

# An analysis of examples for the interpretation of the word *iṣṭa* in Dharmakīrti's definition of the thesis

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The purpose of defining the thesis (*pakṣa*) in inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*), according to Dharmakīrti (ca 600–660 CE), is to remove a false view in which what is to be proved and what is not to be proved are reversed.<sup>1</sup> By defining the thesis, one is able to refute fallacious theses that are deliberately stated in an ambiguous way where the proponent avoids stating explicitly what he intends to prove lest his statement be refuted. Dharmakīrti's interest in the purpose for giving the definition of the thesis is closely linked to the introduction of a new idea, not found explicitly in Dignāga (ca 480–540 CE), in the interpretation of the word *iṣṭa* “intended [by the proponent]” in the definition of the thesis.<sup>2</sup> Dharmakīrti believes that those theses which are stated ambiguously with a view to avoiding a criticism can be refuted on the basis of his distinctive interpretation of the word *iṣṭa*, namely, the specification that what the proponent really intends to prove is the thesis, and not anything that is merely stated and that differs from the statement that is to be proved.

Dharmakīrti sought to simplify Dignāga's account of similar topics connected with the definition of the thesis and that of the reason. In a previous paper I have treated these points, and as an example of the refutation of fallacious theses I have examined Dharmakīrti's argument against one proposed by the Sāṃkhyas.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. PVin III 288a8–b1; Iwata 2007, n.5. For studies of the definition of the thesis see Tillemans 2000, 47ff. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Tillemans who kindly corrected my English and gave me information concerning the Sanskrit manuscripts of PVin III and Dh, and to Prof. O'Leary who kindly checked my English draft.

<sup>2</sup> For the role of the term *iṣṭa* in Dharmakīrti's thesis, see Tillemans 2000, 49ff., Iwata 2007, 277f.

<sup>3</sup> See Iwata 2007, 278f.

Among the examples of fallacious theses which are refuted by Dharmakīrti, some have complex contents, and hence the exemplified theses themselves become an object of investigation. Having seen that the opponents, for example the Cārvākas, had taken full advantage of this complexity in order to paper over a tricky argument by not expressing what they really wanted to prove, Dharmakīrti insisted that their theses must be refuted in a logically persuasive way and thus he revealed the failures of their theses. In this paper I shall analyze such examples of fallacious theses and show that Dharmakīrti's own interpretation of the term *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis serves effectively to refute them.

The word *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis implies that the statement intended by the proponent is precisely that which is to be proved (*sādhyā*), even if it is not stated explicitly. Against this claim of Dharmakīrti an opponent raises the objection that, insofar as an inference-for-others consists of a verbal expression of a valid reason, only that which is stated explicitly is the thesis to be proved, not that which is implied in the context of discussion:

[Objection:] [In an inference-for-others not only a specific property which is not under discussion but] also that [which is under discussion] is not that which is to be proved (*sādhyā*), because it is not stated.<sup>4</sup> [Answer:] Suppose that, when a proving [factor] (*sādhana*) [as the reason] is presented (*upanyasta*) because of a dispute (*vivāda*) about a certain (topic), that (topic) [i.e., the basis for the presentation of the reason] were not that which is to be proved, what then is that which is to be proved? If, further, it were so [i.e., if nothing but that which is stated (*uktamātra*) were the *sādhyā*] either the opposite [of the intended property to be proved] could be proved (*viparyayasiddhi*) or [the proof] would be quite useless (*vaiphalya*)<sup>5,6</sup>

Dharmakīrti indicates that for his opponent, who insists that only what is explicitly stated is the thesis, it would follow either that the opposite of what is to be proved is proved or that the proof itself is useless.

<sup>4</sup> See Dh 20a4f. = Skt. ms. 15b7: *na keva<la>m aprakṛto viśeṣo na sādhyah, prakṛto <'>py anuktatvāt parārthe <'>numāne na sādhyah.*

<sup>5</sup> See Dh 20a7 = Skt. ms. 16a1f.: *tathety uktamātrasya ca sādhyatve viparyayasiddhiḥ sādhanasya vā vaiphalyam syāt*<sup>(1)</sup> (<sup>(1)</sup>syā ms.).

<sup>6</sup> PVin III 289a3f.: *ma brjod pa'i phyir de yañ bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no ze na | gal te gañ la rtsod pas* (D 191a4 ; *pa P*) *sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba ma yin na* (<sup>(1)</sup>*bsgrub par bya ba ci yin*<sup>(1)</sup> / *de lta yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa'am don med par 'gyur te* / (<sup>(1)</sup>*kin tatsādhyam* MsI 37a2; *tadā kim idānīm sādhyam* / MsII 35b3. The original Skt. text might have been *kim idānīm(?) sādhyam*), translated in Tani 1984, 8; see Ce'e PV IV 33: *sādhanam yadvivādena nyastam tac cen na sādhyate | kiṃ sādhyam anyathāniṣṭam bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā* // (= Tillemans 2000, 56); Tani 1984, 9.

## I. The Avyutpattivādins' argument against the Vyutpattivādins in favor of the thesis that the word has its proper object before its connection with the named

By means of two examples Dharmakīrti illustrates these two undesirable consequences of the false assumption that only that which is stated explicitly is the thesis. As an example of the second consequence, uselessness of the proof, he takes the Sāṃkhyas' inference of the existence of the Self, which I have treated in Iwata 2007. As an example of the first consequence, the proof of the opposite (*viparyayasiddhi*), he takes an argument formulated by the Avyutpattivādins for their claim that not every word can be explained etymologically. Making use of a statement in the *Vākyapadīya*, Dharmakīrti shows that their argument would prove the opposite of their thesis, if the explicitly expressed thesis alone were the thesis. Their argument against the Vyutpattivādins, who claim that every word can be explained etymologically through a suitable root, is formulated as follows<sup>7</sup>:

[The thesis –] the [proper] form of the word (*śabdarūpa*) has [its] object (*arthavat*) (i.e., meaning) [already] before the connection [of the word] with the named (*prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhāt*) [that is, before the conventional assignment of the word to the named –] is that which is to be proved [by means of the reason –] because it is recognized [that] case-affixes [are added to the form of the word] (*vibhaktidarśanāt*).<sup>8</sup>

Since the word consists of the form of the word, it seems reasonable to assume that in the context of this argument the form of the word is nothing but the word itself, in accordance with the formulation in *Vākyapadīya* I 67, where the subject of the thesis is the name (*saṃjñā*).

