Peacebuilding Activism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict -
An Analysis of Emerging Activism Since 2000

Wakako Kobayashi

June 2013
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

PART I: Historical Overview of Israeli-Palestinian Search for Peace
Chapter 1: Historical Overview (1880s – 1987)
1.1. Coexistence to Conflict
1.2. The War of 1948
1.3. 1967 War and Occupation (1967-1987)
1.4. Israeli-Palestinian First Encounters
1.5. Summary

Chapter 2: First Intifada and Protest to Occupation (1987-1993)
2.1. Intifada as Nonviolence Movement
2.2. Peace Movement in Israel
2.3. Joint Groups and Meetings
2.4. The Madrid Peace Process and Oslo Secret Channel
2.5. The Peace Movement’s Influence on Israeli Policy and Public
2.6. Summary

Chapter 3: Oslo Peace Process and Peacebuilding
3.1. Oslo Peace Process
3.2. Israeli Response
3.3. Palestinian Reality and Response
3.4. Joint Programs: “People-to-People” Program
3.5. Collapse of Oslo Peace Process - Camp David Failure
3.6. Summary

PART II: Emerging Peace Activism
Chapter 4: New Peace Movements (from Al-Aqsa Intifada to Present)
4.1. Al-Aqsa Intifada and ‘No Partner’ Policy
4.2. Peace Initiatives
4.3. Nonviolent Grassroots movement
4.4. Women Activism
4.5. Questioning Morality of Occupation
4.6. Revising History/ Reconciliation
Chapter 5: Case Study - Protest Movement against the Wall

5.1. Grassroots Protest Movements against the Wall
5.2. International Court of Justice
5.3. Israeli Policy Change
5.4. Palestinian Challenges
5.5. Summary

Chapter 6: Case Study – The Free Gaza Movement

6.1. Gaza under Blockade
6.2. The Free Gaza Movement
6.3. The Mavi Marmara
6.4. International Reactions
6.5. Fact Finding Missions
6.6. International Pressure to Easing of Gaza Blockade
6.7. Summary

Chapter 7: Case Study - Women and Peacebuilding

7.1. Israeli Women in Action
7.2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325)
7.3. Women Representation
7.4. Impact of UNSCR 1325
7.5. Summary

PART III: Conclusion
Conclusion

Maps

Bibliography
Acknowledgements

Writing this study was not possible without continuous and tireless support from supervisors at Waseda Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Professor Yukio Kawamura and Professor Glenda Roberts. Many scholars of international relations and peacebuilding gave me valuable advises, mainly, Prof. Ryoji Tateyama, Professor Terumi Hirai, Prof. Eyal Ben-Ari, Prof. Efrat Ben-Zeev, Prof. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Prof. Eddy Kaufman and Mr. Walid Salem.

I am grateful to many peacebuilders and friends in the region for sharing their stories and enthusiasms with me and giving me the insight to the conflict and thus providing depth to the analysis.

I would not have been able to continue my study for eight years if it was not for the support given to me by my colleagues and friends from work in the region at Japan International Volunteer Center, United Nations Development Programme/PAPP, Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, and Japan International Cooperation Agency.

Special appreciation goes to Suntory Foundation for giving me a generous grant to our project on women and peacebuilding that allowed me to conduct research which became basis for Chapter 7 in this study.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their patience and support to my prolonged study and work, most of the time, away from home.
Introduction

Research Question

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered one of the most difficult conflicts in the world to resolve. This conflict is intractable and has been ongoing for more than one hundred years and it has been forty years since the Israel occupied Palestinian territories.

The first intifada brought to the attention of Israelis and international audiences that the occupation of Palestine by Israel was unjust and unsustainable. Dialogues between the peace camps in Israel and Palestine laid the foundation for the Oslo Peace Agreement and high expectations arose at the beginning of the peace process that it would eventually lead to a long-term agreement. The failure to reach an agreement at the Camp David Summit in the summer of 2010, and the succeeding Al-Aqsa Intifada were a turning point in Peace Process and various attempts to revive it peace process have failed.

The majority of Israeli citizens believed Israeli politicians’ version of the event, namely, that Palestinians not only rejected Prime Minister Barak’s “generous offer” and started military attacks, and subsequently that there is “no partner” for peace. The majority of Palestinians did not feel that the Oslo Peace Process brought peace and stability and that their rights were continuously violated, lands confiscated and life became more difficult. Some Palestinians resorted to violence and Israel re-deployed the army into the areas of the Palestinian Authority.

Hence, negative stereotypes have been reinforced, fueling further discord. The vicious cycle of misrepresentation, skewed perceptions, and consequent mutual dehumanization has become an integral part of the conflict and a formidable barrier to its resolution.

Despite the palpable weakening of peace activism in both societies, reinforcement of peace work is still crucial to any future agreement. Peace activism, however, does not operate in a social or political vacuum. The present impasse points not only to the breakdown of peace initiatives emanating from civil society, but also to the triumph, at least temporarily, of extremists on both sides. The extremists have succeeded, through the skillful employment of fears and threats, to silence the moderate majorities in the two communities and to dominate the political agenda.

Peace activism was seen skeptically. On the Palestinian side joint cooperation was seen as “normalization”, and on the Israeli side activists were accused of being “traitors”. Ambiguity about the objectives of peace work, its aims, its methods, and its target audiences set in. There was need for new types of peace activism. Under the sound of gunfire, new types of peacebuilding activism emerged in Israel and Palestine often with support from the International community. Peacebuilding activities were initiated by Palestinians, Israelis or internationals who joined each other.
This thesis will examine some of these new activities that emerged under a hostile environment and analyze how effective they are in affecting changes to the domestic and international politics related to peacemaking.

The working assumption of this study is that peace cannot be made by political leaders alone: for conflict to be solved, both societies need to support peace and push political leaders toward peacemaking. However, because both societies are internally divided, and peace activism is often marginalized, activists look for support from outside. From its beginning this conflict was affected by regional and international politics and the two parties alone cannot solve it especially because of the asymmetric relation between them of occupation. Therefore, any solution needs regional and international involvement and intervention.

Theories and Approaches

This study will employ approaches from conflict resolution and peace studies as well as the theory of social movement and non-violent movements.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict features various dimensions of traditional conflict: territorial, economic, ethnic, religious and colonial. It is a struggle over history and the future, as well as over resources and symbols. It is protracted and asymmetric, a typical contemporary conflict that Miall and others call a conflict with root not in particular issue or interests dividing the parties, but in the issues of who they are and the relationship between them.\(^1\) Engagement with the structural roots of violence is required for a lasting settlement and to halt existing unpeaceful practices.

According to Galtung, resolving conflict involves a set of dynamic changes including de-escalation of conflict behavior, change in attitudes, and transforming the relationships at the core of the conflict structure. Attitude is defined to as how parties feel and think, perceive “the Other”, their own goals, and the conflict itself. Behavior is defined as how parties act in the conflict, and contradiction is defined as issues at the root of the conflict.\(^2\)

---

The Israel-Palestine conflict fits the features characterizing *intractable* conflicts. Such conflicts tend to be *long-lasting*, generally persisting for more than a generation. This means that young people are socialized to know who their enemies are and what terrible wrongs the enemies have inflicted on their people. Second, leaders and most members of the adversary camps consider their goals regarding the other to be *irreconcilable*. Furthermore, members of one or more of the opposing sides often believe that their very existence is threatened by their adversaries. Third, significant members of each side have *vested interests in the conflict’s continuation*, at least at the level of the ongoing confrontation and interests may be material or ideological. Many persons’ identity or livelihoods are invested in waging the struggle, as warriors, officials, or advocates of ideology or religion. This too contributes to the self-perpetuation of the conflict. Fourth, the conflict is conducted with *recourse to destructive means*. Violence is usually employed, including killing and otherwise physically damaging members of the other side. The violence may be targeted at noncombatants as well as combatants and thus feelings of fear and hatred are aroused. Each side tends to view the other as the enemy, who also may be dehumanized.

A frequent noted factor used to explain intractability is the relative power imbalance between different parties. High levels of inequality between groups within a country or between countries make it possible for the stronger party to impose oppressive burdens on the weaker. Under propitious circumstances, the dominated group may challenge those who are dominant, seeking greater equality. The dominant group sometimes seeks to suppress

---

such challenges even if they were initially nonviolent.4

The direction and degree of power asymmetry between groups, however, are matters of interpretation and are in flux. Frequently, adversaries on each side see themselves as threatened by the others, so they must fight hard to protect themselves. Israeli Jews generally see themselves as surrounded by a vast Arab world, while Arabs generally see themselves as threatened by the militarily mighty Israel, backed by Western imperialism.5

Inhumane treatment deepens antagonism and the callous and indiscriminate use of violence, intended to intimidate and suppress the enemy is frequently counterproductive, prolonging a struggle and making an enduring peace more difficult to attain.6

An important policy affecting the increasing intractability of a conflict is the rejection by one or more sides of the other’s claims regarding fundamental human rights, recognition, and minimal living conditions. Related to this, is the refusal by one side to recognize the other side as a legitimate collectivity and the consequent refusal by one side to communicate with the other.7

Mutual negative perceptions characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and are often reflected and perpetuated by mass socialization processes carried on by state institutes, the media, educational systems and educational textbooks8. The signing of peace agreements does not automatically annihilate these negative constructions. To change these unfavorable portrayals, a bottom-up psychological process of change in perceptions and relations has to take place.9

During a conflict, it is easy to assume the prime necessity is to work with people who are apparently central to any peace process, for example the politicians, or in the case of an armed conflict, military or paramilitary leaders. But this may not be sufficient. Leaders will usually believe, or suggest, that their role as representatives limits their capacity to be flexible and to deliver any compromise solution that will be unacceptable to their people10. And when leaders make agreements without the consent of their people, the solution could easily be unsustainable.

Lederach calls for constructive social change which seeks to change the flow of human interaction in social conflict from cycles of destructive relational violence toward cycles of relational dignity and respectful engagement. As relationships are at the heart of social

4 Ibid., p.334.
5 Ibid., p.334.
6 Ibid., p.335.
7 Ibid., p.335.
change we must encompass and encourage a wide public sphere of genuine human engagement that involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords and accommodates all levels of society: top leadership, middle-range leadership and grassroots leadership.11

**Chart 2: Actors and Approaches (Lederach, 2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Actors</th>
<th>Types of Approaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1: Top Level Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Focus on high-level negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility</td>
<td>Emphasizes cease-fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Led by highly visible mediator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Problem-solving workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders respected in sectors</td>
<td>Training in conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/religious leaders</td>
<td>Peace commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic/intellectuals</td>
<td>Insider/partial teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 3: Grassroots Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Local peace commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local leaders</td>
<td>Grassroots training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of indigenous NGOs</td>
<td>Prejudice reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community developers</td>
<td>Psychosocial work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local health officials</td>
<td>in postwar trauma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee camp leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chart 3: Integrated Framework of Conflict Resolution (Lederach, 2002)**

Peacebuilders and academics in Israel and Palestine are trying to follow this path. Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On believe a peace process is composed of peace-makers who work on top-down peace agreements, and peacebuilders, who work on the grassroots level, bottom-up. The success of a peace process is dependent on the successful synchronization of these two processes. Politicians can make peace from the top down, but they are limited in their ability to create new paths to peace-building that lead from the bottom up – paths that influence the official level by proving that changes in attitudes and patterns of interaction are taking place on the ground. This kind of peacebuilding requires intensive grassroots work, bringing both sides to cooperate through day-to-day activities and programs. Such work requires dynamic mobility and action that responds to the desire of the majority for peace.

To solve intractable conflicts, of special importance is reconciliation requiring change of the socio-psychological repertoire among society’s members and that fed the intractable conflict and served as barriers to the peace process. This repertoire does not change overnight, even when the group leaders resolve the conflict peacefully and sign a peace agreement. The reconciliation process is a long one and does not take place unintentionally but requires planned and active efforts in order to overcome obstacles.

Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing motivations, goals, and beliefs of the great majority of society’s members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves. Eventually, reconciliation supports and solidifies peace as a new form of intergroup relations and serves as a stable foundation for cooperative and friendly acts symbolizing these relations. A peace that is not supported by at least a majority of a society will always be at risk of breaking down.

And while the parties in conflict need to go through the social change themselves, when the two conflicting parties are unable or unwilling to move forward, a complementary range of third party intervention is needed. The range of intervention is not limited to

13 Ibid., p.9.
supporting top leaders in peacemaking, but to also the efforts of movements aimed at social change and non-violent solutions to the conflict.

Nonviolence is often described as nonviolent *resistance*, implying that it is a reaction, a response to some initial force. But, in fact, as practiced by Mohandas Gandhi and his followers (including Martin Luther King, Jr.) nonviolence is much more proactive. Practitioners of politically active nonviolence were masters at taking the initiative and keeping their opponents off balance. Their tactics were unpredictable, spontaneous, radical, and experimental – and, not surprisingly, government authorities found them baffling and exasperating. It is said – of some people and some nations – that “they only understand force,” and therefore they cannot be moved by anything other than force or the threat of force. The truth, however, may be precisely the opposite: Those who understand and expect violent force can generally deal effectively with it: after all, it is typically their stock in trade.¹⁶

Gandhi, who was the outstanding strategist of nonviolent action, regarded nonviolent struggle as a means of matching forces, one which had the greatest capacity for bringing real freedom and justice. The classic national Gandhi’s struggle was the 1930-31 campaign, begun with the famous Salt March as a prelude to civil disobedience against the British. A year-long nonviolent campaign shook British power in India and ended with negotiations between equals.¹⁷ In the United States nonviolent action has played a major role in the struggles of Afro-Americans from the Montgomery bus boycott on.

Nonviolent action, according to Sharp, is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, noncooperation and intervention, in all of which the actors conduct the conflict by doing things without using physical violence. As a technique, therefore, nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction but *action* that is not nonviolent.¹⁸

Sharp writes nonviolent action may involve: 1) *acts of omission* – people refuse to perform acts which they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; 2) *acts of commission* – people perform acts which they do not usually perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation to perform; 3) a *combination* of acts of omission and acts of commission.¹⁹

There are three broad classes of methods: 1) where the nonviolent group uses largely symbolic actions intended to help persuade the opponent or to express a group’s disapproval and dissent, behavior may be called nonviolent *protest and persuasion*. Here are demonstrations as marches, parades and vigils, 2) where the nonviolent group acts largely

---

¹⁸ Ibid., p.64.
¹⁹ Ibid., p.68.
by withdrawal or the withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation, its behavior may be described as **noncooperation**. This class contains **social noncooperation**, **economic noncooperation** (economic boycotts and strikes), and **political noncooperation**: 3) where the nonviolent group acts largely by direct intervention its action are referred to as **nonviolent intervention**. The nonviolent group in this class clearly takes the initiative by such means as sit-ins, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent invasion and parallel government. The technique may be applied by individuals, small or large groups, and masses of people.

Palestinians applied all methods of nonviolence during the first Intifada, which produced a huge wave of response from its leaders in the PLO, Israeli politicians and citizens, and the international community. It worked in changing the course of the conflict that led to the Madrid Peace Process and eventually to the Oslo Peace Agreements. Israeli peace movement was born out of protest movements against government policy related to the conflict in the region. Both Palestinians and Israeli peace activism still uses some form nonviolence to achieve their goal of social change and ending conflict.

According to supporters of the rights-based approach, international law can also contribute to peaceful resolution. This is especially important in an asymmetric power relation in intractable conflict like in the case of Israel and Palestine, where violations of rights are carried out by both sides as the conflict escalates. When the solution is regarded as “unjust”, not only coming to agreement is difficult, but even when agreement is reached there could be a backlash, as after the Oslo Peace Process. According to Falk, the major role of international law is to help parties caught in lethal conflicts to identify the outer limits of reasonable claims on both sides. 20 Christine Bell says addressing human rights is important to addressing the root causes of violence, and if undertaken with awareness of the complicated relationship to conflict resolution, it can facilitate agreement on issues other than human rights (such as political accommodation). 21

Kaufman and Bisharat argue that even at the levels of protocol and declaration, human rights semantics can contribute to an atmosphere of mutual respect more conducive to successful negotiations. Human rights clauses can reduce perceived asymmetries since a language of dignity and respect carries significant weight for persecuted people who are often reluctant to confront the price to be paid for an agreement.

Furthermore, the rights-based approach based on compliance with universally recognized norms, according to John Quigley, could ensure the rights of the parties and ensure that international actors play a role. The international community in endeavoring to

---

facilitate an agreement that will be consistent with legal norms works towards a greater chance of it remaining stable.\textsuperscript{22}

Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, from its beginning a regional and international dimension, the approach used in this study will be to add multiple dimensions to Lederach’s Triangle of Actors and Approaches. Instead of one triangle of society with three layers, there are three triangles of societies of Israel, Palestine, and international community all are interacting each other and influencing each other in making changes.

Assessing the impact of peacebuilders

There has been considerable research on the efficacy of social movements\textsuperscript{23} yet evaluating the efficacy of peacebuilding is still difficult. One of the difficulties is the number of civic organizations involved with often contradictory aims related to peace. In Israel, the concept of peace can mean simply ending occupation, separation from Palestinians, or building a peaceful relationship with them and Arab countries. It is related to the perception of “security” to Israel, not only military but demographically and culturally. For many Palestinians, peace means establishing a sovereign Palestinian state and building peaceful relations based on justice, meaning recognition of suffering of refugees and right of return of refugees.

The players also change in time related the situation. For example, Palestinian society has undergone tremendous changes in different phases of history, therefore, timing is an important factor in assessing the success or failure of social movements. In other words, each major time period in the life cycle of a social movement is characterized by a particular political context that influences a movement’s ability to succeed. For example, the Israeli peace movement had more influence on government policies when the Labor Party was in power.

There is also a fundamental problem in attributing causality since many forces far more powerful than the peace movements influence a peace process. These include the state, the main protagonist in the conflict, changes in local and global political alignments, foreign governments and international organizations, and public opinion. This makes it very difficult to isolate the contributions, if any, of the peacebuilders.

By broadening the perspective to consider the peacebuilders’ impact not just on governmental policies but also on broader collective goods, then the efficacy of such organizations may become more substantial. Amenta and Young suggest that collective

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} For example, Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly eds. 1999. \textit{How Social Movements Matter}. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
goods may be concrete – such as benefits to the constituencies of the movement – but also intangible, such as changes in mainstream cultural beliefs, images, and language.\footnote{Edwin Amenta and Michael P. Young 1999. “Making an Impact: Conceptual and Methodological Implications of the Collective Goods Criterion,” in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly eds. How Social Movements Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp.22-41} From this perspective, the question is no longer simply whether the peacebuilders met their stated goals, but rather whether their activities provided collective benefits to their constituencies.

This research will add to the approach of conflict resolution and peace studies, an approach developed by more recent social movement scholars who recognize that peacebuilders’ contributions are multidimensional and more encompassing than traditional measures of achieving public acceptance and recognition and changing policies. Giugni et al. define social movements as sustained challenges to authorities, and argue that protest can produce political changes in three ways: by altering power relations; forcing policy change; and provoking broader and usually more durable systemic changes, both on the structural and cultural levels, with emphasis on the latter. “Collective efforts for social change occur in the realms of culture, identity, and everyday life as well as in direct engagement with the state.”\footnote{Giugni, McAdam and Tilly. 1999. pp.xxiii.} Mobilization, for example, may result in a strengthening of internal solidarity and identities, the creation of countercultures, and a shift in public attitudes toward a given issue.\footnote{Ibid., pp. xxiii}

Gamson proposes assessing a social movement’s impact on cultural change through analysis of public discourse including mass media\footnote{William A. Gamson, 1998. “Social Movements and Cultural Change.” In M.G. Giugni, D. McAdam and C. Tilly eds. From Contention to Democracy, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp.57-77.} and suggests two measures of success: (1) the cultural acceptance of the social movement as indicated by its “gaining the status of a regular media source whose interpretations are directly quoted,” and (2) new cultural advantages as indicated by the prominence given to the movement’s preferred “frames” (i.e., how the movement defines and views the nature of the conflict, its causes, and remedies) as compared to antagonistic frames. Special attention is paid to the cultural contributions of these organizations, because peacebuilders may have had little direct political effect in light of the powerful political forces operating in each region.

Synthesizing the various approaches to measuring the efficacy of social movements,\footnote{See Benjamin Gidron, Stanley Katz, and Yesheskel Hasenfeld eds. 2002. Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/ Palestine, and South Africa,}
the following dimensions will be utilized for this research:

1) Impact on the resolution of conflict: the extent to which the peacebuilders contributed to important events or developments in the peace process

2) Impact on the process of peacemaking: the extent to which the peacebuilders gained access to the parties involved (Israel society, Palestinian society and international society); brought about changes in the political process (e.g., the rise of new political parties, change in political coalitions, change in governmental procedures, change in laws or resolutions).

3) Impact on defining the conflict and its resolution: the extent to which the peacebuilders brought about changes in public perceptions about the conflict; created new ways to define and describe the conflict; introduced new norms of conduct or relations between people representing the various factions in the conflict (e.g. new images of the people involved in the conflict, new modes of dialogue); linked its ideas about peace/conflict resolution to other values, such as democracy, human rights, and social justice; and developed a new set of strategies or activities (e.g., public demonstrations, dialogue groups, educational materials, media events).

Definition of “peacebuilding” and “peacebuilders”

Building on previous peace and conflict resolution studies, my working definition of peacebuilding is as follows:

- seeking to resolve the conflict within and between peoples through non-violent means on the political, social and cultural levels;
- promoting mutual recognition of national self-determination as a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians;
- its activities include, but not limited to, consciousness-raising, dialogue, peace education, rewriting history, protest, advocacy or provision of professional services directed at reducing the negative attitude and behavior toward the other and assuage the injustice and grievances caused by the conflict in the political, social, economic, legal, religious and cultural realm.

And the definition of “peacebuilders” are those individuals and groups who are working to promote “peacebuilding.”

Literature Review

There are three major studies on Israeli “peace movement” available in English. *The Politics of Protest* 29 written by former peace activist Kaminer studies the Israeli peace movement from 1970s up to the first *intifada* of 1993. Mordechai Bar-On gives a detailed study of peace movements especially of Peace Now in which he was member in *In Pursuit of Peace* covering 1967 to 1988.30 However their studies end at the first intifada when the peace movement lost its momentum as the Israel and Palestine entered the Oslo Peace Process. Another study is Hermann's *The Israeli Peace Movement*31. Various other studies have been conducted on specific organizations such as Peace Now and Women in Black. *Beyond Bullets & Bombs* edited by Judy Kuriansky compiles and introduces various recent efforts initiated by grassroots organizations and written mostly by the activist themselves32.

During the Oslo Peace Process the focus of peacebuilding efforts shifted to “People-to-People” programs aimed at enhancing dialogue and relations between two peoples, but the “official” program ended together with the breakdown of the Peace Process in 2000. Various reports tried to analyze these programs,33 and two studies tried to evaluate and point out dilemmas and issues confronting their activities.34

A very important work is edited by Kaufman, Salem and Vehoeven in *Bridging the Divide*35 that is a collection of work by Israeli and Palestinian peace scholars and practitioners who take critical look at themselves and their activities, to expose and analyze their weakness. Although it tries to evaluate the impact of peace activism, the method of evaluation is not consistent.

For the purpose of this research, a study by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld in *Mobilizing...*
for Peace⁶, a very first attempt to evaluate impact of peace movement, what they term Peace/Conflict Resolution Organizations (P/CRO), using approaches in social movements theory is a significant guiding model.

This research is to build upon this work by Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, by concentrating on the Israel-Palestine conflict and deepening the analysis and evaluation of efforts by the peacebuilders on the conflict resolution.

Significance of Research

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an intractable conflict has a long history and has cost thousands of Israeli and Palestinian lives and instilled fear and distrust to the Other. The conflict has been and still is a source of friction for regional and global stability. The need and benefit of settling this conflict is paramount but efforts by political leaders with the support of international community, so far, are failing. Various studies have been conducted in trying to explain the reason for the failure of peace process, mostly from an international politics perspective with the focus on political leaders. It is true that the peace agreement will be ultimately signed by two leaders but in democratic societies like Israel and Palestine, leaders are not capable of making decisions against the will of their constituencies. However, the study on how civil society influences society and political leaders to facilitate leaders’ making the crucial decision related to peace has only started.

This research will try to highlight some of the efforts made by civil society in both Israel and Palestine, as well as in the international community in pursuit of peace, and how they influenced the policy or social perception of the conflict. Although the case studies in this research are limited, it is hoped that they will become examples as to what works and what do not work from which we can draw lessons. I hope this research will contribute in formulation of strategy for future peacebuilders, and will help the international community in supporting these initiatives financially and morally.

Ideally, therefore, this research might eventually contribute in facilitating peace and stability in the region.

Methodology

This research is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on historical overview of peacebuilding activism. Chapter 1 covers period from 1880s to 1987 and review the origin of

the conflict and efforts to search for peace by PLO and Israeli peace movement. Chapter 2 examines Palestinian non-violent nation-wide resistance *Intifada* and how it influenced the Israeli peace movement and international community that eventually led to Madrid Peace Process and to Oslo Peace Process. Chapter 3 examines peacebuilding activities conducted during the Oslo Peace Process which came to impasse with the failure of Camp David Summit.

Part II focuses on peacebuilding activism that emerged after the collapse of Oslo Peace Process. Chapter 4 summarizes the political condition and peacebuilding activism that emerged despite the deteriorating condition. Following three chapters will analyze three cases. Chapter 5 is a case study of Palestinian protest movement against the Wall which emerged in 2002 as Israel begun to build the Wall. How this Palestinian local initiative movement made a significant result in pushing the Palestinian authority to bring the case to International Court of Justice and subsequently managed to change the route of the Wall and delayed the further construction of the Wall will be analyzed. Chapter 6 is a case study of international initiative of the Free Gaza Movement. The movement started with two small boats to bring humanitarian goods to Gaza and advocate to international community to end the siege of Gaza by Israel. By 2010, its ninth voyage has grown to a flotilla of six vessels including *Mavi Marmara* carrying some six hundred passenger and 10,000 tons of humanitarian goods which was intercepted by Israeli navy on international water off the coast of Gaza and resulted in death of nine Turkish nationals. How this movement succeeded in easing the siege of Gaza is analyzed. Chapter 7 is a case study of women peacebuilding activism. Both Israeli and Palestinian women were forerunner in the peacebuilding activism. Both women share their burden because of the continuing conflict and occupation, from militarization of society, traditional patriarchy, and violence against women. These women efforts to end the conflict and occupation and thus to liberate themselves is analyzed.

Part III concludes the findings from this research. Subsequently, an attempt will be made to present a set of guidelines and recommendations regarding the future efforts for building peace between Israel and Palestine. The solution, of course, must be arrived at by two societies, however, the international community also has a part to play in supporting them toward making and building peace.

This research is based on 7 years (2002-04, 2006-09, 2010-12) of field observation through participating in dozens of peacebuilding programs and talking to hundreds and interviewing dozens of organizers and participants in such programs while I myself held positions in NGO, UN, and governmental cooperation agency in Israel/Palestine and through other projects funded through private foundations. In addition, hundreds of books, reports and public opinion polls are reviewed.
PART I

Historical Overview of the Israeli-Palestinian Search for Peace
Chapter 1: Historical Overview (1880s -1987)

It is an often neglected fact that the Christians, Jews and Muslims were living in relative harmony in the land of Palestine for centuries. This was especially true during the Ottoman period when Jews were able to practice their religion and live their lives under official protection although they were a small minority and did not enjoy equal rights to Muslims.37

Salim Tamari contends, however, that while Arab secular historians tend to paint a portrait of exaggerated harmony between Arabs and Jews for the pre-1948 period, Zionist historiography often tends to suggest that the conflict is perennial and that Jews, at best, were accorded the status of a protected (dhimmi) community under Ottoman and other Islamic rules.38

However, conflict emerged as Jews started to immigrate in huge numbers during the British Mandate threatening the demographic, political and economic balance with the indigenous Arab population. As the British abandoned the conflict, massive numbers of Palestinians become refugees, and the Arab armies joined the conflict upon the declaration of Independence by Israel. While Palestinian society was totally shattered during the war of 1948 with their loss of land and livelihood, a new state of Israel was busy with state building and absorbing immigrants. There was very little effort from the both side to talk of peace.

Israel’s victory of June 1967 War against three major Arab armies led to the conquest of the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. This dramatically changed the terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were administered directly by military commanders until 1981 and since then through a “Civil Administration” established by the Israeli armed forces. East Jerusalem was annexed to the Israeli municipality of the city and in 1980 the Knesset passed a law which declared that "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. The settlement movement flourished and after the Likud party won the 1977 Israeli elections, the establishment of settlements within the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip dramatically accelerated.

In Israel, protest against occupation gained momentum when the possibility of peace with Egypt arrived. Israel’s largest peace movement, Peace Now, was created to support peace with Egypt. Another momentum was expressed during the Lebanon War where many Israeli soldiers were killed.

While Israel’s grip on the occupied territories was strengthening, the PLO shifted its policy to solving the conflict by negotiation and started to dialogue with Israeli peace activists and members of Knesset.

1.1. Coexistence to Conflict

1.1.1. Birth of Two Nationalisms

The Zionist movement, gaining strength after Herzl’s The Jewish State, focused on the ancient Kingdom of Israel as home for a modern Jewish state. On the eve of the first wave of Zionist-inspired immigration in 1882, the traditional, religious Jewish community in Palestine numbered about 24,000, or 5 percent of the population of 500,000, of which Muslim Arabs were a majority and Christian Arab minority consisted of 10 percent. By the conclusion of the second wave in 1914, their number had grown to 85,000.

The early Zionists had been aware of the Arab presence in the country. But the Zionists anticipated that with gradual or, perhaps, abrupt mass immigration, the Jews would eventually become the majority. Zionists saw the Arabs as interlopers whose ancestors in the seventh century had conquered – or stolen (albeit from the Christian Byzantine Empire, not the Jews) – and then Islamized and Arabized Palestine, a land that belonged to someone else. And, during the nineteenth century, the vast majority of the Ottoman Empire’s Arabs, though sharing a common language and culture, had no national ambitions; they were satisfied to live as subjects of the Muslim empire to the day. The early Zionist settlers did not see themselves as protagonists in drama of contending nationalisms or as rivals for the land. Like European settlers elsewhere in the colonial world, they saw the natives as objects, as part of the scenery, or as bothersome brigands, certainly not as nationalist antagonists. And as Zionist, they took it as self-evident that the Land of Israel belonged to the Jews and to no one else.

For Palestinians, some peasants and urban merchants felt their interests threatened and protested against Jewish immigration and land purchases, and even a few violent clashes ensued, as early as the 1880s and 1890s. Opposition to Zionism became more

42 Ibid., p.36.
43 Ibid., p.37.
political with the lifting of press censorship in 1908. Newspapers warned that Zionism would render Arabs strangers in the land that they considered to be their patrimony. Palestine’s Arabs increasingly referred to themselves as “Palestinians” in that context. Feelings of alarm regarding Zionism intensified in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration. For the approximately ninety percent of the population that was Muslim or Christian Arab, this declaration prejudiced their civil and religious rights and precluded their political right to a national home.

The Arab national institutions in Palestine were formed between 1917 and 1923 and formulated positions regarding the right of Palestinians to their country. In the early 1920s, the Palestinian national movement formulated three major demands: opposition to organized Jewish immigration to Palestine; opposition to the transfer of land to the organized Jewish community in the country; and Palestinian Arab independence at the earliest possible date. Regardless of this development, Britain continued its support the Zionist idea.

The first leaders of the Palestinian national movement were urban notables who served as local elites during Ottoman times. Typically hailing from Jerusalem or other large towns, these aristocratic families gained prestige in their communities through tradition, education, property ownership, and positions in governmental or religious institutions. They solidified their influence by serving as intermediaries between the people and the Ottoman state, and extended their social control into the countryside by forming alliances with rural elites.

A new generation of professionals and educated activists criticized the traditional elites’ failure to confront these challenges. Some followed news of Gandhi’s activities and urged Palestinians to carry out civil disobedience. Others formed underground revolutionary cells preparing for military confrontation. Goaded by the Istiqlal Party and others, the AE organized in 1933 its first demonstrations targeting the mandatory government in opposing to Zionism. Meanwhile, within the Islamic establishment, a battle between the mufti and anti-mufti camps raged in rival newspapers and conferences. As Arab society became increasingly politicized, the loose elite alliance that once sufficed as a way of doing politics

crumbled. The national struggle fragmented between conservative elites enmeshed in power struggles, an emergent cohort of more strident activists, and masses on the verge of explosion.\textsuperscript{50}

Leading scholars agree that Palestinians initially adopted moderate tactics and became more militant as those failed to bear fruit. Lesch writes, “The national movement that began with petitions and selective noncooperation in the early 1920s had led, as its demands were blocked and its aspirations thwarted, to a bitter revolt in the late 1930s”\textsuperscript{51} Yeshoshua Porath agrees: “The atmosphere of tension and resentment... was the foundation from which the idea gradually evolved that in order to preserve the Arab character of Palestine...the Arab had to resort to violence.”\textsuperscript{52}

1.1.2. Illusion of Binationalism and Cooperation

While two nationalism colliding, there was attempts by some Jews and Palestinians to call for a peaceful and binational state.

The first group to emerge within the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine was the \textit{Peace Covenant (Brit Shalom)} in 1925. Its aim was to “pave the way for understanding between Hebrews and Arabs for cooperative ways of living in the Land of Israel on the basis of complete equality in the political rights of two nations [each] enjoying wide autonomy and for various types of joint enterprise in the interest of the development of the country.”\textsuperscript{53} This small association sought to persuade the Zionist leadership and the British authorities to adopt a binational state model to prevent the growing Jewish-Arab tensions from developing into a deadly struggle. In the late 1920s, following a series of violent Arab attacks on Jewish neighborhoods and while the Jewish community was still mourning its dead, the Peace Covenant issued a statement that the Jews were partly responsible for the deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations, and advocated that the Zionist movement relinquish its central aspiration to build a Jewish majority in Palestine.\textsuperscript{54}

The Peace Covenant which saw itself as a think tank rather than a political movement, numbered only a few dozen registered members, who were mostly newcomers from Central and Western Europe. The group was very homogeneous and highly elitist its leading members were either prominent academics at the newly established Hebrew University or high-level administrators in the Mandatory Palestine civil service or the Zionist

\begin{itemize}
  \item Porath 1977. p.130.
  \item Heller 2004, 11 cited in Morris 2009, p.46.
  \item Hermann 2002, p.98.
\end{itemize}
establishment. The socio-demographic composition and political views of the Peace Covenant clearly inhibited the group’s ability to “sell” its message to the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine), whose leaders denounced the group for elitism and naïve bourgeois pacifism. The severest critics accused the Peace Covenant of anti-Zionism, defeatism, and pandering to enemy interests. Although the Peace Covenant existed formally for eight years (1925-1933), it was only active for six frustrating years, during which time all of its recommendations were rejected and the Arab-Jewish conflict became increasingly violent. Moreover, the group’s negative public image was projected onto peace activism, in general, which many Israelis still associate with political naivete, academic sequestration, and parochial class motivations.55

This negative attitude also was projected onto the highly visible but notably unpopular Union (Ihud) peace group, which Martin Buber, a prominent philosopher, and Dr. Judah Magnes, the president of the Hebrew University established in 1942. The Union also advocated bi-nationalism and its activists were motivated by a strong moral pacifism. Magnes opposed the idea of conquest, which he called “the Joshua way,” and did not believe in the Great Powers’ right to dispose of the country as they saw fit. Like the Jews, the Arabs also had historical rights to the country, he believed. So Palestine was the home of two peoples and three religions and belonged neither to the Arabs nor to the Jews nor to the Christians: “it belonged to all of them.”56

Unlike some other groups of the time, the Union was unconcerned about provoking the Jewish mainstream. Some of its members – Magnes, in particular – already had been branded political outsiders, so it was futile to try to disguise their recommendations as consensual in order to gain public approval. Moreover, they believed that the situation in Palestine was at such a decisive stage that the choice of policy to be pursued was more critical than ever.57

Peace Covenant and Union faced deep ideological conundrums. Translating the binational idea into a blueprint for political praxis proved immensely difficult. Some members were willing to commit to a permanent Jewish minority though they were unable to find a mechanism that would assure the minority’s rights – indeed, safety – in an Arab-majority state. Others sought further Jewish immigration until numerical parity was achieved – though none knew how to assure its permanency or to practically offset the Arabs’ far higher birthrates. Still others hoped that the Arabs would agree to open-ended

Jewish immigration that would eventually result in a Jewish majority. All sought some form of political parity with the Arab community but none knew how to persuade the Arabs who wanted dominance in and over all of Palestine to accept the binational principle.  

Buber, along with a dozen or so of his colleagues, remained active throughout the first decade of the State of Israel’s existence. During the 1950s, the group congregated around a highly intellectual magazine called Ner (Candle). But the group, which during the 1948 war actively opposed the creation of a Jewish state, had almost no following and was considered by the public at large to be a clique of theoreticians detached from society and reality.

Though not as effective, a few other miniscule groups with leftist orientation were also formed. Youth Guard (Hashomer Hatza’ir) was formed in 1911, and later evolved into a Marxist political party and associated, on the eve of the declaration of Israel’s independence, with the Left Socialist Workers Party. It called for a binational state for Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and a joint organization for Jewish and Arab Workers. It also set up the Jewish-Arabic Rapprochement and Cooperation Group in 1939 and was the predecessor of MAPAM (United Workers Party). Together with the leading social-democratic Ha’apoel Hatsair (Young Worker), later to become David Ben-Gurion’s MAPAI (Eretz Israel Labour Party), and the Histadrut (Jewish General Labor Federation), it organized the workers along nationalist lines. The Histadrut decided that trade unions for both nationalities must be organized separately but "coordinate with each other However no class solidarity evolved, and even the Histadrut’s trade unions did not accept Arab members until 1959.

Among the Palestinians were also prominent groups and individuals calling for cooperation and dialogue. The National Party founded in 1923, by Dajani and Sheikh Al-Farouqi called for good relations between all groups sects in Palestine. Other movement founded in the 1920s called for cooperation with the government for farmers’ welfare. The Islamic National Society founded in Jerusalem in 1918, wrote in its founding document: “We accept the British Mandate in Palestine on the condition that the status of the Islamic majority will be taken into consideration, and also to work for understanding between all the groups … in Palestine, whatever their religions and denominations.”

In addition to these societies and parties, other Palestinian political groups were

60 Ibid., p.189.
formed during the 1930s and entered into negotiations with the Jewish leadership in Palestine. Among others, these groups included the National Bloc Party, the Defence Party, the Reform Party, the Arab Palestinian Party, and the Independence Party. These parties chose nonviolent means to achieve Palestinian rights, and through that process they met several times with Jewish leaders. These meetings generated the idea of cooperation and the establishment of a joint country with Jews as fellow citizens. However, the network of Arab-Jewish relations during this period was not represented only through political negotiations since cooperation already existed in some communities, government, private enterprise, and in municipalities such as Haifa and Jerusalem.

Communal relations between some Palestinian villages and the new kibbutz communes and other Jewish agricultural settlements were often friendly and in a few cases remained as such until the present (i.e., Kibbutz Metser and Kafr Messer).

In 1929, the Palestinian position of accepting Jews according to their percentage in Palestine became clearer in a document presented to Philby one of the leaders of the Labour Party in Britain. It included a proposal for a representative assembly, composed of Palestinians and Jews that would enact legislation and approve a constitution with the government composed of Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

1.1.3. Conflicts

The arrival of tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants to Palestine significantly changed the demographic and economic realities in favor of the country’s Yishuv. Palestinians feared becoming a minority in their own country and having their demands for the exclusive right to self-determination in all of Palestine undermined. They therefore launched a rebellion against British policy.

On April 15, 1936, Arab gunmen shot three Jews. The Jewish paramilitary Irgun responded by shooting two Arabs, and a Jewish funeral ended in attacks on Arabs. As rumors of atrocities spread, Arabs rioted and attacked Jews. Middle-class Arab professionals and merchants hastily formed local committees which they hoped could organize a nonviolent protest strike to channel the Arabs’ explosive anger. Within days,

---

70 Manna and Golani 2011, p.38.
“National Committees” emerged in nearly all Arab towns. The press called for national unity and participation, and the public responded with robust support. Popular enthusiasm and a network of local committees suggested the potential for new cohesion. Elite families and factions, who first resisted to acting against the government, fearful of being cast aside, came together and formed the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). The AHC announced that it would assume leadership of the strike. With Amin al-Husayni as president, the AHC declared that Palestinians would continue the protest campaign until the government established a representative national government in Palestine, ended Jewish immigration, and banned the transfer of Arab land to Jews.\textsuperscript{72}

Hence, the events leading to 1936 rebellion reveal that middle-tier activists were “first movers” who imposed a strategy of protest upon, if not against, hesitant elites. Once protest gathered momentum, remaining on the sidelines would have been political suicide.\textsuperscript{73} In this way, the Palestinian movement crystallized a decentralized institutional framework, collective purpose in society, and finally a national leadership. For a brief but historic moment, the national movement moved toward overcoming fragmentation. The resulting organizational structure would mediate the use of nonviolent protest on a scale theretofore unparalleled.\textsuperscript{74}

The events of April 1936 launched the three-year Grand Arab Rebellion. From April to October 1936, Palestinian Arabs carried out a general strike, demonstration, and a noncooperation campaign, as well as armed activity and was lifted only on the eve of the arrival to Palestine of a royal commission of inquiry led by Peel to investigate the causes of the crisis. In July 1937, the Peel Commission submitted its recommendations to the British government calling for the partition of the area lying west of the Jordan River into two states: an Arab state (linked to the regime in Transjordan, thus forestalling Palestinian efforts to achieve the independence they had been seeking since the 1920s), and a Jewish state. According to the Commission’s recommendations, the Jerusalem area would remain under Mandatory control. The British adopted the Commission’s recommendations, while the Palestinians rejected the idea of partition out of hand. The Zionists, from their part, accepted the principle of partition but rejected the specific terms of the plan.\textsuperscript{75}

The Arab rebellion resumed with greater intensity until it reached the level of a bona fide war between the Palestinian rebels and the British army in Palestine. Concurrent with its suppression of the revolt, the British Government retreated from the idea of partition. In May 1939 The British published The 1939 White Paper to restrict Jewish immigration.

In the West, the support of Jewish state came from the movement of what was later

\textsuperscript{72} Pearlman 2011, p.42.
\textsuperscript{74} Pearlman 2011, p.42.
\textsuperscript{75} Manna and Golani 2011, p.38.
called ‘Christian Zionism’, which according to a particular understanding and interpretation of the Bible supporting the ingathering of Jews in Palestine. The Arabs, apart from the romanticized noble-savage Bedouins, were dismissed as a primitive people unfit for self-determination.

Beginning in 1945, Jews everywhere were forced to confront the results of one of the greatest tragedies that had ever befallen them: the Holocaust. The Holocaust proved the historical relevance of the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz Israel as the only geopolitical entity capable of providing refuge for the hundreds of thousands of homeless Holocaust survivors living in displaced persons camps of Germany. The Holocaust, it seems, convinced the Jews and the rest of the world that the Jews had nowhere to go but Palestine, and that the world was obligated to enable them to go there in order to establish their national home, in contrast to the situation in the 1930s.

From the spring of 1945 onward, the Jewish Yishuv and the Zionist Movement was dominated by a widespread sense that after the Holocaust and after Yishuv had provided Britain with such unequivocal support during the war, the Mandate power would have no choice but to abandon its policies regarding Eretz Israel that were still in force. The Jews saw these policies as a complete and sinful repudiation of Britain’s obligations under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, which had provided the basis on which the League of Nations mandate to Palestine had been awarded, but which Great Britain was now refusing to honor.

On 22 July 1946, Jewish rebels struck at the heart of British rule in Palestine: the King David Hotel, the location of the offices of the Chief Secretariat and the headquarters of British military forces in the country. Aside from the significant tragedy that had taken place, the status and reputation of the British Empire had suffered a considerable blow.

In April 1947, the British government turned the entire matter over to the United Nations for resolution. The UN Special Committee on Palestine decided to partition Palestine between Jews and Arabs. The tragedy experienced by the Jews had become part of Western discourse, and during the early post-war period the Zionist claim for the necessity of a Jewish state enjoyed more acceptance than any other time in history. Using the meager public relations capabilities at their disposal in their offices in London and New York, the Palestinians tried to tell the world, albeit in vain, about the tragedy they would suffer if a Jewish state were established in Palestine.

The Palestinians, who viewed the Zionist settlement enterprise of the Mandate period

---

78 Manna and Golani 2011, p.44.
79 Ibid., p.45.
as an illegal invasion under the protection of a colonial power with no legitimate mandate to award the Jews national rights in Palestine, objected to the very principle underlying the partition of their country. Aside from the principle itself, they regarded the United Nations’ partition resolution of November 1947 as exploitative and unfair by any measure. It provided the Jewish minority, which held rights to approximately 7% of the land of Palestine, with the ability to establish a Jewish state on approximately 55% of the Palestinian homeland, while the Palestinian majority, which accounted for more than two-thirds of the population, was to receive only 45% of the land.80

The leadership of the Jewish Yishuv and the Zionist Movement regarded the partition plan as a historic accomplishment presenting advantages that greatly outweighed its disadvantages. Aside from the natural justice it represented for the Jewish people returning to its homeland, they also regarded it as an appropriate response to the terrible, unprecedented human tragedy that had been perpetrated against the Jewish people just a few years earlier. From their perspective, it was important to establish a Jewish state even in part of Eretz Israel and even without Jerusalem as its capital, as these sacrifices would ensure that the Jews would never again find themselves without a place of refuge in times of trouble and provide a possible solution to the ongoing conflict with the Arabs of the country.81

1.2. The War of 1948

Starting from December 1947 tens of thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee their homes and the massacre at Deir Yassin, in April 1948 accelerated Palestinian flight from their homes. By May 1948, Israel was in control of much of the area designated for the Jewish state in the Partition Plan, including Haifa, Acre, and Jaffa, as well as the route to Jerusalem and on May 14 declared its independence on May 15 the day the British Mandate ended. The next day Arab troops entered Palestine. The Israeli army was successful in pushing the Arab armies beyond the partition boundaries and came to occupy additional land. When the armistices were signed in 1949, Israel had nearly 78 percent of Palestine under its control but the war created over 700,000 Arab refugees (about 70% of Palestine’s population). This event is called al-Nakba (catastrophe) by Palestinians. Sixty years later, refugees are denied the right to return and now 5 million people are registered as refugees under UNRWA.82 1.4 million refugees still live in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza

80 Ibid., p.60.
81 Ibid., p.60.
Strip or in neighboring countries. This refugee problem is a major issue in Arab-Israeli relations, with the Israeli state firmly rejecting all proposals for general repatriation and even compensation.

The Palestinians regard the Nakba and its repercussions as a formative trauma defining their identity and their national, moral, and political aspirations. As a result of the 1948 war, the Palestinian people, which to a large degree lost their country to the establishment of a Jewish state for the survivors of the Holocaust, developed a victimized national identity. From their perspective, the Palestinians have been forced to pay for the Jewish Holocaust with their bodies, their property, and their freedom instead of those who were truly responsible.

Jewish Israelis, in contrast, see the war and its outcome not merely as an act of historical justice that changed the historical course of the Jewish people, which until that point had been filled with suffering and hardship, but also as a birth – the birth of Israel as an independent Jewish state after two thousand years of exile. In this sense, discourse on the war is not at all historical but rather current and extremely sensitive. Its power and intensity is directly influenced by present day events.

The outcome of War of 1948 was also referred to as the “miracle” of 1948 to the fact that the Jewish state’s territories were enlarged far beyond the borders allocated to it by the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947. But even more important, from the Israeli point of view, is that the territories were almost completely cleared of their Arab inhabitants. Morris demonstrated how deeply rooted the idea of population “transfer” was in mainstream Zionist thinking, but he failed to make a connection between these ideas and the actual events of the 1948 War. According to Kimmerling, the full story of that “ethnic cleansing” was told in the eight-volume Book of Haganah History, an official publication of the Israeli military publishing house.

Until the beginning of this century, the very occurrence of the 1948 ethnic cleansing was firmly rejected and denied by Israeli leaders, intellectuals, and even historians – except for a handful of dissident historians and social scientists who were accused of falsifying Israeli historiography for reasons connected to their anti-Zionist inclinations, self-hatred, or search for personal fame. The official version of the “Arab flight” was that they fled because of their fear of internal instability (correct for a minority of upper- and middle-class

---

83 Ibid.
84 Manna and Golani 2011, p.8.
85 Ibid., p.8.
86 Kimmerling 2003, p.23.
88 Kimmerling 2003, p.23.
Palestinian Arabs) and because leaders of Arab states called on them to leave the country in order to make room for invading Arab armies that would annihilate the Jewish entity.\footnote{Ibid., p.23.}

In December 1948, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 affirmed their right to return to their homes inside the new state of Israel. Based on this resolution United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was set up to facilitate negotiations on refugee problem in Lausanne (1949) and Paris (1951) aimed to achieve a permanent solution for Palestinian refugees and a comprehensive peace agreement. However, when Arab delegations requested for the immediate return of all refugees Israel refused, using the argument that an exchange of population and properties had been made: Israel “absorbed” the persecuted Jews from Arab lands, and the Arab states received in exchange their Palestinian brothers and the property of mainly Iraqi and Egyptian Jews.\footnote{Kimmerling 2003, p.30.}

1.2.1. Palestinians and the “Nakba”

The Nakba destroyed Palestinians’ national life in nearly every respect. Villages were erased, homes and fields dispossessed, and families torn asunder. Decades of urban and commercial development were lost. The dispersion of refugees left Palestinians a diasporic nation. The exodus of hundreds of thousands of people on foot with only the clothes on their backs began their descent into a day-to-day battle for subsistence.


The West Bank became part of Jordan and the Gaza Strip was administered by Egypt. Palestinians were unable to play an independent role in shaping their destiny or organizing their associational life. The Jordanian government tried to repress the labor movement...
charging that the movement was under the influence of the Communist Party. Egypt restricted organizational activities that appeared to stray from the government’s line. Despite these restrictions, the Palestinians managed to form social organs in which students, professionals, workers, and women’s groups were involved.\footnote{Muhammad Muslih 1995. “Palestinian Civil Society.” In 

Some of these organs were heir to pre-1948 societies, and all of their organizers benefited from the legacy of the earlier period. As in the earlier period, the creation of these organs was as much rooted in the tradition of national politics as it was an attempt to forge an agenda specifically related to the concerns of their members.\footnote{Muslih 1995, p.247.}

The nationalist awakening of youth marked a transition from a resigned \textit{jil al-nakba} (generation of the disaster) to the activist \textit{jil al-thawra} (generation of revolution).\footnote{Pearlman 2011, p.64.}

Education, esteemed as a rare source of security and pride for a vulnerable nation, likewise contribute to this shift. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children attended UNRWA’s free schools and then studied in universities throughout the Arab world. This resulted in both the employment of many teachers and the creation of an educated generation of Palestinians, whose essential, marketable resource would be skills based on that very education.\footnote{Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal 2003. \textit{The Palestinian People: A history}, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.235.}

Educated Palestinians were starting to look beyond the framework of such possibilities for national leadership. Their focus turned to self-generated organizations in the West Bank, Gaza and elsewhere. Between 1959 and 1963, as many as 40 secret organizations had been formed, with anywhere from 2 to 400 members, expressing frustration with the passivity of their parents – as well as with the Arab states’ propensity to use the Palestinian issue for their own purposes.\footnote{Ibid., p.238.} With Arab universities bringing together talented, highly motivated Palestinians in an atmosphere of relative freedom, a scattered Palestinian leadership thus emerged in the 1960s. Its power derived, not from its traditional place in a largely agricultural society, but from its manipulation of the tools and values of a modern education.\footnote{Ibid., p.239}

In 1964 Gamal Nasser led the first Arab League summit in authorizing Ahmed Shuqayri, the League’s Palestinian delegate, to establish “foundations for organizing the Palestinian people”, which became the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its first covenant, passed in Jerusalem in 1964, called for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a Palestinian state that would include citizens living continuously in
Palestine since 1947, effectively excluding the majority of the Jewish population that immigrated afterward. Yet the liberation of Palestine was considered an introduction to peace.\textsuperscript{100} Fatah’s Central Committee in 1965 declared that the Palestine liberation movement is not struggling against the Jews as an ethnic and religious community. It is struggling against Israel as the expression for colonization based on a theocratic, racist, and expansionist system and of Zionism and colonization. The final objective of its struggle is the restoration of the independent democratic state of Palestine whose citizens will enjoy equal rights irrespective of their religion.\textsuperscript{101}

At that time, however, armed struggle was seen as the only way to redress the injustice of the creation of Israel against the dislodged Palestinians. Ideologically and practically there was to be no legitimate dialogue with the Israeli enemy until 1973.\textsuperscript{102} On January 4, 1965, Yasser Arafat’s Fatah launched its first guerilla incursion into Israel. The National Water Carrier was the target of a mine placed not far from the Sea of Galilee. The explosion cause minimal damage, but the attack carried significant symbolic value. It marked the beginning of the “armed struggle” against Israel. Fatah’s actions represented the emergence of the Palestinians as an independent factor in the region’s political and strategic calculus.\textsuperscript{103}

1.2.2. Israel and Independence

After the 1948 War, the Israeli leadership’s assessment was that it was premature to expect the Arabs to agree to Israel’s existence until it had built a strong state and dealing from a position of strength continued to be part of the prevailing ethos. In the eyes of moderate Israelis in the Labor Party leadership, such as Moshe Sharett, issues available to advance peace were a gesture of acceptance of the return of some of the Arab refugees displaced during the 1948 war and reducing the damage produced by the retaliatory policies of his political foe, Ben-Gurion.\textsuperscript{104}

The new Israel state, protective of its new and still somewhat precarious sovereignty, especially under David Ben-Gurion, energetically constrained extra-parliamentary activity. The first two decades of statehood (from 1948 to the late 1960s) were characterized by centralist and collectivist tendencies.\textsuperscript{105} Political parties were the only channel through

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., p.203.
\textsuperscript{102}Salem and Kaufman 2006, p.20.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., p.20.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., p.19.
\textsuperscript{105}Tamar Hermann 2006. “Civil Society and NGOs Building Peace in Israel.” In \textit{Bridging the Divide Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, London: Lynne Ryenner.
which the public was expected to express their views. Israel in that period can unequivocally be defined as a “party-state” and did not change much until the late 1960s. Voluntary, or civil, political endeavors, as social movements or NGOs, were seen as being against the state’s interest and discouraged. As the Israeli government was preoccupied with establishing its authority it regarded such activities as a threat.\footnote{Ibid., p.41.}

Still, there were several Arab-Jewish rapprochement initiatives within Israel such as a movement led by Uri Davis, questioning the stress on the Jewish identity of a “state of all its citizens”.\footnote{Salem and Kaufman 2006, p.20.}

1.2.3. Israeli Voice of Peace

**The Israeli Peace Committee (Va’ad Ha’shalom Ha’Yisraeli)** engaged in peace and antinuclear activism during the 1950s. The committee was successful for a short time in Israeli politics, but ultimately failed to make an impact. It was formed as the Israeli branch of the World Peace Council, which was noted for its worldwide antinuclear campaign. The Committee was able to collect 400,000 signatures for the petition – almost one-third of Israel’s adult population at the time (although its opponents maintained that many of the signatures were forged.) However, the Committee violated a number of local political taboos and therefore lost its momentum in less than three years: it attempted to organize wide-ranging, grassroots political activity outside of the dominant political-party framework; identified itself with a universal, non-Jewish, non-Zionist organization; and maintained close relations with the USSR. Moreover, it received backing from two left-wing parties: Mapam, the Zionist competitor to the ruling Mapai Party; and Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, which was non-Zionist and lacked national legitimacy. The Committee’s rapid decline added to the legacy of failure among Israeli peace groups.\footnote{Herman 2002, p.99.}

Associated with the MAPAM, **Givat Haviva** was founded in 1949 to work toward peace, pluralism, tolerance, democracy, and justice. Its goal was to promote understanding with the Arab world, in particular with the Arab minority in Israel through peace education and dialogue.\footnote{Givat Haviva website: <http://www.givathaviva.org/Page/3> retrieved Jan 2012.}

After 1948 Uri Avneri was perhaps the first to articulate the need to recognize the Palestinian Arabs as a unique people and to cooperate with them.\footnote{Uri Avneri, 1986. *My Friend the Enemy.* London: Zed Books. p.15.} His efforts to orient Israel toward a cooperative venture with the Arab residents of the land, coupled with his support for the political rights of the Palestinian community, established his credibility with...
many Palestinian nationalists and helped him, after the 1967 war, to formulate a more realistic approach to a negotiated settlement. However, prior to the 1967 war his voice remained solitary and most Israelis did not take his pleas seriously. A party he formed in the 1960s managed to win two Knesset seats in the 1965 elections, but most observers attributed this success to this popularity as an outspoken critic of the political establishment rather than as support for his peace crusade.

