Article

China’s Interests in the Arctic: Threat or Opportunity?

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Abstract

Recent research suggests that Arctic states and nations with stakes in the northern region should pay attention to the recent actions of China, its foreign policy, and strategy in Arctic affairs. In light of China’s current assertive stance in the East and South China Seas, vigilant and suspicious behaviour towards China is not incomprehensible. However, careful and objective analysis of its state practice, including its related stance and achievements concerning Arctic matters, may provide a more pragmatic and hopeful prospect on international cooperation among the Arctic states and non-Arctic states in order to maintain peace and stability not only in the region but also in the international community. This paper, therefore, aims to discuss the following elements: first, China’s achievements and intention to take part in the development in the Arctic region and second, the relationships between China’s position on Arctic matters and on the South China Sea dispute. The paper concludes that unfounded and biased analysis of China’s position and intention on the Arctic is counterproductive in achieving international cooperation among the Arctic states and non-Arctic states in order to maintain peace and stability in the Arctic region.

Key words: Arctic, China, Arctic Council, Law of the Sea

Introduction

Commentators once described China’s various activities in the development of the Arctic region as a strong ambition or even a threat to regional security. Today this kind of observation can be seen in mass media and is often connected with its political and economic power in the international arena. Some take it for granted that China’s action constitute a threat and will cause unwelcome consequences everywhere from the Arctic region itself to global relations. This can be seen as the influence of unfair and biased reports by the mass media.
Professor James Kraska, for example, calls China as ‘the least preferred partner in dealing with Arctic issues’, analysing a survey result conducted only a few years ago. According to Kraska, China has become more assertive about its ‘rights’ in the Arctic Ocean, principally as a means to exploit natural resources in the region. He even connects China’s active stance in the Arctic with its claims in the South China Sea, by saying the following:

Moscow’s resolution of the matter with Oslo and opening to Copenhagen is an apt lesson for China, which has frightened nearly every state in Southeast Asia over its bold and insensitive claims to 80 percent of the South China Sea. China is capable of doing the impossible, which is uniting the A5 against Beijing’s embryonic efforts to establish ‘rights’ in the Arctic.

This statement was certainly shared by those who take the Chinese attitude as a threat, but it is actually one-sided and not necessarily true, as will be discussed below. What is problematic is that China’s Arctic position is also inevitably connected with its allegedly nefarious motives despite the fact that the Beijing government keeps quiet with respect to its policy on the region. It is not necessarily clear that China has purposefully taken actions to cause this negative view.

This paper aims to discuss two elements: (1) the achievements and intention (that is, foreign policy and/or strategy) of China around development in the Arctic region; and (2) the relationship between China’s position on Arctic matters and that on the South China Sea dispute. The paper concludes that unfounded and biased analysis of China’s position on the Arctic will be counterproductive to international cooperation among Arctic states and non-Arctic states in order to maintain peace and stability in the Arctic region.

China’s positive attitude and stance in the Arctic

China is, often referred to as a rising power or a returning power because of its decision to pursue an Arctic policy and showing interest in the development of shipping routes and the exploration of energy and resources in the Arctic region. Not a small number of writers are of the opinion that China’s conduct influences the security environment of the Arctic Ocean. As will be examined below, some quasi-official standpoints see China’s intention and diplomatic policy, but the official view of China’s Arctic policy has not yet been identified probably because it has not yet been publicised. The main reason for this, as is supported by many commentators, is that China has not established an official position on the Arctic issue. Even if this is so, one writer is of the view that behind the current debates of scholars lies in the common intention to drive the Beijing government to make and implement foreign policy and strategy as soon as possible. Moreover, China’s posture concerning Arctic matters seems different with respect to the scientific research that China has conducted since early days in Antarctica. Will the advance of China in the Arctic become a
threat to security in the region?

China’s interest in the Arctic increased in the 1990s, shortly after the commencement of scientific research in Antarctica in the early 1980s, but it did not attract the attention of the world until around 2010. One may say that the large impact was caused by the statement of one Chinese Rear Admiral in 2010, as will be seen below.

Indeed, before China established its scientific research base on the island of Svalbard, Norway, in 2004, it had already sent an exploration party. Thus, it has so far accumulated the achievements of sending parties for five times. China’s icebreaker, Xue Long (Snow Dragon), successfully passed through the route near the North Pole in 2012. China’s leaders including State Chairperson Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, recently visited the Circumpolar states. It seems that China may have consolidated its own footpath by way of bilateral diplomacy around the interests of Arctic development, while China intends to take these opportunities to enhance its own voice and influence at forums such as the Arctic Council (AC) for multilateral rule making.