<sup>7</sup> See PVV 375,5f.: *yathā vyutpannasarvaśabdavādīnaṃ praty avyutpannasamjñāśabdavādīnā*<sup>(1)</sup> *tadarthavattvasiddhyarthaṃ sādhanam ucyate* (<sup>(1)</sup>PVV<sup>1</sup>; °śabdādīnā PVV).

<sup>8</sup> PVin III 289a4f: (*dper na*) *sgra'i no bo ni min can dan 'brel pa'i sñon rol nas don dan ldan pa yin te / rnam par dbye ba dan ldan par mthoñ ba'i phyir ro* (<sup>1</sup>*žes bya ba la*<sup>1</sup>) = Skt. ms. (MsII 35b3f.): (*yathā*) *prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhād arthavac chabdarūpaṃ vibhaktidarśanāt sādhyam* (Tib.: *žes bya ba la* has no equivalent in Skt.; in the Tibetan translation *sādhyam* is translated in the context of the succeeding phrase), see Ci'e PVV 375,6f.: *saṃjñīsambandhāt prāg arthavac chabdarūpaṃ vibhaktidarśanāt tadanyaśabdavat*. PVin III 288b3–291a3 (where Dharmakīrti explains the term *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis) is translated in Tani 1984, 7–16.

The name has [its] form as [its] object before the connection [of the name] with the named; [therefore, it] becomes a cause for [the formulation of] the genitive and nominative cases.<sup>9</sup>

The inference formulated by the Avyutpattivādins consists of the following logical elements: The property-possessor to be proved (*sādhyadharmin*), hereafter the subject of the thesis, is the word (*śabda*). The reason (*hetu*) is the cognition of case-affixes in the word (*vibhaktidarśana*). The property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) is the possession of its object before the connection of the word with the named object (*prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhād arthavattvam*). The example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is other words which are different from the word that is the subject of the thesis (*tadanyaśabda*) and which have both case-affixes and their objects.<sup>10</sup> This inference is abbreviated in the following way:

*śabda: (vibhaktidarśana → prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhād arthavattvam) (tadanyaśabda)* [1]

In order to grasp the intended content of the Avyutpattivādins' argument we must presuppose their view that if the word, for example a name, before its connection with the named object, had no other object, it could not be called a noun-base (*prātipadika*); therefore, no case-affixes could be added to the word.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, when the word has a case-affix, it is a noun base and has its object. Now, at the beginning of Pāṇini's Sūtras the definition of the term *vṛddhi* runs as follows: *vṛddhir ādaic*. The word *vṛddhi* has the nominative case-affix, and thus is a noun-base, which means it must have the named as its

<sup>9</sup> VP I 67: *prāk saṃjñinābhisambandhāt saṃjñā rūpapadārthikā / ṣaṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimittatvāya kalpate* // (the numbering of the verse follows Rau 2002), translated in Iyer 1965, 69; Akamatsu 1998, 124; Ogawa 1999, 33; Rau 2002, 16. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Ogawa who kindly gave me detailed information on the relationship between the word and its object in the *Vākyapadīya*.

<sup>10</sup> See Dh 20a8–b1 = Skt. ms. 16a2f.: *saṃjñinābhisambandhāt prāk saṃjñāśabdasyārthavattvaṃ sādhyam. vibhaktidarśanād iti hetuḥ. bāhyapadārthako vibhaktiyantaḥ*<sup>(1)</sup> *śabdo*<sup>(2)</sup> *dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ* (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib.: *rnam par dbye (rnams dbye P D 17b1) ba'i mtha' can ...* . <sup>(2)</sup>*śabdo*(?) ms.), PVV 375,6f.

<sup>11</sup> See VPV [ad VP I 67] 125,5–7: *yāvat saṃjñinā tu saṃjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na saṃjñūpadārthikety arthāntarābhāve tasyāḥ prātipadikasaṃjñābhāvād vibhaktiyogo na syāt* (“Insofar as, however, the name is not connected with the named, [the name] has not the named as [its] object. Accordingly, if [before the connection of the name with the named] there were no other object [than the named], the [name would] not be called noun-base; therefore, no case-affix could be added [to the name. This is, actually, not the case since, for example, the name *vṛddhiḥ* in the Sūtra: *vṛddhir ādaic* at the beginning of Pāṇini's Sūtras has the nominative case]”), translated in Iyer 1965, 69; Akamatsu 1998, 124f.

object. The object can be the proper form (*svarūpa*) of the word, a conventionally assigned meaning intended by the speaker, or it can be that which is indicated by the word.<sup>12</sup> In the case of the beginning of the Sūtras, neither the conventional meaning “grow” nor the indicated vowels, *ā*, *ai* and *au*, are determined. Accordingly, the object of the word *vṛddhi* is only the form of the word. Thus it is shown that the word which has a case-affix has its proper form as its object before its connection with the named. This is the major premise for their argument. In addition, according to VP I 67cd, this premise is based on a causal relationship in which the word's having its proper form as its object enables us to recognize the formulation of case-affixes in the word. That is, the obvious fact that the word has case-affixes is the effect, which results from the cause (*nimitta*) that the word has its proper form as its object. Since logically this cause is inferred from its effect, the cause as consequence, i.e., the word's possession of its own form as its object, is inferred from the effect as reason, i.e., the cognition of case-affixes in the word.

Thus, according to Avyutpattivādins, their intended statement that the word has its proper form as its object, namely, the statement that the word has its object in virtue of the proper form of the word, is logically proved. Although they do not explicitly state their intended restriction “in virtue of the proper form of the word” in the inference ([1]), it is the point which they want to prove. For their opponent, the Vyutpattivādins, however, it is precisely the object to be refuted, because they insist that the word has its object not on account of its proper form alone but due to other external factors. Using the

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<sup>12</sup> In order to indicate the source of the Avyutpattivādins' view that the word has its proper form as its object before its connection with the named, Jñānaśrībhadrā and Būston cite Bhartṛhari's verse (VP III 3.1 = Jñ 280a3f. = Bū 358,2f.): *jñānaṃ prayoktur bāhyo 'rthaḥ svarūpaṃ ca pratīyate / śabdair uccaritaḥ teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ //* (“The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of the word] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these (namely, the cognition, external things meant and own form) [with the words which are uttered] is well-established” = Houben' translation, Houben 1995, 145, translated in Rau 2002, 174). According to Bhartṛhari, for a listener who hears words there is sometimes doubt with respect to the cognition, i.e., intention, of the speaker or to the external objects of the words, but there is no deviation with respect to their proper forms (cf. VP III 3.2; Houben 1995, 145ff.). That is, the relation of the words with their proper forms is established and does not raise a doubt in the listener's mind. Both of Jñ and Bū, however, seem to understand that before the conventional assignment (*\*saṃketa*) of the word to an object the uttered word makes known not only the proper form of the word but also the intention to speak, see Jñ 280a6: *des na brda'i śna* (P; *śion* D 234b3) *rol nas kyaṅ brjod par 'dod pa'i śes pa daṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo* (bor P D) *go bar byed do //*, Bū 358,3f.

