Ideologies of Integration Past:
Universality, Revolution-phobia, and Integration

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Abstract

It is often stated that regional integration in contemporary Asia is totally different from past integration attempts in the region, that Imperial Japan’s invasion of Asia was a violent integration scheme drafted out of insane ideologies but contemporary integration efforts are peaceful as they are products of democratic processes. This paper analyzes the forms of Shintō discourse under Imperial Japan which was considered the ideological source of Japan’s long-held aggressive ambition. This study shows that the complicated forms of Shintō discourses were a symptom of the Shintō universalism against the fear of revolution potentially caused by the impending integration in that period. While it is clear that we must oppose the ideologies of integration past, this paper suggests, we have the urgent task of re-examining those ideologies, or they might sneak up again behind the contemporary integration processes.

1. Introduction

This paper examines various discourses germane to Shintō in relation to and within the context of the Asia Pacific War (1931-1945) in order to elucidate Imperial Japan’s ideologies of regional integration. The purveyors of these ideologies themselves often declared proudly that Shintō should be the basis of their national essence [国体, Kokutai], and these ideologies have been blamed as the source of imperialistic expansionism for some time. However, I offer a different interpretation in this paper insisting that Japan’s imperialist regional integration was the source or basis of these ideologies. It may implicate the revivability of such haunted ideologies.

Why is it important for our present understanding of regional integration to study the Shintō discourses in question? How does the study contribute to our efforts to direct and shape our future? Because the discourses and practices of wartime Shintō thinkers can be mystic and unapproachable, often because they are expressed in an unreasonable form of thought with illogical logics, progressive scholars have tended to avoid them. What could even the most severe scrutiny of such dogmas produce, other than to reinforce our sense of the iniquity of Japan’s military aggression? Further, as doctrines they are long dead and gone, and there is no realistic chance of their revival. It is easy to dismiss Japan’s imperialist regional integration project as a form of mad and violent aggression against Asia—something caused by the arrogance of modern Japan, the mental defectiveness of Japanese, or the fanatical Shintō ideology. Nonetheless, in dismissing the value of such “mad” ideologies as wartime Shintō fanaticism, we are denying the possibility that they contain anything universal. This seems like a safe assumption. Or is it?

It is my view that it is now vital that we examine the ideologies of Japan’s imperialist regional integration vision. We cannot afford to ignore these ideologies—to put them out of sight and out of mind. Rather, we need to engage and communicate with them, however one-sided the historiographical approach may inevitably make this “communication”. Following Karl Marx’s precept that “human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape,” we need to appreciate that the anatomy of present-day efforts toward regional integration contains a key to the anatomy
of integration past. The narrowness of the opinion which forces the past into exile denies the repeatability of these imperialistic ideologies, by ascribing this negation to their unreason and irrationality. From this standpoint, there is no need to discuss the unreasonable insanity of these Shintō discourses. If these ideologies are indeed dead and gone, and have no hope of a renaissance, this paper will only have meaning as a kind of antique appraisal. If the exile were perfect, we might never trouble ourselves with past specters of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS, 大東亜共栄圏) when discussing current efforts toward Asian integration. If younger generations of Asians outside of Japan did not have memories or did not share in the historical memory of GEACPS, we could be liberated from such specters. Why are we still afraid of them? Why do we continue to try to forget them even now? I believe this is because these specters are not resident simply in our minds—the product of some special state or some miserable era. Rather, they live in the Nation-State system itself. It is for this reason that part of the agenda of this paper is to disclose these seemingly irrational and irrelevant discourses.

How then can we analyze the ideologies of integration past? The first necessity for research is to sketch in outline conventional interpretations. "Know Your Enemy" (1945), the famous American propaganda movie from the World War II era, offers valuable documentation of this interpretation. The ultimate purpose of the movie was to explain to the people of the United Nations why they needed to fight against the enemy, Imperial Japan. Introducing fragmented scenes from Japanese movies, documentaries, and photos, it reconstructed the history of Japan. The history shown was of the narrative of the unnatural and exaggeratedly speedy modernization of Japan’s irrational and backward culture—resulting in a distorted and deformed modern state. Through the process of forced modernization, Japanese reaped the harvest of industrialization, strong army, and economic growth, but without political liberty, a narrow democracy tied with Emperorism and an utterly despotic government. These distortions of modernity nurtured the freakish inflation of self-image and produced expansionism that had ravaged Asia, and was bent on world domination. Consequently, the United Nations (the Allies) had no choice but to beat "the Jap" and repudiate his "fanatical belief that the Japanese are descendants of gods and destined to rule the earth and all who live on it."