Flapan founded a monthly journal called *New Outlook* in 1950 that was published in English to reach the widest possible audience and dedicated to the “clarification of problems concerning peace and cooperation among all the peoples of the Middle East.” Over the years Flapan managed to develop a vast network of contacts with European communists and other left-wing anticolonial activists. He was able to communicate with many Arab leaders, especially those on the left, although the meetings rarely led to more meaningful contacts with the Arab mainstream.

In Italy, series of Congress Mediterranean de la Culture were sponsored in 1958, 1960, and 1961 by the progressive mayor of Florence, Giorgio la Pira. Nahum Goldman, the perennial president of the World Jewish Congress, acted as a self-appointed messenger in the same years, furthering contacts with the influential and ruling circles in Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia.

The last peace venture of this period was in 1966 with the risky flight to Egypt by Abi Nathan, an Indian-born Israeli fighter pilot. He landed in Port Said where his request to meet President Nasser was not granted, and he was returned to Israel. Though not originally focusing on the Palestinians, Nathan sponsored the “Peace Ship” pirate radio station in 1973, broadcasting from Mediterranean waters. He became known as a champion of Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, and openly met with Yasser Arafat at a time when this was illegal in Israel, and spent several months in prison.

During this time, the West was largely sympathetic to the newly born Jewish state of Israel as a homeland for all Jews including Holocaust survivors, due to their feeling of guilt and shame to the Holocaust that swept Europe in 1940s.

1.3. 1967 War and Occupation

Israel’s victory of the 1967 War dramatically changed the terms of the Arab-Israeli

---

112 Ibid., p.17.
113 Ibid., p.18.
114 Ibid., p.19.
115 Ibid., p.19.
conflict.

1.3.1. Occupation

Shlomo Gazit, the Coordinator of Affairs for the Occupied Territories for the first seven years of occupation, once stated that his goal was to create a situation where the Arabs “have something to lose.” Israeli efforts in this direction – from Dayan’s 1967 “open bridges” policy – sought, with varying degrees of success, to construct the appearance of normal economic, social and community life, while enormous demographic and economic transformations took place.\(^{117}\)

However, in reality, the Israeli presence on the West Bank and Gaza hurt more and more as time passed. Military Orders were used to rule the civil affairs of the Palestinian population superimposing and often revoking pre-existing laws. Palestinian land has been expropriated on a massive scale, water resources have been monopolized, settlements have been created in a pattern aimed at fragmenting the Palestinian population, and the local government and the judiciary has been restructured.\(^{118}\)

Workers who depended for their livelihood on intermittent piecwork inside Israel faced daily reminders of their subservient status: they were paid less than Jewish workers, had no union to support them, were required to be kept under lock and key any time they stayed overnight inside the Green Line. Books by the thousands were banned. The colors of the Palestinian flag were outlawed: even the word “Palestine” could earn its user a jail sentence. Administrative detentions were common, as were the dynamiting of houses, torture, collective punishments and harassments, complete with rituals of dehumanizing behavior forced upon unarmed Palestinians.\(^{119}\)

The occupation held economic advantages for Israel by providing Israel a pool of cheap labor and an unrestricted export market for its own goods. For example, Meron Benvenisti has estimated that the so called “occupation taxes” paid to the occupation authorities (excluding local taxes) by West Bankers and Gazans over the first twenty years of occupation stood at “a conservative figure of US$800 million.” In addition, it should be noted that slightly under 40 percent of total public expenditures in the territories comes not from

---


1.3.2. Palestinian Society

In the 1970s, a strong popular movement emerged and many new professional and political institutions (e.g. women, health, agriculture) took a leading role in rebuilding Palestinian society under occupation. Civil society institutions and organizations responded to the social needs of the Palestinians in the absence of any indigenous government and enabled the people to survive under Israeli military occupation. These include for instance, political parties, municipal service organization, cooperatives, educational institutions, charitable organizations, trade unions, or religious groups.

The political affiliations of these institutions were, of course, no secret, but the Israeli authorities made few efforts to impede their routine work as they were offering services that the occupation did not provide and that most families could not otherwise obtain.

The politically supported institutions were not just vehicles for discussion and ideological indoctrination: they also provided employment for members of their organizations. It seems that everyone understood and tolerated the idea of membership as a job qualification: work, after all, was a highly sought-after commodity. Those institutions without political identities, such as the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, also expanded the notion of shared responsibility, teaching people to take the initiative where they could instead of waiting passively for the authorities to act. These institutions helped create pockets of civil society parallel to UNRWA’s quasi-government even while Gaza was under foreign rule and meant that the family was no longer the sole source of social support in Gaza.

The PLO under Yasser Arafat leadership came to represent the collective will of the Palestinian people and an early motto was the ideal of establishing a unitary secular democratic state in all of Palestine. Implied in this concept was a program liberating people from the legacy of imperialism, in which partitions, makeshift state boundaries, and top-heavy national security states produced neither true independence nor the political actualities for which earlier generations had so strenuously fought.

The secular state idea was slowly abandoned and in 1974 the Palestine National

---

123 Ibid., p.67.
Council (PNC) new notion was adopted: Palestinian nationalism had to be recuperated immediately by a Palestinian national authority; thus, any portion of land liberated from Israeli occupation should go directly under the independent jurisdiction of a Palestinian “national authority.” That same year Arafat came to the UN to offer his peace plan, having earlier in the year gained an Arab summit consensus that the PLO was “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”

Any history of the period, then, would have to concentrate on the relentless and unevenly matched fight between Israel and its supporters on the one hand and Palestinian nationalism and its supporters on the other. At regular intervals, but with sharper clarity after 1984, Arafat stated his willingness to meet with Israelis, to negotiate a peaceful settlement and to end the longstanding conflict. His remarks were either not reported or scorned. Meanwhile the situation on the West Bank and Gaza kept getting worse. Talk of “transfer” became widespread. When it finally erupted, the intifada was treated by the media (and the Israelis) as a problem of law and order: the historical and political context was denied and unreported.

1.3.3. Israel and Occupation

After the 1967 War, two seemingly contradictory emotions engulfed Israel. The first was joy at the return to “The Land of Our Fathers” and religious nationalist circles tended to see the victory in terms of the great miracles that God has performed for the Jews. The second was a sense of hope and expectation that an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict was near. The results of the war significantly improved Israel’s bargaining position with regard to a “territories for peace” settlement. But it also awakened dormant aspirations among many Israelis for the acquisition of the entire area of historic Eretz Yisrael. Meanwhile, the new territories afforded the Israeli defense establishment the illusion of greatly enhanced security through the new lines of defense, which were farther from Israel’s population centers.

Within two weeks of the formation the government of Israel passed two significant resolutions concerning the newly conquered territories. First the government of Israel annexed Arab East Jerusalem. And the holy city (with expanded boundaries) was unified as the “eternal capital of the State of Israel.” This unilateral act was violently rejected by the Arab world and to this day has not been recognized by any other government.

125 Ibid., p.9.
126 Ibid., p.13.
128 Ibid., p.27.
The second resolution had been adopted a week earlier, far away from the public eye. It was to be passed onto the relevant Arab governments and stated Israeli readiness to return the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for a formal peace treaty with Israel.\textsuperscript{129} Even Moshe Dayan, the military hero and political hard-liner, was said to have remarked that he was “waiting for a telephone call from King Hussein” to discuss the modalities of peace.\textsuperscript{130} But the telephone did not ring and soon the euphoria faded to a sober realization that peace was far down the road.\textsuperscript{131} The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 in November 22 declaring the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and provided for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and affirmed the necessity “for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.”

Quite apart from the economic interest in the territories, a new complication arose after the 1967 War – the desire of Israeli society as whole, both left and right, to annex the historic heartland of the Jewish people in the West Bank without annexing its Arab residents. A formal annexation would mean that Israel would no longer have a Jewish majority. This contradiction created a built-in crisis, leaving the Israeli state and society unable to make important political decisions that were necessary to resolve the conflict. As time passed, the crisis became more explicit and the contradictory interests became aligned with political parties and were absorbed into personal and group identities and even into various religious streams (“hawks vs. doves,” “right vs. left” or “Zionists vs.post-Zionists.”)\textsuperscript{132}

1.3.4. Israeli Peace and Protest Groups

The formation of Israeli Peace Groups was to protest three main things: the settlement movement and occupation; the reluctance of the government to make peace with Egypt; and the War in Lebanon – “a war of choice”. Another set of protest groups were formed mainly to call for social justice. These groups tried to reach out to the Palestinians who had come under Israeli rule, and proposed bargaining the territories in exchange for peace. On June 9, before the end of the war Uri Avneri wrote to Prime Minister Eshkol and pleaded with him to establish a Palestinian state in the recently occupied territories and to conclude a peace treaty with it but most Jews equated the notion of a Palestinian nation with little more than occasional acts of terror perpetrated at the behest of various Arab states and a refugee problem manipulated for utmost pathos by Arab states seeking to promote their own

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p.28.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p.29.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p.29.
\textsuperscript{132} Kimmerling 2003. p.15.
intra-Arab rivalries and embarrass Israel.\textsuperscript{133}

The Israeli peace camp regained some momentum following the 1967 War which brought new issues to the forefront of the national agenda. The turning point came in 1968 when the \textit{Movement for Peace and Security} (Ha’tnua Le’shalom U’bitachon) was established in response to the \textit{Movement for a Greater Israel}, an extra-parliamentary, right-wing movement that advocated the immediate and total annexation of the Occupied Territories. The mood of the country seemed to be sliding to the right\textsuperscript{134} and the movement felt an obligation to try to stem the tide. It was the first Israeli organization to publicly warn of the occupation’s dangers, and strongly urged that the idea of occupation be abandoned before it became rooted in Israel’s political, economic, and psychological mindset.\textsuperscript{135}

The Movement advocated direct dialogue with any Arab leader or group willing to discuss peace and tried to convince the Israeli public and decision makers that significant territorial concessions were a necessary and reasonable price to pay for peace with the Arabs. It also warned that if Israel administered the Occupied Territories too harshly, a violent Palestinian rebellion would result eventually.\textsuperscript{136}

The Movement for Peace and Security gained the support of a number of prominent intellectuals, artists, and other public figures, and tried to integrate itself into the Israeli mainstream so as to avoid its predecessors’ fate. Nonetheless, the combination of the immense military victory of 1967 – which many euphoric Israelis interpreted as divine intervention – and the Movement’s inability to identify any Arab partners for peace talks led to mounting criticism.\textsuperscript{137} Furthermore the Movement was badly stigmatized and isolated by the political establishment as being unrealistic and its political influence remained negligible. While fading in the early 1970s it still established a new discourse on the options for peace and war and their costs, thereby paving the way for more successful peace activism toward the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{138}

Following the 1973 October War, the national consensus on security issues was shattered as many Israelis became increasingly convinced that long-term national security

\textsuperscript{133} Bar-On 1996. p.46.

\textsuperscript{134} Attitudes in favor of peace have been popularly identified in the Israeli context as “right” or “left”. The terms are, however, also correlated to a large extent with such main political groups in Israel. Yet, one could find within the kibbutz movement a trend toward annexing Palestinian land but many among Israeli industrialists and major entrepreneurs supported a meaningful compromise with the Palestinians. Likewise, in both the Labour and Likud parties, it was possible to find individuals approaching the territorial preferences and policies of the other. Within the two camps there has been a silent majority of the Jewish population, undecided and willing to follow any current leadership on such crucial decisions.

\textsuperscript{135} Hermann 2002, p.99.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p.100.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p.100.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p.100.
depended on a political rather than military solution to the conflict. Thus the political atmosphere was becoming more conducive to grassroots political activism, as evidenced by the emergence in the mid-1970s of Strength and Peace (Oz Ve'shalom), a small, religious peace group established as a religious counterbalance to Bloc of the Faithful (Gush Emunim), formed in 1974. During the first three years since its establishment, Gush Emunim established three new settlements in the West Bank and its members’ deep ideological conviction and readiness for personal sacrifice made Gush Emunim popular among wide circles and even earned the admiration of its political opponents.\textsuperscript{139}

Strength and Peace tried to convince its main target audience, the religious Zionists, that contrary to the Bloc of the Faithful’s ideology, using force to establish claims over the Occupied Territories ran counter to Jewish religious tradition.\textsuperscript{140} Nevertheless, the group’s activities did not elicit much positive response: the group failed to win the support of rabbis with significant religious authority or that of the religious public, toward whom its message was basically directed. Moreover, the group’s religious affiliation isolated it from the secular peace movements that were gaining momentum.\textsuperscript{141}

The heyday of Israeli peace activism began in early 1978 with the emergence of Peace Now (Shalom Achshav) that grew out of a fear among some Israelis that the right-wing, Likud-led government had no genuine interest in concluding the peace talks it had begun with Egypt. The group demanded that the government continue the talks until a peace agreement was reached, and mobilized unprecedented public support in a very short period of time. It should be noted, however, that in addition to its pro-peace components, this support also reflected the anti-Likud sentiments of many in the moderate Left, who could not come to terms with the Labor Party’s unprecedented defeat in the 1977 elections, when the Likud came to power and Menachem Begin became the prime minister.\textsuperscript{142}

In 1978, 348 reserve officers signed a letter urging Begin to accept a peace agreement with Egypt, which led to the creation of Peace Now. The members being officers gave them credibility to talk of peace and security. Peace Now’s first large-scale demonstration took place on April 1, 1978, in front of the Tel Aviv Town Hall. The participation of some 40,000 demonstrators was unexpected and made it one of Israel’s largest political demonstrations to that point. Ten Knesset members attended, including some from the Labor Party.\textsuperscript{143}

The movement viewed itself as a pressure group, and lobbying was an important feature of its activities. During the spring and summer of 1978 activists met with senior politicians in the government and the opposition. Many Peace Now activists had a good

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{139} Bar-On 1996, p.83.
\textsuperscript{140} Hermann 2002, p.100.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p.100.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p.101.
\textsuperscript{143} Bar-On 1996, p.102.
\end{footnotesize}
sense for public relations. They always sought media coverage, primarily television reporting. By the end of May the number of signatures on the Officers’ Letter surpassed 100,000.144 On September 2, 1978, the day before the Israeli delegation departed for Washington, to negotiate peace agreement with Egypt, Peace Now organized a farewell demonstration in Tel Aviv. Over 100,000 citizens marched. After the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, Peace Now – by then a large grassroots movement – needed new, viable causes: first the promotion of a sane, humanistic version of Zionism in response to the growing popularity of the nationalist Zionism; and second opposition to the harsh treatment of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.145

At the same time, to sustain its popularity, Peace Now also was aware that it had to demonstrate allegiance to collective core values and maintain a lawful character. Thus it refrained from opposing the clearly delineated political consensus, as the more radical peace groups often did by advocating conscientious objection, for example. This nonconfrontational stand became particularly apparent when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982.146

Peace Now did not denounce this “war of choice” for ten days – well after several other, much smaller and weaker peace groups had done so. Hence, the more radical peace activists publicly challenged Peace Now’s right to lead the peace camp. Its most conspicuous challenger was the There is a Limit (Yesh Gvul) group, whose program advocated – for the first time in Israel’s history – the option of (selective) conscientious objection and whose members refused to serve in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories and consequently often were jailed. This position directly contravened the Israeli mainstream belief that military service had to be separated from individual political views.

The Hebrew term Yesh Gvul has two meanings: “there is a limit” and “there is a border.” The name was chosen because it referred both the principle of obedience and to the refusal to serve for any reason other than in defense of the borders of the State of Israel.147 It was the first group to demand individual right in deciding morality. Conscientious objectors and draft resisters were a rare phenomenon during Israel’s first three decades. The political and moral divisions cut through Israel by the war in Lebanon, however, brought the limits of obedience into question for the first time.

A new, particularistic style of peace activism emerged during 1980s. A notable example was Parents against Silence (Horim Neged Shtika). Its members, all parents of soldiers who were stationed in Lebanon, had no other goal than the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. They expressed their anger at the misleading reporting by the IDF

144 Ibid., p.109.  
146 Ibid., p.102.  
By spring of 1983, 100,000 parents signed a petition to end the costly presence of the IDF in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{148} When their goal was achieved in 1984, the group dissolved. The Parents against Silence served, however, as a model for subsequent peace groups with limited goals and specific membership composition, most notably the Four Mothers Movement, which in fact adopted the same goal.\textsuperscript{149}

However, the peace movements' socio-demographic makeup impeded their efforts to mobilize support among the lower classes and non-Ashkenazi Israelis. Israeli peace movements were almost entirely composed of middle-class, highly educated, urban Ashkenazi Jews. This discrepancy created a high cognitive barrier between the activists and the Israeli mainstream.\textsuperscript{150}

In the summer of 1983 a handful of Mizrahi\textsuperscript{151} peace activists established a new group called\textbf{ East for Peace (Ha'Mizrach el Ha'Shalom). }On issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict their position was similar to Peace Now's. They sought “to encourage the peace process in the Middle East” and believed that “the physical borders of Israel shall be determined in such a way as to maintain its Jewish nature.” They also aspired “to combat allegations that Oriental Jews are extremist, violent and hostile to peace; to further political consciousness of the Oriental masses...and to help achieve the political, economic and cultural integration of Israel in the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{152}

East for Peace enjoyed initial successes in street activities and in attracting media attention. They believed that the Mizrahim, culturally a part of the Middle East, could serve as a human bridge to the region. Therefore, the transformation of Israeli culture and spiritual orientation should be an essential part of the struggle for peace. However, the members of East for Peace were labeled “eggheads” by other Mizrahi – socially and culturally distant from working-class Mizrahi of the poorer neighborhoods and development towns.

Another Mizrahi group, the\textbf{ Black Panthers}, was a group of young Moroccan residents of Musrara, a slum area of Jerusalem, who protested to social inequalities: the imbalance in the distribution of economic and social resources between the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi communities. They intended to raise awareness of social justice as a national priority and an alternative to the expensive settlement efforts in the occupied territories. The demand to stop wasting the nation’s limited resources on new settlements in the territories and to redirect them to economically depressed areas inside the Green Line was used to establish a

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p.177.  
\textsuperscript{149} Hermann 2002, 102.  
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p.116.  
\textsuperscript{151} The Jews immigrated from the developing societies of the Middle East and North Africa are called Mizrahi Jews or Mizrahims. Mizrahi meaning “east” in Hebrew.  
\textsuperscript{152} The text of the group’s “Statement of Purpose” cited in Bar-On 1996, p.166.
relationship between social and economic justice and peace issues.\textsuperscript{153}

1.5. Israeli-Palestinian First Encounters

Starting in the mid-1970s Fateh, the main PLO organizations, progressed toward supporting peace and negotiation. Said Hammami, the PLO representative in Great Britain, in November 16, 1973, published an article in the \textit{Times} where for the first time a PLO official spoke of a “Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”\textsuperscript{154} In another article he called for mutual recognition,\textsuperscript{155} that amounted to the recognition of the right of the Jews to a state of their own, a position that would later be known as the “two states solution.”

The PLO decided in 1974 to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in any territory that could be liberated from Israel. On November 10, 1975, the UN General Assembly accorded the PLO observer status as “the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East,” and to “secure the invitation of the PLO to participate in all other efforts for peace.” The General Assembly also recognized the “inalienable rights [of the Palestinian people], including the right of self-determination, and their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted.”

A peace group emerged in 1976, called the \textbf{Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace (Ha’moetza Ha’yisraelit Le’elahom Israel-Palestine) (ICIPP)}. This small organization was the first to dare to suggest that Israel negotiate directly with the PLO and recognize it as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. ICIPP’s founders, most of whom had widely acknowledged political or military expertise, developed close relations with prominent Palestinian leaders. Meetings often took place in European countries and were declared private since the Israeli activists had no official authorization to negotiate with their Palestinian counterparts, who were usually PLO officials. Nonetheless, the most prominent Israeli decision makers – including then Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin – usually were appraised of these meetings.\textsuperscript{156}

ICIPP published a charter that stated:

This country is the home of two peoples – the people of Israel and the Palestinian people. The historic conflict between these two peoples over this land, which is dear to both, lies at the bottom of the Arab-Jewish conflict. The only road to peace is in the

\textsuperscript{153} Bar-On 1996, p.121.
\textsuperscript{156} Hermann 2002, p.101.
coexistence of two sovereign states, each one with a distinct national identity.¹⁵⁷

The ICIPP met with Issam Sartawi who served in a PLO diplomatic mission. Later Sartawi agreed to make an unequivocal statement in the presence of Mendes-France (a Jew who had served as the prime minister of France in the mid-1950s) to the effect that an agreement should be reached between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of the 1967 borders, with some mutually acceptable modifications.¹⁵⁸

Still, the ICIPP remained a tiny and exclusive body with only minimal political power and almost no public appeal.¹⁵⁹ The Palestinian flag, which was included in the council’s emblem, was perceived by almost all Jews as the flag of the terrorist PLO and the growing recognition accorded the PLO by the United Nations increased Israeli anger and resentment toward the world body.¹⁶⁰

Interest in conflict resolution and mediation increased significantly within the international academic community, and the Arab-Israeli conflict served as useful case study for testing assumptions and hypotheses. With the help of individuals and organizations in Europe and the United States, Israeli activists organized many meetings under academic auspices in which blatantly public contacts were avoided.

Herbert Kelman, a prominent social psychologist from Harvard University organized a workshop in which Israelis and Arabs, along with a few American scholars. The underlying idea was to use “clinical [psychological] procedures to promote change and collaborative problem-solving among conflicting parties...generating feedback to national and international decision making.”¹⁶¹ Over the years Kelman’s initiatives established direct and intimate contact between a few dozen Israelis and Palestinians, many of whom were leading figures in their respective communities.

Since its establishment in 1958, New Outlook had built a solid base of contributors and supporters among progressive Jews (and some non-Jews) in Europe and North America. In 1977, triggered by Likud’s election victory, editor Flapan and some of his colleagues began an effort to establish an Arab-Jewish center for peace research that was later called the International Center for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME). Combining policy planning with peace advocacy, ICPME sought to influence Israeli politics and policies through symposia and conferences, research publications, and a permanent parliamentary forum in which MKs from different parties could work together.¹⁶² ICPME received the blessing of

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.207.
¹⁶² Ibid., p.190.
prominent international leaders (such as the former French Prime Minister Pierre Mends-France or former German Chancellor Willy Brandt). It also received the cooperation of some key Palestinian leaders from the occupied territories and the honorary president was retired chief justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Chaim Cohen and the chairman of the board was Abba Eban, the former Israeli foreign minister.

The center's three most important achievements in its first few years were progress made in dialogues with Palestinian leaders; the creation of the Arab-Jewish Educators Council; and the creation of parliamentary peace caucus in the Knesset – the “MKs Forum.”

To many within the PLO it became evident that armed struggle alone would not achieve their national aspirations and that some mutual compromise was necessary. They also began to understand that their future was inextricably tied to Israeli public opinion, which had to shift toward favoring some kind of accommodation before any Israeli government would try to reach a compromise.

The new Palestinian leadership met frequently with members of ICPME, and became regular participants in its annual conferences. This enabled them to meet many individuals associated with the Labor Party. Much of this activity, however, remained within limited elite circles of the Palestinian and Israeli communities and did not reach the broader public.

Peace Now’s activities in opposition to the Gush Emunim were often conducted in or near Arab villages or town in the West Bank. This led to contacts between the peace activists and Palestinians in the occupied territories, and a dialogue soon began. Peace Now supported the idea of nurturing contacts with pro-PLO Palestinians in the occupied territories. A new generation of Palestinian leaders was emerging like Ziyad Abu-Zayyad, Hanan Ashrawi, or Faisal Husseini who gradually replaced the previous leadership. Most of the peace groups on the Israeli side maintained contacts with these new leaders and tried to persuade Israelis that these Palestinians could be partners in negotiations.

However Peace Now adopted the position that as long as the PLO did not officially recognize Israel, and continued to undertake and support acts of terror, Israelis should refrain from dealing directly with it. This position grew out of the concern shared by many Peace Now activists of being marginalized within Israeli public opinion – as indeed

163 Ibid., p.190.
164 Ibid., p.191.
165 Ibid., p.217.
166 Ibid., p.218.
167 Ibid., p.123.
168 Ibid., p.217.
happened to the Israel-Palestine Council when it maintained contacts with PLO. From the outset Peace Now was a conglomeration of people with different opinions on various issues other than the issue of peace. Some were ardent socialists; others were free market capitalists. Some were religious but most were secular. A divergence of opinion existed even on matters concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some activists believed that only by negotiating with the Palestinians could a solution be found, while the others advocated the Jordanian Option. Some were convinced that peace could be achieved only by a retreat from all the territories, including Jerusalem, others contended that a territorial compromise could be achieved with Jerusalem remaining in Israeli hands.

In October 1980 two central figures in Peace Now, Dedi Zucker and Yael Tamir, traveled to Europe on behalf of the movement. During a brief stay in Vienna they went beyond their mandate and secretly met with Issam Sartawi, the PLO official responsible for contacts with Israelis. Yuli Tamir reflects on her first meeting with Issam Sartawi in Paris in 1980:

“The most striking lesson I learned from Sartawi related to the similarities between the Israeli and Palestinian national narratives. The first time Sartawi told me the Palestinian narrative, he did so using familiar Zionist language. He spoke about the Diaspora, about longing for the land of Israel, about homecoming and nation building.”

“Once we can see the close affinity between different national narratives, it becomes very difficult to legitimize only our own narrative while delegitimizing that of the other. We are forced to realize that what is legitimate for our own nation must be legitimate for all those who share a similar national dream. How one can claim that Jews have a right to a state without acknowledging that Palestinians have a similar right, or that Jews have a right to return to their own state but that Palestinians do not have a correlative right?”

The meeting with an official of the PLO by official representatives of Peace Now violated movement policy. There were several heated verbal exchanges and calls for the censure and removal of Zucker and Tamir, the two resigned and terminated their involvement with Peace Now.

---

169 Ibid., p.124.
170 Ibid., p.105.
172 Ibid., p.140.
In 1982, the day after the PLO evacuated Beirut, President Reagan announced his “Fresh Start” initiative that used the Camp David Accords as a point of departure, and suggested the election of a representative body in the West Bank and Gaza to provide the Palestinians with self-rule for five years as part of an interim arrangement. The US called for a freeze on Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories during a transition period of five years. While it objected to a Palestinian state, it favored the principle of “land for peace,” which entailed a significant retreat by Israel from the occupied territories. The Israeli prime minister immediately rejected the initiative while Peace Now supported it for focusing attention once more on the Palestinians as a people and on the problems resulting from the prolonged Israeli occupation.

When Shimon Peres became prime minister in 1984 he outlined three main objectives he hoped to achieve during his tenure: completion of the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, restoration of the ailing economy, and the achievement of an understanding with King Hussein regarding the modalities for a serious peace process. Peres welcomed Reagan’s 1982 Fresh Start initiative as a good point of departure. Hence according to both the Labor and the US formulas, peace had to be made with Jordan, not with the Palestinians as a separate political entity.

In 1984 PNC was convened in Amman. A new alliance was forged with Jordan in 1985 to accommodate Palestinian nationalism to the international consensus, now unambiguously upheld by Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. All the Arab states, with the exception of Syria and Libya, had come around to the two-state view, although few actually said it publicly. Yet threats from the United States, the deepening Palestinian gloom in the territories, the indifference of the Arabs, the endless Lebanese crisis, the rise of an anarchical Islamist movement, the absence of reliable Arab and strategic allies: all took a severe toll on the Palestinian drive led by the PLO.

Arafat and King Hussein yielded the Amman Agreement on February 11, 1985, which provided for a “special relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples” based on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and on an agreement to become the “confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine” once the retreat of Israeli forces from the West Bank was secured. But the entire Jordanian venture was ultimately scuttled by rejectionist elements within the PLO and in 1986 the King announced his disengagement from negotiations with Arafat and suspended the Amman Agreement.

---

174 Ibid., p.157.
175 Ibid., p.157.
176 Ibid., p.186.
177 Ibid., p.186.
179 Ibid., p.12.
In 1986 the Knesset, during the national unity government of Shimon Peres, passed an amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1948, in an attempt to stop Israeli MKs to meet with PLO officials. The law was repealed only in January 1993.\textsuperscript{180} Latif Dori, an Iraqi-born member of Mapam’s Central Committee and head of its Arab Affairs Department, was among those who favored challenging the new law. On January 26, 1986, he and several other Mizrachi peace activists had founded the Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue designed to be an umbrella organization that included members of East for Peace and other Mizrachi peace groups. The new group published a declaration of principles to resist “the criminal generalization which depicts all these oriental communities as Arab-haters.”\textsuperscript{181}

Hanna Siniora, the editor of the Palestinian pro-PLO newspaper al-Fajir, welcomed the new committee and in July published its declaration in both the Arabic and English editions of the newspaper. As soon as the law was enacted, Dori, Siniora and Shlomo Elbaz (of East for Peace) convened a press conference in which they asserted that “no power in the world can prevent the dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian peace seekers which will continue at all times in all places.”\textsuperscript{182} At the same time, in Jerusalem people such as Sari Nusseibeh and Faisal Husseini joined the peace movement and held several meetings with Moshe Amirav from the Likud Party in August and September 1987, and also met with Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{183} Hence, dialogue with Israel was made mainly by the Palestinian mainstream centrists.

Most Palestinian universities have maintained over the years an official policy of non-cooperation with Israeli universities. Some academics joined peacebuilding activities with their Israeli counterparts as with the NGOs on both sides. Other academics chose only to speak to the Israeli anti-Zionist or post-Zionist academics. Others chose to do their professional work without having the headache of involving themselves in political work. The latter group boycotted Israeli academics because of their positions against normalization of relations.\textsuperscript{184}

1.5. Summary

Historically, the Jews coexisted with Muslims and Christians under Ottoman rule and even during the British Mandate interactions between Jews and Palestinians continued especially in the cities.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{180} Salem and Kaufman 2006, p.25. \\
\textsuperscript{181} Bar-On 1996, p.215. \\
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p.215. \\
\textsuperscript{183} Salem and Kaufman 2006, p.29. \\
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p.29.
\end{flushleft}
During the 1920s and 1930s Jewish academics and intellectuals formed several small organizations that argued for a binational state and restrictions on immigrations of Jews into Palestine. Although one of these organizations lasted into the 1950s, these groups had little impact on mainstream Zionist thinking and Palestinians were equally unsympathetic to their proposals for compromise. The main effect that these organizations had was to lead the Jewish public to equate peace activism with naïve, extreme utopianism – an association peace camp in Israel and Palestine still struggle to overcome.

However, as the number of Jewish immigrants increased, and Palestinian farmers were expelled from their land, Palestinians began demonstrations against the British Mandate Government, which later turned violent (the Revolt of 1936), and obtained promises to regulate the number of Jewish immigrants.

After the Holocaust, Jews rebelled against the British to abandon the quota set for Jewish immigration using military means, which led to the UN Partition Plan. From the end of 1947, the conflict emerged between Israelis and Palestinians. By April 1948, most Palestinians in the area that was set for the Jewish state in the UN Partition Plan was removed or fled, either by Jewish militant force or by their desire to temporarily leave a conflict area. Declaration of Independence by Israel on May 1948 brought Arab armies. When the War of 1948 ended, Israel placed 78 percent of the historic Palestinian land and its control and denied return of 700,000 Palestinians who left their homes during the war.

Thus the Nakba for Palestinians began, more than half of its population becoming refugees in what remained of Palestine and in surrounding countries, completely shattering the social, economic and political life they enjoyed in Palestine. The remaining 22 percent of the land and population was placed under Jordan, the West Bank, and Egypt, the Gaza Strip. They were merely trying to survive while hoping to return to their land.

Israelis were busy building newly established state, (its founding fathers were those who came mostly from Eastern Europe in late 19th century or early 20th century) and providing for the new immigrants from Europe and Arab countries as result of Holocaust and the War with Arab countries, while preparing for the next war, for Israel was not willing to return the land nor allow any Palestinians to return which were condition to any peace talks. Thus, isolated in hostile environment, national security and thus collective action became center of Israel's policy and society.

The occupation of territories by Israel after the 1967 War brought two opposing reactions to Israel and Palestine. Israeli society was divided on whether to use the occupied territories as a bargaining chip for negotiations or to settle the land to satisfy security, religious and economic interests. The emergence of Movement for a Greater Israel advocating the immediate and total annexation of the Occupied Territories was met with Movement for Peace and Security opposing such action. The Movement for Peace and
Security gained support of a number of prominent academics, intellectuals, artists, and other public figures, and tried to integrate itself into the Israeli mainstream. However, the combination of euphoric Israelis and the Movement’s inability to identify Arab partners for peace led to mounting criticism and it faded in the early 1970s. Later, the peace treaty with Egypt furthered the disagreements over issues of national security, and promoted the crystallization of protest groups. Peace Now was founded in 1978 by reserve officers who signed a letter to Prime Minister Begin to accept peace agreement with Egypt. While working as a pressure group to the government, Peace Now was able to mobilize 100,000 citizens in the march to support agreement with Egypt. The members being officers gave them credibility to talk of peace and security. Peace Now became the largest peace movement.

The War of Lebanon brought about a public discourse about the purpose of war and right to refuse to serve in the war for the first time in Israel’s history. The 1982 demonstrations’ motto, was that the war in Lebanon was a “war of choice”. Such motto contained an open questioning of the legitimacy of the war and the authority of the state’s elites to declare and wage war. Yesh Gvul demystified the unconditional obedience to and compliance with military service. It prioritized civilian values to military commands in cases in which they came into open conflict. Mothers against Silence created a discursive space in which motherhood was politicized and turned into a legitimate resource to engage on issues of peace and security. While the politicization of motherhood challenged the war politics of the state, it did not challenge the militaristic gender order.185

At the same time, Mizrahim, the Jewish immigrants from Middle-East countries, started seeking social justice and peace. However, peace movement’s socio-demographic make-up apparently impeded its efforts to mobilize support among the lower classes and non-Ashkenazi Israelis. Israeli peace movements were almost entirely composed of middle-class, highly educated, urban Ashkenazi Jews. This discrepancy created a high cognitive barrier between the activists and the Israeli mainstream.

On the Palestinian side, the 1967 War brought a realization that they could not rely on Arab regimes and needed to take their fate into their own hands. This brought both military and non-military resistance movement. However, by 1974, PLO has taken its first step to take the peace plan to the UN, and in 1984 Arafat explicitly stated his willingness to meet with Israelis, to negotiate a peaceful settlement and to end the longstanding conflict. PLO, mainly Fatah, was the engine for dialogue with Israelis.

By early 1980s, various dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians, mostly between academics and politicians on both sides, started to take place. At this stage, however, the

main Israeli position was the Jordanian Option. Palestinian leadership, also, contemplated
the possibility of a confederation with Jordan. During this period, the two-state-solution,
with two independent sovereign states, was not seriously taken into consideration even
among peace groups, and neither was the human rights condition in the occupied
territories.
Chapter 2: Intifada and Peace Movements

The Intifada erupted in December 1987 as local demonstrations that snowballed into a sweeping popular uprising that did not die down until the convening of the Madrid peace conference at the end of 1991. It was a sustained attempt by the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to throw out the Israeli occupation by means of mass protest, non-cooperation and building of shadow government after more than 20 years of subjugation.

The Intifada invigorated the PLO which was at low ebb in its history after its forced evacuation from Lebanon and the concomitant loss of the military and political option it represented. More important, the Intifada shifted the focal point of the Palestinian national struggle from the “outside” to the “inside”. At the same time, the Intifada also brought the Hamas movement to the center of Palestinian politics in that it presented itself as a national, ideological and organizational alternative to the PLO.

The Intifada reminded the Israeli public of the ongoing problem of the future of the territories and various peace groups emerged in the wake of it.

The popular character of the Intifada generated unprecedented international sympathy for the Palestinians and their struggle against the Israeli occupation. It brought about renewed American diplomacy to further an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement. Less than a year after it erupted, King Hussein of Jordan was compelled to declare his country’s disengagement from the West Bank.

The result was a declaration of independence by the Palestinians in November 1988, in Algeria, followed by the Madrid Peace Process.

According to scholars of nonviolence, such as Gandhi, nonviolent means have the ability to transform the power of self-suffering into the struggle for justice. Through their preparedness to suffer for the cause of truth, he argued, nonviolent activist could convert the oppressor, revealing to them the error of their ways, and to offer them the possibility of joining in the creative struggle towards a better future from which both sides benefit. More recent advocates such as Sharp argue that nonviolence is an efficient means of waging power-politics, its strength lying in its capacity to erode such sources of an oppressor’s power as the morale of the troops and public support at home.186

However, state control of the instruments of communication and education can foster a world view that appears to render its subjects immune to appeals to morality and conscience, denying any claim the victim/opponent might have a common humanity and, indeed,

blaming the victim for whatever horrors are visited upon them. Soldiers can go on obeying morally unjustifiable orders – so long as they define their victims as “other,” separate from themselves and thereby less than fully human.\footnote{Andrew Rigby 1991. \textit{Living the Intifada}. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. p.167.} Therefore, there is very little chance for the nonviolence of the dehumanized to stir the conscience of the oppressors.\footnote{Ibid., p.167.}

Thus, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Galtung argued that whilst nonviolent resistance by Palestinians might exercise only a limited degree of shaming power, actions on their behalf by Israeli sympathizers is likely to have a far greater impact on the morale of the occupying forces and upon Israeli public opinion in general.\footnote{Galtung 1989. p.19.}

From this perspective the role of Israeli peace and protest groups becomes a crucial factor affecting the outcome of the struggle. Acting as the conscience of Israeli society, they can point out to their fellow citizens the costs incurred by the routine transgression of those values to which they claim adherence, raising the specter of social and political division within the society and state, presenting to the wider international community an alternative vision of the future than that adhered to by the political establishment. In so far as they constitute a bridge between the two sides of the struggle, as members of Israeli society and yet feeling some degree of sympathy and even solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the position of such dissidents is not an easy one and not without its contradictions.\footnote{Rigby 1991, p.167.}

This chapter will examine, how the Intifada affected Palestinian society and leaders, how it affected Israeli society through the work of Israeli peace movements, and its effect on international community in this regard.

2.1. The Intifada as Nonviolent Movement

2.1.1. Prelude Intifada

Non-violent protest movements were not new to Palestinians. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent relocation of the PLO to Tunisia in 1982 helped end the myth that liberation could come from outside and led to early forms of self-reliance among Palestinians in the occupied areas.\footnote{Ghassan Andoni 2001. ‘A comparative study of Intifada 1987 and Intifada 2000.’ In Roane Carey ed. \textit{The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid}, London and New York: Verso. p.209.} Massive grassroots movements were founded aimed at self-support and empowering Palestinians in all walks of life.
Just before the start of the Intifada, awareness of non-violent action as the repertoire of the resistance movement spread and forms of popular resistance matured significantly. A statistical analysis of monthly events classified as popular resistance (demonstrations, strikes, petitions, flying flags, etc.) jumped from 933 in 1985 to 1,358 in 1986 to 2,882 in 1987 and novel forms of resistance were created. What was new and unique to the Intifada is that it was a unified and national protest movement with the clear aim of ending the occupation and with a steadfastness lasting over four years.

In Gaza, Intifada’s first resistances were developed in the labor unions. Since 1967, more and more Gazans had been making their living as a source of cheap labor for Israeli employers, and twenty years later national oppression and economic exploitation had become virtually synonymous for most of the Strip’s population. In their leftist orientation some leaders of the unions were a minority among politically organized Palestinians, but their ideological training seemed to have led them toward the kinds of activities that made sense in their world. Gazan workers, having come to know Israel well and their feeling of discrimination and their jealousy of the old Gazan families converged with a pride in being more resilient, more daring, more forceful, and with their aspirations for real personal and national change.

In December 1987, rage washed over Gaza, following the killing of four men from a refugee camp by an Israeli truck. Rigid control of the press and suppression of all political activity quickly made the one-page leaflet – cheaply produced underground and easily distributed on the streets – the Strip’s popular form of mass communication. Leaflets giving instructions, declaring strikes, conveying news, and offering moral support became common; even though the authors remained anonymous and secret, people followed the instructions and received each new leaflet eagerly.

The demand in the leaflets and slogans amounted simply to this: Palestinians wanted their own state and the call was directed not only at Israel but also at Palestinian leaders. The hallmark of the Intifada, however, was that leaflets were signed jointly by rival political organizations.

In Jerusalem and the West Bank, some educational and nonviolent consciousness-raising activities were initiated by the Center for the Study of Nonviolence in Jerusalem headed by Mubarak Awad founded in 1983 with the endorsement of many in the U.S. including Gene Sharp and the Committee Against the Iron Fist Policy. In its first year, the Center engaged in education and outreach, including translation of works of and about Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Gene Sharp and Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

Workshops such as ‘How to Get Your Rights without Firing a Single Shot’ were held. Arabic pamphlets titled ‘Nonviolence in the Occupied Territories’ were distributed in 1983.\textsuperscript{194}

Awad called for civil disobedience. Setting out from the premise that the Palestinians could expect salvation from neither the PLO’s armed forces nor the regular armies of the Arab states, he concluded that only the people themselves could halt the drift toward Israel’s annexation of the territories. Moreover, he set down no less than 120 possible methods of action that included refusing to cooperate with the occupation authorities: refusing to work in Israeli settlements or factories, to cooperate with the military authorities, to produce one’s identity card on demand, and to pay fines or to violate curfews and limitation-of-movement orders.\textsuperscript{195} Awad also called for Boycotts of Israeli goods and services and strikes.

Alongside these moves Awad called for the establishment of alternative institutions (universities, factories, institutions, libraries, hospitals, or schools) or to replace the unjust institutions of occupation. The creation of these institutions would obstruct the process of annexation and “Judaization,” and makes possible a political solution built upon Israeli withdrawal and the creation of an independent Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{196}

One of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence’s first calls to action to Palestinians was to urging them to visit their ancestral homes and explain to current residents the history of the house they were occupying. The reconciliation and outreach visits were to be made in sorrow and love, not in hate or anger.\textsuperscript{197} Another direct action in January 1986 in the village of Qattana came in response to the settlers erecting a fence and destroying an agricultural area belonging to villagers who asked Awad for help. Hundreds gathered and peacefully started to dismantle the fence. The settlers shot and injured seven of them but the work continued until the military arrived. Within a few days, the land was reclaimed by the owners when the military and settlers backed down temporarily.\textsuperscript{198}

During the same period, Awad and his Center tried to help shopkeepers in Hebron whose areas were coveted by settlers and where Israeli soldiers erected barbed wires along the street, searching and harassing those who tried to reach the impacted shops. Some of the actions were filmed by the BBC and others covered by the Israeli media especially when Israeli volunteers joined to help the besieged Palestinians.\textsuperscript{199}

During the early weeks of the Intifada, Awad began personally distributing his leaflets,


\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{197} King 2007, pp.142-3.

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 146-7.

with as much publicity as he could generate, he spent his days racing from one village and refugee camp to the next, reciting his philosophy to the youngsters of the *shabiba*.

Awad addressed the first gathering of Fatah loyalists at the National Palace Hotel on January, 1988. By the end of January, when the Unified Command was forced to consider the direction the Intifada should take, it found that there were few suggestions other than to follow a course of civil disobedience. From the end of January 1988 onward, it began to adopt whole parts of his program as the primary goals of the Intifada. Early in February Awad met with senior members of the local Fatah and proposed that they declare a “Palestinian republic” forthwith. His center’s pamphlets, which for years had stood piled on shelves without any takers, suddenly became the hottest items in town.\(^{200}\)

Awad was criticized in various quarters: from the Israelis, who had an agenda to vilify Palestinians, from Palestinian militants, from skeptics on many sides, or from those who believed he was too idealistic. But he also received support and protection from notable figures like Faisal Hussaini.\(^{201}\) Israel denied Awad his Jerusalem residency and he was arrested on May 5, 1988 and ordered to be deported the next day. Appeals from a U.S. senator and Coretta Scott King were rejected by Prime Minister Shamir. Awad was deported on June 13, 1988.\(^{202}\)

2.1.2. Nonviolent Actions

The third declaration of the United National Leadership of the Resistance issued on January 18, 1988 called for a boycott of all Israeli products for which local alternatives could be sourced and suggested a tax strike and other methods of popular resistance. On February 6 1988, the Leadership called on Palestinians collaborating with the authorities or employed in the Civil Administration, including appointed mayors, to resign and indeed some resigned.\(^{203}\)

One of the most effective uses of boycott as resistance took place in Beit Sahour where residents took control of public affairs. The educational committee, started underground schools when the occupation closed the state schools; the agricultural committee gave seeds to citizens to grow their own vegetables and taught people how to keep rabbits and other small livestock and the tax committee organised a community refusal to pay taxes to the occupation.\(^{204}\)

---


\(^{201}\) King 2007, pp.145, 156-7.

\(^{202}\) Schiff and Ya’ari 1991, p.245.


\(^{204}\) Ma’an Development Center, 2009. “Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions: lessons learned in
These efforts made the global headlines, primarily because Israel retaliated with violent reprisals including placing the town under curfew for 42 days, cutting telephone lines and attempting to bar reporters from the town. Israeli forces imprisoned around 40 residents and stopped several consul-generals when they attempted to go to Beit Sahour and investigate the conditions during the tax strike. Furthermore, millions of dollars in cash and property were taken from individuals and businesses who refused to pay taxes or file tax returns.\textsuperscript{205}

Through the local Committee the community participated in setting up systems of self reliance. For instance, people donated money to purchase cows to start their own dairy produce and others volunteered to distribute the milk amongst the people.\textsuperscript{206} As a result, Beit Sahour was nominated for the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize and received the annual award of the Danish Peace Foundation in 1990. Their resistance continued until 1995 when the Palestinian Authority took over.\textsuperscript{207}

The Intifada also had a negative impact on the Israeli economy.\textsuperscript{208} According to the Bank of Israel, the Intifada cost Israel $650 million in 1988 in export losses. According to Director of the Defense Ministry’s budget department, Brig. Gen. Michael Navon, the immediate military cost of fighting the Palestinian uprising in the territories was expected to reach approximately $1.8 billion – more than $2 million per day – by the end of fiscal year 1990.\textsuperscript{209}

The Intifada met with a brutal response by the Israeli military. During the first two years of the Intifada, 795 Palestinians died in the territories at the hands of Israeli soldiers and civilians.\textsuperscript{210} Tens of thousands of others were injured from bullets and clubbing, an estimated 48,000 Palestinians were arrested and detained for three days or more.\textsuperscript{211} Other forms of army brutality have included intimidation of civilians after imposing curfew or the sealing or demolition of houses: during the first two years of the uprising some 250 houses

\textsuperscript{205}Ibid., p.6.
\textsuperscript{206}Ibid., p.6.
\textsuperscript{207}Ibid., p.6.
\textsuperscript{210}From Al-Haq data bank and annual reports: \textit{Middle East International}, 15 December 1989, p.3. cited in Shehadeh 1991, p.32.
\textsuperscript{211}Shehadeh 1991, p.32.
were sealed or destroyed for “security” reasons. Reinforcing the violence of the army was that of the settlers, who, like many Israeli citizens, were in possession of firearms and other military equipment. On 28 February 1988, for example, settlers from the West Bank settlement of Halamesh, accompanied by Israeli soldiers, attacked the village of ‘Abbud near Ramallah. Soldiers illuminated the area while the settlers opened fire on the villagers, killing two.

Though bloody clashes continued to erupt all over the territories, the real battle was now over the de facto self-rule that the population was trying to put into practice. In effect, the hundreds of violent incidents had become a smoke screen for the effort to build a “shadow administration” as the stamp of a state-in-making. The initial enthusiasm for driving the army out of the territories had been replaced by the more sophisticated aim of undermining Israel’s rule as a whole. The more the insurgents had to concede the army’s great advantage in street skirmishes, the more they invested in bringing down the Civil Administration and replacing it with an independent, grass-roots arrangement. By the early spring, what had begun as a wild lashing out at the troops had turned into a graduated assault on the machinery of occupation by a competing structure that answered to the Unified Command. And just as the IDF had been unable to quell the violence in the territories, so the Civil Administration found that it was losing ground to the institutions of self-rule that were meant to supplant it.

By the spring of 1988, a sprawling network of popular committees was functioning in one form or another in every city, village, and camp, spreading the web of the uprising’s machinery to the farthest corners of the territories. Health committees cared for the wounded who refused to turn to the hospitals for fear of being arrested. Groups of doctors and nurses gave lessons in first aid and were sometimes assigned to serve as paramedics at processions and demonstrations. Women’s committees specialized in collecting donations for the needy, running blood banks for hospitals, passing out propaganda leaflets, educating housewives against waste, and looking after the families of the dead, wounded, and detained. Education committees tried to organize classes in youth clubs and private homes after the Civil Administration closed the schools in February 1988. Judicial committees formed to settle disagreements, in place of the court system, and often based their ruling on the rural-popular legal tradition to stress their dissociation from both Jordanian and Israeli law. The lands committee of Sur Baher, one of the Arab villages located within Jerusalem’s municipal boundary, urged its residents to lay claim to every empty lot in the village, lest it be expropriated “for a Jewish settlement.” As a result, the villagers began feverishly laying foundations for houses they never intended to build. Agriculture committees encouraged the

212 Ibid., p.34.
213 Ibid., p.34.
214 Schiff and Ya’ari 1991, p.245.
cultivation of abandoned plots.215

Local activists’ immediate aim was not to open negotiations with the Israelis but to sustain the momentum of the uprising, to create a context in which the PLO’s demand for an international peace conference would be heard and to help set the agenda for any such conference.216

However, the longer it lasted, the more the Intifada shifted from civil rebellion – demonstration, work strikes and a boycott of Israeli products – to increasingly uncontrolled violence against both Israel and internal “traitors.” At the same time, the Intifada also brought the Hamas movement to the center of Palestinian politics. Hamas called on Palestinians to abide by the basic goals of the Palestinian national struggle, above all the liberation of Palestine “from the river to the sea.”

2.2. Peace Movement in Israel

Israeli policy toward the Palestinians always contained a large element of denial: denial of rights, of legitimacy, of voice. Not surprisingly, the initial Israeli response to the uprising was to deny: that it was an uprising; that “normal” measures were insufficient to control it; and that it articulated the feelings of the majority of the population.217

Most Israelis had learned to ignore what was happening in the territories through the first twenty years of occupation, but with the outbreak of rebellion there, terrible stories began to surface. Now, on top of the twenty years of oppression, new episodes were revealed of the brutality of Israeli soldiers trying to quell the uprising. More generally, the reaction of the Israeli liberal public was enormous revulsion and guilt. Thus Israeli liberals, at first wrote letters to the editor, then composed, signed, and circulated petitions and published them. Hundreds of paid ads appeared in newspapers during this period by Israelis calling upon the authorities to end the harsh retaliation. For many in the right wing in Israel, the Intifada meant getting tough and clamping down on the Palestinians — the “iron fist policy” as the government and media called it. But for others, the real question now emerged, a question that had lurked in the shadows for so many years: how to end the occupation. The radical left in Israel had long framed the question this way, and finally this formulation was accepted by large swathes of the population.218

215 Ibid., p.247.
217 Ibid., p.35.
2.2.1. Calls To End Occupation

**Dai Lakibush (End the Occupation),** was a leading component of the peace movement in the early stages of the Intifada. The political composition and militancy of Dai Lakibush were keys to its relative success. Its main slogans were, in addition to ending the occupation, negotiations with the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel and negotiating peace in the framework of an international conference.\(^{219}\) The activists of Dai Lakibush come from three main sources: members of left-wing organizations who participated as an expression of their broader political vision; unaffiliated veterans of previous campaigns for peace; and a wave of new activists. For most of the latter this was the first time they felt a sense of responsibility and dedication to the success of a political project. All participants in Dai Lakibush acted as individuals, though the relations between previously organized elements (such as the Communist Party or the Israeli Socialist Left) affected the dynamics of the organization. It adopted a loose, spontaneous style of operation with no formal membership, and anyone attending the weekly meetings (up to forty or fifty people) had a say in discussions.\(^{220}\)

Dai Lakibush's main contribution to the peace movement has been its readiness to go into the streets to vent its outrage over the rising tide of cruelty and repression. It demonstrated more than any other group, repeatedly launching timely rallies and vigils against fresh acts of brutality. It has also sought to develop new forms of activity to express solidarity with the Palestinians, such as weekly educational visits to villages and refugee camps in the territories which allowed many Israelis to hear first-hand reports of the courageous popular resistance against an occupying army composed of their own relatives and neighbors. Dai Lakibush has also brought Palestinians to house meetings in Israel to talk about the impact of the Intifada on their towns, villages and camps.\(^{221}\)

During the first weeks of the Intifada, thousands of Israelis signed an extraordinary document entitled **“The Twenty-First Year Covenant for the Struggle Against the Occupation.”** The Covenant was premised on the analysis that the occupation has permeated all aspects of Israeli society, economy, education, the judicial system and culture, and caused the debasement of the Hebrew language and political thought. It also outlined a new approach to struggle against the occupation, speaking in terms of “refusal to

---

\(^{219}\) Kaminer 1989, p.233.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., p.233.

\(^{221}\) Ibid., p.235.
collaborate,” “resistance” and willingness “to pay a personal price,” and offered some suggestions for possible actions: boycotting goods produced by Israeli settlements in the territories and non-compliance with orders to participate in acts of repression.\textsuperscript{222}

The Twenty-First Year (Ha'Shana Ha'Esrim v'Achat) organized a sub-committee which sends Israelis to serve as witnesses of the occupation, in the hope that the physical presence of Israeli protesters may prevent some excesses by the military, the project known as “Edei Kibush” (Witness of Occupation).\textsuperscript{223} Those who personally came to contact with Palestinians came to identify with the suffering they witnessed. One participant said:

“Once you go into the area you cannot avoid certain level of identification with the other. You cannot look at the Palestinians only as an instrument for your political struggle. You meet human suffering and you cannot maintain your exclusive orientation on the Israeli side of the tragedy. You must cross a crucial line. You are no longer only an Israeli who comes to visit; you become in a certain way also an occupied Palestinian.”\textsuperscript{224}

These moves were significant achievements in terms of seeing the other as humans. However, it was also the reason people became reluctant to go into the territories. As one organizer of Edei Kibush states, “at first we thought people were afraid of the Intifada, but soon we understood that people were afraid to cross a certain boundary. They were afraid that it would bring them to view the entire conflict from the perspective of the Palestinians.”\textsuperscript{225}

Imprisonment was another hindrance to the participants. Members of the Twenty-First Year protesting in the West Bank were apprehended by the IDF, charged with illegally entering a closed area, and accused of inciting Palestinians in the town. For some of the activists this was a traumatic experience, while for others it served a source of pride and strength. The prison experience eventually brought some people to the realization that they were not ready to pay the price.\textsuperscript{226}

Other committees have organized seminars for high school students on the problem of military service during the occupation.\textsuperscript{227}

Though it has been the most widely recognized peace group both in Israel and abroad, Peace Now did not move beyond the Israeli-Jewish national consensus on the Palestinian question. It has generally supported the Labor Party’s vague formulation of “territorial compromise” for peace and endorsed Peres’ efforts to implement the Jordanian option. Peace

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., p.238.
\textsuperscript{223} Bar-On 1996, p.225.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p.226.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid., p.226.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., p.227.
\textsuperscript{227} Kaminer 1989, p.239.
Now did not call for Israeli negotiations with the PLO until nearly a year after the beginning of the Intifada. While recognizing in principle the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, Peace Now has not demanded the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; it has never advocated Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967; and it has supported the annexation of Jerusalem, echoing the official line about the “unified” character of the city.  