case of the etymological explanation of the word “cow” which expresses species, Manorathanandin illustrates the Vyutpattivādins’ view that the word “cow” (*gauḥ*) has its object not in virtue of its proper form of the word – *g*, *au*, and *ḥ* – but in virtue of the universal, cowness:

In this case [i.e., when the word is always connected with its object]<sup>13</sup> for the [opponent who] claims that [every word] is etymologically explained, [the following thesis] is proved: the word “cow” has [its] object in virtue of the external universal (*sāmānya*) [i.e., cowness] that is indirectly indicated by the activity (*kriyā*) [of going], because, when [through the activity of going the word “cow” is etymologically explained in such a way that] on account of [the fact] that something goes it is [called] cow (*gacchatī gauḥ*), [the activity of going is on the one hand a cause for the etymological explanation<sup>14</sup> and on the other hand together with the universal “cowness”] inheres in one and the same thing [i.e., each particular cow] (*ekārthasamavāya*).<sup>15</sup> However, [the thesis of the proponent, the Avyutpattivādins – the word “cow”] has [its] object by means of the [internal] object, which consists of the proper form [of the word] alone – is not [proved].<sup>16</sup>

In the inference formulated by the Avyutpattivādins ([1]), the property to be proved consists merely of “possession of an object” (*arthavattva*), and the restriction “in virtue of the proper form of the word alone” is not stated. Now, according to the objection raised against Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the word *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis, namely, the objection that only that which is explicitly stated is the thesis, the Avyutpattivādins’ intended statement – the word has its object “in virtue of its proper form alone” – would not be the thesis, because in their inference they merely state that the word has its object but do not express their intended restriction “in virtue of its proper form alone”<sup>17</sup> In addition, in the above-mentioned example of the etymological interpretation of the word “cow” expressing species it is proved that the word which

<sup>13</sup> See PVV<sup>1</sup> 426, n.4: *nitye śabdārthasambandhe*.

<sup>14</sup> See Dh 20b1 = Skt. ms. 16a3: *iha vyutpattivādinō yathā gamanād gaur iti jātiśabdaḥ kriyānimittaḥ, tathā ...*

<sup>15</sup> See NBT(Dh) 39,2f.: *yathā gacchatī gaur iti gamanakriyāyām vyutpādīto ’pi gośabdo gamanakriyopalakṣitam ekārthasamavetaṃ gotvaṃ pravṛttinimittikaroti*.

<sup>16</sup> PVV 375,7–9: *atra gacchatī gaur<sup>(1)</sup> ity ekārthasamavāyāt kriyopalakṣitena bāhya-sāmānyenārthavān gośabdaḥ siddho vyutpannavādinaḥ<sup>(2)</sup>, <sup>(3)</sup>na tu<sup>(3)</sup> svarūpamātreṇārthē-nārthavān<sup>(1)</sup>gor PVV<sup>1</sup> <sup>(2)</sup>ms. 84b6; ’vyutpanna° PVV PVV<sup>1</sup> <sup>(3)</sup>ms.; nanu PVV PVV<sup>1</sup>.*

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Dh 20b3 = Skt. ms. 16a4: *arthamātraṃ cōktam, <sup>(1)</sup>na viśeṣaḥ<sup>(1)</sup>. tato na svarūpamātreṇārtha<sup>(2)</sup>vac chabda<sup>(2)</sup>rūpam<sup>(1)</sup>Tib.: (bye brag ni ma) smras (te /) has no equivalent in Skt. <sup>(2)</sup>°vata śabda° ms.); Bu 359,1: *phyi rol la ma grub pa’i sgra’i rañ gi ño bo tsam gyi<s> don dan ldan pa ni ze ’dod yin yañ ma smras pas bsgrub bya ma yin la /*.*

has case-affixes always has an external object.<sup>18</sup> In other words, for the Vyutpattivādins, it is true that the reason of the Avyutpattivādins, the cognition of case-affixes (*vibhaktidarśana*) in the word, leads logically to the consequence explicitly stated by the Avyutpattivādins that the word has an object, but in reality this reason does lead to the possession of an external object, namely, possession of its object due to the external factors. Therefore, for the Avyutpattivādins it would entail an undesirable consequence that their reason leads to the restricted consequence, i.e., word's possession of its object "due to the external factors", and hence reverses their intended statement, viz., that the word has its object in virtue of its proper form alone.<sup>19</sup> In short, provided that only the explicitly expressed statement were the thesis, for the Avyutpattivādins their thesis would be the general statement that the word has its object (*arthavat*). Then they would be obliged to accept also a particular consequence which has the restriction, as far as their reason can lead to this consequence. Indeed their reason does lead to the restricted consequence that the word has its object due to the external factors. Accordingly their reason would reverse their intended statement that the word has its object in virtue of internal factors alone. This undesirable consequence results from the false assumption that only the proposition that is explicitly stated is the thesis, but not that which is really, even if implicitly, intended by the proponent. Thus, Dharmakīrti proves indirectly his view that the thesis to be proved consists of that which is really intended by the proponent.

<sup>18</sup> See PVV 375,10 = PVV<sup>1</sup> 426,23–25: *tato dṛṣṭānte vibhakyantasya vākyārthavattvena*<sup>(1)</sup> *vyāptisiddher...* (<sup>(1)°</sup>*vatvena* PVV<sup>1</sup> ms. 84b7; read: *bāhyārthavattvena*(?) for *vākyārthavattvena*).

