III. Japanese and the War in the Philippines
Chapter 6: The Philippine Society of Japan and The Philippine Information Bulletin

Introduction

The Firipin Jōhō or Philippine Information Bulletin saw its initial print in December 1936 as an information journal of an incorporated foundation, the Firipin Kyōkai (Philippine Society of Japan). This monthly publication (at times irregularly published) lasted until December 1944, with a total of 90 issues published. The Bulletin usually had a little less than 80 pages and carried information in accordance with the prospectus of the Society, which was “to promote friendly relations between the two countries, to advance cultures and to strengthen economic links.” The Bulletin soon became the best source of information in Japan regarding the Philippines. Some articles appearing in the Bulletin contained much important information whose original source was lost forever due to the destruction of the war. We can safely say that the Bulletin is one of the most important historical sources in understanding Philippine–Japanese relations between the late 1930s and early 1940s.

This chapter would first comment on the establishment of the Society, the publisher of the Bulletin. Then I shall proceed to examine the articles in the Bulletin by looking at the Table of Contents of each issue and combined indexes of all the issues that I had compiled. After having done so, I shall discuss the findings.

1. The Philippine Society of Japan or Firipin Kyōkai

Previous studies have given a background of the organization. Include here are the works of Yu-Jose, Yoshihisa, and Terami (-Wada), along with the pioneering study by Goodman. Further, the circumstances of the organization’s establishment were already narrated by KOBAYASHI Jirō (Secretary of the House of Peers) in his essay “Firipin Kyōkai ga Dekiru made (How the Philippine Society of Japan Came to Be Established).” Kobayashi was involved in its establishment and had been handling the general affairs of the Society.1 Therefore, what I

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shall do is to trace the history of the Society from a different angle—that is, by looking into *Kaimu Hōkoku* (The Reports of the Society’s Activities) from the fiscal year 1935 to 1943 and accounts of the Society published in the *Bulletin*.

The Philippine Society of Japan was established on August 6, 1935, after approval from two Ministries, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly it received the official authorization from the Tōkyō Prefectural government on August 9, and on August 24 it completed its registration after filing at the Tōkyō Ward Court. While the Society designated August 6 as the establishment date, some consider August 23 because it was the day they filed the registration, and it was also the day when the members and the officials had met for the first time.

In general, people had thought that the visit of a Japanese tour group that went to Davao and Manila in June 1933 was the direct cause behind the establishment of the Society. The group was called the South Seas Fact-Finding Tour and consisted of the members of the House of Peers, including KOBAYASHI Jirō. However, among 12 members of the group, only Kobayashi was involved in the establishment. Later, a year after its inauguration, two others—HIJIKATA Yasushi, who was the leader of the group, and INADA Masatane—became councillors starting 1936. The more important moving force behind the Society were the cultural and political groups such as the Kokusai Bunka Shinkō-kai (International Cultural Promotion Society) and the Dai Ajia Kyōkai (Great Asia Society). Indeed, the visit of the members of the House of Peers to the Philippines, mentioned above, could be considered as a cause, though, not necessarily significant for the formation of the Society. The more important and direct causes were the upcoming Commonwealth Government to be inaugurated on November 15, 1935, and subsequent independence promised by the Americans on July 4, 1946. These factors have been fully discussed in previous studies and documents. “The Course of Events That Led to the Establishment” in the report of the Society clearly attests to it:

Transportation between the Philippines and Japan has become quite common in recent

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years. Furthermore, economic relations have come to have a closer connection. In this regard, some influential people have been advocating the establishment of a Japan–Philippine association in order to promote goodwill between the countries. In the meantime, the Philippine Constitution was enacted based on the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which was approved by the President of the United States on March 24, 1934. The Philippine Commonwealth Government is to be established on November 15, 1935. This chain of events made us feel the urgency to have such association. After many discussions by the people concerned, in June 1935, we completed the penning of a prospectus of the Society as well as a petition for donation. We also received necessary funding to establish an incorporated foundation. We filed the petition on July 9, 1935 with the Ministers of Education and of Foreign Affairs for establishment of an incorporated foundation under the name of Viscount OKABE Nagakage, representing the founding members. The permission was granted on August 6.

The founding members of the Society:

ISHIMARU Yūzō, HORIUCHI Kensuke, HORII Gensaku, Prince TOKUGAWA Yorisada, Viscount OKABE Nagakage, ŌSHIMA Masanori, YANAGISAWA Takeshi, KOJŌ Tanehide, KOBAYASHI Jirō, AKAMA Nobuyoshi, MORI Denzō.

The document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that the Ministry was cautious about a civilian political organization becoming the parent body of such interchange activities between the two countries. This reflects the atmosphere of the time that both the government as well as civilian sectors in Japan were searching for a way to establish a Philippine–Japan exchange association at the advent of Philippine independence. They, the government and civilian sectors, arrived at the conclusion that such an organization should be established under the ambit of the government; hence, the Philippine Society of Japan.

The ministries that supervised the Society were the Ministries of Education and of Foreign Affairs (after 1942 the Ministry of Great East Asia). However, the Society also had strong ties with the Army and the Navy as seen in the courtesy calls that their officials made. On September 28, they called upon the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of the Navy and on October 12, the Ministers of the Army and of Overseas Affairs. Other evidence of the Army and the


Navy connection can be seen in the names of those who were involved in the initial stage of the establishment and the sources of financial assistance. According to the revenue and expenditure accounts appearing in the Kaimu Hōkoku, the Society had been receiving subsidies from the Ministries of Army and Navy, besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other financial assistance came from the Office of the Taiwan Governor General, as well as from the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, but the Society had to apply in order to obtain a subsidy from these agencies.

The officials of the Society consisted of the president, vice president, advisers, trustees, auditors, and councilors. The prime minister should have been an honorary president as discussed at the October 1943 meeting of the Board of Trustees, but it never materialized. The post of vice president was established in 1939, and several posts of advisers from 1943 on. While the role of the head of trustees was “to govern and represent the Society,” that of the board of trustees was “to dispose of official duties and take responsibilities.” It meant that the decision making power virtually rested in the hands of the Board of Trustees. Actual official duties of the Society were undertaken by the regular trustee (who was paid ¥450 as of fiscal year of 1940), and the manager (shuji) handled all the clerical works. However, the Board of Trustees was in name only since the Board members rarely attended, except ŌSHIMA Masanori who was constantly present. Ōshima played the role of the regular trustee. The councilors’ meetings were supposed to be held every November in order “to deliberate on important matters;” however, it was not held as scheduled from the start. From the beginning until the fiscal year 1937, the meetings of the Board of Trustees were held nine times and the councilors’ meetings thrice. From the fiscal year 1938 to 1940, the meetings of both organizational bodies were held with the same frequency. This indicated that the councilors’ meeting played a more important role. Generally speaking, the councilors seemed to be better versed in the situation of the Philippines compared with the members of the Board of Trustees. Owing to their presence, they were able to perform more realistic activities. However, during war-time, the Board of Trustees began meeting more often. There were 39 meetings held in 9 years, until August 1944, while the councilors met 22 times.

The purpose and the activities of the Philippine Society of Japan were laid down in Chapter 2, Article 3 of “On the Contribution Given to the Philippine Society of Japan Incorporated,” as follows:

Chapter 2: Aims and Activities

Article 3: The aim of this society is to promote goodwill between Japan and the Philippines and to develop culture by coordinating with a similar organization in the Philippines.
1. To introduce culture
2. To arrange inspection and sightseeing tours; and to assist those who wish to study in Japan
3. To collect and exchange economic data
4. Other activities which the Board meeting considers necessary

Both Goodman and Yu-Jose, especially the latter, conclude that the real purpose of the Society was the economic penetration of the Philippines, hiding behind the expressed purpose of cultural and goodwill exchange. The conclusion may have been drawn from the Japanese version of the congratulatory address of Director Okabe on the establishment of the Commonwealth Government delivered on November 15, 1935. In Japanese the Director Okabe noted that the purpose of the Society was to promote “cooperation in the field of culture, goodwill and economy.” However the English translation was simply “…promote cultural relations,” and “cultural and economic friendly relations” became “friendly relations” in the English translation, leaving out the word “economy.” Thus, the Japanese might have received an impression that the Society was to promote economic penetration of the Philippines, while cultural-goodwill promotion was emphasized to the Filipino people.6

However, when we examine the background of the board members such as trustees and councilors, it does not seem to indicate that they were interested in economic advancement per se. The relevant Ministries sent their officials to be the members of the trustees according to their positions and they left the Society when their terms ended. From the business sector, the directors and the heads of trading companies and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry became the members: they included Mitsui Bussan, Mitsubishi Shōji, Marubeni and Nippon Menka. It was only in 1939 that the presidents of the Ohta Development Company and the Furukawa Plantation Company became councilors. The Japanese traders and the bazaar owners in the Philippines never became councilors of the Society. The Manila Japanese Chamber of Commerce was established in 1933 but actual activities started in March 1936, when its articles of association were composed. The officials of the Chamber were as follows:7

Chairman: DAZAI Shōgo (Representative of Manila Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank)
Vice Chairman: KAWAMURA Masajirō (Representative of Manila Branch of the Mitsui Bussan Company)

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6 Ibid., pp. 44–45, 51–52.
Treasurer: MORI Masayuki (Representative of Ōsaka Bōeki Kaisha)
Permanent Directors: KANEGAE Seitarō (Representative of Nippon Bazar), TAKA-HASHI Shōzō (Representative of Mayon Bazar), MURASE Shigeru (Representative of O’Racca Confectionery Company)

Communication with the Philippines was conducted neither through the Manila Japanese Chamber of Commerce nor the Japanese Association but through a liaison, KIHARA Jitarō, the Vice Consul of the Japanese Consulate, who was remunerated ¥ 300 per year. There was a plan to designate other liaisons in Davao, Manila and Taiwan in 1939 but it did not materialize. The active Japanese members of the Society in the Philippines were YAMAMURA Umejirō, the councilor of the Society and the owner of a coconut plantation in Basilan, and ENOSAWA Hisashi, the Society member and publisher of a magazine on Philippine-Japan relations.

Another point to illustrate that the Society was not centered on economic advancement was that the members of the Philippine-Japan Society in the Philippines, the sister organization of the Philippine Society of Japan, were not from the economic field. The Philippine-Japan Society was established on June 18, 1936 through Kihara’s mediation. The honorary president was President Manuel QUEZON. The post of the honorary vice-president was shared by Vice President Sergio OSMEÑA and the Council General of the Japanese Consulate, UCHIYAMA Kiyoshi. The president was Maximo KALAW, a member of the Philippine Assembly and the former dean of the College of Letters of the University of the Philippines: The vice presidency was shared by Mariano V. DE LOS SANTOS and MOROKUMA Yasaku. The former was the President of Manila University, and the latter was the president of the Ohta Development Company and the president of the Manila Japanese Association. The post of Secretary and Treasurer went to Modesto FAROLAN, Editor-in-Chief of the Herald. In sum, there were six Filipinos and three Japanese in the Board of Trustees. The people from the cultural field rather than the economic field predominated in the Philippine-Japan Society. While the Philippine Society of Japan consisted entirely of Japanese, the Philippine-Japan Society’s racial ratio was 2 : 1, in favor of the Filipinos. The Philippine-Japan Society was called “Nippi Kyōkai,” which literally means “Japan-Philippine Society,” which was a reflec-
tion of a Japanese led organization, rather than one of mutual exchange.8

Next we shall look into who had supported the Society and what kind of activities had taken place in the prewar period. The best place to look into is the Society’s budget. First, let us examine the income, which mainly came from subsidies and membership fees. Both were more or less the same amount, running from the thousands to a ceiling of ten thousand yen. The subsidy came mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cultural Enterprise Division), the Army and the Navy, the Office of Taiwan Governor General and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. An annual donation of 1,200 yen came from an individual, MITSUI Takakimi, the head of Mitsui combine (zaibatsu). There were three different kinds of memberships: 1 share of support membership, 200 yen per year; regular membership, 10 yen (became 15 yen in May 1944) per year; and lifetime membership, 200 yen. The support membership mainly came from various enterprises. In 1938, the share of support membership doubled when the Kansai Branch (Osaka) was established. In the following years, the share of support members increased only by around 10 shares each year. There was a big discrepancy between budget and settlement of accounts. It was because they estimated the growth of membership each year which did not happen. By March 31, 1943, there were 82 supporting members, 1 semi-supporting member, 19 recommended members, 9 lifetime members, and 330 regular members; and the total sum of membership fees that year was about 20,000 yen.9 The small number of support membership indicates the reluctance of enterprises to join. It was because they thought they did not particularly have much to gain by becoming members. In other words, they could not expect any new concrete information regarding the economy in the Philippines or any new personal connections with the Filipinos. This point will be expanded on later. In May 1944, the trustees decided that the Filipinos who resided in Japan were allowed to become members, and on August 22, the Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Jorge VARGAS, was nominated as an honorary member.

The Kansai Branch had more supporting member fees than in Tōkyō, as far as 1939 and 1940 fiscal years were concerned. It was because more people in Kansai engaged in the trading business, and they were the ones who joined the Society as supporting members. The reasons behind the establishment of the Kansai Branch on October 20, 1938 were as follows:10

Kansai has been an important area, not only in terms of trading between Japan and the Philippines but also because it has been the first stop for the Filipinos who come to Japan

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9 Kaimu Hōkoku 1942, p. 18.
10 Kaimu Hōkoku 1938, p. 20.
for observation tours and business related visits to Japan. The Philippine Society of Japan had been contemplating having closer relationships with the influential people in Kansai so that we could entertain as well as accord every facility to the Filipino guests. In order to perform these activities, the need for establishing the Kansai Branch arose among the people there. Since last year, after various discussions and meetings of the Board of Trustees as well as the councilors, the decision to establish the Kansai Branch of the Philippine Society of Japan in Osaka was reached…

The largest supporting membership fee for this new branch was 2,000 yen, equivalent to 10 shares. It was paid by Nippon Menshi-fu Tōa Yushutsu Kumiai (Japan Cotton Yarn and Fabric East Asia Export Association), which passed a resolution at the forty-first board meeting on December 24, 1937, as follows.11

A matter regarding the membership of the Philippine Society of Japan: This Association decided to become the supporting member of the Philippine Society of Japan on condition that each member of this Association would not be asked to donate and that the membership fee is within 2,400 yen per year.

Next we shall look into expenditure. We notice that some activities had a big discrepancy between budget and statement of account. They hardly spent anything on research and none at all on inspection tours. Educational expenditure included purchasing for distribution The Philippines–Japan Quarterly published by one of the members, ENOSAWA Hisashi (this magazine stopped publication at the end of 1941; instead they purchased for distribution Nippon–Firipin). Other expenditures included financial assistance extended to the Japan–Philippine Student Conference, the Japan–Philippine Youth Cultural Association, and for lectures and round table discussions, though lectures were hardly held until 1940. The only budget spent regularly were business expenses, which included the publication expense of the Philippine Information Bulletin and entertainment expenses. The latter were spent for the sukiyaki parties for various visiting organizations or for those influential individuals who stopped over in Japan on their way to or from the U.S.A. The entertainment expense of the Kansai Branch was larger than that of the headquarters in Tōkyō. Welcome and send off parties for those Japanese diplomats to and from the Philippines were also held. The main groups that visited

11 “Nihon Menshi-fu Tōa Yushutsu Kumiai Dai 41-kai Rijikai Ketsugi-roku (Record of the Resolution Made at the Forty-first Board Meeting Japan Cotton Yarn and Fabric East Asia Export Association),” December 24, 1937. This document was made available to me by KAGOTANI Naoto. The author is grateful to him.
Japan were for cultural exchange and promotion of goodwill, such as the annual Philippine Educational Tour to Japan. The Society also took good care of Filipino students studying in Japan. In spite of this, the number of Filipino students decreased from around 80 in 1936 to 20 in 1939. There seemed to be not many Filipino visitors to Japan from economic organizations or the business sector. Information concerning the economic situation in the Philippines produced by the Society was no more detailed than that of the Consulate report.\textsuperscript{12}

The budget of the Society in the prewar era was rather limited; therefore, their activities were obliged to focus “mainly on goodwill and cultural cooperation between Japan and the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{13} They requested the salaries of the following people to run the office for the fiscal year 1941: “One full time staff, five part time staff, one office boy, and one janitor.”\textsuperscript{14} Therefore we can conclude that the Society’s activities in prewar time were mainly those of goodwill and cultural exchange. Examples can be seen in the outline of activities for the fiscal year 1940.\textsuperscript{15}

The Main Office in Tōkyō

1. Research on the Philippines and collection/organization of source materials
2. Publication of the monthly \textit{Firipin Jōhō} (Philippine Information Bulletin) as well as other publications
3. Publication and assistance for printed material which promotes Japan–Philippine goodwill and provides information on the Philippines
4. Entertainment and assistance for Filipino students, inspection tour groups, and influential Filipino individuals
5. Sponsor and assistance to the participants of the Japan–Philippine Students Conference
6. Assistance and guidance to Filipino students in Japan as well as those who wish to study in Japan
7. Hosting lectures and round table discussions concerning the Philippines
8. Other activities deemed necessary


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Kaimu Hōkoku 1941}, p. 10. Also see, ŌTANI Jun’ichi, ed., \textit{Firippin Nenkan} (The Philippine Year Book). Japanese Edition 1937–41, 5 volumes.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Kaimu Hōkoku 1940}, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Kaimu Hōkoku} (The Report of the Society’s Activities: Last Half and Additional Period: Fiscal Year 1939), pp. 68, 72.
The Kansai Branch

1. Research on the Philippines and collection/organization of source materials
2. Publication of the monthly *Firipin Jōhō* (Philippine Information Bulletin) as well as other publications, which promote Japan–Philippine goodwill and provide information on the Philippines
3. Dispatching members and others to the Philippines in order to inspect and to promote goodwill between Japan–Philippines
4. Entertainment and assistance for the Filipino students, inspection tour groups and influential Filipino individuals
5. Sponsoring the holding of the 4th Japan–Philippine Students Conference
6. Assistance and guidance to Filipino students in Japan
7. Hosting lectures and round table discussions concerning the Philippines
8. Other activities deemed necessary

These basic activities had not changed until 1941, when the main office added “Dispatching members and others to the Philippines in order to inspect and to promote goodwill between Japan–Philippines,” and the Kansai Branch added “Guidance and sponsorship extended to the Japan–Philippine Youth Cultural Society, Kansai Branch.”

Indeed the Philippine Society of Japan was organized with an aim of promoting a long-term cultural relationship between the two countries, and it needed financial cooperation from the economic sector. However, the sector in Japan concluded that it was no major short-term benefit from supporting the organization. Therefore not much active support came from them, except for the exporters of cotton thread and clothes because they were aware of the problems in exporting such items to the Philippines. On the other hand, the Society faced a problem in promoting Japanese culture among the Filipino elites who were quite Americanized.

It was only in 1941 that the situation began to change when traveling to and from the Philippines became rather difficult as the relationship between Japan and the U.S.A. became strained. In July of that year, activities were difficult to undertake as there was almost no transportation between Japan and the Philippines. Furthermore, communication with the Philippines became difficult. No Filipino visited Japan and the Japanese were also prevented from going to the Philippines.” The war commenced on December 8, followed by the occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942 and the start of Japanese military administration on January 3. At this time, the Society was “still not yet ready for cultural propaganda.”

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16 *Kaimu Hōkoku* 1940, pp. 37, 41–42.
17 *Kaimu Hōkoku* 1941, p. 2.
As soon as the war started, the Society immediately organized the Investigative Committee for Emergency Measures in the Philippines. The following committees were set up to perform the tasks: Political (22 people), Economics (21) and Cultural (19). Each committee was to discuss the maneuvering activities in their respective areas of politics, economics and culture. The general meeting was held on December 26, 1941. MATSUNAMI Ni’ichirō was recommended to become the overall chairman. Moreover, research and study on the Philippine “Moro” were undertaken with cooperation of MIYOSHI Tomokazu, YAMAMURA Umejirō and KAMIYA Tadao. They submitted a recommendation entitled “Philippine Moro Tribe Problem.” The subsidy for the fiscal year 1941 rose to ¥33,500, which was more than doubled compared to that of the past years. This big budget was meant for propaganda purposes. The president of the Society, TOKUGAWA Yorisada, eventually became the adviser to the Japanese Military Administration (from March to November 1942).

The Philippine Society of Japan held five study sessions from June to November in 1941, with the discussions focused on topics such as politics, economics and industry. The participants included heads of the following offices: American Bureau, South Seas Bureau, and Research Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Third Branch of Bureau of Information; the General Staff Office; Bureau of Military Command; Bureau of Development of the South of Ministry of Overseas Affairs; Bureau of Trade of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Bureau of Exchange of Ministry of Finance; and Research Section of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The members’ background indicates that these study sessions were in preparation for the occupation and subsequent military administration of the Philippines. In the

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18 Ibid., pp. 4–6. The Diet Library received a complimentary copy of “Firippin ni okeru ‘Moro’-zoku Mondai (‘Moro’ Tribe Problem in the Philippines (unfinished))” (Firipin Kyōkai: 5 leaves) marked May 7, 1942. It has quite a few mistakes and not up to the academic standard. The lack of understanding of Islam area on the part of the Firipin Kyōkai is apparent especially compared to the following two works: “Nanpō Kensetsu ni Kansuru Chinjō Riyūsho: Surū Ōkoku Saikō, Mindanao, Surū, Kita Boruneo (A Petition on the Establishment of the Southern Area: Re-establishment of Sulu Kingdom: Mindanao, Sulu, North Borneo)” (written by Ōo, no publisher, no publication date, 38 leaves) and “Moro-zoku no Rekishi to Ōkō no Keihu, 1, 2, 3 (The History of Moro Tribes and Royal Genealogies) Nanpō-ken Kenkyū-kai Kenkyū-shiryō (Research Material of the Southern Sphere Study Group), Nos. 20–22, 1943, 33, 34, 44 pages. The zerox copy of the former document housed in the Waseda University library was made available to me by GOTÔ Ken’ichi. The author is grateful to him.

19 According to Goodman (1967a, p. 146), the Society received ¥ 15,000 from the Bureau of Information, ¥ 15,000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ¥ 1,000 from the Navy, ¥ 1,000 from the Office of the Taiwan Governor General, ¥ 300 from the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, total of ¥ 32,300. He quotes from page 5 of Kaimu Hōkoku 1941. However, no such figure can be found. The Nan’yō Kyōkai received ¥ 50,000 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the fiscal year of 1938 to be spent for “Cultural and Economic Maneuvering.” See JMFA I.1.10.0.2-4 “Honpō ni okeru Kyōkai oyobi Bunka Dantai Kankei Zakken (Miscellaneous: The Associations and Cultural Societies in Japan: On the Nan’yō Kyōkai).”
same year, after July, informal gatherings for friendly discussions were held, and around 13 people attended. The members came from the following institutions, societies and companies: Tōa Kenkyūjo (East Asia Research Institute), Nan’yō Kyōkai (South Seas Association), Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo (Economic Research Institute), Nan’yō Economic Research Institute, Taiheiyō Kyōkai (Pacific Society), Nomura Gōmei Kaisha (Unlimited Partnership), Tōyō Economic Research Institute, Information Branch of Dōmei News Agency, Kaigai Kōgyō Kyōkai (Overseas Mining Society), Philippines–Japan Company, South Manchurian Railway Company East Asia Economic Research Bureau, Nihon Takushoku Kyōkai (Japan Development Society), South Seas Section 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Southern Planning Section of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, Ōsaka Shōsen Kaisha (O.S.K. Line), and Textile Product Export Promotion Company Incorporated. This shows that the Philippine Society of Japan had rather close relationships with these companies and organizations. On February 6, 1942, the Society joined the Dai Nippon Kōa Dōmei (Great Japan Resuscitate Asia Alliance), which was affiliated with Taisei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance). On September 15 it became a member of the Nan’yō Dantai Rengō (South Seas Groups Alliance). Other activities in 1942 included sponsoring lectures and renting exhibition materials/or product samples. The Society started to extend assistance to those who again wished to visit the Philippines. They also started to purchase library books in large quantities to answer the “requests for various pertinent materials as the average citizen’s interests, particularly, in the Southern Areas, has increased.”