By January 1988, Peace Now was able to mobilize tens of thousands of Israelis to demonstrate against government policy in the occupied territories, but it remained very cautious. Its call for a demonstration on January 23, 1988 advocated “returning the territories to Jordanian-Palestinian rule on the basis of demilitarization and security arrangements.” Peace Now reaffirmed its commitment to the Jordanian option by calling for elections in the occupied territories after “cessation of violence on the West Bank and Gaza, and terror from outside.” The election would choose representatives who would join “the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to negotiate peace with Israel.”

The increase interaction between Israelis and Palestinians and the broader opportunities for Jewish-Arab cooperation in opposition to the occupation gradually eroded Peace Now’s allegiance to the Jordanian option. With the failure of the Shultz initiative left Peace Now without a political program. Its way out of the Intifada was blocked when King Hussein relinquished any role in speaking and acting for the Palestinians.

Peace Now established a group called “Settlements Watch,” in 1990, which monitored and publicized all settlement construction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The team’s findings were verified and compiled into reports presented to the public and media. The accelerated pace of construction in the territories was deemed a gross misuse of resources desperately needed for the absorption of the immigrants elsewhere, as well as an unnecessary provocation that angered the Arabs and alienated the Americans. As Peace Now intensified its activities during the spring and summer of 1990, its confrontations with the radical right became increasingly acrimonious. Early in June the Jerusalem office of Peace Now was torched (Rabbi Meir Kahane’s Kach movement claimed responsibility). Many activists received threats to their lives and those of their families and the car of Goldblum, the director of the Settlement Watch project, was burned.

---

228 Ibid., p.232.
233 Ibid., p.269.
234 Ibid., p.269.
2.2.2. New Security Discourse

**Yesh Gvul** (There is a Limit) achieved prominence after 2,500 reserve soldiers signed its petition to the government asking that they not be sent to serve in Lebanon. On December 24, 1987, just two weeks after the start of the uprising, Yesh Gvul released a statement announcing that more than one hundred reserve soldiers had already notified the IDF that they intend to refuse orders to “participate in the killing and brutal suppression.” The movement declared that they “could no longer share the burden of responsibility for this moral and political deterioration.”

Yesh Gvul published a small booklet and distributed widely to soldiers passing through urban centers. It featured selections from the Geneva Conventions, court judgments and statements by eminent jurists arguing that soldiers who carried out orders to beat and victimize defenseless prisoners were not legally protected by the claim that they were merely obeying orders. An illegal order, the booklet argued, is no defense for war crimes. As a result of this publication the General Security Service (Shin Bet) whose policy of torturing detainees under interrogation was previously exposed in an official report, initiated an investigation of Yesh Gvul. The Israel Broadcasting Authority decided that it would no longer permit television news reports of Yesh Gvul demonstrations (the ban was later lifted).

By the end of 1989 more than 150 soldiers had gone to jail for refusing to serve in the territories, more than 2,000 soldiers either refused or requested not to serve in suppressing the Intifada and were subsequently dismissed by their commanders. Some spoke of “grey refusal” in which thousands of soldiers found ways to avoid serving in the territories without directly refusing their orders.

Refusal to serve in the military is highly controversial in those sections of the peace movement that have sought to avoid isolating themselves from the national consensus. The leaderships of Peace Now, Mapam and the CRM have all strongly opposed this tactic arguing, first, that the liberal forces have an interest in upholding the rule of law and respect for civic obligations because the right, especially the settlers, has repeatedly threatened to rebel against the authority of a democratically elected government that might order an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; second, that the presence of liberals and humanists in the army can positively influence what happens “on the ground” and make a difference in the battle for influence over the direction of the military.

To Yesh Gvul it was inconceivable that these groups could oppose the methods being

---

235 Kaminer 1989, p.236.
236 Ibid., p.236.
employed in suppressing the Intifada while encouraging their members to obey their orders as reservists in the territories. This position was cynically characterized with the phrase, “They shoot and weep.”

Yesh Gvul’s appeal has in many cases transcended divisions within the peace movement. When thousands of mobilization orders are issued every month, many who oppose government policy must make a moral choice. Many if not most of those who have refused have had little prior contact with the militant left. Refusal may be the first political act of their lives that places them beyond the boundaries of the national consensus.

The approach of the Twenty-First Year and Yesh Gvul was similar in that both tried to appeal to personal moral responsibility and to striving for a new politics of refusal to cross certain “red lines.”

Not only pertaining to young soldiers and reservists, protest to occupation came from high ranking officers as well. The Council for Peace and Security was formed in April 1988, its objectives as “advocating the position that peace is essential for Israel’s security, disputing the belief that the territories are essential for Israel’s security, and convincing the public that security depends on the IDF, not on territories.

Coming from the highest ranks of the military and academia, which included 34 major generals, 86 brigadier generals, and 115 colonels, joined by more than 200 economists, ex-diplomats, and academic experts in international politics and Middle Eastern affairs, these “peace generals” received considerable media attention for their activities. Most were not members of a particular party, but sympathized with the Labor Party and its foreign affairs and defense policies.

During 1988, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) at Tel Aviv University led an effort to identify and assess Israel’s different political and territorial options within the context of a negotiated settlement. Several study groups brought together Jaffee Center scholars and specialists in military strategy and Middle East politics. The importance of the Jaffee Center report was that it provided first-rank academic legitimization for the Palestinian demand for an independent state. It presented this option for public debate, not only on an emotional and moral basis, but as a practical, logical solution.

2.2.3. Women’s Groups

---


241 Ibid., p.239.

242 Bar-On 1996, p.239.

243 Ibid., p.239.
Before the Intifada began, there were three women’s organizations in Israel dedicated to ‘peace and coexistence’: TANDI (The Movement of Democratic Women in Israel); Gesher (The Bridge); and the Israel branch of WILPF (the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). A much higher proportion of Israeli-Arab than Israeli-Jewish women participated in these organizations. Soon after the start of the Intifada, an additional seven women’s peace organizations suddenly appeared, and managed to recruit many women who had never previously been politically active.244

According to Svirsky, Israeli women formed women organizations at least for two reasons: when the intifada broke out, women were not visible among the Peace Now leadership, let alone in political parties or the Knesset; the nature of the intifada was clearly a popular uprising in which children and women were full participants. Svirsky recalls that “the scenes of children being beaten, of women marching in front of the stone-throwers, of poverty and oppression brought about by the actions of Israeli society, whether by omission or commission, all evoked strong feelings among Israeli women, some out of rising defensiveness and others out of compassion. These were compounded by the distress that it was “our men” – brothers, sons, fathers – who were sent to put down the teenagers, the women, and the mobs. Whether one regarded the Palestinian stone-throwers as freedom fighters or not, they were surely not armed troops, and sending Israeli armed troops against them raised complex feelings of confusion, if not shame.246

Professor Galia Golan phrased it thus: “perhaps the intifada spoke to women in a way that other wars had not. This was not only husbands and sons making war, not armies, but rebellion of women and children. Perhaps this spoke to the hearts of women.”247 Naomi Chazan has said, “This is not a struggle of tanks but a people’s struggle. And the issues of self-determination and equality have special meaning for women.”248

Hanan Ashrawi, a Palestinian women leader, points out the most determining factor in the emergence of Israeli women’s consciousness – of making the link between gender issues and national/political issue – came with the Intifada. The prominent role that Palestinian women played was, in a way, a challenge to Israeli women. “They started trying to reach us on a feminist basis … to work together on common agendas – gender self-determination and national self-determination.”249

244 These were Shani (Israeli Women Against the Occupation); the Women’s Organization for Women Political Prisoners; the Peace Cloth; Neled (Israeli Women for Coexistence); Reshet (Women’s Network for the Advancement of Peace); the Women and Peace Coalition; and Women in Black.
245 Svirsky 1996, Chapter 4.
246 Ibid., Chapter 4.
Women in Black gather once a week, every Friday at 1PM for one hour, in Paris Square, a five minute walk from the center of Jerusalem. Women in Black are all dressed in black and they are mourning. Each carries a small sign in the form of a palm containing one simple and short message: End the Occupation, and stand silently. No banners and no speeches. In addition to protesting Israel’s policy toward the Intifada, the Women in Black also seek “to introduce a uniquely feminine voice into the customary all-male discourse on security affairs... and [one that] would not allow for exclusion of women from this crucial discourse.\textsuperscript{250}

However, because it is a women only vigil, the reactions of many male drivers – often vulgar and sexual – were extraordinary. For some men, the vigil evoked a visceral response to seeing a wall of women looking powerful, intimidating, and – what’s worse – flaunting a political opinion, no less an opinion different than theirs. But the women seemed to be used to these sometimes obscene gestures by passerby and even empowered by them.\textsuperscript{251}

The Jerusalem-based Shani (Israeli Women Against the Occupation) centers its activity around bi-weekly discussions. Meetings, often featuring Palestinian speakers, focused on general political questions and specific aspects of the occupation such as children, education, health and the role of women in the Intifada. Many Shani members have little or no prior political experience, and the meetings are conducted in a supportive educational atmosphere. The success of the Jerusalem Shani group, the activity of feminist groups in Tel Aviv and Haifa and the appearance of other women’s organizations (like Women for Political Prisoners) have enlarged the autonomous role of women in the peace movement.\textsuperscript{252}

When it became clear that the occupation and the Intifada were not important enough subjects to get on the agenda of the First International Jewish Feminist Conference in Jerusalem in late November 1988, activists from Shani and other women’s groups organized a highly successful post-conference meeting entitled “Occupation or Peace: A Feminist Perspective.”\textsuperscript{253}

By the end of 1988 a coalition was formed under the name Reshet - Women and Peace Network, which for the first time included both Jewish and Palestinian women. On December 29, 1988, an impressive “March through the Lines” was organized. Four thousand Israeli and Palestinian women joined arms and marched across the line that had divided east and west Jerusalem before 1967. The marches called for “Two States for Two People”

\textsuperscript{251} Author’s observation in the Summer of 2009.
\textsuperscript{252} Kaminer 1989, p.242.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., p.242.
and the end of enmity and occupation. Its “Call for Peace” declared:

We, Palestinian and Israeli women, share a vision of freedom and equality. We are joined in a common struggle against discrimination, oppression and subjugation of any type, be it on the basis of gender, religion or nationality...We therefore affirm that each people has the right to live in its own state within secure and recognized boundaries...the government of Israel must negotiate with the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people, the PLO.

During the later months of 1989 and much of 1990 (until the August invasion of Kuwait) Reshet organized meetings in all major Israeli cities at which Palestinian women presented their views to Israeli women. Similarly, Israeli women were invited to Palestinian homes and women’s institutions. As Hazan-Rokem, an anthropologist from the Hebrew University and an organizer of these encounters, later commented:

It is easier for women to cross the lines of hatred. Even though most Israeli women served in the army, they were never involved in combat and were not likely to have served in the occupied territories on reserve duties like Israeli men frequently did. Each side felt a need to inform the other of its own fears and concerns. The Palestinian women found it difficult to realize that Israelis have genuine fears, since they were immersed in their own fears as occupied people. We too needed to understand better, in simple human terms, how it feels when your home is no longer your castle.

**Peace Quilt**: Some 5000 Israeli women participated in the creation of a cloth made up of individual squares – each embodying a personal statement about peace. The quilt, about 200 meters in length, was started in January 1988 and was eventually displayed in front of the Knesset in June of that year as a symbolic peace cloth for the negotiating table.

**Women for Women Political Prisoners (WOPP)** was formed in May 1988 in response to the harassment of Palestinian women by the security forces with the aim of providing support to women who have been imprisoned in Israeli jails for their social and political resistance activity and whom WOPP consider to be “political prisoners.” Its work has developed on a number of fronts: as a relief agency through visiting prisoners, collecting and distributing food and clothing for their families, and engaging in other forms of welfare activity. It has also worked to arouse Israeli and international opinion against the denial of prisoner’s basic rights: illegal arrests and administrative detentions: lack of the proper

255 Ibid., p.243.
medical care, particularly for pregnant women; the refusal of the authorities to allow breast-feeding women to keep their children with them in prison; or using women prisoners as hostages to bring pressure to bear on their family and friends.\textsuperscript{258}

In many ways the Intifada contributed to “the predominance of women participating in political activism.” The Arab- Israeli conflict was no longer a war between men fought on distant battlefields but a clash in which entire populations, including women and children, were deeply involved. Prior to the Intifada, fewer women than men were active in Israeli peace work, and most of these in mixed-gender organizations, not independent women’s groups. From the outbreak of the Intifada, however, women seemed to form the majority of the rank and file in the mixed peace organizations, as well as setting up their own peace movement.\textsuperscript{259}

2.2.4. Human Rights Groups

New trends in Israel peace groups emerged focusing on monitoring and reporting on the dramatic deterioration in human rights (i.e. collective punishment, many casualties among unarmed Palestinian civilians).

\textbf{B’Tselem (“In the image”), the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselm)} was established in 1989 with the aim of providing an authoritative monitoring and publicizing of human rights abuses in the territories by means of monthly and special reports and parliamentary questions placed by some Knesset members who are on its board. As an Israeli human right organization, it acts primarily to change Israeli policy in the occupied territories and ensure that the Israeli government protects the human rights of the territories’ residents and complies with its obligations under international law. Throughout the years B’Tselem’s activities received extensive media coverage, and the organization was viewed by the press a reliable source of information.

From the outset B’tselm hoped to remain apolitical and nonpartisan. Nevertheless, it was impossible to avoid the public impression that B’tselem’s work clearly implied political opposition to the occupation, and the organization was seen as a part of the peace movement. At the same time, some on the radical left accused B’tselem of implicitly legitimizing the occupation by dealing only with its symptoms rather than its causes.

B’Tselem received (in association with its Palestinian equivalent, Al Haq) a Jimmy Carter Award for “profound commitment to human decency and the protection of human

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., p.180.
\textsuperscript{259} Svirsky 1996. Chapter 4.
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) is a largest human rights group in Israel and joined other organizations on the issue of deportation of Palestinians who were lacking proper residency permits required by the authorities. By the end of 1989 some 250 Palestinians, mainly wives and children, had been deported to Jordan because they did not have the necessary “legal” status for permanent residence according to the military government. In June 1990, it was announced that the 250 expellees would be allowed to return.

Rabbis for Human Rights consists of a coalition of rabbis from all streams who gathered in December 1988 to stress the moral imperatives of Judaism and to declare themselves against the growing acts of humiliation, degradation and abasement against the Palestinian people. In acting as a pressure group to bring about changes in Israeli policy, its members have drawn upon their religious credentials to add weight and legitimacy to their task.

Physician for Human Rights was established in late 1988. Health services in the occupied territories were inadequate and the casualties produced by the Intifada strained the already limited resources. The group provided medical services in cases where facilities in the territories were inadequate. Additionally, it monitored medical care in military prisons and regularly questioned the authorities about the treatment of detained Palestinians.

2.3. Joint Groups and Meetings

The resolutions of the PNC in Algeria in November, 1988, transformed the political outlook and infused new energy into the peace movement. Within days of the PNC decisions, Peace Now, in a major policy shift, came out clearly and without reservations for negotiations with the PLO.\textsuperscript{260} Joint institutions and programmes mushroomed in this period, providing venues for dialogues and joint actions.

Meetings between Peace Now and a group of Palestinian leaders became routine and created an effective channel of communication for both sides. Conversely, the Palestinians recognized that the contacts Peace Now maintained with many Labor and leftist members of Knesset were limited in terms of access to the Israeli political establishment since policy

\textsuperscript{260} Kaminer 1989, p.245.
decisions concerning peace and security remained in the hands of the Likud.

**Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Project** (IPPRP) undertaken by the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University and Faysal Husseini’s Arab Studies Society of Jerusalem 1989 was the first comprehensive cooperative action ever undertaken by the two sides. It published 22 papers on some of the thorniest issues of the conflict: territory and boundaries, security dimension, Jerusalem, settlements, economic relations, water resources, Palestinians in Israel, democracy, and education for coexistence.²⁶¹

**Search for Common Ground** was a decade long Track II project started to bring together former diplomats, high-ranking military officers, parliamentarians, journalists, and academics.

**The Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information** (IPCRI) was founded in 1988 by Israeli educator Gershon Baskin and Adel Yahia, a history teacher at Bir Zeit University and a member of the Palestinian Communist Party. IPCRI recruited a number of prominent Israelis and Palestinians to form a board of trustees. It defined itself as “a think tank of Israelis and Palestinians aimed at providing concrete solutions for the future public policy and planning regarding the two state solution.” The joint teams identified seven issues on which they would focus their attention: among them were the future of Jerusalem; border arrangements; allocation and development of water resources; refugee settlement; or the link between the West Bank and Gaza.

**The Alternative Information Center (AIC)** was established in 1984, by Michael Warschawski and Mazpen members and some activists of the Palestinian left as an institutionally joint, unified and binational Palestinian-Israeli organization that prioritizes political advocacy, critical analysis and information sharing on the Palestinian and Israeli societies as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.²⁶² Its raison d’etre was the desire to work for a common strategic vision, capable in due course of mobilizing Palestinians and Israelis in the same struggle for the future.²⁶³

**Co-authorship** was another type of joint academic work done by Palestinian and Israeli academics. A joint book, *No Trumpets, No Drums*,²⁶⁴ book tries to outline a set of overall principles which authors believe should guide Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

---

²⁶³ Ibid., p.111.
Amongst the protest groups that drew participants from particular sections of Israeli society, were a large number of “professional” organizations and committees. Their activity might consist of little more than sending occasional letters to the press or publishing statements expressing concern, but more often it went beyond that.

Professionals formed Mental Health Workers for the Advancement of Peace, issuing petitions and organizing conferences and meetings to warn about the implications of the occupation on the mental health of young soldiers and their victims. Thus in June 1988, a conference of 600 mental health workers, including Jews and Arabs, convened, bypassing previously existing professional organizations and called on members of the profession to become more involved in the events in the territories. The statement issued at the end of the conference called for more people to join the protest against the destructive occupation.\footnote{Advertisement, \textit{Hadashot}, January 29, 1988. Cited in Kaminer 1989, p.240.}

The mental health workers’ conference was marked by a high level of cooperation between Israeli psychologists, both Jews and Arabs, and psychologists from the occupied territories. At the conclusion of the meeting the participants formed Mental Health Workers for Social Responsibility.\footnote{Kaminer 1989, p.240.}

Committee of Jewish and Arab Creative Writers: Creative writers and artists organized themselves into a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee: Israeli and Palestinian Writers, Artists and Academics Against the Occupation and for Peace and Freedom to Create! In June 1988 they signed what they claimed to be the first peace treaty between Israelis and Palestinians, thereby illustrating in the words of one of their member, “that it was possible to reach a compromise, with pain and gritted teeth. For the sake of the future of the two peoples, whose common interest was to live together and not die together.”\footnote{Rigby 1991, p.177.}

Academics in Tel Aviv formed Ad Cun (Thus Far and No Further), inviting guest lecturers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, holding seminars, teach-ins and sit-ins, protesting in particular against the closure of Palestinian universities, seeking to draw upon their professional status and expertise to add weight to their political interventions.

Other professional groups that have organized against the occupation include medical school teachers and students, painters and sculptors, musicians, performing artists, ceramicists, lawyers, writers, architects and physicians. The strength and level of activity of the professional groups has varied widely. Many cooperate closely with their Palestinian counterparts and there has been much solidarity work that has gone unnoticed by the media. These organizations indicate the extent to which opposition to the occupation has

266 Kaminer 1989, p.240.  
267 Rigby 1991, p.177.}
sunk deep roots in certain sectors of Israeli society.\textsuperscript{268}

In 1979 Faisal Husseini, a leading Fatah figure in Jerusalem and later a key leader in nonviolent resistance in Jerusalem, along with a small group of Palestinian intellectuals, founded the \textit{Arab Studies Society} in Orient House. With an Israeli colleague, Gideon Spiro, Husseini set up a number of ad hoc committees in defense of Palestinian rights. These committees evolved in the early 1980s into the \textit{Committee Confronting the Iron Fist} and held demonstrations calling for an end to deportations, administrative detentions and other Israeli practices that contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention. The committee was one of the first Palestinian-led groups to involve Israelis and implicitly accept the idea of a two-state solution. The office in Orient House was raided on July 31, 1988 and documents seized that showed he had been working on a Declaration of Independence for a Palestinian State. The documents reveal a highly developed vision of asserting authority in areas liberated from the occupation via Palestinian self-governance.\textsuperscript{269}

Informal meetings and dialogue occurred in a variety of ways and by different bodies throughout the 1970s and 1980s – often at the risk to the participants’ jobs, reputations and very lives. Hanan Ashrawi refers to these various dialogue efforts that took place around the world in workshops, seminars and conferences “rehearsal negotiations” and writes:

“...we met, debated, agreed and argued how to unite and resolve the Gordian knot of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. We approached it from different angles and with a variety of tools, knowing full well that we were the advance team carrying out preliminary explorations and trial runs in preparation for the real event.”\textsuperscript{270}

2.4. The Madrid Peace Process to the Oslo Secret Channel

The popular character of the Intifada generated unprecedented international sympathy for the Palestinians and their struggle against the Israeli occupation. Even in the United States, as the nightly news was filled with images of Palestinian children being attacked by a brutal Israeli army, the old image of Israel as the valiant but outgunned David facing an Arab Goliath was turned on its head.\textsuperscript{271} The rise of this pro-Palestinians sympathy factor

\textsuperscript{268} Kaminer 1989, p.240-241.
\textsuperscript{269} Qumsiyeh 2011, p.156.
among Americans translates into support for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, and for PLO participation in peace negotiations. In a poll conducted by Gallup in February 26-March 7, 1988, asking nationwide sample if they “favor or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank,” of those who were aware of the events in the region, 41 percent favor an independent state, while only 23 percent opposed the idea.\(^{272}\)

Initially, the Intifada brought about renewed American diplomacy to further an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian settlement. But less than a year after it erupted, King Hussein of Jordan was compelled to declare his country’s disengagement from the West Bank putting an end to the illusion of a “Jordanian option”. The immediate result was a declaration of independence by the Palestinians in November 1988, in Algeria.

Following these developments, Israel’s national unity government came out with a peace initiative in May 1989, which for the first time in the history of the conflict categorized the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the primary side in negotiations for the future of those areas.

George Bush Sr., having promised to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the Gulf War, pushed hard to convene an international conference. US linkage between the loan guarantees and a freeze on settlements in the occupied territories pressured Israel to the conference. While the PLO was not officially invited to Madrid in October 1991, the Palestinian delegation to the talks clearly was coordinating and consulting regularly with the PLO leadership in Tunis.

At the beginning of the Madrid Peace Process, the same youngsters who during the previous four years had regularly thrown stones at Israeli soldiers now handed them olive branches. Arafat’s supporters in the Gaza Strip organized a peace demonstration, shook hands with the occupiers, and tied balloons to the soldiers’ jeeps. When the delegates to Madrid Conference returned to the territories, they were given a hero’s welcome.\(^{273}\) Yet while on the Israeli side there was little public euphoria, but polls showed substantial support for the peace initiative. In one poll 92 percent supported Shamir’s decision to go to Madrid, although only 56 percent expected that the conference would result in peace. The question of territorial compromise in exchange for peace still divided the nation into roughly equal halves, for and against. However, in a poll conducted in November 1991, the question “If the establishment of a Palestinian state turned out to be the last obstacle to peace, would you agree to concede?” produced an unprecedented 84 percent affirmative response.\(^{274}\)

Palestinian leaders in the occupied territories launched an effort to increase popular


support for the peace process. Led by Sari Nusseibeh, apparently with the consent of PLO headquarters in Tunis, Fatah activists organized political action committees in a numbers of Palestinian towns and resumed their contacts with the Israeli peace movement.\(^{275}\)

With victory in the June 1992 election Labor declared its intention to pursue peace and a political breakthrough as its main goal, and a majority of the Israeli public approved. At the same time, Rabin’s victory was no less due to his reputation as “Mr. Security”. He was former chief of staff of the IDF and defense minister during the first Intifada, whose concern for Israel’s security was paramount.\(^{276}\) In other words, although Israeli society had authorized Rabin to go ahead with the bilateral and unilateral talks within the Madrid framework Israelis also expected him to safeguard the country’s security.

The Labor Party announced new approach to peace in that Israel would have to deal with the Palestinians in the occupied territories, who would select their political representatives through elections facilitated by Israel. It also acknowledged Jordan’s continued importance because peace on Israel’s eastern border would not be possible without Jordanian involvement. The revised process would follow the two-phase model established in the Camp David Accords: an interim phase with extended autonomy for the Palestinians in the territories would be followed by the beginning of negotiations that culminating in a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians in the territories and Jordan.\(^{277}\)

Soon the absence of progress in the formal Track I negotiations in Washington, D.C. was seen to be a result of the parties still being locked in their long-time attitudes of mutual hostility. It was then that Track II conferences among scholars acted as a legitimating forum in which both sides could meet, thereby avoiding officially sanctioned restrictions. The guise of academic conferences protected the participants, and even drew considerable (albeit silent) official observation by both the PLO and the Israeli government.

**Norway Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO)** from 1992 to 1993 facilitated Track II meetings that developed into official negotiation and to Oslo Agreement. The initial meeting was proposed by Hanan Ashrawi mediated by Terje Larsen between Israeli academic Yair Hirschfeld of Haifa University with PLO official, Ahmed Qurai (Abu Alaa), the head of the PLO Finance Department. Hirschfeld called his friend Ron Pundak, affiliated with Hebrew University and Abu Ala was accompanied by Hassan Asfour.

Hirschfeld had three important advantages: he was a scholar with a good knowledge of the political and psychological conditions of the peace process; he already had experience in


dialogues with Palestinians; and he was well connected to the Israeli establishment.\textsuperscript{278} Hirschfeld had been a member of the Labor Party for many years and was active in its different dovish circles. He knew Yossi Beilin from this circle. Immediately after his meeting with Abu Alaa, Hirschfeld called Beilin and Beilin encouraged him to continue to explore the new channel.

Terje Larsen was connected to Norway’s Foreign Ministry through his wife, Mona Juul, and was able to obtain facilities away from the public eye in which the talks could take place. Johan Joergen Holst, Norway’s minister of foreign affairs, took charge of planning meetings. By the end of April 1993 the Oslo group produced a draft document that received enough interest of Israeli and Palestinian leaders to warrant the upgrading of their representation. Israel sent Uri Savir, the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a seasoned diplomat, and Joel Singer, a legal adviser to the ministry and a confidant to the prime minister in May to take over the negotiations. The PLO sent Mahmoud Abbas, a close confidant of Arafat’s and senior members of its Executive Committee. The Oslo track had become an official diplomatic effort. At this stage, Arafat and Rabin carefully examined the draft and after numerous revisions, the final version of the Declaration of Principles was initialed by Savir, Singer, and Abu Alaa in the presence of Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen in Oslo on August 20, 1993. On September 13, 1993, on the White House lawn, the letters expressing the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the PLO were exchanged. Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles. Arafat and Rabin and Peres shook hands.

2.5. The Peace Movements’ Influence on Israeli Policy and Public

According to Hermann, the Israeli peace movement’s tireless efforts to convince the public of its political relevance and concern for the national interest, and thus to gain recognition and become an influential actor had failed. She suggests that the origins of this failing stem from three different factors, concerning the movement’s political agenda, organizational structure and dynamics, and socio-demographic composition.\textsuperscript{279}

All components of the Israeli peace movement were located on the left of the national political spectrum. Thus, in this respect, the peace movement as a whole stood in opposition to all political parties of the Right, as well as almost all of the religious parties. However, a significant perceptual gap could also be observed between the movement’s political agenda and that of center and even somewhat left-of-center political actors, as they, together with the right-wing political bodies, shared the postulates of the mainstream security ethos that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{278} Ibid., p.305.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Hermann 2002, p.106.
\end{itemize}
the peace movement rejected. Hermann lists the following tenets as the Israeli mainstream’s security ethos, which all of the major political parties espoused is based on: (1) Power politics are central to international and intercommunal relations and thus the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is a zero-sum struggle over the same piece of land: accordingly, recognizing Palestinian national rights and interests necessarily means that Jewish rights will be undermined. (2) Israel’s struggle with its neighboring states is part of a pattern of persecution and catastrophes that has occurred throughout Jewish history. Thus, Israel is seen as acting defensively with little ability to prevent recurring violent clashes endangering its existence. (3) This underlying existential anxiety has led to the glorification of the Israeli army. Military service is considered a primary and indispensable obligation of all qualified citizens, thereby excluding from the legitimate body politic the Arab citizens of Israel who do not serve in the army. (4) Control of the historical land of Israel and maintenance of the state’s Jewish character are connected and indispensable to the nation’s existence. Thus, significant territorial compromises would affect Israel’s national character and jeopardize its very raison d’etre.

In contrast, the peace movement rejected the logic of power politics and its practical ramifications, such as the zero-sum definition of the regional conflict. Instead it advocated win-win definitions of the situation, and usually considered military resolutions as more costly and less effective than political ones. The peace movement also regarded democratic values as equal to or more important than Jewish ones in determining the national character of the state of Israel. Unlike the Israeli mainstream, all of the peace groups long recognized the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and the PLO as their legitimate representative. They also believed that neither side could achieve a decisive military victory: therefore significant territorial concessions, painful as they may be, could contribute to Israel’s long-term security.

At the same time, there was considerable ideological diversity within the peace movement, which damaged both its political status and its public image. The most significant ideological cleavage occurred between the Zionist majority and the non- or anti-Zionist minority. The Zionist peace groups endorsed the Jewish nature of the state of Israel, defined Israel as the Jewish homeland, and often maintained strong relations with Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Although Zionist peace organizations were devoted to promoting Israeli-Arab peace, most limited their activities to opposing the occupation of the territories or advocating a political solution to the conflict. They rarely emphasized Jewish-Palestinian social or cultural integration, either because of disinterest or a desire to mobilize widespread public support. The few groups that advocated integration were the

---

280 Ibid., p.106.
281 Ibid., pp.106-7.
282 Ibid., p.107.
tiny and short-lived, such as East for Peace Mizrahi peace group, which strongly supported cultural integration, and the joint Israeli-Palestinian women’s groups, which often promoted social interactions between the two sides. In addition, the Zionist peace groups frequently used their members’ military service and rank to legitimize their participation in the security debate.\textsuperscript{283}

The non-Zionist peace groups, on the other hand, made no effort to appease the mainstream. Instead of forging contacts with Jewish communities in the Diaspora, these groups established links with foreign, non-Jewish organizations that purposed to be politically progressive such as European bodies of the new-Left and Green types, as well as Christian churches. Along with certain Palestinian critics of the Israeli peace movement, the Non-Zionist groups argued that their Zionist counterparts unintentionally served as a smokescreen behind which the abuses of the Israeli occupation could continue. Some non-Zionist groups, such as the Alternative Information Center, even maintained that the Arab-Israeli conflict was the direct result of the Zionist movement’s colonialist nature and expansionist policies that flourished in Israel/Palestine and later in the state of Israel. Not surprisingly, these “heretic” views isolated the non-Zionist groups from the Israeli public, and the negative image associated with them was reflected on the entire peace movement, contributing greatly to its political marginalization.\textsuperscript{284}

In addition to their disparate views about the causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Zionist and non-Zionist peace organizations proposed different solutions. The Zionist peace groups advocated the Two States for the Two Peoples solution – that is, the establishment of a Palestinian state that would coexist with the state of Israel. Although the non-Zionist groups were the first to openly support this alternative, most of them preferred a binational state as a solution because a separate Palestinian state would be too economically, militarily, and politically weak to be genuinely independent; only a joint framework, rather than political and economic separation, could provide the Palestinians with a commensurate degree of prosperity and thus prevent further bloodshed.\textsuperscript{285}

Despite their diversity, all of the political agendas the peace movement put forth were criticized over the years, mostly by centrist and right-wing organizations or individuals, although the left-wing establishment also expressed reservations about certain tenets. The mild criticism was that the peace activists were politically naïve: they were ignorant of the dominant role that power played in interstate and inter-community relations, and did not fully understand that Israel’s existence depended on its ability to maintain military superiority. Critics also questioned the movement’s basic loyalty to Zionism and Israeli national interest. The peace activists were virtually accused of lacking patriotism,

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p.107.
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p.108.
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., p.108.
preferring the Arab/Palestinian cause over the Israeli/Jewish one, and giving precedence to “bleeding-heart,” universalistic values.\textsuperscript{286}

Organizational factors also affected the Israeli peace movement’s political status and its relations with the mainstream. First, the negative effects of the movement’s extra-parliamentary tactics cannot be underestimated, even though extra-parliamentary tactics had become an integral and legitimate part of Israeli political life since the early 1970s. Since the groups that promoted such activity were not elected and hence could not be held accountable, the political establishment and the broad public often questioned their right to try to change the national consensus and influence decision-making processes, particularly when sensitive national-security matters were involved.\textsuperscript{287} In addition, their relatively small size hindered their ability to gain influence. The combined membership of most groups did not exceed one hundred activists and supporters, and many had fewer members.

Socio-demographic features also influenced the Israeli peace movement’s political status. The peace movement was almost entirely composed of middle-class, highly educated, urban Ashkenazi Jews. Another factor that influenced the movement’s image was the disproportionate number of members who were born in the United States and other English-speaking countries. To these activists, many of whom were politically socialized on European and American campuses during the 1960s, values such as liberalism, human rights, and participatory democracy were “natural.” To the majority of Israelis, however, these ideas were much less self-evident and acceptable.\textsuperscript{288}

Thus, because of its distinct and allegedly elitist orientation and composition, many less privileged Israelis questioned both the peace camp and its motives. Some even contended that the movement was actually motivated by its members’ particularistic class interests since they would have been the first to benefit from a peace settlement. This prevalent impression impeded almost all of the peace movement’s efforts to mobilize support among the lower classes and non-Ashkenazi Israelis.

Gender was another socio-demographic feature that affected the peace movements’ political status and efficacy. During the 1980s women’s groups became the spearhead of the entire peace movement but because many Israelis believed that these women advocated Palestinian/Arab interests and used somewhat emotional and often moralistic anti-war/pro-peace arguments to do so, their participation evoked hostile feelings at the grassroots level. The women were often stigmatized as treasonous Arab lovers, and even called “whores.” Furthermore, male participants in the security discourse often based their recommendations on their military experience, putting Israeli women at a clear

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., p.109.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., p.110.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid., p.116.
Religiosity was another factor that affected both the peace movement’s status and its political agenda. The Israeli peace movement was almost entirely secular in its ideology and social composition. This was largely because Judaism does not have a historical legacy of theological pacifism. Moreover, most of the peace movement’s members were openly secular and even antireligious.

According to the classical indicators of a social movement’s success – namely, accomplishing policy transformation and institutional consolidation – no causal relationship between the movements’ activities and the policy change can be established. However, according to the more recently defined criterion of a social movement’s success – namely, the gradual introduction of a desired attitude change into the collective public agenda – the peace movement, despite its marginal political status and limited popularity can be credited for its contributions to the cognitive change that facilitated Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement and resulted in the Oslo process. As Hermann states, its most significant accomplishment was to influence public opinion by broadening the scope of public debate. The insistent advocacy of the peace movement gradually led many people, both in the center and on the left, to modify their views and accept the need for mutual recognition and compromise. The idea that the occupation is a political, financial, and moral liability rather than a strategic asset, and that Palestinian self-determination is inevitable, gradually gained greater currency.

The leaders of the Israeli peace movement consistently viewed moral concerns as an important component of its agenda, even though they recognized the greater persuasive appeal of the national interest argument. And moral sensitivity toward the “enemy” clearly did influence Israeli public opinion, as demonstrated by the significant impact of the Intifada on Israeli attitudes. However, in a protracted, violent struggle such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, sympathy and compassion for the enemy tend to be muted as a consequence of the psychological tendency to dehumanize the enemy. Israeli national self-interest tended to be more persuasive than appeals to morality, especially when most Israeli saw the Palestinians as terrorists irrevocably committed to Israel’s destruction. The Israeli public’s sensitivity to the image of the army and its mode of suppressing the uprising was a restraining factor that influenced Israeli politics. In time, though, that influence vanished.

The Intifada gave rise to militant slogans that would also accompany the second Intifada and the evacuation from the Gaza Strip. Among these were “Let the IDF win,” and the

---

289 Ibid., p.118.
290 Ibid., p.118.
291 Ibid., p.123.
Some Israelis are critical of the influence of peace movement. Meron Benvenisti, one of the most prominent analysts of Israeli-Palestinian relations, stated that the peace movement had had almost no influence and that this reflected a lack of clearly defined goals. The peace movement preferred to remain in a protective bubble: “The movement actually preaches to the converted.”

2.6. Summary

Under the non-violent resistance movement Palestinians were united. The entire mass of people under the occupation came together in unity that opposed occupation and demanded self-determination. The role of women was substantially altered as they came to the fore as equal partners in the struggle. The Palestinians’ insistence upon their identity as a people was underscored. A new set of institutions emerged, a sign of a first step in the appearance of the Palestinian state as well as economic transformation, and developed a local leadership that shifted the weight of activism from areas outside of Palestine to inside. This led PLO to declare the Palestinian Declaration of Statehood on November 15, 1988.

Palestinian organizations were very effective at getting the international media to publicize their views on human rights violations and abuses by the Israeli authorities. This represented a major shift in the international press, which hitherto had ignored much of the Palestinian perspective on the conflict.

To Israelis, the Intifada challenged the myth of benign occupation and showed the moral, economic, and political cost of occupation. It triggered the emergence of the Peace Movement in Israel and gained its support in documenting and disseminating – especially in the international media – abuses by the Israeli army and human rights violations.

Israeli peace movement’s most significant accomplishment was its ability to influence public opinion by offering two alternative themes that had not been visible in the mass media. The first was the notion that the occupation was a political, financial, and moral liability rather than a strategic asset. Indeed, the occupation had been framed as a threat to the long-term security and the “Jewish” identity of the state. Second, and equally important, was the idea that the Palestinians had justifiable aspirations for a national identity and a right to self-determination, and that the Intifada was a legitimate Palestinian national struggle. Both of these themes gradually gained greater currency in public discourse. This was one of the greatest accomplishments of Peace Now. Over time there was a clear shift in public opinion so that by the mid-1990s the majority of the Israeli public accepted the

---

293 Meron Benvenisti, Haaretz 7 May 1998.
Palestinians’ right to a state. One of the reasons that Peace Now was successful in changing public discourse was that it cast its position within the dominant Zionist ideology and maintained a strong allegiance to the state. Legitimizing contact and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians was another important contribution of the Israeli peace movement. In doing so, the organizations broke a major taboo in Israeli society.

Finally, an important measure of success was the ability of the organizations to attain media coverage and thus gain acceptance in public discourse. In Israel, organizations such as Peace Now were particularly effective at mobilizing the mass media on their behalf. Similarly, human rights organizations, such as B’Tselem and joint research and advocacy groups such as the AIC became a very important source of information and data for the foreign press, and European journalists regularly published reports on the conflict based on the perspective that these organizations provided.

Therefore, it is clear that the Israeli peace movement achieved the following indicators of social movement’s success: it helped to redefine the political agenda, changed social values, and expanded the range of ideas about what is possible. Without these contributions, the dramatic policy change that included the signing of a peace agreement to end the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict might not have been possible.

As for international community, with the information coming out from Palestinian and Israeli peace and human rights groups picked up by international media, world attention was brought to Palestinian Question. Even in the United States, pro-Palestinians sympathy grew into support for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, and for PLO participation in peace negotiations. There is no doubt that this public support for Palestinians facilitated the U.S. administration’s pursuit of the peace process to this conflict.

Coupled with the changing international environment, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and its regional and international repercussions, and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a central challenge of the new times, the Intifada added an urgency of a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. US President Bush pressured Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to participate in the multi-track Madrid Peace Process supported by key international players.

Intifada showed a perfect example of how Palestinians and Israelis worked effectively both to change perception of their people as well as changing their leaders’ policy, while conducting various meetings and solidarity actions. Their action, solidarity action to oppose military action and the information dissemination and advocacy, had great influence on bringing international media attention and changing the perception of world public to sympathize and support for self-determination of Palestinians. This change in perception combined with the international relations at that time, has pushed the parties to the first peace negotiation, Madrid Peace Process.
In order to circumvent the Madrid Process which soon became stalemated, back channel meetings between Israeli academics affiliated with peace movement and Palestinian PLO members eventually resulted in the Oslo Accords.
Chapter 3: The Oslo Peace Process and Peacebuilding

In September 1993, the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Government of Israel agreed to recognize each other and signed the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP)”. In 1994 the Palestinian Authority was established following the DOP in Gaza and Jericho and in 1995 “the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”, also known as “Oslo II”, detailed practical steps to be implemented by the parties in view of the negotiations on the final status of the territory.

Moving away from the multi-track approach of the Madrid Peace Process, the Oslo peace process was a bi-national approach leaving Israel and the PLO to negotiate face-to-face with very little intervention from international community.

The dream of peace was not realized upon the signing of the Oslo Accords. Indeed, recent approaches to peace building emphasize that political agreement must be accompanied by deep societal transformations down to the grassroots level. Such transformations require a fundamental shift in the personal attitudes of the people on both sides – toward the development of a new behavioral repertoire favoring coexistence.

This is the reason joint cooperation projects which came to be known as the People-to-People Program was officially included in the Oslo II because it was aimed to foster understanding between the two peoples and to increase the size of the constituency of the peace process. But the Oslo Peace Process was not devoid of opposition involving violence on both sides. In addition, the step by step transfer of power from Israel to Palestine faced delay after delay in negotiations leading to disappointment of the public, especially of Palestinians.

This chapter will examine the efforts to transform both societies made during the Oslo peace process and how they affected and affected by the peace process.

3.1. Oslo Peace Process

The result of secret talks in Norway was expressed in two agreements: the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and a mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, where the latter committed itself to ‘a peaceful resolution of the conflict’ and reiterated that it ‘renounced terrorism and other acts of violence’. It also affirmed that the articles in the Palestinian Covenant that denied Israel’s right to exist ‘are now inoperative and no longer valid’. The DOP established the mechanism for handing over the control of Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinians (thus the Palestinian Authority was established in 1994 in those areas only)
and stipulated a stages leading from a five-year autonomy regime to negotiations on the final settlement. But it is crucial to note that no prior pledge or commitment was made by Israel as to the outcome of the negotiations on either of these chapters. No firm promises were established by the parties for the solution of any of the issues pertaining to the final settlement. The expectation was that political agreements between the leaders would significantly change the realities on the ground so that the two peoples would eventually support the process.

The initial euphoria in both societies was soon lost with stalling negotiations and the rise of violence on both sides. Israel's reluctance to delegate power and authority to the Palestinian Interim Authority, and the continued expansion of settlement and severe closure system were a serious blow to the Palestinian economic and social situation.

The Interim Agreement of 1995 (Oslo II) defined three areas of jurisdiction in Gaza and the West Bank: area “A”, in which Palestinians would have full administrative and security responsibilities; area “B”, in which Palestinians would have administrative responsibilities, but Israelis would retain security control; and area “C”, where Israelis would maintain administrative and security responsibilities. Critically, Israeli authorities also retained control over all borders, which means control over the movement of labor and goods. Furthermore, no Palestinian laborer or product could exit the West Bank or Gaza without an Israeli permit. For Palestinians, freedom of movement was no longer a right but a privilege, allotted to an entitled few. Israel awards the privilege incrementally, by means of a permit system that has carved up Palestinian society in much the same way as the new geography has carved up the land. The quota of those who are privileged is fluid: the principle is not since it is Israel that sets the criteria and controls the benefits.

The 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations, signed by representatives of Israel and the PLO on April 29 in Paris, offered a trade-off: until a final status agreement was reached, Israel would control customs and trade, while Palestinians would be allowed to enter Israel and work there. However, the latter part of the agreement fell apart with the closure that Israel imposed on the OPT and only the customs union remained in effect.

During the Oslo years, from 1994 to 2000, Israel enjoyed an economic boom, fueled by immigration from the former Soviet Union, by loan guarantees from the United States, and massive international investment in the Israel economy. Israel was then seen as a country on the path to peace. In addition, the Arab boycott against Israel was largely dismantled. During the same years Palestinian economy contracted, with poverty and unemployment increasing. During the Oslo years, Israel’s per capita GDP increased by 14.2 percent, while

---

Palestinian per-capita GDP fell by 3.8 percent.\textsuperscript{297} The average unemployment rate of Palestinians increased over ninefold between 1992 and 1996, rising from 3\% to 28\%, one of the highest unemployment rates among nearly 200 countries and political entities according to the World Bank.\textsuperscript{298}

Moreover, between 1994 and 2000, the Israeli government confiscated approximately 35,000 acres of Arab land in the West Bank, much of it agricultural and worth more than $1 billion, for the construction of bypass roads and settlement expansion. Indeed, between September 1993 and April 2000, the number of settlers in the West Bank grew by 85\%, from 100,000 to 185,000 people (excluding Jerusalem), and the number of settlements increased by thirty.\textsuperscript{299}

The Palestinians did raise the issue of settlements in the negotiations but Rabin replied that a clause in the agreement explicitly addressed the freezing of the settlements, it would be difficult for him – with the small coalition he had assembled – to obtain broad support for the agreement. The Palestinians eventually accepted Rabin’s position.\textsuperscript{300}

The Palestinians suspected that the real purpose behind the closures, the bypass roads, and the separation of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem – ostensibly for security reason – was to carve up the occupied territories permanently, keep them under different political systems, and complete the destruction of the Palestinian social structure that began to emerge in 1948. In fact, neither Rabin nor, especially, Peres wanted the autonomy to usher in a Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{301} As late as 1997 Peres still believed in a Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian condominium in the territories.\textsuperscript{302}

Furthermore, the Oslo Peace Process was not devoid of opposition from both sides. An Israeli Jew fired a semi-automatic rifle in the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron in 1994 and Hamas retaliated with a suicide attack. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by an Israeli Jew in 1995 dealt a lethal blow to the peace process. When Prime Minister Netanyahu opened the Wall Tunnel blood was spilled on both sides in September 1996. Palestinian anger further mounted with the announcement of a new settlement in

\textsuperscript{298} Roy 2001, p.92.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., p.95.
\textsuperscript{301} In mid-1993 Shimon Peres unveiled his notion of separation in a closed meeting with Jews from America and Europe. He floated the idea of an “independent” ministate in Gaza and an autonomous West Bank linked to Jordan, where a local parliament would resolve matters jointly with the Jewish settlers. Palestinian leaders rejected a similar proposal in the spring of 1995, but practical measures subsequently implemented by the Rabin-Peres government indicate that the idea had not been abandoned. Cited in Hass 1999, p.348.
Jerusalem in Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghneim.

Successive Israeli Governments and the Palestinian political leadership failed to reach an agreement on the final status at the Camp David summit in 2000 and during direct talks in Taba (Egypt) in 2001.

During the Oslo peace process, even after signs of failure, very little intervention was made by the international community other than providing funds to the newly established Palestinian Authority as if the situation had already reached the post-conflict stage. The only exception was Norway’s participation in formulating Article 8 of the Oslo II on People-to-People Program and US intervention toward the end of the process by pressuring Netanyahu to agree to the Wye River Protocol in October 1998 and hosting the Camp David Summit in July 2000.

This was the reality of Oslo Peace Process. Robinson describes this situation as the “hegemonic peace”, a peace between two significant unequal powers that nevertheless retained the parties’ autonomy to accept or reject the terms of settlement. It is not a peace between relative equals, nor is it a “peace” completely imposed on an utterly vanquished enemy.303

3.2. Israeli Response to the Oslo Peace Process

The announcement on August 29, 1993 of the signing of the Oslo Accord, and subsequent signing ceremony on September 1993 at White House Lawn produced initial euphoria amongst many Israelis. To some Israeli peace activists, this announcement was “electrifying”, and was a stunning volte-face for the Israeli government, which had for years denounced the PLO as a terrorist organization with whom it would never negotiate.304 And on the day of the announcement, Women in Black initiated a joint Israeli-Palestinian peace march held in Jerusalem holding aloft a banner in Hebrew and Arabic saying “We want peace”.305

For Israel, Oslo was the introduction to one of the most breathtaking eras of economic growth and opening up of markets in her history. Coinciding with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the removal of the barriers of hostility towards the Jewish state in Russian and Eastern Europe, the period witnessed the acceleration of the mass immigration of highly qualified Soviet Jews to Israel. Israel’s population increased in the 1990s, by almost twenty per cent. And by the time the Oslo accords came into effect, Israel could also see how her

305 Ibid., Chapter 10.
international status had improved dramatically. With diplomatic relations being established with countries such as China and India, the dynamic markets of Asia were added to the widening horizons for the vibrant Israeli economy. Arab counties in the Maghreb and in the Gulf established economic and even diplomatic links with Israel – Israeli diplomatic delegations were opened in Rabat, Tunis, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman – in addition to Egypt and Jordan. Yet, the main economic benefit that Israel reaped from the Oslo years did not come from the surrounding Arab markets; it came from the normalization of her international relations and her concomitant integration into the global economy. For the first time in Israel’s history, McDonalds and Burger King appeared on its city streets.

However, not everyone was excited, throughout the Rabin-Peres era Israeli Jewish public opinion was split almost equally between supporters and opponents of the Oslo process. Not once since the signing of the Oslo agreement did an absolute majority of Israeli Jews support it. Although the Israeli electorate had authorized Rabin to go ahead with the bilateral and unilateral talks within the Madrid framework but expected him to safeguard the country’s security. Yet the government went further than originally expected by many Israelis who voted Labour. This was the first time any Israeli government had publicly acknowledged the territorial and other compromises a political solution entailed. Given the formal position of all former Israeli governments, that defined the Israeli-Arab conflict as a zero-sum activity the Rabin government’s declared acceptance of the costs of a political solution came as a shock.

3.2.1. The Peace Movement and the Anti-Oslo Movement

In Israel, the forces on the right saw the strategic shift represented by the process in Oslo as mistaken and extremely dangerous. The Oslo narrative adopted by right-wing groups reflected many reservations about the process, involving the security risk, the impairment of the Zionist endeavor, the religious transgression, and the ominous achievement of the leftist Labor-Meretz government. The right put blame on the left in general and the peace movement in particular. The massive hate campaign against Rabin and the Oslo process took place with the participation of a number of Likud leaders, including future Prime Ministers Netanyahhu and Sharon, indicating that opposition to the strategic shift that Oslo entailed was extensive and vicious, even if legal.

The traditional, major movement of right wing camp, Gush Emunim, with the help of

---

307 Ibid., p.231.
308 Hermann 2006, p.43.
309 Ibid., p.42.
310 Ibid., p.46.
311 Ibid., p.43.
the right-wing parties and of wealthy Jewish supporters mostly from the US and Australia, various smaller groups managed to organize large-scale anti-Oslo activities. Numerous ads against the government’s and vicious pamphlets, some bearing a photomontage of Rabin dubbed “traitor” and dressed in a Nazi uniform, were distributed all over the country.312

Typically, right-wing activists were between the ages of 16 and 40, traditional or Orthodox in religious self-definition, and average or lower in education and income. The settlers and their supporters played a pivotal role in activities against Rabin’s government, knowing that the process would eventually entail an extensive settlement evacuation.313 Along with their massive anti-Oslo campaign, the settlers continued expanding the settlements, often without the government’s permission. In fact, the Israeli authorities, even when Labor was in power, did not take real steps to prevent these initiatives, even when unlawful.314 While the government talked peace with the Palestinians, these Israeli civilians took steps to create facts on the ground that would impede any peace plan.

Some new, small, radical right-wing groups appeared at that time, such as the Women in Green, whose members vigorously protested any move aimed at advancing the peace process. But the most visible right-wing extra-parliamentary group at that time called This Is Our Land (Zo Artzenu). Ironically invoking Martin Luther King as a model of civil disobedience, it protested the government’s alleged betrayal both of vital security interests and of the religious value of land settlement. The group used such techniques of nonviolent resistance as blocking roads and burning tires, and was fairly successful in conveying its message. Its leader, Moshe Feiglin, was indicted for disrupting public order but eventually was almost fully acquitted on freedom-of-speech grounds.315

Prominent figures of the Orthodox rabbinical establishment, which largely backed the settlers, strongly condemned the expected ceding of territories and, with the signing of a final status agreement, extensive settlement evacuation. A few rabbis even declared Rabin a transgressor deserving the death penalty according to halacha (Jewish law).316 As a direct or indirect result, on Nov 5 1995, Rabin was murdered by Yigal Amir, a political activist of the religious radical right and a student at the religious Bar-Ilan University.

For the Israeli peace movement, the strategic transformation of the Oslo process was a great success, and apart from some small radical groups, it applauded the Labour government’s steps. Yet, almost immediately after the signing of the DOP, it became clear that the peace movement was being deflected and kept far from negotiations. Moreover, in an apparently calculated attempt to dissociate the peace process from the peace movement,

312 Ibid., p.46.
313 Ibid., p.46.
314 Ibid., p.46
315 Ibid., p.47.
316 Ibid., p.47
Israeli decision makers refused to give the latter any credit for its past efforts. No member of the peace movement was invited to the signing ceremonies for the various agreements, nor were the movement’s connections with Palestinians ever used, even at times when negotiations reached a dead end.\^{317}

Nevertheless, peace activists generally adopted the Oslo cause and supported the Labour government even when its stances were seen as too rigid by many of them. By the early 1990s, after years of arduous activism, many of the activists were exhausted and decided to leave peacebuilding in the hands of the government. There were also doubts about the need for civil activism when the government was promoting the cause of peace. Thus in the first half of the 1990s the peace movement basically went in the hibernation.\^{318}

The movement’s more radical elements rejected the “Two States for the Two Peoples” formula, arguing that it was only a scheme to stop the Intifada, and that the Palestinians would end up with limited self-government and not the independent state to which they were entitled. Even while negotiations were in progress, these groups maintained that peace activism and anti-government protests should continue.

One of a few groups that maintained some activities is Women in Black. Although in 1993, Jerusalem’s Women in Black voted to end the weekly vigil they gathered on certain occasions that they thought necessitated showing support for the peace process.\^{319} For example, as the Oslo agreement’s implementation became subject to delay after delay, doubts began to fester about the sincerity of the sides, the groups called for an ad-hoc vigil to express its concerns.\^{320} Another occasion was when Baruch Goldstein opened fire and killed 29 Muslims in prayer at the Ibrahim Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, on Friday, February 25, 1994.

The shooting in Hebron cast a terrible pall over the entire fabric of relations between Israel and the PLO, and many called for a halt in the peace negotiations. This was only one of the wrenches thrown into the peace process: repeated acts of terrorism by Palestinian extremists against civilian populations in Israel were certainly another. Indeed, there was a dramatic rise in the number of civilians killed and injured on both sides after the signing of the Oslo accords by those who rejected the peace process. As a result, alternating currents of hope and despair became endemic to the peace camp throughout the years of the peace process.\^{321}

Israeli peace groups held a first joint peace rally in 4 November, 1995 to show support to the peace process which came to shed dark shadow and became under intense anti-Oslo campaign. Ironically, it was at this rally that Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli Jew of

\^{317} Ibid., p.49.
\^{318} Ibid., p.49.
\^{319} Svirsky 1996, Chapter 10.
\^{320} Ibid., Chapter 10.
\^{321} Ibid., Chapter 10.
extreme-right ideology. However, by the time Rabin was murdered the peace process was, for all practical purposes, in a state of political coma. Indeed, after the assassination of Rabin, the strongest motif in Jewish discourse was not peace and peacemaking with the Palestinians or with Syria but domestic peace, that is, national unity.