<sup>19</sup> See PVin III 289a5f.: *rañ gi ño bo tsam gyis don dañ ldan par ni* (<sup>(1)</sup>*bsgrub par bya ba*<sup>(1)</sup> (D 191a5; *ba* om. P) *ma yin la / don dañ ldan par yañ* (<sup>(2)</sup>*mthoñ ba*<sup>(2)</sup> *de'i phyir phyi rol gyi don <gyis don> dañ ldan pa ñid mi 'dod pa* (<sup>(3)</sup>*grub par*<sup>(3)</sup> 'gyur *ba'am*<sup>(3)'</sup> = Skt. ms. (MsII 35b4): *na ca svarūpamātrārthavat, arthavac ca, tato bāhyenārthenārtha*<sup>(4)</sup> *vat tvam aniṣṭaṃ syāt*<sup>(4)</sup> ("However, [for the Avyutpattivādins their intended statement that the word] has [its] object in virtue of its proper form alone is not [the thesis to be proved, because the restriction "in virtue of its proper form alone" is not stated], in addition, [from their reason "cognition of case-affixes" it is proved that the word] has [its] object. Therefore, it would follow [for the Avyutpattivādins that] an undesirable [consequence] that [the word] has [its] object [only] due to an external thing." <sup>(1)</sup>In the Sanskrit context the word, *sādhyam*, belongs to the immediately preceding sentence. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. has no equivalent in Skt. <sup>(3)</sup>Tib. has no equivalent in Skt., although the Tibetan translation (*mi 'dod pa grub par ... ba'am l*) has the same construction with that of Jñ 280a7f. (: *mi 'dod pa bsgrub pa'am l*). <sup>(4)°</sup>*vatv{e?}am aniṣṭaṃ syāt / MsI 37a3; °vatvem*(?) *iṣṭaṃ syāta / MsII*).

## II. Cārvākas' *sadvitīyaprayoga* and Dharmakīrti's refutation of their proof

In order to show that on the basis of his interpretation of the term *iṣṭa* (intended [by the proponent]) in the definition of the thesis many pseudo-proofs can be refuted, Dharmakīrti takes as an example the Cārvākas' formulation of the proof of their thesis that a pot has a second factor (*sadvitīyaprayoga*).<sup>20</sup> Their inference runs as follows:

For example, a pot (*ghaṭa*) is accompanied by a second (*sadvitīya*) [i.e., a companion,<sup>21</sup> or a counterpart, namely,] by either of the two (*anyatara*)<sup>22</sup> – a person characterized as a body to which a consciousness manifested [by the material elements] belongs, or a pot – because it is not a blue lotus (*anutpalatva*), like a wall (*kuḍya*).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See PVin III 289a8: 'dis ni gñis pa dañ bcas pa'i sbyor ba rnams la yañ<sup>(1)</sup> rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa bśad pa yin te / ("On account of this [i.e., the indication of the fault that there is no co-presence of the reason with the property to be proved in the example, on the basis of the interpretation of the term *iṣṭa* that what is intended by the proponent is the thesis to be proved,] the fault of no co-presence (*niranvayoḣa*) in the case of the formulations [of reasons] for [the type of consequence that the subject of the thesis is] accompanied by a second [factor] (*sadvitīyaprayoga*) is [also] explained." <sup>(1)</sup>yañ has no equivalent in Skt. MsII 35b5, MsI 37a5), PV IV 34abc'; Watanabe 1977, 197, Tillemans 2000, 57f.

<sup>21</sup> See Dh 21a3f.: *de dag las gañ yañ ruñ bas gñis pa dañ bcas pa ste zla bo dañ bcas pa'o //* = Skt. ms. 16b3: *tayor anyatareṇa sadvitīyaḥ saśahāyaḥ*; Tillemans 2000, 58, n. 209.

<sup>22</sup> Literally: a pot has a second (a companion) in the form of either of the two, see Tillemans 2000, 58f. I follow Śākyabuddhi's paraphrase of the compound *anyatarasadvitīya*, cf. PVṬ(Ś) 316a8 (ad PVP 329a3f., PV IV 34): *de dag las gañ yañ ruñ ba ste bum pa dañ skyes bu gñis pa dañ bcas par 'jug pa'i phyir gñis pa dañ bcas pa'o // – Ci' PVV<sup>1</sup> Appendix 526,13f. (= Steinkellner 1981, 293,8f. = Tillemans 1991, 416,25): tayor anyatareṇa ghaṭena puruṣeṇa vā saha dviṭīyena vartata iti sadvitīyaḥ<sup>(1)</sup>* ("Because [the vase] exists together with (*saha*) a 'second' (*dviṭīya*) which is either of the two, viz. the vase or the person, it is said to be *sadvitīya*" (translation in Tillemans 1991, 417) <sup>(1)</sup>*ca dviṭīyaḥ* in text).

<sup>23</sup> PVin III 289a8–b1 – Ci' PVBh 496,31–497,1: *yathābhivyakta<sup>(1)</sup>caitanyaśarīralakṣaṇapurusaḡhaṭānyatarasadvitīyo ghaṭaḡ, anutpalatvāt<sup>(2)</sup>, kuḍyavad iti* (<sup>(1)</sup>ms. 246a6; *yathā vibhakta<sup>o</sup>* in text <sup>(2)</sup>ms.; *anutpana(?nna)tvāt* in text. See Watanabe 1977, 194 & 205, n.1; Steinkellner 1981, 292,26–293,1; Tani 1984, 9, n. 16; Tillemans 1991, 416, 3ff.; Tillemans 2000, 58 & n. 210); Ci' SyVR 538,23f. (Watanabe 1992, 660); Ci'e PVV 375,16 (*anutpalatvāt* (ms. 85a1; *anutpannatvāt* PVV PVV<sup>1</sup> 427,7)); Ci'e NBhūṣ 228,5f. PVin III (289b1) reads: *mñon par gsal* (D 191b1; *bsal* P) *ba'i sems pa* (D; om. P) *can*; *gñis pa dañ bcas pa* (P; *pas* D) *yin te /*. For translations of the passage of the *sa-*

This inference consists of the following elements:

- subject of the thesis (*sādhyadharmin*): a pot (*ghaṭa*)
- reason (*hetu*): being not a blue lotus (*anutpalatva*)
- property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*): being accompanied by a second, i.e., either a person or a pot (*puruṣaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyatva*)
- example (*dṛṣṭānta*): a wall (*kuḍya*)
- ghaṭa*: (*anutpalatva* → *puruṣaghaṭānyatarasadvitīyatva*) (*kuḍya*) [2]

From the standpoint of the Cārvākas, the pervasion, according to Dharmottara's commentary, can be explained in the following way: the co-presence of the reason and the property to be proved is established, because it is illustrated by a wall which is not a blue lotus and is accompanied by either of the two, namely, a pot. The co-absence of the reason and the property to be proved is also established, because it is illustrated by the ether on the basis of the idea that real properties belong only to entities, not to what does not exist at all. That is, the property to be proved, being accompanied by a second, and the reason, being not a blue lotus, i.e., being something other than a blue lotus,<sup>24</sup> are real properties and hence are absent in that which is not the entity. The ether, also, is not the entity; therefore, in it both the reason and the property to be proved are absent:

Further, when [the property to be proved] “being accompanied by a second, [namely,] either a pot or a person” is excluded from those [dissimilar instances, for example,] the ether and so on, which are not entities, then [the reason] “being not a blue lotus” also is excluded from them, since [the reason in the sense of “being something other than a blue lotus”] has the entity as [its] essence. In a wall [as a similar instance], in contrast, both [reason and property to be proved] can [be present]. Therefore, the positive concomitance and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) are established.<sup>25</sup>

*dvitīyaprayoga* see Tani 1984, 9ff. and Watanabe 1992, 672ff.; for a detailed explanation of the refutation of this proof see Tillemans 1991, 406ff.; Tillemans 2000, 58ff.