The content of the activities of the fiscal year 1942 is listed below and two new programs were added; one was to hold study sessions and the other was to dispatch cultural delegations:

1. Research on the Philippines and collection/organization of source materials
2. Publication of the monthly *Firipin Jōhō* (Philippine Information Bulletin) as well as other publications which provide useful information on the Philippines
3. Publication and assistance to publishing materials which provide information on the Philippines
4. Sponsoring study sessions, informal gatherings for friendly discussions, lectures and round table discussions
5. Dispatching cultural delegation to the Philippines
6. Dispatching qualified people in order to inspect and conduct research in the Philippines

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20 Kaimu Hōkoku 1941.
7. Entertainment and assistance to the Filipino inspection tour groups and influential Filipino individuals
8. Assistance, guidance and accommodation of Filipino students in Japan
9. Other activities deemed necessary

Their planned propaganda activities in the Philippines were not carried out as they had hoped because there were many obstructions in transportation as well as communication between Japan and the Philippines, even in the latter part of fiscal year 1942. On the other hand, activities in Japan became lively, which included lectures, gatherings for discussion on the Philippine situation, informal gatherings for friendly discussions on the Philippines, study sessions about Mindanao natural resources, and informal gatherings for friendly discussions on the Philippine cultural measures. The Society came up with three suggestions and distributed them to the government offices.22

1. Suggestions on Measures to Manage Mindanao Island (July 16)
2. Suggestions on How to Disseminate Japanese Language in the Philippines (July 24)
3. Suggestions on Measures to Deal with Lack of Commodities in the Philippines (September 2)

On June 27, 1942, the Society’s Kyūshū Branch in Kumamoto was established with the simple rationale that the Branch would maintain an “intimate geographical relationship.”

In October 1942, the military’s interference with the Society became full scale. For instance, the former supreme commander of the Japanese Military sent to the Philippines, Lieutenant General HONMA Masaharu, gave a series of lectures, which included: “Characters of Filipinos Seen during the War and an Idea of How to Treat Them” (October 6); “On the Philippine Situation in General,” “Philippine Industry and Economy,” “Impressions on the War of Philippine Conquest,” and “The Great East Asia War, the Philippines and the Filipinos.” The last four lectures were given twice in Osaka and once each in Kumamoto and

22 Kaimu Hōkoku 1942. Some of the lectures were printed in the pamphlet form. For instance, the lecture commemorating the establishment of independence of the Philippine Republic was held co-sponsored by the Kansai Brach of the Philippine Society of Japan and Tōa Keizai Konshin-kai and supported by the Mainichi Shimbun. The content was published as Pamphlet No. 8, Shinsei Firipin Kyōwakoku (The New Republic of the Philippines) by Osaka Nanpō-in, 1944, 39 pages. Among the three suggestions mentioned above, at least two were published: Kimura Atsushi, Mindanao-tō Shōri ni Kansuru Ikensho (Suggestions on Measures to Manage Mindanao Island), 16 pages and Hitō ni okeru Busshi-busoku Narabini Taisaku ni Kansuru Ikensho (Suggestions on Measures to Deal with Lack of Commodities in the Philippines), 42 pages.
Beppu, between November 19 and 23, 1942. The informal gathering for friendly discussions on taking measures regarding the Philippine culture was held on November 23; it was attended by General Honma and the former Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Military sent to the Philippines, Lieutenant General MAEDA Masami. The participants of another informal gathering held on December 1 included many military people: Major General Okubo, Colonel Nakayama, Lieutenant Colonel Akiyama, Major Wada, Major Shirai (all of whom were staff officers of the Japanese military sent to the Philippines) and three other military officers belonging to the Southern Group of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Military. They were Lieutenant Colonel Takahashi, Major Tomita, and Major Matsuo. There were a total of 47 regular board meetings in the fiscal year 1942 alone.23

On October 23, 1943, HOSHINA Masaaki, chairperson of the Board of Trustees, HARA-GUCHI Hatsutarō, and KIMURA Atsushi, both members of the regular Board of Trustees, were replaced; and on October 25, HONMA Masaharu took the post of vice presidency and the chairmanship of the Board of Trustees in order “to adapt to the new situation after the Philippines gained independence.” On December 25, while TOKUGAWA Yorisada resigned and assumed the post of adviser, OKABE Nagakage became the president of the Society. On January 15, 1944, Major General SATŌ Kaname became a member of the regular Board of Trustees, which brought the Philippine Society of Japan under the complete control of the military regime. The interference of the military could have been the result of their becoming impatient with the Society, which did not produce the concrete results they expected.

2. The Philippine Information Bulletin or Firipin Jōhō

The Bulletin commenced its publication on December 28, 1936, with 28 pages and 200 copies. The first three issues were mimeographed copies. The second issue had 16 pages and 200 copies were printed, while the third had 39 pages with 210 copies. None of these issues printed a classification of the articles. The fourth issue came off the press four months after the previous one. From this issue on, it was letterpress printing. The publication became regular, being published on the 15th of every month in compliance with the Newspaper Law. The circulation had increased to 300 copies. It further increased to 400 from No. 23 (January 27, 1939), however, the publication became rather irregular until No. 45 (February 28, 1941). For instance, there were three months interval between No. 27 (June 30, 1939) and No. 28 (September 30, 1939). The circulation increased to 500 after No. 27, perhaps because it became available for sale for ¥0.80. The price was reduced to ¥0.50 from No. 28 until No. 38 (July

23 Kaimu Hōkoku 1942.
After that, no price was printed on the Bulletin. The Bulletin again was published regularly and starting from No. 46 (April 1, 1941), it was published on the first day of the month, except No. 51 which came on the fifth. There was no indication how many copies had been published after No. 46. The copies had been distributed to the members, and they did not increase drastically. It is assumed that it did not go beyond 500 until 1944, when they said the membership had "greatly increased." They announced in issue 60 of June 1, 1942, in the section "Respectfully Informing the Members" that they refused to sell to non-members due to the lack of paper. Since then, the publication became difficult; they had to delay publication and to shorten pages. The last issue, No. 90 (December 1944), printed an apology saying "The January, February and March issues of the Philippine Information Bulletin will not be published since all the manuscripts and materials were burnt due to the bombings. We sincerely apologize."

As regards the supplements and extra issues of the Bulletin, the following issues had a supplement: Nos. 12, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 28. There was an extra supplement issue (March 15, 1941) between No. 45 and No. 46. In the supplement of No. 12 an article entitled "To Our Filipino Friends Regarding Japan–China Conflict" by YAMAMURA Umejirō, one of the counselors, was included. He expressed concern that the deterioration of the Japan–China relationship after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (or Lugouqiao Incident, July 7, 1937) might affect the Filipinos. The other articles included publication of ENOSAWA Hisashi’s speech, reprints of letters to the editors in the dailies, and people’s reactions to the incident in the Philippines. The supplement of No. 21 was classified as "secret," indicating that the issues were not to be given to anyone, and discretion was required. It carried a speech given by the former Consul General in Manila, UCHIYAMA Kiyoshi, entitled "On the U.S.–Philippine Relationship." It discussed the problem of Philippine independence and the U.S.–Philippine relationship after independence. The supplement for No. 22 was a reprint of a newspaper article that appeared in the daily in the Philippines. It was written by Paul VERZOSA, the head of the Fourth Philippine Educational Tours to Japan and the editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Commonwealth. The article was based on his speech introducing Japan and its people and his impression of Japan. The supplement of No. 25 was also classified as "secret" and consisted of three articles in Japanese: "On the Davao Industry: Educational Round Table Discussion;" "The First Informal Gathering for Friendly Discussion on the Philippine Problem;" and "Preparation for Organizing Society for the Filipino Students in Japan." The supplement for No. 26 was "On the Various Philippine Groups Which Are Expected to Visit Japan This Spring in Order to Investigate and Tour Japan to See How the [China] Incident Has Affected Japan" (in Japanese). The above supplements were all politically inclined. The sup-
plement for No. 28 chronicled a radio program, "Radio Scenery: Touring around the Philippines," meant to make the Japanese listeners/readers more aware of the Philippines. The extra issue was published due to "many different kinds of news being dispatched that required reporting immediately and which was argued as having been" caused by the rapid changes taking place due to the strained relationship between Japan and the U.S.A.

The Philippine Society of Japan published, besides the Bulletin, around 20 other publications. Even before the Bulletin came out, four issues of the "Firipin Shiryō (Philippine Source Materials)" and a few others were published. Except the books about the source materials and on laws and regulations, there were hardly any publications that took book form. The rest were merely pamphlets with less than 100 pages. One exception was a book entitled Hitō no Kiki (The Crisis in the Philippines) (1941, 348 pages, in Japanese) written by SATŌ Ken’nosuke, which was published by the Kansai Branch. In this sense, we can say that the Bulletin was the main publication of the Society.

The content of the articles could be gleaned from each issue’s table of contents. Starting with No. 5 (July 15, 1937), the heading of the magazine had three classifications; "Information," "Source Materials," and "Miscellaneous." They added "A Frontispiece" starting from No. 14 (April 15, 1938). Basically, these three classifications remained until No. 34 (March 28, 1940), although sometimes the following classifications were added: "Appendix," "The Tone of the Bulletin," "European Situation and the Philippines," "The Editorial," and "Society Activities." The new categories "Essay" (No. 35, April 28, 1940), "Lecture" (No. 37), and "Contribution" (No. 38) were added. Starting from No. 48 (June 1, 1941), the category "Information" was further divided into the following three sub-headings; "Economics-Trade-Industry," "National News," and "Military-Self Defense." The new heading called "War Situation" appeared in No. 55 (January 1, 1942) and "Collection of Discussions" appeared in No. 57 (March 1, 1942). Both headings dealt substantially with the policy of how to govern the Philippines, counter-measures to be taken, the situation in general, as well as Philippine culture.

Around this time, in 1941, many articles and reports penned by the Filipino specialists were translated and printed in the Bulletin. The above-mentioned new headings indicate that the Society members became conscious of the impending war between Japan and the U.S.A. and the subsequent Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The heading "Collection of Discussions" disappeared from No. 79 (January 1, 1944) in order to "increase circulation with fewer pages" due to "sudden increase of membership in recent months." Instead, the Bulletin placed "more importance on reporting about the local situation in the Philippines and offering source materials."
As regards the three headings, the section on “Information,” reported the political situation in the Philippines, which was reproduced from the English dailies published in Manila, such as the Tribune and the Manila Daily Bulletin, as well as Japanese newspapers such as the Nippi Shim bun (published in Davao), the Manira Nichi Nichi Shim bun (formerly Manira Shōkō Shinpō), and the Dabao Nichi Nichi. There was also much information coming from the Bureau of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second heading, “Source Materials,” included legal matters such as pending bills, laws, and ordinances, or economic statistics. The third heading, “Miscellaneous,” carried various information mainly related to culture.

Topics pertinent to the economy were merely information lifted from the following sources: “Consul’s Report” (Overseas Economic Situation), Gaimu-shō Tsūshō-kyoku Nippō (Daily Report of Bureau of Commerce: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Minami-Shina oyobi Nan’yō Jōhō (South China and South Seas Information), Manira Nihon Shōgyō Kaigisho Tsūhō (Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Manila Information) and Dabao Shōkō-kaihō (Davao Chamber of Commerce and Industry Report). Thus, the Bulletin did not have its own news gathering system. The publication of the Japanese residents in Davao called Dabao Nihonjin-kai Kaihō (Davao Japanese Society Bulletin) was also an important source of information. Most of the Japanese printed material published in the Philippines no longer exists today, except that reproduced in the Bulletin. In short, it was evident that political articles under the heading of “Information” and the ones on culture found in “Miscellaneous” were rather short, while the economy-related articles in “Source Materials” were longer, occupying more space than other topics, although the number of articles in this section was less.

After the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, articles written by the Research Section of the Society and its officials or members increased. The “Information” relied on the news source from the Domei News Agency in Manila or the news from the Asahi. Articles reproduced from the Manila Tribune and the Manira Shim bun appeared in issue No. 73 (July 1, 1944), but reprints from the Tribune soon disappeared.

An index of the articles printed in the Bulletin would reveal the frequently reported personality, places or subject matter. The name “Quezon” appeared the most, 178 times, followed by “Sayre,” 51; “McNutt,” 43; “Roxas,” 33; “Osmeña,” 30. All of them, except Roxas, sometimes appeared not by the name but by their official positions, such as President, Vice President, and High Commissioner. In the economic reports, the name “Leopoldo AGUINALDO,” who was the former chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and had a close relationship with the Furukawa Plantation Company, appeared only five times.

As for the names of places, “Manila” appears the most, followed by “Davao” and “Mindan-
ao,” where many Japanese resided. It was followed by “Far East” which appeared 36 times, and "England," 30 times. The names of other countries and places included Australia, China, Singapore, Spain, the Soviet Union, Taiwan, Germany, Hong Kong, Dutch East Indies and Washington. The appearance of these names shows that many articles in the Bulletin discussed the international situation.

In the group “subject,” the word “President” appeared the most, followed by “High Commissioner.” This is the same as the name index. The words “Assembly/Congress” and “independence” were often seen, which means the Society was interested in what had been discussed in the Assembly/Congress regarding Philippine independence and how the U.S.A. had reacted. Many articles on “trade” appeared, and attention was paid to “sugar” and “cotton.” After the Japanese occupation, “cotton” appeared a lot, indicating that the Japanese military administration was interested in cotton cultivation. The Bulletin paid attention to the Japanese residents in the Philippines, and at the same time quite a few articles on goodwill and cultural interchange, such as "Japan–Philippine Student Conference" and "Philippine Educational Tour to Japan," were published. Economic articles included how they entertained a visiting business group on the way to the U.S.A. in 1939 and in 1940 the Manila Commerce and Industry Inspection Tour Group (led by Sawamatsu) which was officially invited by the City of Tōkyō.

As seen above, most articles published in the Bulletin were on political trends. Therefore we do not share the opinion that “a close look at the information disseminated by the society will hardly give the impression that it was a cultural society: the great bulk of its publications on the Philippines was about Philippine natural resources and economy.” This is not to deny that the interest of some members was on mineral resources and the economic-political situation as seen in the following articles. For instance, the very first article that appeared in the No. 1 issue was indeed on natural resources: "Investigation of Iron Ore in the Philippines Undertaken by the National Development Company; Natural Resource Development Plan Materializes.” Besides this article, there were two more articles on the mining industry in the same issue, and similar articles continued to appear in other issues. As we noted, the three principles of the Japanese military administration were indeed the following: 1) to procure immediately important defense resources 2) to recover of peace and order and 3) to ensure self-sustenance of the operational army. These facts made the members more concerned for natural resources and the economic-political situation. However, judging from the index, articles on cultural topics appeared more often than those on political and economic topics.

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This meant that the cultural propaganda was actually being waged, and it was the primary purpose of the Society. In other words, we may say that the real motive was cultural propaganda and they used economic advancement as a cover.25

**Concluding Remarks**

Previous studies concluded that the activities of the Society and the articles printed in the *Bulletin* were closely associated with Japanese economic penetration of the Philippines. To this, we disagree given the content of the Society’s Bulletin and other conditions prevailing at that time.

For one, most of the trade between Japan and the Philippines prior to the war was carried out through two ports in Kansai; one in Osaka and the other in Kobe. For instance, in the 1930s, Kobe Port occupied 50–70 percent of the trade, and if combined with Osaka Port, it would be 80 percent of all the trade. The same was true of the trade with other Asian countries. If the promotion of exports from Japan to the Philippines was the primary purpose, then it would have been more appropriate for the society to originate from Kansai.

Furthermore, in the Philippines, the Japanese were quite active in retail trade such as the bazaar business, although the Chinese still had a strong influence on the distribution network.26 In British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, the major Japanese trading companies drove local Japanese bazaars. However, Japanese business in the Philippines was different. Major Japanese trading companies, whose main offices were in Tōkyō, neither had much influence in the Philippines, nor had close personal relationships with the Filipinos. Further, there was hardly anybody among the members of the Society who had substantial knowledge of the economic situation in the Philippines. Most of the trustees came from government offices, the military, and enterprises in Tōkyō. When the Society was established, there was no one among the councilors who had any relations with the Philippines. When these people argued, they had the situation in East Asia or other Southeast Asian countries in mind. Therefore, they lacked a realistic approach to the Philippine situation.

In this respect, I believe that Japanese discourse on the Philippines should be analyzed within the context of the history of modern Japanese thought as well as the Japanese attitude toward East Asian countries. Another point I would like to make is that the expatriate Japa-

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25 Yoshihisa also analyzed the title of 274 major essays. His conclusion was as follows: Political-administration related articles; 84 (31%), Economic-industry related articles, 136 (50%); social-education-literature related articles, 27 (10%); history-geography related articles, 11 (4%); Japan-Philippine relations related articles, 14 (5%); bibliography related articles, 2 (1%) [Yoshihisa, 1988, p. 28].

26 See Chapter 4.
nese in the Philippines were not respected; therefore, there was no effective communication between Japanese and Filipinos. This attitude continued during the Japanese occupation as mentioned in one of my essays.27

The Philippine Society of Japan was established by people in Tōkyō, who had hardly any knowledge of the Philippine reality. Even if they aspired for cultural propaganda and economic maneuvering, there was no one who was capable of doing such works. The economic maneuvering was expressed only in discourse through speeches, which gave a false impression and led to misunderstanding that the real purpose of the Society’s activity was “economic advancement.” What the Society managed to do was gather information about the political situation in the Philippines and its relations with United States. Without obtaining concrete information on the Philippines, economic maneuvering was not possible. For this, the Society depended mainly on influential Filipinos, most of them Nacionalista Party members who frequently made stops in either Kōbe or Yokohama on the way to or from the U.S.A. For the Society, cultural propaganda such as cultural and goodwill exchange, was the only activity they could afford to carry out. At the same time, such programs were readily accepted by the Filipinos.

In relation to goodwill activities these consisted merely of social events and could hardly be labeled as cultural propaganda. Also we could not say that there were successful, especially when you look at the number of participants in the Philippine Student Tours to Japan. The very first tour in 1935 had 58 participants, the second 51; and the third had jumped to 86. However, after the full scale Sino–Japanese War in 1937, the number declined. The fourth tour saw only 16 and the fifth, 17. The last tour in 1940 was merely nine delegates of which there were four Filipino students, two Japanese students, a Filipino professor, his wife, and a newspaperman.28

The main activities of the Society during the Japanese occupation were centered on cultural propaganda as seen by the fact that the president of the Society, TOKUGAWA Yorisada, actively engaged in such activities. To support the cultural propaganda activities, the expatriate Japanese who were well versed in the local situation were mobilized; however, they were mainly the employees of major Japanese companies such as the Ohta Development Company or Furukawa Plantation Company, not the bazaar owners who had wide and intimate personal relationships with the Filipinos. The lectures held in Japan during the war years were deliv-

ered by those who were sent to the Philippines, just as in the prewar time. It was only on February 22, 1944, when the Society started to hold a monthly meeting, called Informal Gathering for Friendly Discussion on the Philippine Economy in order to establish communication regarding research/study on industry and economy, to exchange opinions and to obtain local information.\textsuperscript{29}

The propaganda/maneuvering in the Philippines activities of the Japanese started even before the Philippine Revolution (1896–1902). These have been documented by Goodman, Yu-Jose, Terami (-Wada), Saniel, Hatano and Ikehata.\textsuperscript{30} Even after the revolution, the Japanese activities continued, which can be gleaned from the detailed reports made by the Philippine Constabulary between 1906 and 1913.\textsuperscript{31} Japanese operatives had been integrating with the first President of the Republic, Emilio AGUINALDO, until the Japanese occupation in 1942. WATANABE Kaoru resided in Manila for more than 17 years and served as trade correspondence for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. He was constantly in touch with Filipino leaders. He was the author of many books (all in Japanese) including \textit{Firippin Zairyū Hōjin Shōgyō Hattatsu-shi} (The History of Development of Japanese Commerce in the Philippines) (Nan’yō Kyōkai, 1935), which was published in commemoration of his tenth year of residency in Manila. He published another book right after the outbreak of Pacific War under the sub-title “My Personal View on Cultural Propaganda in the Southern Area.” His involvement in the Society was minor except that he gave a lecture in the Kansai Branch on November 27,

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Philippine Information Bulletin}, No. 81, March 1, 1944, pp. 47–48.


\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Philippine Constabulary Reports}, 1906–13,” 4 volumes, Harry Hill Bandholtz Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.
None of the people from or related to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry became members, not to mention officials of the Society. Furthermore, the fruits of their maneuvering activities were not reflected in the Bulletin or Official Report of the Society.

The Philippine Society in Japan continued its existence after the War. The third president in 1954 was MURATA Shōzō, the first Japanese ambassador to the Philippines under the occupation. After his death, TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke, the chairman plenipotentiary of the Japanese side in Philippines–Japan Reparation Agreement, assumed the position in 1957. Other presidents included ITŌ Takeo (president of Osaka Shōsen Kaisha (O.S.K. Line)), NAGANO Mamoru, Minister of Transportation, and KOBAYASHI Setsutarō, president of Fuji Film. They were followed by former Prime Ministers such as KISHI Nobusuke and FUKUDA Takeo.33


Chapter 7: The Japanese Residents of “Dabao-kuo”

Introduction

*Manira no asa motte Nippon no hata o tsunagu ni tariru*—It is Manila hemp that will tether the Flag of the Rising Sun.

This is the last line of an attempt at Chinese poetry by SUGANUMA Tadakaze (popularly known as Sadakaze or Teifū) upon his departure for Manila in April of 1889. Suganuma was on his way to the Philippines to conduct field surveys for the purpose of Japanese emigration and colonization. He fell victim to cholera and died suddenly in the course of his investigation on July 6 of that year, just before a brief return to Japan to prepare for the establishment of a Manila hemp cordage company. Manila hemp (also referred to as by its botanical name *abaca*) would in later years be grown in huge quantities by Japanese colonists. It was the rich abaca-growing region of Davao in southern Mindanao that would develop into “Dabao-kuo,” a Japanese community with a population of some 20,000 immigrants.¹ At the outbreak of the Pacific War, Dabao-kuo was occupied by the Japanese military, and thus “tethering the Rising Sun” with Manila hemp was realized.