The type of interpretation, which explains aggressive expansionism in terms of the distorted modernity of Japan, maintains its currency even today. One outcome of this interpretation is the idea that, in order to reform Japan, it is necessary to correct the distortions in its "modernity", and this was in fact at the heart of the program of reforms executed by GHQ/SCAP in occupied Japan. It is not my intention here to seek out the flaws in the modernization theory itself. Rather, I will confine myself to noting the similarities between the interpretive framework set out in "Know Your Enemy" to the ideas and worldview of Shintō thinkers. This assertion may sound odd in light of the obvious fact that Shintō ideologues never imagined the ruin of their Empire. They did, however, conclusively grasp the "distorted modernity" of Japan. More precisely, their discourses sought to suture the wounds caused by this distortion while at the same time seeking to consecrate a mixture of the modernity and the tradition, which was regarded as the imperative to "overcome modernity" [近代の超克, kindai no chōkoku]. On both poles, Japanese Shintō ideologues and the American propaganda movie, there is a shared discourse that regarded Shintō as the supreme source of Japanese wartime activities. The only difference was the adjectives that were attached to Shintō: "prominent" in wartime Japan and "insane" in America (as well as post-war Japan). The former sought to nurture these prominent ideas while the latter sought to abolish their insanity. The former explained their prominence through myths, and the latter explained their insanity through the distorted development of Japan’s modernization process, and so on. Still they are on the same position: their ideas or ideologies drifted Japan.

These discourses share the following problem: They both treat Japan as a state having a special status. The prominence or insaneness they deal with is enclosed and their experiences sealed
into a single race, which is identified by the special characteristics of something called "Shintō".

"Know Your Enemy" is marked by an exquisite incoherence. And it is this that provides the key of my analysis. There is a shade of nuance that is apparent in certain of the adjectives used in the movie. This ambiguous region lies between the two words, ambition and insanity. We can say clearly that ambition is a concept that exists within the realm of reason (whether the reason of the acquisitive individual or the "reason of state"); in contrast, insanity by definition lies outside the realm of reason. How should we grasp this shading? Is it negligible and meaningless? Perhaps it is not. By this I mean that "insanity" is the distorted form of the ambitious dream, and ambition thus forms the essential core of insanity. It is not, however, sufficient to point out the reasonable meaning of the insane dream. What we have to examine is the form of the discourse. We have to ask why such a primitive ambition can take the form of such a chimerical cosmology. What is the dream-work between the imperialistic desire and these discourses? To this end we need to anatomize the Shintō discourses themselves, however difficult they may be to interpret. The key to the anatomy of these discourses is found in the concept of regional integration.

Another significant point as part of this paper reverses the often-assumed relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Here it is assumed that ideology follows and is subject to the real. The independent variable is the idea of integration that underlies the Shintō discourses, while the Shintō discourses themselves are analyzed as the dependent variable. Shintō discourses, self-identified as the independent variable, sometimes asserted that Shintō ideals lead the process of integration. Such assertions obscure the discordance between these discourses and the actual practice of military invasion. In order to make this discordance explicit we should not base our readings on the kind of idealistic attitude that claims that the idea precedes and shapes the real. In other words, if we are able to understand Shintō discourses as a dependent variable of past attempts at regional integration, we have to acknowledge that this type of discourse is not nation-specific. Rather hegemonic dreams of regional integration are integral to the nation state and will remain so as long as the system of such states persists.

2. Shintō Discourses

The Concept of State Shintō

This section analyzes Shintō discourses using the keyword “integration”.

The first question we may ask is: what is Shintō? That question is the most difficult one for Shintō itself, the question pursued by Shintō thinkers, politicians, intellectuals for whom it was an overriding concern for years; the attempt to articulate Shintō determined their position in modern Japan. As is commonly known, the concept of "State Shintō," which is still used by some researchers on Shintō issues, was born within GHQ/SCAP’s democratization policies. To quote Sakamoto Koremaru:

In the narrow sense, kokka Shintō refers to shrine Shintō as supervised until 1945 by the state and as administered separately in law from other forms of Shintō. In the wider sense, it has been conceptualized as the state religion manifest in the merging of the Shintō of the imperial court and shrine Shintō. Again, others have defined it as "the religion that provided the basis for Japanese state ideology from the Meiji restoration of 1868 until Japan’s defeat in World War Two in 1945. To all intents and purposes it was the state religion of Japan." In brief, there is little consistency in the conceptualization of State Shintō among scholars. Historically, the term acquired common cur-
rency only with the Shintō Directive [神道指令, Shintō shirei] of December 15, 1945. State Shintō is clearly defined therein as "the branch of Shintō distinguished in state law from 'sect Shintō.'" This conceptualization or definition of State Shintō accords with understandings in pre-war Japan.

The argumentation of Shintō's ideological position in modern Japan has been supplanted by the argument about how to think about State Shintō. While researchers have not yet reached a consensus regarding the degree of actual influence it had on the various other domains of society, some of them assert that the framework of State Shintō is useful for describing the close relationships between the state and Shintō from ancient times to the present. Shimazono Susumu, for example, maintains as follows:

"I think that after the Meiji restoration the "Rites of the Emperor" and the system of "the civilization by the worship for the Emperor" such as Imperial Rescript on Education [教育勅語, Kyōiku Chōkō] was formed binding the adoration of nation-wide powerful Jinja, and the modern State Shintō was constructed. ... Through the building up of the nation state, Shintō played a part of the consecration of the nation, which the Emperor initiated, and penetrated the national life in such a new aspect. So it is proper to call such a new aspect of Shintō "State Shintō."