<sup>24</sup> See Dh 21a4f. = Skt. ms. 16b3f.: *anutpalatvāt, utpalād anyatvād iti hetvarthaḥ*, Bu 360,5 (s. note 25).

<sup>25</sup> Dh 21a5f. = Skt. ms. 16b4: *yataś cākāśāder<sup>(1)</sup> avastuno<sup>(2)</sup> ghaṭapurūṣānyatarasadvitīyatvaṃ vyāvṛttam<sup>(3)</sup>, tato<sup>(4)</sup> <'>nutpalatvam api vasturūpaṃ vyāvṛttam, kuḍye tu dvayor api sambhava<sup>(5)</sup> ity anvayavyatirekasiddhiḥ* (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib. has no equivalent in *cā* <sup>(2)</sup>*avastunaḥ* ms. <sup>(3)</sup>*vyāvṛ(?)m* ms. <sup>(4)</sup>Tib.: *de ñid las* <sup>(5)</sup>Tib.: *yod pa*), Dh 21a6–8 is translated in Tillemans 2000, 61, n.215. See also Bu 360,4f.: *bum pa dan ldan pa'i rtsig pa la gaṅ ruñ gi spyi'i gñis bcas su grub ciñ / rtags u tpa la ma yin pa'an yod pa'i (pas ?) rjes 'gro grub / nam mkha' la sogs pa <las>(?) gaṅ ruñ gi gñis bcas log pa la u tpa la las gzan pa'i dños po'an log pas ldog pa grub ciñ /*

Thus, the positive and negative concomitances, the Cārvākas insist, are established, and the first condition for the valid reason – that the reason “being not a blue lotus” is a property of the subject of the thesis “pot” – is also satisfied.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly their consequence “A pot is accompanied by a second, namely, either a person characterized as a body or a pot” can be derived by the reason. Further, according to the context, the pot is accompanied merely by the person, since the pot can not be accompanied by itself.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, the existence of the person characterized as a body is proved.<sup>28</sup> This is the outline of the Cārvākas’ formulation of the reason for the property to be proved “being accompanied by a second” (*sadvitīyaprayoga*). From this they deduce that there is no rebirth for the materialist version of a person, since such a person does not exist after the death of the body.

If their thesis – a pot is accompanied by a second, namely either the object that they intend to prove or a pot – were correctly proved, it would be possible for them to prove the existence of any object that they wish to establish: since a pot is accompanied not by the pot itself, they will surely have it accompanied by their wished object. Yet such a thesis is in reality not faultless. Its faults can be easily pointed out through a quick survey. When the Cārvākas make no mention of the person as a second factor and prove quite generally that a pot is accompanied by a second, which can be anything, this conclusion is self-evident.<sup>29</sup> The proof is useless because they cannot establish their intended materialist version of persons. Even if, on the contrary, intending to establish the person characterized as a body, they prove that a pot is accompanied by the person, there is a fault: the property to be proved – being accompanied by the person – is not present in the example, a wall, because the materialist’s type of person itself is doubtful for the Buddhist opponent (see II.1). Thus, they fail to

<sup>26</sup> See Dh 21a6 = Skt. ms. 16b5: *anutpalatvaṃ pakṣadharmā eva*<sup>(1)</sup> (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib. has no equivalent in *eva*).

<sup>27</sup> See Dh 21a7 = Skt. ms. 16b5f.: <sup>(1)</sup>*ghaṭas tu na ghaṭenaiva sadvitīya*<sup>(2)(1)</sup> *iti sāmārthyāt*<sup>(3)</sup> *tathābhūtena puruṣeṇa bhaviṣyati* (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib.: *bum pa ṅid ni bum pa ṅiis* (P; *ṅid* D 18a6) *pa dañ bcas pa yod pa*. Tib.: *ṅid* has no equivalent in Skt; *na* (*n{ā}*a ms.) om. in Tib. <sup>(2)</sup>*dvitīya* ms. <sup>(3)</sup>*sāmārthyāt* ms.).

<sup>28</sup> See Tillemans 2000, 59f.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Dh 21b1f. = Skt. ms. 16b7–17a1 (ad PVin III 289b2 – Ci’ PVBh 497,22): *taśya*<sup>(1)</sup> *viśeṣasyānākṣepe sādhanasya na kiṃcit phalam, yena kenacit sadvitīyatvaṃ yataḥ siddham*<sup>(2)</sup> (<sup>(1)</sup>*taśya* om. in Tib. <sup>(2)</sup>*siddham*{*i*} ms.) (“If they do not hint at the particular [i.e., being accompanied by the person as a second], there is no benefit of the proof because it is [already] proved that [a pot] is accompanied by a second, namely, an arbitrary [thing]”); SyVR 539,6f. = Watanabe 1992, 662f.: *aparatra tu siddhasāadhanam, yena kenacit sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvāt*.

establish that which they really intend to prove, even if their inference, as far as what is expressed explicitly is concerned, appears to be formally valid.

The point of their argument is as follows: when they ascertain the pervasion of the reason by the property to be proved, they make use of the example, the wall, which is nothing to do with what they really intend to prove. From a strategic point of view, they merely show that the wall as the example is accompanied by the pot as a second, but they do not allude to their intended property to be proved – being accompanied by the person as a companion – in order that the latter may not be negated by the opponent. Dharmakīrti claims that this kind of thesis, in principle, can be refuted by means of his own interpretation of the word “intended [by the proponent]” (*iṣṭa*) in the definition of the thesis, namely by the rule that what is really intended to be proved is the thesis, but not what is merely expressed.