The main topics of this chapter deal with (1) the expectations and behavior of the Davao Japanese toward Japan both prior to and during the war, and (2) how this immigrant community affected local Philippine society.²

I shall first examine what modern Japan expected of the emigrants and colonists that departed from its shores. Then, I shall examine through the pages of such Japanese-language newspapers as the *Manira Shimbun* and *Dabao Shimbun* exactly how Japanese residents of

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¹ The figure of 20,000 for Japanese population is the result of a general notion about the size of the community, and there is no way of verifying it statistically. However, none of the available statistics put that figure over 20,000. The maximum recorded population figure of 19,089 appeared in an announcement made by the Davao Japan Association in the January 23, 1943 issue of the *Manira Shimbun*. For a detailed discussion of the population issue, see Hayase Shinzō, *Firipin-yuki Tokōsha Chōsa, 1901–39* (An Analysis on Japanese Emigrants to the Philippines, 1901–39: From Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Record Office, Archival Documents ‘Lists of Those People Going Overseas’). Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyōto University, 1995, 141 p.

² Defining the Japanese “residents” of the Philippines in terms of settlement patterns is by no means an easy task. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the tendency of Davao Japanese to set up permanent residency after their arrival in the Philippines soon led to their losing features that might have characterized them as migratory laborers or temporary residents. While the term *zairyū-hōjin*, or “Japanese citizens residing overseas,” may suggest the latter, at certain times and among certain groups the term *zaijū-nippon-jin*, or “Japanese settlers,” may be more appropriate. However, due to the difficulty of actually determining the specific times and groups to be thus differentiated, for at least the time after the outbreak of the war, the term “Japanese citizens residing overseas” seems more appropriate—the term used in the present study.
the Philippines cooperated in the Japanese Army’s war effort. Finally, I shall depict the image of the Japanese residents of Davao projected to the Filipino population, based on the records of war-crimes tribunals.

1. **Japanese Emigrants and Colonists to the Philippines**

(1) **The Overall Plan**

Migration and colonization activities have not always taken place under an atmosphere of peace. Often throughout history such activities have been carried out in the context of military expansion with migrants performing the role of vanguards for the ultimate purpose of colonization and territorial occupation by armed force.

In modern Japan, many proponents in both the northern and southern expansionist schools of thought agreed that Japanese emigrants should be viewed within the context of the nation’s imperialist and colonial interests. Three proposals made by the previously mentioned SUGANUMA Tadakaze, as well as YOKOO Tōsaku and SUGIURA Jūgō, around the beginning of the second decade of the Meiji era (1887) to send Japanese colonists to the Spanish-occupied Philippines all held firmly to the principles of Japanese expansionism.

Yokoo, who was a section head in the records department of the Metropolitan Police, called for the organization of a public forum concerning the South Seas, with the specific purpose of planning the relocation of “the poor, new commoners and convicts” to the Philippine islands of Palawan, Sulu and Mindanao, the leasing of land through “establishing friendly relations with local tribal chiefs and mutual trust among the islanders,” and the distribution of those leaseholds. Similarly, in his booklet entitled *Hankai Yume Monogatari* (Revelation of a Bold and Courageous Dream) was published in 1886 Suganuma called for the relocation of “new commoners” to the Philippines for the purpose of raising a rebellion against the Spanish colonial government. In an addendum to his 1888 commercial history of Japan entitled “Shin-Nihon no Tonan no Yume (A Dream of New Japan’s Grand Endeavor)”

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3 "New Commoners" (*Shin-heimin*) is an official term used in the first modern population registry (1872) to designate commoners under the previous Tokugawa social system; they had been exempt from taxes due to their special occupations or economic condition. Most noteworthy were those who had been given the social status of *eta* and were involved in the so-called unclean tasks of slaughtering animals, disposing of animal carcasses, and cleaning imperial palaces, executions, and the like. These persons along with the homeless (*hinin*), were “liberated” from such feudal statuses in 1871 and incorporated into the commoner class, which was subjected to both taxation and military inscription. These people, who continued to live in the ghettos provided for them during the Tokugawa period, were discriminated upon in marriage, educational opportunities, and employment, a problem that exists to this day.

Suganuma quotes from *Hankai Yume Monogatari* that according to “one man’s plan:”

We [should] gradually move people to the Philippines to act as subordinates engaged in personal service, cultivation and crafts, waiting for the right opportunity. Through such tact, what traces of suspicion will there be? What constitutional problems will be posed? What will we have to fear about breaking international law? We move to the Philippines and make friendly contact with the natives. After all, we are both of oriental origin. That is to say, we are not people who will quickly forget the intimate friendship that has arisen between us. We are well aware that, in the countries of Western Europe, despite their own praise of freedom and emphasis on civil liberties, they ignore the distaste for the exploitation they have foisted on the oriental people and that they haven not the least concern about the despotic and cruel governance they exercise over these people. Nowhere is this state of affairs more intolerable than in the governance of the Philippines. The cruelty of the regime will become fully apparent to all within the next year or so, presenting us with an opportunity that comes once in a thousand year. Our comrades scattered around the Philippines should seize this chance to raise a rebellion and fire a shot that will be heard around the world, like that one fired at the onset of the American Revolution. In accordance with the promises we have made, and following the orders of our military commanders, we will bring down the present government of the Philippines in one fell swoop, and abolish all of its despotic laws and cruel exploitation. Thus, the hope of four million people for rain clouds in the midst of drought will be fulfilled, as the women greet our army of deliverance with baskets of food and jars of water, and the men will jump for joy and applaud in obeisance to the military wisdom of our leaders. It will not be long before the weak find their true protectors.5

Suganuma, who regarded Spain “as the most backward race in Europe,” states, “The first enemy that Japan should proceed to wage war upon is not Korea, China, or even England, Russia, Germany or France. It is Spain.” He concludes, “After we colonize Luzon and succeed in organizing the natives to oust the Spanish, the Filipino people will continue to receive our assistance in establishing the foundations of national independence, as sovereignty over the new kingdom of Luzon is entrusted to the Emperor of Japan.” For all this to be accomplished,

Suganuma estimated that some 90,000 Japanese would have to be sent to the Philippines to serve as migrant laborers in the sugarcane, abaca and tobacco fields.\(^6\)

This kind of thinking represented not only at least one portion of the Meiji-era expansionists but also a call for economic development through overseas colonization and economic advance in the face of serious overpopulation and scarce resources that become apparent after Japan was opened to free international trade. Due to this clamor, the Meiji Government, fearing that its citizens might be subjected to conditions of slave labor abroad, conducted surveys of such popular destinations for emigrants as Central and South America and Southeast Asia, in order to make certain that the rights of Japanese migrants were being protected. The results of these surveys were made public between 1908 and 1914 in thirteen volumes entitled *Imin Chōsa Hōkoku* (Emigrant Survey Reports). Information on the Philippines is contained in volumes 1 and 6. Here the Philippines is considered a very desirable destination for Japanese, and it urged that the most promising migrants be sent there.\(^7\)

The Japanese diplomatic mission in Manila hoped for the arrival of Japanese immigrants interested in settling down as rice farmers; however, of the 2,000 or so Japanese residing in the Philippines during the final years of the Meiji era (the first decade of the Twentieth century), the majority were engaged in such occupations as prostitution, roadwork, and carpentry. Moreover, these immigrants had entered the country as “contracted” migratory laborers, a status that had been outlawed in U.S.-occupied Philippine territories. Such was hardly an appropriate existence for immigrants who had come from the first country in Asia to achieve modernization. They were regarded as inferior in both appearance and mannerisms to the Caucasian foreigners, the Spanish and American colonists, that whom the Filipinos were accustomed, and they were employed in manual labor, a type of work that Caucasian foreigners would not even think of engaging in. For these reasons, Japanese immigrants were unable to gain the respect of the Filipino people. There was also a wide gap between the Japanese emigrant envisioned by the diplomatic corps of modern Japan and the realities of the Japanese workers who actually came to live in the Philippines. For this reason, the consular reports were filled with contradictory statements reflecting this gap between the real and the ideal

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\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 680–681, 698. A more detailed discussion of this point may be found in Hayase Shinzō, “Japan and the Philippines: The ‘Southward Advance’ School of Thought and ‘The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’,” *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 47, First Quarter (January 1999), pp. 30–47.

showing the growing impatience felt by members of the diplomatic corps. However, on the occasion of World War I, a Japanese community with strong tendencies toward permanent settlement began to develop in the vicinity of Davao. Whether or not these Davao residents met the expectations of the diplomatic corps concerning Japanese immigrants to the Philippines requires some explanation.

(2) The Origins of the "Dabao-kuo"

The Spanish conquistadors first arrived at Davao during the mid-nineteenth century. The development of the region, however, did not get under way until 1898 when, under U.S. occupation, a group of retired American soldiers and other Europeans opened abaca and coconut plantations in the area.

The Japanese who first came to Davao did so for the purpose of working on these plantations, but those who contracted to work in April 1903 for a year were unable to stand the horrible working conditions there and departed before their term of employment has been completed. Also around this time, a group of Japanese migratory workers, who had been employed in building the Benguet (Kennon) Road which led to the cooler environs of Baguio in the northern mountains of Luzon, came to Davao under the leadership of one ŌTA Kyōzaburō. During 1904 and 1905, some 350 Japanese migrated to Davao. Ōta himself, who arrived in July 1905, first set up a store, then in 1907 applied to purchase land that was to be disposed of by the government, and founded a stock corporation called Ohta Development Company. In 1914 FURUKAWA Yoshizō (Gizō) established the Furukawa Plantation Company with assistance from the Ito Trading Company (the predecessor of Itō Chū Shōji and Marubeni trading companies). Then, because of the prosperity enjoyed from mobilization for World War I, surplus capital began flowing into Davao from Japan, resulting in a sudden swelling of the Japanese community there. By the end of 1918, there were seventy-one Japanese-managed agri-businesses operating in Davao, and as the application for leases of land being disposed of by the government continued, the Japanese population there was estimated to have surpassed the 10,000 mark.

From that time on, the Japanese population fluctuated along with economic vagaries until 1923, from which time steady increases were recorded over the next two decades. As the Jap-

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anese population of Davao grew, so did the region’s production of abaca. During the 1920s Davao’s abaca output exceeded that of the Bicol region of Luzon, which had been the leading producer up until that time. During the 1930s Davao claimed one-third or more of all the abaca being produced throughout the Philippines, and from 1938 that share rose to over half of the total Philippine production. The greater part of the abaca produced in Davao was grown by Japanese. These growers were successful in producing a stable supply of inexpensive, high-quality abaca; and it was the mutual cooperation on which the Japanese community was founded that enabled these growers to eliminate enough non-Japanese growers to monopolize, in effect, the local industry. Since the development of Japanese-led abaca production brought about general prosperity for Davao, the area came to be called “Dabao-kuo” after Manchu-kuo, the state established by Japanese colonists and the military in northern China.

In the process of “Dabao-kuo”’s development, labor shortages were filled by lowland Christian Filipinos who came mainly from the Visayan Islands to work for the Japanese growers as their subordinates. In the absence of any other industry of note in the Davao region during the prewar era, all of its residents came to lead lives dependent on the Manila hemp industry. The activities of the local elite, made up of politicians, administrators, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals, were all related in one way or another to the Japanese community there. Even the Chinese community, which played a valuable economic role throughout the Philippines, was in Davao secondary in importance to the Japanese business community.9

The fluctuations in the Japanese population in Davao match the rise and fall of the total Japanese population in the Philippines. Conversely, we can say that the fluctuations in the Japanese population of the Philippines depended on the rise and fall of the population of Davao. During the 1930s, the 9,000-male Japanese population remained stable, as the female population steadily grew, 5,985 women occupied 35.7 percent of the population by 1938. In this way, Davao was transformed from a center for Japanese migrant laborers into a residential community of Japanese families struggling side by side. This was the major reason the residents of Davao would not return to Japan after the onset of the Pacific War.

On the other hand, despite an increase in the number of Japanese residents in Manila to 7,376 in July 1943, the female population, which comprised 30 percent or more of that number during the 1930s, suddenly dropped to 23.9 percent.10 In contrast, the Davao population, which was announced as 19,089 in January 1943, was made up of 38.4 percent women, an ac-

10 Manira Shimbun, September 4, 1943.
tual increase from prewar figure. In particular, those residents classified as minors included 4,122 boys and 4,240 girls, coming to a total of 8,362 or 43.8 percent of the Davao community. People who had immigrated from Okinawa numbered 10,166 or 53.3 percent of the total population.\footnote{Ibid., January 23, 1943.} One more demographic aspect should be considered, and that is the number of mestizos of Japanese and Filipino blood. While we are not able to get an accurate picture of the conditions under which Japanese colonists intermarried with the Bagobo natives of Davao and the lowland Filipino Christians who migrated there, the Philippine census report of 1939, 269 Filipinas living at Davao (894 nationwide) who had Japanese husbands and who had given birth to 754 (2,358 nationwide) children. Some 267 (740 nationwide) of these mestizo children were registered as Japanese citizens. Davao in this sense represented a rather unique Japanese Philippine community with many women and children, including mestizos, and dominated by natives of Okinawa.

After experiencing a population increase as the result of wartime prosperity, Davao of the 1930s became further populated with families arriving to live with their bread earners, exactly the situation that the Japanese government had imagined as ideal for communities of agricultural settlements abroad. The Davao Japanese were not rice growers but were cultivators of abaca that was internationally acknowledged as an important item for military use. Nevertheless, the Davao Japanese did not rate very highly in the Japanese imperial world. In addition to the stigma attached to Japanese who moved abroad in general—since most of the Davao Japanese were Okinawans and a good number of them had local Filipina wives—they were frequently looked upon as a community of “second-rate Japanese.” Conversely, the Davao Japanese were constantly being called upon to be “model Japanese citizens,” in an environment where some 20,000 Japanese immigrants would be turned into “Dabao-kuo.”

2. Davao Japanese Residents’ Cooperation in the War

   (1) “Place of Death”

   Today there exists a group known as the Dabao-kai (Davao Society), a friendship organization of former residents of “Dabao-kuo” who have returned to Japan. There is also a monument called the “Dabao no Tō (Davao Memorial)” completed on March 28, 1972 at Mabunino-oka in Okinawa, where a remembrance service is held each year on May 15. Within this memorial a ledger of the deceased is kept, and as of May 15, 1988 a total of 4,627 names (including repetitions) have been entered in it. Along with each name has been entered place of birth, and date and place of death. The “place of death” entries are particularly indicative of
the nature of the Davao community’s cooperation in the Japanese war effort in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{12}

The most frequent “place of death” that appears in the memorial ledger is Tamogan, north of Davao, where 314 Japanese “mainlanders” and 1,115 Okinawans met their end. These numbers increases if we include those who died in the vicinity of Tamogan. Tamogan was designated on April 29, 1945 as the evacuation point for Japanese nationals after U.S. forces landed at Cotabato. These deaths were clearly the result of attacks by the American forces on the Japanese soldiers who were accompanied by Japanese civilians. Arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese civilians were made neither by the field army in Manila nor by the local forces in Davao. Despite the complete lack of a policy regarding the safety of the lives of Japanese civilians, those Davao residents who died at Tamogan were first ordered by the army to accompany them as cultivators in guaranteeing food self-sufficiency, after which they were abandoned. Most of casualties in Tamogan died between June and September 1945.

The second most frequently appearing place of death is Davao itself, where 496 mainlanders and 669 Okinawans perished. Third is Daliaon (Daliao), Davao, the scene of 64 mainlander and 148 Okinawan deaths. Almost all of these deaths occurred in the concentration camp there between August and November 1945. In a listing of those who died in that concentration camp, which is in the possession of FUKUURA Yukio and was made public in 1993, there are 734 names, and of those for whom age was listed, almost half of the total, or 355, were under the age of ten. The wretched fate of Japanese civilians at the end of the War in the Philippines is sufficiently described by the number of children who perished in Daliaon. 129 mainlanders died “on Mindanao.” In addition to this figure that indicates various locations around Mindanao Island, 12 mainlanders and 48 Okinawans died in Cotabato. In addition, Davao residents who died outside of Mindanao “on Luzon” and “on Negros” numbered 86 and 62 respectively. Of the deceased in Luzon, some were those who fled with the Japanese army to Kiangan in the mountains of northern Luzon.

One cannot help noticing the relatively large number of mainland Japanese who died in places other than Davao. This can probably be attributed to the fact that the employees of such companies as Ohta Development Company and Furukawa Plantation Company were well-informed about Philippine affairs, could speak English, were scattered all over the Phil-

\textsuperscript{12} “Dabao no Tō Go-Reichō Eirei-mei (A Listing of the Names in the Ledger of the Deceased at the Davao Memorial),” \textit{Dabao} (Dabao-kai), No. 42, September 1988, pp. 80–104; No. 43, March 1989, pp. 111–142. This ledger contains the names of those who died before the Pacific War, but the majority died during wartime. Among those born in the four main islands of Japan, some names are listed according to company, and these include Okinawans and other persons who came to Davao after the start of the Pacific War.
In the Philippines, and cooperated with the Army in its production activities and as interpreters. On the other hand, the Okinawans remained in Davao to work mainly at increasing the Army's food supply. For this reason, many of them fled along with the Army to Tamogan, where they fell victim to U.S. attacks or to starvation.

(2) The Invasion of Davao and the Japanese Community

There are clear reasons why the Japanese residents of Davao continued to cooperate in the war effort, despite their large casualties. To begin with, they felt shame or guilt over their failure to fulfill the obligations of regular citizens by applying for draft exemptions and the like. Secondly, they feared they would be considered out of touch or even as foreigners, a fear...
which caused them to feel extreme sensitivity and loyalty to the nation. There were other special circumstances that evoked loyalty to Japan. For instance, Japanese nationals who were captured at the outbreak of the war and put in concentration camps were eventually rescued by the Japanese forces and for this the nationals were grateful.

The Davao Japanese were incarcerated just after December 8, 1941, but with the Japanese invasion of Mindanao beginning on the twentieth, they were almost all released by the twenty-fourth. However, in the confusion fifty-seven Davao Japanese were killed, and due to delays in the invasion plan, their incarceration lasted for over ten days, resulting in their indescribable exuberance upon release. The ecstatic scene of the release was described in the official Japanese-language textbooks for primary school students published in 1943 and 1944.

Before the excitement could calm down, the Davao Japanese were organized into civil defense brigades and were assigned duties related to propaganda, food supply, law enforcement and traffic control. Until the restoration of normal conditions, Japanese associations were integrated into eleven civil defense brigades with association chairmen assuming leadership. The brigades were mobilized by local reservists and youth groups under the direction of the military authorities, and each major brigade organized a law enforcement team that was equipped with army-issued rifles and charged with keeping the peace. As early as the period between January 15 and February 3, 1942, six members of the civil defense brigade were killed in action during propaganda activities. Later, the civil defense brigade was renamed “The Volunteers,” and put under the command of the Military Police for law enforcement, intelligence, and propaganda activities.14

(3) Resident Japanese as “Models of Deportment for the People of the Philippines”

The image of the Japanese resident of the Philippines envisioned by the Japanese military appeared frequently on the pages of both the Manira Shimbun (a Japanese-language newspaper managed by the Tōkyō Nichi-Nichi Shimbun and Osaka Mainichi Shimbun publishing companies) and its local branch newspaper, the Dabao Shimbun.15

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15 The Manira Shimbun has been reprinted in its entirety (67 issues missing) at the Nihon Tosho Sentā in the form of a reduced-size publication entitled Manira Shimbun: Shukusatsu- Fukkoku-
These newspapers, which aimed at “the education of the natives, the introduction of Japanese culture, and the edification of Japanese residents,” were published under the guidance of the Fourteenth Army; but due to the lack of diffusion of Japanese reading skills among the Filipino population, their readership was, in effect, exclusively Japanese. The *Manira Shimbun*, with a daily print run of 5,000 copies, seldom circulated anywhere outside Manila and its environs, and thus ended up only “edifying” the Manila Japanese community.  

The *Dabao Shimbun* was of course subject to the same limitations. Their formats were also similar with news on the European war, “The Great East Asian War,” and the war effort in Japan on the front page, and features concerned with current events in Japan, entertainment information, and the like, on the second page. Articles were often shared by the two newspapers. In other words, the content concentrated on information about Japan and the world with circular notice-type information and entertainment news added, all for the purpose of helping local Japanese residents keep in touch with their homeland.

The *Manira Shimbun* was published daily, excepting Mondays, while the *Dabao Shimbun* was forced, just before the air raids that began on August 1, 1944, to cease publication of its Sunday, Wednesday, and Friday issues. In the editorials of the *Manira Shimbun*, we hardly find any ideas or comments related directly to local Japanese residents. Particularly, during the time prior to the worsening of the war effort for Japan—that is, up through mid-1943—in spite of articles and features of importance to local Japanese, almost nothing of such import was taken up in the editorial section. We even see conflicting opinions between at least one local Japanese reporter and members of the military command. One notices criticism of the military scattered here and there in the articles written by such reporters. Moreover, during this same time there was no notable active attempt by the military command to recruit local Japanese residents in the war effort. Its only concern was that Japanese residents conduct themselves as “models of deportment for the people of the Philippines.”

On December 18, 1942, the military command published the results of a discussion over “the deportation of Japanese nationals of undesirable behavior.” Seven Japanese had been accused of “outrageous acts of greed and selfishness insulting the dignity of the Empire.” The introductory portion of the record goes:

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*bannan*, 1991, 5 vols. (November 1, 1942–January 31, 1945). On the other hand, only few copies of the *Dabao Shimbun*, which was first issued on November 16, 1942, are extant. Among these are copies of the December 1942 issues and the issues published between May 1943 and August 1944.

To All Japanese Residents of the Philippines!
As soon as you became residents of the Philippines you became responsible to the past. Under your new destiny and set of responsibilities, you have become warriors on the front lines of the march to realize the great ideals of our Empire. Every move you make, every step you take is not merely one individual’s action, but rather an outward act representing the people of Japan as a whole.

We have taken command of over 16 million Filipino comrades, acting as their fathers and brothers, and marching hand-in-hand, side-by-side in the task of leading their rebuilding and development efforts. It is time that the Japanese residents of the Philippines instill in their daily lives the confidence that we are a race destined to lead the weak throughout our entire 2,600-year history as a nation.17

This type of rhetoric was part of a plan designed to demonstrate to the Filipino people, through the behavior of their Japanese neighbors, the importance of action emphasizing the nation and the superiority of Japan. Unfortunately, the Japanese nationals who came to live in the Philippines were not exactly the type of Japanese in whom the military command was much interested. Within a month after this report, on January 12, 1943, the military command announced the repatriation of six Japanese nationals as decided by the “Committee for the Deportation of Persona non Grata.” At this time the names of the individuals to be deported were made public and the “criminal and improper” behavior resulting in such action was described as “demands for money, goods and labor from war victims, selfishly obtaining and consuming goods produced by the enemy, or making fraudulent claims misrepresenting position/rank to coerce and intimidate.”

Then on January 19, the military command issued a warning that certain Japanese nationals were utilizing the new relationship between the victorious nation (Japan) and the conquered nation (the Philippines) to force Filipino landlords to lower rents to unreasonable levels.18

On the occasion of the Army’s anniversary on March 10, 1943, Lt. Col. INUZUKA Keisuke, then section head of the JMA Bureau of General Affairs, in speaking before a gathering of reservists in Manila, outlined the following three guidelines to be practiced by local Japanese residents.

First, double their efforts in obtaining important defense resources.

17 Manira Shimbun, December 19, 1942.
18 Ibid., January 13, 19, 1943.
Second, realize complete self-sufficiency through means of livelihood in the Philippines, in order not to burden the Japanese economy.

