A Japanese Translation of *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* by Takashi Iwata (2)

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This paper is an annotated Japanese translation of chapter 2 of *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* written by Professor Emeritus Takashi Iwata of Waseda University. The translation of the introduction and chapter 1 was already published as “A Japanese Translation of *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* by Takashi Iwata (1)” (*Kuwon: Research papers*, vol. 7, pp. 1-30). This pioneering study by Professor Iwata focuses on the differences in the use of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* within the Buddhist epistemological tradition, and since some researchers have recently begun to pay attention to this topic again, this translation might be well-timed and useful for many readers.

*Prasaṅga* is a hypothetical reasoning through which the proponent deduces unreasonable consequences from the hypothesis proposed by the opponent and thereby negates the opponent’s proposition. *Prasaṅgaviparyaya* is a contraposition of *prasaṅga*. This is a type of reasoning by means of which the proponent can establish his own proposition as a conclusion based on the negation of the consequence of *prasaṅga* as the logical reason.

Dharmakīrti, the founder of the Buddhist epistemological tradition and one of the most influential scholars in the history of Indian thought, illustrates *prasaṅga* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* with the following example: if the single entity (the universal, for example), which is held to subsist in many individual things according to the opponent’s system, connects with a particular thing (a), then it would follow that the single entity cannot connect with any other things (b, c, d, …) because it possesses a property of being related exclusively with that particular thing (a) and therefore loses the other property (the property of subsisting in many individual things, i.e. nonunity). This example, albeit hard to understand, is of *prasaṅga* in context, but Dharmakīrti’s successors interpret and reformulate it in different ways. Dharmottara and Jñānaśrībhadra view Dharmakīrti’s example not as *prasaṅga* but as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, while Prajñākaragupta takes it as *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

In the first half of chapter 2 of his work, Professor Iwata deals with Dharmakīrti’s example and closely analyses interpretations thereof by Dharmottara and Jñānaśrībhadra, revealing that there is a slight difference in the application of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* between the two commentators. Dharmottara’s view is that, if the subject of reasoning is a thing that is not accepted to be existent by the proponent himself, as the Self (*ātman*) for Buddhists, *prasaṅgaviparyaya* can be used to put forward the
proponent’s proposition as far as the logical reason is formulated as pure negation. Jñānaśīrbhadra, on the other hand, holds that, as with prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya also simply indicates a contradiction within the opponent’s doctrines in the case of non-existence of the subject of reasoning.