**Dor Shalem (Peace Generation)** was established in November 1995 by a group of young people in their twenties and thirties, many still students or young professionals. From the beginning, Peace Generation leaders expressed their wish to be located at the center of the ideological map – not even the moderate left, where Peace Now was located. Peace Generation carried connotations of a blend of mainstream Zionism, a security orientation, and acceptance of the Oslo agenda. It set itself apart from the peace movement.\(^{322}\) It received unprecedented public readiness to listen to its message, extensive media coverage, and in contrast to all former peace groups enough money to carry out extensive public activities and hire first-rate staff, from media officers and PR specialists to and financial and legal experts. The number of its registered members reached almost 17,000 in 1996 and 25,000 in 1998. Its financial support came mainly from members of the Israeli industrialist milieu, who had been close to Rabin and were interested in a peaceful Middle East, because peace, aside from its own merits, was also good for business.\(^{323}\)

The tactics that Peace Generation’s leaders used to separate themselves from the peace movement were to underplay the peace issue and emphasize socioeconomic issues, thereby gaining a foothold in the less-well-to-do social sectors and in the poor neighborhoods. This was done in the hope of reducing the impact of the Mizrahi, Orthodox Shas Party which acted like a hawk on the parliamentary level with its voters comprising one of the most right-wing segments of Israeli society.\(^{324}\)

However, Peace Generation failed to gain a foothold in poor neighborhoods, where contempt for peace activism was strongly class motivated, precisely because its activists were immediately identified as the same as traditional middle-class peace activists. Much worse than that, their so-called apolitical peace message was perceived by these audiences as a plot, a way of marketing the peace movement’s ideas in a different, misleading packaging.\(^{325}\)

The endorsement by Labour of Palestinian statehood in its May 1997 conference was qualified by the need to limit the sovereignty of that state in order to satisfy vital Israeli concerns. The party’s resolution stipulated that, though the Palestinian state should have most of the West Bank and the practical totality of the Gaza Strip, it should not encompass

\(^{322}\) Hermann 2009, p.146.  
\(^{323}\) Ibid., p.146.  
\(^{324}\) Ibid., p.148.  
\(^{325}\) Ibid., p.148.
the major settlement blocs or any part of Jerusalem. After all, the Labour Party had just lost the 1996 elections to Likud due in part to Netanyahu’s ingenious campaign that ‘Peres will divide Jerusalem’.326

Benjamin Netanyahu was brought to power after Rabin’s assassination by the Jerusalem coalition. A broad Jewish rainbow alignment of Israel’s social periphery, the Russian nationalist electorate, Orthodox Jews, the wide sectors of traditionalist Israelis and the religious settlers viewed the peace process and its economic fruits with their concomitant international peace festivals as the exclusive patrimony of the leftist Tel Aviv elite. Economic dividends did not spill over to the popular classes but remained confined to the elites, while the gap between the haves and have-nots kept widening.327

An agreement on Hebron was to be Netanyahu’s sole contribution to peace with the Palestinians, and even that came about only after the bloody clashes in and around the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount in September 1996, which cost the lives of sixteen Israeli soldiers and eighty Palestinians. Nor did the PLO do much to recover the credibility of the peace process since it failed to devise a new National Covenant, as it was committed to do, and did almost nothing to uproot the terrorism that originated in the cities under its control. However, Netanyahu refused to withdraw on the dates he had promised but preferred to talk of a permanent agreement without presenting a practical route to it. The Palestinians refused to start talks with him on the permanent status before he implemented what he had promised in the interim agreement. Indeed, the frustration on the Palestinian side was strong and deep. Nationalist and religious extremists, who had opposed the Oslo Accord from the start, admonished the Authority and insisted that, in its gullibility, it had signed an agreement with one government and failed to see that its successor would not implement it. Israel had benefited economically and internationally from the Oslo Accord but the Palestinians were weakened economically.

Netanyahu’s three-year premiership, however, ended by alienating his supporters and dissolving the social and political alliance that had brought him to power in the first place. Indeed by signing the Wye agreement in October 1998, that gave the Palestinians additional thirteen percent of land in Judaea and Samaria, Netanyahu sealed his political fate and saw his coalition rapidly melting away.328

A successful Israeli peace activism during the Oslo period was about withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon. The Four Mothers Movement was launched in 1997 by four mothers of Israel Defense Force (IDF) soldiers serving in southern Lebanon, and was rapidly joined by many more mothers demanding that Israel withdraw its forces from there.

327 Ibid., p.238.
328 Ibid., p.239.
This movement attracted much attention from the media, the public, and even the political establishment. Prime Minister Barak’s decision on an Israeli withdrawal from this area in June 2000 was widely attributed to the pressures exerted by this group and its growing circle of supporters. Besides this specific achievement, this movement has left a legacy of success that was much needed for the peace movement to keep functioning.329

Israeli advocacy and human rights organizations increased their activities as the Israeli human rights violations in the Occupied Territories continued and Palestinian living conditions deteriorated. While older groups such as Alternative Information Center, Physician for Human Rights, or B’Tselem continued with their work for justice, other groups followed such as: Gush Shalom (1993), Bat Shalom (1993), Adalah (1996), the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) (1996) and BIMKOM (1999).

Stemming from necessity, various ad hoc coalitions were formed that included peace and human rights groups to counter the negative effects of their small size. Thus, decrease in the number of activists and resources led to enhanced cooperation. Some coalitions formed for a single event (for instance, a demonstration); others were intended to be more lasting endeavors, such as the campaigning against the “silent transfer” of Palestinian residents from Jerusalem, or the problem of indefinite administrative detention of Palestinians. Along with participating in these coalitions, the organizations maintained their distinctive goals and character. A typical, highly active coalition is the Israeli Committee against the House Demolitions, which encompasses Bat Shalom, Rabbis for Human Rights, Peace Now, and the (Palestinian) Land Defense Committee. The coalition’s sole purpose is to fight the Israeli policy of destroying houses built without permits by Palestinians on their own property in the occupied territories.330 So far the coalition has not been very successful in stopping these acts, but is highly successful in gaining media exposure of the injustice and hardship they inflict on Palestinians. One of the most active coalitions appears to be the Women’s Peace Coalition, which brings together all the women’s peace organizations, from the moderate to the radical, and has initiated some of the more impressive peace protests and activities in recent years.

Many Internet peace lists and sites were created with numbers and intensity of communication skyrocketing in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. One can actually point to a correlation between the disappearance of the actual peace activities and the swelling of virtual interactions. The accelerating use of the Internet as a substitute for on-the-ground activities or as a means to organize them, marked a turning point in the peace movement’s mode of operation. The use of the Internet has contributed to the further isolation of the peace movement; it provided it with relatively protected bubble while considerably reducing

329 Hermann 2006, p.50.
330 Ibid., pp.50-51.
its public voice and it has been argued that living in this bubble created a false sense of competence and power.\footnote{Hermann 2009, p.162.}

3.3. Palestinian Reality and Response

After the transfer of authority to the Palestinians in May 1994, some positive changes were felt right away in Gaza. For one thing, the soldiers were gone from the streets, along with their guns and their noise and their condescension. “We aren’t afraid now to let the children play outside,” people would say. “We don’t run around looking for a child who’s little bit late coming home. We’ve stopped having nightmares about a son or a daughter shot in the head.”\footnote{Hass 1999, p.24.} Within weeks after the pullout, as if someone had waved a magic wand, bands of small boys suddenly materialized in Gaza City, riding bicycles in the middle of the roads, even against the flow of traffic, thumbing their noses at the honking cars. Beside them strode groups of chattering girls. I even began to see girls riding bikes.\footnote{Ibid., p.24.}

The media in Israel and throughout the world were quick to praise the changes. Gazans’ trips to the beach in the evening, the crowds that filled the streets to overflowing, the lights on Omar al-Mukhtar Boulevard – all were noted enthusiastically as triumphs of the peace process. So, too, was the potential for commercial enterprise, for building and development.

But most Palestinians were less impressed. They were hit by Israeli closures, collective punishment, unemployment, economic decline, a humiliating dependence on Israel and the expansion of existing settlements.

Within this context, the Palestinian social and political settings under Oslo underwent dramatic shifts. First and foremost, class divisions deepened tremendously, including within the constituencies of the political parties themselves and particularly among Palestinian society’s weakest and most exposed sectors many of whom were formerly dependent upon employment in Israel. Popular discontent with the negotiation process would also repeatedly manifest itself in outbursts of anger directed against the Israeli occupation and through repeated demands for political, financial, and organizational reform of the PA.\footnote{Tikva Honing-Parnas and Toufic Haddad 2007. Between the Lines. Chicago: Haymarket Books. p.45.}

Opposition or criticism of the Oslo Accords did not come only from the Islamic movements and left-wing parties but from intellectuals and academics, human rights activists and refugee rights advocates. After 1996, there was even a split within Fatah in
this regard. Specifically, the leaders of the largest opposition bloc, the Islamic movement, represented by Hamas, were appalled by the Accords, believing that they traded sacred Palestinian rights for paltry material gains. During the subsequent elections both Hamas and the Popular and Democratic Fronts decided to boycott the elections as the elections were the result of the Oslo agreements, which they opposed. The result of the opposition’s boycott, though, was that it left the field open for decisive majority by Fatah. In addition, the traditional political structures of the Palestinian national movement historically tied to the PLO began a process of collapse.

While Fateh had largely dissolved and incorporated itself into the PA after Oslo, the Palestinian Left was split between those who supported the Oslo Accords (the People’s Party and the Palestinian Democratic Union [FIDA]) and those who rejected them (the PFLP and DFLP). But even the latter were not serious about organizing a counter Oslo movement. Their demoralization and ideological disorientation after the fall of the Soviet Union were but the last stage in a long process of their own distancing from any radical strategy, leaving them incapable of mobilizing their constituencies around building an alternative to Oslo.

After establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the NGOs who had functioned as a shadow government providing various services became unclear as national ministries began to claim responsibility for these services. Further friction arose when the third sector began to question the Palestinian Authority’s efficacy and efficiency: the result was polarization between them and the PA.

The issue of human rights became a subject of debate for organizations that had previously focused their efforts on the Israeli army’s violations. As with the case of the Israeli occupation, professing human rights often comes with a political price: that of imprisonment and harassment, only this time at the hands of the Palestinian Authority. Various notable human rights figures have butted heads with the Palestinian Authority and since have served prison terms. Human rights advocates found this reality deeply disheartening as it was precisely the same advocates who had publicized the atrocities committed by the occupying forces.

Refugee Advocacy Groups such as Badil and Shaml were set up to conduct research and publication on the rights of refugees, fearing their rights would be bargained, and started advocacy and lobbying campaign.

335 Hass 1999, p.75.
336 Ibid., p.69.
338 Hassassian 2002, p.139.
To create conditions for peaceful negotiations with Israel and to justify its right to govern, the Authority depended on recognition of the PLO, Israel and the international community. It relied especially heavily on credit the PLO had built up among Palestinians through its well-established organizational apparatus and by militant underground activity. But material needs had become pressing and support depended on the immediate economic recovery that everyone believed the agreement with Israel would produce. But Palestinian economic recovery was only to be reciprocated with Israeli security. Through the Oslo Accord Israel hoped to streamline the occupation by removing its troops from direct contact with Palestinians and replacing them with Palestinian subcontractors. Hence, Palestinian security forces arrested activists opposing the peace process thus increasing tensions between Fatah and opposing factions such as Hamas and PFLP.

Another opposition to peace process came from within Fatah, Tantheem, many of whom constituted the PA security services. The overwhelming majority of Tantheem cadres were also highly influenced by local heroes of the 1987 Intifada as opposed to those who returned with the PA following the Oslo agreement. The significance of these forces began to shift with the visible decline of the “peace process,” beginning during the tenure of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996. The national conscience of many Fateh cadres was becoming infused with a sense that there was something drastically wrong with the political trajectory of the PA that was becoming perceived as corrupt abusers of power on the street. After the Jabel Abu Ghneim/Har Homa settlement crisis in 1997, the Fateh general-secretary in the West Bank and a leading figure in Tantheem, Marwan Barghouti, began calling for drastic changes in PA tactics: “We are demanding that the PLO cease all negotiations with Israel. We are also calling for an end to all security cooperation between Israel and the PA. We cannot and will not defend Israel’s security unconditionally.” Along the way, Tantheem was able to clarify the divisions within Fateh between those who were loyal to the Palestinian cause and those who defended PA corruption. Their participation in demonstrations – be they local nonviolent events or as active participants in armed clashes with Israel – has gained a cautious respect from the Palestinian masses.

The best-known example typifying both the popular discontent with the negotiated process and the PA’s reaction to such protests was the “Petition of the Twenty: A Call from

---

344 Haddad 2007, p.63.
the Homeland,” released in November 1999. The leaflet was a sharply worded political statement signed by twenty prominent social and political leaders, representing diverse political backgrounds, including Fateh. The statement called for “the alarm bell to be sounded” because of the high levels of political and organizational corruption in the PA, which was leading the national movement to catastrophe, and the fear that Palestinian national rights were in the process of being sold down the river.\textsuperscript{345}

While there was emergence of organizations openly talking of peace based on the Oslo track, they represented a minority sentiment since most of the population was awaiting the outcome of the negotiation process. NGO activists abandoned much of their work supporting the peace process when they came to perceive the Oslo Accords as an agreement that legitimized the Israeli occupation, the corruption and self-aggrandizement of the Palestinian Authority, and Israel’s control over fundamental Palestinian rights, resources, and properties.\textsuperscript{346}

International supporters of Oslo Peace process often criticized those Palestinian organizations that chose to stick to their principles and reject the Oslo process, and sometimes withdrew their donations because, many of them perceived Palestine as a post-conflict area rather than one under continued conflict. The donor agencies and actors took on the role of ‘neutral’ mediators ignoring the root causes of the conflict and its colonial nature.\textsuperscript{347}

Western donors introduced new criteria for funding and dispersing aid which established a hierarchy among organizations and invariably the charitable societies and popular committees lost out and were marginalized. The middle-class actors over-turned the old elite of the voluntary charitable societies and represented an emerging social force. Moreover, internal divisions such as urban/rural, pro/anti Oslo or English/Arabic speakers were been reproduced and became more pronounced.\textsuperscript{348}

\subsection*{3.4. Joint Cooperation \textendash{} People-to-People Program}

The Oslo DOP opened the door for new kinds of projects, conducted by organizations from both sides which may be different and have points of disagreement but find partnership in a joint space: for example, through professional efforts that avoid politics like joint ventures in scientific research. These are defined as “Israeli-Palestinian

\textsuperscript{345} “the Beginning of Mass Democratic Revolt?” editorial, \textit{News from Within} 15, no.11 (December 1999).
\textsuperscript{346} Hassassian 2002, p.149.
\textsuperscript{347} Hanafi and Tabar 2004, pp.115.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., p.122.
People-to-People (P2P) projects aimed at bringing Israelis and Palestinians together with the expressed aim of peacemaking and peace-building.349

P2P projects consisted of both “official” and non-official, the first sponsored by Norway and where the official authorities in Israel and Palestine decide on the endeavors, and the second type of programs sponsored by foreign donors such as USAID and the EU, and directed to the Palestinian-Israeli civil societies without intervention of official bodies.

3.4.1. “People-to-People” Program Overview

The original aim of the P2P program was to involve ordinary people in the peace process since “political leaders can make peace, but only people can build peace”.350 The directives were given in the Interim Agreement Annex VI, “to take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction, and to increase people-to-people exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation described in this Annex and in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex.”351 The initiative came from the chief negotiators in the secret Oslo channel, Uri Savir and Ahmed Qureï’a They were concerned about how little Palestinians knew about Israelis and vice versa. As the Oslo agreement was the result of elite negotiations, they wanted to bridge the gap between them and their publics. Hence by embarking on the program, these authorities wanted to gain legitimacy for groups on both sides ho wanted to meet and cooperate.352

The design of the official P2P programme went through many changes. Initially it focused on what they called “a public-opinion project” aimed at bridging the gap between the negotiators/leaders and the public, and at providing the people with a wider exposure to the process. By the time the Program started in 1996, however, an Israeli had murdered Prime Minister Rabin. Sometime later, Israel killed the “Engineer,” a Palestinian responsible for several attacks on Israeli civilians. A new cycle of violence began. Acting Prime Minister at the time, Shimon Peres, launched a major military operation in South Lebanon. He called for early elections, and lost to Binyamin Netanyahu during the summer of 1996.353

---

353 Ibid., p.42.
Program designed a new approach focusing on supporting non-governmental organizations within specifically targeted segments of the society and wishing to undertake joint projects between Israelis and Palestinians. To maximize outreach, financing was spread to many organizations for relatively small projects limited to US$20,000 within the fields of culture, media, adult dialogues, youth, and environment. In 1998, the “school twinning” was added as support by parents represented potential to reach out to people who had not previously participated in peace-related activities. As the Israeli elections in May 1999 brought Labor to government the program tried to enter new political space and build institutionally oriented projects such as Cooperation North, involving cross-border cooperation between municipalities in the north of the West Bank.

After the failure of Camp David Summit and the second Palestinian intifada started, the Program shifted into financing the initiative called the Peace Coalition. It consisted of one Palestinian group and one Israeli - both headed by respected leaders on both sides - who worked to influence public opinion. The Program also urged the Quartet to include people-to-people activities in its new Road Map - which it did. Despite of all these efforts, everything came to a halt in 2003.

Between 1995 and 2003, a total of 465 organizations cooperated in these projects, and Program spent U.S. $2.9 million on project support. By category Adult Dialogues was the biggest with 29 percent of the total project support, while Youth was second biggest with 20 percent. There was some albeit limited media coverage.

Other P2P Programmes

Along with the official P2P, other international players (mainly the United States and the European Union) also supported civil-society such efforts. The EU institutionalized a substantial budget line in 1998, and the first US funds allocated specifically for civil society cooperation under the 1998 Wye River Memorandum were released after the second

---

354 Ibid., p.42.
355 Ibid., p.43.
357 Hanssen-Bauer 2005/06, p.45.
358 Ibid., p.46.
359 Ibid., p.47.
360 Until 1998, EU support for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects came from various existing budget lines, such as Micro-Projects. The EU "People-to-People Program" (today called the "Partnership for Peace Program") was institutionalized as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Following the first allocation of funds (Euro5 million in 1998), internal EU corruption scandals delayed funding for the second round of proposals, which only became available in 2001. Cited in Herzog and Hai 2005. p.31.
Intifada began.\textsuperscript{361}

All in all, the P2P phenomenon bloomed during the Oslo years (between 1993 and October 2000). About 500 such projects involving over 100 organizations were initiated. An estimated total equaling U.S. $25-35 millions\textsuperscript{362} was donated for such activities by numerous governmental actors, foundations and private donors and tens of thousands of Israelis and Palestinians met, dialogued and cooperated. Yet if divided by the number of Israelis and Palestinians between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, this amounted to no more than a few dollars per capita.\textsuperscript{363}

3.4.2. Main Programmes in P2P

Major projects supported under P2P can be divided into 3 categories: 1) Dialogues projects/Peace Education, 2) Policy Change/Track II projects, 3) Peace Institutions.

Facilitated, transformative dialogue between groups in conflict have been, in the past few decades, a prevalent device used extensively in efforts to improve relations and mutual perceptions, especially in conflicts accompanied by mutual prejudice or dehumanization.\textsuperscript{364} Scholars describe transformative relationship-building encounters as engaging members of conflicting groups in an open and respectful exchange of perspectives where different voices get a chance to express themselves and to be listened to in order to build mutual understanding, trust, and insight. \textsuperscript{365} In the same vein, other scholars describe

\textsuperscript{361} Throughout the 1990s, the US government supported only small joint projects through various budget lines in its Tel-Aviv Embassy and Jerusalem Consulate. In 1998, as part of the Wye River Memorandum, $10 million were allocated for support of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.

\textsuperscript{362} IPCRI 2002, YES PM” – Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{363} Mari Fitzduff, a central figure in the Northern Ireland "Community-building/Community-Relations Program, specifically mentions the importance of this external assistance as well as the fact that these funds included incentives for joint, budgetary decision-making. Changing History – Peace Building in Northern Ireland, in People Building Peace – 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, 1999.


transformation relationship-building dialogues as aimed at bringing each side to understand and appreciate more deeply the subjective reality of the other.\textsuperscript{366}

Typically, a dialogue-encounter group includes 8-10 Jewish and 8-10 Palestinian participants and is co-facilitated by one Jewish and one Palestinian facilitator. Dialogue-encounters deal with experiential, affective, and political aspects of the relationship between the sides through the sharing of experience, storytelling,\textsuperscript{367} facilitated awareness-increasing discussions,\textsuperscript{368} and other psychosocial techniques. These range from one-time workshops to a longer process in which the group meets regularly for one year or more.\textsuperscript{369}

Dialogue-encounters between Jews and Palestinians faced the question of should they include political discussions on controversial and emotionally loaded issues directly related to the conflict, or concentrate only on interpersonal, professional, or cultural issues that are less loaded and less related to the conflict.\textsuperscript{370} Another, softer version of this question concerns the phase of the dialogue in which political discussion should be introduced: from the outset or only in a later phase?\textsuperscript{371} One method of avoiding political discussions at the outset of the encounter was described as focusing on the less-provocative subject of intercultural or interreligious dialogue. Facilitators agreed that these topics were less controversial, and participants could more easily find common values than when discussing the political situation.\textsuperscript{372}

Whereas the more or less successful dialogue activities by peace groups in the late 1980s signaled an authentic wish by the participants to learn how things looked from the vantage point of the other and aimed to pierce the cognitive curtain between the Israeli and Palestinian collectives, many of the post-Oslo establishment-encouraged encounters were rather superficial and unauthentic since the controversial issues were not discussed.\textsuperscript{373}

This is why Palestinian side has disparagingly labeled as P2P as “normalization”, a negative term central to internal Palestinian (and Arab) discourse on Oslo generally and on P2P efforts specifically. The “normalization” argument claimed that by entering into dialogue and cooperation projects not directly opposed to the occupation, the weak (Palestinian) side implied occupation had ended and thereby legitimized ongoing Israeli practices. Additionally, because the two governments’ stated backing for the program,

\textsuperscript{366} Fisher 1997.
\textsuperscript{369} Maoz, Bekerman and Sheftel, 2007, p.38.
\textsuperscript{371} Maoz, Bekerman and Sheftel 2007, p.43.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., p.43.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., p.43.
opponents of Oslo also became opponents of the program. In various Palestinian circles, the stigma of “normalization” was as good as killing P2P’s chances. There were few exceptions projects that did try to tackle sensitive issues.

The Seeds of Peace program

Participants in the Seeds of Peace program brings youths aged 13 to 15 from Israel, Palestine and America to three-week sessions at the Seeds of Peace International Camp in Maine. Its mission is “empowering the children of war to break the cycle of violence” by “enabling people blinded by hatred to see the human face of their enemies.” The teens come from a variety of backgrounds; in many cases their families have experience suffering either directly or indirectly as a result of the conflict. Some are grandchildren of refugees or of Holocaust survivors, or had relatives killed in one of the several wars between their peoples. Each government’s delegation of campers is accompanied by adult chaperones who are educators or community leaders. None of the teenagers had met youths from the other side prior to the camp experience. Many arrive with deep-rooted negative images of one another. Israeli campers tend to perceive the Palestinians as violent (as one Israeli said, “I didn’t think they would be all terrorists, but I would generalize sometimes”), inferior (“I didn’t see them as equal people”), and dehumanized (“I just didn’t think of how they live, and where they live and who they are.”)

Palestinian campers’ main associations of Israelis, prior to the camp experience, are as violent soldiers and settlers, occupiers, violators of their human rights, and people who aren’t human. As one Palestinian said, “I thought of Israelis as being a different nation, aliens from another planet. They only have guns in their hands. They don’t have people ten years old or thirteen years old.”

At the camp Israelis and Palestinians eat, sleep, and live together, engaging in numerous joint activities, including sports, art, and drama. The hallmark of the program consists of daily dialogue sessions, led by professional facilitators, in which the teens present their respective peoples’ views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, air grievances, discuss their histories, and share stories of their lives. During three weeks, campers discover the human side of the “Other” and some become friends. After returning home, participants can continue their involvement in Seeds of Peace through the follow-up program operated out of Jerusalem Center for Coexistence, located in an area bordering Arab and Jewish

376 Ibid., p.198.
377 Ibid., pp.198-9.
neighborhoods. However, one of the thorniest issues facing the program and participants is called the “IDF dilemma”, emanated from the fact that Israelis enter the military at age 18 and could be ordered to serve in the West Bank and Gaza. The idea that Israeli Seeds would become soldiers fighting against Palestinians was often incomprehensible and overwhelming for both sides. Indeed, several Israelis reflected upon the great confusion, anxieties, and contradictions they experience upon receiving their induction notices. The message learned from Seeds of Peace about the other side being human is perceived by some Israelis to be incongruous with army service. As a result, some Israeli Seeds tried to resolve the dilemma by serving in noncombat units such as public relations, media, and intelligence. Several Seeds went further and declared themselves to be conscientious objectors – prompting the Israeli Ministry of Education (for whom refusal of military service was unacceptable) to complain to the Seeds of Peace organization.

Parent’s Circle

Parent’s Circle was established in 1994 by Yizhak Frankenthal, following the abduction and murder of his 19-year-old son, Arik, by Hamas. Frankenthal, a well-to-do Orthodox businessman, founded the – Circle which is an organization of Israeli and Palestinian parents who had lost their children in events related to the conflict. The organization is still active today, bringing together over 500 bereaved families from both sides. The basic function of this new organization was to enable parents on both sides to share their grief in the understanding that both sides are victims of the raging violence. The second manifest aim of the Parents’ Circle is no less important: to promote peace and coexistence through education for tolerance and compromise by showing everyone that even parents who lost those dearest to them could reach out to the other side.

By promoting the Jewish moral and religious obligation to preserve and value human life above all, the group organized a variety of activities with the participation of families from both sides, explaining the human toll paid in the name of Greater Israel on one hand and the equally detrimental maximalist ideologies on the Palestinian side. The group was very successful in raising funds and organized several very original peace-promoting activities – from educational programs, artistic political displays, and innovative Israeli-Palestinian interactive endeavors, such as connecting on the telephone, at no charge, Israelis and Palestinians of similar socio-demographic characteristics so that they could talk

380 Ibid., p.201.
about the conflict, their feelings in this context and their preferred solutions382.

Parents’ Circle was met with mixed feelings by Israeli and Palestinian public. On one hand, it was taken as a sign of extremely high morality and humanism; on the other hand, however, many in the general public as well as in other bereaved families considered this unnatural.383

Jerusalem Link – “Sharing Jerusalem”

Sixty Jewish and Palestinian women from Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Europe and North America were invited to a four-day conference entitled ‘Give Peace A Chance: Women Speak Out’ which was organized by the Centre for Secular Humanistic Judaism in Brussels in May 1989. Many of the speakers explained how their political analyses grew out of personal experience; it was later suggested by several participants that the linking of political arguments to personal experience was a particularly female form of expression. This idea was reiterated several times, that women should continue to explore alternative forms of political activity, not to imitate male politics, but to change the nature of power.384

Out of these meetings, the Jerusalem Link comprising two women’s organizations – Bat Shalom on the Israeli side, and the Jerusalem Center for Women on the Palestinian side – was born in 1994. The two organizations share a set of political principles, which serve as the foundation for a cooperative model of coexistence between two respective peoples. During the Oslo years, the link organized meetings between Israeli and Palestinian women with the aim of learning to know and understand one another. Women from refugee camps visited kibbutzim and hosted women from the kibbutzim in their homes. Israeli and Palestinian authors and artists met and worked together. They organized demonstrations, seminars, conferences, and in-service training programs. They also held contests for female writers and artists, along with workshops for young girls, young mothers, and mothers with teenage children. They founded a fair for Palestinian artists to present and sell their work; they supported and organized art exhibitions.385

The Link’s important and significant event was a week-long cultural and political festival called “Sharing Jerusalem: Two Capitals for Two States” in June 1997, to mark thirty years since the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem. At the opening of the event, the Link made a bold statement that no other peace group publicly announced: The future of Jerusalem is central to the success of the peace process. Without finding a just solution to the question of Jerusalem peaceful coexistence can never achieved in the region. It is possible to find ways of sharing Jerusalem, recognizing it containing two capitals for two

382 Hermann 2009, 142.
383 Ibid., p.143.
384 Pope 1993, 182.
sovereign states. Jerusalem, the focus of discord can be transformed into living proof of the human capacity for reconciliation and peace.\textsuperscript{386} The event was sponsored and largely funded by the European Union. During that week thousands of Israelis and Palestinians participated in seminars on the shared future of Jerusalem, visited three art exhibitions assembled especially for the occasion, and listened to music on both the east and west side of the city.\textsuperscript{387}

**Perceived Effectiveness of the Dialogue-Encounter**

One successful attitude change from a typical Israeli-Palestinian youth dialogue-encounter session conducted in Israel: Avi, an Israeli-Jewish ninth grader from a school in the center of Israel, used to hate Arabs. He heard at home and also understood from the media that they are all evil and want to destroy Israel. When he finally personally encountered Palestinian ninth graders through a facilitated dialogue project his school had participated in, he was surprised to learn that they are actually youth like him, and have dreams and aspirations just like his own. A friendship formed between him and Hassan, a Palestinian youth, that lasted long after the dialogue project had ended.\textsuperscript{388} Like youth in the Seeds of Peace, Avi went through attitude change, still, the change remains on the personal level and is not generalized to the macro level of the whole society.\textsuperscript{389}

According to a survey conducted in 2005, by Maoz, Israeli Jews who had participated in encounters with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, the change of attitude was seen in 56% of participants, and since 6% of Israeli Jews participated in encounters with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, the 3% of whole Israeli Jewish population went through an attitude change toward Palestinians.\textsuperscript{390}

This number shows that even if these activities were effective, their outreach was extremely limited and included only small population that are highly unrepresentative of Israeli society as a whole. The demographic data indicated that these were mostly secular females who were identified with left-wing ideologies, more than 40 years old, and of European origins and who had a high level of education and high socioeconomic status.\textsuperscript{391}

2) **Joint Research/Academic Forums/Track II**

During the Oslo years (1993-2000), over 200 joint research projects with over 20 of


\textsuperscript{387} Golan-Agnon 2002. P.135; For details of the event see: Badran, Golan and Persekian eds. 1997.

\textsuperscript{388} Maoz, Bekerman and Sheftel 2007, p.36.

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., p.46.

\textsuperscript{390} Maoz 2009, p.308.

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., p.306.
these just on the Jerusalem issue. These projects were mostly sponsored by the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University, Israel-Palestine Conflict Resolution Institute (IPCRI), and the Bronfman Fund. Various forums and roundtable discussions were also held at the Arab Studies Society (Orient House), The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), and Panorama – Palestinian Center for Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development. In addition, the Palestine-Israel Journal provided space for joint discussion through its journals, Bitterlemons or on its website, while Search for Common Ground used the internet. Most of these organizations were established during Oslo period and still operate.

One of the participants in the Track II meetings hosted by IPCRI said these meetings went very deep and produced thorough proposed plan. However, the founder of IPCRI said although these plans were submitted to politicians, they were of no interest to the policy makers. However, this “problem-solving” type of meetings did foster confidence among participants, and many came to participate in official negotiations. These meetings, however, had limited numbers of participants because of the Palestinian Council for Higher Education’s decree on “normalization” and the boycott by Palestinian universities on these types of meetings. Palestinian academics and intellectuals often suffered criticism if they participated even in a private capacity. Members of the Zionist left for their part were overly enthusiastic about Oslo, ignoring repeated warnings from the Palestinian side that the Oslo framework was being endangered by its non-implementation. In addition, they failed to convey to the Israeli public how the lives of Palestinians had worsened during Oslo were slow to recognize the centrality of the Palestinian refugee experience and the “right of return” instead assuming that it was not “realistic” to expect Israel to conceded on this point. On the other hand, secular liberal-left stream Palestinian Intellectuals did not educate their public for peace were extremely timid in their discussions of the Israeli-Jewish “Other” and made little or no effort to explain to a skeptical or ignorant public the Jewish connection to the land and holy places because the focused almost exclusively on the injustices perpetrated by the Israeli side.

Returning to the P2P programs, Tamari, a renowned Palestinian historian, criticizes them; while including many Israelis and Palestinians looking for ways to break the heavy burden of war and displacement, but these projects also attracted unemployed academics, fortune seekers, guilt-ridden Israeli liberals, and European donors. Although a few cases involving a genuine exchange of ideas and attempts at solidarity across the ethnic divide did emerge, they were marginalized by the existence of donor funding for “feel-good”

392 Interview with a participant to IPCRI Track II meetings.
393 Interview with Gershon Baskin, founder of IPCRI, August 2007.
394 Maddy-Weitzman 2002, p.73.
395 Ibid., p.72.
396 Ibid., p.72.
enterprises. Tamari goes to explain that these projects trivialized Israeli rule as a colonial project, and reduced the subjugation of a native population to a mere matter of breaking of stereotypes and not to a need for rectification of inequality. Furthermore, scholarly activity and research became contingent on political considerations and contrived partnership, whose aim was to sugar-coat the nature of the occupying power, and to assume that conflict resolution belongs to a “balanced perspective” and not to a struggle based on the critical examination of oppression.  

3) Peace Institutions/Forums

The Oslo period saw the institutionalization of many institutions established specifically to contribute to peacebuilding. Some are Israeli-Palestinian joint organization, while others worked unilaterally. To begin with, Jerusalem Link is an umbrella organization of Israeli Bat Shalom and the Palestinian Jerusalem Center for Women established in 1994. From the start, financial support came mainly from European donors, who were active in shaping its constitution and modes of operation to fit the Oslo spirit. It was meant to institutionalize ongoing dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian women with the aim of ending the occupation and improving the status of women in both societies. Over the years, this cooperation produced some very visible activities such as the 1997 “Sharing Jerusalem – two Capitals for the Two States” conference, perhaps the first public gathering of such magnitude that openly called for making East Jerusalem the capital of the future independent Palestinian state. Considering the fierce opposition of the majority of the Israeli Jewish public to sharing Jerusalem, this was a ground breaking political move which caused severe criticism of Bat Shalom on the Israeli side.

Strong friendly relations between Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women activists emerged and were maintained over the years, however, the meetings were often rather tense. Israeli activists’ explanation for these tensions focused on the different priorities of Israeli and Palestinian women: the Palestinians considered their struggle for national liberation more important than the feminist struggle The Israeli women, while strongly opposing the occupation, were equally interested in promoting the feminist agenda.

Bat Shalom’s feminist agenda included reaching out to women of a variety of political views, including those who were more “patriotic.” But Israelis had to choose between pleasing their Palestinian counterparts and being loyal to their own beliefs, but losing the chance of reaching out to wider women’s circles in Israel, or to be less openly sympathetic to the Palestinian struggle and perhaps gaining a stronger foothold and some support on the

---

397 Tamari 2005/06, p17.  
398 Ibid., p.18.  
399 Hermann 2009, p.138..  
Israeli side. The natural dynamics over the years and the ensuing developments pushed the organization away from the mainstream Jewish public.\(^{401}\)

The Bat Shalom Social Justice and Peace outreach project was launched in 1995, and aimed at introducing the organization’s ideas on peace, feminism, and social justice to Jewish Mizrahi women from poorly educated, low-income sectors, living in development towns and inner-city neighborhoods. Several women’s clubs were established in the next few years, mainly in Jerusalem and a few in Tel Aviv, which held weekly small-group meetings organized by Bat Shalom’s community workers. However, the social justice agenda proved very difficult to implement, again because of the wide discrepancy between the activists and those whom they were supposed to reach. The latter – women of the socioeconomically underprivileged strata, often holding right-wing views sensed that the support the organization offered them was often a fig leaf to cover up its real intentions of converting them to the peace camp, a feeling that was not completely baseless.\(^{402}\)

The **Peres Center** was established by Shimon Peres after being defeated by Netanyahu in 1996. Relying on his reputation as a peace maker and his Nobel Peace Prize, Peres used his connections with the global upper crust to raise the money and international support needed for the establishment of the Center. The declared mission of the Peres Center is “realizing [Peres’] vision of a “New Middle East,” in which people of the region work together to build peace through socio-economic cooperation and people-to-people relations...We believe that the only solution to this conflict is through a negotiated agreement, which respects the national identities of both peoples...The Peres Center projects aim to break through the boundaries of misconception and suspicion to arrive at authentic cooperation.”\(^{403}\)

In 1996-1997 funding for many Israeli peace organizations almost dried up and when much of the external funding went to the Peres Center. Peres Center they considered it an intruder and threat.\(^{404}\) Furthermore, Benvenisti strongly criticised institutionalized peace groups stating that “[t]he number of those involved in the “peace industry” is already large and the number of projects that could be conceived is infinite... After all, they are all busy seeking funding and researchers and mixing with potential entrepreneurs and with official political and economic bodies. Everyone is taking some ‘overhead’ for their center’s administration and its expenses. If the number of institutes and peace centers were multiplied by their overheads, the total could provide for the needs of an entire Palestinian

---

\(^{401}\) Hermann 2009, p.139.

\(^{402}\) Ibid., p.140.

\(^{403}\) Peres Center official website <http://www.peres-center.org>

\(^{404}\) Hermann 2009, p.150.
refugee camp.”

3.4.3. People-to-People Program Evaluation

People-to-People (P2P) programs in total, from September 1993 to September 2000, according to IPCRI report, allocated an estimated funding of US$26 million mainly through NGOs and civil society institutions in Israel and Palestine, and half a percent of Israelis and half a percent of Palestinians met the other in these activities.

Some projects were very successful. For example, youth dialogue provided opportunity to see youth from the other side to see the other as humans, and academic projects produced serious discussions on the issues to be solved. However, overall, the amount of projects was too little to make any impact to the society or to the political process. The limited P2P activities that did take place were a fraction of what needed to happen if the reality of conflict if relations between the two societies were to be substantially challenged.

As Dennis Ross, an American envoy to the Middle East during the peace process reflects: “All of us talked a good game when it came to people-to-people programs. Yet our investment...of time, money and efforts was far too limited. We focused far too much on the leaders and negotiators and far too little on the public on each side.”

While the amount of investment was a major issue, there were several other issues that helped the downfall of the P2P programme. As an official program P2P could have launched a long-term institutional program that only authorities are able to do. (i.e. Peace Education through Ministries of Education or joint training programs in institutions of higher education). Instead, authorities designed and supervised P2P initiatives without consulting the grassroots. P2P was held hostage to Oslo’s weakness by political developments. The formal process robbed P2P activities of the legitimization framework necessary for their success and from the Palestinian side P2P was seen as ‘normalization’. Physical/logistical barriers was another issue. The continuation of settlement activities by Israel and the Israeli policy of closure on the West Bank and Gaza after 1994 made the issue of movement and entry permits for Palestinians a constant, constraining factor for P2P activities. This increased not only administrative time in obtaining permits for the

406 IPCRI 2002.
407 Ibid., p.4.
participants, but also budget since sometimes it became easier to meet outside of the region than to obtain permits for Palestinians to come to Israel. Differences in objectives also became evident. While Palestinians sought to raise awareness among Israelis about the suffering of the Palestinians, the Israeli side’s political agenda was to promote the idea that the Oslo process constituted the solution to the Palestinian problem. One of most serious issue was inability to mobilize wider segment of both society. Due to Palestinian perception of P2P as a form of ‘normalization’ and boycott by NGOs and academics, many participants were politicians or affiliated with Fateh. For Israelis, fear and distrust of Palestinians together with the delegitimation of the left made it more difficult to recruit people for dialogue or cooperation. This is how many of the meetings were conducted with similar participants called the “usual suspects”, and P2P was criticized as “converting the converted” or an isolated “bubble.” These circumstances thus negatively affected the continuity and reputation of the bottom-up programmes dealing with cross cultural communication and cooperation developed during the 1987 Intifada.

3.5. Collapse of the Oslo Peace Process - Camp David Failure

Camp David Summit failed to produce a final status agreement, and so did the subsequent Taba meetings. The negotiating process fell victim to the conflicting expectations of the parties, and to their diverging interpretations of its meaning and of what exactly was the actual premises upon which it was built. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction, inherited from, and inherent in, the letter of the Oslo accords, that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed. To them, not all ‘the territories’ were under discussion, but ‘territories’, because Oslo left to negotiations the nature of the final border and just one UN resolution was relevant to the negotiations, Resolution 242, which indeed was the exclusive platform upon which the entire Madrid process was based.\(^\text{410}\)

For the Palestinians this was a simple, clear-cut process of decolonization based on ‘international legitimacy’ and ‘UN relevant Resolutions’ that compelled Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders, divide Jerusalem, dismantle the

\(^{410}\) Ben-Ami 2006, p.247.

\(^{411}\) Beilin 2004, p.291.
settlements for being illegal and acknowledge the refugees’ right of return.

An argument holds that Barak turned over every stone at the Camp David Summit, that the Palestinians rejected him instead of agreeing to his proposals, and therefore it is impossible to reach an agreement with them. Indeed, Barak did make very brave proposals, or, more accurately, Clinton made such proposals and Barak did not reject them. This was the most far reaching position ever taken by an Israeli Prime Minister, not because Barak was the most moderate among them, but because he was the first Prime Minister prepared to enter talks on the permanent arrangement. He was the first who was forced to deal with real positions on borders, Jerusalem, solutions to the refugee problem, security arrangements, and the future of the settlements.412

Public support for the Oslo process began to decline significantly few months after Barak was elected as prime minister in May 1999. Apparently the ongoing deadlock in the political negotiations (along with the frequent Palestinian terror attacks against civilians both inside and outside the Green Line), which was not broken after the elections, disillusioned most Israeli Jews about the Oslo process well before the process was declared dead after Camp David. Nevertheless, this erosion was clearly accelerated after Camp David, as Israel adopted the formal position – eagerly embraced by the public – that the negotiations had failed because Arafat had rejected Barak’s highly conciliatory offer and refused to announce, in return, the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli support for the process reached less than 30 percent according to a public opinion poll. Almost without exception, all remaining supporters identified themselves in surveys as being on the left.413

On September 29, 2000, after Sharon’s provocative visit to the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount and subsequent violence, Oslo peace process came to an end. With the collapse of Oslo Peace Process, in 2000, Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network (PNGO) announced a decision that barred its member organizations from engaging in P2P activities as a protest against the lack of implementation of the peace process. Soon after, the official People-to-People also came to an end with the end of Oslo Peace Process.

3.6. Summary

The Oslo Accord allotted a five-year interim period allegedly for “confidence building” between the former foes to facilitate the final agreement. However, from the start, the Process was fragile. It was almost broken by the massacre perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein at the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron in 1994; when Rabin was assassinated in 1995; when Netanyahu opened the Wall Tunnel and blood was spilled on both sides in 1996; and finally

412 Ibid., p.271.
413 Hermann 2006, p.43.
when Sharon went to the Haram Al Sharif/Temple Mount in September 2000. The Oslo Process did bring political leaders from both sides to recognize each other as people and to negotiate and agree on several interim agreements. However, implementation of these interim agreements, mainly transferring responsibility from Israel to Palestinian Authority, was repeatedly delayed. Five year interim period passed without even starting the final status negotiations. And when the final status negotiation took place in Camp David, both sides were not ready, their political leaders and the public, to make painful compromise needed.

The Israeli peace movement lost momentum and visibility when it was needed. Although in later years it was sometimes able to bring thousands to public squares to protest the policies of the Netanyahu or Sharon governments, these were only sporadic events insufficient to reawaken the peace camp. Ongoing projects such as the “Settlement Watch” operated by Peace Now, which was indeed very important in exposing the realities of continuous land expropriations and expansion of the settlements against the agreements signed with the Palestinians and the official declarations of the various Israeli governments, were equally ineffective.

The closure of the territories, the continued construction in the settlements, and the failure to make preparations for peace all led to a serious deterioration of the situation. But these developments were not stopped, largely because of the sense that peace was just around the corner, and with it would come change. Only a few peace organizations, mainly, advocacy and human rights groups remained active but they were marginalized. Indeed, the forces of opposition to the peace process were much stronger.

Palestinians initially had high hope for the Oslo Peace Process believing their independent is close, however, became critical of the peace process as occupation continued and more land was taken away to build settlements. The criticism came not only from opposition parties but from all walks of society.

Joint cooperation, People-to-People programmes in totality, was too late and too little and operated in its own “bubble” and could not widen its constituents. Some encounter-dialogue projects made significant discussion and had impacts on participants on a personal level, however, they had very little, if any, impact on society. The linkage to the peace process was a major cause of rejection by both sides, but more so by Palestinians for any joint project under ongoing occupation was came to be seen as “normalization” and rejected by large part of the society. This is not to say People-to-People programmes were not necessary, but they needed to confront the reality on the ground, rather than pretend that the conflict had ended. And much more support was needed to those willing to pursue peacebuilding under difficult condition.

International community intervention in the peace process was not sufficient. Even when it was showing signs of deterioration, it did not intervene, believing it would be solved
by two parties at the final status agreement. It treated the peace process as if it were already in a post-conflict phase, while occupation still continued. There was no public condemnation of settlements construction coming from members of the major international community. And their financing of peacebuilding projects was affected by temporary political and diplomatic changes, and ignored long-term objective related to mindsets and perceptions.

One major achievement during Oslo years is that Israeli leaders and public came to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state. Such an acceptance came not only from the Left: many on the Right were forced to come to terms with the idea, even if they thought that the borders and the degrees of sovereignty of the future Palestinian state would be open to discussion.
Part II

Emerging Peace Activism
Chapter 4: Emerging Peace Activism (from Al-Aqsa Intifada to Present)

The failure to come up with an agreement in the 2000 Camp David Summit and subsequent Taba negotiation left Palestinians and Israelis in a difficult impasse. Since the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, relation between Israelis and Palestinians have further deteriorated and are characterized by escalation of violence and by the breakdown of mutual trust and continued harshening of the Israeli occupation. Official efforts to revive the peace process have been made, but have not succeeded since Israeli “unilateralism” and Palestinian “anti-normalization” have prevailed.

During the Oslo Peace Process, there were, if limited, approaches to peacemaking at the top, middle, and bottom of the social strata. However, since Al Aqsa Intifada, with the absence of the top level peacemaking, civil societies are facing new challenges and must look for new approaches and strategies to influence its society and leaders. In addition, the international political climate is changing, especially since the “War against Terror” in response to September 11, 2001 attack on USA, which divided world opinion on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This chapter will highlight some of the peace activism that emerged or developed during this period of turmoil.

4.1. Al-Aqsa Intifada to “No Partner” Policy

The Camp David summit did not produce a final agreement. Soon after, Ariel Sharon stepped onto the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound with large number of Israeli security force personnel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted. Days before Sharon’s visit, a senior Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, had been sent as a personal envoy from Palestinian president Yasser Arafat to plead with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prevent Sharon’s well-publicized coming visit. The PA correctly feared that such a provocative measure would ignite the situation on the ground. But Palestinian protests fell on deaf ears.

The day after Sharon’s visit, Israeli police under the jurisdiction of the minister of internal security, Shlomo Ben Ami (of the Labor Party), were sent to surround the compound after the midday prayers. Seven worshippers (including one Palestinian citizen of Israel) were subsequently killed and dozens were wounded in the ensuring yet predictable conflagration.

The Israeli military planned re-taking of Palestinian cities and Barak "approved the

---

operational and tactical plans of the IDF to halt the intifada." The IDF fired one million rounds in the first three weeks of the intifada, "a bullet for every child" according to one Israeli officer. In the first five days of fighting, Israeli forces killed 50 Palestinians and wounded more than 1,000. Israel prepared to use tanks and helicopters to "crush" the Palestinians and re-take land in Area A. The plan also called for an economic blockade and arresting PA officials. In addition to IDF preparations, Israeli settlers in the West Bank were also arming.

The War on Terror launched by the United States against Islamic fundamentalism led to the development of strong anti-Arab feelings and attitudes in the West. Hence, Palestinian violence was now interpreted, or framed, by many in Europe and the United States as less a liberation struggle and more as part of the global Islamic Jihad.

Like the 1987 rebellion this second intifada at its inception was overwhelmingly nonviolent. However, in Ben-Ami’s words, “Israel’s disproportionate response to what had started as a popular uprising with young, unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed with lethal weapons fuelled the [second] intifada beyond control and turned it into an all-out war.”

Palestinian National and Islamic Forces (PNIF), an umbrella movement made up of all factions, including the Islamic movements of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was formed and a statement was issued on October 18, describing the summit as a “failure” that did not meet the Palestinians “minimal expectations” and called for a continuation of the “people’s peaceful Intifada until sovereignty and independence are achieved.” Few dispute that the driving force behind this revolt was Arafat’s Fateh movement and particularly its grassroots organization, the Tantheem. Tantheem emerged as a new opposition within Fatah, criticizing the failures of the Palestinian Authority and Arafat in particular, stating that the whole system suffered from corruption, lack of harmony and coordination among ministries and senior PA officials and between ministers and President Arafat. In addition,

---


Ibid., p.58.
the Palestinian Authority had failed to make much progress in liberating Palestinian territories through negotiation or in stopping the steady expansion of settlements. The new opposition began to gain popularity by working at the community, grass roots level, including in refugee camps.\(^{422}\)

However, the call for peaceful Intifada did not move Palestinian people. The political and social bodies on the ground associated with the PLO and its constitutive parties, which in years past had acted as the vital organs of the national movement under occupation, particularly during the 1987 Intifada, had so deteriorated and/or become bureaucratized, that they were simply unable to offer any substantial support to the new currents of political energy to which the Intifada gave birth.\(^{423}\) Many Palestinian NGOs became “neutral” and “spectators” of the Intifada.\(^{424}\)

What Palestinian NGOs undertook was a very successful form of professional action providing the most accurate and up-to-date information on the number of Palestinian injuries and fatalities, the damages caused by Israeli military operations and human rights violations. Some Palestinian NGOs played a major role in organizing international popular protection (in the form of civil missions), however, they were not able to work with these missions to develop nonviolent forms of resistance.\(^{425}\)

It was primarily Hamas that combined a clear oppositional stance to Oslo within a social and political platform that attempted to both resist Israel and take up the enormous social and class questions that were being left unaddressed by the PA, Fateh and the Left. Armed with substantial financial resources (something the Left failed to develop other than through grants from Western governments and institutions) and the occasional suicide operation (which harvested the growing anti-Oslo/anti-Occupation frustrations among the Palestinian masses), the political conditions were ripened to affirm Hamas’s platform and activities by default and practically irrespective of its religious content.\(^{426}\) The first Hamas suicide bombing of the second intifada started five months into Israel’s attacks.

Israel’s disproportionate use of force was quickly noted by human rights organizations and Dennis Ross, US Special Envoy to the Middle East, expressed US concerns to Israeli Prime Minister Barak.\(^{427}\) As the Mitchell report noted, the most significant elements for the escalation of violence were "the decision of the Israeli police on 29 September to use

\(^{422}\) Klein, 2002.

\(^{423}\) Honing-Parnass and Haddad, 2007, p.55.


\(^{425}\) Ibid., pp.112-3.

\(^{426}\) Honing-Parnass and Haddad, 2007, p.46.

\(^{427}\) B’Tselem 2000. "Illusions of Restraint" (December); Amnesty International 2000. "Excessive Use of Lethal Force." (October); and Enderlin 2003, p.299.
lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators” and “the subsequent failure of either party to exercise restraint.”

Given the weakened state of the Palestinian economy before the uprising, economic conditions deteriorated further and faster since the Al-Aqsa Intifada began. For the first time in the history of Israel’s occupation, Palestinians faced a humanitarian crisis that began to emerge within weeks of the uprising’s start. By January 2001, close to 1 million people, or 32% of the population, were living below the poverty level. The rapid increase in poverty is due primarily to the loss of employment in Israel and in the domestic economy itself a result of the widespread and prolonged imposition of total closure.

Palestinians contended that the shortcomings of Israel’s offer proved Israel wanted to continue the occupation. Israel’s diplomacy was merely a facade. Israel wanted to keep control of some Arab areas of East Jerusalem, keep a sizable percentage of the land of the West Bank, and prolong a host of intrusive security measures. In short, talks would not end the occupation or bring about independence. Thus, to some Palestinians, a different route, a military one, was the only way to get Israel to leave.

At the same time, many Palestinians were led to believe the worst of Israelis. Many feared that the inclusion of far-right parties in Mr. Sharon’s coalition government signaled a new respectability in Israel for the extremist belief that Palestinians should be “transferred” to neighboring Arab lands. And Palestinians also feared that Israeli forces were planning to conduct a massive invasion along with the start of the US attacks against Iraq. Together with Arab leaders, they called for a UN resolution to send international peacekeepers to the occupied territories to protect Palestinian civilians, the resolution was vetoed by the United States.

For Israelis, Arafat spurned a generous Israeli offer because the Palestinians wanted a military not a diplomatic solution. Many Israelis believed that Arafat had been completely discredited as a "peace partner" and that there was no point in negotiating more agreements with him. They believed that he deliberately resorted to violence to put pressure on Israel to give him what he could not obtain at Camp David. And an increasing

---


number believed that he once more has his sights fixed on destroying Israel and in March 2001, 72% of the Jewish respondents maintained that the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they could.\footnote{Peace Index, March 2001.}

At Camp David, Barak did break Israeli taboos against any discussion of dividing Jerusalem, and sketched out an offer that was politically courageous, especially for an Israeli leader with a faltering coalition. But it was a proposal that the Palestinians did not believe would leave them with a viable state. And although Mr. Barak said no Israeli leader could go further, he himself improved considerably on his Camp David proposal six months later. Terje Roed-Larsen, the United Nations special envoy to the Middle East, said "[i]t is a terrible myth that Arafat and only Arafat caused this catastrophic failure. All three parties made mistakes, and in such complex negotiations, everyone is bound to. But no one is solely to blame."\footnote{Deborah Sontag, \textit{The New York Times}. 26 July, 2001.}

Since October 2000, Israel had refused to hold talks with the Palestinians “while under fire” or while “terrorism continues.” It chose to take unilateral steps, such as building the separation wall.

Israel's harsh measures against largely nonviolent demonstrations were also directed at Palestinian citizens of Israel, who had immediately identified with the outbreak of the Intifada in the Occupied Territories. The killing of thirteen Palestinian citizens in the early days of the uprising was seen as an intended and unequivocal message directed against the process of strengthened national identification of 1948 Palestinians with the PA and their desire to challenge their inequality in the Jewish-Zionist state by demanding collective national rights.\footnote{Honig-Parnass and Haddad 2007, p.56.}

For the peace camp, the collapse of negotiations and, much worse, the upsurge in Palestinian violence against Israeli civilians, the suicide bombings came as a severe blow. Their political rationale seemed to have been discredited, and many former activists “went home,” turning their backs on the options of reconciliation with the Palestinians. External financial support shrunk considerably as many liberal Jewish donors became disillusioned with the cause of peace.\footnote{Hermann 2006, p.53.} The post-September 11 international environment was also not conducive to peace negotiations.

However, even under heavy criticism, some activists nevertheless saw building ties and cooperative relations as the most effective means to counter demonization and delegitimization. Today, some also see themselves as deliberately challenging the post-2000, “there’s no one to talk to” discourse.

New approaches to peacebuilding can be seen in various activities and this chapter will
highlight some of them.

4.2. Peace Initiatives

One development was the emergence of new civil initiatives for peace, mainly the People's Voice and the Geneva Initiative based on the assumption that if a sufficiently strong joint wave of public support for resuming negotiations generated, decision makers will not be able to ignore it. Also, a publicized campaign winning the support of many thousands on each side would signal to the other side that despite the hostilities and killings, the “silent majority” of people on both sides is still interested in peace. The question the organizers had to deal with in both cases was how to create a popular wave of support when the facts on the ground appeared so antithetical to the cause of peace.