Third, make every attempt to capture the hearts of the Filipino population and instill in them the principles of Japanese military rule, in order to promote smooth, problem-free governance over the occupied territories.

Here we see that Japanese civilian residents of the Philippines were not considered the subject of cooperation in the war effort. Inuzuka put special emphasis on the third guideline calling for “us to capture the hearts of the Filipino people…” explaining in concrete terms, “Those Japanese who threaten the economic lives of the Filipino people and those Japanese who torment our nation for the sake of personal profit are clearly in defiance of this guideline and should be strictly censured.”19

Furthermore, on May 10 of that year the JMA issued its “Ordinance for the Immediate Prosecution of Japanese Criminal Acts,” which read as follows:

Article 1: This ordinance applies to all Japanese residing in the Philippines.

Article 2: Platoon leaders of the Military Police (Kempei-tai) force under the Watari Expeditionary Group (the Fourteenth Army) are authorized to imprison for up to thirty days or impose a fine of up to 50 pesos anyone in their jurisdictions described under Article 1, in the commission of the following acts attacking or defiling the person of any of the people under our governance.

1. Unprovoked, senseless face slapping or any other similar form of insult;
2. Brawling and/or drunken behavior on public thoroughfares;
3. Defecating on city streets;
4. Nakedness or indecent exposure of bodily parts in places within public view;
5. Defilement of churches, chapels, cemeteries, monuments, statues or any similar structure;
6. Posing fraudulently as military personnel or utilizing Japanese citizenship in order to coerce, threaten, or profit through illegal means;
7. Posing fraudulently as a government official, person of aristocratic order, or academic rank, and/or donning decorations or emblems conferred by law, regardless of whether such items are borrowed or counterfeit;
8. Attempting to obstruct crowds of people in churches, theaters or any other public

19 Ibid., March 11, 1943.
places;
9. Forcing restaurants or any similar establishment to entertain guests, to serve food and drink, or entertain after business hours.
10. Any behavior similar to the previous nine acts or any act that does serious injury to the dignity of any imperial subject or endangers the maintenance of public law and order.

Article 3: Anyone who aids or abets the commitment of the acts mentioned in the previous articles will also be liable to prosecution.

Article 4: Offenders will be imprisoned at the military police guardhouse.

Article 5: All fines will be paid immediately upon pronouncement. Those unable to pay all or part of their fines will instead be required to serve prison terms of up to 30 days.

Article 6: Cases will be decided after hearing a statement by the accused and examining the evidence.\

It seems that all of the specific acts listed under article 2 had in fact already been committed. Moreover, all of them describe moral behavior that was apparently given little or no previous notice in Japanese-occupied Philippines. Despite the determination of penal measures in dealing with such acts, the deportment of Japanese residents did not improve. Over the month-and-a-half from the time this ordinance was issued, seven Japanese were punished for assault, acts that were made public without divulging the names of assailants. By the end of 1943, a total of seventeen Japanese had been deported for “disgracing the Empire.”

The manual entitled “Rules of Conduct for Local Japanese Nationals” that appeared in the Manira Shimbun on July 27, 1944 forbade behavior such as face slapping and appearing in public wearing only underwear, and such encouraged courteous behavior such as not wearing hats indoors, not exposing hairy legs, and bowing to passersby. It seems not a few Japanese were embarrassing themselves before the Filipino public, the majority of whom were Christians and had learned their manners from European and American colonizers.

From such circumstances, we can confirm that up until the time that Japan’s war effort took a turn for the worse, the military had no intention of actively organizing local Japanese civilians as a part of its activities. The only request the military made was that Japanese residents behave as role models that would not raise doubts among Filipinos concerning the ability of their Japanese occupiers to lead them. However, among the Japanese actually living in the Philippines, many had become intoxicated by Japan’s military victories and had become

\[20\] Ibid., May 4, 1943.
\[21\] Ibid., June 29, 1943; Dabao Shimbun, June 3, 1944.
arrogant over the Army’s authority, feeling that they could conduct themselves in any way they pleased. Long-time Japanese residents who were now liberated from former restrictions placed on foreigners began behaving in an unrestrained fashion; and there were newcomers who arrived in Japan’s newest possession searching for ways to make easy money. Of these newcomers there were those who were either ignorant of Filipino manners and customs or else did not care about them, and in either case drew grimaces and dirty looks from local people wherever they went. Included in this latter group of brusque newcomers were military personnel and administrators who were put in charge of directing the Japanese civilian population. It is no exaggeration to say that the civilian behavior so frowned upon by the military was exactly the same means by which the army had occupied the Philippines. On the other hand, the Filipino’s lack of respect for the Japanese, their refusal to cooperate with the Japanese military, and rising guerrilla activities were all being blamed on the behavior of the local Japanese population. For all intents and purposes, the military’s lack of initiative to getting local Japanese civilians (who had sunk deep roots in Philippine society and were most capable of “winning the hearts of the people”) involved effectively in the government took away any opportunity for them to help. In other words, before going about “winning the hearts of the Filipino people,” the JMA should have tried to win the hearts of the local Japanese community first.

(4) Monetary Donations

The cooperation that the local Japanese communities did lend to the military was in the indirect and rather lackadaisical form of monetary donations to the war cause, which became popular after mid-1943, when that cause began taking a turn for the worse. The following is a list of the major articles covering this activity, which appeared in the Manira Shimbun and Dabao Shimbun:

May 27, 1943 The Davao Japanese contribute two airplanes worth 224,981 pesos.

Jun. 30, 1943 Japanese residents and others donate 89,992 yen to the overseas soldiers’ relief fund and 601,025 yen to the national defense fund.

Oct. 9, 1943 The Japan Association of Central Luzon donates 545,071 yen to the Army and the Navy for military aircraft.

Jan. 17, 1944 A local Japanese, SAIKYO Gaiji, donates 80,000 pesos to build a Navy aircraft.

Feb. 19, 1944 Japanese residents of northern Luzon donate 11,119 pesos for the national defense and soldiers’ relief funds.

Mar. 1, 1944 A Japanese resident of Manila donates 10,000 pesos each to the Army and
the Navy for aircraft.

**Apr. 11, 1944**  Japanese students of Manila Primary School donate 630 pesos to the Army and the Navy for airplanes.

**Jul. 1944**  The Cotabato Branch of the Japanese Association of Mindanao donates 30,000 pesos to the Ministry of Army for military aircraft.

In the August 10, 1943 issue of the *Manira Shim bun*, there appeared a listing of contributors beginning with the Mori Bicycle Store, which donated 3,000 yen, and MORI Teizô, who donated 2,000 yen. This listing would continue to appear daily thereafter. Mori had arrived in the Philippines in 1904 and became the president of the above bicycle store bearing his name. It was people like Mori, long-standing, successful residents of the Philippines, who led the donation movement. The publication of their names in the newspaper smacks of coercion, and the listing of the donated was probably designed not only to engender a competitive bidding psychology, but also to show in a most pretentious manner the patriotism of the donors.

**5) Volunteer Labor**

The air strikes on Palau during March 1944 helped raise by a notch or two the nervous anxiety already felt by the Japanese military, for it was from Palau that the Japanese has launched their initial attacks on Legazpi, Leyte-Samar, and Davao. In other words, the Japanese knew all too well from first-hand experience how easy it was to launch an attack on the Philippines from a base of operations in Palau.

March 1944 was also an important turning point in the lives of the Japanese civilian residents of the Philippines. To begin with, all the regional Japanese associations were reorganized for the purpose of providing labor and military training. For example, the Japan Association of Central Luzon, centered around Manila, was so reorganized on March 10, and from the eighth all able-bodied male Japanese fifteen years or older were required to provide volunteer work. On the eleventh an initial military training program was implemented for the citizens of Manila. The military reservists who formed the core of these activities were also reorganized on April 16 in ceremonies called “The Formation of Branches of the Coalition of Imperial Reservist Associations of Luzon.” Despite all the pompous ceremonies, the volunteer labor programs never got off the ground. The initial plan for 10 percent of the work force to be employed on weekdays and the whole force to be put to work on Sundays was changed several times regarding days, hours, and personnel before a final mobilization formula of 10 percent on weekdays and 40 percent on Sundays was determined on May 15. The initial program had not been in operation for a month when the *Manira Shim bun* wrote in its editorial
of April 2, “We observe that participation in the work program is by no means producing the results expected of it.” The reasons cited were lack of awareness concerning the present situation on the part of local Japanese residents and poor organization. The Japanese residents of Manila, who spent the great part of their daily lives commuting to work at companies around the city, had little time for volunteer work with their neighborhood associations. However, even before the war, in contrast to retailers in Manila who would volunteer their Japanese staff members for military-related work and leave their shops in the care of Filipino employees, those who worked at the large trading companies did not participate, complaining about “how long this volunteer labor is going to last, or that the work is meant only to drill them into shape.” Also in Manila, which was in the midst of a very tense atmosphere, Japanese residents were made to take time off from work to perform such tasks as freight loading, since Filipino workers could not be employed without compromising secrecy at the same time. In addition, after the main force of the Japanese Army abandoned Manila, many Japanese civilians were inducted during the final year of the war into the ranks of the Manila defense force that remained behind to defend the city.

In contrast, the tension surrounding the Davao Japanese increased at a quicker pace. Because Davao was also a fleet supply depot designated as the Navy’s Thirty-second Special Base of Operations, it was a region very sensitive to how the War was going on in the Pacific. Moreover, given the large Muslim population residing nearby, there was no room for any level of unpreparedness. It was for such reasons that a volunteer engineering corps was formed in Davao as early as February 1943. During the first three-month work period involving this corps, four members died from illness. Afterwards similar corps would be organized to work for a certain number of months to guard the borders, repair and reconstruct roads and bridges in areas of guerrilla activity, and disseminate propaganda. Also, from May 1943, self-defense force members alternated in organizing volunteer groups for such purposes as civil engineering projects. A volunteer labor service program began in and around Davao City limits on October 17, 1943. All Japanese males fifteen years of age or older were required to participate in half-day work schedules on Sundays and holidays. The schedule was changed on May 20, 1944 to every Wednesday and Sunday, with Friday being added from August 1. On May 29 the name of the work force was changed to Patriotic Work Corps. Naval personnel who

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22 Manira Shimbun, March 2, 26, April 2, 1944. In Davao as well, employees at the trading companies had little enthusiasm for volunteer chores. “Those [newcomers] who are no less than shopkeepers or hemp growers and have first-hand experience living in Japan, and know the situation there should be taking the lead as role models for the rest” [Dabao Shimbun, August 21, 1943].

had been defeated and transferred from other parts of the South Pacific were assigned to build airfields in Davao and other regions of Mindanao, and the army was hurrying to complete battle position bunkers and a road of escape linking Kibawe, Basiao, Mintal and Davao. Although many of the Davao Japanese were abaca growers, land for abaca cultivation had been reduced under the food production increase program, and a labor shortage had caused arable land to go fallow. In addition, military conscription of the Davao Japanese soon began. On September 30, 1943, a revised military induction law was promulgated and implemented the same day. The law contained provisions canceling draft deferrals for Japanese at home and abroad, resulting in compulsory service for Japanese residents of the Philippines. In conformity with the revised law, conscription examinations were conducted during May and June 1944, and in Davao 734 conscripts entered the Army on October 1 of that year. Afterwards, periodic conscriptions were held, and even males who were in the process of evacuating were separated from their families and drafted into military service.24

On August 1, the day on which volunteer labor was raised to three days per week, Davao was placed in an extreme state of emergency, and all persons involved in military projects were to be treated as civilian employees of the Army. All other Japanese residents were urged to leave the city. Five days later, on the sixth, Davao was attacked by American bombers. On the tenth an order was issued to mobilize all personnel for the construction of bunkers, and on the twenty-first the Army high command in Davao issued a state of emergency announcement to be “proclaimed to all Japanese comrades.” Davao had been burned to the ground by the air attacks of September 9 and 10. The military responded on the thirteenth, in anticipation of an American landing at Davao, by dispatching the Yamada Unit (headed by Major YAMADA Fujie) by transport ship as reinforcements. The Yamada Unit was totally dependent on the Japanese of Mintal District for its mess, sanitation and communications. However, on the tenth the Davao Misinformation Incident, also called the Waterfowl Incident, occurred during which white cap waves caused by strong winds were falsely reported as the oncoming American naval fleet. The error resulted in a hasty retreat and did much to shake the confidence of the Davao Japanese in the military.25


(6) Increasing Food Production\footnote{This section on food production is based on "Kaigun Dai-103 Gunjubu Mōshitsugi (Relayed Message from the 103rd Navy Supply Department, July 20, 1944)" (103 Kei-da-zan No. 4, May 8, 1946, documents submitted by 103rd Navy Accounting Division Supply Department, Manila Transport Section, Davao Branch Officer in Charge of Settling Remaining Affairs Naval Accountant Colonel FUKUIZUMI Sadaichi Kure Region Bureau Chief of Demobilization) contained in Dabao-kai (Davao Society) Archives.}

Due to the nature of its mission, the Navy was required to set up food supply facilities in the regions around its bases. The Navy’s One Hundred Third Military Supply Department, which was established on December 10, 1941, set up its headquarters in Manila after its occupation by Japanese forces. The Department was created for the purpose of supplying food to a basic troop strength of 22,000 and about 90,000 troops that would be moved during the advance south. This plan was to be carried out from Davao. The Department set up its Davao branch on February 1, 1942, and from August, according to one report, “almost all food, military items, and commissary goods, as well as a portion of naval supplies and clothing, no longer need to be shipped from Japan, and steps are being taken to ship surplus items to Japan and other parts of the Co-prosperity Sphere.” This was attributed to none other than the 20,000 Japanese residents of Davao.

The Department’s Manila Headquarters (1,867 engineers as of July 20, 1944 and 99 warehousemen at Cavite) then set up a regional office (189 staff members) in Cebu on April 10, 1942, and during 1944 set up local offices in Legazpi (9 staff members) and Bulan (12 staff members), and under the Cebu office Bacolod (171 staff members) and Tacloban (13 staff members). The Davao branch also set up an office at Zamboanga (170 staff members) on March 2, 1942 and Tawi-tawi (20 staff members) on July 1, 1944, and was preparing to set up another office at Jolo.

The Manila Headquarters, along with its local offices, was in charge of fourteen farms and animal ranches (five under direct management), four fisheries (two under direct management), eight processing factories (one under direct management and one each located at Davao and Zamboanga), seven clothing makers (none under direct management), and five facilities producing war-related items (none under direct management). The Davao branch was in charge of ten farms and animal ranches (six under direct management), six fishery-related groups (three under direct management), eleven processing factories (three under direct management), and one facility producing war-related items. Despite its many directly managed projects, the Davao branch also commissioned work to companies such as Ohta Development Company, which had developed in the Davao area before the war. Since Japanese agri-business in Davao was in control of public land purchased or leased from the Phil-
ippine government, or controlled through dummy Filipino landlords, no significant friction arose over the use of such land for supplying the Japanese war effort, as Japanese-cultivated abaca fields were easily converted to food production.

Note should be taken of the Davao Military Production Union Farms. Some 256 union members and 251 employees produced ten tons of vegetable per day, an unspectacular, but very important task, given the tendency of fresh produce to run low on board ship and in the battlefield. The union members were all independent abaca farmers who had divided themselves into eleven groups and continued their supply efforts as civilian employees of the Army from August 1944.27 In addition, the Ohta Development Company ran the Manila Headquarters’ Calamba farms in Laguna, Luzon, employing forty Japanese volunteers and 300 local Filipinos to harvest 1.5 tons of vegetables daily from 61.25 acres of land. Also, at the 49-acre Baliuag farm in Bulacan, Luzon, 63 Japanese volunteers and 400 local Filipinos were producing 0.7 tons per day. There are other reports of truck farms producing 0.5, 0.6 and 0.3 tons, attesting to large-scale the operations carried on by the Davao Military Production Union. The produce harvested in Davao was supplied both to the Navy and the Army.

The above-mentioned food and clothing facilities made progress due not only to the management skills of Japanese businesses and the labor of local Japanese residents, but also to the large-scale employment of Filipino workers. The former two entities played an important role in paving the way for the smooth, problem-free employment of the local Filipino population in producing supplies needed by the military. Indeed, it is impossible to think of any food production program succeeding without the cooperation of Filipinos working alongside the Japanese. However, it should be remembered that the employment of Filipinos in Army and Navy business was the result of industrial relations that these Filipinos had enjoyed with the Japanese private sector before the war, and implies no active Filipino role in the war effort itself.

(7) The Evaluation of the Davao Japanese

Such phrases appearing in the newspaper as “our comrades living in Davao were not very well regarded in the past” and “the Davao Japanese were at one time the subject of criticism” indicate the attitude toward the Davao Japanese on the part of military, bureaucratic and civilian personnel who came to the Philippines along with the War.28 The newcomers from Japan regarded the Davao Japanese as “not exactly fine Japanese citizens.” Therefore, active participation in the war effort was the only means by which such Japanese nationals

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27 Yamada Saikichi, "Dabao Gunjubu Kaiko (A Memoir of the Davao Military Supply Department)," in Dabao, No. 10, November 1968, pp. 25–27. Yamada recalls that the output of the "Increasing Vegetable Production Union" was more than twenty tons a day.

28 Dabao Shim bun, May 21, 1943; Manira Shim bun, March 7, 1944.
could gain recognition as “fine Japanese.” Hence, the sorrow and bitterness experienced by local Japanese residents who did not get the respect they deserved, no matter how fervently they rendered service to the country. In his “Outline of Military Administration” written in July 1946, Lt. Col. INUZUKA Keisuke of the First Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Agency assessed local Japanese residents in the following manner.

With the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [and] large trading companies Japanese residents of the Philippines were, prior to the war, generally involved in occupations such as fishing, hemp growing, and carpentry. Most were of Okinawan ancestry, lacked education and proper manners, and their intermarriage with low-class Filipinas produced a large number of second-generation Japanese nationals.

Also among those Japanese who resided in the Philippines before and after the war began, there were those who tried to profit by inappropriate means.

It was due to the undesirable influence such people had on winning the hearts of the Filipinos for the Japanese military administration’s cause that in each administrative district a Japan Association led by a chairman of impeccable character was established, in an attempt to encourage under the leadership of district heads self-discipline, personal improvement, and so on, for the sake of building better character in the Japanese community. Together with its request to Japan Associations for more self-discipline, the military made it clear that strict measures would be taken to deal with any persons who did not conform to such ideals (During the period in question, a number of persons were in fact deported for disgracing Japan’s reputation).29

This quotation indicates that the evaluation of Japanese residents did not change in any way during the war. Moreover, we find no mention concerning effective utilization of the unique qualities of the long-standing residents. Rather, we are given the impression that they were a nuisance to the military. It is also clear that, with the exception of diplomats and trading company employees, those who emigrated to the Philippines for personal reasons were not allowed to take part in the organizations under the Japanese Military Administration. Japan’s administration of occupied territories was geared toward obtaining resources for use in Japan and establishing the self-sufficiency of the Occupation forces. There was no intention of

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building a new Philippine society in harmony and cooperation with the occupied population. It was for this reason that there was no effort to utilize the experience gained over the years by Japanese residents living and working within Philippine society. The only group given such a role to play was the large trading companies, which were used for gaining the necessary know-how to develop and procure resources for military use.

However, the deep sense of pride felt by other Japanese residents in loyally serving their country continued even after Japan’s defeat. In the February 1971 issue of Maru (Magazine) there appeared an article entitled “A War Diary of Tears and Laughter” written by retired Private First Class TAKASAKI Tsutomu of the former Kawaguchi Detachment, which became the object of strong protest by the Dabao-kai (Davao Society). What the Takasaki article said about the Davao Japanese can be summarized thus:

1. There were many Japanese men in Davao, but they did not seem happy that the Japanese army had come to the Philippines. Despite the efforts of our outfit to free them from incarceration by the U.S.-Philippine forces, their attitude toward us was not very amicable.

2. There was something else strange about Davao. Not one Japanese woman appeared before us. I thought that at least one old lady could have come to receive us, but from the time we arrived until the time we left, we saw not one Japanese female face.

3. I have heard stories that at the opening of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese men and women were locked up and that all the Japanese women young and old alike were raped by American and Philippine soldiers and the local police.

4. Therefore, since even now the Japanese women think that the morals of the Japanese soldier are lower than those of the Filipino soldier, they would not come out to meet us for fear of being raped.

For the former Japanese residents of Davao this narrative was “filled with errors, insults and slander, and a clear defamation of our character.” In a letter of protest to the editors and Takasaki, the Davao Society took up each of the above points, showed how the facts had been misrepresented, and rebutted with an explanation of just how cooperative Japanese civilian residents were in the military effort:

After being rescued by the Imperial Army from two weeks of incarceration at the hands of the Americans and Filipino troops, we local Japanese happily accompanied fighting units, acting as scouts in the hope of doing as much as we could to assist in the
Imperial Army’s war effort. At the same time over a thousand of us fell before the enemy’s fire, while over 10,000 Japanese women of Davao, both young and old, took the lead in volunteering to work at nearby military camps. We performed these duties happily in the spirit of our national heritage as Japanese and in gratitude to the Imperial Army for saving our lives…

A large Manila hemp-growing Japanese colony of some 100,000 hectares centering around Davao was placed under the occupation army and the situation returned to normal due to the security provided by the troops. Some of us were able to return home and cultivate our fields (mainly to produce food for the Army). Most of the young and middle-aged men and women were employed as military civilian workers. Even the children, some 3,000 strong, at the eleven Japanese primary schools, Higashi Honganji Temple’s Girls’ High School and Bago Agricultural School were all ready to help in maintaining troop morale. The Davao Japanese all banded together to cooperate fully with the Japanese army and fulfill our appointed tasks as a large, important base of operations in the occupied Southern areas.30

After reading the news concerning the suicidal deaths of Japanese soldiers and civilians (who chose to commit suicide rather than be captured by the enemy) at the Battle of Saipan on July 7, 1944, the Davao Japanese continued to cooperated in the war effort, despite grave concern over a possible repeat of mass suicide in the Philippines. The July 19 issue of the *Manira Shimbun* reported the Saipan incidents as follows:

From the outbreak of the Great East Asian War, every man, woman and child among the Japanese civilians on the islands of Saipan and Tinian, which numbered 50,000 prior to the War, came together as one in total support of the Imperial Army, volunteering their labor in building airfields and establishing the South Sea Development Agriculture Company to expand the islands’ truck farms, in order to supply the Army with larger quantities of produce. They collected monetary donations for the National Defense Fund and the building of airplanes. The women did their part, as well, in lending a hand for logistics support. Every single civilian worked hand in hand in this heart-rending struggle. And when the enemy attack began, everyone stopped what they were doing and built gun emplacements and airfields.

Through such articles the Davao Japanese were enlightened about what the war now had in store for them.

However, the total cooperation shown by the Davao Japanese in the military effort put the Filipino people in danger and caused many casualties among them. Let us look at how the Japanese civilians residing in Davao were viewed by their Filipino neighbors.

3. **The Image of Japanese Held by Filipinos in Davao**

(1) **War Crimes in Davao**

The previously quoted letter of protest written by the Davao Society members also touched upon the local Filipino population. What they were protesting was not only “defamation of the character of Japanese residents during that time,” but also “distorted reports concerning the U.S. and Philippine armies and the Filipino police.” Here we see the Filipino people being treated not as outsiders, but rather, as comrades and neighbors. For example, it was written that “Prewar Davao was a veritable paradise fostering close friendships between the peoples of Japan and the Philippines.”