Shimazono questions such arguments as that State Shintō dominated people ideologically, but insists on refining the idea of State Shintō in order to understand historically the deification of the Emperor in the 1930’s, a process he refers to as "Emperor-messianism". The advantage of this work of refining can be summarized into three points: (1) to bridge the accomplishment between historical studies and religious studies; (2) to rethink the relationships between Shintō, the state, and people comprehensively from the ancient to contemporary times; and (3) to analyze Shintō practices and discourses by reasoned deduction, not to dismiss them as unreasonable.

To some extent, I support these outcomes. It is, for example, certain that Shintō has a special relationship with the nation of Japan. The use of the term "State Shintō," however, risks obscuring the important specificity of Shintō discourses. That specificity is aspirations to universality through regional integration. The State Shintō analytical framework cannot explain the universality/universalist aspirations of Shintō discourses during this period. The framework of State Shintō is suitable for the nation state of Japan, but not for Imperial Japan during the period of regional integration through the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Further, the framework of State Shintō might erase the complexities of Shintō discourses in order to exile them in the name of human reason.

What were the Shintō discourses during the Asia-Pacific War? The following section introduces two Shintō doctrines, that of Imaizumi Sadasuke (1863-1944) and that of Hoshino Teruoki (1882-1957). There are several reasons why I have chosen to examine these thinkers. The first is that their respective discourses exerted important influences over the world of thought in intellectual circles in Imperial Japan; they are, however, largely forgotten today. The basis of their doctrines was clearly traditional Shintō documents/texts and practices, but they both went beyond these sources and explored the universality of Shintō. Finally, and most crucially, in 1942, the ideas of these two influential thinkers, who knew each other personally, came into an unintended conflict. The following dissection of these two Shintō thinkers will show how their doctrines expanded earlier forms of Shintō into a form compatible with modern thought, as well as the subtle signs that sustained all the logic of their doctrines.
Imaizumi Sadasuke and His Doctrine of Kōdō [皇道]

Imaizumi Sadasuke (1863 - 1944) was a Shinto philosopher and activist. In 1921, he assumed the presidency of the Jingū Service Foundation [神宮奉斎会, Jingū Hōsaikai]. He was also the chairman of Kōdō-sha [皇道社; Imperial Way Association], which published monthly magazine Kōdō-Hatsuyō [皇道発揚; Enhancing the Imperial Way]. He became the adviser of Jingi-in [神祇院] in 1941. Imaizumi lectured on his Kōdō [Imperial Way] theory to leaders of political circles, military, activist groups and educators, and in December 1941 he gave a lecture to the then Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki on this subject.

Central to Imaizumi’s thinking is the concept of Kōdō, which he claimed contains the consistent homology of all laws—from those of nature to those governing the operation of the human heart and mind. Everything—ethnic cosmology, national polity, social systems, household, and people themselves—operate in accordance with Kōdō. It is the perfect truth and the root of all the sciences and philosophy. Potentially it contains all the knowledge, everything in the universe, from social sciences to quantum theory. However each element in our universe is not necessarily equal; the root existence is the Trinity composed of the deities Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and the Emperor. Amenominakanushi was given special emphasis because of its vague and malleable character as an unidentifiable deity in the myth tradition. Imaizumi’s doctrine paid special attention to this mysterious Kami (deity) in order to extend the Shinto theory, and gave the transcendental position to Amenominakanushi as the embodiment of the universe itself.

Imaizumi clarifies the unique and extraordinary position and character of Japan with a doctrine that identifies Japan with the universal truth of Kōdō as embodied in successive Emperors. Because Japan is the sole “root” of all things, other nations are merely branches and ramifications of Japan. And because Japan, as the root of all things, is the perfect nation, the war—an exercise in imperial expansion—functions to evangelize the Kōdō, the Universal Truth.

Imaizumi’s Kōdō theory explains the war and its mission, and defines the relationship between the metropole and various cultures/religions within Japanese-occupied territory. Imaizumi wrote the short paper named “Answering Doubts regarding the National Essence” in the style of a dialogue with leftist students.

Question No. 8: We Japanese people forced the governor-general on the Korean people. At the same time, we educate them on the Japanese National Essence. Are we not engaged in a contradictory practice?

[Answer] It is not a contradiction at all to teach the Japanese National Essence to Koreans. To declare our National Essence to the world will in the end be the salvation of the earth. Thus it is never a contradiction teaching it to Koreans as well as other peoples. ... Emperor Meiji sanctioned annexing Korea in order of course to improve the welfare of both Japanese and Koreans. However I sometimes wonder whether the policy of government-general improves this or not, and I am afraid it swerves from the wishes of the Emperor.

Imaizumi’s Kōdō theory projected itself as a universal truth or principle. In this aspect, it supported the universality of an integrated Empire. On the other hand, however, as the final quoted sentence of this response demonstrates, it could be the basis of criticizing the administrative practices associated with the implementation of these principles. In this respect, Imaizumi’s doctrine could play a role of dissatisfaction absorber, in the sense that Kōdō discourse could be interpreted in ways with a critical political potential.