It is true that as long as one's aim is the general one of refuting the Cārvākas' thesis, one may assume that their thesis can be easily refuted. But the logical invalidation of their argument is not as easy as one expects. In PV IV Dharmakīrti takes the Cārvākas' *sadvitīyaprayoga* as an example to show that their proof can be invalidated on the basis of his own interpretation of the word “intended” (*iṣṭa*) in the definition of the thesis. Further, he gives a full account of the refutation of their inference in PVI III. Light has been shed on that inference in papers by Watanabe 1977 (197ff.); Steinkellner 1981 (293f.) made available a Sanskrit fragment of Śākyabuddhi that was found in Vibhūticandra's appendix to *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*; T. J. F. Tillemans has examined Dharmakīrti's refutation of the *sadvitīyaprayoga* in PV IV; Tani 1984 and Watanabe (1992) give translations of the relevant passage in PVI III. Tillemans' study based on PV IV has elucidated the core of this issue.

What remains to be done is an analysis of Dharmakīrti's description in PVI III. In order to get a glimpse of the fundamental idea of his description we need to refer to commentaries, among which Dharmottara's extensive discussion in his commentary on PVI III helpfully clarifies the logical structure of the refutation of the Cārvākas' inference. Dharmottara's interpretation has been partially examined in previous papers. In the following I shall analyze Dharmakīrti's refutation, mainly on the basis of Dharmottara's commentary.

Before doing so, let us be clear about the limitations which context imposes on the terms, *anyatara* and *dvitīya*, in regard to the property to be proved of “being accompanied by a second, namely, either of the two” (*anyatarasadvitīyatva*), in order for this property to be established. These will help us to understand the points of Dharmakīrti's refutation.

According to the Cārvākas' thesis, the subject of the thesis exists together with a second, its companion or counterpart, which is either of the two. [3.a]

In this context, either of the two (*anyatara*) is a second (*dviitīya*), that is, either a pot or a person characterized as a body is a second factor for the subject of the thesis (*sādhyadharmin*), namely a pot. [3.a.1]

Since the companion, or the counterpart, is different from the accompanied, either of the two (*anyatara*) as the counterpart for the subject of the thesis is a thing other than (*arthāntara*) the subject of the thesis, the pot.<sup>30</sup> [3.a.2]

Further, the property to be proved – being accompanied by a second (*dviitīya*), namely, either of the two (*anyatara*) – must be present not only in the subject of the thesis (*sādhyadharmin*) but also in the example, namely, the subject of the exemplification (*dr̥ṣṭāntadharmin*). That is, *anyatara*'s being a second, contextually implied by the thesis, holds for both of these subjects (*dharmin*). [3.b]

Therefore, the statement that either of the two (*anyatara*) is a second means that *anyatara* is a second (*dviitīya*) for both *dharmins*, namely, both the subject of the thesis and the example. [3.b.1]

That either of the two is a second (i.e., companion) for both *dharmins* means that either of the two is different from both *dharmins*. Accordingly, either of the two (*anyatara*) must be a thing other (*arthāntara*) than the subject of the thesis and the example.<sup>31</sup> [3.b.2]

In short, from their thesis – X (*dharmin*) is accompanied by Y (*anyatara*) – the following statement is implied:

Y (either their intended object or the subject of the thesis) is a thing other than X (the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification). Concretely:

Y (either the person or the pot) is a thing other than X (the pot and the wall) [3.b.2']

This shows that the determination of the alternative member referred to by the word *anyatara* is dependent on the *dharmins*. That is, their property to be proved, which includes *anyatara*, is regulated by the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification. This is one reason for the complexity of the thesis.

Dharmakīrti claims that at least one of these limitations cannot hold in their inference. In his refutation of their inference, he divides the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) into two types – the particular property to be proved and the universal property to be proved – and indicates faults in these two forms of the thesis.

<sup>30</sup> See PVin III 289b5–7 (for a translation see II.2.1).

<sup>31</sup> See Dh 23a7f. = Skt. ms. 18b2ff. (ad PVin III 290a2–b1), Bu 364,6f. (ad PVin III 290a2); note 44.

### II.1. Refutation of the particular property to be proved (*sādhya*dharma) of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*

The point about Dharmakīrti's refutation of the particular property to be proved consists in the following argument: No matter what member is referred to by the word *anyatara*, it is not possible to show that the property to be proved – “being accompanied by a second, namely either of the two (*anyatara*), a person or a pot” – is present in both of the subjects (*dharmīn*), the pot and the wall. Seen from the angle of *anyatara*, be it the person or the pot, the limitation – that *anyatara*'s being a second (i.e., companion) holds for both subjects ([3.b]), namely, *anyatara* is a companion of the pot and the wall – is not satisfied. In other words, the limitation ([3.b.2]) – *anyatara* (i.e., the person or the pot) is a thing other than the pot and the wall – is not satisfied.

As for the negation of their thesis in the case where the word *anyatara* refers to the pot concretely, it is clear that their thesis – the pot as the subject of the thesis is accompanied by a second, the pot referred to by the word *anyatara* – does not hold. The point is as follows: in order for the pot as the subject of the thesis to be accompanied by a thing as its companion, as stated in [3.a.2], these two, the companion and the accompanied, must be different from each other, but this cannot be satisfied in the present case since it is obviously contradictory that the pot (i.e., the companion referred to by the word *anyatara*) is a thing other than the pot (i.e., the accompanied, the subject of the thesis).<sup>32</sup> For this reason the limitation ([3.b.2]) – *anyatara* (i.e., the pot) is a thing other than the pot and the wall – cannot be satisfied either; therefore, when *anyatara* is the pot, their thesis – a pot is accompanied by *anyatara* as a second – does not hold.

When the Cārvākas intend to prove the existence of the person characterized as a body, that is, when the word *anyatara* refers to the person concretely, then, according to the limitation ([3.b]) – the property to be proved must be present not only in the subject of the thesis but also in the example –, the property to be proved, being accompanied by *anyatara*, i.e., the person as a second, must be present also in the example, the wall, namely, the wall must be accompanied by the person. But this is not proved:

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. PVIin III 289b7: *bum pa rañ ñid kyis don gzan gyi no bor khas ma blaṅs pa'i phyir ...* (for a translation see II.2.1 below); Dh 23a1 = Skt. ms. 18a4: *ghaṭād ghaṭo nārthāntaram*<sup>(1)</sup> (<sup>(1)</sup>*nārthāntara*{*d*} ms.) – Ci'e SyVR 539,21 (= Watanabe 1992, 669); PVV 375,25–376,7: *na hi ghaṭaḥ svarūpeṇaivānyatarasadvitīyaḥ*, ibid. 376,9. See also Tillemans 2000, 59, (c).