However, when the war began, certain incidents prevented Filipino–Japanese friendship from continuing. To begin with, when the local Japanese were imprisoned in concentration camps before the Japanese military invasion, their wealth and assets were confiscated or looted by Filipinos. Then when the invasion occurred, some Japanese, exhilarated over the idea that “Japan now owns the world,” “took the opportunity to break into shops, especially those owned by Chinese, and steal food.” As soon as the Filipinos discovered that the Japanese army had landed, “They fled from the city into the mountains, leaving behind the bodies of those who lagged behind. Then the city’s shops were looted on a mass scale.” Relations of mutual trust that could have prevented the confusion that arose with the outbreak of the war did not exist between the Japanese and their Filipino neighbors. This fact is once more apparent in the records of war crime tribunals held after the war.

The Philippine National Archives is the depository for a set of documents entitled, “Japanese War Crime Records—Closed Reports.” Those crimes that were committed at Davao occupy 34 of the 361 documents in the collection. How the Filipino general public viewed their Japanese neighbors and the Japanese who appeared during the Occupation is not very easy to clarify, so there are limits to what these records can tell us about the image of the Japanese among the Filipino people. This is because testimonies appearing in these records given by either Japanese suspects or their attorneys are very rare, as Filipino witnesses gave their

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32 A listing of these documents appears in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Side of what happened with little or no chance of rebuttal by the accused. During the postwar period, which was characterized by intense anti-Japanese sentiment, any testimony concerning crimes committed in the most chaotic periods during wartime is bound, at present, to raise doubts as to its objectivity. However, the task before us here is not to question the guilt or innocence of convicted Japanese war criminals, but rather to get some idea from the records of how the Davao Japanese were reflected in the consciousness of Filipinos at the time. Furthermore, there is no great problem regarding accuracy or inaccuracy of these testimonies because the image of Japanese residents at the time would greatly influence the relations between the two countries for years to come, and also because we want to investigate the real sentiment of Japanese residents of the Philippines during the war.

First, as to when the crimes contained in these records were committed: two-thirds were committed around April 1945, when the American forces landed in Davao. Several incidents also occurred just after the Japanese attack on Davao in December 1941. We notice that the role played by Japanese civilians was different for each of these three periods: the beginning of the war, the period of Japan’s military administration, and around the time when the Japanese began to take flight.

(2) Killings Soon after the Beginning of the War

The Davao Japanese who were freed by the Japanese attack formed the Japanese Settlers Corporation centering around the Japan Association. The Corporation was tasked with keeping the peace under the direction of the military; its first operation was to search for confiscators and looters of Japanese-owned property during the incarceration. It also arrested local Filipinos who were considered rebels because of their pro-U.S., anti-Japan attitudes before the war. The Japan Association imprisoned three Filipinos in the primary schoolhouses of the province, and some of those arrested never returned from these prisons (Report Nos. 154, 261).

There were also some Japanese who could not control their anger. About 95 percent of all Japanese homes had been victims of looting, and some had been burned to the ground. Japanese civilians, irate over the destruction of their property and two years’ supply of food that had been held in reserve, broke into and looted the homes of Americans as well as Filipinos. On December 20, 1941 the Davao Japanese Consulate, fearing that street fighting would break out, received assistance from the military to send out two consular inspectors for the purpose of preventing looting and recovering the looted goods. On the following day, an announcement was posted in large characters all over town. It read,
1. Be tolerant of fellow Filipino citizens.
2. Looting or housebreaking is strictly forbidden.
3. Imprisoning, shackling or abducting local citizens on impulse without direct orders from the military is forbidden.
4. Do not forget that you are Japanese citizens.

All vacant homes of Americans and Filipinos, as well as shops of citizens of neutral countries, were sealed. However, the looting by the Japanese did not stop. On January 12, 1942, when the Japanese Military Administration Mindanao Branch was established in Davao, it was announced, "All measures in effect that suggest privileged status for Japanese residents should be completely abolished and strict supervision taken over by the military administration branch head." Moreover, the next day’s Dabao Nichi-Nichi Shim bun reported an interview with Consul MORI Haruki entitled "A Call for Restraint by Our Japanese Comrades in the Philippines." On the fifteenth twenty-six Japanese who had been arrested for improper behavior and held for a time in the prisoner-of-war camp were gathered together at the consulate and made to sign pledges promising that they would reform.

In the midst of such chaos, many Filipino civilians had evacuated from the city in an attempt to avoid the wrath of the Japanese. Except for cases of lack of food, they would return to the city only after the restoration of law and order marked by the issuance of "good citizen certificates," which guaranteed the safety of Filipino lives. About 30,000 of these certificates had been issued by February 1, 1942.

Leading Filipino citizens of Davao also fled the city along with their neighbors, but began to return from December 30 onward. These community leaders formed the nucleus of the Filipino Emergency Committee (chaired by Alfonso G. OBOZA), which was established on January 10, 1942 for the purpose of returning the city to normalcy. Since the Davao Gulf region had developed via a mono-cultural economy focused on the cultivation of abaca as its major commodity, it suffered serious food shortages at the outbreak of war. In the remote regions where the Filipino population had taken refuge, it often became impossible to find food, as starvation and sickness afflicted these areas. For the refugees to return to the city, it was crucial that the food problem was solved. The Filipino Emergency Committee devised a plan to relocate returning Filipinos to agricultural land; and on February 1 the government of the city of Davao was set up with Oboza as mayor. The fact that this body was a Japanese-operated puppet government is shown clearly by the appointments of the vice-presidents of Furukawa Plantation Company and Ohta Development Company as its administrative advisors. Of the ten-members of the city council, five members were Japanese—a former Japanese As-
association chairman and vice-chairman, and employees of Furukawa, Ohta and the Davao Branch of Osaka Bōeki Kaisha (Osaka Bazar). From this legislative lineup, we can see that regional governance would be carried on by decisions made mainly by large Japanese corporations and by the Japan Association. From the viewpoint of the city’s Filipino community, a situation had developed in which the newly arrived Japanese military had combined with the city’s prewar Japanese citizenry to rule the region.33

Sometime after the Japanese invasion, the Japan Association and the Settlers’ Committee merged. On the evening of December 31, 1941, a doctor, two dentists, and a former teacher at the local Japanese school, all Filipinos, were allegedly murdered in Calinan. The chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the Calinan branch of the Japan Association were accused of involvement in these killings, which had been apparently motivated by the pro-U.S. sentiments. Japanese residents of Calinan had before the war formed a secret society volunteering their services in the interest of Japan’s advance southward, and after being freed at the onset of the war, they returned immediately with the Army to Calinan and formed a volunteer army, which became involved as a propaganda organ in mopping-up operations in the remote areas. Their thirst for blood no doubt led them to extremes in the performance of their duties. The killing of the four Filipinos might have been an organized attempt by the Calinan branch of the Japan Association to punish the local indigenous elite for political opposition. Even today a street in Calinan bears the name of the murdered doctor (Report No. 235).34

The activities of the self-defense league that operated under the Settlers’ Committee at times went beyond the limits imposed by the military. These vigilantes, who soon became known in the Filipino community as hooligans, were organized along corporate lines as the Furukawa Plantation, Tibungco Lumber and Ohta Development Companies. Of them the hooligans in the Tibungco Lumber Company were the most feared by the Filipino community for their lawless behavior. The mestizos and Japanese with Filipino spouses actively participated in these vigilante activities to disarm the Filipino community and kill anyone who resisted. They killed four Filipinos, and were involved in the looting of over 100 homes and the burning of about forty (Report Nos. 163, 261). The self-defense league played a large role in the issuance of “good citizen certificates,” by torturing alleged pro-U.S. sympathizers to which such certificates could not be issued (Report No. 261). The self-defense league was, in the eyes of the Filipino community, identical to the Japanese Military Police (Kempei-tai). In addition, Chinese commercial competitors and Filipino landlords also became targets for elimination. These executions were carried out in order to remove barriers to “liberty” within

33 Mori 1993, pp. 255–268.
34 *Firipin Jōhō*, No. 60, June 1, 1942, p. 68.
Japanese-occupied Davao.

On August 28, 1942, the Davao self-defense league was reorganized as the Mindanao Defense Force under the direct command of the All-Mindanao Japan Association headed by Reserve Lt. Maj. Gen. MOTOKAWA Shōzō, and recruited members between the ages of seventeen and forty. On October 4, 1944 the Defense Force was again reorganized into a volunteer army centering around reservists, recruiting troops between the ages of fifteen and sixty. These volunteers cooperated actively with the Army in increasing production of Army necessities, providing labor, and also policing areas after air raids and dealing with the guerrillas. Such “active” participation would also extend to the victimization of the Filipino community.

(3) Killings by the Military Police

The Kempei-tai, Japan’s version of Germany’s Gestapo, set up operations in Davao on June 1, 1942 to replace the Settlers’ Committee in the task of maintaining law and order. Another important task of the Kempei-tai was to gather information concerning anti-Japanese guerrillas. In this activity, local Japanese mestizos became valuable as intelligence agents and language interpreters. We know of at least three such mestizos and two full-blooded Japanese who worked for the Kempei-tai in Davao. In addition, two mestizos, including a lover of a Japanese army officer, and four pro-Japanese Filipinos, were employed in spying activities. Persons involved in guerrilla activities or suspected of sympathizing with the enemy were interrogated and even tortured by the Kempei-tai. Some Davao Japanese who had been employed as language interpreters were also accused of involvement in torture (Report Nos. 184, 198, 228, 239).

As Japan’s war effort took a turn for the worse, compulsory labor in the name of materials procurement and volunteer service began to be extracted from the Filipino community (Report Nos. 153, 264), and Filipinos were forced against their will to form neighborhood associations similar to those of Japanese residents. Anyone who failed to join these associations’ activities was considered to be an anti-Japanese, and liable to get killed. Those who escaped execution were often subjected to the hardest labor and abuse, and/or forced to live in unsanitary conditions that led to sickness and even death (Report No. 154).

(4) Killings in the Midst of Flight

The Japanese massacre of Filipinos occurred mainly during the latter’s attempts to escape the city in the face of military defeat. These incidents may be classified into killing by military

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35 Manira Shimbun, October 4, 1944.
personnel or by inducted local Japanese, those committed by Japanese civilians under order, and those committed by Japanese civilians alone. Within these various forms are incidents of murder accompanied by looting (Report Nos. 124, 150, 153, 154, 163, 240) and rape (Report Nos. 150, 228). There are also cases of attacks and murders committed by Japanese soldiers who had formerly been regarded as friends of the Filipino community, who used to buy fruit from local stalls on a daily basis and used to work side-by-side with local people in volunteer projects (Report Nos. 150, 172, 184, 244, 264). There was also a plan to eliminate the whole Filipino community en masse when a U.S. assault on the region seemed imminent, and it was feared that all Filipino citizens would begin working for the enemy and become guerrillas or at least guerrilla sympathizers (Report Nos. 244, 271). In this respect we should mention the Philippine Constabulary of Davao province, with fairly open pro-American leanings, which would no doubt rebel in the case of an American landing. There was strong support among the military command to have the officers of this force executed before a firing squad. The Kempei-tai opposed such a move, and the Constabulary was instead peacefully disbanded on April 29, 1945; however, the plan, resulting from a Japanese persecution complex over the use of Filipinos by the enemy, also called for the extermination of all persons with even the slightest knowledge of internal Japanese affairs, in anticipation of the threat Filipinos could pose after an American landing.37

The most reprehensible killing occurred in Tugbok on May 14, 1945. About 200 local residents were rounded up and 89 were massacred by former employees of the Saburô Plantation (the South Mindanao Development Company). A similar incident occurred on May 30 at the Upper Manuel Plantation, where about 30 Davao Japanese, together with naval personnel, murdered 31 Filipinos. According to the report, a group of Japanese citizens had planned to murder all Filipino landlords living in the vicinity of their farms, apparently in order to make more effective use of the land (Report Nos. 172, 264). However, at the time, the Japanese did not have the wherewithal to cultivate any more land, and the murder victims included Filipinos who had fled to the plantations from the city due to air raids that had begun in September 1944. Filipinos who had been employed on Japanese-managed farms were murdered throughout the region for having had secret information about Japanese operations. The looting that had been done first by Filipinos, then by Japanese at the beginning of the war, had engendered mistrust between the two communities, eventually resulting in that human tragedy. Chinese residents of Davao at the beginning of the war had been murdered for similar motives. The Japanese harbored deep resentment toward the Chinese, no doubt leading to the

37 Ibid.
mass killings (Report Nos. 225, 226, 242, 271, 280, 289). Davao’s overseas Chinese community formed an association on June 29, 1944, and the Dabao Shim bun reported, “Based on a survey of members conducted on July 20, 1942, punishments, including forced labor of from one to two months duration in military projects, will be inflicted on uncooperative Chinese, after taking into consideration how far they are located from the projects and the time its takes to contact them.” In their position of weakness, the Japanese had no way of distinguishing guerrillas and American sympathizers from other members of the Filipino public. Anyone who refused a Japanese military order for any reason would be killed. It is believed that non-political groups of Filipinos were massacred for merely speaking or acting (consciously or unconsciously) as though they were watching the paranoid Japanese.

(5) Role Played by the Davao Japanese

As mentioned earlier we are unable to attest to the authenticity of all the testimony contained in the war crimes records; and not all the Japanese residents of Davao appeared as enemies of the city’s Filipino community. We see scattered instances of Filipinos being helped by their Japanese neighbors. For example, just after the initial Japanese attack, on December 23, 1941 to be exact, a group of ten Japanese soldiers gang-raped a fourteen year-old girl at Dalían. When they came back the next day, she sought help at the Furukawa Plantation Company and was rescued by the Kempei-tai. In February 1942 a group of twelve Filipinos at Darong were arrested and held by the Japanese Self-Defense League. After two persons were killed, a Japanese by the named of Matsumoto of the Furukawa Plantation Company, where the remaining twenty detainees were employed, intervened for their release (Report No. 228). Similarly, on December 29 just after the initial Japanese attack, a certain Saburo was able to win, for the mother of a Filipino charged with possession of firearms, a reprieve from the firing squad (Report No. 236). Just before and during the flight from Davao, Japanese residents helped evacuate groups of Filipinos in anticipation of their mass murder by their fellow Japanese (Report Nos. 244, 271).

However, on the whole, the Japanese did nothing but wreak havoc upon the Philippines and its people; and if we can believe the reports on Davao, the number of unarmed civilians killed by the Japanese exceeded 1,000, over 500 of which have been certified. In other words, the killing of innocent non-combatants by the Japanese cannot be denied. Without questioning the war crime aspect, it is a fact that many Filipinos, including women and children, were killed by the Japanese for unknown reason.

38 Dabao Shim bun, July 4, 1944.
The Japanese residents of Davao, who knew well the lay of the land, spoke the local lan-
guage, and were well-acquainted with local customs, were mobilized for the such tasks as
gathering information, persuading guerrillas to surrender, questioning guerrillas who had
surrendered, and translating confiscated documents (Report Nos. 239, 243). Their scope of
activity was much wider than that of Japanese soldiers. And because their faces were familiar
to the local Filipino population, they were named specifically in the war crimes testimony.
Among these Davao Japanese who were greatly involved in the war effort, very active roles
were played by mestizos and spouses of Filipinos. Marrying a Filipina was, in Davao Japanese
society, considered humiliating. The mestizos, born of such marriages, were discriminated
against from the day they were born. The Okinawan-born Japanese and Japanese spouses and
sons of Filipinas, in response to the demands by mainland newcomers to become “fine citi-
zens,” felt that they had to prove themselves by behaving in such a way as not to shame or en-
cumber the Japanese community in any way. It was their attempt to escape such prejudice
that caused them to become the most visible Japanese before the Filipino community and to
take the lead in persecuting it. While this group could have provided a door to friendly rela-
tions between the Japanese and Filipino communities, its members became, instead, oversen-
tsitive to the idea that they were humiliating Japanese society, resulting in the drawing of a
clear dividing line between “us” and “them.” According to the research done by TERAMI
Motoe, the image of the local Japanese that appeared in popular novels before the war com-
pletely vanished to be replaced afterwards by a Japanese in military uniform.39

Concluding Remarks

The Japanese military plunged the countries of Asia into war in the name of building a
Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, stressing the emotional aspect and self-denial in
overcoming the myth of white supremacy, which was said to emphasize materialism based on
rationalism and technology. Since the Philippines had been a colony of the United States, the
strongest nation among the Allied powers, the Japanese occupiers set out to wipe the Filipino
population clean of their Yankee-oriented tendencies. Among the images the Japanese
stressed was that of the United States as a racist nation. Such slogans coined by the Japanese
as “Asia for the Asians” and “The Philippines for the Filipinos” were meant to impress on the
Filipinos that they were a people of color placed under the supremacy of whites.

39 Terami Motoe, “Firipin Taishū Shōsetsu ni Miru Nippon(jin)-zō no Hensen (Changes Occurring
in the Image of Japanese Depicted in Popular Philippine Novels),” Sekaiishi-zō no Kenkyū (Images
of World History) (International Christian University, Institute of Asian Culture), No. 4, June
1984, pp. 3–31. Here Terami examines the images of Japanese that appeared in popular Tagalog
short stories and novels published in the magazine Liwayway.
Nevertheless, as soon as Japan’s military administration was established in the Philippines, people began to notice that Japan, too, was a nation marked by ethnic discrimination. During the inter-war years Japanese were taught that they were the nation destined to lead Asia. Official textbooks used in public schools from 1918 on, for example, were designed to instill in young students the idea that “primitive natives were residing in the South Seas.” Japan’s Navy Ministry classified the countries of the Co-prosperity Sphere into five categories: the principal nation (Japan), independent nations, independent protectorates, territories under direct rule, and colonies under the sovereignty of countries outside the Sphere. The Japanese were also classified according to ethnic origin, family origin, and place of birth. There were three possible groups of Japanese based on “places of birth”: those born in the main islands (naichi), those born in Okinawa, and the Ainu in Hokkaido. Modern Japan had abandoned the pre-modern social stratification scheme for a social order biased in favor of academic merit.

In Japanese-occupied Philippines a stratification scheme consisted of, from the top down, military personnel, civilian bureaucrats, employees dispatched from large business enterprises headquartered in mainland Japan, local Japanese residents who had been in the Philippines since prewar years (mainlanders, Okinawans, spouses of Filipinos, mestizos), Christian Filipinos (Spanish mestizos, Chinese, Malays, among others), overseas Chinese, Muslims, and ethnic minorities. This social order was divided into even more minute strata. For example, news reporters dispatched from the same Mainichi Newspaper Company to Manila were ranked top-down as members of the Army Department of Information (Hodōbu), Mainichi Shimbun Manila Bureau staff member, or employee of the Manira Shimbun Company.

Within this complicated stratification scheme, the Japanese of Okinawan descent and Japanese spouses of Filipinos believed that through their close cooperation with the Japanese military, they would be treated on an equal basis with Japanese mainlanders. Or rather, permanent Japanese residents of the Philippines cooperated with the military in order to be treated on an equal basis with Japanese mainlanders. However, from the previously quoted report made after the war by INUZUKA Keisuke, we know that the toil and hardships suffered by these second-class citizens for the sake of the war effort were not reported to the military command. In 1981 Maj. Gen. UTSUNOMIYA Naokata, who was assistant chief of staff of the

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41 Nanjo 1995, p. 182.
Fourteenth Area Army, also devoted a section of his memoirs to “the treatment of Japanese civilian residents,” and after quoting from Inuzuka’s report in the first part, he praised the contribution made by them in the following manner:

However, in general the Japanese adopted the ideals of the Great East Asian War and cooperated admirably with the Japanese military administration. On the local level, Japanese who had long held the trust of the Filipino people - mainly IMAMURA Eikichi, KANAZASHI [sic. KANEGAE] Seitarō, Mr. Enosawa - set up consultation centers for indigenous people to come and express their needs and discuss problems they were having. This information was of great help to us in our policy decisions at military headquarters.

As the war developed in Manila and other large cities many were called up for military duty and died for their country. Especially in Mindanao, the cooperation shown by Japanese of Okinawan descent was commendable. Men and women, alike, in great number, fell in the battlefields as well as behind the lines.42

All this author can say here is that if higher-ups in the military like Utsunomiya had recognized the achievements of local Japanese residents during the Occupation, their own performance would have been different from what we know. Most importantly, if Japanese who were in a position to talk on an equal basis with Filipinos were actually given the opportunity to work at what he calls “consultation centers,” the friction and trouble that arose between the Japanese and Filipino communities would not have been as great as it actually was.

Furthermore, Filipinos who supported the Japanese occupation of their country were not effectively utilized. For example, MAKAPILI, a group of Philippine patriots, in the vein of prewar pro-Japanese factions like the Sakdal and Ganap parties, were not given any major role in the occupation, due in part to opposition from the politicians and organizations making up the Partido Nacionalista Party, the ruling political party since prewar years. After these pro-Japanese elements were exploited to the military’s satisfaction, they went to fight alongside the Japanese army and were never seen again. This is very similar to the way in which long-time Japanese residents of the Philippines were treated. Neither the Japanese residents who were well-informed about the situation in the Philippines nor the Filipinos who were loyal to the Japanese cause were consulted by the military administrators. As a result, the military administration was alienated from the rest of the Filipino citizenry, and thus lost an ex-

cellent opportunity to gain the understanding necessary for establishing relations between the two peoples based on mutual respect.\footnote{See in detail on Sakdal Motoe Terami-Wada, \textit{Sakdalistas’ Struggle for Philippine Independence 1930–1945}. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014.}

The Japanese military at the time no longer envisioned the Meiji ideal of “sending emigrants to the Philippines to integrate with the Filipino people and fight side-by-side with them.” On July 6, 1944, just before the Saipan suicides, the fifty-sixth commemoration ceremony for SUGANUMA Tadakaze was held at his grave site in Poro, just outside of Manila, by the Japan Association of Central Luzon and the Tadakaze Honorary Society.\footnote{\textit{Manila Shimbun}, July 7, 1944.} What would have been going through the minds of the Japanese residents attending the ceremony at a time when the saying “It is Manila hemp that will be able to tether the Flag of the Rising Sun” was no longer credible?

Long-time Japanese residents had joined the army and were now wreaking havoc on their former Filipino friends and neighbors, creating total mistrust of Japan in general. The typical Japanese stereotype that would appear in postwar popular fiction in the Philippines would no longer be an individual man-on-the-street type of figure, but would be depicted as a group of soldiers. The individual values held by Japanese were placed within a group context, and all Japanese were seen to be members of the armed forces.\footnote{See Terami 1984.} Such an image is closely connected to the Filipinos’ mistrust and hatred of Japan after the war, and represented a denial of goodwill, humanitarianism, or strength of character on the part of individual Japanese.

On July 4, 1946, the day on which the United States celebrates its national independence, the Philippines became an independent nation, despite an even stronger political and economic dependency on the U.S. than ever before. However, there was one area in which the Philippines departed from the policy of this postwar superpower, that is, in regard to diplomatic relations with Japan. Filipinos were bitterly opposed to the U.S. position of not demanding war reparations from Japan. In 1956, as the result of six years of negotiations, the Philippines won a total of US$ 550 million in war reparations, besides the loans from Japan worth US$ 250 million. In addition, from as early as April 1953, the U.S. had taken the lead in signing a friendship, trade and navigation treaty with Japan, granting it most-favored nation status and allowing Japanese citizens to conduct business freely on U.S. soil. In contrast, the Japan–Philippine Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation was strongly opposed by the Philippine Congress and had to wait for passage in 1973 after Ferdinand MARCOS declared martial law. That was how bitter the Filipinos felt toward Japan.