Kōdō theory blessed Japan and its expansionism, while at the same time it sought to eliminate the potential for total reformation, or revolution. In Imaizumi’s doctrine, because Japan as the root is the perfect nation, revolutions have never occurred, and will never occur in Japan.
This self-evident truth is seen in the fact that Japan had an unbroken line of emperors. Other nations, as branches and ramifications, function under the theory of historical materialism as defined in the Marxist tradition.\(^8\) We may find it surprising that Imaizumi’s doctrine accepted the validity of Marxism in a manner. He was able to do this because his theory confined Marxism to the outer-Kōdō world, to the imperfect branch and ramification nations. In such countries, class struggles and regime changes continue without cease, and the Royal dynasty is often displaced; these fundamentally unstable societies might find themselves ruled by democracy, fascism or communism.\(^9\)

Imaizumi’s Kōdō doctrine was the hybrid integration of Shintō and scientific knowledge with some philosophical flavor. This hybridization gave the theory transcendent universality that could interpret the meanings of the war for the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Moreover, the new order for the world manifested the evolving and providential processes of the perfect truth of Kōdō, a concept so fluid that it could be used to explain the attack on Pearl Harbor and render acceptable in principle even Japan’s unconditional surrender. The universalization of the Shintō theory propelled by regional integration released the theory itself from the yoke of the Empire into higher reaches of advanced abstraction.

**Hoshino Teruoki and His Doctrine of Riteology**

Hoshino Teruoki (1882 - 1957) was a Shōten (掌典; an assistant in the conducting of ceremonies) and a bureaucrat within the Imperial Household Ministry. Although most Shōten came from the peerage, Hoshino did not. Hoshino published a number of articles on the essence of Imperial rites; thus his doctrine was based on knowledge of the secret ceremonies of the Imperial Court. He carefully kept away from political discourse, but often criticized intellectuals and Shintō philosophers for their absurd interpretation of the Court rites; he typically did so without naming any particular individuals.\(^11\)

The central idea of Hoshino’s doctrine is the rites (祭祀, saishi). In almost all his works, he described Shintō rites and he developed his theory on the basis of them. His doctrine asserts that all human practices are some sort of ritual. So he proposed the study of ritual practices, or the “Riteology” (祭祀学, saishigaku) in order to interpret them hermeneutically. For Hoshino, the sole ultimate message of ritual practice is to spur humans into making the greatest possible effort, a message he was confident was acceptable to all people, including materialists. All rites conducted or presided over by Emperors represent this essential message. Only the Japanese courtesy ceremonies represent the most essential form of ritual practice, because they have been transmitted from the imperial ancestress Amaterasu to present time through the pure medium of the Emperors’ unbroken succession. The Emperor in this sense is the monarch of encouragement to ceaseless endeavor.

In this scheme, Jinja shrines exist to refresh human beings’ determination toward all the efforts and endeavors of everyday life. The ultimate purpose of the rites is thus to improve the everydayness of humankind. Hoshino named this aspect the eternal returning to and renewal of daily life (everydayness) (復常の生活, fukujō no seikatsu).\(^12\) For Hoshino the meaning of the war was that of an effort of great creation; this was ideally the creation of Earthly Completion and Perfection (地上完成, chijō kansei); in practical terms, it was the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In Hoshino’s doctrine, however, the success or failure of this effort depended on the effort of the Japanese people, not providence or miracles.

Myths are the process of discovery and revelation of the ethnic philosophy. According to the classical Japanese mythology, Amaterasu took refuge in the cave (Amano-iwato gakure) as a result of the fundamental treason of Susano’o and Takamimusuh. According to Hoshino, it was the successful attempt to lure her out of the cave using various popular inducements that resulted in the establishment of Amaterasu as the supreme divinity. This established the foundation for an
ethnic philosophy and revolution-free, immortal dynasty. However, if we neglect doing our own efforts and/or the people who did their efforts, the possibility of revolution would again arise. We therefore must respect—worship—the people who work hard to build the nation, in other words, the Deities (fallen soldiers) enshrined at Yasukuni shrine and Kenkoku shrine in Manchuria. Hoshino wrote:

I insisted we should define the subject of the providence that the Emperor of Manchuria followed this time. A man came to me. I asked, "Do you have any idea?" and he said no. [I said] "Ok, I have an idea. The content of providence is the Imperial Edict of Foundation and the one of visiting to Japan. Unless you restrict it to these, revolution will occur again. ... Such a thing [eclectic interpretation of Providence] occurred not only in China or in Manchuria. But in Japan, we have to be cautious about the same types of ideology spreading to the state deeply, which profess themselves to be "Japanese Idealism." 15

As mentioned, Hoshino’s doctrine of Riteology was the hermeneutics of ritual practices for human beings. This type of universality was not eclecticism but the common denominator of all the people on the earth. It was the universality which, sifting out impurities, purified itself.