The People's Voice

Sari Nusseibeh, a renowned academic and independent Palestinian political activist and Ami Ayalon, a former commander of the Israeli navy and former head of the General Security Service (Shin Bet), prepared a short document outlining the features of a final status agreement and presented it to the public. The initiative aimed to collect hundreds of thousands of signatures of Israelis and Palestinians, hopefully even a million or more, so that it would become a “People's Voice” for peaceful settlement of the conflict. The signatures, collected, for example, through the internet, signing stations in public places, or telephone and mail, were to be presented to the decision makers of both sides in the hope that they would impel them to renew negotiations and eventually arrive at an agreement. Over six months after the formal launching of the signing campaign, around 375,000 signatures of Israelis and Palestinians were been collected. This initial list was presented to the president of Israel in a small ceremony. However, this initiative is no longer in the public discourse.

The Geneva Initiative

Yassir Abed Rabbo and Yossi Beilin, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators at the Taba meeting and many preceding negotiations, established the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition in January 2002 determined to prove to each side that a partner for peace still existed. The forum included public figures, politicians, and intellectuals who worked, both together and separately, to influence public opinion on both sides. The Coalition held meetings, published joint notices, and arranged discussions with visitors from abroad, which later cumulated into the Geneva Initiative. The Geneva Initiative produced a detailed version of a final status agreement including the issue of the refugees and the status of
Jerusalem.

The initiative was officially launched on December 1, 2003, at a ceremony in Geneva. It gained the blessing of prominent world figures such as Nelson Mandela, Mikail Gorbachev, Bill Clinton, and Kofi Annan. The Geneva Accord was widely publicized in both societies and was further disseminated to the Israeli public by direct mail and to the Palestinian public though newspaper inserts. Most Israelis, though finding it far too long and complex to read, became aware of its existence. A November 2003 poll commissioned by the James Baker Institute at Rice University and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group found 53 percent of Israelis and 56 percent of Palestinians supporting the accord.

U.S. leaders including Dr. Zbigniew Brezinski, former National Security Advisors to the President, Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State, Robert McNamara, Former Secretary of Defense, expressed their support to the initiatives. The statement reads that both Geneva and People’s Voice initiatives both reflect public opinion [to end the conflict] and can help give it new momentum, and that international support will be crucial to translate these endeavors into a concrete mechanism to bring about a lasting peace.

In the national polls support for the Initiative was lower in both Israel and Palestine. The initiative received 30% support in Israel in November 2003. In Israel, one main reason for negative response was that initiators had no legitimacy to conduct negotiations or come to an agreement. Another issue, which provoked extensive public disapproval, was the fact that the initiative received vast financial support from external bodies that included the Swiss and EU. Geneva Initiative was portrayed by its opponents as a vehicle for the promotion of foreign interests and not necessarily Israeli ones.

In Palestine, according to the poll conducted in October only 31 percent of Palestinians in favor and 51 percent opposed (33 percent strongly). Palestinians reacted negatively to the Geneva document’s renunciation of the refugee right to return, Israeli retention of large

---

437 According to the November 2003 Peace Index survey, 86.5% of Israeli Jews had heard about the Geneva document, and 32% had expressed support for it.
441 In a poll conducted in October 2003 by Tel Aviv University Steinmetz Center, 65% of the Jewish responded about the Geneva Initiative that only the government should negotiate peace with the Palestinians and that any civil group conducting such negotiations undermines the government’s authority. Only 28% thought it legitimate for NGOs to conduct such talks even though such talks clearly are not binding.
442 Hermann 2009, p.222.
settlement blocs, and “end of claim” clause. Palestinian opposition among refugees, both in the territories and in surrounding countries, as well as by Palestinian human rights groups has been particularly strong.

Still, Geneva Initiative was a bold move on the part of domestic players to interfere with the leaders’ game in an attempt to expand their influence through public opinion. In fact, it went even further, offering a full-blown alternative game with different assumptions, different rules, and perhaps even different players. As such, it was perceived as a threat to Sharon and to Arafat, and challenge to their leadership capacity, particularly since it appeared to be in conflict with their domestic political calculations and outside their acceptability.

The Geneva Initiative, coupled with a desire to renew the political process on the part of the Israeli public, a deteriorating economy, and protest groups refusing to serve in the territories, provided the impetus for Sharon’s Disengagement Plan. In a revealing interview to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Dov Weisglass, Sharon’s senior adviser, vividly explain the forces that motivated the disengagement Plan: “The economy was stagnant, and the Geneva Initiative garnered broad support. And then we were hit with letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos. These were not weird kids with green ponytails and a ring in their nose who give off a strong odor of grass. These were...really our finest young people.”

Israeli and Palestinian pollstars Shamir and Shikaki said there can be no doubt about the central role of NGOs, grassroots protest, and public opinion in pressuring Sharon to come up with a new policy initiative. The Sharon’s Disengagement Plan was announced in December 2003, two months after the Geneva Initiative, is no coincidence.

The Arab Peace Initiative

Peace initiatives also came from outside, including Arab states. The Arab Peace Initiative is a comprehensive peace initiative proposed by then-Crown Prince, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and endorsed unanimously at the Beirut Summit of the Arab League on March 27, 2002. It attempts to end the Arab–Israeli conflict, by means of normalizing relations between the entire Arab region and Israel in exchange for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on UN Resolution 194 (calling for a diplomatic

---

443 Palestinian Center for Public Survey and Policy (PCPSR) survey, October 2003.
446 Shamir and Shikaki p.92.
resolution to the conflict and resolving that any refugees "wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors" should be able to do so or should be provided with compensation). 447

The Arab Peace Initiative represented a total break from the Arab League’s Khartoum Resolution of 1967 which stated the "three No’s" that was to be the center of all Israeli-Arab relations after that point: no peace deals, no diplomatic recognitions, and no negotiations. In Israel, the Arab Peace Initiative was not rejected; it was simply never discussed nor raised by the government as an issue to be dealt with. Any discussion of the plan immediately turned into an inventory of evidence confirming the prior supposition that the offer was not valid. 448

Trusteeship

Another peace initiative came from Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and who served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs from 1997 to 2000, and as Ambassador to Israel in 1995-1997 and 2000-2001. He proposed a plan to establish an international trusteeship for Palestine in the May/June 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs.” 449 Indyk’s proposal was a full-scale U.S.-led and U.N.-endorsed international intervention to take away control of most of the West Bank and all of Gaza from Arafat and the Israeli army. Those territories were to be held in trust for the Palestinians while the trustees worked with responsible Palestinian partners to create the institutions of a viable, independent state and while final status negotiations between Israel and representative Palestinians defined the state’s final borders. The trusteeship for Palestine would have required an international force of some 10,000 troops responsible for maintaining order, dismantling the infrastructure of terror, and rebuilding Palestinian security forces. 450

Although this idea was considered by the Bush administration, the White House’s appetite for trying anything similar in Palestine disappeared when its far more ambitious trusteeship in Iraq began to founder. Bush went back to his default position of disengagement from any serious effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with predictable results. 451

---

450 Ibid.
Indyke wrote in 2007 that this Trusteeship approach is still valid. The 2007 version of the trusteeship idea is perhaps better referred to as a "partnership" between the Palestinians and the international community, since the international force would not be replacing the Palestinian government but rather helping the Palestinian president take control of the West Bank as Israel withdraws in stages. Should Israel have to reenter Gaza, the same principle could apply.\textsuperscript{452}

Tikkun Initiative

Another initiative came from an American Jewish Rabbi Michael Lerner, the founder of Tikkun a progressive Jewish Movement in the USA.\textsuperscript{453} The essence here is calling for the US administration to play a more positive role in the resolution of the conflict by presenting the peace plan along the following lines with those who live outside Israel/Palestine challenging the discourse of "blaming the other" that gets strengthened by the more extreme partisans in both camps\textsuperscript{454}: deployment of an international force to separate and protect each side from the extremists of the other who will inevitably seek to disrupt the peace agreement; creating of a joint peace police \textsuperscript{455} composed of an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis \textsuperscript{455} that will work with the international force to combat violence; establishing a truth and reconciliation process modeled on the South African version but shaped to the specificity of these two cultures.

Discussion around bringing international peacekeeping force was taking place among scholars and military experts, both Israelis and Palestine.\textsuperscript{455} However, after the quagmire experience by international forces in Iraq, it is unlikely that these proposals would be put into action soon.

Following the Mitchell Report, the Quartet (EU, Russia, USA, and United Nations) was created and the Road Map to Peace was presented and accepted, with certain reservations, by both Israelis and Palestinians. For Palestinians, it was a step forward that other parties joined US to forward the peace process. However, the Road Map’s first stage, ending

\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{455} For example, Tel Aviv University organized symposium on 29 April 2002. Tamar Hermann and Ehraram Yuchtman-Yaar ed. 2002. \textit{International Intervention in Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case}. Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University.
violence and halting settlement construction, did not occurred.

In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, some joint programmes continued to provide forums for discussions and researches such as Search for Common Ground, Palestine-Israel Journal, IPCRI, or PASSIA. These forums brought various groups in both Israel and Palestine together: soldiers who participated in wars and the ongoing conflict; former prisoners trying to achieve freedom through the use of dialogue instead of weapons; women leading social change; professional facilitators and activists working with groups on “track two” diplomacy; and journalists searching for better ways to cover the conflict. All seemed to share one common goal: to explore how Palestinians and Israelis can humanize one another and find common ground for real change.456

4.3. Nonviolent Grassroots movement

While Israeli military operations take place in the occupied territories, there are a few active groups devoting significant efforts in challenging the occupation forces on a daily basis by building nonviolent capacities. Palestinian nonviolent direct-action groups aim to achieve a wide civil-based resistance by drawing on both symbolic and actual acts of resistance as well as inviting Israelis and internationals to join them and draw media attention both locally and internationally.

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM)

The ISM began its activity in March 2001 (led by local and international volunteers) with an international presence in the village of Hares to protect local Palestinians from settlers and the Israeli army. This action was followed by a group of foreign volunteers who camped outside the Arafat compound when it was first targeted by the Israeli army. In July they sat in some homes in Beit Sahour that were under attack by Israel. The official campaign call was issued in August 2001 for fifty foreigners to protest the closing of, and attack on the Palestinian Orient House in East Jerusalem. The arrest of the international participants along with many Palestinians was widely covered by Arab and Israeli media.

Activities included accompanying ambulances targeted by the Israeli army, staying in Palestinian homes to protect them from Israeli intrusion, and carrying food and medicine to 150 Palestinians under siege for forty-three days in Bethlehem’s historic Church of the Nativity. In early 2004, many of the international activists, especially ISM volunteer, began assisting in organizing villages in Beit Suriek, Bidou, and Budrus to oppose the building of

the separation wall on the West Bank. In addition to the intended physical protection of ISM presence on the ground, it has greatly raised the morale of Palestinians by “seeing civilians from other countries come and be willing to put their time, their energy, their resources and their bodies on the line, it lessens the big feeling of isolation.”

ISM leaders are careful in defining their contribution as outsiders and maintaining that they “help support the nonviolent Palestinian resistance by tapping into the resources that internationals can provide – global attention.” However, probably the most significant factor in the visibility of the ISM has been when Israeli security forces targeted its active members, especially after the killing of Rachel Corrie, one of its foreign volunteers in Gaza. Many of ISM’s members and volunteers have been banned from entering Israel or the occupied territories. In addition, in the fall of 2003, Israel forces began requiring all foreign visitors to Israel to sign a document prohibiting them from entering the occupied territories. Such a policy reflects the wide impact that ISM and its members have had on the occupation policy.

Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People (GIPP)

Similar to the ISM, this initiative was inspired by local Palestinian NGOs and leaders who invited several foreign delegations to Palestine in March 2001 to visit refugee camps, hospitals, and demolished homes, as well as to Israeli settlements and bypass roads. Many Palestinian organizations supported the initiative, among them the Palestinian NGO Network, YMCA/YWCA, Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace, Members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, Palestinian General Union for Charitable Society, General Union of Palestinian Women, and ISM.

The initiative was launched after the United States vetoed the United Nations resolution to send international peacekeepers to the occupied territories. Mustafa Barghouti, the founder of the largest medical NGO in Palestine, spearheaded the campaign and initially focused work on bringing European diplomats and government officials to witness and monitor violations of Palestinian human rights by the Israeli military. However, the initiative expanded and with international partnerships, it brought hundreds of officials and over 2,000 foreigners into Palestine.

Eventually the work of GIPP and ISM began converging, especially on the ground when international volunteers responded to calls to protest Israeli actions. Most of these volunteers would report what they saw, the brutal reality of occupation, to their family and friends and some became activists back home.


Mohammed Abu Nimer 2006, p.150.

Ibid., p.150.

Mohammed Abu Nimer 2006, p.152.
Despite the increasing Palestinian participation in GIPP and ISM, according to local Palestinian nonviolent coordinator Ghassan Andoni, these groups are more effective at the local level.\textsuperscript{461} The work of the nonviolent direct organizations, especially ISM has been in the rural and most underdeveloped and poorest area of Palestine. There is still a lack of strong engagement from the Palestinian middle class and NGOs and civil-society groups with well-educated constituencies.\textsuperscript{462}

As settler violence increased, various international organizations began arriving to affected villages to protect farmers in tending their farms or accompany children going to school safely without obstruction by settlers. The Christian Peacemakers Team and The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) are some international groups active since the early 2000s. Israeli peace organizations, such as Rabbis for Human Rights and others also try protecting Palestinian civilians from settler violence. A rabbi from the organization is assigned just for this purpose, and is ready to intervene anytime Palestinians call for help by phoning the IDF or taking affidavits from the victims to submit to the Israeli courts. When the situation is tense, sometimes, members of Rabbis for Human Rights will stay in a village.\textsuperscript{463}

The Non violent Movement Against the Wall

As the Separation Wall was being constructed confiscating much fertile land and wells, Palestinian villagers took initiative to confront the soldiers and bulldozers. One of those villages Budrus succeeded in moving back the route of the Wall back to Green Line, by forming a popular committee consisting everyone in the village. Many villages affected by the Wall followed this model and many demonstrations in villages were joined by Israeli and international peace activists including ISM.

Also, the Apartheid Wall Campaign established in 2002, played an important role in collecting data and reporting the facts on the ground both locally and internationally, as well as coordinating efforts of villagers, and providing legal assistance to appeal to Israeli High Court. Their efforts supported the Palestinian Authority in appealing to the International Court of Justice. The Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice stated not only that the route of the Wall was illegal, but that the settlements in the West


\textsuperscript{462} Ibid., p.182; For NGOs role during the second Intifada see, Sari Hanafi and Tabar, Linda, 2005, \textit{The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite: Donors, international organizations and local NGOs}, Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies.

\textsuperscript{463} Conversation with a member rabbi of Rabbis for Human Rights in the Summer 2006.
Bank were illegal. Subsequently, the Israeli High Court was pressured to review the cases brought to them and often ruled against the route of the Wall that Israeli government planned.

This case will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

4.4. Women Activism

After the Second Intifada, some Israeli women groups re-organized, accelerated its activities, coalition was formed, and new group emerged.

**Machsom Watch**

Machsom Watch is a new organization of female volunteers, begun in 2001, to monitor checkpoints in the West Bank. Initially, the women started to stand at checkpoints where soldiers could see them, to prevent the soldiers humiliating the Palestinians. And it seems, the presence of women helped soldiers to behave somewhat appropriately. The movement’s initial stated goals were: to monitor the behavior of soldiers and border policemen at checkpoints; to ensure the protection of the human and civil rights of Palestinians attempting to enter Israel and travelling within the West Bank; and to bear witness to the widest possible audience from the decision-making political and military levels to the general public in Israel and abroad, including media coverage.

The group’s volunteers have rapidly increased to 500 in three years and are present at major checkpoints.

**Coalition of Women for Peace**

The Israeli women’s peace movement in November 2000 established the Coalition of Women for Peace to serve as a platform for feminist peace and human rights organizations, to express their protest against the violence used by Israeli forces and the wrath of the Zionist left-wing movements that accepted the “no partner” version promoted by the government, to prevent further disintegration of the feminist space, and shared a desire to continue the joint activities of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. The Coalition included nine feminist organizations, of them veteran groups such as Women in Black, Movement of Democratic Women in Israel (TANDI), the Israeli branch of WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Women for Coexistence (Neled), Noga Feminist Journal and younger networks such as Women and Mothers for Peace (some of

---

464 From conversation from members of Machsom Watch, Summer 2003.
which have in past Four Mothers movement and later founded the Fifth Mother), New Profile and later Machsom Watch. The member groups increased to twenty including groups specializes in social issues, which became their coalition, liking social issues to peace.

The Women peacebuilding activism will be examined in detail in Chapter 7.

4.5. Questioning the Morality of Occupation

Given the shift in the Israeli public opinion, demonstrations, which used to be highly popular among peace groups, became nearly obsolete. The remaining core of peace activists has had to develop new ideological options and modes of actions in response to the dismal circumstances. A few peace groups emerged to question the morality of the occupation and conduct of the occupation army.

**Breaking the Silence**

Breaking the Silence was founded in the form of an exhibition of photographs, titled “Breaking the Silence,” taken by Israel Defense Forces soldiers who served in Hebron during the second intifada. One week after the exhibition, the Military Police arrived with warrants to confiscate the exhibited materials. The group continued collecting testimonies from soldiers and publishing them both in Hebrew and English. It states its concern for the damage to the morality caused by occupation:

“Service in the occupied territories and the incidents we faced have distorted and harmed the moral values on which we grew up. We all agree that as long as Israeli society keeps sending its best people to military combat service in the occupied territories, it is extremely important that all of us, Israeli citizens, know the price which the generation who is fighting in the territories is paying...That’s why we decided to break the silence, because it’s time to tell.\(^{467}\)

Many soldiers’ testimonials include accounts of their initial shock at encountering the brutality and lawlessness associated with the daily practices of the occupation. Despite the enormous power they had over Palestinians, these young soldiers felt utterly helpless to affect their situation. The soldiers viewed the violence they took part in as anchored in the occupation context and believed that nothing they would do as individuals in that situation could have any real effect. And they openly admit to how quickly they became accustomed to

\(^{466}\) Coalition of Women for Peace website: <http://www.coalitionofwomen.org>

the brutality, developing a moral numbness that allowed them to participate in upholding it.

Rather than addressing their polemic directly to military superiors, or the political leadership, these young men sought to create a space for a broad-ranging intergenerational dialogue at the familial and societal levels. Contradicting the widely accepted picture of familial protectiveness toward young soldiers, they insisted that the same parents who were spending sleepless nights agonizing about their material and emotional wellbeing during military service nevertheless remained willingly ignorant of their moral torments. They accused the parent generation of looking away, of refusing to acknowledge the price their offspring were paying for their failure as adults to see what was happening and to act on this knowledge.468

In the larger context of the political debate in Israel, it was clear that this testimonial campaign was highly controversial. Not surprisingly, people on the right found it objectionable, even treacherous, as for them the Occupied Territories were the Promised Land liberated by the Jews in 1967. Less obviously perhaps, this testimonial project was also rejected by some left-wingers who faulted the soldiers for not joining the ranks of the conscientious objectors, but rather engaging in the Israeli version of moral equivocation know as “shooting and crying”.469

Nevertheless, the effort to circulate soldiers’ testimonies has added its weight to the campaign against the normalization of Israel’s continued occupation policy. Drawing on their credential as Israel patriots who are willing to serve their country in uniform, and who deeply care about the moral profile of Israeli society, the “silence breakers” boldly forced an open cultural conversation about morality in war, the abuses of military power, individual agency, national values and human solidarity. If the political impact of their dissent remains unclear, the cultural import of the alternative paradigm they charted is unmistakable.470

**Conscientious Objectors**

More than a thousand Israelis refused to serve in the army between 2001 and 2005. Some have wished to totally dissociate themselves from an army whose behavior and ethos they consider immoral. Others have refused only to serve in the occupied territories, or, in some cases, to follow orders they consider illegal while serving there. Certainly, many tens of thousands of young Israelis – perhaps as many as 30-50 percent – exercise a ‘grey’ officially tolerated refusal, in which ‘medical’ or ‘psychological’ reasons prevent service.471 Refuseniks, as the conscientious objectors are called in Israel, are thought to suffer in the

---

469 Ibid.
470 Ibid.
job market after leaving the army. In addition, many soldiers have been perhaps traumatized by the experience of fighting an enemy often indistinguishable from the civil population it lives among.

The tendency to delegitimize any civil act not totally legal emerges in Israelis overwhelming disapproval of conscientious objection, or refusal to serve in the occupied territories. Around 75% see as illegitimate both kinds of refusal in various polls.\textsuperscript{472} One explanation for this is that Israeli national ethos had idolized the army and military service that developed in contrast to the image of the weak, passive and rootless Diaspora Jew. Where Diaspora Jews were believed to have gone like sheep to the gas chambers, the heroic native born Israelis took the initiative and against all odds carved out a Jewish homeland.\textsuperscript{473}

4.6. Revisiting History/Reconciliation

Since late 1980s, some Jewish-Israeli scholars have begun publicly addressing the stories behind the expulsion/fleeing of Palestinians from their homes during the 1948 and 1967 wars.\textsuperscript{474} They have based their arguments on declassified documents in the British Public Record Office and the Israeli State Archives or considered British and Israeli evidence along with similar material in the American and French archives. Moreover, in the late 1970s and early 1980s Arab scholars, and in particular Palestinian historians, began publishing heir accounts of, and views on, the war of 1948. Based mainly on Arab material such as diaries, letters and memoranda of all kinds, their works also contributed to the new historical picture of the war.

For many years the prevailing Israeli popular conviction, as well as the official propaganda line, has been that the blame for the protraction of the conflict lies with the

\textsuperscript{472} Hermann 2006, p.45.
\textsuperscript{473} Nelsen 2006, p.36.
Arabs, who for years have clung to a totally intransigent rejectionist posture and have refused to recognize Israel even if only as a fait accompli. It has been assumed that Israel was always prepared to make peace with the Arabs “without conditions.” These continuing dominant ideological convictions and prevailing myths made the pursuit of peace within Israeli society difficult and frustrating.

Those Israeli historians were called the ‘new historians’ because they challenged the standard Zionist version of the causes and course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They challenged the many myths that have come to surround the birth of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Some have attempted to expose the manipulative way in which Israeli politicians and the media have used the Holocaust to justify aggressive policies to minimize any consideration of international calls for a heightened moral sensitivity in the management of the conflict. Others have tried to encounter the prevailing image of the Arabs as incurable Jew-haters and diehard enemies. Yet others have attempted to refute the established Zionist narrative, based on Ben-Gurion’s version, that the radicalization of the Palestinian national movement under the leadership of Haj Amin al Husseini had blocked all attempts to mitigate the conflict. Their narratives include cases in which Arab leaders were prepared for far-reaching cooperation with Zionist leaders even during the tumultuous 1930s. The New Historians try to balance Israeli self-righteousness by showing how Israel had a share in escalating the conflict and by exposing some less-than-pleasant aspects of Israeli conduct. This may well be a prime motive for Benny Morris’ strong case for a more balanced description of the roots of the Palestinian refugee problem, including his exposure of atrocities perpetrated by Israeli forces during the 1948 war and after.

Avi Shlaim writes in Introduction of his book *Israel and Palestine*: “The chapters in this book... are a testimony to an alternative view, to a more critical way of looking at the past. They are also grounded in the belief that the past is our best guide for understanding the present and for predicting the future. Only by coming to grips with the tangled and tortured history of this conflict can we make sense of it. Alongside the political conflict between Israelis and Palestinians runs a parallel conflict between two distinct national narratives. Only by taking full account of these two narratives can we form a true picture of the character and dynamics of this tragic conflict, and of the prospects for its resolution”.

And efforts to put these two narratives together, has been made by many Israelis and Palestinians.

---

PRIME Shared History Project

PRIME Shared History Project is an effort to put two narratives together in one publication in textbooks. One study of Palestinian and Israeli textbooks, since 1995, shows both sides failed to talk about the complexity of the refugees’ problems. The Israeli texts put most of the blame on the Palestinians and the Arabs for the refugees’ plight, while the Palestinian texts mainly blamed the Israelis and the British. The texts even fail to agree on the facts, for example, Israelis write that there were between 600-700,000 Palestinians who became refugees as a result of the 1948 war, while Palestinians wrote there were more than 1 million Palestinians who became refugees as a result of the 1948 fighting. Based also on similar studies, the project developed an innovative school booklet that contains two narratives around certain milestones in the history of the conflict meaning that students also learn the narrative of the other in addition to their own as a first step toward acknowledging and respecting the other. The project also focuses on the central role of teachers in the process of using shared history texts so they were involved in developing texts and trying them out with their 9th and 10th grade classrooms.

Some of the students expressed an interest to meet students from the other side to discuss these texts together. Others wanted to know more about this date or that person mentioned briefly in the texts. There were reports of students who right away started to deconstruct the other’s narrative In general there was a surprise effect by presenting the two narratives, a surprise that created interest and curiosity.

The Project received a wide coverage, both in the region and abroad, partly because despite the fact that the Israeli Ministry of Education refused to add it to the list of recommended textbooks some teachers and students insisted using them. As of writing, this textbook is still banned from use in schools, therefore, some students have formed private


480 The PRIME Shared History Project was granted by the Wye River People-to-People Exchange Program of the U.S. State Department for 3 years, and by Ford Foundation for 2 years (during 2002-2007).


483 Ibid., p.312.

484 Ibid., p.316.
groups to study them. On the Palestinian side, the Ministry of Education responded to the Israeli decision and also prohibited the text from use in school.

**Zochrot**

On the 60th Anniversary of the Palestinian “Nakba” Day (May 15), commemoration events took place all over Palestine and Israel and were organized by various rights groups in Palestine, including Badil, but also by the Israeli organization Zochrot (Remembering). Since its foundation in 2002, Zochrot works to make the history of the Nakba accessible to the Israeli public so as to engage Jews and Palestinians in an open recounting of their painful common history. They hope that by bringing the Nakba into Hebrew they can make a qualitative change in the political discourse of the region since acknowledging the past is the first step in taking responsibility for its consequences.

Zochrot conducts several activities: placing signs of Arabic names in villages where Palestinians lived before they were made to leave; they go to schools and centers to talk about the Nakba; and conduct tours to the ruined sites of Palestinian villages. On the occasion of 60th Anniversary of “Nakba”, Zochrot organized a tour from the center of Tel Aviv to Shfar’am where Palestinian citizens of Israel were organizing the event.

One of the Israeli Jewish participants said that since she has learned to recognized the signs of Palestinian ruined villages, through cactus trees and half demolished stone buildings, her life had totally changed. What used to be only a park or empty space for her came to symbolize the expulsion of Palestinians and injustice done to them by Israel. She no longer can celebrate Israeli Independence Day and she cannot go out with friends she used to. Even though the number of Israeli Jews who participate to Zochrot activities may be limited, once they understand that the history still lives on, their attitude and behavior changes for good.

And yet another initiative is the joint project by BADIL and Zochrot ongoing since 2009 to study the practical aspects of refugee return. The project builds on the deep respect in international law for the right of return, and its widespread affirmation as the only acceptable durable solution, and starts to address how refugees will return to properties and homes from which they were forcibly displaced, and how such a return can be implemented in a practical, fair, and efficient manner that protects the legitimate interests of all stakeholders involved.

In Israel, despite the impact of Zochrot’s work and the revelation made by the New Historians verifying Palestinian accounts of the Nakba, the Palestinian right of return continues to be considered a synonym for “the destruction of Israel” and stirs deep-seated fears among Jewish Israelis about their future. Whilst this view predominates as a result of

---

a system of entrenched racism against Palestinians derived from the Zionist impulse towards forcible transfer, there nevertheless exist legitimate concerns among the Israeli public about the implications of the Palestinian right of return. These fears can only abate if Israelis have an understanding of how their lives, properties and privileges will be affected by the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. The project aims to show this audience that refugee return, as well as being legal and just, can also be achieved in a manner which also takes into account the rights of the existing receiving communities; thereby moving the focus from prejudiced assumptions to a reasonable discussion on the practical aspects of refugee return.486

Sharing historical narrative of the former or present enemy is no easy task. However, it is crucially necessary in Israel-Palestine, for it is directly related to the aspiration of over 4 million Palestinian refugees to have injustice done to them to be recognized. The peacebuilding efforts to accommodate the Other’s narrative are not reaching to the wide public, yet. But their efforts are making clear difference to those individuals who took part.

4.7. Interfaith Dialogue

A new approach to peacebuilding also came from religious circles. Even though religions do play a certain role in prolonging and escalating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, religious circles have mostly been silent, partly because there is no structured religious institutions in Judaism and Sunni Islam in the region. However, since the September 11, 2001, growing fear of religious extremisms, interfaith dialogues became one avenue for peacebuilding.

One such event is the “Great Sulha” where Christian, Jews, Muslim and people from other faiths come together to annual three day event in Latrun near Jerusalem. During the event, there are more than 20 activities participants can choose to attend: some are fun such as dancing and singing together and some are serious like discussing the role religion can play in the conflict. But more than anything, participants have three full days to spend and talk with each other in a kind of like a short summer camp which is a rare occasion for adults. At the end of three days, scenes can be very emotional.487 Organizers try hard to obtain official IDF permission for Palestinians to enter Jerusalem and so far, they have succeeded as some dozens of Palestinians have participated each year.

487 Observation at Great Sulha, Summer 2008.
Other organizations such as Rabbis for Human Rights, Mozaic and the Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel (ICCI) also started to organize youth interfaith dialogue program between Israeli Jews and Israeli Muslims and Christians.

Some international NGOs and donors support holding interfaith dialogue forums outside the region. For example, a Japanese NGO invited religious leaders/scholars from three monotheistic religions in the region to Japan and organized sessions together with Buddhist priests/scholars. For some participants, learning about non-monotheistic religion was an exciting experience and was particularly interested in the “engaged Buddhism” as in the teaching of Vietnamese Buddhist monk and scholar Thich Nhat Hanh.488

Thich Nhat Hanh brings Israelis and Palestinians to Plum Village, a monastery and practice center in south west France he established. Based on his belief that human beings are not enemies and the true enemies are hate, fear, despair and especially wrong perception, in Plum Village, the practice begins with calming one’s emotions. And then he brings deep listening and loving speech, a method to speak of one’s suffering without blaming the other side, that helps the other understand the one’s situation and suffering. This allows communication to be possible and peace will be possible.489 He believes peace and reconciliation are not dreams. “In Plum Village, Palestinians and Israelis have found transformation and made peace among themselves. We have done it on a small scale. If we can do it on a large scale, there will be peace in the Middle East.”490

A forum of institutional religious bodies, the Center for Religious Institutes in Holy Land (CRIHL) was founded. The members often discuss the sensitive issues and make joint statements.

Christian churches in Palestine, in unified voice, announced Kairos Palestine “A Moment of Truth” in 2009, a call not only to Christians, but to all faithful in Israel, Palestine and abroad. The document calls on Israel to end its occupation and liberate both the perpetrators and the victims of injustice.491 It advocates loving resistance, creative resistance, a resistance based not on hate or revenge but on respect for the enemy’s fundamental humanity, a resistance that honors the power behind and within human life. It understands the boycott campaign as a peaceful resistance. These advocacy campaigns proclaim that their objective is not revenge but putting an end to existing evil.492

The Kairos Document received both national and international reactions and endorsement came from across the globe: the South Africa Council of Churches, World

488 The author was the organizer of this interfaith dialogue project in 2007.
490 Ibid., p.18.
492 Kairos’s Palestine 2009.
Council of Churches, Middle East Council of Churches, All Africa Council of Churches, or church-based organizations such as YMCAs and YWCAs. Arab Muslims offered solidarity and Jewish voices also joined the chorus of supports.493

4.8. Peacebuilding Challenges in Gaza

In April 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon announced that Israel would “disengage” from Gaza. Sharon understood, that Israel could not continue occupying Palestinians and maintain a Jewish majority in the land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea because of the “demographic threat”. However, the decision to withdraw was met by fierce opposition from the settlers and their supporters. Protest demonstrations and marches to Jerusalem took place. Regardless, in August and September 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew approximately eight thousand settlers along with military personnel and installations from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank near Jenin.

Israel subsequently declared that it was no longer the occupying power in Gaza494 with the Gaza Strip becoming a “foreign territory” and thus the crossing between Gaza and Israel was crossing “international borders.” In addition, Israel declared the right to re-enter Gaza militarily at any time in its “Disengagement Plan.”

The fact that the withdrawal was not coordinated with Palestinians, strengthened the standing of Hamas in that military resistance had won. In January 2006, coupled with the feeling of disappointment to Fatah for its corruption, the Palestinians elected the political party “Change and Reform” affiliated with Hamas into office. Israel immediately tightened its blockade on Gaza and the U.S. joined in. It was demanded of the newly elected government that is renounce violence and recognize Israel together with prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The blockade became total after the Hamas takeover of security in Gaza. The blockade destroyed what was remained of Gaza’s economy and worsened the already severe living condition of Gaza’s people leading to a humanitarian crisis. Militants from Islamic movements launched rockets to Israel and Israel conducted assassination of leaders of Islamic movements and military operations to Gaza. An Israeli

493 Kassis 2011, p.111.
soldier was kidnapped in 2006 by Palestinian militant. Israel has conducted military operation in 2006 with the stated aim of rescuing this kidnapped soldier, which failed to achieve its aim. Operation Cast Lead was most severe military attack on Gaza that took place from December 2008 to January 2009. A 23-day military offensive that claimed lives of close to 1,400 Palestinians, and injured over 5,000. In addition, the civilian infrastructure was heavily damaged. The extent of casualties and damages inflicted upon Palestinian civilians by heavy weapons and Israel's unwillingness to cease fire, brought fierce criticisms from around the world. Israeli public, however, remain staunch supporter of the operation.

The United Nations Human Rights Council set up a fact-finding mission, headed by Richard Goldstone. The mission, however, was denied cooperation by Israel and thus denied entry to Israel and the West Bank. The mission did enter Gaza through Egypt. Israeli human rights organizations (Adalah, ACRI, Gisha, HaMoked, Physician for Human Rights, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and Yesh Din) as well as Palestinian human rights organizations (Adameer, The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Al Haq, The Palestinian Center for Human Rights) played an important role in providing reports to the mission. Subsequently, the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, or Goldstone Report, found that some of the actions committed by both Israel Military and Palestinian military groups would constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity.

From the moment the Goldstone Report was released in September 2009, its lead author Richard Goldstone, a Jew from South Africa, has been subjected to fierce, attacks by Israeli and American Jews who purport to be defending the legitimacy of the Jewish state and the safety of the Jewish people. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the report by saying, “[t]here are three primary threats facing us today, the nuclear threat, the missile threat, and what I call Goldstone threat.” President Shimon Peres called Goldstone “a small man, devoid of any sense of justice.”

On the other hand, pro-Palestinian lawyers in Britain have sought the arrest of Israeli officials under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows courts to prosecute

---

495 The reported number of Palestinian fatalities during the offensive ranges from 1,116 (IDF spokesperson) to 1,455 (Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza). UNOCHA has verified 1,383 Palestinians whose death was confirmed by at least two independent source. See UNOCHA, “Locked In: The humanitarian impact of two years of blockade on the Gaza Strip,” August 2009. p.12.


498 Ibid.
alleged war crimes from elsewhere in the world. Pro-Palestinian activists have used universal jurisdiction to pursue past and current Israeli officials linked to military operations that have killed civilians. No case has gone ahead, but Israeli officials have canceled trips due to fears of arrest. Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor canceled a trip to London in 2010 fearing arrest, and former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni canceled a trip to Britain during the same year. A spokesman for the British Foreign Office, however, said officials on state business are immune to arrest.499

Israeli politicians and right wing movements began to campaign against Israeli human rights organizations which helped Goldstone mission. NGO Monitor, an Israeli right wing NGO that monitors activities of leftist NGOs, criticized a written statement submitted by seven Israeli NGOs because it does not address alleged war crimes by Hamas. It also criticized the NGOs for making speculative assertions about the motivation for the IDF operation against Hamas, claiming that “[t]o the extent that this was planned as a punitive operation which main purpose was not the achievement of actual military objectives, but the inflicting of deliberate damage as a deterrent and punitive measure” – despite their lacking the requisite information in order to make such an assertion.”500

**Free Gaza Movement** initiated sending humanitarian ships to Gaza since 2006: its aim was to “sail as an expression of citizen nonviolent, direct action, confronting Israel’s ongoing abuses of Palestinian human and political rights and will continue to challenge Israel’s legal siege on Gaza.”501

In the early morning of May 31, 2010, Israeli navy intercepted a flotilla of six-ships carrying 600 activists and 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, including the Turkish ship “Mavi Marmara,” bound for Gaza. The excessive use of force by Israeli military resulted in death of nine passengers, and severely damaged the country’s relation with Turkey which was already tense since Operation Cast Lead. The world-wide criticism did not end at the flotilla incident but extended to the blockade of Gaza that has dire consequences for the people of Gaza. This incident led to the intervention of the USA, who considers both countries important allies. Eventually, Israel eased somewhat the restriction on the goods brought into the Strip. This event is analyzed in detail in Chapter 6.

Following the ceasefire by Israel and Hamas, negotiation to release kidnapped Israeli soldier bore fruit by facilitation of an Israeli peace activist and director of IPCRI, Gershon

Baskin in October 2011. What could not achieved by several military operations were achieved by endless effort of a peace activist.

Above two cases show how civilian initiatives have influenced policy where other formal channels, both diplomatic and military, failed.

4.9. Changing Discourse in the U.S.

As the peace process faces impasse and violence and human rights violations continue, world criticism, especially in Muslim world, was mounting on Israeli policies and U.S. policies. Attempts to challenge U.S. policies and public discourse toward Israeli-Palestinian conflict started to be expressed by mainstream U.S. scholars and former politicians.

Two highly respected scholars, John Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, a professor at Harvard, released a highly controversial article “The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” in 2006 in *The London Review of Books*, and later published an extended version, under the same title in 2007. They argue that the pro-Israel lobby plays a vitally important role in determining the direction of policy in the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and that the lobby cements the U.S. – Israeli relationship. Their ground-breaking book on the lobby essentially broke the taboo on discussing it. Naturally, critical respondents were made from the Jewish lobby, including Abraham H. Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), in his book *The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control*, in 2007.

Kathleen Christison, a retired Middle East analyst at the CIA, also argued, that the lobby has profound effect on how policy is made in US Middle East policy. One of the most important aspects of this impact is the state of public discourse that has formed around the Palestinian-Israeli situation over the years. This is a mindset that has been building and shaped – and internalized – for almost a century it is essentially centered on the Zionist-Israeli narrative which has a huge impact on how a policymaker approaches the Arab-Israeli issue and particularly the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

---

Another controversial work came from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in his book *Palestine Peace Not Apartheid* published in 2006. Carter points out that the problems is that the actions of some Israeli leaders have been in direct conflict with the official policies of the United States, the international community, and their own negotiated agreement. Also, two other interrelated factors have contributed to the perpetuation of violence and regional upheaval: the condoning of illegal Israeli actions from a submissive White House and U.S. Congress during recent years, and the deference with which other international leaders permit this unofficial U.S. policy in the Middle East to prevail. Carter writes that “Peace will come to Israel and the Middle East only when the Israeli government is willing to comply with international law, with the Roadmap for Peace, with official American policy, with the wishes of a majority of its own citizens by accepting its legal borders.” He concludes, “[i]t will be a tragedy – for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the world – if peace is rejected and a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence is permitted to prevail.

Jewish Americans are also becoming critical of the Jewish establishment in the U.S. Peter Beinart, an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York and the editor in chief of *Zion Square*, wrote an article in *New York Review of Books*, on June 10, 2010, titled “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” and later in his book *The Crisis of Zionism*. Beinart is concerned that “morally, American Zionism is in a downward spiral” and “if the leaders of groups like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations do not change course, they will wake up one day to find a younger, Orthodox-dominated, Zionist leadership whose naked hostility to Arabs and Palestinians scares even them and a mass of secular American Jews who range from apathetic to appalled.”

**J Street** was launched in 2008 by 100 distinguished Americans in order to lobby to give pro-peace, pro-Israel Americans a voice in American politics and in the policy process. *J Street* activity includes supporting student campus groups. Many Israeli peace and human rights organizations (such as B’Tselem, Peace Now, IPCRI) provides information to these groups and U.S. policymakers.

These attempts have surely made wide public discourse and broke the taboo of

---

508 Ibid., p. 209.
509 Ibid., p. 209.
512 Peter Beinart 2010.
discussing openly about U.S. policy on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4.10. The Arab Spring

Arab Spring began in December 2010 from Tunisia and spread to many parts of the region including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. It is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, and sometimes civil wars. People stood up to oppose the policies or the structure of governments and requested democratization.

The emergence of new government in Egypt headed by the Muslim Brotherhood, was welcomed by Gaza people, but was cautiously seen by Fatah and Israel.

In Palestine, not necessary directly related to the Arab Spring, but a major event took place. On Nakba Day of May 2011, Palestinian refugees in the region, under coordinated effort with Palestinians in the occupied territory, made a march to the Israeli border. Some Palestinian refugees living in Syria managed to cross the fence border and entered their historic homeland.

In Israel, what started as a single issue demonstration such as high price of cottage cheese and housing has developed into a social movement and swept through the country drawing 450,000 participants to the demonstration at the end of the Summer 2011. The leaders of this social movement, however, failed to connect the social injustice and the continuing occupation, in fear of being labeled leftist and turning public away.

4.11. Summary

Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, despite the violence and criticism, peacebuilders have been busying themselves with new approaches and activities. One of the approaches apparent in many activities is bringing international attention to the conflict. When the top leaders are not moving forward and public follows them, peacebuilding needed outside support and intervention.

Even the protest movements against the Israeli occupation policy in the Palestinian villages, invites Israelis and internationals, hoping to receive international attention through media, and search for legal action where possible.

Some Israeli peacebuilders fear that continuing occupation is destroying Israeli society morally and their challenge is to be creative in raising their voices to put the discourse on the table. The breakdown of the Oslo process gave understanding to some that unless the root cause of the problem, the Nakba, is tackled, there will not be a just and long lasting solution to the conflict. They tried to show that accommodating the other’s narrative is not
necessarily threatening to its own narrative.

Israel’s total blockade of Gaza after Hamas’ military takeover of Gaza in 2007 and subsequent military operations in 2008-2009 aroused wide criticism around the world for excessive use of force. And again in such criticism was sounded in regard to the Gaza Flotilla in 2010. Israel’s denial of cooperating with the UN fact-finding mission, and its unwillingness to respect the international law have further isolated itself from the international community.

What was taboo in the U.S. to publicly oppose Israeli policies was challenged by mainstream American scholars and politicians as well as Jewish Americans, and is growing.

The Arab Spring that swept the Middle East from the Winter of 2010 has affected regional politics as well as Israeli and Palestinian demands to the government/authority.
Chapter 5: Case Study - The Protest Movements against the Wall

In June 2002, the government of Israel approved the first stage of the Wall\textsuperscript{514} separating the West Bank and Israel. The official reason for the decision was the wave of suicide attacks carried out by Palestinians against Israeli citizens in the preceding months. The “barrier” was to be and actually built as multi layered composite obstacle comprised of: a ditch and a pyramid shaped stack of six coils of barbed wire on the eastern side of the structure, barbed wire only on the western side: a path enabling the patrol of IDF forces on both sides of the structure: an intrusion – detection fence, in the center, with sensors to warn of any incursion: smoothed strip of sand that runs parallel to the fence, to detect footprints: a solid (concrete) barrier which would be 6\% of total length or approximately 30km; and various observation systems installed along the fence.\textsuperscript{515}

The Wall soon deviated from the Green Line and snaked inside the West Bank to place Israeli settlements on the Israeli side of the wall, taking over some of the most fertile farm land and aquifer beneath it and thus severely limiting Palestinian access not only to farm land but to schools, hospitals, and relatives.

Villages affected by the wall, immediately started to protest to stop construction. Jayyous, Mes’ha, Budrus, and Jerusalem are only some of the areas active in protests. From the early stages, these demonstrations were joined by Israeli and international peace activists. Local initiatives were soon coordinated under The Apartheid Wall Campaign in addition to coordinating demonstrations, provided and disseminated extensive data on the reality and effects of the Wall and settlements through various media in order to lobby the Palestinian Authority as well as to raise the awareness of the international community. Other organizations, including Israelis and internationals started to publish their reports on the Wall and the settlements it was going to protect. This movement led the International Court of Justice to state their Advisory Opinion on the route of the Wall.

Learning from the success of the earlier local initiatives, other villages soon came to face the same experience of being confiscated of their land, and took actions.

This chapter will study the grassroots efforts that paved the way to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, and how they have affected Israeli policy related to the route of the Wall.

5.1. Grassroots Protest Movements against the Wall

\textsuperscript{514} The structure is referred to as “wall” by the United Nations. Israel refers to it as a “fence” or a “barrier.” This paper will follow the term used by the United Nations as its document is the central theme of this paper, however, the term may change according to the sources referred.

\textsuperscript{515} Israeli Ministry of Defence website: <http://securityfence.mod.gov.il>
Soon after the beginning of construction in June 2002 in the northern part of the West Bank, the route of the Wall started to deviate inside the Green Line towards the West Bank. In the area of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilya, the most fertile farm land sited on the aquifer and wells was taken away by the Wall, and farmers were restricted in access to their farms causing serious economic damage. Some villages were encircled by the wall and separated from both the West Bank and Israel in what it came to be called “seam zone.” People in the seam zone had restricted movement and had difficulties reaching their place of work, schools, health facilities, and everywhere. Since help was not coming from the Palestinian Authority, they had to act on their own.

5.1.1. Jayyous

In September 2002, bulldozers arrived in Jayyous, a village situated near Qalqiliya almost on the Green Line in the mid-West Bank. With a population of around 3,500, agriculture provides 75% of its income. These lands and those in Qalqiliya and the village of Falamiya are situated on the western drainage basin, the biggest drainage basins in the West Bank. With this fact is taken into account, Israel’s wall was built and settlements were expanded to isolate 75% of fertile lands as well as the drainage basin, thus depriving the Palestinian residents of their lands and water. In addition to this, the settlement of Zufim was built on parts of Jayyous’s lands.

Villagers, whose income depended on agriculture, saw the bulldozers and ran to their groves to protect their trees. They stopped construction work, hugged the trees, got beaten and dispersed, some were arrested – yet the next day they came out again. Almost two years after Israel crushed the popular demonstrations at the dawn of the second Intifada and Palestinians turned to arms – nonviolent popular resistance was making its initial comeback.

Internationals were part of the struggle from the early stage of the Jayyous action. Many were part of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI).

ISM began its activity in March 2001 led by both local and international volunteers, with an international presence in the village of Hares to protect Palestinians from settlers and the Israeli army. In late 2002, ISM volunteers began assisting in organizing villagers in

---

516 From the interviews conducted to mayors of villages affected by the wall in Winter of 2004.
518 Ibid.
They accompanied villagers to demonstrations, often to stand in to protect villagers being arrested by Israeli soldiers, patrolled the village under curfew, delivered food and medicine, monitored the actions of Israeli soldiers, and reported what they witnessed.

The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), coordinated by the World Council of Churches started sending volunteers to Jayyous in August 2002 to monitor and report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, support acts of non-violent resistance alongside local Christian and Muslim Palestinians and Israeli peace activists, offer protection through non-violent presence, engage in public policy advocacy, and stand in solidarity with the churches and all those struggling against the occupation. They all wear a uniform of beige vest and are, thus, quite visible.

The importance of the presence of these international volunteers is that they document visual evidence of the effect of the Wall and practices of Israeli soldiers and report them through whatever connections they have and thus have brought the situation to the attention of the world media. In addition, similar protests started to take place in many other locations along the route of the wall.

5.1.2. The Apartheid Wall Campaign

In order to coordinate and support the communities in their struggle to safeguard their lands and their future, the Apartheid Wall Campaign was established in October 2002. The Campaign is a part of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network’s (PENGON) a non-profit, non-governmental organization founded in 2001 following the start of the second Intifada due to increased demands and responsibilities to defend the Palestinian environment. Seven members of PENGON formed the Apartheid Wall Campaign Steering Committee.

The Campaign calls for 1) the immediate cessation of the building of the Wall. 2)
dismantling all parts of the Wall and its related zones already built, 3) return of lands confiscated for the path of the Wall, and 4) compensation of damages and lost income due to the destruction of land and property (this compensation is in addition to, not instead of, restitution of land.)

In addition to coordinating and supporting local initiatives, the campaign works to:
- raise awareness on the national and international levels about the implication of the Wall for Palestinian towns and villages, including psychological, humanitarian, environmental, and legal impacts;
- link the issue of the Wall with that of the Occupation and its consequences for life and land, most notably through advocacy efforts;
- and activate international organizations, movements and actors around the Campaign.

The Campaign published its first report *The Apartheid Wall Campaign: Stop Israel's Stronghold of Palestine Report #1*, in November 2002, both in Arabic and English, which became a landmark in providing facts about the route of the Wall and communities affected by the Wall.

By May 2003, six months after its establishment, the Campaign succeeded in mobilizing thousands of Palestinians – individuals, NGOs and grassroots organizations to support and be involved in it: organizing three Emergency Centers that are active in tens of communities; producing numerous publications, including reports, fact sheets, press releases, and maps; meeting and touring with hundreds of journalists (print, broadcast and film) and representatives of international organizations; contributing to the worldwide publication of over 100 articles about the Wall; gaining the involvement of international solidarity groups worldwide to support the Campaign efforts; and producing presentations, presenting them and disseminating them to activists.

One of the important activities of the Campaign is lobbying the Palestinian Authority to ensure that the Wall is of high significance to the PA as it enters additional rounds of “negotiations” with Israel. The Campaign argues that the call to stop the wall is an essential priority, if not precondition, in the PA’s demands of Israel. The processes that have been taking place since the Oslo Agreements in 1993 have continuously widened the divide between signed agreements and rhetoric and what is taking place on the ground, as the Occupation has furthered its stranglehold on the Occupied Territories in the past 10 years.

---

524 Ibid., p.122.
525 The Apartheid Wall Campaign: *Stop Israel’s Stronghold of Palestine Report #1* November 2002.
years. This is in response to the growing frustration felt by villagers toward not only Israel but the Palestinian Authority. The villages affected by the Wall and facing economic crisis has been appealing to the Palestinian Authority to stop the construction and to financially assist the villagers. However, no help has been coming. Villagers had to find ways to collect support from other sources especially the money for scholarships to the students from poor families who cannot afford it.

Gaining international solidarity was another important activity. The campaign recognized from the beginning that for protest to become effective it needed world attention and support. One example of such an effort was a World Anti-Wall Kick Off Day on November 9, 2003, to protest against the barrier in events from Ramallah to New York. The date was chosen because it marks the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, said Jamal Juma, coordinator of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON). The hope, he said, was to highlight hardships created by the fence and to remind people that the Palestinians are part of the international community.

According to PENGON's Web site, demonstrations were planned in more than 50 cities worldwide including Europe, Jordan, Japan, Latin America, Canada, and the US. In Palestinian areas there were demonstrations in Jenin, Bethlehem and Kalkilya. Outside Zububa, Jenin at 11 a.m. on 9 November, several hundred Palestinians attacked the security fence and were joined by 30 activists from the International Solidarity Movement and about 30 Israelis. “We wanted to make it clear that the wall will not be tolerated,” Israeli demonstrator Jonathan Pollak said. In Israel, Gush Shalom held a demonstration in the Sawahra Valley in the morning and a rally in Tel Aviv in the evening.

Another important activity of the Campaign was legal aid by working with a law office and taking various legal actions from the start of the construction of the Wall through the Israeli courts calling for the cessation of the Wall in the northern areas and in Jerusalem. These actions were undertaken by Palestinians and campaign organisers in coordination with Israeli human rights organizations. Such cases have taken up for the halting of the destruction of property. The court decisions, a number of which have reached the Israeli High Court, have consistently come out against the cessation of the Wall and in agreement with the destruction and confiscation of land and house demolitions for the “security of the State of Israel”, which the courts have repeatedly stated takes precedent.

---

527 Ibid., p.128.
528 Interview to mayors of the villages in the Tulkarem and Qalqyia area. 31 December 2003.
530 Ibid.
531 Ibid.
The Apartheid Wall Campaign published a second and more thorough report, *Stop the Wall in Palestine: Facts, Testimonies, Analysis and Call to Action* by PENGON in both Arabic and English in 2003. The report emphasizes that the path of the ever-winding Wall follows the logic of land confiscation and control, including the annexation of settlements and the caging off of built-up Palestinian areas. Contrary to worldwide news reports, the Wall would not mark the 1967 border. It stated that the Wall is in fact a major land grab and a sealing of the fate of the Occupied Territories and of Palestine. It reported that the Wall’s “first phase” taking place from Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalquilia, alone, 65 communities were to be affected, including 200,000 peoples. The Wall sneaks through these districts on paths which enable Israel to annex 10 settlements with a total population of 19,800, and ensure their expansion.

It went on to state that the Wall causes massive destruction to communities including the razing of agricultural land, damage to irrigation networks, isolation of water resources, and the demolition of homes and community infrastructure; all of this atop preventing access to Palestinian their land, markets, and traveling for employment and to visit family. It provides a list of impact on 51 communities in Jenin, Turkarem, Qalquilia: land destroyed under the wall; land separated from communities; water resources isolated or destroyed; access to land (limited or not); and water accessible to land.

Agriculture is exceptionally productive in three districts of Jenin, Tulkarem, and Qalqilya despite Israel’s imposed restriction on Palestinian water usage. According to the World Bank, these three regions accounted for 45% the West Bank’s agricultural production in 2000. The Wall reaches up to 6 kilometers inside the West Bank, isolating nearly 122,000 dunums (1 dunum equals 1/4 acre or 1000m2) of which 66% is cultivated with vegetable crops, greenhouses, citrus and olive trees, or used for grazing.

The area is the most fertile and water rich lands in Palestine. In the first phase alone, the Wall has destroyed at least 30km of water networks, uprooted approx 102,320 trees, and demolished 85 commercial buildings and tens of agricultural shelters, along with the confiscation of 14,680 dunums for the footprint of the Wall.

Other organizations joined in collecting data and reporting the affect of the Wall to the Palestinian population. For example, the Health Development Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) published *Health and Segregation: The impact of the Israeli Separation*

---

533 Ibid., .p.12.
534 Ibid., .p.12.
537 Ibid., .p.12.
Wall on Access to Health Care Services in January 2004. It provided detailed mappings of how health service provision in the West Bank has been affected by the first phase of Israel’s Wall complex. Its research draws on HDIP’s regularly updated databases of local health infrastructure and services and is complemented by interviews and testimonies from affected communities.

International organizations such as United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) started to monitor and report the route of the Wall and its effects on the communities in late 2002.

These collected data became important evidence to the judges at International Court of Justice when the case was brought for an Advisory Opinion in 2004.

Anarchists Against the Wall

In April 2003, a central struggle tent was erected in the village of Mas’ha, in the path of the wall, and within it were organized multi-lingual workshops on nonviolence and demonstrations in the same spirit.

The camp, formed by Palestinian, Israeli and international activists was composed of two tents on the village’s land slated for confiscation. The presence of Palestinian, Israelis and internationals lasted for four months. This is when Anarchists Against the Wall was formed by a small group of mostly Israeli activists already doing various political work in the Occupied Territories.

Anarchists Against the Wall believes that “it is the duty of Israeli citizens to resist immoral policies and actions carried out in our name.” “We believe that it is possible to do more than demonstrate inside Israel or participate in humanitarian relief actions. Israeli apartheid and occupation isn’t going to end by itself · it will end when it becomes ungovernable and unmanageable. It is time to physically oppose the bulldozers, the army and the occupation.”

Since its formation, the group has participated in hundreds of demonstrations and direct actions against the wall specifically, and the occupation generally, all over the West Bank. All of AATW’s work in Palestine is coordinated through villages’ local popular committees and is essentially Palestinian led.

When a member of Anarchists Against the Wall was hit and injured by a unit of the Israeli Defense Forces a sensational discourse took place in Israel. On December 26, 2003, the Israeli army deliberately shot at Gil Namati, a 21 year old Israeli protestors that

---

539 Anarchists Against The Wall website: <http://www.awalls.org>
540 Ibid.
541 Ibid.
demonstrated against the wall. Gil was shot with live ammunition in both legs. The incident invoked a media frenzy and raised many questions. “What would have happened if the army didn't lie about the shooting of Gil Namati.” “Would it have justified the actions taken by the soldiers?” “Is there a difference between shooting a Jew and a non-Jew?”