This anti-Japanese sentiment was not noticed by the average Japanese citizen residing in Ja-
apan, which had achieved miraculous economic prosperity under American protectionist policies. Those who bore the brunt of such sentiments were none other than the Japanese mestizos who remained in the Philippines after the war. These Filipinos of Japanese descent were for a long time deprived of education and forced to hide from the general public. They were to pay dearly for their ambitious efforts to prove themselves as bona fide Japanese citizens during the war. The image that Filipino individuals held of Japanese individuals was so concretely embedded that it was almost impossible to erase.

The abaca fields of Davao, which had not been tended during the war and became infested with insects, quickly fell victim to another enemy after the war, the synthetic fiber industry. Today in Davao one would be hard-pressed to find any remnant of the achievements realized by its prewar Japanese community. Postwar Davao has developed on the strength of lumbering and banana cultivation. Most of these products are exported to Japan; but there are no Japanese settlers directly and exclusively involved in either industry, unlike in prewar times. After the war Filipino Christians assumed ownership of the lumbering operations and the land rights previously enjoyed by the Japanese. The mainly Japanese community of “Dabao-kuo” had been converted into a frontier society centered around in-migrated Christian Filipinos.

Appendix “Japanese War Crime Records
—Closed Reports” in the Philippine National Archives

Bdle. #11, Report No. 124, 66 p.

The Massacre of Filipino Civilians by the Japanese at Mahayag, Tibungko, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I. on May 9, 1945

Bdle. #15, Report No. 150, 100 p.

Murder and Rape at Bacaca, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., by the Japanese on May 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1945

Bdle. #15, Report No. 152, 35 p.

Murder and Disappearance of Civilians at Bacaca, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., by the Japanese on May 3, 1945


Murder at Ilang-ilang and Bunawan, Davao, Mindanao, P.I., by the Japanese between May

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14, 1945 and June 15, 1945

Attempted Murder and Murder of Filipino Civilians at Biao, Calinan, Davao Province, Mindanao, P.I., on May 5, 1945 by the Japanese

Bdle. #17, Report No. 163, 80 p.

Murder of Four Filipino Citizens of Ilang, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., and Looting on December 28, 1941

Bdle. #17, Report No. 166, 45 p.

Murder of Approximately Eighty-nine Filipino Citizens near Tugbok, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., on May 14, 1945

Bdle. #17, Report No. 172, 30 p.

Murder of Six Filipino Civilians at Manuel Plantation, Guianga, Mindanao, P.I., on 30 May 1945 and June 1, 1945

Bdle. #18, Report No. 184, 88 p.

Torture of Civilians at Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., by Kempei-tai Members March and April 1944

Bdle. #19, Report No. 198, 26 p.

Mistreatment of Hitolio Fidelis at Davao, Mindanao, P.I., in March 1945

Bdle. #20, Report No. 208, 22 p.

Murder of Three Filipinos near Manuel Plantation, Tagakpan, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., on May 18, 1945.

Report No. 210

Transportation of Prisoners of War under Improper Conditions from Davao Penal Colony, Mindanao to Manila, Philippine Islands from June 6 to June 26, 1944

Bdle. #21, Report No. 221, 29 p.

Lapoy Plantation Murders, Davao, Mindanao, P.I.


Murder of Approximately Thirty Filipino Civilians at Biao, Davao Province, Mindanao, P.I. on the 17th of May 1945

Bdle. #22, Report No. 225, 35 p.

Murder of Chinese in Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P.I., May 1945

Bdle. #22, Report No. 226, 35 p.

Murder of Nine Civilians at Davao City, Davao, P.I. on May 21, 1945

Bdle. #22, Report No. 228, 32 p.

Murder of Two Filipinos at Daliao, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I.
Murder of Five Filipinos at Digos, Santa Cruz, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on October 25, 1942

Report No. 233
Mistreatments at the Davao Penal Colony and Davao Civilian Interment Camp Committed by the Japanese Armed Forces during January 1942 to September 1944

Atrocities at Calinan, Davao City, December 1941

Bdle. #22, Report No. 236, 37 p.
Murder of a Filipino Civilian in Mintal, Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on or about December 29, 1941

Bdle. #23, Report No. 239, 137 p.
Murder of Filipino and American Prisoners at Mintal and Neighboring Area, Mindanao, P. I., on September 10, 1944

Bunawan Murders, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., May 7, 1945

Murder of Five Chinese Civilians at Tungkalan, Davao City, P. I., on May 18, 1945

Murder of Two Filipinos and Attempted Murder of Another at Gatungan, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on or about May 19, 1945

Bdle. #23, Report No. 244, 77 p.
Murders near Tigato, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on May 3, 1945

Murder of Four Filipino Civilians at Manay, Davao, P. I., on November 2, 1942

Torture and Killing of Emilio Rafols at Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P. I.

Bdle. #24, Report No. 264, 140 p.
Murder of 16 Civilians and Attempted Murder of Another at Wangan, Riverside, Calinan, Davao, P. I., May 4, 1945

Massacre at Mulig, Davao City, May 5, 1945

Bdle. #26, Report No. 280, 58 p.
Chinese Murder at Davao City, May 1945

Bdle. #27, Report No. 289, 15 p.
Murder of Chinese and Bagobo Civilians and Arson in Catalunan Grande, Davao, Mindanao, P. I.
nao, P.I., May 5, 1945

Murder, Attempted Murder and Ill-Treatment of Filipino Civilian Residents of Matina, Pangi, Davao City, Davao, P.I., on May 23, 1945

Bdle. #36, Report No. 357, 16 p.
Disappearance and Possible Murder of Bernardo Sison at Nanyo, Davao City, P.I., on April 29, 1945
Chapter 8: Publications of War Memoirs as Paper Cenotaphs
—Mass Death and the Defeat: The Meaning of Writing War Memoirs—

Introduction

As of March 31, 2014, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has recorded approximately 2,400,000 Japanese deaths overseas during World War II, yet only a little over half (1,270,000) of the remains have been returned to Japan, and 1,130,000 have not yet been collected. Of these, 300,000 went down at sea, and it was not possible to retrieve 230,000 due to mainly political problems of the particular countries where the remains rest or were found. Therefore, about 600,000 are collectable, and about 330,000 have already been brought home through the efforts of the Japanese government. This undertaking is still being carried out today. Of all the retrieved remains, about 360,000 have not been claimed by the families; therefore, they have been laid to rest at the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery.¹

When the “Greater East Asia War” was declared on December 8, 1941, the Japanese all believed that when one was killed in action, honor would be bestowed and the bereaved family would be well taken care of. However, what actually took place was disappointing. Those who died as a result of fighting or from illness were not given proper burials. Their families simply received an official report of death without remains or personal articles left behind by the deceased. Those who survived and returned home had to live through the anti-military/anti-war attitude that was prevalent at that time. They were criticized for having participated in the “unjust war.” Furthermore, the occupation forces ordered the suspension of pensions for the veterans and war bereaved. They not only felt ashamed but also had to bear economic hardship.

In 1952, when the San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan went into effect and Japan regained sovereignty, the situation began to change for the better. The pensions for the war bereaved and the veterans were restored in 1952 and 1953, respectively, and the fellow-soldiers associations and bereaved families organizations became active. Memorial pilgrimage tours and the undertaking of collecting remains commenced. Starting in 1963, the annual national memorial service for fallen soldiers was established (August 15). In the following year, the practice of awarding medals to fallen soldiers was resumed.² When the Military History De-

partment of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan Defense Agency, started publishing its War History Series in 1966, ordinary soldiers began writing their own war memoirs. Those on the Philippines alone numbered more than 1,300.

What motivated the publication of such a vast number of memoirs? Was it because there was such a wide gap between the soldiers’ expectations and the reality they had to face upon returning to their home country after the war? Did they expect to be honored and publicly recognized for their service and sacrifices? Were these expectations in sharp contrast with the reality of cold treatment? Were there other reasons and motives? In the case of the Philippine war front, we can add the following. Fierce battles were fought, and 518,000 were killed, amounting to 21.6% of the total war dead. The soldiers either witnessed or heard of mass deaths. After the defeat of the war, they were subjected to the Filipinos’ rancor and angry jeers.

This chapter attempts to understand what these soldiers who experienced fierce battles were trying to convey through writing and publishing their war memoirs. To do this task, first I went through a little over 1,300 memoirs related to the Philippine war front. Next I created a bibliography and indices according to personal names, places, and subjects. I also examined chronologically the background of each memoir and how it came to be written. If this is called quantity research, quality research comes next. For this purpose, I chose MARUYAMA Yutaka’s memoirs. He is a medical doctor and poet who was sent to Burma. The Burma-Yunnan war front was as fierce as that of the Philippines and produced a great number of war dead, including those who contracted sickness and disease. Both in Burma and the Philippines, at the time of the Japanese surrender, the Japanese military administration had already ceased to exist. This paper will try to answer these questions by looking into what the respective authors tried to express through writing and publishing their war memoirs.

1. Memorializing the War Dead in Modern Japan

After the modern state of Japan was established through the Meiji Restoration, the Compulsory Draft Order was proclaimed in 1873. In the beginning, the drafting rate was as low as 20%. The draft order was partially amended in 1889, making all able-bodied male citizens eligible for service. In 1927, the draft order was totally revised and became the Military Service Law. This new Law authorized the drafting of all male citizens over 20 years of age. In 1943, the age of conscription was lowered to 19 years of age to strengthen the military toward the end of the “Greater East Asia War.” This law was abolished after the war on November 17,
Backed by the order and law of a universal conscription system, Japan had engaged in the Sino–Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo–Japanese War (1904–05), World War I (1914–18), the Sino–Japanese Conflict (1931–45), and the “Greater East Asia War” (1941–45).

The fallen soldiers in all of these wars were memorialized by the government. The war dead were first cremated where they were killed. When the remains were brought home, funerals were conducted by their military units. Last, public funerals were held in the fallen soldiers’ hometowns. The following studies can provide details on how the public funerals were conducted for these fallen soldiers in the wars cited above: HIYAMA Yukio on the Sino–Japanese War; KAGOTANI Jirō on the Russo–Japanese War and the Sino–Japanese Conflict; TANAKAMARU Katsuhiko on World War I and the Sino–Japanese Conflict; ICHINOSE Toshiya on the Manchurian Incident and thereafter.4

The number of Japanese war dead in these wars cannot be ascertained because those who died from illness were not included in the statistics in the beginning. As of October 17, 2004, 2,466,532 remains had been enshrined at Yasukuni Jinja (Shrine). The numbers by war are as follows: Meiji Restoration, 7,751; Seinan War, 6,971; Sino–Japanese War, 13,619; conquest of Taiwan, 1,130; Hokushin Incident (Boxer Rebellion), 1,256; Russo–Japanese War, 88,429; World War I, 4,850; Jinan Incident, 185; Manchurian Incident, 17,176; Lugou Qiao Incident, 191,250; and Greater East Asia War, 2,133,915 (based on the Yasukuni Jinja data).5

According to the official guidebook of Yasukuni Jinja, the shrine deifies the “e’irei” (spirits of the war dead) who gave their precious lives for the sake of the country.6 The dictionary Kōjien (Japanese language dictionary, 6th edition, Iwanami Shoten, 2008) defines “e’irei” as “Spirit or soul of an outstanding person; Honorific title given to the spirit of the dead, espe-

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5 Mainichi Shimbun, June 20, 2005.

cially of the war dead.” However, this word did not exist in ancient times.\(^7\)

An investigation of the word “e’irei” was undertaken by TANAKAMARU Katsuhiko. The word “e’irei” came to be used at the time of the Russo–Japanese War. Unlike the Sino–Japanese War in which nearly 90% of soldiers died from illness, in the Russo–Japanese War many died fighting in the battlefields. This heroic war created the “god of war,” and the military, schools, and mass media reported to the citizens that each soldier had died a hero’s death, sacrificing his life for the sake of the country. Thus, the word “e’irei” entered the vernacular and came to be used commonly among the people. Previously, its use had been limited to the military and in news coverage. An organization called “E’irei ni Kotaeru-kai” (Association of Responding to the E’irei) defines the word as an “adorning title given to (the souls of) the dead. In a narrow sense, it means (the souls of) the dead soldiers. In Japan, it designates souls enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja.”\(^8\)

The public funeral further contributed to this “adorning title” of “e’irei” coming into common usage. After the Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese Wars, public funerals in hometowns became more systematic: elementary school fields were used as funeral sites; school children sang songs and school bands played music; city/town mayors and other public officials gave memorial addresses; photographs of the deceased were displayed. Admiration and praise for the war dead were stressed, which in turn made the war bereaved proud. Public funerals had become more elaborate by World War I, although Japan was hardly involved and suffered only 4,850 casualties. Public funerals that affirmed the war and heightened national prestige held tremendous influence over school children to the extent that some boys even thought, “I do not mind dying if they hold such a grand funeral.”\(^9\) The war bereaved proudly placed a wooden plate inscribed with “the house of honor” at the entrance of their houses.

The concept of honoring the spirits of the dead soldiers is not unique to modern Japan. When the book written by George L. MOSSES, *Fallen Soldiers; Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford University Press, 1990), was translated into Japanese, the main title became “E’irei,” which designates the fallen soldiers who were deified through ceremony.\(^10\) World War I was all out total warfare and news of draftees dying in the battlefields became rather common. Therefore, how to memorialize them became an issue for modern states because the conscription of soldiers was expected for the next war. It was also extremely important to educate school children, the source of future troops, as long as the state depended on its citizens for the execution of war.

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\(^7\) Tanakamaru 2002.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 21.
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 36.
During the war, due to the worsening war situation, and right after the war, due to the material hardship, official funerals and memorializing of the war dead were not as elaborate as they should have been, but they did take place even after the war. By the time the Shintō Directive (Abolition of Governmental Assurance, Support, Maintenance and Supervision of the National Shintoism and Shintō Shrines) was issued to the Japanese government on December 15, 1945 by the Allied Powers’ General Headquarters (GHQ), this had changed. The Shintō Directive did not directly ban the official funeral. Rather, the military administration in each locality banned funerals and memorializing practices because it considered them to be infusing "militarism and ultra nationalism" into the hearts of the people. On November 1, 1946, the Vice-Minister of the Department of Interior and Education issued an official notice titled "On the Official Funeral and Other Matters" (No. 51) to the local directors.11

In this notice, the war dead were considered "militarists or extreme nationalists."

Transporting, keeping, and delivering the remains of the war dead to the bereaved must be done in a courteous and devout manner. Delivering the remains is the government’s duty; therefore, a public building or public place (except school buildings and school grounds) can be used. However, the public in general is not allowed to participate in the ceremony. One must keep in mind the following: when the funerals and other ceremonies/events, such as welcoming the remains of the war dead, are held, the school teachers should not lead their students to attend such function, and the public in general should not be forced to attend. One must also bear in mind that these occasions are not to be used for disseminating militaristic ideology.

Clause 4 of the same official notice has the following passage on the "War Memorial":

4: Construction of memorial towers, monuments, and bronze statues for the war dead, militarists, and extreme nationalists are not allowed. Those that are currently under construction should be immediately stopped. For the treatment of those that already exist, refer below:

a. Remove those existing in school buildings and premises.
b. Remove those existing in public buildings or on public lands whose purpose is clearly to disseminate militaristic and extreme nationalistic ideologies.

In compliance with this notice, 5,613 memorial towers and monuments and 354 bronze statues were either removed or destroyed; 890 memorial towers and monuments and 17 bronze statues were moved to inconspicuous places; 908 memorial towers and monuments and 29 bronze statues were remodeled: a total of 7,411 memorial towers and monuments, and 400 bronze statues. Some of these were removed and buried underground and then dug up after Japan regained sovereignty. Some were changed to peace towers. Some of the war bereaved, who considered memorial towers their "lifeline" to their deceased loved ones were deeply hurt and refused the removal.

This notice is indicative of GHQ’s effort to totally eradicate militaristic education not only through religion but also through public funerals and war memorials. The war bereaved families were already suffering economic hardship, having had their military pensions cut off as a result of the “Special Case on the Pension Law” ordered on February 1, 1946.

GHQ’s treatment of the war dead as “militarists or ultra-nationalists” further created another kind of predicament, mental anguish. The soldiers returned home after having narrowly escaped from the terrifying battlefields where they had witnessed mass killings, and the war bereaved were grieving the loss of their loved ones. And this was the situation they had to face: The big gap between the gala send-off and the disparaging treatment they received after the war, as if they were criminals. Consequently, they were disconsolate. One of the outlets for expressing themselves was writing war memoirs. However, this practice did not start right after the war. I would like to trace the process of writing war memoirs, using as an example a war memoir about the war fought in the Philippines.

2. Publication of War Memoirs on the Philippines

More than 1,300 War Memoirs on World War II in the Philippines have been found in libraries in Japan. They include Japanese translations of war memorials written by non-Japanese and some copies of hand-written or type-set (using a word processor) manuscripts. Many publications did not enter the market as they were published either privately or by fellow-soldiers organizations. Roughly speaking, fewer than 500 (1/3 of the total) were privately published; 200 (1/6) were published by organizations such as those of fellow soldiers. Some privately published memoirs were written by those who edited the war histories of the fellow-soldiers organizations. Kōjin-sha Publishing Company, which specializes in war memoirs, has published 40 so far. Also, some privately published books were later reprinted and pub-

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13 This section and “annotation” of Hayase Shinzō, ed., Firipin Kankei Bunken Mokuroku (Senzen, Senchu; Senkimono) (Lists of Philippine-Related Books and Articles Published in Japan (Prewar, During the War; War Memoirs). Ryūkei Shosha, 2009, partly overlap.
lished by Kōjin-sha. In celebration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Kōjin-sha created Kōjin-sha NF (Nonfiction) pocket editions and some of the war memoirs were published in that format. Approximately ten books were published by other publishing companies, such as the Bungei-sha and Kindai Bungei-sha, which have specialized in private publications. Numerous war memoirs have been published in magazines, volumes of collected writings, and reference materials such as eye-witness records. It is almost impossible to collect all of them; therefore, they were not included in my research.

(1) Publication Date

The number of publications steadily increased every five years, from the latter half of the 1960s to the mid-1980s, and remained active until the mid-1990s. In terms of years, the highest number of war memoirs (58) was published in 1995, which was the 50th year after the end of war. The number of publications began to decrease rapidly thereafter [see Figure 8-1].

Next, I analyzed the content of the publications chronologically. Those written during the war were authored by the war correspondents and dealt with the dramatic capture operations on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island. For instance, NISHIDA Ichikazu, the correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun wrote Dan’u ni Ikiru: Bataan Korehidōru Kōryaku Sakusen (Living in the Shower of Bullets: The War Records of the Capture Operation in Bataan and Corregidor) (Sōei-dō, 1943); NISHIKAWA Yoshio wrote Hitō Jūgun-ki (A Record of War Correspondents in the Philippines) (Kōa Shoin, 1943). Some writers and novelists, such as HINO Ashihei and OZAKI Shirō, were drafted into the army as members of the Propaganda Corp (later called the Department of Information). Their writings were published in the Bunka Hōkō-kai (Cultural Service Association), ed., Daitōa Sensō Rikugun Hōdō Han’in Shuki Bataan Korehidōru Kōryaku-sen (Notes of Army Reporters of the Greater East Asia on the Bataan and Corregidor Capture Operations) (Dai-Nippon Yūben-kai Kōdan-sha, 1942) and Hitō Hakengun Hōdō-bu (Dispatched Army, Department of Information), ed., Hitō Senki (War Records in the Philippines) (Bungei Shunjū-sha, 1943).
These war correspondents and novelists also wrote about their experiences immediately after the war. For instance, ŌOKA Shōhei, who later became known as a “war novelist,” wrote *Furyo-ki* (A Record of a Captive) (Sōgen-sha, 1948–49), *Nobi* (A Fire on the Plain) (Sōgen-sha, 1952) and culminated in *Reite Senki* (A War Record of Leyte) (Chūō Kōron-sha, 1972). Another novelist, KON Hidemi, wrote *Hitō Jūgun* (Going to the Philippine Front) (Sōgen-sha, 1944) and *Sanchū Hōrō: Watashi wa Hitō Sensen no Furōnin datta* (Wandering in the Mountains: I Was a Wanderer at the Philippine Front) (Hibiya Shuppan-sha, 1949). Although these publications were few in number, the miserable war experiences they recounted were published immediately after the war. Shortly thereafter, a growing interest in the actual circumstances of the war rose among the readers, and books written by Americans were translated into Japanese. Particularly noteworthy were the following books on the battle of Leyte: James A. FIELD, Jr., *Reite-wan no Nippon Kantai: Taiheiyō Sensō no Dai-Kaisen-shi* (The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Shō Operation) (Nihon Kōhō-sha, 1949); and Ira WOLFERT, *Reite* (Leyte) (Myūgi Shuppan-sha, 1951).

After 1950, the Japanese military officers, novelists, and the Americans published numerous works on the Yamashita trial: KURIHARA Yoshihisa, a former staff officer and commander, wrote *Unmei no Yamashita Heidan: Hirippin Sakusen no Jissō* (Destined Yamashita Army Corps: Real State of the Philippine Operation) (Rokumei-sha, 1950); KON Hidemi, *Higeki no Shōgun: YAMASHITA Tomoyuki, HONMA Masaharu* (Generals of Tragedy: YAMASHITA Tomoyuki and HONMA Masaharu) (Bungei Shunjū-sha, 1952); and A. Frank REEL, *Yamashita Saiban* (The Case of General Yamashita) (Nihon Kyōbun-sha, 1952, 2 volumes). General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki (1885–1946), the martial commander of the 14th Area Army, was charged with the massacres that had taken place in Manila. He was sentenced to death on December 7, 1945 and was hanged on February 23, 1946. At that time, many Japanese POW soldiers were still in prison camps in the Philippines. They were devastated to hear about his execution and no small number of them wrote about the Yamashita trial in their war memoirs. KAGAO Shūnin, an international war trial chaplain who witnessed Yamashita’s execution, wrote *Montenrupa ni Inoru* (Praying in Muntinlupa) (Fuji Shōen, 1953). The prison in Muntinlupa, where Japanese suspected war criminals were housed, came to be known to the Japanese when WATANABE Hamako’s popular song “Aa Montenrupa no Yo wa Fukete” (Ah! The Night at Muntinlupa Wears On) (1952) became a hit. Another factor which encouraged publications on the Yamashita trial was related to the recovery of Japanese sovereignty, which came about due to the San Francisco Treaty of Peace concluded on September 8, 1951 (put into effect on April 28, 1952). Since the Japanese did not ratify the Geneva Convention, which stipulated the treatment of POWs, the Japanese
were not recognized as POWs and were instead held as “surrendered Japanese soldiers.”