[There is a fault of no co-presence of the property to be proved and the reason] because it is not established (*asiddhi*) that the wall is accompanied by a second, namely, a person of such a nature.<sup>33</sup>

The reason why the wall is not accompanied by the person, according to Jñānaśrībhadrā, is the fact that such a material person who is one and the same with the body is doubtful for the Buddhist, and hence the presence of the property to be proved – “being accompanied by the person” – in the example, the wall, is doubtful.<sup>34</sup> Even the Cārvākas illustrate in their indication of the example that the wall as the example is accompanied by the pot, which is a second factor for the wall, but it is not accompanied by the person taken in the materialist fashion.

## II. 2. Refutation of the universal property to be proved of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*

The Cārvākas may counter that their thesis consists not of the specific but of the universal property to be proved. Dharmakīrti refutes this objection in detail in PVI in III (289b2ff.). At first glance his description seems to be verbose because of the repetitive treatment of similar topics. However, when one refers to Dharmottara’s detailed and illuminating interpretation one is forced to change one’s attitude entirely. As will be shown later, Dharmakīrti treats the issue from two different angles and describes it quite systematically. In the following I shall trace his argument in PVI in III on the basis of Dharmottara’s commentary. In order to interpret Dharmakīrti’s refutation of the Cārvākas’

<sup>33</sup> PVI in III 289b1f.: *rtsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa’i skyes bus gñis pa dan bcas par* (P; *pa* D 191b2) *ma grub pa*<sup>(1)</sup> (*bžin no l/*) (<sup>(1)</sup>*ma grub pa* for °*asiddheh* MsII 35b6). Cf. **Ci’e** SyVR 539,1f. = Watanabe 1992, 661: (<sup>(1)</sup>*atha prayoge*<sup>(1)</sup> *tathābhūtena puruṣeṇa tathā*<sup>(1)</sup> *kuḍy*<sup>(1)</sup>*ādau*<sup>(1)</sup> *sadvitīyatvāsiddher anvayadoṣaḥ*<sup>(1)</sup>) (<sup>(1)</sup>Skt. has no equivalent in Tib.; read *ananvayadoṣaḥ* or *niranvayadoṣaḥ* for *anvayadoṣaḥ*, cf. Dh 21a7–b1 = Skt. ms. 16b6f.: ... *tathābhūtenety abhivyaktacaitanyena sadvitīyatvam* ... *kuḍyasya yato na sidhyati, tato ’na,nvayadoṣaḥ* (Tib.: *rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i skyon du ’gyur ba*) and PVT(Š) 316b4f. (ad PV IV 34ab) – **Ci’** PVV<sup>1</sup> Appendix 526,20 = Steinkellner 1981, 293,15f. = Tillemans 1991, 416,31: *tasya* (i.e., *puruṣasya*) *cāsiddhatvād dṛṣṭānte ’nanvayadoṣaḥ*).

<sup>34</sup> See Jñ 280b8–281a1: *de lta bur gyur pa* (*tathābhūtena*) ... *skyes bus* (*puruṣeṇa*) *gñis pa can du ma grub* (*sadvitīyatvāsiddheh*) *ste / lus* (*śārīra*) *ni sems* (*cāitanya*) *las tha mi dad par* (\**abheda*) *the tshom za ba’i phyir ro // de ltar na sems gsal* (P; *bsal* D 235a4) *ba’i lus* (*abhivyaktacaitanyaśārīra*) *gñis pa can* (*sadvitīya*) *žes bya ba bsgrub par bya ba’i chos* (*sādhyadharmā*) *la the tshom za ba’i phyir dper* (*dṛṣṭānta*) *mi ’gyur ro //*; Tillemans 2000, 60.

thesis in a logically persuasive way we need to make a preliminary observation. First let us clarify the assumptions necessary for the property *anyatarasadviṭīyatva* to be a universal property to be proved and then analyze Dharmakīrti's refutation of the thesis.

The Cārvākas' inference is clearly open to criticism, but we encounter difficulties when we begin to demonstrate its failures. These difficulties stem from at least two points. The first is the above-mentioned relationship between two members referred to by the word *anyatara* and two subjects (*dharmin*). That is, the word "a second" (*dviṭīya*) in the property to be proved, *anyatarasadviṭīyatva*, means that *anyatara* – i.e., either the subject of the thesis or the person – is a second for the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification (see [3.b.1]). From this a characteristic feature of their thesis becomes clear: the subject itself is included in the description of the property to be proved, namely, both in *anyatara* and *dviṭīya*, in a complicated way. This makes it difficult to grasp the thesis. The second difficulty is the ambiguity of the word *anyatara*, which, as we shall see later, not only means the alternative but also presupposes conditions which include the modal concept of possibility (*sambhava*). The latter is connected with the concept of indeterminacy (*aniyama*) or determination (*niyama*) in the sense of necessity as its counterpart. A proper understanding of Dharmakīrti's refutation of their thesis by means of these concepts requires us to analyze the presupposed conditions thoroughly. If we do not know exactly what the Cārvākas mean by the word *anyatara*, it will seem that Dharmakīrti's refutation is almost a repetition of the same argument.

As for the solution of the first difficulty, the above-mentioned limitations which are contextually placed on the terms, *anyatara*, *dviṭīya*, and the subject (see [3.a], [3.b], and so on), will give us a clue to disentangle the complicated relationship between *anyatara* and two subjects. Since these limitations hold in general in the context of their thesis, they can be regarded as general assumptions necessary for their thesis taken as a universal. As for handling the second difficult problem, the ambiguity of the meaning of the word *anyatara*, it is worth noting that Dharmottara makes clear that the word "either of the two" (*anyatara*) has two meanings:

When, further, the word 'either of the two' is [used] for the purpose of indicating the possibility of an object of establishment (*vidhiviṣayasambhava*), [for example, the proposition that] either Devadatta or Yajñadatta is to be provided with meals means that either of the two can be a person for whom the provision of meals is established, [that is, it indicates a person who can be provided with meals], then the word 'either of the two' is significant, when it is [merely] possible that even one [of the two] is provided with meals (*ekasyāpi bhojanasambhave*).