However, the story is not so simple. Some may regard these activities as good opportunities for Chinese business as a result of environmental factors such as climate change and of the development of shipping routes and energy resources in the Arctic, mainly driven by the wish to maintain governance based on the existing legal norms (including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)). Commentators are, however, divided on the answer to the question as to whether this is an opportunity or a threat.

In March 2010, Admiral Yin Zhou of the People’s Liberation Army Navy stated, ‘in the light of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the North Pole and its surrounding area do not belong to any state but the common wealth of the world people.’ Probably due to some misguiding translation of his speech cited in many academic papers and journal articles, his statement in particular, was taken by the states concerned to show China’s ‘aspiration’ as a ‘threat’. Its ‘ambitious’ and active attitude has been reported with special emphasis partly because China was also admitted with permanent observer status at the AC, partly because it had an increasing number of conflicts with its neighbouring states in and around the East China Sea and the South China Sea over territory.

However, not a small number of thinkers hold that the current attitude of China towards the Arctic is not necessarily the one that surrounding states should be vigilant against. These views are largely based on the following facts: (1) China has had ample achievements in cooperation with scientific research; (2) China has strengthened bilateral relations in economic terms with Scandinavian countries and Arctic states such as Russia and Canada; and (3) China has actively participated in, and adhered to, the idea of governance in the region on the basis of legal orders, including the AC and LOSC. In light of these facts, perceived threats from China’s seemingly active stance should rather be seen from a cool and realistic viewpoint.
China’s Arctic Policy?

Let us now turn our eyes to some semi-official opinions on Arctic cooperation. It is worth taking a brief look at these views in order to have a rough sketch of China’s quasi-official position, even though these should not be regarded as official. It is of course a little too optimistic and unrealistic to trust any written statements publicised by the Chinese state or its agency. In order to understand official policy in this case, it is best to first understand at least quasi- or semi-official position of China in order to analyse its further intention or strategy on the Arctic.

The official site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled ‘China’s View on Arctic Cooperation’, in an entry dated 20 October 2010 outlines three points as the reasons for China’s interests in Arctic cooperation: (1) China’s geographical location, which may seriously be affected by climate and weather in the Arctic; (2) scientific research is required in order to understand global climate research and environment assessment; and (3) potential impacts on China through new shipping routes, energy activities and trade.

China’s initial conclusions on the trend in Arctic cooperation can be understood in the next three points: first, a need to comprehend the causes and impact of the natural and environmental changes in the Arctic; second, the expanding areas of Arctic cooperation; and third, more institutionalised cooperation. Thus, China seeks the following partnerships: first, recognition and respect between Arctic and non-Arctic states under current international law; second, mutual understanding and trust, on the one hand, and mutual support and assistance on the other; third, wider trans-regional and comprehensive approaches to tackle trans-regional issues; and forth, common interests in peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic. These are the reasons and motivations for China to show interest in the Arctic matter. One may assume that these elements reflect its foreign policy on the Arctic.

It is also of some interest to briefly examine the views shown in the paper, ‘Arctic Issues and China’s Stance’ dated 4 March 2013, written by Mr Tang Guoqiang, former Ambassador to Norway, likely the original writer of the abovementioned ‘China’s View on Arctic Cooperation’. These two papers overlap in essence, and one may assume that they imply China’s position on Arctic matters.

‘Arctic Issues and China’s Stance’ may be summarised as follows: China considers the Arctic to be rich in energy, mineral and biological resources. Understanding these is part of a process of scientific research to understand the Earth, in particular in the current situation of climate change, the Arctic may moreover widen the possibility of commercial use of three major maritime routes in the Arctic region whose military and strategic value has been also important to major powers. Even though the current law of the sea, including LOSC, and other related international agreements are applicable, some Arctic maritime disputes remain unsettled such as safety navigation and its environmental impacts. Whereas the Arctic states have various national interests, overlapping and/
or competing, Arctic states and non-Arctic states should have more mutual trust and intensified cooperation in order to face new challenges that will not be fully covered by the current governance system in the Arctic such as the Arctic Council (AC). Therefore, AC should accept the applications of new observers of non-Arctic states, throwing away its unfounded doubt and uneasiness over the idea.

The paper continues by emphasising its respect for Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction according to international law and its wish to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in the region. It pronounces China’s stance on the following Arctic matters: (1) the significance of Arctic scientific research under current and future climate change; (2) cooperative relations on shipping and trade of energy resources with the Arctic states in accordance with relevant international rules and norms; (3) China’s wish to become an observer in AC to make a contribution to the peace, stability, environmental protection, and sustainable development in the region; and (4) the establishment of win-win relationship of cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic States.