In terms of fiction, EZAKI Masanori’s Ruson no Tanima (Valley in Luzon) (Chikuma Shobō, 1957) won the Naoki Literary Award in 1957. By this time, the Japanese were not so opposed to the war. This feeling can be seen in the publication of Hitō Senki (War Memoirs in the Philippines) (1958) edited by Nippi Irei-kai (Japan–Philippines Memorial Association). The Japan–Philippines Memorial Association was organized in 1956, with an Imperial prince, HIGASHIKUNINOMIYA Naruhiko as chairman and WACHI Takaji as chief director. Higashikuninomiya served as general during the war and as Prime Minister just after the end of war. Wachi served as major general and chief of staff of the 14th Area Army during the Bataan and Corregidor capture operations. In 1957, YAMAMOTO Shigekazu, who remained on Mindoro Island for twelve years after the war, wrote Mindoro no Nihon-hei: Janguru Seikatsu 12-nen (A Japanese Soldier at Mindoro: The Jungle Life for Twelve Years) (Kōbun-sha, 1957). It was around this time, the fellow-soldiers associations started publishing their war histories and memoirs; for example, the Izumi 5315 Association edited Reite: Dokuritsu Hohei Dai-12 Rentai no Senshi (Leyte: History of War of the 12th Independent Infantrymen Regiment) in 1958. As indicated on its opening page: “Dedicated to the spirits of the war dead who fought bravely,” many publications were dedicated to the war dead with words of memorial and commendation.

In 1967, narratives written by pilgrimage groups who had visited the scenes of the battlefields were published. SHIMAMURA Kin’ichi, who had joined the fourth visiting group to the Philippines, collected the remains of his father, who came to in Manila in May 1944 as the general manager of the Manila branch of Mitsubishi Mining Company and later committed suicide in the mountain area of northern Luzon Island. The younger Shimamura privately published Kyangan no Aozora: SHIMAMURA Daisuke no Ikotsu Shūshū no Kiroku (Blue Sky at Kiangan: A Record of Collecting the Remains of SHIMAMURA Daisuke). Another publication is a record of a pilgrimage called Hitō Junpai Kiroku (A Record of Pilgrimage in the Philippines) published in 1969. It was written by the members of the pilgrimage for memorial services, which consisted of the bereaved family association and the Manabe Unit fellow-soldiers association organized in 1963. They visited the battlefields in the Philippines between November 20 and 25, 1968. Around this time in the 1960s, memorial cenotaphs were constructed in the Philippines. Hitō Senbotsu-sha Irei-hi Hōsan-kai (Philippine War Dead Memorial Cenotaph Dedication Association) constructed the cenotaph and published Firipin no E’irei ni Inoru (Pray to the Spirits of the War Dead in the Philippines) in 1969 as a construction commemoration.

Private publication of war experiences increased after the National Institute for Defense
Studies came out with a series of histories on warfare in the Philippines between 1966 and 1972. Some of the writers wrote based on their notes; some wrote their manuscripts right after the war upon their repatriation; and others published their diaries written during the war or while in war camps. These books were published by commercial publishing companies and have high value as historical source materials. On the other hand, the publications that were based on the histories of warfare written by the National Institute for Defense Studies and war memoirs written by others are considered to have low value as source material.

In 1973, the Hitō Kannon Konryū Hōkoku Shōkon Junpai-dan (Philippine Goddess of Mercy Construction Report and Invitation of Pilgrimage Group) was established and this group traveled through the Philippines from April 25 to May 2, 1973 and published Chōkon: Hitō Junpai Kikō (Mourn for the Souls of the Dead: Pilgrimage Trip to the Philippines). The participants in this pilgrimage also began publishing individual travel accounts. For instance, FURUSAWA Sadaichi privately published Ruson-tō no Mitama ni Sasagu (Dedicated to the Souls on Luzon Island). Gradually, the travel schedule of the pilgrimage was lengthened to include more sightseeing. In 1978, on the occasion of the 33rd commemoration anniversary, the fellow-soldiers associations constructed more memorial cenotaphs and visited the Philippines for memorial services. Around this time, the generation that had experienced the war reached retirement age, and therefore the number of participants increased. These Japanese memorial activities in the Philippines were supported by President Ferdinand E. MARCOS’s tourist attraction policy under martial law (1972–81). In 1974, ONODA Hiroo, who was in hiding on Lubang Island, returned home and published Waga Ruban-tō no 30-nen Sensō (My Thirty Years’ War on Lubang Island) (Kōdan-sha).

In the 1980s, the ex-soldiers with leisure time and monetary freedom journeyed to the Philippines for memorial services and constructed even more memorial cenotaphs. Upon their return, they published books about their activities. While such publications were on the rise, accounts based on the research conducted in the Philippines, including interviews, began to appear. The following publications representing such nonfiction works were written by those born in the 1930s: WADA Tashichiro, Firipin Nōto: Ani no Fūkei, Sensō eno Tabi (Philippines Notes: A Scene of the Elder Brother, Travel to the War) (Mumeisha Shuppan, 1983) traces the footprints of his elder brother who had been killed in the war. Others included; AKAMATSU Mitsuo, Taiheiyō Sensō Ani-tachi no Senkun, Ruson ni Kuchita Wakaki Kōkūhei-tachi no Higeki (A Pacific War, Lesson of My Elder Brother and the Others from the War, A Tragedy of Young Aircraftsmen Who Died in Luzon) (Kōjin-sha, 1984); OSABE Hideo, Mishiranu Senjō (Strange Battlefield) (Bungei Shunjū-sha, 1986); and OSABE Hideo, Senjō de Shinda Ani o Tazunete: Firipin to Nippon (Looking for the Elder Brother Who Died in the Philippines).

In 1990, the publications questioning the actions of the Japanese military in the Philippines came out one after another. For instance, UEDA Toshiaki (born in 1964), first visited the Philippines while in college to participate in the anti-war activities, was shocked to hear stories about the Japanese occupation. During school breaks, he began visiting the villages in the Philippines and collected testimonies of war experiences. Eventually, he published Kikigaki Firipin Senryō (Hearing and Writing about the Japanese Occupation) (Keisō Shobō). Another publication in this category is entitled Ajia no Koe Dai-4-shū Nippon-gun wa Firipin de Nani o Shitaka (Voices from Asia 4: What Did the Japanese Army Do in the Philippines?) (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan). This book was edited by the Ajia, Taiheiyō Chiiki no Sensō Giseisha ni Omoi o Hase, Kokoro ni Kizamai Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai (The Executive Committee on World War II Victims in the Asia Pacific Region: Remembering and Carving Their Suffering into Our Hearts). It is a compilation of conference records and a collection of testimonies. Another book is Waran Hiya: Nippon-gun ni yoru Firipin Jūmin Gyakusatsu no Kiroku (Shameless: The Records of Massacres of Filipino Residents by the Japanese Army) (Gendai Shokan) by ISHIDA Jintarō, who was born in 1922 and experienced the war as a new draftee in the naval forces. He published several more volumes of Filipino testimonies as well as works of fiction based on his research in the Philippines. In the 1990s, due to the proliferation of the word processor, the number of private publications increased, including posthumous manuscripts.

While the number of publications of war memoirs by those who had experienced the war rapidly decreased after 1995, and a different kind of writer appeared. The participants of pilgrimages for memorial services changed from ex-soldiers to their children or children of the war dead. They had reached their retirement with time and money to spend. One such person is KAWASAKI Takuyoshi, who joined the pilgrimage on its 50th anniversary to visit the old battlefields in the Philippines and privately printed Kamigami-tachi no Omoide: Sesō Zakkan, Firipin Ruson-tō Junpai-ki (Memories of “Pantheons”: Impressions of Social Conditions, A Record of Pilgrimage on Luzon Island, Philippines) (1994). NANJŌ Takehiko, whose father had been a war correspondent, traced his father’s footsteps and tried to assess the realities of the war coverage by newspaper reporters in 1945-ren, Manira Shimbun: Aru Mainichi Shim bun Kisha no Shūshō: Aru Mainichi Shim bun Kisha no Shūshō (Manila Shim bun) (Newspaper in 1945: The Last Chapter of a Journalist of Mainichi Shim bun) (Sōshi-sha, 1995). These books demonstrate that the writers were trying to view the war objectively, not necessarily in a sentimental way, having lost family members or relatives. Here, we can observe a change in trend.

Around this time, Filipino war memoirs were belatedly translated into Japanese, although they were few in number. For instance; War Memoirs of Dr. Jose P. LAUREL (Nihon Kyōiku
Shimbun-sha Shuppan-kyoku) was not published until 1987. Laurel was called the “puppet” president (1943–45) of the Republic during the Japanese occupation. Other translations include: Alfonso P. SANTOS, * Philippine-Nippon Tales* (Pan-Research Institute, 1988), a collection of stories that focus on the friendship between Japanese soldiers and Filipinos; Maria Rosa L. HENSON, * Beyond the Destiny of the Slave* (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), a memoir of a Filipino prostitute; and Pelagia Villaflor SOLIVEN, * Pelagia Villaflor SOLIVEN* (A Woman So Valiant) (Dandan-sha, 2007). These works introduced how the Japanese occupation affected the Filipinos’ lives, an aspect hardly known to the present day Japanese.

It is difficult to classify war memoirs into categories, but they can be roughly divided into the following four: war experience, history of the military unit, pilgrimage travelogue, and non-fiction/documentary. About 600 are personal accounts of the war. Writing about one’s personal experience might be an attempt to free oneself from the trauma of war. About 150 are histories of the military unit (division, corps, regiment, battalion, and company). The writers felt that their experiences were unique and were therefore compelled to record them. At the same time, writing such histories gave them comfort in knowing that there were still other fellow soldiers who understood what they had gone through. They also felt that by memorializing the dead fellow soldiers, they would be freed from their personal problems such as the obligation to leave an account behind. Ten percent, a little over 100, were travelogues written by the participants of the pilgrimage/collecting remains. This may be a reflection of the fact that many war dead have not yet been buried. Those soldiers who survived and repatriated to Japan tried to pay their “debt” by erecting memorials near where their comrades had died if they were unable to collect the remains. Fifty publications belong to nonfiction/documentary category and try to convey the “facts” since personal war accounts are not reliable for use as research material.

(2) Age of Author

Next, I will focus on the writers of war memoirs. The highest number of writers, according to their birth year, is concentrated around 1920. This means they were approximately 25 years old during the war. The word “young” is used to describe the author’s background in the titles of their publications. It is easy to imagine that the war had the strongest impact on their lives. However, it was not until the 1980s that this generation started to write their memoirs. Most of the soldiers of this generation were low in military rank during the war; therefore, in the beginning, they were not active in the fellow-soldiers’ associations, and at the same time, they were busy with their professional lives until the 1980s. Around this time, they gradually became more involved in the fellow-soldiers associations.
Many of the initial authors of the war memoirs were newspapermen and writers. They were followed by people with high academic backgrounds such as teachers, doctors, nurses, and conscripted college students, and particularly army/naval surgeons and military nurses. Since they did not directly participate in combat, they had a higher survival rate. They also had opportunities to hear stories from their patients and to take notes or write diaries even during the war.

(3) **Index of Personal Names, Places, and Subjects**

Research on the occurrence of personal names, places, and subjects in the titles of relevant publications yields the following statistical data:

**Personal Names:** The name of "Yamashita" appears in the titles 14 times, followed by the name "MacArthur" 5 times. These two generals are the representatives of both Japan and the U.S. In the initial stage of the war, Douglas MACARTHUR (1880–1964), the highest Commander of the USAFFE, retreated from the Philippines with the famous words "I shall return." In the meantime, YAMASHITA Tomoyuki advanced southward on Malay Peninsula as the army commander of the 25th Army and forced the British forces in British Malaya to surrender on February 15, 1942. For this operation, he was nicknamed "The Tiger of Malaya." Later, the war situation reversed and MacArthur landed on Leyte Island on October 20, 1944. He recaptured Manila on February 23, 1945 as the "liberator" of the Philippines from the Japanese occupation. On the other hand, Yamashita arrived in the Philippines as the Commander of the 14th Area Army on September 26, 1944 to lead the defense operation in the Philippines when the Japanese defeat was imminent. He lost the Battle of Leyte and moved his headquarters to the mountain area of northern Luzon after abandoning Manila. He finally surrendered on September 3, 1945. After the war, Yamashita was charged in Manila Court with "absolute responsibility" for the atrocities committed by the Japanese military including
the “Manila Massacre.” He was found guilty and executed. He was considered to be the “Tragic General” because it was widely believed that he was the victim of MacArthur’s retaliation.

Besides these two generals, the name of Lt. General HONMA Masaharu (1887–1946), who was executed for the Bataan Death March, appears three times. The name of KOZUKA Kinshichi (1921–72) appears two times. He was killed “on the battlefield” (shot to death by the Philippine Constabulary) on October 19, 1972, a year and a half before ONODA Hiroo (1922–2014) was “rescued” in March 1974. Kozuka had been in hiding on Lubang Island with Onoda for 30 years after the end of the war. With the exception of the names MacArthur, Yamashita, Honma, and Kozuka, other names appear in the titles of books written by one author.

**Places:** The place that ranks the highest is “Hitō” (the Philippine Islands), occurring 353 times. Following in rank are: "Luzon," 173; "Firippin" (the Philippines), 120; "Leyte" or "Leyte Island," 66; "Firippin" (the Philippines), 36; "Mindanao" or "Mindanao Island," 35; "Negros" or "Negros Island," 22; "Manila," 19; "Davao," 19; "Cebu" or “Cebu Island,” 18; and "Muntinlupa," 10. Off the coast of the Philippines and "Northern Philippines" also occur in the titles. There were many occurrences of "Hitō," "Luzon," and "Leyte" because battles were fought there during the Philippine Capture Operation, Luzon, and Leyte decisive battles. After the war, the returning soldiers continued to talk about these battles. “The Philippines” was written as “Hitō,” “Firippin,” “Hiripin,” or in Chinese characters in the prewar period and during the war. After the war, it became “Firippin.” “Muntinlupa” is the place where a prison was located and war crime suspects, such as General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki, were housed there.

The names of specific battlegrounds, rivers, valleys, and ridges are mentioned. Balete Ridge, for instance, was where a running battle had been fought. These names indicate that the remnants of the defeated army wandered around after the Leyte Battle and abandonment of Manila. This also tells us that many soldiers died not only on the battlegrounds but from starvation and illness.

**Subjects:** The subject that occurs most frequently is ‘war memoir,” 131, followed by “record,” 104; “serving in the army and its account,” 59; “war,” 46; “war front,” 46; “the Pacific War, its account and history,” 40; “Operation,” 39; “a note,” 39; “last, final, ultimate,” 37; “memorial, account of memorial, record of memorial,” 33; “recollection,” 33; “memories,” 32; “memorializing,” 32; “foot soldier, soldier,” 32; “war dead,” 31; “battlefields,” 29; “battle site,
battle site pilgrimage” 29; “the infantry,” 29; “fellow soldiers, friends” 26; “the springtime of life,” 23; “diary,” 22; “naval battle, an account or history of naval battle,” 21; “the Japanese residents,” 21; “the pacification of the spirits, song for the pacification of the spirits,” 20; “the decisive war,” 19; “mountains and rivers,” 19; “battle,” 19, “a fight to the death, an account of the fight to the death,” 18; “the Greater East Asia War, history of the GEAW, the Greater East Asia Battle,” 18; “a reminiscence, a collection of reminiscences,” 18; “the truth, the facts,” 18; “a pilgrimage, memorial pilgrimage,” 17; “a tank, a tank corps,” 17; “Southern Cross,” 16; “routing,” 15; “collecting remains,” 14; “returning alive,” 14; “peace,” 14; “testimony,” 13; “a defeat,” 13; “die a hero’s death,” 12; “dies in the war,” 12; “defeated,” 12; “the Philippine Operation,” 12; “army surgeon,” 11; “father,” 11, “the Japanese military,” 11; and “mourning,” 10.

Many titles, 235 of them, include the phrase “War Record,” which indicates that the authors felt compelled to record their experiences, feeling that was the responsibility of those who returned home alive. The title “Truth” (18) supports that notion. Their experiences in the war were indeed bordering on the verge of death, thus the words “live or die” were included in the title. Titles that start with the word “death” number 43. Some have “the fellow soldiers,” “the mountains and rivers,” and “the Southern Cross” in the titles. Perhaps the soldiers who were wandering around in the mountains remembered their fellow soldiers who had died under the stars. Some publications were written as memorials and therefore contained the words “memorial,” “appeasing the dead souls,” “memorial pilgrimage,” and “mourning.” These are the characteristics of the Philippine war front that produced mass war deaths due to fierce battles.

3. Analysis of War Memoir: The Moonlit Road by MARUYAMA Yutaka

It is difficult to give a simple reason as to why so many war memoirs have been published, because each individual’s war experience and life after the war has been different. On the other hand, many people either did not or could not write. Even those who wrote could not write the whole truth. Some wrote with particular readers in mind and others not. In view of this, it seems useless to investigate and analyze war memoirs. If we take one publication written by a sensible person, we may be able to better understand. The problem lies in not knowing who this particular individual is. Therefore, I have chosen to analyze war memorial writer MARUYAMA Yutaka (1915–89) and his book Tsukishiro no Michi (The Moonlit Road), which was first serialized in the local newspaper, Nishi-Nippon Shimbun in 1969 and then published the following year. In 1987, the revised and enlarged edition included a new section
called “Minami no Hosomichi (The Back Road to the South).”\textsuperscript{14}

MARUYAMA Yutaka was born in Hirokawa Town, Fukuoka Prefecture and grew up in Kurume City, Kyūshū Island. He began to compose poetry during his Meizen High School days. He entered the First High School of Waseda University but left to attend Kyūshū Medical School (today’s School of Medicine of Kurume University). His father was a medical doctor and his younger brother served as an army surgeon. Maruyama was drafted into Kurume Army Hospital in 1940. In 1942, he was sent as an army surgeon to the Philippines, Borneo, Java, Burma, and Yunnan, China. In the beginning of the war, victory was easy for Japan. From Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines to Java was an easy, speedy advancement. However, it became a desperate fight once Maruyama entered Burma and encountered “hell-like” battles. In May 1944, he and his unit advanced to Myitkyina in north Burma, where they were surrounded by enemy soldiers more than twenty times their number. On August 3, most of the 3,000 guards were killed. After escaping to Yunnan, Maruyama’s unit was attacked by enemy soldiers who were 15 times greater in number, and 650 of his fellow soldiers were killed in September (7 or 10). By September 14, all of original 1,600 had been killed. Maruyama’s second edition, with the new section “The Back Road to the South,” is the record of what took place on the “Bleached White Bone Highway,” the road numerous Japanese soldiers took as they tried to flee to allied Thai territory after the Imphal Operation\textsuperscript{15} failed. Maruyama returned to Japan in June 1946 and opened a medical clinic. Later, Maruyama composed poetry and eventually became one of the noted poets in Japan.

Two months into the serialization of his essay, Maruyama wrote his closing remarks. In this culmination of his essay, the author divulged his strong feelings. Yet the readers would not have detected any intensity; instead, from his words they would have felt uplifted and relieved. It is beyond my ability to summarize Maruyama’s closing remarks, much less speak on his behalf. I will therefore quote the whole “Concluding Chapter” below and later I will try to discuss some points.

I would thank the readers who have read through my essay to the end over the past two months. My essay has no humor, no brazen irony; in fact, it is rather dull and old-fashioned. My original intention was not to write only about the war. However, when I

\textsuperscript{14} I am grateful to Ms. MORISAKI Kazue who recommended that I read MARUYAMA Yutaka’s \textit{The Moonlit Road}.

\textsuperscript{15} The Imphal Operation was an offensive to invade Imphal, the northeastern part of India, in March 1944. This was at the time when the Allied Powers, mainly consisting of British and Indian Armies, were fiercely advancing into Burma. The operation unfolded with 85,000 Japanese troops and the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra BOSE, the head of the Free India Provisional Government.
began reminiscing about the war and actually started to write, I could not help but continue the war story. Perhaps it was because I had so many things to tell and found I could not “leave the battlefields.” While my essay was being serialized, I received numerous letters and phone calls of encouragement. They gave me a boost when I was facing the problem of not finding enough time to sit down and concentrate on my writing because I had so many patients.

One of the letters said: “You have been writing about the war. Why don’t you shift to more contemporary issues and exhibit your critical spirit as a poet.” I believe that the war is the most contemporary issue and I stubbornly continued to write about the war. My reminiscing goes back 25 years. I cannot help but notice how different the circumstances and the ways of thinking at that time were compared to today.

Pacifism, advocated by those of us who experienced the war as well as the youth who had no war experience, has been hotly debated in recent years. I have wondered if I could offer some material for the debate, no matter how insignificant it might be.

I also received two long letters from Ms. HONDA Kaoru of Obama Town of Nagasaki Prefecture. In her letter, she stated in a bitter tone, “Why have you been silent for these long years when your experience should have been made public much earlier?” This stung me, and I would like to explain.

First, I write modern poetry and I have written about the war in some of my poems. Modern poetry is hard to understand. Not everybody appreciates it. I do not like fiction: I get easily annoyed with apparent contrived set ups. I also avoid writing essays (including chronicles/narrations). Essays tend to become ordinary and retrospective. I was not going to write essays until I felt old. This is the reason I have kept quiet.

Second, only now have I begun to feel that I could write the truth. It is not only that enough time (25 years) has passed but I also found I had reached a certain point when I felt that I was finally able to write.

Whenever I read war memoirs, I feel war is neither particularly ugly nor beautiful. I also realize how hard it is to write about things as they truly are. I often wondered whether I could describe the things/events the way they actually were. I am afraid not, not with my writing ability. I must tell you that there is one thing that I cannot describe when writing about the war. However, it is not that important any more.

The author was no ordinary doctor. Maruyama was known as “the doctor who does not refuse a house call,” or “a poet dedicated to educating the younger generation.” He was an extremely busy person. He worked as a civil mediation committee member, composed school
songs, and taught poetry to patients with Hansen’s disease. In this respect, readers could understand how hard it was for him to find the time to write essays for two months, which demanded choosing the right words carefully. ANZAI Hitoshi who wrote the “Introduction” to the book entitled, “The Theory of Mr. Maruyama,” emphasized the importance of his book by stating: “We the listeners are receiving “a banked coal” of brevity in our bare hands, which is necessary for the protection of human dignity.”

In 1969, the movements of the anti-Vietnam War and anti-Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan were at their height. One youth who was active in these movements did not understand the pacifism that came from the war experience from place 25 years earlier. Maruyama had been disappointed in the unchanged “circumstances” and “ideology” of the past 25 years in Japan. On the other hand, those who did not know what took place overseas during the war could not understand why he was silent for all these years: 25 years were necessary in order to reflect the battleground objectively. While writing, Maruyama needed to consult the newly published *Irawaji Kaisen: Biruma Bōei no Hatan* (Irrawaddy Encounter: Failure of Burma Defense), which was included in the War History Series published by the Military History Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan Defense Agency (Asagumo Shimbun-sha; 1969). He read it with “irritation as if he were reading a chess game (shōgi) played by officers.” He also read war memoirs by “fellow soldiers” to make sure that he was able to say that war was neither ugly nor beautiful.

Maruyama stated toward the end of his book that what was important on the battleground was not important, not even necessary, to talk about after 25 years. And he did not even feel guilty about not being able to write. We do not know exactly what he meant by this but he seems to have been holding some kind of unresolved issue that he was not able to express. Perhaps the depiction of the death of two of his close fellow soldiers, found in the “Postscript” to the first edition, may give us a clue.

