdrawal of preferential trade benefits to Indonesia dampened the latter’s desire for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Based on the proposed model for the recognition of regions, these examples highlight the role of external influence and actors on the development of a regional concept like ASEAN.
Chapter 6 summarizes the key ideas and findings while highlighting the usefulness of the proposed model for future studies on regional cooperation. In addition to reviewing the significance of external recognition on the progress of ASEAN during its founding years, this chapter shows how the struggle for recognition is a continuous and transformative process. It identifies and discusses more recent endeavors by ASEAN to secure external recognition for the grouping. The orchestrated formalization of the grouping’s legality through the conclusion of an ASEAN Charter is a case in point. The discussion also reiterates the significant role of cumulative recognition in the development of a regional concept. In addition to the archival examples taken from the Cold War period, the chapter discusses how foreign powers’ slow but gradual recognition of the various facets of ASEAN (for example, on the diplomatic, economic or security front) since the 1990s had a catalytic effect on the progress and status of the grouping. The main assertion that is made in this dissertation is that, if the conditions for a struggle of recognition exist, the proposed model best explains the growth of a regional entity like ASEAN.

III. Evaluation of the thesis

This Ph.D thesis is highly original. The academic discourse on ASEAN has recently suffered from a long series of repetitive contributions - books and articles alike - that tend to make the same core arguments (usually based on the mainstream social constructivist take on regional identity formation and an allegedly emerging security community with a sole analytical focus on the activities by actors only within ASEAN). This thesis provides a new and fresh approach both in theoretical and empirical terms and clearly benefits from the extensive use of previously unknown or neglected materials (above all diplomatic cables), by elucidating how external powers were motivated to recognize ASEAN while the recognition force within the member states were not so strong, as evidenced by the lack of summit until 1976. This thesis will mark the beginning of a fresh strand of the academic discourse on ASEAN.

In more details, what the thesis tried to show is that external recognition does not depend on whether foreign powers think ASEAN states were putting their act together. Even before ASEAN became more "institutionalized" (like having summit meetings/secretariat), foreign powers were already extending recognition. External recognition was the catalyst (rather than the outcome) of ASEAN members working together. As long as the foreign powers have something to gain (such as to maintain hegemony), they will confer recognition. For example, the U.S. started to recognise ASEAN only because it was worried about European Economic Community’s (EEC)
increasing trade links with ASEAN, not because there was a strong internal recognition force among member states while U.S. diplomats were still reporting about how inefficient ASEAN was at that time. On the other hand, Japan was "forced" to recognize ASEAN because the grouping demanded a response from Japan about its rubber industry’s practice. External recognition prompted ASEAN to deepen cooperation rather than the other way round. This explains why foreign powers still engage ASEAN even though the grouping is assessed to be ineffective or just a talk-shop.

One of the shortcomings is that the recognition of regions can be constructed analogous to the recognition of persons and states. States are defined by international law; they do not formally exist without diplomatic recognition. The definition of regions sounds fuzzy and their status and actoriness in international relations is not well-defined and contested. In empirical terms the analysis is slightly one-sided as it fails to discuss instances of open and very vocal US support for ASEAN in 1970s (the analysis is too much focused on ZOPFAN which was an important element of regionalism during the 1970s but not the only one). Having indicated some shortcomings, the thesis is undoubtedly innovative and it can be publishable as a potentially essential book in the near future.

IV. Decision of the Committee

Considering the results of careful assessment of the submitted dissertation, which is presented in section III of this report, the oral presentation of the dissertation and subsequent discussions, which was held on May 11, 2012, the Committee members came to a unanimous decision that Bernard Ong, the author of the submitted dissertation, should be granted a Ph.D.

May 24, 2012
2012年5月24日
Evaluation Committee
審査委員会
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