In Hoshino’s doctrine, text is the production of human practices and the opaque medium that records the processes of practices, but does not have any other authority over the world. It is the practice of people—their efforts and endeavors—that prevents revolution, never the miracles of deities or the grace of sacred texts. To depend on deities and, as a result, failing to make efforts is a grave error; the Japanese deity is the helper, not the savior nor the giver. Japanese deities desire that humankind make themselves thrive and achieve the completion of Earthly Completion and Perfection. "The deity never asks too much of us. ... It is the only wish of deity that we work hard to the best of our ability and skill." 14 The final conclusion of Hoshino’s quest was that of a deity that never performed miracles. What he saw in this was the ethics of capitalism, a process of infinite endeavor threatened at all times with depravity and decay.

On his sickbed, one day after defeat, Hoshino told a disciple, "Under the new Constitution of Japan, we Japanese renounce war forever. I hope it is followed by every country on the earth." 15 The unconditional surrender did not make clear the defects of his doctrines. Rather, it was his doctrine that made clear the faults of the war.

3. Universality

Here it is necessary to compare the respective doctrines of Imaizumi and Hoshino. Both men were proponents of the reformation of Shintō doctrines in order to accommodate the reality of expansion and regional integration. Both tried to discover a certain universality within the teachings of Shintō. Each of them attached universality to the earlier forms of Shintō, so that the actualities of regional integration might be seen as catching up with this inherent universality. I will call these aspects of Shintō "Universal Shintō." During the wartime period of regional integration, Shintō could be said to have met the world. This encounter was not spontaneous but had been forced by the historical contexts. The doctrines of Shintō expanded in response to the pressures and demands of this integration. So, we can understand the universal Shintō theories as the product of wartime regional integration, as eccentric as this may seem to us.

However, the types of universality sought by Imaizumi and Hoshino differed greatly; their Shintō theories were opposed on all fronts. Although both doctrines expanded the theoretical application of Shintō beyond the framework of Japan, their theoretical subject is the cosmos or uni-
verse in Imaizumi’s doctrine, and humankind, *Dasein*, for Hoshino.  

The following are examples of the discourses on truth by Imaizumi.  The article titled “10. The principle of the new world order of Chapter 5 The essence of Kōdō and its enhancement” from *Kōdō ronso*, shows the characteristics of his doctrine on universality.

1. *Definitely it is the final idea and the honest hope that we live in peace*17 with all the people in the world. However, when we trace the terrible conflicts and struggles in world history, some people wonder what type of order could guarantee eternal peace, but they might be defeated in the end by their own cleverness. ...

2. Scholars today despise some ideas such as “the truth of the universe” as a stargazing idealism that cannot be proved, but this attitude is too irresponsible for a scholar. Without the dedication for proving the truth, the authority of science must be suspect. ...

3. The concept of justice in foreign nations, which was based on faked-truths, has had to change its contents because of revolution and invasion. In comparison to that, the Japanese never changed their contents of the concept of justice; they have aimed at uniting with the truth of the universe as their justice. After the national founding, for thousands or tens of thousands of years, the [Japanese] justice has been to unite with the Emperors who are as one with Amaterasu in state of tenjō-mukyū [天極無窮; the infinite progression of the homeland].

4. ... It is hardly possible that all of humankind accords with the direction of tengyō-yokusan [天極翼贊; to support the Emperor’s holy governance]. The arbitrary directions of peoples cause conflicts with each other. In contrast, peace will come by itself if we all go to the center. The Japanese potentially have this essential attitude so their Kōdō [皇道; the imperial way] never be exploded by revolution or invasion, like the truth that can never be destroyed by human practices. Only our nation has the [Japanese] national essence which embodies the universal truth directly, and our Emperor has the essence of bansei-ikkei [万世一系; the unbroken succession of Emperors] and tenjō-mukyū [天極無窮] only for the realization of hakko-ichiu [八極一字; make the world into one family], so we must entirely dash forward toward the realization of tengyō-yokusan [天極翼贊] believing the ineluctable coming of the new order of the Kōdō-world [皇道世界].”

In contrast with Imaizumi, Hoshino’s article “The holy command of Kōso [皇祖; the Emperor’s progenitor] and the order of Ten [天]” shows a diametrically opposed opinion on the question of universality.

This is my memory of Mr. Sugiuira Shigetaka [杉浦重剛; 1855-1924, an educator of Prince Hirohito], whose opinion I cannot agree with, but whom I admire on two points. Here I introduce one of them. ... He said to us:

In my youth, I had been to Great Britain for three years to study engineering. What afflicted me there was the problem of whether the cusp of the straight line in the geometric context is real or not. I extended that problem a long way, but I could not answer it even after three years. That is the accomplishment of my three-year study abroad. Involuntarily I [Hoshino] take off my hat to him. We are never able to know whether the cusp is real or not. We human beings cannot know such a small thing. How then can we know the truth of the universe? If we could know all about the others who like us form humankind, could we know their psychology as if seeing it in the mirror? Do
you know how deeply the cosmic science goes today? Many scientists argue about cosmic rays in different ways. Then, can we say that the universe loves humankind? Some scientific theory insists that cosmic ray damages our health even if we take shelter in the basement. In that case, can we insist that the universe is the truth or the substance, without any reason? The tradition of our nation never had such a fantasy. Sometimes in China, the sage who does not have power and developed only his ideas daydreamed such a fantasy in order to expand the scope of his power and influence, I think.