The Mas’ha camp became a center for information dissemination and a base for direct-democracy decision-making. A number of wall related direct actions were planned and prepared at the camp – such as the July 28, 2003 direct action in the Village of Anin. In that action Palestinians, international and Israeli activists managed to force open a gate in the wall in spite of being attacked by the army.

Late in August of 2003, with the wall around Mas’ha nearly completed, the camp moved to the yard of a house slated for demolition. Following two days of blocking the bulldozers and mass arrests the yard was demolished and the camp ended but the spirit of resistance it symbolized was not demolished.

5.1.3. Budrus and Popular Committee

With time, the struggle became partly institutionalized with popular committee operating in each of the uprising villages and determining local demands and tactics. Budrus is the first village that protested against land confiscation by forming a popular committee and successfully pushing back the route of the Wall to the Green Line. Budrus is a village of 1,500 people, 45 kilometers west of Ramallah in the occupied West Bank.

When bulldozers accompanied by the IDF arrived to Budrus on Friday, 7 November 2003, all the villagers rushed to the scene. The soldiers started shooting tear gas and rubber bullets and around five people were injured by rubber bullets. But villagers managed to reach the bulldozers and the IDF commander decided to withdraw them. According to the founder Ayed Morrar "popular committee," means a committee of volunteers, comprising all Palestinian political factions in villages suffering from the wall and that have decided to resist through civil, unarmed resistance. And "popular resistance," means to collect all the possible means of putting pressure on the occupation except those that involve killing.

The IDF came back with bulldozers and tried to arrest all the coordinators of the committee but the demonstrations continued; then they started arresting the children but the demonstrations still continued. Soon the struggle was joined by Israelis and

542 Ibid.
544 Anarchists Against The Wall website: <http://www.awalls.org/democracy_isnt_built_on_demonstrators_bodies>
internationals and journalists. There were people of 35 different nationalities coming to support them as well as Israeli activists.\textsuperscript{546} Anarchists Against the Wall joined their daily demonstrations as they understood that the mere presence of Israelis at Palestinian civilian actions offers a degree of protection against army violence. The Israeli army’s conduct is significantly different when Israelis are present and violence, while still severe, is significantly lower. Furthermore, Budrus were written about in well-known papers: \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{Newsweek}, \textit{Der Spiegel}, \textit{Le Monde} and all the big television stations, from Al-Arabiyya to Al-Jazeera, broadcast their actions.

On 23 February 2004, after around forty demonstrations, the Israeli commander gathered all the journalists in Budrus and told them that they were planning to move the section of the wall back towards the Green Line [the internationally-recognized armistice line between Israel and the West Bank]. Altogether, the Israeli army had managed to take 74 dunams of land out of their original plan, which was to confiscate 1,200 dunams of land, and uproot 3,000 olive trees in the process. The resistance was a huge success.\textsuperscript{547}

Morrar believes, as most Palestinians do, that under international law Palestinians have the right to resist against the occupation by any means necessary, but civil resistance is the most effective path of struggle. For one, “We feel that our form of civil resistance is the only way to unite all our people; our children, or our grandparents, for example, would not be able to participate in certain other forms of struggle.” And by choosing civil resistance, “we are escaping the disease of harmful fighting between the political factions.”\textsuperscript{548} Also, civil resistance is aimed to separate the Palestinian national struggle for liberation from international terrorism. In order to be successful in our struggle, we must show the world that we are struggling not to kill people, but for our freedom, and after our freedom, to achieve a real peace. A real peace means a peace between two equal sides, from human beings to human beings. The Israeli leaders talk about "economic peace," or "security peace;" these amount to a peace between a slave and his master.\textsuperscript{549}

In Budrus, more than half of participants were women, and they played an important role in the demonstrations. According to Morrar, “women humanize the scene of the demonstration, and for this reason, you would never hear the kids shouting rude words at the soldiers in Budrus, for example, because they would be ashamed to do so in front of the women of the village. And when women are present, you see the spirits of the men becoming even stronger, because firstly, they do not want to be seen as weaker or less brave than the woman, and secondly, it is shameful for them to see women beaten in front of their eyes, so

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{547} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid.
they will strive to protect them from the soldiers.”

Morrar succeeded in doing what many people believed to be impossible: he united feuding Palestinian political groups, including Fatah and Hamas; he brought women to the heart of the struggle by encouraging his daughter Iltezam’s leadership; and welcoming hundreds of Israelis into Palestinian territory for the first time to join the nonviolent effort.

The Budrus model spread to many villages across the West Bank. In the Jerusalem district, it was used in Biddu, Beit Suriq, Beit Duqqu; in the Ramallah region there was Beit Liqia, Saffa, Kharbatha, Deir Qaddis, Nilin, al-Midya, Bil’in, Nabi Saleh; in the Salfit district there was al Zawiyya, al-Masaha, Jayyous; and near Jenin there was Zbouba, and many others.

The pattern of action varied from one place to another and from time to time, some focusing on direct action, some on slogans and dialogue with soldiers, and some on creative protest using music, theater, costumes and more. Almost all invited Israelis and foreigners to join the struggle either as a safety tool, by forcing soldiers to be less violent, as a political statement of joint resistance and a belief in equality and peace; or as a mixture of both. But whatever the tactics, the army always responded with varying degree of violence.

Some Israelis participated in demonstrations against the Wall and protected farmers against violence. In addition to Anarchists Against the Wall are Gush Shalom, Rabbis for Human Rights, Taayush, Yesh Guvul and Women Coalition for Peace (The organization included nine feminist organizations, of them veteran groups such as Women in Black, Movement of Democratic Women in Israel (TANDI), the Israeli branch of WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Women for Coexistence (Neled) Noga Feminist Journal and younger networks such as Women and Mothers for Peace, New Profile and Machsom Watch). Later, the coalition was joined by independent women, who were not involved in existing organizations.

The site of the Wall has become a popular destination for many internationals, not only journalists and peace activists, but also diplomats, parliamentarians, or nobel prize laureates. Many of these visits are facilitated by organizations who provide alternative tours within the West Bank including Jerusalem such as The Campaign Against Apartheid Wall, Alternative Tours, Alternative Tour Group, The Center for Jerusalem Studies and Israeli peace groups, such as the Committee Against House Demolition, or Rabbis for Human Rights.

The Budrus protests were video recorded and later edited and made into a film “Budrus” by Just Vision. Budrus received the Panorama Audience Award, Second Prize, at the Berlin

---

550 Ibid.
551 Al Haq 2011 “Case Study On the Village of Al-Nabi Saleh.”
International Film Festival in 2010. Just Vision was founded in 2003 has its main office is in Washington D.C. and teams based in New York and in East Jerusalem. It generates awareness and support for Palestinians and Israelis who pursue freedom, dignity, security and peace using nonviolent means by presenting under-documented stories through films and educational tools that undermine stereotypes, inspire commitment and galvanize action. Just Vision conducts targeted, sustained public education campaigns for Palestinian, Israeli and American audiences, amplifying the courageous efforts of ordinary people who act when government officials fail to do so.\textsuperscript{552}

Just Vision offers inspiring models that alter the way that audiences think about and respond to the occupation and the conflict. They seek to connect essential dots, providing success models to bolster Palestinian and Israeli nonviolence leaders' morale and activate constituencies to support them, venues to exchange ideas and best practices, and opportunities for reaching out to broader publics to highlight the centrality of nonviolence in resolving this conflict. Just Vision is made up of a team of Palestinian, Israeli, North and South American human rights advocates, conflict resolution experts, filmmakers and journalists. They engage tens of thousands of people in direct workshops, screenings and discussions, and touch millions more through the media.\textsuperscript{553}

5.1.4. Protest Actions Against Jewish Settlement

Many scholars of international law have for a long time pointed out the illegality of settlements and Israeli settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories,\textsuperscript{554} although Israel has denied this on the principle that it is not an occupying force but only administering the land, therefore not obligated as occupier under the Geneva Conventions. Also, because the question of settlements was regarded in the Oslo Peace Process as an agenda to be discussed in the final status issue, very little discussion, including public discussion, was held. However, since the breakdown of the Camp David summit, it became clear that the continuous expansion of settlements was no small obstacle to peace, and research and reports on settlements and the Wall became an urgent point on the agenda of many NGOs both Palestinians and Israelis.

\textsuperscript{552} Just Vision website: \textit{<http://www.justvision.org>}

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid.

An Israeli human rights and peace activist Jeff Halper came up with a term “Matrix of Control” in 1999 to describe the Israeli system of control of the West Bank. According to Halper Israel’s “Matrix of Control,” is a subtle system of administration, planning, law and the creation of “facts on the ground” to conceal the brute reality of occupation and lay the infrastructure for permanent Israel control from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean.\(^{555}\)

Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem also revealed Israeli policy toward the settlements in the West Bank and the results of this policy in terms of human rights and international law in its report *Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, May 2002.\(^{556}\) The map of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank May 2002 included in the report became a useful tool to understand the reality of construction of the settlements. The report also relates to the settlements in East Jerusalem that Israel established and officially annexed into Israel. Under international law, these areas are occupied territory whose status is the same as the rest of the West Bank. The report focuses on three points of Israeli settlement policy: the settlements under International Law; and the land-seizure mechanisms.

First, the B’Tselem report states that contrary to the expectations raised by the Oslo Process, Israeli governments have implemented a policy leading to the dramatic growth of the settlements. Between September 1993, on the signing of the Declaration of Principles, and September 2001, the number of housing units in the settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip rose from 20,400 to 31,400 an increase of approx fifty-four percent in just seven years. The sharpest increase during this period was recorded in 2000, under the government headed by Ehud Barak. At the end of 1993, the number of settlers was 100,500 but by the end of 2000 this figure increased to 191,600.\(^{557}\)

Second, the report states the settlements established throughout the West Bank violate various provisions of international law that are binding on Israel. Breach of this prohibition leads to the infringement of numerous human rights of Palestinians that are set forth in international human rights law.\(^{558}\)

Third, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams throughout the West Bank by means of a complex legal-bureaucratic mechanisms whose central element is the declaration and registration of land as “state land” along with three complementary methods: requisition of land for military needs, declaration of land as abandoned property

---


\(^{557}\) Ibid., p.17.

\(^{558}\) Ibid., pp.37-45.
and the expropriation of land for public needs. In addition, Israel has also helped its Jewish citizens to purchase land on the free market for the purpose of establishing new settlements. Using these methods, Israel has seized control of some fifty percent of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{559}

**Peace Now** is another organization who believes settlements are obstacle to peace with Palestinians and have been implementing “Settlement Watch Project” since 1990. Peace Now explains “Settlement Watch Project” in its website as follows:

> There can be no doubt that a major obstacle to a peace agreement which would establish a viable and independent Palestinian State alongside a secure Israel are the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It is for this very purpose that the settlements were located where they are by those Israeli governments and forces who wanted to prevent any future peace agreement. During this current period, characterized by serious clashes, violence and suffering, but also by the first signs of a diplomatic horizon, the settlement issue has emerged as a key factor in determining the future. Successive international interlocutors, both the Mitchell Commission and the Quartet, attempting to restore stability and restart diplomatic negotiations, have recognized that a settlement freeze is a vital first-step in this process.\textsuperscript{560}

Since 1990, Peace Now has taken upon itself to provide reliable and accurate information regarding the expansion activities of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Its “Settlement Watch” project was established for that very purpose, its principal objective being to bring to the attention of the Israeli public information regarding what is being done on the eastern side of the Green Line in its name and with its resources... Since the end of the 1970’s, most of Israel’s governments have made an effort (to which the settlers themselves have contributed to a certain extent) to conceal from the eye of the Israeli public the scope of construction activities in the territories, and the heavy price – economic, security and social – which Israel has had to pay in order to realize the misleading vision of a “Whole Israel.”\textsuperscript{561}

Peace Now has also taken legal actions to change the situation on the ground, since 1998, especially that of “illegal” outposts, but also to raise the issue of the settlements and how they harm Israel in public consciousness. The decision to take legal action was made

\textsuperscript{559} BTselem, May 2002.

\textsuperscript{560} Peace Now “Settlement Watch Project” retrieved on 12 December 2012. Available at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/what-settlement-watch-team>

\textsuperscript{561} Ibid.
because “it couldn't exactly bring 400,000 people out to demonstrate” to Area C where “illegal” outposts were built.562

In its first petition it petitioned against the defense minister, the commander of the civil administration and the attorney general, demanding all outposts built from 1996 on to be dismantled immediately. The case was delayed by Chief Justice Aharon Barak. About a year later the outpost agreement was signed between Ehud Barak and the Yesha Council (October 1999), in which it was decided to freeze most of the outposts (of which there were 40 at the time, compared to more than 100 today), and relocate and dismantle the others. The petition was canceled. Peace Now still continues to petition cases related to “illegal” outposts.563

Voices against the route of the Wall also came from Israeli ex-army officers. “The Council for Peace and Security,” consisting of over one thousand ex-army officers, used their prestige in opposition to the route of the Wall. In the militaristic society of Israel the word of former generals and colonels carries a lot of weight. The Council takes the view that it is necessary to build the Wall to defend Israel from attacks across its border with the West Bank. But it is of the opinion that the path of the Wall should be determined solely by defence requirements and without political considerations. The path of the Wall planned by the Government has not always abided by this rule. Along several sectors it would have caused undue hardship to local communities. The Council has frequently offered its professional opinion on security aspects involved to the High Court for the petitions brought to it.564

Voices against settlement policy came also from American Jews. Brit Tzedek v'Shalom (the Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace) is an organization of American Jews established 2002, and by 2004 already had 18,000 members with 30 local chapters around the United States. Brit Tzedek had been established on the basis of principles including the evacuation of settlements: a complete end to the occupation in the Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem; the establishment of a viable Palestinian State alongside Israel, based on the pre·1967 borders, with whatever adjustments both sides agreed to; the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both States; and a just resolution of the refugee issues that was agreed upon by both parties.565 By 2013, Brit Tzedek v'Shalom has grown to a network of nearly 50,000 supporters and over 1000 rabbis educating and organizing the American

562 Peace Now “First Petitions Against the Outposts” retrieved on 12 December 2012. Available at <http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/first-petitions-against-outposts>
563 Ibid.
565 Brit Tzedek v'Shalom website: <http://btvshalom.org/btvshalom.org/>
Jewish community in support of Israel’s long term interest in peace.\footnote{Ibid.}

Brit Tzedek states that “without substantial commitment on the part of the United States to act as an honest broker and within an international framework to secure peace for Israelis and Palestinians, there could be no progress towards resolution of the conflict. There was a clear correlation between the resurgence of anti-Semitism and the increasing isolation of Israel in the international community as a direct consequence of its policies.”\footnote{Ibid.}

According to Brit Tzedek at least 50 percent of American Jews supported a negotiated two-State solution, the evacuation of settlements and territorial compromise based roughly on the 1967 border. That voice had not yet been heard by the White House or by Congress, and it was Brit Tzedek’s work to amplify it sufficiently for it to be heard.\footnote{Ibid.}

Al Aqsa Intifada was characterized by serious clashes, violence and suffering, but during this period, the settlement issue has emerged as a key factor in determining the future of peace negotiations. Successive international interlocutors, both the Mitchell Commission and the Quartet, attempting to restore stability and restart diplomatic negotiations, have recognized that a settlement freeze is a vital first step in this process.

5.2. The International Court of Justice

Under pressure from grassroots movements, and supported by facts and data and worldwide condemnation of the construction of the Wall, Palestinians made a big move to take the case to the UN and confront Israel in the international legal arena. In December 2003, the United Nations General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an advisory opinion on “the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolution.”\footnote{Tenth Emergency Session of the General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14.}

The ICJ decided to deliver its advisory opinion, despite the opposition from Israel and the United States. And on July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) read its advisory opinion \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory}.\footnote{International Court of Justice, \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion}, 9 July 2004,}
associated regime are in violation of international law and that Israel should forthwith cease construction of the wall, dismantle what has been so far constructed, and make reparations to the Palestinians for all damages caused by the project. It also held the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created. The ICJ also argued that the United Nations should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime taking due account of the Advisory Opinion.  

The Court also determined settlement activity by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in contradiction to various international laws. From the perspective of my analysis, the Court has made a clear connection between settlement, the right of self-determination and peace process. It stated that if the settlements and the land they are situated on are annexed to Israel, the Palestinian will not be able to establish an independent state to exercise its self-determination, thus jeopardizing the principle of the two-state solution based on international law.

On 20 July 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-10/15 demanding that Israel and all member states comply with the legal obligations stipulated in the Advisory Opinion, and requests the Secretary-General to establish a register of damage caused to all natural or legal persons concerned.

The Advisory Opinion on the Wall received wide attention worldwide, including those of scholars of international law. Numerous academic journals published articles on this topic creating a big academic discourse. However, most of scholars expressed favorable opinions the ICJ Advisory Opinion.

5.2.1. Implication of ICJ Advisory Opinion for the Peace Process

Two important implications related to the opinion were that the ICJ confirmed the applicability of International Law to the Conflict, and the possibility of third party intervention to reduce its asymmetry.

The ICJ embodies an important institutional dimension in the crystallization of a
moral international community of humankind.\textsuperscript{574} Israel and the United States had argued in the jurisdictional phases of the proceedings that issuing an advisory opinion here would be destructive of the peace process as encapsulated in the road map. However, the opinion of the Court ends with a particularly useful formulation on the relevance of international law throughout the course of a peace process: “The Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is addressed, to the need for these efforts [at compliance] to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding problem and establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region.”\textsuperscript{575} It is a strong statement coming from an organ of the United Nations who is a party to the Road Map.

Richard Falk believes, such a sentence, when examined in the extent to which international law has been systematically excluded from the negotiating process, dating back to the Oslo peace process initiated in 1993, would reveal that the Court’s admonition to the General Assembly addresses a serious concern. Oslo as enacted in practice for seven years during the 1990s excluded international law considerations from the negotiations and was a bargaining forum that reflected the disparity of power between the two sides, a circumstance accentuated by partisanship of the United States, which purported to act as an “honest broker.” Moreover, negotiations generated by Oslo were allowed to coincide with the persistent expansion of the Israeli settlements and the construction of an expensive infrastructure of roads used exclusively by settlers to connect the settlement blocs, and maintain secure access to Israel. Falk hopes that “the discipline of international law on such matters would infuse any future peace process.”\textsuperscript{576}

Arie Kacowicz, shares the view that the ICJ as the major judicial organ of the United Nations is an important institution of the international society alongside other institutions such as diplomacy, great power management, deterrence, and even war. He understands at the same time that the international adjudicative machinery of the ICJ has not been well developed or always functionally effective.\textsuperscript{577} Hence, even if its ruling is considered biased

\textsuperscript{574} For example, Thomas and Sally Mallison view, in basic conception, international law consists of a common body of norms or principles which are used in the solution of diverse problems. It is essential that such norms or principles be applied consistently in order to promote the objectivity and uniformity associated with “law” as opposed to \textit{ad hoc} or unprincipled decision-making in which a different rule is developed for each problem. Upon the basis of this premise, international law may be accurately regarded as a set of uniform principles which require at least minimum standards of reasonable and humane conduct in the world community. W.T. Mallison, Jr.; S.V. Mallison, “The Role of International law in Achieving Justice and Peace in Palestine-Israel” in \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, Vol.3, No.3. (Spring, 1974), pp.77-87.

\textsuperscript{575} Advisory Opinion, para 162.

\textsuperscript{576} Richard Falk, \textit{supra} note 49, p.51.

\textsuperscript{577} Arie M. Kacowicz, “The Normative Dimension of International Relations and the
or distorted, it still carries an important normative and political baggage, by underlining paramount norms such as self-determination and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{578}

Whether or not Israel admits these rights as principles to the peace process still remain as a question. There are critical voices such as Steinberg’s stating “the role of the UN and the ICJ in the case of Israel’s separation barrier is overwhelmingly political...blatantly one-sided and often illogical claims regarding human rights and justice are pressed in to service as part of the ongoing political war against Israel.”\textsuperscript{579} However, Kacowicz argues that if Israel continues ignoring the relevance and scope of international humanitarian law applied in the occupied territories, it will do it at its own risk, not only undermining its international prestige and reputation but even eroding its own national security.\textsuperscript{580}

**Third Party Intervention for Reducing Asymmetry**

The ICJ observed that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations \textit{erga omnes}, such respecting the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and certain obligations under international humanitarian law.

The Court’s emphasis on the interest of third parties as well as the role of the UN is an expression of a hope to provide a balance to the present asymmetry of power between the parties. This position is shared by Moshe Hirsh on his analysis of Jerusalem issue. Hirsh states that the Court’s approach to de-bilateralize the legal dispute between Israel and the Palestinians (including with regard to East Jerusalem), if materialized, is likely to weaken Israel’s bargaining position in future negotiations. In light of the current asymmetric power-relationships on the bilateral level in favor of Israel, growing involvement of third parties along the lines drawn by the Court is likely to enhance the Palestinian’s position in the future negotiations”\textsuperscript{581}. However, he warns, “growing pressure by third states may estrange Israeli leaders regarding external interference in this dispute, which is extremely charged with national and religious symbols.”\textsuperscript{582}

In September 2004, two months after the delivery of Advisory Opinion by the ICJ, \textbf{the International Conference of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People} was held focused on the theme “Ending the occupation – a key requisite for achieving peace in the Middle East”. It aimed to provide civil society organizations from all regions of the world

\textsuperscript{579} Ibid, pp.349-350.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid, p.315.
with an opportunity to discuss the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem; coordinate their activities; and develop action-oriented proposals in support of the Palestinian people.

The Conference Steering Committee adopted a plan of action to support Palestinian rights through International Law stating internationally coordinated action would be developed to escalate pressure to end the Israeli occupation and achieve the realization of Palestinian rights. To that end, non-governmental and civil society organizations participating in the Conference would work together to educate people and to pressure governments to move towards strict enforcement of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the resolutions of the General Assembly calling for self-determination of the Palestinian people, stopping and reversing Israeli settlements and dismantling the separation wall.\textsuperscript{583}

The Plan also states that if the occupying Power continued to violate international obligations, the participants would, as civil society, initiate divestment and other targeted sanctions against the occupying Power, and urge governments to impose restrictions including arms bans, withdrawal of economic privileges, bans against items produced by illegal settlements, travel restriction on violators of the Geneva Convention and other components of international law.\textsuperscript{584}

5.3. Israeli Policy Change

While the Palestinians considered the ICJ’s ruling as a historical decision describing the ruling as a victory not only for the Palestinian people and Palestinian right but also for international right and justice,\textsuperscript{585} Israel\textsuperscript{586} and the United States rejected the advisory opinion immediately after its issuance.

However, in its response to the Israeli Supreme Court regarding ICJ advisory opinion on the Security Fence\textsuperscript{587} the state emphasized that the fence is a temporary security measure and not intended to annex territory or predetermine the political border of Israel.


\textsuperscript{584} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{587} Summary of the Israel’s response to the ICJ advisory opinion on the Security Fence, available at Ministry of Defence website:  
<http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/news.htm>
No changes have been made to the boundaries which remain subject to negotiation between the parties. No less important, despite criticism by the State of Israel towards the conclusions of the Advisory Opinion and the procedures which led to the findings, Israel recognizes that a detailed consideration of the legal ramifications of the Advisory Opinion, and a consideration of its impacts, is appropriate even if it remains non-binding in nature.

5.3.1. Israeli High Court of Justice Rulings

The HCJ Ruling on Beit Sourik Case

Nine days before the reading of the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice, Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ)\(^\text{588}\) pronounced a judgment on the Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel case.\(^\text{589}\) It was not initially receptive to petitions related to the wall. In a decision delivered in October, 2002, shortly after the first steps to build the barrier were taken, the Court dismissed a petition challenging requisition of land for building barrier. It stated that while the barrier did indeed cause harm to the petitioners, “this harm is the result of the state of fighting which has existed in the area for more than two years – a state that has cost many lives.”\(^\text{590}\) The Court recognized that the harm caused was quite substantial, but held that the barrier was an essential element in the security doctrine of the IDF, and “as is well-known this Court does not tend to interfere in operational security considerations.”\(^\text{591}\)

In February 2004 residents of several villages northwest of Jerusalem, among them Beit Sourik, petitioned the High Court of Justice to opposed to the route of the Wall planned for their area. The Council for Peace and Security joined the petitioners and submitted an opinion regarding the route set by the defense establishment, and suggested an alternate route closer to the Green Line that would significantly reduce the injury to the local residents. The High Court gave its decision in June 2004 stating thirty of the forty kilometers of the barrier's route involved in the petition (the area between Givat Ze'ev and Maccabim) was illegal and that the state must change the route.

The Court assumed that the West Bank is occupied territory, subject to international

\(^{588}\) Ever since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza commenced in 1967, the Supreme Court of Israel acting as the High Court of Justice has entertained petitions challenging actions by the military authorities in those areas. For detailed information on Israeli High Court of Justice, see, David Kretzmer, *The Occupation of Justice: the Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories*, SUNY, New York, 2002.


\(^{591}\) Ibid, p.7.
humanitarian law:

We accept that the military commander cannot order the construction of the separation fence if his reasons are political. The separation fence cannot be motivated by a desire to "annex" territories to the State of Israel... Indeed, the military commander of territory held in belligerent occupation must balance between the needs of the army on one hand, and the needs of the local inhabitants on the other. In the framework of this delicate balance, there is no room for an additional system of considerations, whether they be political considerations, the annexation of territory, or the establishment of the permanent borders of the state.\textsuperscript{592}

Based on this determination, the justices found that "construction of the fence comes within this framework," in that the decision was made in light of legitimate military needs. According to the judgment, the fact that the barrier is motivated by legitimate security concerns does not release the military commander from his duty to choose a "proportionate" route that balances between security and the inhabitants' needs. The judgment states that most of the route in the area under review is disproportionate because it severely impairs the residents' fabric of life.\textsuperscript{593}

However, as it has done for many years, the justices ignored the question of the illegality, in international law, of the settlements and thus did not examine the effect of this illegal action on the legitimacy of the considerations underlying construction of the barrier.

After the High Court gave its decision, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon directed the defense establishment to review the entire route of the Separation Barrier and to conform it to the spirit of the Court's judgment. The new route, which was proposed by the defense establishment in September 2004, was approved by the Cabinet in February 2005.

The HCJ, for the first time, decided to rule on a case which might interfere in operational security considerations, emphasized the application of humanitarian and human rights law in the territories, and incorporated a proportionality test, at least in part, due to the influence of the ICJ proceeding on Advisory Opinion.

The HCJ Ruling on Alfe Menashe (Mara’abe) Case

In September 2005, the HCJ ruled on the Mara’abe Case, its second ruling regarding the wall in an expanded panel of nine justices who ordered the state "to reconsider, within a reasonable time, alternatives to the route of the Barrier by Alfe Menashe." The decision followed the High Court of Justice's finding that the existing route of Barrier

\textsuperscript{592} HCJ Beit Sourik, para. 27.
\textsuperscript{593} Ibid., para. 94.
disproportionately violates the human rights of Palestinians living in an enclave of five villages situated west of the Barrier. The Court held that respondents must reconsider the existing route and examine the possibility of removing the villages of the enclave – some or all of them – from the “Israeli” side of the wall.\footnote{HCJ Mara’abe, paras. 111-114.}

Many more cases related to the route of the Wall continued to be deliberated in the highest court of Israel and caused delays and changes to the construction of the Wall.

5.3.2. The Status of Settlements and Route of the Wall

In rejecting the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, Israel stated that it will follow the Quartet Roadmap plan of March 2003 requiring that during the first phase it would evacuate outposts created after March 21, 2001. These have subsequently been referred to as “illegal outposts.”\footnote{Characteristics of an Unauthorized Outpost: a. there was no government decision to establish it, and in any case no authorized political echelon approved its establishment. B. the outpost was established with no legal planning status. Meaning, with no valid detailed plan governing the area it was established upon, which can support a building permit. C. an unauthorized outpost is not attached to an existing settlement, but rather at least a few hundred meters distant from it as the crow flies. D. the outpost was established in the nineties, mostly from the mid nineties and on. (The Sasson Report about Illegal Outposts (hereinafter “Sasson Report”, March 2005. Available at <http://www.mideastweb.org>)} After much pressure from the USA, Israel sent a letter that claimed there were 28 such outposts and that it would eliminate 12 of them and legalize the others. This was deemed unacceptable by the United States.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Prime Minister’s Office, requested Talia Sasson, from the advocate general’s office to report on the outposts. Submitted in March 2005, the report identified 24 outposts established after March 2001, 71 established before that date, and ten outposts established at an uncertain date. Of those that Sasson was able to identify, only 26 outposts are located on State land; 7 are located on survey lands; 15 are located on Palestinian private property; 39 are located on “mixed “ lands – part State, part survey, part owned by Palestinians.\footnote{Ibid.}

Sasson states in her report that after the High Court of Justice ruling in the case of Elon More, a 1979 Israeli government resolution states that Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza shall be established only on State land, hence, no settlement is to be established other than State land. No settlement is to be established on survey land (to which the title is unclear). Such outposts must be evacuated, the sooner the better.\footnote{Ibid.}

Sasson also suggested a reasonable criterion for distinguishing between the building of a neighborhood or expansion of an existing settlement, and construction of a new settlement.
Sasson examined that “establishment of another neighborhood or expansion that is directly adjacent to the community, and certainly in the case of those that are far from the existing community, such as hundreds of meters by air and more, cannot be considered part of the existing community, and is a new community.”

The report created a sensation by documenting the fact that outposts had been created in contravention to Israeli laws, often on land of dubious ownership, both before and after the March 2001 cutoff date. Most of the facts had been known for a long time, but this was the first time they had been admitted in an official report.

Following Sasoon Report, peace group and human rights groups accelerated its effort in documenting settlements construction and expansion illegal under Israeli law.

**Peace Now** also revealed that settlements are constructed on private Palestinian land and therefore illegal in its Settlement Watch Project report of October 2006. The report, based on the data obtained from the Civil Administration, the body appointed by the State of Israel to administer all the civil aspects related to the military occupation including construction of settlements, shows that Israel has effectively stolen private owned Palestinian lands for the purpose of constructing settlements.

According to the report, nearly 40 percent of the total land areas of the settlements, outposts and industrial zones in the West Bank are comprised of private Palestinian land, and that the settlement enterprise has undermined not only the collective property rights of the Palestinians as a people, but also the private property rights of individual Palestinian landowners. Peace Now demanded that the present Israeli Government rectify the situation, which means returning the private land to its owners.

A report published by Israeli human rights organizations, BIMKOM and BTSELEM, in 2005, revealed four cases (Zufin, Alfe Menashe, Modiin Illit, and Jerusalem) based on researched data and eight more cases based on preliminary data, that many sections of the wall’s route were not based on security considerations but on the****

---

599 Ibid.
601 Ibid., p.7.
602 Ibid., p.7.
603 BIMKOM – Planners for Planning Rights was established by planners and architects with the vision of strengthening the connection between the planning system in Israel and human rights. BTselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories documents human rights abuses in the Occupied Territories and bring them to the attention of policymakers and the general public.
The barrier’s penetration into the West Bank, which is the cause of most human rights violations, occurred mostly in areas in which Israeli settlements are located, leaving them on the “Israeli” side of the barrier. The route approved by the government in February 2005 leaves sixty settlements (twelve of them in East Jerusalem) west of the barrier, separated from the rest of the West Bank and contiguous with the State of Israel. In some areas, such as near the Zufin settlement, concern for the expansion of settlements has resulted in more Palestinian farmland being situated on the Israeli side of the barrier increasing the number of Palestinians who require permits to gain access to their own land. In other areas, such as near the Alfe Menashe settlement, the result has been the creation of enclaves in which Palestinians are separated from the rest of the West Bank, and Palestinians have been severely harmed in many aspects of life: many residents are not able to reach hospitals, schools, or even workplace. Also, in certain areas, such as the area northeast of Jerusalem, the barrier has impeded the urban development of Palestinian villages, in some cases making any development impossible. Implementation of the expansion plans in the areas remaining on the “Israeli” side of the barrier is likely to further harm the Palestinians by dispossessing them of more farmland and by causing further deterioration of the lives of residents of the villages that have become isolated enclaves.

In their report, BIMKOM and B’Tselem conclude, that the settlements are illegal under international humanitarian law. Therefore, any act to perpetuating them is illegal, especially if it involves expansion of settlements. For these reasons, BIMKOM and B’Tselem urge the government of Israel to immediately cease the planning and execution of additional sections of the separation barrier around settlements in the West Bank, and dismantle those sections that have already been built. If the state believes that a physical barrier is needed in those areas, it should be built, as a rule, along the Green Line or in Israeli territory: return the land taken to build the barrier to their Palestinian owners, and cancel the order declaring the “seam zone” a closed military area; immediately cancel all plans to expand settlements in the West Bank, whether they have been approved or are awaiting approval, and cease construction where work has begun.

**Tzofin Case**

In October 2002, Palestinian residents of ‘Azzun and a-Nabi Elyas petitioned the High Court against a section of the barrier that was to be built east of Tzofin (or Zufin), which threatened to detach them from their farmland situated west of the barrier. In her decision, Justice Dorit Beinisch accepted unchallenged the state’s contention that running the barrier...
inside the West Bank was necessary to create a “warning space”. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and the barrier was built along the originally planned route. However, in light of the severe impairment of access to their lands since construction of the barrier in July 2003, residents of ‘Azzun and a-Nabi Elyas again petitioned the court represented by HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual, the petitioners requested the court to order that the barrier be dismantled or moved to a place that does not block access to their farmland. Unlike its response to the previous petition, the State Attorney’s Office emphasized that the barrier had to be built along the route chosen “to protect the southern and eastern parts of the Israeli community Zufin.” The State Attorney’s Office went further and admitted that, “In planning the route in the area, consideration was given to the existence of a plan that is under preparation, but has not yet gained official approval.”

A renewed petition was submitted in 2005, after the petitioners obtained documents proving that the route had been selected so as to encompass the settlement’s future industrial zone, whose construction had not yet even been approved. On 15 June 2006, High Court of Justice ruled that the wall east of the settlement of Tzofin, must be dismantled within six months, after an alternative fence is erected along a route close to the settlement.

**Bil’in Case**

Located 12 kilometers west of Ramallah and 4km east of the Green Line, Bil’in is an agricultural village spanning 4,000 dunams with approximately 1,800 residents. Starting in the early 1980’s, and more significantly in 1991, approximately 56% of Bil’in’s agricultural land was declared ‘State Land’ (for the construction of the settlement block Modi’in Illit). Beginning in December 2004, and then every Friday since February of the following year, Palestinians, Israelis and Internationals have converged in Bil’in to protest against the Wall. Bil’in is famous for its creative demonstrations. Each week, demonstrators try to come up with something new, either chaining themselves to the trees or dressing in Avatar costumes both to raise their spirits and to attract world media attention. In addition to grassroots organizing, Bil’in has held annual conferences on popular resistance since 2006, providing a forum for villagers, activists and academics to discuss strategies for the unarmed struggle against the Occupation.

In April, 2005, about 1,000 Palestinians and some 200 Israeli guests, invited by the people of Bil’in, participated in a demonstration against the wall. All the participants undertook in advance to avoid all violence, no matter whether they had seen the Gandhi

---

607 Ibid.
Among the demonstrators were the Palestinian minister Fares Kadduri, presidential candidate Mustafa Barghouti, Israeli peace activist and former Knesset member Uri Avnery and Israeli Knesset member Muhammad Barakeh who was wounded during the attack.\footnote{Haaretz, April 29, 2005.}

International dignitaries also visited the site of popular resistance. The Elders who visited Bil‘in were Desmond Tutu, Ela Bhatt, Gro Brundtland, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Jimmy Carter and Mary Robinson. Elder’s chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu said: “My fellow Elders …were impressed by their commitment to peaceful political action, and their success in challenging the wall that unjustly separates the people of Bil‘in from their land and their olive trees.”\footnote{Palsolidarity.org/2009/12/9957 Retrieved Jan 3, 2010.}

The village is also fighting on legal grounds. First it turned to the courts in the winter of 2004. Three years after they initiated legal proceedings, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that due to illegal construction in part of Modi‘in Illit, unfinished housing could not be completed and that the route of the Wall be moved several hundred meters west, returning 25% of Bil‘in’s lands to the village. In 2007, the Israeli High Court of Justice ordered the state to dismantle and re-route a section of the Barrier in Bil‘in to return village land on which the Modi‘in Illit settlement was projected to expand. In May and again December 2008, the High Court found that alternative routes proposed by the state did not adhere to the 2007 ruling. In April 2009, the state proposed a third alternative route which returned 607 dunums of land isolated by the original route to the village.\footnote{UNOCHA, The Barrier Route in the West Bank, July 2011. <http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_update_july_2011_english.pdf>}

On 29 June 2011, the army dismantled the section of the Separation Barrier built on land of the Bil‘in village within the West Bank. The route of the barrier has been moved westward, with a new section already in place, thereby returning to the village 745 dunams of farmland that had been taken by the previous route. However, 1,300 dunams of village land remain west of the barrier within the borders of the Modi‘in Illit settlement.\footnote{B’Tselem “29 June 2011: Separation Barrier moved, but some 1,300 dunams of Bil‘in land remain on other side” 30 June 2011. <http://www.btselem.org/topic-page/29611-1300>}

This comes four years after the HCJ rejected the government’s argument that the route of the Wall in the area responded to security needs, yet failed to demand that the new route coincide with the Green Line. This move follows six years of weekly non-violent protests, which have attracted large media attention and the involvement of international peace activists and political leaders. Such form of resistance in Bil‘in has cost the life of Bassem Abu Rahmah, who was killed by a teargas canister during a peaceful protest in 2009, and has left American citizen Tristan Anderson permanently brain damaged after also being hit
by a teargas canister fired by Israeli forces. Countless others have been injured, detained and harassed as the Israeli occupying forces have persistently attempted to suppress peaceful resistance to the annexation of Palestinian land by the Wall.613

Muhammad Khatib, among the leaders of Bil’in resistance, explains the reasons for the success: “First, the popular committee has built a close relationship with members of the community. Second, we’ve managed to achieve a balance between protesting and living our daily lives. Third, there is the relationship between Israelis, Palestinians and internationals. We all work together and share in the decisions, since this is a joint struggle. We have come to know each other better and trust each other. Fourth, there is the originality and creativity of our demonstrations. Peaceful struggle has been present in Palestine for a long time. But what we’ve done here is adopt new approaches that have developed that struggle and strengthened our relationship with the media into one of trust. Fifth, we know what we want to do and understand the possibility of doing it. International law gives Palestinians the right to use armed resistance, but this path isn’t useful or helpful to us in our struggle her. Our struggle is a truly popular one.”614

5.3.3. Impact on the Construction of the Wall

The petition accepted in Beit Surik had wider significance, influencing plans for the path of the Fence elsewhere in the West Bank. In response to Beit Surik ruling by Israeli High Court and the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, the government of Sharon amended the route in February 2005 to include nine percent of the West Bank instead of 20 percent of the original plan. In April 2006 an additional one percent was shaved off by the government of Ehud Olmert.615

In addition, the construction of the Wall was continuously delayed. When Israel started to work on the wall in 2002, the plan was to complete it in 2005. Construction was halted in some areas because of resistance by affected communities. Court cases were initiated, which took six or seven months, during which time all construction was put on hold. So the deadline was pushed back from 2005 to 2008. Now, completion of the Wall is not expected until 2020, some 18 years after its construction began.616

The cost of the Wall is becoming a burden to Israel. It is estimated that to 2011, US 1.8

---

614 Jaradat and Rioli 2011, p.29.
615 Amos Harel, “West Bank Fence not done and never will, it seems” Haaretz 14 July 2009. UNOCHA puts this number as 15 percent. UNOCHA, The Barrier Route in the West Bank July 2011.
billion was spent on construction of the Wall, which is also a reason for the delay in construction. IDF Colonel (res.) Shaul Arieli, who has studied the fence issue extensively on behalf of the Council for Peace and Security said “exorbitant sums of money have been pumped into infrastructure and fences that were supposed to follow a route that was impossible to complete.” According to an internal Ministry of Defence document obtained by Army Radio, ‘conconstruction of a 40-kilometre stretch of the West Bank security barrier near Gush Etzion was halted due to budgetary considerations.

The stated aim of the Wall, is to protect Israeli civilians from attacks from the West Bank and indeed they have significantly decreased since 2004 letting Israel claim that the Wall is effective. However, it is quite obvious that this resulted not only from the building of the Wall which was only half completed because since 2004 Palestinian security services have made great effort in stopping attacks against Israel, arresting members of militant groups, especially that of Hamas. It also disarmed the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade. Hamas, on the other hand, announced a unilateral ceasefire when it decided to participate in the local election of 2005 and general election of 2006.

This is why Palestinians suspect the aim of the Wall is not security but confiscating more land for settlement expansion. Prime Minister Sharon, for example, said in an interview that the “settlement blocs,” which will be located on the western side of the separation barrier, “will be part of the State of Israel, contiguous with Israel, with many more people.” Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz made a similar declaration. Then Justice Minister Tzipi Livni stated publicly that the wall will serve as “the future border of the state of Israel” and that “the High Court of Justice, in its ruling over the fence, is drawing the country’s borders.” Livni said “One does not have to be a genius to see that the fence will have implications for the future border. This is not the reason for its establishment, but it could have political implications.”

5.4. Palestinian Challenges

Demonstrations still continue and take place weekly at Bil’in, Na’alin, Ma’asara, Nabi

---

617 Ibid.
618 Amos Harel, “West Bank Fence not done and never will, it seems” Haaretz 14 July 2009
620 Aluf Benn and Nir Hasson, “Sharon: The Evacuation will Begin in Mid-August,” Ha’aretz, 10 May 2005.
621 Ibid.
Salih, in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of East Jerusalem, and in more than fifteen other locations around the West Bank where the frequency is less predictable. The immediate aim is to change the route of the Wall and regain lost land. The wider aim is to make the movement a national movement and thus to free themselves from Israeli occupation. However, Palestinians are facing challenges both within villages and as a nation.

**In the Village**

One serious challenge to the protesting villages is increasing casualties to protesters. Demonstrations against the Wall and settlements expansions are met with intense campaign of violence, intimidation and arrests by Israeli occupying forces. Israel Defense Forces gunfire has killed 26 Palestinians at the weekly demonstrations, 11 of them minors. During 2009-2010, Israeli authorities have intensified efforts to suppress protests, as evidenced through the increased use of violence against protesters, reckless and excessive use of weapons, and tactics that punish residents of towns and villages where demonstrations are held.

The Israeli security apparatus increased the number of arrests; in 2010, “hundreds” involved in popular activities have been arrested. In March, 2010, Israel further increased pressure, declaring Bil’in and Na’alin “closed military zones” on Fridays until August, rendering protests illegal and using greater force to suppress them. The army has also set up new roadblocks on Fridays to prevent Palestinians (as well as Israelis and internationals) from reaching the villages. According to Al-Haq, Israel’s policy of curtailing the rights of those who protest the confiscation of their land is aimed at silencing dissent.

Another challenge is development because while some villages enjoy projects to their water and sewage networks, protesting villages are awarded few, if any, such projects. For example, Bil’in does not have a complete water network forcing villagers to buy water from the Israeli water company by water tanks which can cost up to 4 times the cost of the water from the network (also bought from the Israeli water company).

The constant presence of internationals also causes social problems. In Bil’in, for example, every Friday is a protest day, and each time villagers together with Israelis and internationals try innovative ways of protesting. Children and youth in the village are also involved in these events and distracted from studies. Some youth developing close relationships with internationals was seen negatively by villagers.

---

624 Al-Haq 2011, 35.
625 Conversation with Bil’in villager, Summer 2011.
626 Ibid.
Political Intervention

As the popular movement gained momentum and international recognition, Fatah decided to support the local initiatives since 2005 by creating the National Committee in 2005 led by Qaddura Fares as a national umbrella for all popular resistance activities. Salam Fayyad’s government, decided to set up The Coordinating Committee in 2009 to link together the heads of popular committees around the West Bank.627 By January 2010, organisers in Bil’in and Na‘alin became “tour guides” for factional leaders seeking to shore up their credibility.628 The Palestinian Authority has dedicated substantial funds to its newly created committee, estimated to hundreds of thousands of shekels (100,000 NIS = $26,889), provoking resentment and leading to charges that the government is “fragmenting the already fragmented” by channeling money toward its preferred allies.629 Jamal Juma, the founder of Apartheid Wall Campaign criticizes these moves that “[p]ouring money into a specific committee decentralises the movement and creates a dynamic in which the main task becomes spending the money.”630

Morra, founder of the Budrus popular committee argues for creating a new movement completely independent from the Palestinian Authority or any political factions, to unite everybody and that there is a need for stronger leaders to encourage all Palestinians to participate in the struggle together.631

Obstacle to a Mass Movement

Many local activists hope that the current initiatives will crystallise into a broader movement, as they did in the first Intifada. But the political and social structures that existed around the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the late 1980s have largely disappeared. The popular struggle in the villages does not resonate with Palestinians living in cities. While those inhaling tear gas and sitting in Israeli prisons may differ, many urbanites deride the protest as a “comfortable intifada” and a “Western import”. Some have taken to referring to Bil’in as the Palestinian “Hyde Park”, where one heads for an afternoon outing then returns home to life as usual under occupation.632

There is also a sharp intra-communal tussles over whether to launch and continue protests, since the costs can be high, including nightly Israeli raids, imprisonment, even more restrictions on agricultural lands and movement. Neighbouring villages, in which people suffer the costs of the demonstrations but stand to reap fewer benefits, sometimes

628 Ibid.
629 Ibid.
630 Ibid.
631 McIntyre, 2010.
632 ICG 2010.
are opposed. In one West Bank location, a large landowner at first encouraged demonstrations and reimbursed villagers who suffered damages, but, after a court decision to return of much of his land, has grown reluctant to mobilise protests. Parents with children in jail in Israel who fear losing permission to visit them often demure.

**Bab Al-Shams (Gate of the Sun) Village**

Popular Committees were looking for a new approach that would bring more youth to actions related to news events – like the construction plans for the E-1 area – so to generate media interest. In response to Israeli announcements to construct new settlements in the E1 area between East Jerusalem and Israeli Ma’aleh Adumim settlement, popular committees came up with a new idea of building a protest tents village “named Bab Al-Shams” in that area owned by Palestinians.

The naming of the tent village itself was inspirational to many young Palestinians. “Bab Al-Shams” is named after the title of a famous novel written by a Lebanese author, Elias Khoury, about the life of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. On January 2013, some 200 Palestinians and foreign peace activists set up 20 tents donated by Palestinian businessmen. The Israeli government, in a rare prompt manner, evicted the tent village after only two days but the event was broadcast on local Palestinian TV and radio as well as on major news channels such as Al-Jazeera and the BBC.

An Israeli journalist Bradley Burston, writes in Haaretz, that the founding of Bab Al-Shams was a stroke of “genius.” The way the Palestinians put up the tents on a hilltop, was how the settlements were built across the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The encampment sent a message that was clear, piercing, and entirely nonviolent. The proof is that Netanyahu said it had to be destroyed at once. Bradley argues that Netanyahu needed it to be destroyed because it was fighting facts on the ground. According to him, Bab Al-Shams had to be destroyed because where the occupation is concerned it touched the central nervous system. Palestinians are fighting the Netanyahu government with the one weapon against which this government has no defense – hope. Hope is the government’s worst enemy, more threatening than Iran.

5.5. Summary

Local communities affected by the construction of the Wall, seeing no help coming had to pull themselves together and act. From an early stage, villagers were joined by

---

635 Ibid.
636 Ibid.
internationals and Israelis in participating and planning for protest actions. In the villages, demonstrations took place often applying creative methods to attract internationals and media attention. Popular Committees were formed in affected villages uniting all villagers regardless of differences in political affiliation.

Soon the local actions were coordinated by the Apartheid Wall campaign which collected information and published reports and turned to both the Palestinian Authority and the international community. Demonstrations in the villages gained broad international media coverage. Because the route of the Wall was designed to include settlements to the Israeli side, the mechanism and policy of settlement also became a focus area for Israeli peace and human rights organizations, which has for a long time left them untouched.

Another avenue sought was through petitioning to Israeli High Court of Justice. Palestinian lawyers were assisted by Israeli lawyers and human rights organizations in making petitions, because only Israeli citizens can stand in the Israeli courts.

The result was impressive. Palestinians were able to push their Authority to take the case to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice has made Advisory Opinion, despite strong objection from Israel and the United States.

The delivery by ICJ advisory opinion became a highly publicized event both worldwide and inside Israel. The pressure from the international community was already felt even before the delivery of the opinion in addition to the escalation of protests in the towns and villages affected by the Wall highly covered in world media. The Advisory Opinion stated not only that the route of the Wall inside the West Bank is illegal, but also that settlement inside the West Bank is illegal.

The growing pressure has pushed the Israeli High Court of Justice to rule on petitions related to the wall despite of past denials. The Israeli HCJ was forced to make judgment on the petitions related to the Wall and take into account the internationally used proportionality test, which does not automatically justify military needs. The HCJ is flooded with dozens of petitions from Palestinians and many judgments resulted in halting the construction, and some in altering the route of the wall.

In response to the Beit Surik ruling by the Israeli High Court and the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, the government of Sharon amended the route in February 2005 to include nine percent of the West Bank instead of 20 percent as in the original plan. In April 2006 an additional one percent was shaved off by the government of Ehud Olmert. Also, the construction of the Wall is continuously delayed because of resistance by affected communities and by legal cases in the HCJ, as well as the increasing cost, and only some sixty percent is constructed. Completion of the Wall is not expected until 2020.

Lederach's Actors and Approaches can be used to explain how various actors and
approaches were integrated in the movement that became effective.

In Palestine, protest movement was initiated from grassroots leadership – village leaders and led to the formation of Popular Committees inclusive of men and women in the villages. Soon, middle-range leaderships, such as environmental NGOs and human rights NGOs began data collection and advocacy to both Palestinian authority and the international community. The Apartheid Wall Campaign was formed to coordinate the actions among villages and to lobby and advocate the situation. Also, International Solidarity Movement was formed to facilitate participation of internationals to the movement. Leadership at the top level was pressured to take the case to the United Nations and ask for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice. Later, top level leaders recognized importance of non-violent grassroots efforts in the villages and showed support.

In Israel, on the grassroots level peace activists and human rights activists participated from the initial stage to demonstrate and plan the action together with the Palestinian villagers. Anarchist against the Wall was formed out of these actions. In the middle-range leadership, human rights groups such as B’Tselem and peace movements such as Peace Now increased their actions related the settlements by revealing data and by collecting evidences for appeals. In the top level, Israel’s High Court was pressured to take the cases related to the Wall.

In the international community, on the grassroots level, peace and human rights activists participated in the demonstration in Palestine and abroad in coordination with Palestinian groups such as ISM. In the middle-range leadership, various international NGOs worked in advocacy in coordination with Palestinian groups. In the top leadership level, the countries voted for requesting an advisory opinion of International Court of Justice. Also, former top leaders such as members of Elders made visits to these villages and received international media attention.

The impacts of the movement are assessed as follows according to the criteria set forth in the beginning of this study.

1) Impact on resolution of conflict: the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice has become another legal norm to the resolution of conflict. It stated not only that the route of the Wall inside the West Bank is illegal but that settlement inside the West Bank is illegal, as well as obligating the international community not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created.

2) Impact on the process of peacemaking: Palestinians were able to push its Authority to take the case to the United Nations and to International Court of Justice. Subsequently, Israel’s High Court of Justice decided to make judgments on the
cases related to the Wall. Israeli governments, due to the Court’s intervention and protests, were forced to alter the route of the Wall and delay the construction. Thus, the movement is struggling to avoid the route of the Wall to become a political border which will prejudge the final border. In addition, international community, including the U.S. increased their concern of settlement expansion.

3) Impact on defining the conflict: the movement has utilized several strategies - non-violence, appealing to legal system, lobbying and advocacy, and internationalizing the issue of settlements. It also brought attention to rights based approach through legal actions. By doing so, it shed light on the issue of settlements and settlement expansion as a major obstacle for peace. It helped to gain perception both internationally and in Israel that the settlements cannot be constructed or expanded while trying to make peace.

The grassroots movement against the Wall thus has shown impressive impacts. However, the Popular Committees’ larger goal of ending the occupation is still far away. They are facing challenges locally and not receiving enough support from outside the affected villages.

Their creative effort try to gather attention of wider Palestinian publics, especially youth, by constructing Bab Al-Shams Village in E1 area did have certain success. It provoked inspiration among the youth and received wide attention and public discourse in Palestine as well as in Israel and rest of the world. However, Popular Committees and civil society will need to come up with many other such initiatives to keep up the momentum created.
Chapter 6: Case Study – The Free Gaza Movement

Israel withdrew its citizens and military forces from Gaza Strip in the Summer of 2005, and declared the end of its control over the Strip. The withdrawal, however, did not improve the living condition of Gaza people. On the contrary, the stricter control over the border and sea has worsened already poverty stricken community where majority are refugees. Militant Islamic groups continue to fire rockets to Israel and Israel conducted military operations against these militant groups. Hamas won the general election in 2006 and Israeli closed the border except for urgent humanitarian cases. Israeli soldier was abducted by Hamas in 2006. Several ceasefires were announced by both Israel and Hamas but violence continued.

The Free Gaza Movement was formed in 2006 by internationals who are concerned with the humanitarian situation in Gaza and aimed to end the siege of Gaza. After two years of planning, the first ship reached Gaza in 2008 carrying humanitarian goods and made four more successful voyages.

Its ninth voyage and largest of the movement, a flotilla of six vessels including the Mavi Marmara carrying some six hundred passenger and 10,000 tons of humanitarian goods to help the people of Gaza who was suffering from blockade even after the Israeli military operation Cast Lead conducted from December 2008 to January 2009. However, the ships were intercepted by the Israeli navy in international waters off the coast of Gaza on 31 May 2010. Israel placed the coast of Gaza under a naval blockade since Cast Lead. When the Israeli navy forcibly boarded the Mavi Marmara nine passengers lost their lives and many others were wounded.

This incident caused an international uproar centered on condemning Israel's excessive use of force and requested Israel to ease blockade. As a result, Israel has changed its policy to ease the blockade.

This chapter will examine, how a movement initiated by internationals that started with two small wooden boats and eventually led to change Israeli policy to ease the blockade.

6.1. Gaza Under Blockade

Gaza was placed under closure since 1991 after the first Intifada. The permit system was introduced to control the movement of people and goods. In 1995, Israel built a perimeter fence encircling the Gaza Strip and separating it from Israel. For most of the time since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, permits to enter or leave
Gaza were limited mainly to “humanitarian cases.”

The laws of belligerent occupation have applied to Israel since it captured Gaza from Egypt in 1967. These rules grant powers to and impose duties on a foreign power that exercises effective control over a territory, in order to protect and provide for the occupied population. Indeed, the Israeli Supreme Court has held that Israel is a belligerent occupant in both Gaza and the West Bank and has applied the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations to evaluate Israel's conduct there—a position that the international community almost uniformly shared.

In June 2004, Israel adopted a “disengagement plan” providing for the unilateral removal from the Gaza Strip of Israeli forces and civilians living in settlements. As a result, it declared ‘there will be no basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.’ However, at the same time, Israel stated that ‘Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.’ Immediately upon completing its disengagement plan on September 12, 2005, Israel declared an end to the military government that had administered the Gaza Strip since Israel's capture of the territory in 1967, claiming that control over Gaza had been transferred to the Palestinian Council. Three days later, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared “the end of Israeli control over and responsibility for the Gaza Strip.”