Judging from the timing of this paper, its motive was to explain the reasons that China wished to become a permanent observer of AC. Shortly after the paper was published, China successfully became a permanent observer in May 2013, along with India, Italy, Japan, Korea and Singapore. This may be a sign of the nature of AC as a ‘state-centric body’, since the AC failed to act on the permanent observer status applications field by seven non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations.23 In this sense, the expansion of AC by accepting non-Arctic states such as China and other Asian shipping as observer states has not necessarily been taken as a fear or a concern.24

As is often pointed out, China’s major concerns are threefold: first, the environmental impacts of melting Arctic ice due to climate change; second, Russia’s strong influence on the Northern Sea Route;25 and third, China’s accessibility to energy and resources under the Arctic seabed.26 However, these concerns are countered by the more convincing argument that since ‘nearly all of the identified Arctic resources lie within state borders or within the universally agreed 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone of the coastal states’, ‘they are not subject to debate’.27

**Is China’s position on the South China Sea parallel with its position on the Arctic?**

It is also a shared view that China as an ‘Arctic stakeholder’ regards the future of the Arctic as economic opportunities of global significance. Every country is entitled to a stake that may be gained through a due process. Indeed, some scholars admit that there is no need to fear China’s motives, and others hold a half-optimistic, or ambivalent feeling. As one remarks:

There is some irony when Chinese official call on Arctic states to consider the interests of mankind so that all nations can share the Arctic. China displays no such benevolence when
it comes to what it perceives as its sovereign rights in seas closer to its own territory. When China’s core interests are at stake, we can expect assertiveness. In areas such as the Arctic, we should not let anxieties take hold.28

What is misleading here is to connect the Arctic matter with the South China Sea dispute.29 Certainly, both cases are similar, in that, they are concerned with China’s involvement in territorial and maritime matters, with the hopeful prospects for future energy and resources. However, this type of unreasonable and ‘misplaced’30 argument is usually countered by legal arguments carried out in a number of stages.

First, it is argued that although there is no official position the Chinese government seems to maintain its claims for the territorial sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and for maritime areas surrounding their islands on its historical grounds.31 Some scholars are of the opinion that China, which ‘knows very well [that] it cannot argue [that it] has a long tradition of using the Arctic’, certainly maintains that the Arctic Ocean is the ‘inherited wealth of mankind’, which refers to the part of the Ocean beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the extended continental shelves, that is to say, the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) under Article 136 of LOSC.32 This interpretation of China’s stance on the legal status of the maritime part of the Arctic Ocean is, to some extent, misleading, because China’s position on the Arctic Ocean has nothing to do with its ‘long tradition of using the Arctic’. Rather, it is with the LOSC’s explicit provisions concerning the legal status of CHM, which shall not be eroded by the illegal extension of jurisdiction of the littoral states of the Arctic states.

The argument continues, noting that China does not claim any sovereign right over sea expanses in the Arctic. However, this is only natural, not because China cannot consider claiming an EEZ or a continental shelf in the Arctic ‘unless it begins openly questioning LOSC, which it ratified in 1994’,33 but because China, by default, has no intention to claim any sovereign right in the Arctic, regardless of the application of interpretation of LOSC. As regards the application of LOSC to the South China Sea, China seems to be of the opinion that LOSC is not applicable to the South China Sea situation because the latter preceded the former in legal terms.34 Therefore, a possibility of China’s ‘openly questioning LOSC’ does not have any bearing in this context, and China, as a state party to LOSC, would not challenge the provisions of LOSC per se in their application to a practical case.

Third, the security environment in the South China Sea is totally different from the one in the Arctic Ocean, irrespective of China’s naval presence in the former or its (non-)capacity to send a warship to the latter. One may even simply think that its remoteness is the main reason why China does not pose a military threat in the Arctic.35 In addition, China sees the Arctic not for its military value but for its scientific, environmental, and economic value.

Lastly, some writers observe that ‘questioning the claims of Russia or Canada over Arctic
straits would prove counterproductive for China’, since arguing the North West Passage is an international strait ‘would be tantamount to reckoning the Qiongzhou Strait also is’. As regards the argument on internal waters, it is observed that ‘Bohai Bay satisfies the [LOSC] geographic tests’, whereas ‘the administration of Qiongzhou Strait as internal waters apparently has not been accompanied by international protests’. However, in the application and interpretation of LOSC, there still seems to be some practical uncertainties with respect to the Arctic shipping practice and its relations with the international straits in the region. As this hypothetical and theoretical argument is not China’s official position, it rather states that it respects the littoral states’ rights and jurisdiction under relevant international law rules, including LOSC, this argument is out of focus.