A good statesperson may conform himself to Ten [天; above, heaven, tian] as the order and support his king in the name of Ten, but a sly-old-fox politician often pursues his own interests. All through the history, under the banner of Ten, Chinese revolutionists came. Considering them, we need to investigate carefully the concept of the order of Ten.¹⁹

It is clear that both Imaizumi’s article and Hoshino’s focused on the same concept: that is, the truth of the universe. Imaizumi insisted on the necessity of this concept and asserted that failure to explore it adequately was what caused the corruption of the intelligentsia. In his doctrine, what was then called “the new world order [世界新秩序, sekai shinchitsujo]” meant rejoining the order of the root, or the National Essence of Japan. In contrast, Hoshino insisted on the more limited knowledge of human beings, separated the truth from the universe or cosmic science, and sought to pursue political objectives on the basis of scientific or philosophical knowledge. He insisted the ressentiment of the intelligentsia caused the confusion of the concepts.

This is the dilemma of exploring universality. It is certain that Imaizumi and Hoshino shared the concern for universality, but they could not achieve unanimity. However, there is one more concern that they shared. It is the negative of universality, revolution-phobia.

4. Revolution-phobia

These universal Shintō doctrines also shared a theoretical fear. Universal Shintō was required to produce two universalities. One was the spatial universality, in other words, global or international extensiveness, and another one was temporal universality, or historical purity. This is an aporia: ideological extensiveness always threatens historical purity; in more concrete terms: the pursuit of regional integration undermined the purity of the national essence.

So, what did they name their terror? Both doctrines called it “revolution”. The quoted articles above by Imaizumi and Hoshino treat the concept of revolution as something to be denied from the past to the future. The theoretical principle of Universal Shintō is the absolute negation of the possibility of revolution. In reality, they had a hard time to exorcise revolution from their ideologies, and from their integrated Empire. We might call this symptom “revolution-phobia”, which was an aporia of the universal Shintō. More correctly, a revolution-phobia is an integration-phobia, because their integration had a power to damage Japan’s national essence. The ideal of regional integration pursued to its logical conclusion would mean the dissolution of the nation of Japan; but they could not stop the forward momentum of imperial integration. For example, in introducing a modest outline of the relativity principle, Imaizumi concluded, “It shows that science arrived at the right universal-holism [宇宙万有観, uchūman'yōkan] which is almost identical to our ideas of spirits [霊魂観, reikonkan] at last, after the thousand years of efforts in experiments and theories.”²⁰ This farfetched discourse seems to be a hallucinated thought, but it was a strategic one.
The idea that time-space is absolute controlled the thought of human beings for a long time, together with the idea that mass is absolute. Rather, even today such ideas are ruling the thought of many. For instance, three-dimensional Euclidean space and one-dimensional time are believed to be absolute and the principle even in Anti-Dühring by Engels, Materialism and the criticism of imperialism by Lenin and so on, all works considered to be masterpieces of radical materialism. But if we consider them profoundly, we will find soon that their ideas are shallow arguments. So it may be enough to introduce the theory of relativity for this consideration.  

Certainly, the theoretical target of this discourse is Marxism. Imaizumi’s doctrine combined Shintō myths with Einstein’s theory of relativity in order to overcome Marxian social science that predicted theoretically the doom of capitalism.

By using the concepts of universality/revolution-phobia, Shintō discourses may be understood more accessibly than ever, in particular in their relation to imperial integration. The mysterious figure of their doctrine was formed—or distorted—by their integration. The positive symptom of Shintō universalism is the desire for the integration, and the negative one is fear of revolution. Both amplified the traditional Shintō theories out of their league in order to assure their integration and Shintō itself. Both of them shut their potential revolutions away overseas or in gray past by acknowledging Marxism itself.

Both doctrines examined here built what they hoped would be a universal principle of integration without revolutions. But this was not to be. Although Universal Shintō had to be one and only literally, they proposed very different universalities. This inevitably generated the strife. So we should examine the curious incidents that occurred in 1942. The first attack occurred on March 4, when the censors banned the article written by Imaizumi named “The Development of the Imperial History [Kōdō shikan no tenkai].” Imaizumi did not blame the authorities for the press ban but his supporters planned a counterattack against that prohibition. Their strategy against the government was brilliant: to undermine the authorities by the deployment of undeniable universal principles.

The supporters lodged some inquiry to the Jingi-in, Dai-Nippon Jingikai [The Great Japan Association for the Worship of the Deities] and Köten kōkyūjo [Imperial Classics Research Institution] in the spring of 1947. They asked these questions:

1. Is the Kojiki the Holy Classics of Japan, or a violator of Japanese national essence [Kokutai], because it contains some flavor of Chinese ideas?
2. Is the genesis at the beginning of the Kojiki a Japanese-ethnic idea, or a Chinese one?
3. Do theories that undervalue or deny Amenominakanushi profane the Holy Classics, and should they be eliminated?
4. Is the faith affirmed or not, that Amaterasu is the supreme Deity not only of Japan and the Japanese people but also of all of humankind and the whole universe?
5. Is the faith affirmed or not, that the Emperor is not only the leading figure of Japan and Japanese but of the earth, humankind, and the whole universe?