While the State of Israel admitted to continuing ground troop activity in Gaza, it characterized its presence as sporadic, limited to entering specific areas in order to thwart attacks or stop the firing of Qassam rockets toward Israel. The state also claims that control of the airspace or territorial waters do not meet the criteria for imposing the laws of

---

641 Ibid.
occupation. The state argued that the restrictions on passage of people and goods through Rafah Crossing are not imposed by military might but rather determined consensually by the Nov. 15, 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access,645 entered into by Israel and the Palestinian Authority.646

Accordingly, Israel made changes in its domestic law treating Gaza as a foreign territory, separated from the West Bank and subject neither to Israeli control nor Israeli duties. The State of Israel has issued administrative orders defining the Erez, Kerem Shalom, Sufa, and Karni crossings between Gaza and Israel as international border crossings. It has compared Gaza to Syria, claiming that it bears no obligation to permit the provision of humanitarian aid in Gaza and no obligation to permit people and goods to cross between Gaza and the West Bank.647

This position, however, is not shared by the international community, including the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Neither Palestinian nor Israeli human rights organizations agree.648 According to Israeli human rights organization, GISHA: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement (GISHA), Israel’s withdrawal of settlements and permanent military ground installations from the Gaza Strip in 2005 did not end Israeli control of Gaza but rather changed the way in which such control is effectuated. Israel continues to control Gaza through substantial regulation of land crossings; power on the ground through incursions and sporadic ground troop presence; complete control of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters; control of the Palestinian population registry; control of tax policy and transfer of tax revenues; control of the ability of the Palestinian Authority to exercise governmental functions; control of the West Bank, which together with Gaza, constitute a single territorial unit.649

The situation in Gaza worsened after Hamas won the Palestinian Authority (PA) legislative elections and established itself as a major actor in domestic politics in January 2006. Some countries and organizations, including Turkey, consider Hamas a democratically elected, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel considers Hamas to be a terrorist group and arrested some forty elected members of Palestinian Legislative Council, thus freezing any legislative activities. The U.S. State Department designates Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Hamas has criticized peace

talks with Israel in line with its commitment to resistance, has perpetrated terrorist attacks against Israel, and has launched rockets from Gaza into Israel. The relationship between Hamas and opposition party Fatah, who had been the leading party since the establishment of PA and PLO became contentious. It prompted the United States to end all direct foreign aid to the Palestinians.

In the summer of 2006, Israel undertook a military offensive into Gaza in response to the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Gaza’s only power station was bombed and as a result, because of the limitation to the supply of the industrial diesel to operate the plant and the supply of spare parts, Gaza is under continuous shortage of electricity.

After the capture of Israeli soldier, Israelis were banned from entering Gaza, even humanitarian workers and journalists. In addition, entry of internationals also became severely restricted only to humanitarian workers who were able to obtain permission with prior coordination.

Under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Hamas and Fatah formed a unity government in February 2007. However, in June 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by force. This “coup” prompted PA President Mahmud Abbas to dissolve the Hamas-led government and replace it with the current one under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad administering only the West Bank. Israel and the United States reestablished relations with the new PA government, and Israel imposed a tight land, sea, and air blockade on the Gaza Strip in what it describes as an act of self-defense to prevent arms from reaching Hamas, but stated that it would be tailored to avoid a “humanitarian crisis.”

Israel claimed it “has been engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza strip. This armed conflict has intensified after Hamas violently took over military power in Gaza from Fatah, in June 2007, and turned the territory under its de-facto control into a launching pad of mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli towns and villages in southern Israel.”

The blockade has severely affected the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, although Israel and its critics differ about the effects. The Israeli government maintained that there is no humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and the IDF issues a detailed Weekly Summary of Humanitarian Aid Transferred into Gaza to support that position. The Ministry of Defense Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) issues a similar Gaza Strip Merchandise and Humanitarian Aid Report on the number of trucks and persons allowed to enter Gaza and lists the cargos of food, medicine, and other supplies moving into it.

However, international agencies reported a worsening humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), the daily average of imported truckloads dramatically went down from 631 in January 2007 to 83 in September 2007 and remained around 100 until June 2009, except for 23 and 35 during November 2008 and December 2008 respectively during Operation Cast Lead. Various other international agencies state that the blockade has effectively dismantled the economy and impoverished the population of Gaza.

International Aid Agencies claimed Israel’s policy affected the civilian population of Gaza indiscriminately and constitutes a collective punishment against ordinary men, women and children. The measures taken are illegal under international humanitarian law.

While most of the Jewish Israeli public supported the policy of blockade, some Israelis demonstrated in front of Erez crossing demanding an end to the blockade and requesting humanitarian goods to be brought in. The protest demonstrations were led by human rights activists and by the Islamic Movement Northern Branch in Israel. However, these demonstrations were sporadic and had very little media attention.

Furthermore on 27 December 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in the Strip, a 23-day military offensive that claimed the lives of close to 1,400 Palestinians, and injured over 5,000. Children suffered a tremendous toll, with more than 314 killed, over 860 injured, and countless others traumatized. The civilian infrastructure in Gaza sustained significant damage as a result of this military operation. On January 3, 2009, in the midst of the large scale military operation “Cast Lead”, Israel declared a maritime blockade off Gaza’s coast, and though the operation ended that same month, the blockade remained in force.

---

653 Such as WFP, UNOCHA, the World Bank and Oxfam.
655 Witnessed by author at the Erez crossing.
656 The reported number of Palestinian fatalities during the offensive ranges from 1,116 (IDF spokesperson) to 1,455 (Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza). Based on the cross checking of multiple fatality lists, UNOCHA has verified the records of 1,383 Palestinians whose death was confirmed by at least two independent source. See UOCHA, “Locked In: The humanitarian impact of two years of blockade on the Gaza Strip”, August 2009. p.12.
The operation was supported by overwhelming majority of Israeli public. Demonstrations supporting the “War” were held in many parts of Israel attracting tens of thousands of Israelis, while peace demonstrations against the attack took place in Tel Aviv drew little more than one thousand people and received little media attention.657

Recovery of the damages done to Gaza by the Israeli military operation was very slow because of the continued blockade which prohibits enter of construction materials. According to UNDP report after more than one year, nearly none of the 3,425 homes destroyed during Cast Lead have been reconstructed.658 Public infrastructure – hospitals, schools, electric systems, or sewage treatment plants – cannot be repaired because Israel will not permit the delivery of materials such as steel, cement, and tiles that could be used both for rebuilding and for the manufacture of weapons or other military purposes.659

There is the smuggling of goods (and weapons) via a network of tunnels under the border that relieves the blockade somewhat, but smuggled goods create economic distortions by fueling a large informal economy. Israeli planes often bomb the tunnels, but these attacks have not put a stop to the activity.

6.2. The Free Gaza Movement

The Free Gaza Movement began in the Fall of 2006 with a simple idea: “Instead of waiting for the world to act, we would sail to Gaza ourselves, and directly challenge the Israeli siege ourselves.”660 The Movement is a Cyprus-based coalition or alliance formed to oppose Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip and is said to have roots in the International Solidarity Movement, a non-violent movement dedicated to ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.661

According to its website, the Free Gaza Movement seeks to work with as broad a spectrum of the Palestinian society in Gaza and cooperate with all non-partisan groups that wish to participate in the planning visits. These include the International Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza, the Palestinian Medical Relief Society, the Popular Committee Against

---

657 Interview with a human right activist.
the Siege, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, and the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Palestinian Agriculture Committee.\textsuperscript{662}

For almost two years, Free Gaza activists in Australia, Britain, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Lebanon, Palestine, and the United States worked to raise money, locate ships and crews, and train and organize for the first attempt to break through Israel’s blockade. By August 2008 they sailed to Gaza in two, small, wooden fishing boats: the Free Gaza and the Liberty.\textsuperscript{663} Since then the movement continued to sail to besieged Gaza, bringing in human rights workers and lawyers, journalists, academics, and parliamentarians, as well as several tons of desperately needed humanitarian aid.

An Israeli human rights activist, Jeff Halper, made the first voyage to “expose Israel’s attempt to absolve itself of responsibility for what is happening in Gaza. Israel’s claim that there is no Occupation, or that the Occupation ended with ‘disengagement’, is patently false.”\textsuperscript{664} He said his voyage to Gaza was a statement of solidarity with the Palestinian people in their time of suffering, but also conveys a message to his fellow citizens: “First, despite what our political leaders say, there is a political solution to the conflict, there are partners for peace.”\textsuperscript{665} The second voyage was made on October 28 - November 1, 2008 with a new ship the Dignity carrying doctors, lawyers, journalists, and human rights workers, representing 12 different countries, including Palestinian legislator Mustapha Barghouti, Nobel Laureate Mairead Maguire, and Italian opera singer Joe Fallsi – who delivered Gaza’s first ever opera concert.

Also included in passenger was a Palestinian-Israeli, a human rights lawyer, Lubna Masarwa. It was her first visit to Gaza that “changed her life.” As an Israeli citizen, she had very little exposure to what is happening in Gaza, because the way Israeli media reports or ignores reporting situation in Gaza. The life of people of Gaza, how they are deprived of their basic human rights, was beyond her imagination. After the trip, she became a part of the movement as the coordinator for the later trips.\textsuperscript{666}

The third voyage was made on November 2008 with the Dignity carrying 24 passengers. On this voyage, the Free Gaza Movement joined with the European Campaign to end the Siege to bring over a ton of medical supplies to Gaza accompanied by 11 past and current European parliamentarians from England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Italy and Switzerland, including Baroness Jenny Tonge, Lord Nazir Ahmad and Clare Short, the former British Secretary for International Development.

\textsuperscript{662} The Free Gaza Movement website
\textsuperscript{663} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{664} Jeff Halper, “An Israeli Jew in Gaza: A Statement by Jeff Halper.” ICAHD website <http://icahd.org/node/331>
\textsuperscript{665} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{666} Interview with Lubna Masarwa in Spring 2009.
Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist working for an Israeli major newspaper Haaretz, was the first Israeli journalist to set foot on Gaza since the Israel government set the ban on December 2006. During her three week stay in Gaza, she tried to communicate to the Israeli people, the complex feelings of people in Gaza, where everything, from fuel and electricity to food are in shortage and that Ismail Haniyeh said that Hamas was willing to accept Palestinian state with 1967 borders.\textsuperscript{667}

The fourth voyage of the "Student" Delegation was made on December 2008 on the Dignity. Professors Mike Cushman and Jonathon Rosenhead of the British Committee for Universities for Palestine (BRICUP) headed the delegation which toured schools and universities in Gaza to assess the impact of the siege on education, and brought out 11 Palestinian students who had been accepted to universities abroad but were denied exit by Israel. The Dignity carried a ton of medical supplies and high protein baby milk formula.

The fifth voyage was made later that December and joined by two envoys from the Qatari Eid charity, in partnership with the people of Qatar. With this historic journey, Qatar became the first Arab nation to ever break the siege of Gaza. Envoys from Qatar assessed hospitals, schools, and civilian centers, and established the foundation for future, lasting partnerships between Qatar and Gaza. Alze Al-Qahtani, one of the Qatari envoys, declared: "This is just the beginning..." In fact, Emir of Qatar visited Gaza in October 2012, promising 400 million dollars support to its people.

In response to the Israeli military attack on Gaza from the end of December 2008, the Free Gaza Movement made several attempts to reach Gaza, however, all were unsuccessful.

The eighth voyage was made in June-July 2009. On board were 21 journalists and human rights workers representing 11 different countries, including Nobel Laureate Mairead Maguire and former U.S. congresswoman and presidential candidate Cynthia McKinney. In addition to 3 tons medical aid, the passengers were carrying symbolic gifts to Gaza, including crayons, toys, 20 olive trees, and cement and copper wiring to wire 20 homes that had been destroyed during Israel's December/January operation.

In the early morning of June 30th, the Israeli Navy began attempting to intimidate the crew and passengers, threatening to open fire if they did not turn around. The Israeli Navy sent Zodiacs loaded with ten commandos who boarded and high-jacked the boat, detaining the 21 passengers. Despite having no diplomatic relations with Israel and refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Israel's government - the King of Bahrain personally and successfully intervened to force Israel to immediately release the five Bahraini prisoners kidnapped from the Spirit of Humanity. The Greek government formally intervened with Israel on movement’s behalf. Micheál Martin, Ireland's foreign minister, issued a statement calling both for the release of the prisoners as well as for an immediate end to the

continuing Israeli blockade of Gaza. Richard Falk, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the OPT, issued a formal statement calling the seizure of the ship "unlawful," and re-iterating the need to end the Israeli blockade. The British parliament scheduled a formal debate on Israel's unlawful abduction of our passengers. And Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, former prime minister of Malaysia, issued a statement calling on both the Israeli and American governments to release the prisoners and uphold international law by ending the Gaza siege.

The Free Gaza Movement brought many notable international personalities and human rights activists in solidarity with Gaza people who are imprisoned in Gaza, and advocated the situation of violation of human rights and human dignity through the media available to them, including mass media, internet, and blogs. Another characteristic of the Free Gaza Movement was the presence of Israelis both Jewish and Palestinians in the movement. Because Israelis rarely hear about the situation in Gaza from Israeli media, especially after the ban on Israelis to enter Gaza including journalists, it was an important first hand experience for them to see for themselves and tried to convey the message to fellow Israeli citizens.

Some of the Israeli human rights activists inspired by the Free Gaza Movement have attempted to bring their own boat to Gaza. However, as they were waiting for the boat to carry them and their humanitarian goods at Jaffa port, the boat that was supposed to take them to Gaza never reached the port. It was speculated that the driver of the boat had been threatened that his license will be taken away if he made this voyage and thus backed down in the last minute.668

6.3. The Mavi Marmara

The ninth voyage of Free Gaza Movement was a coordinated effort of “Coalition of Palestine Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load Flotilla Campaign” consisting of IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, The European Campaign to End the Siege of Gaza (ECESG), The Greek Ship to Gaza Campaign, The Swedish Ship to Gaza, The Free Gaza Movement and the International Committee to End the Siege on Gaza.669 It was a six-ship flotilla set to sail for the Gaza Strip with the intent to deliver 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and to break the Israeli blockade. In all, about 600 activists from 36 countries participated in the expedition, including approximately 11 Americans, some European parliamentarians, and Swedish writer Henning Mankell. There was even an Israeli Holocaust survivor and a member of Israeli Knesset on board. It included the Mavi

668 Interview with human rights activists.
Marmara, a former Istanbul passenger ferry owned by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation.

One of the passengers of the Mavi Marmara, Hanin Zuabi, a Palestinian-Israeli member of Knesset, told Haaretz before boarding the ship in Istanbul, that the “aid convoy...ruins the Israeli plan...to remove the issue of occupation and siege from the political agenda.” Her participation in this flotilla later drew huge media attention in Israel and condemnation from Israeli politicians and large parts of the public.

IHH is a Turkish humanitarian aid organization founded in 1995 that is said to have ties to the International Red Cross; holds special consultative status with the U.N. Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and operates in more than 100 countries.

Days before the approaching of the flotilla, Israel started a negative campaign against the flotilla especially of IHH. In an attempt to show that there is no humanitarian crisis, Israeli Government Press Office sent an e-mail on 26 May to members of the Foreign Press Association in Israel containing a guide to a luxurious restaurant in the Strip and a recently opened Olympic-sized pool.

IDF Col. Moshe Levi, Commander of the IDF’s Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration told the Jerusalem Post, that “this flotilla is a provocation that is not needed considering the humanitarian situation in Gaza, which is stable and good.” Levy said “100 trucks, loaded with supplies, enter Gaza on a daily basis, and that in the past two months over 1200 tons of medical supplies were transferred to the Strip.”

The Mavi Marmara Attack

On May 31, 2010, before dawn, when the ships were in international waters, Israeli navy zodiac boats intercepted them and naval commandos took over five ships, reportedly without incident. However, the Mavi Marmara resisted and commandos rappelled from helicopters onto that ship and were confronted by some passengers/activists. Nine passengers were killed, including eight Turks and a Turkish-American; 24 were injured, including one American, and 10 commandos were injured. The dead were members of or volunteers for IHH.

Meirab Michaeli, “MK Hanin Zuabi, are you afraid of what will happen to you when you return to Israel?”. Haaretz, 27 May 2010.


“IDF says it plans to stop Free Gaza Flotilla” Jerusalem Post, 27 May, 2010.

Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, Report of Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, February 2011, submitted by the Government of Turkey to the UN.
The IDF released videos showing that individuals attacking the commandos were armed with iron rods, knives, broken glass bottles, and sling shots, and equipped with gas masks, night vision goggles, and life vests. The IDF said that the passengers also seized a commando’s side arm.\textsuperscript{675}

All of the ships were taken to Ashdod, where the passengers were detained and the cargo was unloaded, inspected, and trucked to the Kerem Shalom border crossing between Israel and Gaza. By June 3, Israel had deported all the detainees, including all alleged perpetrators of the attacks on its military personnel, except for a few severely wounded who were repatriated a few days later.\textsuperscript{676}

Israel’s first official response was made by Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon at a Jerusalem press conference on Monday morning. Ayalon charged that the flotilla of ships on its way to Gaza "was an armada of hate and violence, in support of the Hamas terror organization was a premeditated and outrageous provocation" and its organizers had ties to Global Jihad, Al Qaida and Hamas. Ayalon also said, "[t]he organizers' intent was violent, their method was violent, and unfortunately, the result was violent."\textsuperscript{677}

But Israel appeared isolated at the UN Human Rights Council, where even its closest ally the United States said it expected a credible, transparent investigation into attack.

On his first address to nation after the flotilla incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended the Israeli Navy’s raid and declared that Israel would continue to blockade the Hamas-run Palestinian enclave, saying that "Iran is continuing to smuggle weapons into Gaza." He continued that "[t]he goal of the flotilla was to breach [the closure] and not to bring goods, as we would have allowed them to do," said Netanyahu. "If the blockade had been broken, dozens and hundreds more ships carrying weapons could have come."\textsuperscript{678} On the whole, the Israel public stood behind their leader.\textsuperscript{679}

6.4. International Reactions

The Turkish government, all political parties, and people were outraged by the Israeli attack. After the raid, mass demonstrations occurred in Ankara and Istanbul, and officials

\textsuperscript{675} Secretary-General's Panel on Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, on 11 February 2011 (Hereinafter Turkish Report).
\textsuperscript{676} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{677} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{679} AP “Netanyahu: World hypocritical for condemning Gaza flotilla raid” \textit{Haaretz}, 2 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{679} Yossi Verter “Rally round the leader”, \textit{Haaretz}, 10 Jun, 2010.
made repeated, dramatic, if not hyperbolic, statements about Israel’s actions. The Turkish Foreign Ministry first protested Israel’s use of force “in the strongest terms,” charging that “Israel has once again clearly demonstrated that it does not value human lives and peaceful initiatives through targeting innocent civilians.” The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered the recall of the country’s ambassador to Israel. Turkey called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council—on which it held a nonpermanent seat. Turkey also called for NATO permanent representatives in Brussels and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which it chairs, to meet on the issue. Erdogan further urged Israelis to question the actions of their government.

The UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, condemned the violence and called for an investigation. The UN Security Council has called for an impartial investigation into Israel’s assault on a flotilla and called for the immediate release of hundreds of civilians held after the raid. Separately, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted to launch an independent, international inquiry into the events, although the United States voted against it. On June 1, a compromise Statement by the President of the Security Council at the U.N. called for a “prompt, impartial, credible, and transparent investigation conforming to international standards.” In addition, the council reiterated its “grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Gaza” and called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and expressed support for the ongoing proximity talks (that were being mediated by U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell).

The British Prime Minister, David Cameron, described the assault as "unacceptable". In a telephone conversation with Netanyahu he insisted that Britain remained committed to Israel’s security, but called for a "constructive" response to "legitimate criticism" of its actions. The foreign secretary, William Hague, issued a statement "deploring" the loss of life. “There is a clear need for Israel to act with restraint and in line with international obligations,” he said.

The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, described the storming of the flotilla as a "massacre" and called for three days of national mourning.

---


681 Harriet Sherwood and Matthew Weaver, “UN calls for inquiry into Israel flotilla attack” The Guardian, 1 June, 2010.

682 Afro Middle Eastern Center, “Erdogan delivers ferocious speech to Turkish parliament after Israel’s flotilla raid”, 2 June 2010.


686 Ibid.

687 Ibid.
6.5. Fact Finding Missions

6.5.1. UN Human Rights Council fact finding mission

On 23 July 2010, the President of the Human Rights Council appointed Judge Karl T. Hudson-Phillips, Q.C., retired Judge of the International Criminal Court and former Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, to be Chairman and to head the Fact-finding Mission. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the HRC advised in writing at the end of the meeting that the position of his government was one of non-recognition of and non-cooperation with the Mission. The fact-finding mission conducted interviews with more than 100 witnesses in Geneva, London, Istanbul and Amman.

The report concluded that a humanitarian crisis existed on the 31 May 2010 in Gaza and that for this reason alone the blockade was unlawful and could not be sustained in law. It also stated that the State of Israel is entitled to peace and security like any other. The firing of rockets and other munitions of war into Israeli territory from Gaza constitutes serious violations of international and international humanitarian law. But actions in response which constitutes collective punishment of the civilian population in Gaza were not lawful in the present or any circumstances. Based on this conclusion the action of the IDF in intercepting the Mavi Marmara in the circumstances and for the reasons given on the high sea was clearly unlawful.

The report also states that a distinction should be made between activities taken to alleviate crises and action to address the causes creating the crisis. The latter action is characterized as political action and therefore inappropriate for groups that wish to be classified as humanitarian. An examination should be made to clearly define humanitarianism as distinct from humanitarian action so that there can be an agreed form of intervention and jurisdiction when humanitarian crises occur.

6.5.2. Israeli National Commission of Inquiry – The Turkel Commission


689 Ibid., para.263.

690 Ibid., para.262.

691 Ibid., para.277.
While international criticism was mounting, Israel's cabinet approved plans for an internal investigation to examine whether Israel's Gaza blockade and the interception of the flotilla conformed with international law. The inquiry was headed by Yaakov Turkel, a former Israeli supreme court judge. The foreign observers are the former Northern Ireland first minister David Trimble and a Canadian judge, Ken Watkin. The inquiry fell short of a UN proposal for an international investigation, but was agreed upon after consultation with the US. The White House welcomed the decision as “an important step forward in proposing an independent public commission to investigate the circumstances of the recent tragic events on board the flotilla headed for Gaza.”

The Commission documented testimonies taken from 38 combat and other IDF personnel who were directly involved in the events, and extensive additional material documenting the various aspects of the incident was received. Following this, additional supplementary inquiries were carried out, in which twenty additional personnel provided written testimony. In addition, the representatives of three Israeli human rights organizations and two Israeli nationals who participated in the flotilla were invited to testify, and did so, before the Commission.

Commission reached conclusion that imposition and enforcement of the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip does not constitute ‘collective punishment’ of the population of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli armed forces' interception and capture of the Gaza Flotilla vessels in international waters was in conformity with customary international humanitarian law. The report claims that the IHH activists carried out the violence on board the Mavi Marmara by arming themselves with a wide array of weapons and the IHH activists lost the protection of their civilian status for such time as they directly participated in the hostilities.

6.5.3. The Turkish National Commission of Inquiry

The Government of Turkey established Turkish National Commission of Inquiry. The Turkish Interim Report concluded the Israeli attack on the humanitarian aid convoy in international waters constitutes a violation of freedom of navigation and safety of

---


694 Ibid., p.111.

695 Ibid., p.278.

696 Ibid., p.278
navigation on the high seas a long-standing rule of customary international law, and Israeli blockade is illegal and any interdiction based on such blockade is unlawful for Israel remains the occupying power in the Gaza Strip and as a result, any imposition of a naval blockade of the territory of the Gaza Strip is a legal nullity: a State cannot, by definition, blockade the borders of territory it occupies. The report also stated Israel must acknowledge its responsibility and accordingly express public apology and provide compensation for all damages and losses resulting from its unlawful attack.

6.5.4. Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry

The Panel found that the naval blockade was imposed as a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea and its implementation complied with the requirements of international law, however, Israel’s decision to board the vessels with such substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone and with no final warning immediately prior to the boarding was excessive and unreasonable and the loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force by Israeli forces during the take-over of the Mavi Marmara was unacceptable. And in order to avoid similar incidents in the future, the Panel recommended that Israel should continue with its efforts to ease its restrictions on movement of goods and persons to and from Gaza with a view to lifting its closure and to alleviate the unsustainable humanitarian and economic situation of the civilian population. Panel also found that all humanitarian missions wishing to assist the Gaza population should do so through established procedures and the designated land crossings in consultation with the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Finally the Panel found that an appropriate statement of regret should be made by Israel and that Israel should offer payment for the benefit of the deceased and injured victims and their families.

6.6. International Pressure to Easing of Gaza Blockade

6.6.1. Deterioration of Relationship between Israel and Turkey

The flotilla affair caused a steep decline in Israel-Turkish relations. Officials in Ankara

697 Turkish Interim Report, p. 6.
698 Ibid., p.6.
699 Ibid., p.69.
701 Ibid.
demanded an official Israeli apology, along with compensation payments meted to families of the casualties. Israel did not assent to these demands. Various cooperative exercise and activities between armies and security industries from the two countries were suspended.

The Turkish-Israeli friendship was fostered in the 1990s when their bilateral relations improved in tandem with Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and when both governments viewed Syria, then their common neighbor, as an adversary. Cordiality was aided by the Turkish military’s appreciation of Israeli arms for use in the fight with Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgents. Joint military exercises became routine. Surprising to some, relations did not deteriorate when the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamist roots, came to power in 2002. Prime Minister Erdogan visited Israel and Israeli President Shimon Peres addressed the Turkish parliament. Israel trusted Ankara enough to allow it to mediate indirect peace talks with Syria in 2008.702

However, Israel’s suspicions of the AKP may have been sparked when the party hosted Hamas Politburo Chief Khalid Mish‘al in 2006, after the Palestinian Authority legislative elections. Turkish officials repeatedly refer to Hamas as a democratically elected group that was denied the chance to govern, and call on the international community to engage Hamas. Moreover, Israel is aware of Turkey’s close relations with Iran, its defense of that country’s right to develop nuclear energy, and its charge that the international community uses a double standard when it fails to castigate Israel for its nuclear weapons. Erdogan and other Turkish officials almost always refer to Israel’s nuclear weapons when countering international concern about the possibility that Iran seeks such weapons. In other words, a gap has been widening between the two erstwhile friends.703

Bilateral relations have been deteriorating rapidly since Israel’s military campaign against Hamas from December 2008 to January 2009. Prime Minister Erdogan has said that he was insulted that then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had failed to inform him of the anticipated offensive while in Turkey for consultations regarding the Turkish-mediated Israeli-Syrian peace talks just days before launching the offensive.704 In January 2009, Erdogan took offense at President Peres’s defense of Operation Cast Lead at the World Economic Forum and stormed off the stage.

After Israel’s raid on the flotilla, Turkey recalled its ambassador from Israel and cancelled three joint military drills, cooperation in the fields of energy and water, and soccer matches. It also is demanding that Israel apologize and compensate the victims. Foreign Minister Davutoglu says that relations will not improve until the results of an international

---

703 Ibid., p.13.
704 Ibid., p.13.
probe of the Israeli raid are implemented and Israel lifts the siege of Gaza.\footnote{Marc Champion, “Turkey Lashes out at Israel and Denounces ‘Massacre’,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, June 2, 2010.}

6.6.2 Mounting International and US Pressure to ease the blockade of Gaza

Since the flotilla assault, world attention shifted to Israel’s blockade of Gaza and an international consensus emerged that something had to be done to lift or ease the blockade. The United States was caught between two long-time allies—Israel and Turkey—and the Obama Administration seemed to be interested in finding a path between them. Hence, the Obama administration held extensive consultations with Israel and Turkey in order to defuse mounting tensions between them.

The Administration likely did not want its reaction to the flotilla incident to further disrupt what has become an uneasy bilateral relationship with Israel because it needed a better relationship with the Netanyahu government to make progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, which U.S. officials believe to be in America’s national security interests. At the same time, the Administration needed to consider its desire for Turkey’s support in the Security Council for sanctions against Iran.\footnote{Migdalovitz 2010, p.10.}

President Obama described the situation in Gaza as “unsustainable.” He stated “we agree that Israelis have the right to prevent arms from entering into Gaza that can be used to launch attacks into Israeli territory. But … it is important for us to explore new mechanisms so that we can have goods and services, and economic development, and the ability of people to start their own businesses, and to grow the economy and provide opportunity within Gaza.” He added, “there should be ways of focusing narrowly on arms shipments, rather than focusing in a blanket way on stopping everything and then in a piecemeal way allowing things into Gaza.”\footnote{Remarks by President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority after Meeting, June 9, 2010, <http://www.whithouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-abb as-palestinian-authority-aftermeeting>}

Amr Moussa, the secretary general of the Arab League, arrived in Gaza in the most high-profile visit by an Arab official since Hamas took control of the territory in June 2007, after winning elections six months earlier. Moussa told a press conference in Rafah: “The Palestinians deserve that the world, and not just the Arab world, stand by them in the face of the siege and in the face of what is happening in the occupied territories and Jerusalem.”\footnote{Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli cabinet approves internal inquiry into Gaza flotilla raid” \textit{The Guardian}, 14 June, 2010.}
On June 14, the Council of European Union stated that the situation in Gaza remains unsustainable. The continued policy of closure is unacceptable and politically counterproductive. The EU called for an urgent and fundamental change of policy leading to a durable solution to the situation in Gaza. The Council deplores the continuing acts of rocket fire and called for release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.\(^{709}\)

6.6.3. Easing of the Blockade

On June 20, the Prime Minister’s Office announced the package of easing measures intended ‘to provide relief to the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, while preventing the entry of weapons and other materials that can be used to harm the citizens of Israel’. The four main components of this package were: the relaxation of import restrictions; the gradual approval of building projects funded by certain international organizations; the expansion of the capacity of commercial crossings (Kerem Shalom and Karni points); and the ‘streamlining’ of the permit policy regarding movement of people to and from Gaza.\(^{710}\)

The White House responded, “Once implemented, we believe these arrangements should significantly improve conditions for Palestinians in Gaza, while preventing the entry of weapons.” It also wanted to “explore additional ways to improve the situation in Gaza, including freedom of movement and commerce between Gaza and the West Bank.”\(^{711}\)

Some PA officials are concerned that efforts to lift the blockade will lead to a more autonomous Gaza Strip that is permanently separated from the West Bank. Such concerns may have animated Prime Minister Fayyad’s suggestion, also proposed by Tony Blair and others, to reinstate the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, which called, *inter alia*, for the Rafah border crossing to operate with EU monitors and Israeli surveillance as well as for a link between Gaza and the West Bank.\(^{712}\) The EU Border Assistance Mission (EU-BAM) operated until suspended when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. Its revival would be a way for the PA to reestablish its forces at the border.

A follow-up announcement issued two weeks later, presented two lists of goods that were classified by Israel as ‘dual civil-military use’ items, the import of which would remain restricted.\(^{713}\) One of the lists contained an expanded version of the internationally-


\(^{712}\) For text of Agreement, see <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+documents+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm>

recognized catalog of ‘dual use’ goods.\textsuperscript{714} The other list included a wide range of basic construction materials (cement, gravel, steel bars, concrete blocks and asphalt, among others), which are not considered ‘dual use’ by Israeli legislation or by any international standard. Under the new regime, any item not included in either of these lists would be allowed into Gaza, subject only to prior coordination with the crossings’ authorities.\textsuperscript{715}

On the logistics side, Israel committed to immediately expand the import capacity of the Kerem Shalom Crossing from 90 to 250 truckloads a day, five days a week, and of the conveyor belt at Karni Crossing, which was used for the transfer of bulk items (aggregates and grains), from 80 to 120 truckloads a day, twice a week. Israel also committed, subject to security considerations, to open additional land crossings when additional capacity becomes necessary.

On 8 December 2010, the Government of Israel announced that in order to further assist the economy of Gaza it would allow the export of agriculture, furniture and textile products, ‘subject to security and logistical preparations at the Kerem Shalom crossing’.\textsuperscript{716}

Shortly after the \textit{Marmara} incident Egypt announced the opening of the Rafah crossing “indefinitely,” although it only allowed travelers with special permits and continued to restrict potentially dual use goods.

The easing of import restrictions triggered a significant increase in the volume and variety of goods entering Gaza, as well as a decline in the prices of some products. Overall, in the second half of 2010, the monthly average of truckloads entering Gaza increased by 66 percent, compared to the first half but represented just 35 percent of the equivalent figure during the first five months of 2007, before the imposition of the blockade. Moreover, the share of non-food items among all imports continued to be disproportionately low, ranging between 40 and 50 percent, compared to over 80 percent before the imposition of the blockade.\textsuperscript{717}

The relaxation of the blockade also entailed the approval of over 100 projects funded by international organizations to improve the quality of extremely deteriorated water and sanitation, education and health services. UNRWA, for example, the largest UN implementing agency, received as of 2011 approval for 43 such projects, which are worth approximately 11 percent of the cost of its entire work plan for Gaza. \textsuperscript{718} The

\textsuperscript{714} Also known as the “Wassenaar Arrangement”. The list issued by Israel contains 56 items that were previously included in the “Directive on Defense Export Control”, issued in 2008 by the Israeli Ministry of Defense.


\textsuperscript{716} Ibid., p.4.

\textsuperscript{717} Ibid., p.5.

\textsuperscript{718} Ibid., p.2.
implementation of these projects has been slowed down and expenses increased due to a multi-layered system of approvals regulating the entry of each individual consignment of materials. This has been compounded by the recurrent disruptions in the supply of construction aggregates, due to the limited opening of the single relevant crossing (Karni). Therefore, while the potential benefit of these projects, once implemented, is significant, due to the recurrent delays in implementation, the population has so far experienced only very limited improvement in the quality of services.\textsuperscript{719}

A UNOCHA report concludes that while the recent relaxation measures constituted a step in the right direction, to comply with the abovementioned legal obligations Israel must fully lift the blockade. This includes a removal of restrictions on the import of construction materials and the exports of goods, as well as a lifting of the general ban on the movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank via Israel. Additionally, Israel must remove to the fullest extent possible the current restrictions on the access of people to areas in the vicinity of the perimeter fence and to sea waters along Gaza’s coast. When resorting to the use of force, it must ensure that civilians and civilian objects are not targeted, and that all necessary measures are adopted to prevent or minimize the negative effect of attacks on the civilian population and its property.\textsuperscript{720}

6.6.4. Changes in World Perception

Many in Israel see the action taken by Israel in relation to the attack on the flotilla as a PR disaster rather than the problem of the act itself or its treatment of people of Gaza. In a long-awaited special report published on 13 June, 2012, State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss criticized the way both the prime minister and defense minister made decisions in the run-up to the May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident. The report sharply criticizes as 'unsystematic' the decision-making processes at the most senior political levels, particularly by Prime Minister Netanyahu in the period preceding the flotilla's arrival in Israeli waters and that severely damaged Israel's relations with Turkey and caused a wave of international condemnation of Israel's handling of the event. The report includes a special chapter on failures in public diplomacy and public relations before, during and immediately after the flotilla incident, which caused considerable damage to Israel's international image.\textsuperscript{721}

An Israeli think tank, the Reut Institute, analyzed the incident found that “Israel is not considered to be genuinely striving for peace, consistently and honestly committed to ending

\textsuperscript{719} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{720} Ibid., p.22.
control over the Palestinians, or concerned with alleviating the humanitarian situation in Gaza. This perception of Israel erodes Israel's political firewall.\textsuperscript{722}

Whether the PR campaign was a failure or not, Mavi Marmara has concentrated already mounting criticism on how Israel uses excessive force against Palestinians as well as humanitarian and peace activists. Not only did the incident brought criticism from around the world including the USA to lift or ease the blockade on Gaza, it also accelerated the efforts in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel. Hollywood actors such as Meg Ryan and Dustin Hoffman backed out of attending that year’s annual Jerusalem Film Festival following the international outcry over Israel’s attack on a Turkish-led flotilla.\textsuperscript{723}

**Flotillas Still to Come.**

The Mavi Marmara incident did not stop more ships from attempting to sail to Gaza and the Free Gaza movement prepared the tenth voyage in July 2011 although the ships were prevented by Greece from leaving port. In reaction, the movement criticizes that Israel and the U.S. outsourced Israel's occupation of Gaza to Greece.\textsuperscript{724}

One notable yacht sailed for Gaza from Cyprus on 26 September 2010, carrying nine Jewish activists from Israel, Germany, the US and Britain organized by Jews for Justice for Palestinians, a network of Jews who are British or live in Britain. They oppose Israeli policies that undermine the livelihoods, and human, civil and political rights of the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{725} Jews for Justice for Palestinians is supported by Marion Kozak, the mother of the Labour leader, Ed Miliband.\textsuperscript{726}

Richard Kuper, of Jews for Justice for Palestinians, said the activists on the yacht were not seeking to support Hamas, but to send a message that Gaza’s civilians should not be punished for the actions of their rulers. The voyage was a “symbolic statement” intended to draw attention to what he called Israel’s “illegal, unnecessary and inhumane” blockade of Gaza.\textsuperscript{727}

Rami Elhanan, an Israeli passenger whose daughter Smadar was killed in a suicide bombing at a shopping mall in Jerusalem in 1997, said it was his “moral duty” to act in support of Palestinians in Gaza because reconciliation was the surest path to peace.

---

\textsuperscript{722} Reut Institute, “The Gaza Flotilla: A Collapse of Israel's Political Firewall Case Study”, August 2010.

\textsuperscript{723} Ruth Eglash “Hollywood stars snub film festival” Jpost, 7 July 2010.

\textsuperscript{724} Free Gaza Movement website


\textsuperscript{727} AP in Cyprus, “Jewish activists set sail for Gaza planning to break blockade”, The Guardian, 26 September, 2010.
Elhanan said, “Those 1.5 million people in Gaza are victims exactly as I am.”

Two days later, the boat was diverted to the nearby port of Ashdod.

6.7. Summary

The humanitarian situation in Gaza was repeatedly cited by the international aid community since early 2000. Israeli organizations, and a number of journalists, offered the public (including diplomats) exact details about the siege in weekly reports on user-friendly Internet sites, in eyewitness reports from the field and petitions to the courts. But according to Hass, the right to provide the public with information, which is honored in Israel, does not entail the need that the public will know. Thus, the official stand (mainly that “in effect, Gaza is no longer under siege”) keep gaining strength.

The Free Gaza movement that started in 2006 by internationals concerned with the humanitarian situation in Gaza, in coordination with community based organizations there. The movement’s first five voyages successfully reached the shores of Gaza bringing humanitarian goods and over 100 passengers most of them human rights activists and peace activists and some internationally renowned personnel as well as some Israeli citizens, both Jews and Arabs. The movement was steady growing and the passengers became voices of the people trapped inside Gaza.

The Free Gaza Movement’s efforts to reach Gaza since the start of the “Cast Lead” all failed, due to the fact that Israeli navy interception remained in force. However, Israeli interception, especially to the eighth voyage made in June 29 to July 7, 2009, helped raise awareness of the Gaza crisis all over the world, and resulted in the international community intervening with Israel on the movement’s behalf in releasing passengers held in Israeli prisons.

One year later, the Free Gaza Movement was joined by several other campaigns Europeans and the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation of Turkey, and the voyage consisted of six-ship flotilla with over 600 passengers and 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid. Israeli interception of Mavi Marmara resulted death of nine Turkey citizens.

The death of nine Turkish citizens by the Israeli Navy threatened the relationship not only between Israel and Turkey, but the balance of relationship between U.S. and its important allies Israel and Turkey. The flotilla incident has forced the U.S. to play a huge role in pressuring Israel to investigate the incident. The International community, including the U.S. for the first time condemned the blockade as “unsustainable” and urged Israel to ease it. And Israel did ease the blockade.

728 Ibid.
729 Amira Hass, “The palace lie on Gaza”, Haaretz, 11 October, 2010
By applying to Lederach’s Actors and Approaches, the Free Gaza movement can be said as a case where internationals were able to coordinate and to involve various actors in the international, Palestine and Israel communities to optimize the effect.

In the international community: the movement was initiated by peace and human rights activists from the international community, in coordination with Palestinian organizations. The make-up of international activists was wide in range from grassroots to top-level – it included peace and human rights activists, former holocaust survivor, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, politicians and former politicians. The Mavi Marmara incident involved decisions by top leaders in the United Nations Security Council, from Turkish government, Israeli government, and the United States government.

In Palestine, various local NGOs supported and helped coordinate the movement’s activities in Gaza. The human rights organizations constantly provided human rights and humanitarian situation analysis to internationals.

In Israel, on the grassroots level, some of its citizens were involved in the formation of the movement. In the middle-level leadership, the human rights organizations have been reporting on the human rights conditions in Gaza and helped the UN fact finding mission in gathering the data. Some Israeli politicians also participated in the voyage, which enhanced media coverage of the event and public discourse. The top-level leadership was forced to make policy change with regards to Gaza blockade under the international pressure, especially of the U.S.

The impacts of the movement are assessed as follows according to the criteria set forth in the beginning of this study.

1) Impact on resolution of conflict: the movement brought about an international understanding that Gaza and the West Bank is an integral part of Palestine and Gaza blockade is not “sustainable.” The U.S. requested Israel to explore the additional ways to improve the situation in Gaza, including freedom of movement and commerce between Gaza and the West Bank.

2) Impact on the process of peacemaking: Israel announced the package of easing measures to Gaza. Egypt opened the Rafah border.

3) Impact on defining the conflict: introduced human rights issue as a just reason for internationals to intervene in the policy of the party to the conflict. It also challenged the notion that one cannot make peace while one side is placed under blockade and suffering dire humanitarian conditions.
Chapter 7: Case Study · Women and Peacebuilding

Women of Israel have always been the majority of participants in peace movements. Many have formed women’s peace groups that are often unique and creative in their approach. Women of Palestine also have always been the major player in providing social assistance to its people and empowering women and have played a crucial role especially during the first Intifada.

However, in both societies, the continuing conflict and occupation kept issues of women at the periphery secondary to national and collective debate, although women were the most affected by the conflict and occupation. Women in both societies share their burden because of the militarization\(^{730}\) of society, traditional patriarchy, and violence against them.

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution1325, calling parties in a conflict to respect women’s rights and to support their participation in peace negotiations and in post conflict reconstruction. Women are expected to play a larger role in making and building peace in conflict areas, and national and international communities are to support these efforts by women.

This chapter will examine current efforts of Israeli and Palestinian women in peacebuilding and whether and how UNSCR 1325 is effective in supporting these women.

7.1. Israeli Women in Action

Since 1980s women became the majority of participants in peace movements, and some women groups started to form. After the second Intifada, women activism were rejuvenated and resulted in forming new groups and coalitions, as well as reviving old ones.

Ever since Women in Black began its first vigil in January 1988, women’s peace activism in Israel has been varied, progressive, and courageous. They engaged in a wide variety of activities – conferences, lectures, marches, bringing food and medicine to refugee camps, street theatre, dialogue groups, and seemingly endless series of vigils. They took radical positions well before the mixed-gender groups did, from ‘the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’ to ‘Jerusalem must be a shared capital.’ Some of them are courageous in challenging social taboos that women should stay away from stating opinions publicly related to peace and security.

\(^{730}\) Militarization has been described by Cynthia Enloe as “the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria.” Cynthia Enloe 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.292.
**Women in Black**

Women in Black officially was disbanded in 1993 with the start of Oslo Peace Process, however, it made a come-back with the start of the second Intifada. Women wearing black clothes continue to stand in city centers around Israel, protesting the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence, and preventing the issues from being swept under the national rug. Opposition to the occupation was itself two-fold: to decry the oppression of the Palestinian people and at the same time to warn against the concomitant moral corruption of Israeli society.\footnote{Sara Helman 2001. “Citizenship Regime, Identity and Peace Protest in Israel.” In Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari and Zeev Rosenhek, eds. *Military, State, and Society in Israel.* News Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. pp. 295-320. p.312.}

Women in Black never defined itself as a feminist movement, however, during the vigil years feminists consciousness was raised. The growing feminism of participants in the Women in Black vigil was not coincidental. In peace activist Svirsky's view, the following elements raised the feminist consciousness of participants in the Women in Black vigils: First, the sexual and gender-oriented curses directed at them helped alert women to the fact that women were being attacked not only for their political views, but for holding views at all. A strong woman or one with a political opinion was equated to a whore. Second, the fact that the Women in Black vigil was virtually ignored by the media, while smaller and less interesting mixed demonstrations were garnering media attention, was another wake-up call. Third, the formats, structures, and principles of the Women in Black movement (the vigil, nonviolence, non-hierarchy, consensus decision-making, etc.) were not only comfortable for women, but were preferred to that of mixed-gender peace groups. Fourth, inevitably, the women were making the connection between war and the oppression of women. Some of the feminists among the members helped them notice this. Take Nabila Espanioly and Dalia Sachs from the Haifa vigil: “War creates and legitimized the norms of discrimination and oppression of women and other minorities in the personal, political and societal levels. For women on all sides, this is not victory. We pay the price.”\footnote{Nabila Espaioly and Dalia Sachs, “Peace Process: Israeli and Palestinian Women,” *Bridges*, Vol.2, No.2, Fall 1991, pp.112-119. Cited in Svirsky 2006.} Fifth, many women were appalled by the militarism of the Peace Now message.\footnote{Gila Svirsky 2000. “The Impact of Women in Black in Israel.” in Marguerite R. Waller and Jennifer Rycenga eds. *Frontline Feminism: Women, War, and Resistance.* New York and London: Garland Publishing. pp.235-246, p.238.}

**Profile Hadash (New Profile)**

Profile Hadash (New Profile) is a women-based (yet not exclusively female) organization established in 1998 with the aim of demilitarizing Israeli society. According to this group’s interpretation, Israeli society has been controlled by militaristically minded
men for too long to enable the emergence of a proper civil society in which women and people who do not share the militaristic ethos or experience can make their voices heard. The focal proactive element in the group’s activity was its support for individual choice about whether to join the army, without going into the question of which grounds for refusal are justified and which are not.\footnote{New Profile Annual Report 2007.}

New Profile is expanding its activities. It conducts seminars on Gender and Militarism, focusing on a wider analysis of the cultural and gender contexts in which militarization takes place, gender awareness as a mindset for effective resistance to war and injustice, and the continued marginalization of women in movements of conscientious objectors to military services around the world.\footnote{Ibid.}

Another project is a joint one with the other organization, Zochrot, and to provide opportunity to learn about the Palestinian 
\textit{Naqba} and how the inhabitants of Arab villages were driven out of their homes in 1948.\footnote{Ibid.} New Profile’s Annual Report of 2007 states, “We are witness to a new public discourse which questions many of the basic myths of Zionism, reflects on the Naqba and critically considers 60 years of nationhood. We contend that Jewish Israelis are currently undergoing an identity crisis. A harsh experience for many, there is a desperate need for new voices and new ideas, in order to deal with demise of the old myths of social solidarity, and of the strong alliance between people and state brokered, largely, by the military and achieved through military service”.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP)}

The Israeli women’s peace movement was united as the Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) in November 2000 with the following founding principals: the struggle to end the occupation on the basis of two states for two peoples, Jerusalem as two capitals for two states, a just solution to the refugee problem based on UN resolutions, involvement of women in peace negotiations, reducing Israel’s militarism, social and economic justice for all, equal citizenship of the Palestinian citizens and integration of Israel into the Middle East.\footnote{Ibid.} They organized the largest rally of 2,000 people for a just peace that has been held since the outbreak of the Intifada in September, and that was a joint Israeli-Palestinian event. Women came in droves from all over Israel – Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Druze. At the Notre Dame conference center located on the border of Jewish and Palestinian Jerusalem, the wall displayed two huge banners in Hebrew and Arabic: Women Demand: No to occupation – Yes to a just peace! From the conference center, they moved to Hagar

\footnote{The original name was the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace, in time the name was shortened to the Coalition of Women for Peace.}
Plaza, the location of Jerusalem’s Women in Black vigil, and women filled the entire plaza and spilled over on to the side streets carrying the traditional black signs with “End the Occupation” painted in Hebrew, Arabic and English.739

On 4 February 2001, women held civil disobedience action in front of Israel’s Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. About 500 women dressed in black and donned black “sandwich boards” with the word ‘Closure’ painted in white in three languages (Hebrew, Arabic, and English) completely blocked all passage of cars with a solid block of ‘Closure’ signs preventing the drivers from advancing. This was intended as a small representation of what the Palestinians experience every day – being blocked entry and exit from their towns and villages.740 Police came and dragged women to the sides, but women returned to the road again and again for about one hour. Twelve women were held in the police station until bailed out next morning.741

According to Svirsky, participating in non-violent civil disobedience has been empowering to women. They “seem to get a surge of energy from defying the authority in the name of morality and justice, thereby placing themselves squarely in the noble tradition of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela. We end up being women who are not only bold and vibrant, but are actually starting a revolution.”742

The Coalition also demonstrated its solidarity with Israel’s Palestinian citizens: a mass rally in Wadi Ara was held on 21 November 2000, demanding equality for Israel’s Palestinian citizens after thirteen were killed by the Israeli police in October 2000; and participating in the large rally on Palestinian Land Day on 30 March 2001 in the Palestinian town of Sakhnin in the north of Israel. On International Women’s Day on 8 March 2001 activists marched through Jaffa demanding women’s rights and explaining the connection between the oppression of women and the occupation.743

The Coalition has initiated several major initiatives in recent years: a campaign to end the siege of Gaza; mass demonstrations against the Second Lebanon War and against the Israeli assault on Gaza; protesting sexual violence by Israeli officials in the government and military; and local and international campaigns demanding accountability for war crimes committed by Israel.744

The Coalition is working to promote its unique initiatives such as “Who Profits from the Occupation” project, launched in 2007, which investigates the involvement of Israeli and

740 Ibid., p.240.
741 Ibid., p.240.
742 Ibid., p.247.
743 Ibid., p.246.
744 The Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) website: <http://www.coalitionofwomen.org/?lang=en>
international corporations in the occupation.\textsuperscript{745} “Who Profits from the Occupation” project has some success, as seen in Ahava case.

One of Israel’s best known brands overseas, Ahava makes skin care products derived from Dead Sea mud and mineral-based compounds from Dead Sea. Abigail Disney, the granddaughter of Roy O. Disney, who co-founded the Walt Disney Company with his brother Walt, said in 2012 that she is renouncing her share of the family’s profits in Ahava, through Shamrock Holdings founded by Roy E. Disney in 1978 which had 17 percent stake in Ahava since 2008, saying “recent evidence from the Israeli Civil Administration documents that Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories sources mud used in its products from the Occupied shores of the Dead Sea, which is in direct contravention to provisions in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention forbidding exploitation of occupied natural resources.”\textsuperscript{746} Disney’s reference to “evidence from the Israeli Civil Administration” relates to a letter received from the Civil Administration by the “Who Profits from the Occupation” research project, which confirmed that the military government had issued a permit to Ahava allowing it to take mud from the area adjacent to the Dead Sea captured by Israel in 1967.\textsuperscript{747} Disney said she will donate the profits and a sum equal to the worth of her share to “organizations working to end this illegal exploitation.”\textsuperscript{748}

Disney was part of the team that produced a five-part series for the U.S. Public Broadcasting Service called “Women, War and Peace,” which was aired in 2011. The series deals with the changes in war theaters since the end of the Cold War, on the one hand, and on the other with the role of women in war-torn societies that are struggling for peace, in countries like Bosnia, Afghanistan, Columbia and Liberia. In the details given to the media about the series’ creators, it said “[Disney’s] longtime passion for women’s issues and peacebuilding led her to producing these films.”\textsuperscript{749}

Another initiative is FORA: Russian-speaking Activists Forum, where migrant women are working to change attitudes in the Russian speaking community in Israel. In time, CWP has acquired a central status in the peace movement and became a prominent voice in the struggle for social change.\textsuperscript{750}

The record of the Coalition is quite impressive both as a peace organization and as a women’s organization, a situation in which they attempt to overcome what is referred to in sociology as ‘double marginality.’\textsuperscript{751} Even during the bloodiest phases of the intifada, it

\textsuperscript{745} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{746} Amira Hass, “Disney family member renounces her investments in Israel’s Ahava Cosmetics.” \textit{Haaretz}, 16 July, 2012
\textsuperscript{747} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{748} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{749} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{750} The Coalition of Women for Peace (CWP) website.
\textsuperscript{751} Hermann 2009, p.200.
managed to maintain some relations with its Palestinian counterparts in the Palestinian territories at a time when many other Israeli peace organizations lost theirs. Also, the Coalition succeeded in establishing a nonhierarchical and fairly, although not totally, harmonious work routine, a remarkable achievement considering the highly opinionated character of the figures involved and the variety of agendas that the different participating organizations brought with them.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.200.}

**Machsom Watch**

Machsom Watch is an organization of female volunteers, which began in 2001 with the monitoring of physical and administrative checkpoints on the West Bank, has developed various areas of expertise: travel bans for security reasons, the military courts, police fines, permits for reasons of health, restrictions in the Jordan Valley and more.\footnote{Yehudit Kirstein Keshet 2006. \textit{Checkpoint Watch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine.} London, New York: Zed Books.}

Initially, the women started to stand at checkpoints where soldiers could see them in order to prevent soldiers from humiliating Palestinians. Its initial stated goals according to one of the founders Keshet was: to monitor the behavior of soldiers and border policemen at checkpoints; to ensure the protection of the human and civil rights of Palestinians attempting to enter Israel and travelling within the West Bank; and to bear witness from observations and report findings to the widest possible audience from the decision-making political and military levels to the general public in Israel and abroad, including media coverage.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.36.}

The reason they selected checkpoints is because they served no real security purpose but were rather a means of control, harassment and humiliation for those wishing to cross them.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.35.} According to Keshet, the abuses at checkpoints are not isolated cases by individual miscreants: they are a part of a system which in itself deliberately abusive. “More than any other aspect of the Occupation, checkpoints symbolized the absolute power of the Israeli state over the Palestinians. Checkpoints not only physically control mobility, time and space, but also determine, or rather deny, the boundaries of Palestinian national autonomy, for individuals and the collective alike. Machsom Watch by its civilian, humanitarian, and political presence challenges that absolute power.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.150.}

Machsom Watch is an all-women’s activity. The three founders, coming from activism in the women’s movement, had a definite agenda, part of which was to challenge military assumptions and practices by means of their civilian presence at the checkpoints. This was not an essentialist claim for women as peace-makers, but rather the intention to take

---

agency in a male-dominated area. An incidental outcome of Machsom Watch’s activity has been the empowerment that came from that agency. Watchers have acquired a voice and expertise countering that of the military. For some women it is the voice of the resistance, for some protest, for others a reaffirmation of humanitarian concerns.\textsuperscript{757}

Although its activity directly challenges the dominant militaristic-macho discourse that prevails in Israeli society, many of Machsom Watch members, which had grown to 500 by 2004, do not hold strong feminist or anti-militaristic ideology. They encompass a wide spectrum of ages and backgrounds, although with a definite bias towards Ashkenazi, middle-aged, professional, and secular women. Their party identification, if they have any, is diverse from the center parties to the far left. Within this continuum, the group is politically pluralistic and puts forward a wide ideational framework of opposition to the occupation and a commitment to human rights.\textsuperscript{758}

Partly because most women participating in Machsom Watch activities are not classic political protests, because they are basically ideological mainstreamers and well integrated into the Jewish Israeli sociodemographic center, their activities today are fairly consensual, much more so than when they began to operate, and their voice is often heard in mainstream media. It seems that they have succeeded in delivering their message better than other peace organizations. Apparently, Machsom Wath managed to perforate the curtain of silence and to influence public discourse about the checkpoints and the closures.\textsuperscript{759}

Machsom Watch has had significant influence in appealing to the Israeli military courts on behalf of Palestinians and by January 2012, they helped some 5,000 people through the appeals process. The justification of "security prevention" evaporated for 35 percent of the cases already in the initial legal stages.\textsuperscript{760} Recently, Machsom Watch also added tours to the West Bank, in Area C under Israeli military control, conducted in both Hebrew and English, targeting both Israelis and internationals.

**Inspiring Individuals**

Women’s peace actions are not limited to groups or organizations. Some individuals are defiant and have taken courageous, sometimes, illegal (under Israel law) actions, which are inspiring to many others.