One of these fellow soldiers was his town-mate. He and Maruyama took the “Bleached White Bone Highway” together while escaping to Thailand. After returning home, the town-mate died vomiting blood due to drinking too much home-brewed sake. Although he lived with his gentle mother, he seemed to have given himself up in despair, as if he had sold his soul. The other fellow soldier was his unit mate and was one of the model soldiers. After the war, he tilled the land which his elderly mother left him, married a young woman farmer, and had three children with her. He was looked up to as a hard-working and innovative farmer in his village. However, some ten years later, without any apparent reason, he committed suicide by ingesting an agricultural chemical. Maruyama understood his fellow soldiers’ deep de-
spair and their desire to leave this world.

In the "Postscript," Maruyama explained why he wrote the serialized essay: "I always thought of recording my war experience in Yunnan and north Burma before I die. First, it is to appease the souls of the departed who left with regrets. Second, I wanted to express my own pain and to convey exactly what took place in the battlefields of desolation and screams." Twenty-five years had already past while he was thinking about writing. The author continues on to say that he has fulfilled part of his responsibility.

In order to complete what he considered his “responsibility,” Maruyama published the revised and expanded edition 17 years later in 1987. This was two years before he passed away. In the new edition, he describes the fleeing route from north Burma to Thailand, while in the original he talked about the battlegrounds in northern Burma and Yunnan. This new added section was entitled "The Back Road to the South." He wrote the "Introduction" and the "Postscript" to the second edition of The Moonlit Road. I would like to quote both in full and compare the difference between the two: one was published in 1987 and the other in 1970. The "Closing Chapter" and the "Postscript" appeared in the 1970 edition and those in 1987 edition were exactly the same.

Forward to the Second Edition of The Moonlit Road

The war memoir The Moonlit Road was first published 17 years ago. After it went out of print, I often received inquiries regarding a reprint. This is proof that many war bereaved exist who lost their loved ones in northern Burma and Yunnan. It is my duty to produce a reprint and I apologize for taking so long. I had planned to write about our miserable retreat (during the war) and wanted to add to the reprinted version. That was the reason it took so long. I published it only this summer with the added section The Back Road to the South. The “Introduction” written by my respected friend ANZAI Hitoshi and the portrait painted by the master artist UCHINO Hidemi in the original edition were used in the second edition.

The truth of what took place in the battlefields is difficult to determine. No matter how those of us who returned tried to describe our experiences, the depth of silence is as deep and dark as the sea and will be forever tucked into the folds of history. My pen could not reach a lot of places in The Moonlit Road. I often questioned the trick behind the war-making. For instance, the fact that Your Excellency Minakami received a telegram stating: "I will name you (those who died bravely) the ‘god of war’ and promote you two ranks higher" is not mentioned in the official war history. Who sent that telegram? If only I had witnessed it, then it would be my words against others. However, the
receipt of the telegram was witnessed by others such as Major Shigyō, who was in the same trench as Your Excellency and Captain Ninomiya, who was in charge of cipher.

In writing about the war, I am not able to write about some things and I prefer not to write about other things. The things I cannot write about are whatever took place beyond my defense line, and also my limited writing ability holds me back. The things I prefer not to write about are those concerning ethics. Which is more courageous: to pursue it or to bear it until one is fossilized? There is no easy answer.

This book helped me close the chapter of my postwar period. I hope I have conveyed how unjust the war was and at the same time, how humanity, severely beaten to the limit, still soared beautifully in the battlefields.

The second edition of The Moonlit Road includes the “Forward” addressed to the readers (the war bereaved) was added. When writing a second edition, some authors revise the original because they feel compelled to add something more. Others retain the original text and add only a little new material. Maruyama belongs to the latter. In the forward, he said; “It was the duty of those who survived to publish the second edition.” He vents his frustration by saying that he could not do anything about certain matters due to “the trick behind the war.” He wrote, “This book helped me close the chapter of my postwar period.” He was determined never to write (or could not write or chose not to write) anything more. He concluded his “Postscript” by praying to His Excellency MINAKAMI Genzō who committed suicide in order to save the lives of his subordinates. He was the symbol of humanity: “humanity, severely beaten to the limit, still soared beautifully in the battlefields.”

Postscript for the Second Edition of The Moonlit Road

It has been said that the Japanese tend to beautify the past. Perhaps I am one of them. In The Moonlit Road and The Back Road to the South, I might have overly purified the past. I am a born optimist, sensitive, not logical, and not reflective. While I was writing The Moonlit Road, my memory was still sharp but I cannot say the same when I wrote The Back Road to the South. My memories were often lost.

The road was more than 2,000 km from Yunnan to Chiang Mai in Thailand through Burma. We retreated on this muddy road. From the Salwin River to the mountains of Chiang Mai was more than 400 km. We silently walked this long march without much adventure. I have no way of recalling my thoughts and feelings. Even if I had tried, the dark shameful part was submerged. What was meaninglessly magnificent in my memories were only the fragrant poppy fields that stretched as far as the eyes could reach and
the brightness of the immense chinquapin trees on the hills.

We cannot blame beautifying the past memories. Notes taken in the battlefields can be discriminating. Memories that do not serve you well tend to be forgotten and those that suit you tend to be kept. It is an inner work, this writing of war memoirs. In other words, what a soldier unconsciously selects to remember amidst the turmoil of war is a reflection of his personality and his ideological principals.

After the war, I came to treat the following three words very seriously: “e’irei” (souls of the dead soldiers), “gyokusai” (dying a hero’s death), and “heiwa” (peace). I use the first two words when I appreciate the bitterness and hardness the words carry, and only when I feel the spiritual upsurge that is equivalent to what the words really mean. For “peace,” I have hardly used that word until today. I remind myself not to mention that word casually.

I would like to thank my fellow soldiers for the assistance rendered to me and Sōgensha publishing company for publishing the second edition of The Moonlit Road. Lastly, I put my hands together in prayer for His Excellency Minakami.

The “Postscript” starts with Maruyama’s self-defense for not being able to write, although he was aware that writing “is my duty.” Irritated by inability to write, he attributes it to his personality and to the passing of 42 years. He thinks that other authors of war memoirs suffer the same fate. Therefore, Maruyama tries to disclose his “inner workings of war memoir;” that is, his own personality and ideological principles as a soldier.

After the war, Maruyama treats three words with most caution. To use the words “e’irei” (souls of the dead soldiers) and “gyokusai” (dying a hero’s death) gave him psychological pain precisely because he underwent the trauma of war. When people reflect on the past war, they often use the word “heiwa” (peace). Maruyama knows how difficult it is to attain “peace;” therefore, he cannot use it so lightly. Despite the fact the war had produced so many deaths, he may have felt that the postwar Japanese society would not able to maintain peace.

In the first and the second editions, Maruyama narrates his personal war account from May 1944 to August 1945, the end of World War II. However, the narration of victorious rapid advancement from Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines to Java in 1942 is short. The defeat in the war, not the victorious fight, compelled Maruyama to write his war memoir because he witnessed the mass deaths. He wanted “to appease the souls of the dead who died with regrets” and “to express my own pain” and asserted that this was “the duty of those who survived.” However, writing did not liberate the survivors from the trauma of war. There were many authors who worked and re-worked their manuscripts, such as OOKA Shōhei
who wrote *Reite Senki* (A War Record of Leyte). Others were compelled to write their own stories after reading the War History Series by the National Institute for Defense Studies. Instead of recovering from the trauma of war, those who wrote had to face another threat: to correct others’ mistakes and give supplementary explanations, thinking that it was their duty as survivors, just as Maruyama mentioned in the “Forward to the Second Edition.” This produced a chain reaction.

War memoirs can be called “paper cenotaphs.” People wrote them wishing for “heïwa” (peace) so that the deaths of those who were deified as “e’irei” (souls of the dead soldiers) and who died a “gyokusai” (dying a hero’s death) wouldn’t be forgotten. If these three words are used without much thought, the war survivors cannot help but feel alienated. The war survivors have never been freed from the trauma of the war because they witnessed the mass deaths, including those who died of illness before they even engaged in fighting, and because they were not able to say these deaths were not in vain, for they had fought in nothing but an “unjust war.”

**Concluding Remarks**

When one hears the word “history,” one might think of three different historical narratives: one is based on historical research; a second on school textbooks; and a third on historical novels and dramas often made for TV or film. These historical narratives are supposed to present the same picture; however, different stories exist. This is because what historical research can provide is quite limited; therefore, people tend to add elements from their own imaginations from different points of view, thus creating different versions of historical narratives circulating among people.

Those who experienced the war tried to find themselves in these historical narratives. One narrative is an official history, the *History of War Series* published by the Military History Section, National Institute for Defense Studies of the Defense Agency. The content of this series was unacceptable to those average soldiers who actually fought the war. They could not find themselves in it because the series seemed to avoid the issue of responsibility for the war. School textbooks mention the war but only very briefly, centering on the Great Tōkyō Air Raid, the Battle of Okinawa, and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They hardly describe the battlefields of China and Southeast Asia where the majority of Japanese soldiers fought. Therefore, the soldiers had to write their own memoirs, describing their own experiences. Some organized gatherings to talk about their war experiences in order to relate them to children. Some could not even do these things because this was something they just could not do.
Some historical events became a part of the group memory because they were based on common experiences: air raids, evacuation to the countryside, the Battle of Okinawa, and the atomic bomb explosions. Victory on battlefields also became a part of the group memory. However, there is no group memory in some: for example, after losing a battle and roaming around the fields and mountains without command, soldiers succumbed to mass deaths due to sickness and disease. Moreover, when one’s unit chose to die rather than surrender, and only a few survived, to whom do they relate their experience? If their unit had a leader, those former soldiers were able to talk about their war experiences at reunions of fellow soldiers.

Experiences on the battlefields have nothing to do with official memories and are never found in the official war history or in school textbooks. What soldiers experienced would not be understood by anyone, even members of the family; therefore, the memories had been kept to themselves. People close to MARUYAMA Yutaka did not know what he went through in Burma and learned about it only when his story had been serialized in the newspaper. His personal tragic experience that could not even be talked about at a reunion of fellow soldiers was sealed in his own mind. When economic growth was achieved in the postwar period, former soldiers began enjoying a peaceful time of material and spiritual comfort. In this tranquil life, they began thinking about why they were the ones who survived and could lead such luxurious lives, while their comrades had to die violent deaths. When they thought of the very fine line between the survivor and the dead, all the more they could not allow themselves to lead such contented lives. Furthermore, when they thought about their former enemies living in the developing countries where lives have not improved much since, they felt guilty. Those who went through miserable experiences not found in the official or group memory were crushed by their own memories; eventually this trauma grew worse. Yet some considered writing war memories as a way to carry out some kind of “obligation.”
Conclusion

The Japanese in the Philippines during the Modern Era

It is often said that the American colonization of the Philippines (1898–1946) brought positive influences to the Philippines, most importantly English education and rich material and mass cultures. Education—particularly one which is relevant to global society—is usually seen as a critical step towards economic and political development. Why, then, has the Philippines not become economically successful and politically stable? This was one of the questions posed in the “Introduction.” Finding the answers to such questions is one of the tasks of modern and contemporary Philippine history. We may not be able to find the answer if we only focus on Philippines–U.S. historical relations. As seen in this book, Philippines–U.S. relations is insufficient as an explanation; it appears the Japanese who went to the Philippines were active within the framework of the American colonial system and actually reinforced it. In order to complete our examination of modern Philippine history, in this section, we will look into how Japanese immigrants to the Philippines after the Meiji era have been incorporated into Philippine modern history and what kind of influence they had on Philippine society.

Most Japanese who went to the Philippines in the Meiji era engaged in simple physical labor. They were among the “poor Asians” that the modern era had produced. They worked as construction workers on the “Benguet Road” connecting Manila to the “summer capital” of Baguio, a resort for the American colonial rulers. Those Japanese laborers were not “excellent workers,” as Japanese in the homeland were described in both prewar era and during World War II. In fact, their migration to the Philippines was considered a “failure.” The fact remains that they did participate in maintaining the infrastructure of the colony. After the completion of the road, some remained in “the summer capital,” participating as carpenters in constructing the city. Others began cultivating vegetables that grew only in the temperate high mountain region. Those who left Baguio ventured into work which required hardly any capital, such as peddling or selling halo-halo (shaved ice) in various places, their main clients being Filipinos. Japanese fishermen operated in Manila Bay, supplying fish to markets in the relatively modern city of Manila. Thus, these Japanese contributed to the Philippine economy by helping to transform fish and vegetables into modern commodities.

Japanese who engaged in abaca cultivation in Davao were initially mere abaca cutting/slicing laborers, but gradually obtained access to land and operated abaca plantations. The mode of operation was not that of large-scale plantations which required new European or Ameri-
can machinery. Nor were their operations based on the prevalent native landlord-tenant relationship. They were run by “independent operators,” a category between the two models cited above. These Japanese “independent operators” were under the control of Japanese-owned agricultural corporations which supervised planting and selling. The Japanese “independent operators” built personal relationships with indigenous Bagobos who became their dummy landlords, while the Christian Filipinos who migrated to Davao became their agricultural laborers. In other words, the Japanese dragged the various local Filipinos into the vortex of the modern money economy.¹

These early Japanese migrants were farmers and fishermen, not faceless, big corporate organizations. They were in constant, direct contact with ordinary Filipinos. In this way, they played a role in the imparting of modern economic/business concepts to Filipinos.

The Japanese merchants who came to the Philippines in the Taishō (1912–26) and Shōwa (1926–89) eras before the war were not large-scale traders. The goods they had brought were not major commodities for the Filipinos. Neither merchants nor goods were influential enough to leave a significant mark on the Philippine economy, yet Japanese merchants and their goods soon became indispensable to the people in Manila’s downtown as well as in the provinces. The Japanese goods, most of which were dry goods for daily use, soon became popular favorites. The Filipinos’ customary purchasing of Japanese goods was incorporated into annual events that centered on Catholic rituals: new dresses and other special attire were made, and gifts were exchanged for Christmas and fiestas (festivals honoring Catholic saints). The Filipinos’ inherent love of new things made it easy for them to accept what the Japanese merchants had brought.

One might ask why Filipino merchants and goods made in the Philippines did not thrive. The answer may lie in the fact that the Philippine islands are situated in a tropical sea area. Before the coming of the Europeans, population density was quite low. No industry that required stable, intensive labor power developed. Marine or water transportation was used for long distance transportation of people and goods, regardless of the size and weight. People thought of how to bring goods to themselves rather than how to produce them. If they could not bring them, then people moved to where the things were. This is the characteristic of the Melayu (Malay) world in insular Southeast Asia. This would also help to explain why the Filipinos bought relatively inexpensive Japanese goods. The Japanese merchants and their goods enriched Filipinos’ lives and were readily accepted without hesitation. In this way, consumer habits further developed. The purchasing power of the Filipinos came from rich agri-

cultural, forest, and marine products, mineral resources, and labor power. In earlier times, Filipinos easily migrated because they belonged to the Melayu world. They have no resistance to migrating to other places in search of wealth. Furthermore, those who left their birthplace were considered courageous and able men.²

Filipinos generally are not cautious of outsiders; however, they had to take precautions against the Japanese military invasions. Those Japanese who arrived in the last part of the history of Philippines–Japan relations were those who interacted with the Filipinos just before the invasion and during the occupation. During the first decades of the 20th Century, Japan did not have proper diplomatic relations with the Philippines, as it was under U.S. control. Thus, in 1935, corresponding with the establishment of the Commonwealth government, the Philippine Society of Japan was created to establish a smooth relationship between Japan and the soon-to-be independent Philippines. During the war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army, and Navy did not utilize the civilians who were involved in organizations like the Society, however, civilian Japanese willingly cooperated with the Japanese military, bringing great injury to the Filipino people.

Japan and the Philippines took different paths in establishing modern nation-states. Imperial Japan formed its modern nation centered on the Emperor. Owing to the so-called kōninka kyōiku, an educational policy that sought to transform people into the Emperor’s subjects, Japan established a system in which the whole nation would unite to “serve the country.” Overseas Japanese residents did not have the opportunity to be drafted; thus, unlike their fellow Japanese at home, they did not fulfill their duties and therefore were all the more eager to become the “Emperor’s subjects.” On the other hand, the Philippines was a multi-ethnic, multi-language society and a U.S. colony following the 1898 transfer of authority from Spain. The people of the Philippines did not have a feeling of unity, especially when the U.S. began to withdraw in the 1930s–1940s. The invading Japanese military used this situation to divide and rule, encouraging Filipinos to fight among themselves; they were already divided and suspicious of each other.

One of the main goals of the Philippine revolution, unfolding between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, was to narrow the gap between classes; however, the gap further widened under U.S. colonial rule. The Japanese occupation, despite attempting to erase American influence, was not successful in reducing the gap either. Under the Japanese occupation, neither the Filipinos nor the small number of Japanese who were knowledgeable of Philippine society were given an opportunity to build and lead a new soci-

ety. They were merely used as tools of the Japanese military, working in the lower echelon of the military administration.

After the war, the Japanese who had been brain-washed to be subjects of the Emperor never even thought about the great damage the Japanese occupation inflicted upon the Filipinos, neither the material damage, nor the cultural and social damage, including human relationships. The Japanese optimistically, did, however, seek a revival of a relationship between the two countries. After Japan regained economic stability, a bilateral relationship materialized, however, it was not an equal relationship as Japan was in an economically superior position. Therefore, the so-called “negative legacy” of Philippines–Japan relations, the product of the prewar era and occupation, was overlooked by the two countries. The positive effects of interactions in the prewar period were erased by the “betrayal” of Japanese wartime behavior. Not only were these effects erased, but Filipino animosity toward the Japanese was created, deeply engraved in each Filipino’s heart and has been handed down to the next generation.3

The case of Philippines–Japan relations in modern and contemporary times illustrates the great effect that one country can have on another. The impact of individual Japanese on Philippine history, society, and individuals’ lives is also apparent. These individual actions and behavior could play an important role, particularly because there was no formal diplomatic relationship between the Philippines and Japan during the American colonial period. This then tells us how each individual could live independently of their social circumstances, such as colonial rule.

Recent Philippine historical research shows how Filipino historians have challenged historical narratives and produced new narratives which could not have been written based solely on modern written historical source materials. Responding to these works, Japanese historians also contributed to the same agenda.4 For instance, Reynaldo C. ILETO recovered the real meaning of the Philippine revolution, recorded as a mere “revolt” in American colonial documents. Ileto did so by going into the world of the Filipino masses who expressed themselves in the most important indigenous language of the Philippines, Tagalog.5 In Japan, IKEHATA Setsuho responded to this work, examining Catholicism in relationship to the revolution, in

addition to her work on the Japanese occupation. 6 Ricardo Trota JOSE described Philippine society under the Japanese occupation and concluded that Filipino autonomy was never lost, even while under foreign control (Japanese occupation). He drew an analogy between bamboo and the Philippines: they may bend under pressure, but they never break. 7 This point was further elaborated by NAKANO Satoshi in “Appeasement and Coercion”; autonomy was maintained despite the employment of these two techniques by the oppressor. 8 The same point was made by NEMOTO Kei in the case of Burma (Myanmar). Burma was given “independence” by the Japanese military on August 1, 1943, earlier the Philippines, which was granted independence on October 14, 1943. 9 If one knows the history and society of countries and regions in Southeast Asia, one knows how difficult indirect rule would have been. 10 This has been expressed effectively by a number of individuals, including one woman who courageously lived through the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. 11

Lack of Philippines–Japan Cultural Exchange

As this book has shown, considerable exchange of people and goods between Japan and the Philippines took place in modern and contemporary times. In spite of this, the effects of this exchange only reached those who were directly involved and rarely if ever reached others, not to mention succeeding generations. Why did the Philippines’ existence not become something to be reckoned with in Japan? This was the second critical question posed in the introduction. We must understand the reason for this absence, in order to more effectively shape future exchanges between the two countries.

In the distant past, the contact Japan had sought with ancient China and Korea as well as its contacts with modern Europe were based on the notion that there was some culture “to be learned.” These contacts continued and their fruits spread throughout Japanese society. The case with the Philippines was not the same. Most Japanese thought the Philippines had no culture worth learning. Unlike in India or China, there is no (ancient) philosophy or ideology in the Philippines, nor is there an “Angkor Wat” or a “Borobudur” in the Philippines. Today, the Philippines does have some cultural heritage sites registered at World Heritage: the Rice Terraces of the Cordilleras on Luzon Island (registered in 1995); Baroque churches (1993); and Vigan historical city (1999). The last two are of colonial heritage, built during the Spanish period. There is no indigenous Philippine culture that might arouse historical romance in people’s hearts. This is mainly because no organized kingdoms existed in the Philippines before the Spanish conquest, except the Islamic kingdoms in the south.

Since the Meiji era, Japan consciously strove to make rapid progress as a modern nation, using Europe as her model; therefore, Japan tended to look down on areas like Southeast Asia which were colonized by Europe. The Japanese attempted to establish the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere where Japan held a dominant position not only militarily, economically, and politically but also culturally, trying to attain cultural superiority over the peoples in the region. The Japanese at that time all received an education that created a superiority complex in their minds, as proud subjects of the Emperor. It never occurred to them that there was something “to be learned” from Philippine culture. Worse yet, this tendency remained even after the war; therefore, no new form of exchange between the two countries developed.

Meanwhile, for Filipinos, Japan had always been “second” to the U.S. after the Philippines came under American rule. Filipinos thus often ventured into the U.S. in search of the American dream. In reality, it did not always work out as they wished; however by 2010 the number of Filipino-Americans had reached 3,400,000, second only to the Chinese (4,000,000) among Asian-Americans. When it comes to income in the U.S., Filipinos rank second after Indians and earn more than Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans (including the North Koreans). In contrast, as of 2011, there were only around 210,000 Filipinos residing in Japan. So far, no new development of exchange between Japan and the Philippines on equal footing seems in sight.

Such ideal exchange has not yet been possible because of Japanese rigidity. Many Japanese classify others as superior or inferior, using the degree of modernization as a yardstick. Thus,

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they consider the Philippines rather inferior as it is neither economically rich nor politically stable. However, to the surprise of the Japanese, Filipinos seem to be quite content being Filipinos. They belong to the Melayu world that encourages mobility. In addition, English is popular, a legacy of American colonial rule. Owing to these two factors, they have come to be known as a people of the Diaspora. They live scattered throughout many countries in the world, leaving their families and motherland behind, yet they are satisfied with who they are. Where does this contentment come from? We will not be able to understand it if we use only a modern “developmental” concept.

We may be able to find the key to this mystery when we look at the historical and cultural background of Philippine society. The major occupations of Filipinos in the Diaspora include household maid, entertainer, caregiver, nurse, and medical doctor. These jobs all provide basic necessities, comforts, and pleasure in life. Filipinos in general are also profoundly kind to the weak. We can say each Filipino has the ability to make home and society a safe place. This ability is inherent for this mobile people who have the skills and inborn nature that enable them to be accepted wherever they reside. Filipinos have the basic “philosophy and ideology” necessary for a future society of co-existence.

In contrast, what did the Japanese discussed in this book bring to Philippine society? We can say they brought the necessities for modern economic development and consumer culture, supporting the American colonial process. However, modernization from outside has not destroyed Philippine society because the Filipinos know how to make modernization acceptable on Philippine soil. Today’s Philippine society thrives on this soil. This is a good example for us Japanese: we may learn from the Filipinos how to build a contented society despite great change coming from outside forces. Contentment may be found neither in “development,” a prevalent ideology in modern times, nor in ancient remains, but in a society which brings “comfort and peace.”