What did this questionnaire mean? They did not blame the government directly, but proposed in effect a loyalty test to be used against the government authorities. The inquiry gave rise to the possibility of frictions among the authorities. This inquiry simplified both the theories of Imaizumi and Hoshino. It focused on only two topics, Kojiki’s infallibility and the limit of the Emperor’s reign. In addition, it pressed the government for an answer about which theory they should give approval to. For instance, the Imaizumi doctrine might say: Kojiki is the Holy Clas-
sic and the essence of the Japanese ideas, so Amenominakanushi and its spiritual successor Amaterasu shall reign over the whole universe, and the Emperor has the authority to govern all over the world. Against that, the Hoshino doctrine might say: Kojiki was edited under the powerful influence of Chinese ideas, so the idea of Amenominakanushi is a smuggled idea of the Tian 天 of the Chinese mythological system. Therefore, we have to say that the Emperor’s authority only comes from the divinity of Amaterasu, never from Amenominakanushi. Furthermore, Japanese Deities never bring miracles; Japan’s development and flourishing always hinge only on the efforts of its people. So, the limit of the Emperor’s reign is determined by the people’s effort dynamically, not by the Holy Classics statically.

The directors of Dai-Nippon Jingikai and Kōten kōkyūjo gave their approval to Imaizumi’s doctrine while Jingi-in answered, “We have no reason to give you an answer.” Receiving this reply, the supporters of Imaizumi might consider that the Government affirmed the Hoshino doctrine negatively and tried to suppress the Imaizumi doctrine with the power of censorship. Then the supporters started some campaigns to denounce the Hoshino doctrine and his factual work Prolegomenon of the Japanese Ethnic Philosophy for failure to respect the Emperor, or lése majesty. The book Prolegomenon, based on the Hoshino doctrine, was published on November 25, 1941, and credited the son of Hoshino as the author. Some activists among Imaizumi’s supporters accused Hoshino and his works of liberalism and historical materialism: Hoshino’s doctrine was regarded as an invitation to revolution. They all feared revolution—revolution-phobia—and each of them found the sign of revolution in their enemy—the other type of universality for their integration.

It is most likely the Government feared the spread of this conflict and campaign to the radical nationalists. The authorities struggled to find a solution and conducted discussions among the Ministry of Education (responsible for religious organizations), the Imperial Home Ministry (for police and censorship), the Imperial Household Ministry, and Jingi-in.24 Jingi-in, which was the nominal top administrative institution for Jinja and Shintō issues, was not able to approve the Imaizumi doctrine, because his doctrine overstepped the consensus of modern academic Shintō studies. On the other hand, Jingi-in was not capable to give full support to the Hoshino doctrine, because the Kojiki had already become popular as the Holy Classic and the Jinja that deified Amenominakanushi was very popular and it was too difficult to eliminate them. Such an ambiguous attribute delayed Jingi-in’s response, and created the space for political intervention into the Shintō issues.

These incidents needed to be resolved from the perspective of political cost-management, not as a theological controversy. What was important for the authorities was not the theoretical potential but the political potential; the strength of Imaizumi supporters. On August 4, 1942, Imaizumi was invited to the Executive Mansion of Prime Minister Tōjō, and the same day Hoshino retired from the Imperial Household Ministry. On August 7, the censorship authority banned the Prolegomenon and two other books written by Hoshino. Here is a quotation from the secret censorship journal.25

Prolegomenon of the Japanese Ethnic Philosophy by Hoshino Kōichi. ... Published November 15, 16th year of Shōwa. Banned October 7 [17th year of Shōwa].
This book intended to illuminate the Cardinal Principles of the National Body with the knowledge of the Kojiki and the Nihon-shoki, and the Courtesy Ceremony. However, it contains some factors to obscure the national flavor of the Imperial Household and National Essence, because its terms and style are improper. So it must be banned.

Hoshino was expelled from the Imperial Household Ministry with a national decoration, and this ressurected Imaizumi’s honor. Newspaper and other opinions referring to this solution were
also censored. Therefore, the campaign ended, the police report said. However, what does “the end” mean? After handing in his resignation, Hoshino composed some Tanka:

Following the legend of the cave;  
Still I confine myself to a library.

At present, it has not been possible to find the documents on the censorship code for religious issues and the connection between censorship authorities and Hoshino Teruoki. A reconstruction of the censorship code for religious issues with the Journal of Censorship Policing [出版警察報, Shuppan keisatsuho] shows that the censorship code seemed to catch two kinds of discourses:

1) Discourses violating the absolute holiness of Amaterasu. For example:
   a. The article referring to the dualism of Amaterasu and her brother Susano’o, or Amaterasu and Kunitokotachi.
   b. The article referring to the Trinity of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and Emperor.
   c. The article regarding Amaterasu as the divine of the Sun, or Amenominakanushi as the supreme ruler of the universe.
2) Discourses containing the phrase like “Emperor shall reign all over the world.” This idea is based on a stretching of the meaning of the Holy Classics, their mythology and authority of Deities.