**Neta Golan**, a member of the Coalition, is an Israeli woman who, at the invitation of some Palestinians, virtually moved to a village in the occupied territories, where she works.

\textsuperscript{757} Ibid., p.35.  
\textsuperscript{758} Hermann 2009, p.209.  
\textsuperscript{759} Ibid., p.203.  
\textsuperscript{760} Amira Hass “Does helping Palestinians beautify the occupation?” *Haaretz*, 30 Jan 2012
as one-woman human rights defender. She monitors army and settler abuse of the local Palestinian villages, and intervenes whenever possible calling out to the Israeli soldiers from inside the Palestinian village to stop them from shooting in. This worked a couple of time, perhaps because the soldiers were shocked to hear a fellow-Israeli speaking Hebrew to them from inside the firing zone.\textsuperscript{761}

She would wrap chains around her neck and body and link herself to olive tree in the paths of bulldozers. Neta and other young Israeli peace activists were repeatedly arrested. Her experience and others who joined her became a foundation of the peace group International Solidarity Movement.

\textbf{Lea Tsemel} is a well-known Israeli Jewish human rights lawyer who has represented Palestinians in legal cases since the 1970s involving identity card confiscation, family reunification, house demolitions, deportations, political prisoners and administrative detainees, accused suicide bombers, and land confiscation. Her efforts to contest the use of torture on Palestinians are internationally recognized. In 1996, Tsemel received the Human Rights Award of the French Republic on behalf of the Public Action Committee against Torture in Israel. Also, Tsemel was part of a group of lawyers who voluntarily assisted prisoners from the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. Tsemel is married to Michael Warshavsky, a journalist and peace activist.

Tsemel is also a co-founder of the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) which was founded in 1990 in reaction to the ongoing policy of the Israeli government, which permitted the systematic use of torture and ill treatment in GSS interrogations. PCATI advocates for all persons - Israelis, Palestinians, labor immigrants and other foreigners in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories – in order to protect them from torture and ill treatment by the Israeli law enforcement authorities: the Israel Police, the General Security Service (GSS), the Israel Prison Service and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).\textsuperscript{762} Tsemel was instrumental in a landmark Israeli Supreme Court decision of 6 September 1999 prohibiting the use of torture in interrogations by the Israeli General Security Services. Although the ruling significantly improved the situation that existed at the time, it left an opening for the use of torture and ill treatment in Israel (the "necessity defense/ticking bomb" scenario).\textsuperscript{763}

\textbf{Ilana Hammerman}, an Israeli translator and editor who exposed her experience of “smuggling” three Palestinian women to Israel in the Haaretz newspaper. Hammerman

\textsuperscript{761} Svirsky 2002, p.245.
\textsuperscript{762} The Public Committee Against the Torture in Israel (PCATI) website: <http://www.stoptorture.org.il/en/odot>
\textsuperscript{763} Ibid.
crossed checkpoints with three Palestinian girls who, because their young age, had not lived one day free of occupation. In Tel Aviv they visited the museum, the mall and the market, dipped in the sea, ate ice cream on a bench in the boulevard and when the evening came they crossed the checkpoint again to return to their homes.\footnote{Ilana Hammerman, “If There Is a Heaven,” Ha’aretz, 7 May 2010.}

The published story touched many Israelis and aroused some heated discussions. An Israeli nationalist organization urged the State Attorney’s Office to start a criminal investigation against the law-breaking writer. Many in the Zionist left and the peace movement expressed sympathy with Hammerman but were quick to register their reservations on this “boundary crossing” of civil disobedience.\footnote{Ofra Yeshua-Lyth 2011 “A Year of Saying No”. Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, Vol. 17, No.3& 4, 2011. pp. 81-83. p.81.}

To some women, like Yeshua-Lyth, it seemed that “doing an Ilana” was exactly what they were longing to do.

The action fully reflected our long-felt disgust with the Israeli legal system that discriminates against people according to their ethnic origins and religion. “Preserving a Jewish state with a Jewish majority” has become axiomatic in Israel and abroad. An absolute majority of Israeli Jews feel it is a “must” to turn a blind eye to all evil “necessary” to facilitate it. For too long we [Israeli Jews] have been demonstrating, writing and complaining about the sorry state of mind Israelis have locked themselves into. Now we saw a chance to actively break away from all this, as Hammerman had done.\footnote{Ibid., pp.81-82.}

Motivated by the urgency of the direct threat to Hammerman – her action could potentially lead up to two years in prison – a group of twelve women decided to join her and follow her example with courageous Palestinian women willing to make a political statement and interested in a day trip outside their harsh reality. On July 2010, they set off in six cars with twelve Israeli drivers and escorts, twelve Palestinian women, four children and one baby.\footnote{Ibid., p.82.} They aimed to go public and force a public debate. It soon became clear that the Israeli media would not take too much notice without further prompting, and they opted to place an advertisement titled: “We Do Not Obey: Women in the Footsteps of Ilana Hammerman.”\footnote{Ibid., p.82.} This time, Israeli TV covered the story on prime time and their action became the center of a heated public debate. As they had hoped, more women joined the group and hundreds signed petitions supporting their acts. Women made more trips, and with generous donations managed to publish more advertisements, clearly and openly

\footnotesize{764 Ilana Hammerman, “If There Is a Heaven,” Ha’aretz, 7 May 2010.}
\footnotesize{766 Ibid., pp.81-82.}
\footnotesize{767 Ibid., p.82.}
\footnotesize{768 Ibid., p.82.}
describing their determination to challenge the Israeli legal system.\footnote{Ibid., p.82.}

Law enforcement made its move on October 2010, after the second advertisement and the TV prime time exposure. Thirty women, who until then had identified themselves with the act of driving Palestinians to the beach or the zoo, were summoned for a criminal investigation by the Jerusalem Police.

Yeshua-Lyth says “a trial against us is bound to become a perfect platform to speak against the military occupation of Palestine, against the settlement policy and the militarized, discriminatory nature of our society...we ask good, honest, liberal democratic Israelis to join us in refusing to comply with laws and regulations that deny basic human rights to fellow humans. It is simple as it sounds and is long overdue.”\footnote{Ibid., p.83.} And the trial has not taken place as of this writing.

\textbf{Amira Hass} is the only Israeli Jewish journalist who lives among Palestinians in the occupied territories and reports to Israeli newspaper Haaretz which is highly respected but not considered mainstream for its left-leaning stance. She has lived in Gaza and wrote a book \textit{Drinking the Sea at Gaza}\footnote{Amira Hass, 1999. \textit{Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and nights in a land under siege}, New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC.} describing the life of people of Gaza under Israeli occupation. Hass now lives in Ramallah and brings particular insights into the social and political issues involved in the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians. Hass provides a firsthand description of the day-to-day lives of the Palestinians under Israeli military occupation, the hypocrisy of administrative bodies that bend the law to the advantage of Israeli settlers, and the escalation of violence on both sides as Palestinians and Israelis lay claim to the territory, the stories which are not covered in Israeli mainstream media.\footnote{Her collection of reports from Ramallah has been published as \textit{Reporting from Ramallah: An Israeli Journalist in an Occupied Land} in 2003.}

\textbf{Hanin Zuabi} is the first ever female Palestinian Israeli to be elected to the Knesset in an Arab party in 2008. She submitted 124 motions, focusing on employment for Arab women, the dearth of shelters for girls, and law enforcement in cases of violence in general and violence against women in particular, including murder within the family. Other issues that concerned her were education and children's rights.\footnote{Dalia Karpel “Not Her to be Loved.” \textit{Haaretz Magazine}, 11 January 2013.} However, her participation in the Gaza flotilla of 2010 has made her “the most hated woman” in Israel, but became a “national hero” to some in the Palestinian communities in Israel.\footnote{Ibid.} Zuabi has been subjected to a process of delegitimization since the Gaza flotilla. “I was turned into a terrorist who wants
to throw the Jews into the sea and destroy the state.” Zuabi says, “the flotilla was part of a political struggle from which the Arab citizens were also meant to gain. I opened a door that says, ‘take us seriously, we are stubborn and not your house pets.’”

For January 2013 general elections, the Central Elections Committee requested to disqualify Zuabi from running for the Knesset. According to a committee member, her participation aboard the Mavi Marmara in 2010 was an expression of her support for terrorism and for the armed struggle of Hamas. In the end, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the request.

**Jerusalem Link**

After the second Intifada, what was a very successful joint women group slowed down joint activities and started to focus on unilateral women empowerment projects.


An international call to respect women’s rights and to support their participation in peace negotiations and in post conflict reconstruction came in the form of **Security Council Resolution 1325** in October 2000. Resolution 1325 calls upon UN member States to enable women, whether living in armed conflict zones or living in free countries, to participate in the prevention of international armed conflicts, and to play a larger role in the prevention of local armed conflicts. The Resolution calls for women’s participation in decision-making circles, so that they participate in solutions to conflict and in peacemaking. This new Resolution follows a series of decisions and policies adopted by the UN to urge and guide member states to take further measures and policies that ensure increased participation of women at decision making levels, such as, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.

---

775 Ibid.
776 Ibid.
777 Ibid.
778 Although the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) does not reference peace talks, Article 7 demands that states allow women “to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government...” and Article 8 calls on state parties to “take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international organisations.”
779 The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action states that “the full participation [of women] in decision making, conflict prevention and resolution and all other peace initiatives [is] essential to the realization of lasting peace.” Recommendation E.1 demands that states
In addition to above international laws, there are some shifts in international policy toward peacebuilding. First, there has been a shift in policy discussions about security, away from national security and toward greater emphasis on human security. Second, there has been a shift in thinking on conflict and peace, away from focusing peacemaking efforts on mediation and formal agreements and toward a broader and more inclusive concept of conflict transformation, which requires dismantling unjust structures and policies that exacerbate violent conflict and replacing them with mechanisms, processes and institutions that enable grievances to be recognised, heard and dealt with. Third, there is increasing acceptance of women’s rights within the global policymaking framework. Respect for the human rights and dignity of every person is not only central to, but is in many ways the starting point for these developments.  

To underscore their commitment to the international frameworks, many regional multilateral institutions including the European Commission and the Organization of American States among others have also adopted resolutions calling for the inclusion of women in peace processes. UNIFEM plays a leading role in promoting the implementation of Resolution 1325 by advocating on women’s behalf at international forums and supporting women’s efforts to enter peace processes across the world, from Burundi to Afghanistan. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI) also plays a key role in advancing the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the UN. Since 2004, the UN’s Department for Political Affairs (DPA), which has primary responsibility for UN engagement in peacemaking, has prioritised gender mainstreaming and is attempting to be more inclusive of women in its peacemaking activities.

7.3. Women Representation

Both Israel and Palestine has had low records of representation of women in politics and in peace negotiations. Israeli women are removed from participation in formal discussions to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, up until 2007 when Tzipi Livni became Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the negotiating team in the Annapolis peace process. In the Oslo accords, the Road Map, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative, and Geneva Initiative the people involved on all sides (Israelis, Palestinians, and internationals) were mostly male military personnel, government officials and diplomats. Professionals from other fields were

“increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels.”


delegated to various sub-committees that dealt with arms control, economic development, water, environment, refugees, and others, and even on these committees, women were scarcely represented.\(^{782}\)

The absence of Israeli women in peace negotiations goes hand-in-hand with women’s shallow representation in powerful and influential forums and in political decision-making in Israel. For example, 18 women serve in Israeli Parliament as of 2005. This represented 15% of 120 members of Parliament. There were three women ministers. Minister of Justice, Education and Communications: Tzipi Livni, Limor Livnat, and Dalia Izik – Tzipi Livni later became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and leader of Kadima party, Dalia Izik became chairwoman of the Knesset and briefly became acting President on the absence of former President Katsav on his indictment.\(^{783}\)

On the Palestinian side, during the Madrid Peace Conference and the peace talks in Washington that followed, three Palestinian women participated: Hanan Ashrawi, Suad Amiry, Dr. Zahira Kamal, but only Hanan Ashrawi was the official negotiator. In the Palestinian political scene women are also underrepresented. In the January 20, 1996 elections five women were elected to the eighty-eight member Palestinian Legislative Council. One woman, Intisar Al Wazir (Um Jihad), became Minister of Social Affairs.\(^{784}\) Zahira Kamal became head of the Women’s Technical Committee, a quasi-government body established as a result of a political struggle waged by women and funded primarily by a foreign donor.\(^{785}\) The committee formed subcommittees to examine issues such as legislation, education, and employment, with the aim of making policy recommendation. But its ability to influence political decisions was limited.\(^{786}\)

Disappointed by results in the 1996 elections, many women’s organizations and associations concentrated their efforts to increase the number of women candidates in elections. And the Palestinian Authority adopted policies that improve women’s participation and establish the foundation for equality and the protection of women’s rights, such as adopting the quota elections system by law and the President’s ratification of The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). A 2005 amendment to the Election Law included a formula for women’s inclusion in election lists (one woman in the first three, one in the next four, and subsequently one in five) as well

---


\(^{783}\) Ibid.


\(^{786}\) Giacaman, Jad and Johnson 2006. p.96.
as other changes such as increasing the overall number of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council from 88 to 132. And the 2004 amendment for local elections guaranteed women two seats in each municipal or local council.\textsuperscript{787} The quota was used from the 2005 local elections and in the 2006 general election.

This quota system resulted in improving number of PLC members in the 2006 general election: out of 132 members, 17 or 13 percent were women. Women also obtained 300 seats in the four-stage municipal elections.\textsuperscript{788} However, increase in number of seats through quota system does not automatically secure qualified women for the position. It was revealed that among women who won in the local elections, some had no time to dedicate to municipal work as they held full-time jobs in the health, education, or, the private sector. They were accused of having been tactically drawn to the elections to consume the quota system and leave no place for strong and qualified women from other parties.\textsuperscript{789}

As for representation in the cabinet, as of Spring 2011, there are five women Ministers out of twenty members (Ministry of Education, Tourism, Social Affairs, Women Affairs and Culture).

7.4. Impact of UNSCR 1325

7.4.1. Women’s Representation in Negotiation

In Israel, to address the situation of women’s low representation in negotiations, an amendment to the existing Law for Women’s Equality (women’s representation in government processes), following a long process led by feminist organizations and several members of the Israeli parliament, was initiated by two women Parliament Members, Yuli Tamir and Eti Livni in July 2004 and passed in 2005. This amendment, states that in all negotiating teams, at least 25\% of all members must be women, in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{790}

Israel was the first UN member to integrate these stipulations into the law of the land but, unfortunately, has consistently refused to adhere to its own law. On May 30 and 31, 2010, Israeli commandos attacked the Mavi Marmara. The government of Israel established a commission of inquiry in order to allay political pressure amidst the controversy. It should not come as a surprise that none of the five appointed members was female. Rather, these honorable men were mostly ex-army generals. Women’s demand to include women in the

\textsuperscript{787} Rizq-Qazzaz 2007, p.80.
\textsuperscript{788} Ibid., p.81.
\textsuperscript{789} Ibid., p.84.
\textsuperscript{790} Isha LIsha 2005, p.10.
commission was initially ignored, and they demanded a place at the table. The court ordered the government to search for suitable women to be part of the commission. The government made a very small effort in response to that ruling – it offered a place to five women, all of whom refused to join the committee. The case was closed.\textsuperscript{791}

When Israelis and Palestinians were to hold direct talks in Washington in 2010, once again, no woman was nominated to the Israeli negotiating team. But unlike the situation in the past, after receiving a letter from women’s organizations, the prime minister announced that he intended to appoint a woman to the small advisory team to the negotiations with the Palestinians. However, the prime minister did not appoint a woman, and negotiations didn’t take place.\textsuperscript{792}

In Palestine, MIFTAH – Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), an organization aimed at enhancing democracy with a focus on women empowerment, is supporting the UNSCR 1325 and working to raise awareness, as some leaders of women organizations barely know about the Resolution.\textsuperscript{793}

The Institute for Inclusive Security has been developing a roster of Palestinian and Israeli women with expertise in negotiations and technical issues – Jerusalem, Refugees, Security, Water, Settlements, Environment, Economy, Civil Society Work, Legal Issues, and Prisoners. It held the first consultation of Palestinian women in November 2009, together with MIFTAH. However, it is not able to get enough women to the roster from both sides.\textsuperscript{794}

7.4.2. International Women’s Commission

Since UNSCR 1325 was adopted, Palestinian and Israeli women have studied it with a view toward making it a reality in the “peace process.” In 2002, Terry Greenblatt, director of Bat Shalom, and Maha Abu-Dayyeh Shamas, WCLAC executive director and representative of Equality Now, met with members of the Security Council to discuss ways of increasing women’s participation in peace and security. On March 8, 2003, women from Jerusalem Link met with national and international representatives in Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. The Jerusalem Link and Equality Now held negotiations with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s office to develop a mechanism for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.\textsuperscript{795} In early February 2005, the

\textsuperscript{791} Saragusti 2011, PIJ, p.56.
\textsuperscript{792} Ibid., p.56.
\textsuperscript{793} MIFTAH 2009. “Palestinian Women & Resolution 1325.”
\textsuperscript{794} Interview with the director of The Institute for Inclusive Security in February 2011.
Ad Hoc Coalition of Palestinian and Israeli Women wrote a letter to Condoleezza Rice during her mission to the Middle East, pointing out that women have been at the forefront of peace-building and that “women are the majority stakeholders in this enterprise, with a proven expertise in reconciliation and rapprochement, yet not a single Israeli woman, and only one Palestinian woman - Hanan Ashrawi, has held an official role at any Middle East peace summit.\textsuperscript{796}

Consequently, in 2005 the International Women's Commission for a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace (IWC), was established by a group of women from Israel, Palestine and the international community, supported by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The Commission was intended to work together as a group that spoke with one voice. Women all shared the idea that peace between peoples is possible, and it must be based on the achievement of a two-state solution based on the borders of June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states.

However, it was not easy to maintain a working relationship based on common views, especially during times of national stress and violence. It was extremely difficult during the extended period of rocket shelling and the Israeli military attack on Gaza in January 2009 which led to an end to the joint activity.\textsuperscript{797}

The only evident impact of UNSCR 1325 so far is amendment to the existing Law for Women’s Equality in Israel, however, no woman has been included in negotiations since the passing of the law.

7.5. Summary

Women in conflict zones are often categorized as “dual victims” of war and militarized societies. And this is true in both Israel and Palestine. Although their positions are asymmetrical in terms of occupier/occupied, both groups of women suffer from a militarized mindset and traditional and religious code, both formal and informal, forced upon them. Women’s voices are often silenced and their rights ignored.

However, that did not hinder many Israeli women from taking courageous and progressive political views and action on peace issues. They were first to publicly state the need for a just solution to the refugee problem based on UN resolutions; and social and economic justice for all; and, equal citizenship for Palestinian citizens.

\textsuperscript{797} Ibid., p.342.
\textsuperscript{798} Interview with Idit Avidan, Israeli Coordinator of International Women’s Commission – Israel in August 2009.
Israeli Women peace groups formed a coalition that includes other women groups who work in different fields and were thus able to merge social issues, especially women issues, into dealing with conflict and occupation, in ways that mixed-gender peace groups could not. Hence the link between the conflict and social issues spread among women who are affiliated with the Coalition. Israeli women have also been creative in peacebuilding and seemed to find satisfaction from the process, even when the action is civil disobedience.

Both women’s participation in formal peace negotiations is limited. However, with the support of UNSCR 1325, the Israeli government is now obligated to include at least one woman out of every five members, however, the real result is still yet to come. For Palestinians, no such law is under considerations. MIFTAH is promoting the resolution. The Institute for Inclusive Security is recruiting a roster of qualified women for the negotiations. However, it has not recruited enough candidates as of yet.

The International Women’s Commission for Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace, established based on UNSCR 1325 supported by UNIFEM is facing difficulties in joint projects because of violence, and is operating only unilaterally.

Using Lederach’s Actors and Approaches, we see that the women peacebuilders come from various layers of societies, however, their influence to the top-leaders still remains low when it comes to having their voices heard in the peace process.

In Israel: a majority of peace activists has been women, and they come from all the strata of the society: top-level politicians, middle-level intellectuals and NGO leaders, and grassroots leaders. Women are consciously trying to broadening their base for peace activism, however, their voices are still not heard in the establishments. Women’s low record of representation in the politics, and especially in the peace negotiation, is hoped to be improved through new legislation.

In Palestine: women have always been a part of the struggle for independence. However, just as its Israeli counterpart, their representation in the politics and peace negotiation has had a low record. The quota system in elections is hoped to bring more women voice heard in the politics.

In International Community: women around the world paid great effort in adoption of UNSCR 1325. And since its adoption, international community, especially UN agencies and international NGOs, are playing the role in highlighting and supporting women’s role in resolution of conflicts. International Women’s Commission for a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace was established, although it had ceased to act.

The impacts of the activism of women peacebuilders are assessed as follows according to the criteria set forth in the beginning of this study.

1) Impact on resolution of conflict: UNSCR 1325 became a new legal norm for conflict
resolution to include women in the process of negotiation and peace process.

2) Impact on the process of peacemaking: Both Israeli and Palestinian women have succeeded in changing the law to increase their representation in politics. Israeli women succeeded in internalizing UNSCR 1325 to Israeli law to secure women representation in peace negotiations. Palestinian women internalized CEDAW to secure women representation in local and national elections.

3) Impact on defining the conflict: Israeli women groups are trying to link the issue of peace and security with the women and social issues. Some women groups such as Machsom Watch are innovative in their activities: they stand at the checkpoints, appeal to military courts and monitor courts’ proceedings, as well organize tours to the checkpoints and Palestinian villages. These new activities are gaining media attention and public discourse. Palestinian groups, such as MIFTAH, are also trying to promote UNSCR 1325 and empower women to take more active role in politics and peace process.

Coupled with the fact there is no negotiations taking place recently, UNSCR 1325, so far, has little impact to Israeli and Palestinian women and the resolution of the conflict, however, there seems to be an opportunity when more women are represented in the politics and when women are able to link the social issues to the peace and security issues.
PART III

Conclusion
Conclusion

The butterfly effect cannot be seen  
The butterfly effect endures  
It is the lure of the mysterious  
It seduces meaning, and leaves  
When the path becomes clear  
It is the lightness of the eternal in the quotidian

Mahmoud Darwish (2008)

1) Conclusion structure

The underlying theme of this research is to contribute to peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no sign of any constructive peace negotiations taking place any time soon with leaders on both sides are heading toward unilateral actions. However, while both Israeli and Palestinian people aspire for peace and safety, which they deserve, as time passes, the possibility of the two-state solution is diminishing, politically, geographically, and demographically with violence continuing and costing lives of both sides. Both sides are blaming the Other for where they are now and unable to listen and understand the Other’s fear and suffering nor aspiration for nationhood. But some committed people are trying to reach to the other side and find a peaceful way out of current quagmire for a just solution of the conflict. Peacebuilders work with their own expertise and there are many activism efforts being conducted in different fields. This research seeks to review types of Peacebuilding activism that has been conducted historically and under current difficult situation, and to analyze which activisms make difference. In doing so, it will help the international community in identifying where and how they can and should intervene if they are willing to support a just solution between Israelis and Palestinians.

As stated at the beginning, the assumption underlying this analysis is that peacebuilding needs to integrate various players from different strata of society in order to make an impact: top leaders, middle-level leaders, and grassroots organizers. And because of the nature of the conflict, it comprises three triangles: Israel, Palestine, and international community. For peacebuilding activism to be successful, it needs to work inside its own society, either to influence top leaders for policy change or to involve wider publics through enhancing public discourse to move society in direction of peacemaking. At the same time, this efforts need to be synchronized with the other side, for it is with the other side that peace is to be made. And finally, in case of current stalemate of peace process, and also
because of the nature of the conflict, involving the international community and its leaders are crucial.

This chapter will analyze the impact of various peacebuilding activism with focus on those that took place since 2000 on the resolution of the conflict, on the process of peacemaking, and on defining the conflict and its resolution. Based on this analysis, a prospect for possible future direction of peacebuilding is presented.

2) Background

In Part I historical overview of the conflict was reviewed. While political development took its course from the British Mandate to Israeli independence and the Palestinian Nakba, there were always interactions between Jews and Palestinians living in the same land. Many Jewish and Palestinian villages had good relations and some helped each other during the conflict. In the cities Jews and Palestinians worked together and some formed joint workers organizations. Many interactions took place. Palestinians helped new Jewish immigrants providing them with food and clothes in a simple humanistic gesture. While two nationalisms began to collide with one another, there were attempts made by some prominent Jews and Palestinians calling for cooperation and dialogue, opting for a peaceful and binational state. Much of both Jewish and Palestinian resistance was directed toward the British Mandate Government and not directly against each other, although Palestinian Revolt of 1936 did become violent in the later stage. Massive Jewish refugees fleeing from the Holocaust started to arrive and United Nations passed the partition plan which eventually led to the War of 1948. Still some cooperation and dialogue efforts continued until the War, although they were never able to change the course of conflict. Unfortunately, the number of people who remember this time of coexistence are rapidly diminishing.

The War of 1948 resulted in establishment of an independent State of Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza came under administration of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. Soon after the War, the United Nations with its General Assembly Resolution 194 demanded Israel to allow the return of Palestinian refugees. UNCCP was establish to facilitate the refugee solution, however, the negotiations between Arab states and Israel failed. Given the shock and despair of the Arab world, it would have been considered tantamount to an act of treason for any well-intentioned citizen in the region to come to the Israelis with a message of peace. The only place where cooperation did exist was between the marginalized communist parties that found mutual recognition feasible on a class rather than an ethnic level. There were several domestic Arab-Jewish rapprochement
initiatives within Israel, with projects to fight against such restrictions imposed by the Israeli military governing authority over Israel's Arab population of Israel until 1966. Palestinians elsewhere were not in control of their destiny until 1964, when the PLO was founded, to be followed by Fatah in 1965. The PLO’s first covenant called for the liberation of Palestine. At that time, armed struggle was seen as the only way to redress the injustice of the creation of Israel against dislodged Palestinians. Ideologically and practically there was to be no legitimate dialogue with the Israelis until 1973.

Some peace groups were formed in Israel such as Givat Haviva engaging in peace, pluralism, tolerance, democracy and justice. Its goal was to promote understanding with the Arab world. Simha Flapan published a pluralistic magazine, New Outlook, that reached Palestinian intellectuals in the diaspora and Arab world, and held occasional conferences. These different Israeli attempts to get Arab recognition of Israel did not succeed.

The occupation of territories by Israel after the 1967 War brought two opposing reactions to Israel and Palestine. Israeli society was divided on whether to use the occupied territories as a bargaining chip for negotiations or to settle the land to satisfy security, religious and economic interests. The Movement for Peace and Security was the first peace movement to counter the emergence of the Movement for a Greater Israel advocating the immediate and total annexation of the Occupied Territories. However, the combination of euphoric Israelis and the Movement for Peace and Security’s inability to identify Arab partners for peace led to mounting criticism and it faded in the early 1970s. Later, the peace treaty with Egypt furthered disagreements over issues of national security, and promoted the crystallization of protest groups. Peace Now was founded in 1978 by reserve officers who signed a letter to Prime Minister Begin to accept a peace agreement with Egypt, and played an important role in both lobbying the government and mobilizing citizens to support this agreement. The members being officers gave them credibility to talk of peace and security.

During the War of Lebanon, Yesh Gvul openly questioned the legitimacy of the war and the unconditional obedience to and compliance with military service. It prioritized civilian values over military commands in cases in which they came into open conflict. Mothers against Silence created a discursive space in which motherhood was politicized and turned into a legitimate resource to engage on issues of peace and security.

However, peace movement’s socio-demographic make-up apparently impeded its efforts to mobilize support among the lower classes and non-Ashkenazi Israelis. Israeli peace movements were almost entirely composed of middle-class, highly educated, urban Ashkenazi Jews. This discrepancy created a high cognitive barrier between the activists and the Israeli mainstream.

On the Palestinian side, the 1967 War brought a realization that they could not rely on Arab regimes and needed to take their fate into their own hands. This brought both military and non-military resistance movement. However, by 1974, PLO has taken its first step to
take the peace plan to the United Nations, and in 1984 Arafat explicitly stated his willingness to meet with Israelis, to negotiate a peaceful settlement and to end the longstanding conflict. PLO, mainly Fatah, was the engine for dialogue with Israelis.

By early 1980s, various dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians started to take place, mostly between academics and politicians on both sides. Later Israeli government banned meeting with members of PLO as the organization was considered “terrorist”.

It was the first Intifada that dramatically changed the course of peacebuilding. It was a Palestinian national non-violent grassroots movement aimed at ending the occupation and pushed PLO to declare independence on November 15, 1988 and Jordan’s declaration to end its administration of the West Bank. It triggered the emergence of various peace movement and human rights organizations. The peace movement’s most significant accomplishment was its ability to influence public opinion by offering two alternative themes that had not been visible in the mass media. The first was the notion that the occupation was a political, financial, and moral liability rather than a strategic asset. Indeed, the occupation had been framed as a threat to the long-term security and the “Jewish” identity of the state. Second, and equally important, was the idea that the Palestinians had justifiable aspirations for a national identity and a right to self-determination, and that the Intifada was a legitimate Palestinian national struggle. Over time there was a clear shift in public opinion so that by the mid-1990s the majority of the Israeli public accepted the Palestinians’ right to a state. One of the reasons that Peace Now was successful in changing public discourse was that it cast its position within the dominant Zionist ideology and maintained a strong allegiance to the state. Another important measure of success was the ability of the organizations to attain media coverage and thus gain acceptance in public discourse. In Israel, organizations such as Peace Now were particularly effective at mobilizing the mass media on their behalf. Similarly, human rights organizations, such as B’Tselem and joint research and advocacy groups such as the AIC became a very important source of information and data for the foreign press, and European journalists regularly published reports on the conflict based on the perspective that these organizations provided.

Israeli peace activists held many contacts and dialogues with Palestinian members of the PLO both in occupied territories and abroad challenging the law. Legitimizing contact and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians was another important contribution of the Israeli peace movement. In doing so, the organizations broke a major taboo in Israeli society.

Therefore, it is clear that the Israeli peace movement achieved the following indicators of social movement’s success: it helped to redefine the political agenda, changed social values, and expanded the range of ideas about what is possible. Without these contributions, the dramatic policy change that included the signing of a peace agreement to end the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict might not have been possible.

As for the international community, Palestinian aspiration for independence gained
sympathy worldwide. Coupled with the changing international environment, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and its regional and international repercussions, and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a central challenge of the new times, the Intifada added an urgency of a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. US President Bush pressured Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to participate in the multi-track Madrid Peace Conference supported by key international players.

The first Intifada is a perfect example of how Palestinians and Israelis worked effectively both to change the perception of their people as well as changing their leaders’ policy. Their solidarity action to oppose brutal military action and information dissemination and advocacy, had great influence on bringing international media attention and changing the perception of world public to sympathize and support self-determination of Palestinians. This change in perception combined with the international relations at that time, has pushed the parties to the first peace negotiation, the Madrid Peace Conference.

In order to circumvent the stalemated the Madrid Process, however, back channel meetings between Israeli academics affiliated with peace movement and Palestinian PLO members eventually resulted in the Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Process did bring political leaders from both sides to recognize each other as people and to negotiate and agree on several interim agreements. However, implementation of these interim agreements, mainly transferring responsibility from Israel to Palestinian Authority, was repeatedly delayed. The five year interim period passed without even starting the final status negotiations. And when the final status negotiation took place in Camp David, both sides were not ready, the political leaders and the general public, to make the painful compromises needed.

The Israeli peace movement lost momentum and visibility when it was needed. Although in later years it was sometimes able to bring thousands to public squares to protest the policies of the Netanyahu or Sharon governments, these were only sporadic events insufficient to reawaken the peace camp. The closure of the territories, the continued construction in the settlements, and the failure to make preparations for peace all led to a serious deterioration of the situation. These developments were not seriously protested largely because of the sense that peace was just around the corner, and with it would come change. However, the opposing forces and their negative campaigns were much stronger. Ongoing projects such as the “settlement watch” operated by Peace Now, which was indeed very important in exposing the realities of continuous land expropriations and expansion of the settlements against the agreements signed with the Palestinians and the official declarations of the various Israeli governments, were equally ineffective.

Palestinians initially had high hope for the Oslo Peace Process believing their independence was close, however, they soon became critical of the peace process as occupation continued and more land was taken away to build settlements. The criticism
came not only from opposition parties but from all walks of society.

Joint cooperation, People-to-People programmes in totality, was too late and too little and operated in its own “bubble.” Some encounter-dialogue projects made significant discussion and had impacts on participants on personal level, however, they had very little, if any, impact on wider society. The linkage to the peace process was a major cause of rejection by both sides, especially the Palestinian side deemed any joint project under ongoing occupation as “normalization”.

The international community’s intervention in the peace process was not sufficient. Even when it was showing signs of deterioration, it did not intervene, believing it would be solved by two parties at the final status agreement. It treated the peace process as if it were already in a post-conflict phase, while occupation still continued. There was no public condemnation of settlements construction coming from members of the major international community. And their financing of peacebuilding projects was affected by temporary political and diplomatic changes, and ignored long-term objective related to mindsets and perceptions.

One major achievement during Oslo years is that Israeli leaders and the public came to accept the inevitability of a Palestinian state. Such an acceptance came not only from the Left: many on the Right were forced to come to terms with the idea, even if they thought that the borders and the degrees of sovereignty of the future Palestinian state would be open to discussion.

When the Camp David Summit of July 2000 failed the already fragile Oslo Peace Process went into an impasse. The peacebuilding efforts made during the Oslo years were not enough to build enough support to sustain the peace process. Violence erupted on both sides. Both sides blamed the other for the failure and mistrust of the other intensified. Peace movements in Israel were blamed for this outcome, and they blamed Palestinians for opting for violence. Palestinians blamed Israeli peace movements for not having an impact on leaders and public, while praising their leaders for not agreeing to agreement which does not serve justice to Palestinian people. But the Oslo Peace Process also produced or increased social division on each society.

On the Israeli side, those who work for peace or with Palestinians came to be labeled as “traitor” and “disloyal” to Israel. Economically, Israel enjoyed prosperity, however, many Israelis felt it was the elite Ashkenazi who was benefitting from this, the same social group that made up peace movements. A plan to divide Jerusalem proposed by Barak during the Camp David Summit was unforgivable to many on the right.

On the Palestinian side, the tension increased between PA and those opposing peace process and PA corruption, namely the Tantheem and Hamas. PA members and those affiliated with the center of power were the ones who enjoyed the peace dividend most, often
by obtaining preferred status from Israel. Tension between the PA and civil society, as PA attempted to control them, become tense. And new NGOs funded by international donors often lost their connection to the grassroots.

Leaders on both sides opted for unilateral steps and the public support for peace negotiations was weakening. These were the conditions that peacebuilders had to work under. Peacebuilders struggled to show to their leaders and public that the other side is human beings too and that peace was possible with the other side. While preparing ground for peacebuilding inside their society, they became increasingly aware of the need of the international community's support and protection by international law in order to overcome the impasse.

3) Findings

In Chapter 4, emerging peacebuilding activisms were introduced. Peace initiatives emerged after the failure at Camp David attempted to involve enough public support for resuming the political negotiations in order to pressure decision makers. The initiatives, especially the Geneva Initiative, conducted PR campaigns and gained much media coverage and arouse public discourse. This led Israel's government to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza.

Some peacebuilders understood that in order to make a just peace, both side needed to understand the narrative of the other side. Israeli new historians and some organizations such as PRIME, BADIL and Zochrot are working in this area. Some of their works, such as Zochrot, are able to transform participants perception of the conflict, however, the audience is still too limited to become influential.

New actors to peacebuilding came from religious circles. With the growing fears of religious extremism, interfaith dialogues became one avenue for peacebuilding. Several organizations conduct youth dialogue programs. Some dialogues are not limited to the three monolithic religions, major religions in the region, but often include Buddhism and other religions, which may bring different religious perspectives to the conflict. Christian churches in Palestine have gone a step further and announced Kairos Palestine “A Moment of Truth”, calling on Israel to end occupation and calling on all faithful to conduct peaceful resistance, such as boycott campaigns. The Kairos document received endorsement from many world councils of churches around the world and church based organizations.

The Arab Spring swept through the Middle East. The aspiration of youth to participate in political discourse is growing in both Palestine and Israel. In Palestine, youth are calling for unity. Youth are more connected with Palestinian refugees in surrounding countries. In Israel, the youth was engine for the Social Justice movement of 2011. The leaders of the
movement were careful not to make explicit links to the occupation for fear of being labeled as leftist. However, it has become evident that occupation and settlement expansion takes away the budget that should be used for social welfare and services.

The three case studies of peacebuilding activism initiated by three different actors, Palestinian villagers, international peace activists, and women, are analyzed.

3-1) The Protest Movements against the Wall

From the beginning, the villagers affected by the construction of the Wall took three approaches simultaneously: uniting the village by forming popular committees to resist against the Wall; taking legal action to Israeli courts and lobbying the Palestinian Authority to take their case to the international court; advocacy to international community by inviting internationals and Israelis and international media.

Hence, local communities affected by the construction of the Wall, from an early stage, were joined by internationals and Israelis in participating and planning for protest actions. In the villages, demonstrations took place often applying creative methods to attract internationals and media attention. Popular Committees were formed in affected villages uniting all villagers regardless of differences in political affiliation. Soon the local actions were coordinated by the Apartheid Wall campaign which collected information and published reports and disseminated to both the Palestinian Authority and the international community. Local communities appealed to Israel’s High Court of Justice. Palestinian lawyers were assisted by Israeli lawyers and human rights organizations in making petitions. Because the route of the Wall was designed to include settlements in the Israeli side, the mechanism and policy of settlement became the focus of Israeli peace and human rights organizations. Demonstrations in the villages and reports on settlements gained broad international media coverage.

The result was impressive. Palestinians were able to push their Authority to take the case to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice made an Advisory Opinion, stating not only that the route of the Wall inside the West Bank is illegal, but also that settlements inside the West Bank are illegal. This involvement of the International Court of Justice pressured the Israeli High Court of Justice to rule on petitions related to the wall despite past denials utilizing the proportionality test, which does not automatically justify military needs. The HCJ is flooded with dozens of petitions from Palestinians and many judgments resulted in halting the construction, and some others in altering the route of the wall. This led the Israeli governments to amend the route to reduce the area to be confiscated from twenty percent to eight percent. The construction of the Wall was continuously delayed because of resistance and the pending legal cases in the HCJ, as well as the increasing cost. Up to now only some sixty percent of the planned route is constructed.
and completion of the total length of the Wall is not expected until 2020.

The issue of the route of the Wall, which was causing land confiscation because it was planned to surround Israeli settlement in the West Bank, influenced the actions of Israeli human rights organizations and economists publishing reports related to “illegal” settlement construction and expansion and settler’s violence against Palestinians as well as costs related to settlement expansion which draw attention of Israeli media and public discourse, which led to Israeli public discourse on settlement issue and changes in Israeli perceptions.

Two important implications related to the opinion were that the ICJ confirmed the applicability of International Law to the conflict, and the possibility of third party intervention in case the laws are violated. Following the opinion, the BDS movement against Israel has taken a big step. Palestinians have formulated groups calling for actions and Israelis also set up their support groups. The international community has also shown a strong support. And in January 2013, the UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission called in its report upon all Member States to invoke sanctions against Israel over the West Bank settlements.

Palestinians are hoping to turn this local movement into a national movement, however, they are facing several challenges. The fact the villagers demonstrating are target of arrests and closure by Israeli military discourages many other villages to join the campaign. The political parties are also trying to ride on this movement but movement leaders try to stay independent and grassroots. The movement itself is not able to attract youth and people from the cities. The civil society in general are not involved. On the Israeli side, although the public awareness of settlements has increased and certain changes in the policy occurred, the base of peace activists in these demonstrations is limited, partly due to their location and the risk of being injured or arrested.

3.2) The Free Gaza Movement

This is a case of internationals challenging the Israeli policy of the Gaza blockade, which was showing devastating effect on Gaza’s economy and the health and psychology of its people. The Free Gaza Movement started in 2006 by internationals concerned with the situation in Gaza, and in coordination with community based organizations in Gaza. Its aim was to break the siege of Gaza and bring much needed humanitarian goods to people of Gaza. It was both humanitarian and human rights advocacy. The movement’s first five voyages with small wooden boats successfully reached the shores of Gaza bringing humanitarian goods and over 100 passengers most of them human rights activists and peace activists and some internationally renowned personnel as well as some Israeli citizens, both Jews and Arabs. These passengers had a chance to meet with people of Gaza, see the situation on the ground and discuss possible further cooperation in much needed Gaza.
They also became voices of the people trapped inside Gaza.

The Free Gaza Movement’s efforts to reach Gaza since the start of the Israeli military operation “Cast Lead” of 2008-09 all failed, due to Israeli navy interceptions as part of the declared maritime blockade off Gaza’s coast that remained in place since the operation. In May 2010, the Free Gaza Movement was joined by several other campaigns Europeans and IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation of Turkey, and the voyage consisted of a six-ship flotilla with over 600 passengers and 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid. When the Israeli Defense Force intercepted the Mavi Marmara, it resulted in death of nine Turkish nationals.

This incident that took place only one year after operation “Cast Lead” brought massive criticism globally. As the United States, who has been strong supporter of Israel, had to maintain its alliance with Turkey, the incident has forced U.S. to play a huge role in pressuring Israel to investigate the incident. The case was brought to the United Nations and the fact-finding mission was established. The international community, including the U.S., for the first time, publicly condemned the blockade of Gaza as “unsustainable” and urged Israel to ease the blockade. Subsequently, Israel did change its policy to ease the blockade.

The Qatari mission who boarded a ship on fifth voyage paved the way to fund development projects in Gaza. In October 2012, the Emir of Qatar visited Gaza via Egypt, the first head of the state to enter Gaza after blockade, and promised 400 million dollars in aid.

This case shows how international peacebuilders, joined by Israelis including Holocaust survivor and member of Israeli Knesset, in coordination with Gaza’s civil society, were able to appeal to the international community and to the United Nations and pressure Israel to change its policy on siege of Gaza, although the casualties were unexpected and unfortunate.

3-3) Women and Peacebuilding

Women in Israel compose a majority of members of peace movements. And some founded women-only peace groups, many with feminist agendas. Israeli women formed a coalition to include wider constituents. They try to link feminism and peace and covers wider social segment of Israeli women including Mizrahi and Russian immigrants.

Israeli women group such as Women in Black and Machsom Watch are still active. Machsom Watch is broadening their base of volunteers and activities to include intervening in appeals to military courts and organizing tours to checkpoints and around the Wall. It is enjoying media attention other women groups cannot get. Some women utilize civil obedience to challenge Israeli laws with the intention of obtaining media coverage. Still the challenge for women’s groups in general is getting their voices heard in issues related to
peace and security.

In order to support women participation in peace negotiations and the peace process UNSCR 1325 was adopted. Israeli women members of Knesset succeeded in passing a law obligating the government to include at least one woman out of every four members to peace negotiation mission and other official commissions. Palestinian women also succeeded in adopting the quota system in the election system, but under CEDAW.

Israeli and Palestinian women, with the support of UNIFEM and internationals, established the International Women’s Commission for a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace in 2005, which was intended to work together as a group that spoke with one voice. However, by the time of Israeli military operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, the joint activities ended. Only occasional joint declaration is made, in addition to some unilateral activities to empower women.

This case shows that women peacebuilders are making progress in terms of broadening their constituencies and agendas. Some impacts are made using UNSCR 1325. Israeli women representation altered policy for their representation in politics and peace negotiations. However, it is still yet to see, how women can influence to transform the security discourse to more a humanistic peace discourse.

After analyzing the three cases by using Lederach’s Actor and Approaches and assessing their impacts, it can be said that the movement or activism have impacts when various actors and approaches are integrated within and among the three communities. The analysis also has shown that the importance of the role that can be played by the international communities in making impacts.

Following is the overall summary of the analysis of the peacebuilding activism.

Israel:

Israeli peace movements are not able to mobilize wider public for their membership social make-up and image of elite, highly educated, middle-class. One way to bring more people to end occupation is the linkage between social issue and the occupation (as women coalition and radical left groups are trying to do). Peacebuilding should be inclusive. Bringing women and youth to the process will widen views on peace and security. The engine of Social Movement of the Summer 2011 was youth, who see the unequal distribution of wealth, to which themselves are affected. The movement refrained from linking social issues with the occupation, fear of alienating the public. This is an issue that needs to be tackled. And Israelis are missing an opportunity by not listening to the Arab Peace Initiative which provides a chance for Israel to normalize relations with over 50 Arab and Muslim countries.
Palestinians

For Palestinians, internal division is a serious problem. The Palestinian public wants to be united and have one voice for independence. Going to the UN to obtain “observer state” status was a move in right direction, however, what is a state, if it is divided socially, politically, and physically. Including Hamas into PLO and politics is a necessary step, on the condition they will renounce any violence, recognize the State of Israel, and respect the past agreements with Israel, which on several occasion, they have implied their readiness to do. Fatah is in a difficult position, because their agenda was bringing peace and prosperity to Palestine, and are failing in both. They lost legitimacy when they lost general election in 2006. There is a need to reform the PA and PLO institutions to include all political faction. Thus providing better services is the way to regain confidence from its people. Popular Committees are successful in bringing all walks of life together in their struggle against the Wall, however, they are limited to protesting villages and not spreading to other villages or to the cities. Again, peacebuilding should be inclusive. Women should be empowered to have more voices heard. And the youth is the most critical of internal division, and some youth are becoming active in forming youth councils. They are more independent in thinking and pluralistic in their views and ready to work together. They have potential to add alternatives to current Fatah-Hamas party politics.

Joint Programs:

Dialogue and encounter projects did have impact on the personal level, if not on the social one. Although there were problem with recruiting and funding, the personal transformation of attitude cannot be ignored, especially among youth. Most youth have never met the other side. For Israelis the other is terrorists. For Palestinians, the other is soldiers who deny them movement and access at checkpoints or come to house arrest in the middle of night. Meeting each allows them to see the other as humans just like them. Sharing history and narrative projects tackles the most sensitive issues of the root cause of the refugee issue. It is important that both understand the other’s narrative, since recognizing the other’s narrative can change their attitudes for good. At the same time, work to reduce fear of Israelis on issue related to refugees’ rights is crucial. Professional groups are also important for they allow cooperation in their specific fields of interest, such as health. When Palestinians have limited opportunity to improve their skills in areas such as health, trainings in Israeli hospitals is an important technical opportunity. Women’s programs have shown impressive results. They were ahead of their society in their willingness to live together and work together. However, because of physical separation, the two parties have difficulties meeting each other on their own in the region, and thus usually it was international facilitation that helped bring the two sides to meet either in the region or abroad.
Internationals:

The international community should have intervened more in the peace process when it was facing difficulties. Especially it should have raised its voice against settlements construction (although Roadmap did requested Israel to halt settlements construction but did not do enough to actually stop it) and violence from both sides. One reason for failure of the Oslo Peace Process is its absence of respect to international law, such as International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law and various UN Resolutions. The international community should have shown more eagerness to monitor the peace process and peace agreements to make sure both sides are respecting international law, and should act as obligated under international law when they are violated. It was a mistake to assume that the conflict had entered the post-conflict stage during the Oslo peace process when occupation was and is still continuing. It should have supported much more the peacebuilding efforts initiated by Israelis and Palestinians during the Oslo Peace Process. Some projects, especially dialogue projects, were effective when done properly, but there just was not enough. Now that the physical separation by the Wall, hinders two parties to meet on their own, the involvement of the international community is critical both in facilitating Palestinians in obtaining permits and funding for these meetings often needs to take place overseas. It should have made more effort to support including wider public to these projects, while taking sensitivity, such as being labeled as “normalization.” It was a mistake to isolate the Palestinian Unity Government when Hamas and Fatah reconciled after Hamas won the general election in 2006, it fostered division instead of reconciliation. Rather than isolating Hamas, the international community should try to contain them. International community should have been more engaged in supporting international law and UN resolutions. Not only passing law and resolutions, but are obliged to implement them. This conflict is a result of actions or inactions of the international community in the past, the international community should be more responsible for a just solution based on international law, for in such asymmetric relation the two parties cannot come to a just solution on their own. International laws/UN resolutions that are important are UNSCR 242, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion and UNSCR 1325 to empower women in peacebuilding.

4) Prospect

Both Israelis and Palestinians deserve peace and security. And a just solution to the conflict is in interest of the international community for the stability of the region and the world. Continuing military occupation of a nation by another cannot go on. It will only increase fear and hate of both peoples and makes peace even more difficult. If the political
leaders are not able to reach agreement in any foreseeable future, urgent international community involvement is not only required but is obligation.

Based on the findings above, the international community is recommended to support the peacebuilding effort by Israelis and Palestinians, especially in the areas of: supporting Palestinians with state building and reform inclusive of all sections of society through development projects; facilitating economic growth of Palestinians by easing and ending blockade of borders including Gaza and implementation of Agreement of Movement and Access of 2005 (which promises linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, Airport rehabilitation in Gaza, and Sea Port construction in Gaza); empowering Palestinian youth to become more inclusive in political decision making as well as supporting them to join work force (current situation of high employment among youth is a source of instability); supporting women of both societies in empowering to become more inclusive in political decision making; supporting and facilitating joint projects such as dialogue because Israelis and Palestinians have difficulties meeting each other, sharing history and narrative for this will support bringing a stable just solution; supporting both sides to respect international law in the peace process and peace agreements for a just solution of the conflict.

A just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is long overdue. While Israelis and Palestinians need to work on their own for their pursuit of peace, they need international support and intervention now more than ever.
**MAPS**

Map 1: Palestine under the British Mandate

Map 2: 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine

Map 3: 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine (Jerusalem)

Map 4: Armistice Lines after 1948 War

Map 5: Territories Occupied by Israel after 1967 War

Map 6: Territory Transfer under Oslo Agreements

Map 7: Settlement Map 2011

Map 8: Route of the Wall

Map 9: Route of the Wall – North West Bank

Map 10: Route of the Wall – Central West Bank

Map 11: Gaza 2010
Map 1: Palestine under the British Mandate

Approximate area in which the Jews hoped to set up a National Home.

The Palestinian Mandate granted to Great Britain by the 1920 San Remo Conference, in the region of a Jewish National Home.

Area ceded by Great Britain to the French Mandate of Syria in 1920.


Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
Map 2: 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine

Source: United Nations
Map 3: 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine (Jerusalem)

Source: United Nations
Map 4: Armistice Lines after 1948 War

Source: MidEastWeb
Map 5: Territories Occupied by Israel after 1967 War

Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace 2004
Map 6: Territory Transfer under Oslo Agreements

Staged Israeli Transfers of West Bank Territory to Palestinian Self-Rule During the Interim Period, 1994 - 2000

Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace 2004
Map 7: Settlement Map 2011

Source: Peace Now 2011
Map 8: Route of the Wall

Source: UNOCHA 2011
Map 9: Route of the Wall – North West Bank

Source: UNOCHA 2004
Map 10: Route of the Wall – Central West Bank

Source: UNOCHA 2004
Map 11: Gaza 2010

Source: UNOCHA 2010
Bibliography

Adwan, Sami and Dan Bar-On 2000. *The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace Building between Palestinians and Israelis*, Jerusalem: PRIME (Peace Research Institute in the Middle East)


Bar-Tal, Daniel 1990. ‘Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and
Bar-Tal, Daniel 1995. The rocky road toward peace: Social beliefs in times of intractable conflict, the Israeli case. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, School of Education.


Parents' Perspectives on the Hand in Hand School in Jerusalem. Freiburg: Centaurus Verlag.


Finkelstein, Norman, 2010. This Time We Went Too Far: Truth and Consequences of the Gaza Invasion, New York, OR Books.


Hermann, Tamar and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar ed. 2002. *International Intervention in Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case*. Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University


pp.237-252.


257


Morris, Benny 2009. *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict*, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press.


Salomon, Gavriel 2006. “Does Peace Education Really Make a Difference?” Peace and...


and Middle East Research & Information Project.


**Reports/Documents/Proceedings/Web Articles**


Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights (PHR-Israel), July 1995, Intifada-Related Head Injuries and Rehabilitation of the Head-Injured, Tel Aviv.
B’Tselem-Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem) 2000. "Illusions of Restraint." (December)
B’Tselem 2002. Land Grab: Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank. (May)
Coalition of Women for Peace website: <http://www.coalitionofwomen.org/>
Dahlan, Mohammed 2002. "A Palestinian View - Nothing Tangible Was on the Table"
Farsakh, Leila, 2002, “Palestinian labour flows to the Israeli economy: a finished story?”
Free Gaza Movement, “Demands to Israel Regarding Property”, 17 June 2010
       <http://www.freegaza.org/en/boat-trips>
       <http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications_english/Publications_and_Reports_E


Hever, Shir 2007b, “Education in East Jerusalem: report on the educational system in East


<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.PDF>


Israel Defense Force (IDF) The Military Advocate General’s Corps (MAG) website:  
<http://www.mag.idf.il/>

<http://www.idi.org.il/sites/english/ResearchAndPrograms/NationalSecurityandDemocracy/Terrorism_and_Democracy/Newsletters/Pages/19th%20Newsletter/2/2.aspx>


Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, 6/2/2010 (June 2) Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu “No Love Boat”  
<www.pmo.gov.il/.../pmo/32communication/speeches/2010/06/mashateng0206010.doc>

Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Disengagement Plan – General Outline”, 15 April 2004
Israeli Prime Minister's Office “The Sasson Report Concerning Unauthorized Outposts”
<www.pmo.gov.il>
“Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip – Red Lines” Presentation
http://www.haaretz.com/resources/Pdf/red-lines.pdf
Jews for Justice for Palestinians website <http://jfjfp.com/?page_id=2>
<http://middleeast.atospace.com/article_1705.html>
<http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/d/ContentDetails/i/2095>
Ma’an Development Center, Boycott, Divestment, & Sanctions – Lessons learned in effective solidarity, Ma’an Development Center; Ramallah, 2009.
<http://maan-ctr.org/pdfs/Boycott.pdf>

272


<http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/TK5_peace_negotiations.pdf>


<http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/41_section2.pdf> pp. 16-32


Palestine Our Route, Humanitarian Aid Our Load Flotilla Campaign Report


Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC), Palestinian Civil Society Calls for BDS,

<http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>

Peace Now Settlement Watch Project, October 2006. *Breaking the Law in the West Bank* –
One Violation Leads to Another: Israeli Settlement Building on Private Palestinian Property.

Peace Now “What is Settlement Watch Team?”
<http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/what-settlement-watch-team>

Peace Now “First Petitions Against the Outposts”
<http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/first-petitions-against-outposts>

Peace Now “Peace Now’s plan to save billions by reducing some benefits of settlements”
<http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/peace-now’s-plan-save-billions-reducing-some-benefits-settlements>


PRIME “Establishing a “Localized” Process for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Israel and Palestine to Address Refugee Issues at the Heart of the Conflict”
<http://www.vispo.com/PRIME/truthandreconciliation.htm>

The Reut Institute, “Building a Political Firewall against the Assault on Israel's Legitimacy – Conceptual Framework Version A Submitted to the 10th Herzliya Conference

The Reut Institute, “Building a Political Firewall against the Assault on Israel's Legitimacy - London as a Case Study Version A - Final Draft” November 2010)


Turkish National Commission of Inquiry, Interim Report on the Israeli Attack on the
Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on 31 May 2010.

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-%20UN%20Copy.pdf>


<http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_special_easing_the_blockade_2011_03_english.pdf>

UNOCHA, The Barrier Route in the West Bank, July 2011


<http://www.alternativenews.org>


Magazines/Newspapers/Web magazines
Foreign Affairs
Journal of Palestine Studies

275
Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture
Haaretz
Jerusalem Post
Ma’an News <http://www.maannews.net/eng/>
Ynetnews.com <http://www.ynetnews.com/>
Guardian
New York Times
New York Review of Books
Bitterlemons.net <http://www.bitterlemons.net/>