**Is it natural and inevitable for China to become a ‘stakeholder’ in the Arctic?**

China is more and more active in cooperation with scientific research and economic relationships with Norway, Canada, and Iceland, for instance, mainly because these countries have reasonable domestic demands for China’s economic and technological power. This may only be natural if one takes a look at the current situation of China as the world’s number two of economic power. It would not be unreasonable to advocate the merits of promoting international cooperation to avoid over-reaction concerning security and not to amplify unstable elements in the Arctic, by way of incorporating China into the AC after taking into consideration its ambition and interests.

According to reports Mr Hu Zhengyue, Assistant Director of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated that non-Arctic states including China, also have legitimate interests recognised under LOSC in the deep seabed of the Arctic Ocean as the CHM. This draws attention to the anxiety that some Arctic states might make an excessive submission of the prolongation of its own continental shelf. This statement has been interpreted as pushing the states concerned to comply with LOSC. In this connection, it is noteworthy that China submitted a note verbale to the United Nations Secretary General concerning the submission in 2008 by Japan of its extended continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), maintaining that a submitting state should respect the scope of the deep seabed so as not to have any influence upon the interests of the international community as a whole. This position may share the same basic concern that China shows with respect to the submissions of the extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean made by the Arctic states. At the same time, the statement made by Mr Hu has been deemed one reflective of the position of the developing states, and has turned a spotlight on the Arctic Ocean as one of the Global Commons, which other major parties have failed to do.

Thus, it may be said that China has played a unique role in appealing for good governance of the Arctic Ocean. Moreover, the Chinese point of view fears the extension of jurisdiction of the coastal states in the Arctic Ocean and the exercise of rights by way of the submission of an extension of their continental shelves. This is a point of view that maintains that China is claiming its rights
in the Arctic by tracing its position in the Arctic in parallel with its position in the South China Sea. However, this can be said to be flawed in that it mixes up the two cases, which represent different legal situations and need distinct approaches, as was discussed above.47

Conclusion

The more objective and persuasive view seems to be that there is no certain evidence that the conduct of China in Arctic matters has exceeded the scope of the various rights recognised for non-Arctic states.48 Stressing viewpoints that may see China’s actions as a threat to security in the Arctic region would be unbalanced, regardless of whether or not China has publicised its own foreign policy or strategy on the Arctic. This holds true whether China has taken a position of ambiguity on purpose or not, and regardless of how the country’s scholars and writers may express themselves.

Note: This paper partially reflects the results of research that has been funded by the 2013 Special Research Grant (General) of Waseda University.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.


4 Kraska, supra note 1, p. 266.


13 For the role of the Arctic Council, see Klaus J. Dodds, ‘Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, Precaution and Preparedness’, 49 *Polar Record* 193 (2013).

14 Whether the Northern Sea Route will become ‘a new Silk Road’ to replace the existing southern shipping route from Asia to Europe is doubted by some writers. See Malte Humpert, ‘The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China?’, The Arctic Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, November 2013 (http://issuu.com/thearticlinstitute/docs/the_future_of_arctic_shipping_-_a_n) (accessed 25 January 2014).


20 See the following site: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/txsw/t812046.htm (accessed 25 Jan-
21 See the following site: http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-03/04/content_5772842.htm (accessed 25 January 2014)

22 This may be assumed by checking the following site: http://no.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/t654759.htm (accessed 25 January 2014)


24 For example, see Linda Jakobson, ‘Beijing’s Arctic goals are not to be feared’, Financial Times, 19 May 2013, at the following site: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3dfd6f16-bef1-11e2-87ff-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2rQbRk7nV (accessed 25 January 2014)

25 For a comprehensive research on this issue written in both Russian and English, see Nataliya Marchenko, Russian Arctic Seas: Navigational Conditions and Accidents, Springer, 2012.

26 Jakobson, supra note 24.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 For a cautious view on China’s approach to the Arctic, see also Wright, supra note 5, pp. 37-38.

30 See Alexeeva & Lasserre, supra note 7, at p. 85.

31 In this respect, Gayazova picks up three related topics concerning ‘historic rights’; internal waters, groups of islands and other insular features, and the ‘U-shaped line’ in the South China Sea. See Gayazova, supra note 10, p. 88.

32 Alexeeva & Lasserre, supra note 7, p. 85.

33 Alexeeva & Lasserre, supra note 7, p. 86.

34 For the semi-official views on this issue, see Ikeshima, supra note 3, pp. 32-33.


36 See Alexeeva & Lasserre, supra note 7, p. 86.


39 See the opinions posted on the site in supra notes 20 and 21.

40 Chircop, supra note 5, p. 14.


43 Hu Zhengyue, ‘China’s Perspective on Arctic Matters’ (「中国对北极事务的看法」), Shijie Zhishi


See also Chircop, supra note 5, p. 14; Wright, supra note 5, pp. 37-38; Alexeeva & Lasserre, supra note 7, pp. 85-86.

See Gayazova, supra note 10, at p. 95.