Why were those discourses prohibited? Censorship judgment says that the reason was that those descriptions might work to dissolve the Japanese National Essence. Nevertheless, there may be another reason why the Emperor’s sovereignty for the world was denied by the censors. Some powerful popular religions utilized an over-reading of the Holy Classics. For example, the Kōdō Ōmoto sect embraced the idea of the dualism, the Hitonomichi-kyodan sect regarded Amaterasu as the Sun, and the Amatsu-kyō sect integrated Japanese classical myths to other classics like Egyptian myths, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and so on. They were all cracked down on, from 1920, and had been dragged into court cases. It can be supposed that the Hoshino doctrine was the basic resource of the censorship code to some extent, and the main target of that code was so-called pseudo-religions [類似宗教, ruiji shūkyō]. Under this code the description of the Trinity might apply to Imaizumi’s article. Though it is not at all clear whether Hoshino wanted to provide the theoretical/theological basis for censorship and thus spark the suppression of the Imaizumi doctrine, it is supposed, judging from its form, that the censorship code for Shintō and religious issues was based on the Hoshino doctrine.

5. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis shows that the complexity of Shintō discourses was a product of the past processes of integration. When we approach them from the concept of integration, we can understand the basic structure of their discourses without labeling them insane or aberrant. It is certain that Shintō discourses may be very complicated and confused, but they cannot be dismissed as the intoxicated fantasies of hidebound nationalists. They are better understood as a form of modern thought that attempted to supplant the possibility of revolution by a different solution; theological-theoretical integration.

This integration gave rise to both universal theory and revolution-phobia. The aporia is that
they should realize integration while avoiding revolutions, but integration itself invited revolutionary changes. The signs of revolution-phobia are never concealed in their discourses. It is always evident. The will toward universality fragmented the discourses. This powerful intention fogs their revolution-phobia.

However, revolution-phobia is as old as the nation-state, which in the case of Japan was born of the revolution called the Meiji Restoration. We could say that the revolution is the mother of every modern nation, but revolution must not come again in the future for the lifetime of the nation. In this reading the objects that had been oppressed and concealed were the impossibility of connecting the origins of the nation with its legitimacy. To say more historically, revolution-phobia was the phobia for the coming crunch of their imperial integration.

Then, we have to ask again: why is the study of Shinto discourses important for our integration? Does it contribute to our ability to control our future?

Shinto discourses show the symptom, universality with revolution-phobia, or revolution-phobia with universality. This symptom is embedded in the system of the modern nation, and becomes evident when the system seeks to transcend itself. The implication of this analysis is that our present-day integration may also produce such a symptom. That means the necessity of analyzing quasi-insane discourses distributed in Asia today, even if their figuration appears incomprehensible and their message appears too simplistic.

Notes

1 This paper is a rewritten and improved version of the author's presentation at the Summer Institute on Regional Integration at Waseda 2008, and is partially based on the author's paper, "Designs of Universal Shinto: the Heritage of Their Empire," Li Narangoa, ed., New Research in Japanese Studies: Proceedings of Asia Pacific Week 2007, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University.

2 Film & Sound Online - Know Your Enemy - Japan Part 1, http://www.filmandsound.ac.uk/collections/records/0023-0000-1487-0000-0-0000-0000-0.html (accessed November 2008).

3 My investigation in this paper was inspired by the works of Slavoj Žižek. See Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso, 1989.


6 The mechanism of oblivion must be a part of the postwar history, but there is no space to analyze it in this paper.

7 Jingi-in was established in 1940 to be the national authority of Shinto and Jinja administrations, and is often considered as the ultimate embodiment of State Shinto.


14 Hoshino Teruoki, "Shushi wo Maki Tagayasu Kokoro" (The mind of seeding and cultivating), _Ie no Hikari_, Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1942), p. 31.


16 I suppose that some motive from Nietzsche’s works and Heidegger’s infected Hoshino’s and slightly Imaizumi’s, but this is still my inference, not a demonstrated contention. However, if we extend this supposition, it can be said that Hoshino’s doctrine found the problems on _Dasein_ into the ritual practices.

17 "Yasukuni-to tairake-ki naka" is the phrase from Ōharae [大戦].


21 Jōhōkyoku (Intelligence Agency) 1st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship Section of the Keihō-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, _Shuppan Keisatsu_ 142, 1942, p. 155.

22 In the article named “The Development of the Imperial History,” Imaizumi insisted the trilogy of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and the Emperor. This description was the direct cause of banning, but this idea did not seem to be the main topic of the article. I think that the purpose of this text was to overcome the western philosophy, especially the ontology of Heidegger.


24 Jōhōkyoku (Intelligence Agency) 1st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship Section of the Keihō-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, _Shuppan Keisatsu_ 144, 1942.