When, on the contrary, the word 'either of the two' is used in the sense of indicating the indeterminacy (*aniyama*) with respect to the object of providing meals that is to

be established (*vidheyabhojanaviṣaya*) under [the condition] that [on the one hand] it is possible to establish that both of the two are provided with meals [and on the other hand] that the provision of meals is to be established in an indeterminate way (*aniyamena*), then the [the word ‘either of the two’] is significant when it is possible to establish that both of them are provided with meals (*dvayor api bhojanavidhānasambhave*). And this difference is to be understood from implication, the context of the discussion, and so on, in the mundane usage [of the word].<sup>35</sup>

According to this passage, the word *anyatara* in the context of the *sadvitīya-prayoga* is used in the following two senses:

An undetermined (*aniyata*) one of the two (*dvayor ekam*)<sup>36</sup> is a second ([4.a]) under the condition that, although both of the members referred to by the word *anyatara* are able to be a second factor ([4.a.1]), there is no determination which of the two is a second ([4.a.2]). [4.a] [4.a.1] [4.a.2]

It is possible for either of the two to be a second factor. [4.b]

In the former case the word *anyatara* indicates the indeterminacy (*aniyama*) with respect to the object to be established; in the latter case it indicates the possibility (*sambhava*) of an alternative object to be established. For the sake of simplicity we may express two meanings of the word *anyatara* as follows:

undetermined one of the two [4.a']

possible one of the two [4.b']

Dharmottara’s remark is all the more noteworthy for his indication of the conditions necessary for the usage of the word *anyatara*. In the first place, the

<sup>35</sup> Dh 24b8–25a4 = Skt. ms. 20a1–4 (ad PVin III 290a8): *anyataragrahaṇam ca yadā vidhiviṣayasambhavakhyāpanārthaṃ*<sup>(1)</sup> *devadattayajñadattayor anyataro bhojanīyo*<sup>(2)</sup> *nyatarabhojanīyo vidhiḥ*<sup>(2)</sup> (sic) *sambhavatīty arthaḥ, tadaikasyāpi bhojanasambhave <’>nyataraśabdaḥ samarthaḥ*<sup>(3)</sup>. *dvayor bhojanavidhisambhave tv aniyamena bhojane vidheye <’>nyataraśabdo*<sup>(4)</sup> *vidheyabhojana*<sup>(4)</sup> *viṣayāniyamakhyāpane vartate, tadā dvayor api*<sup>(5)</sup> *bhojanavidhānasambhave samarthaḥ. ayaṃ ca pravibhāgo laukike prayoge ’rthaprakaraṇāder anugantavyaḥ*<sup>(1)</sup> *vidhiviṣayasambhava*<sup>o</sup> ms. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. 25a1: (*zan sbyin par bya ba yin no źes bya ba*) *zan sbyin pa sgrub pa’i yul gañ yañ ruñ ba* (*srid do źes bya ba’i don yin pa*), read: *’nyataro bhojanavidhiviṣayaḥ*(?). <sup>(3)</sup>*sa*{*rtha*}*marthaḥ* ms. <sup>(4)</sup>Tib. 25a2f.: *zan za bar bsgrub* (D 21b4; *bsgrubs* P) *pa’i (yul)* <sup>(5)</sup>*api* om. in Tib.), see also Bu 367,3: *za ba sgrub pa’i yul srid par ston pa’i gañ ruñ gi sgra ni gcig za yañ nus la / gñis ka za ba srid pa nes pa med par sgrub pa’i gañ ruñ gi sgra ni gñis ka za sird na nus pa yin źin de’an skabs dañ śugs kysis śes par bya’o //*.

<sup>36</sup> See Dh 22b3f. = Skt. ms. 17b7: <sup>(1)</sup>*anyataraśabdo*<sup>1</sup> *hi* <sup>(2)</sup>*dvayor ekam aniyatam āha*<sup>2</sup> <sup>(1)</sup>Tib.: *gañ yañ ruñ ba’i (ba ni P D19b1) sgra ni* <sup>(2)</sup>Tib.: *gcig tu ma nes par gñi ga brjod* (D 19b1; *rjod* P) *pa yin pas*).

word *anyatara* in the sense of the indeterminacy as to which of two members is a second (see [4.a]) is not significant if it is not so that both of the members can be a second. That is to say,

The possibility for both of two members to be a second is the necessary condition for the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two. In other words, the indeterminacy implies the possibility for both of the two to be a second. [5.a]

In the second place, the possibility for either of the two to be a second ([4.b]) makes sense only if it is merely possible that one of the two is a second:

The fact that one of the two at least can be a second is the necessary condition for the possibility for either of the two to be a second. In other words, the possibility for either of the two to be a second implies that one of the two at least can be a second. [5.b]

Through these two meanings of the word *anyatara* together with their necessary conditions, according to Dharmottara, one can explain the universality of the Cārvākas' thesis; thus, they are regarded as an assumption necessary for the universality of their thesis.

While Dharmakīrti describes his refutation of their thesis taken as a universal briefly in PV IV, he has a long excursus on the refutation in PVI III. Analyzing this, we find that Dharmottara's interpretation of the word *anyatara* in two ways is helpful. Thanks to this indication of two meanings of the word *anyatara*, we can grasp Dharmakīrti's two exegetical stances on his refutation of their thesis: in the first part of his refutation (PVI III 289b5–290a2) the former meaning ([4.a]) is assumed, while in the second part (PVI III 290a2–8) the latter meaning ([4.b]). This enables us to see that his excursus is not a repetition of similar refutations but reflects a systematic aim to refute the Cārvākas' thesis from two angles that are based on two meanings of the word *anyatara*.

### II.2.1. Refutation of their thesis taken as a universal, i.e., *anyatarasadvitīyatva*, on the basis of the first meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([4.a], [4.a'])

Suppose that we rely upon the first meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., “an undetermined one of the two” ([4.a']) and the necessary condition contextually implied by indeterminacy ([4.a.1], [5.a]), i.e., “it is possible for both of the members to be ...”, in the above-mentioned limitation ([3.b.2]). We can then derive the following statements from the Cārvākas' thesis taken as a universal:

It is possible for both of the members which are referred to by the word *anyatara*, namely, the person and the pot, to be a second factor for both subjects (*dharmin*), that is, for the two members it is possible to be a thing other than both subjects.

[4.a.1']

An undetermined one of the two is a thing other than both subjects. In other words, there is no determination which of the two is a thing other than the subject. [4.a.2']

The latter statement ([4.a.2']) implies the following statement:

The member (referred to by the word *anyatara*), which is a thing other than (*arthāntara*) the subject (*dharmin*), is variable in accordance with the difference whether the subject is the subject of the thesis (*sādhyadharmin*) or the subject of the exemplification (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*).<sup>37</sup> Seen from the viewpoint of the qualification of *anyatara* “a thing other than” (*arthāntara*), its content “a thing other than the subject” varies according to which member of the two is referred to by the word *anyatara*. [4.a.3]

We shall show later an inconsistency in their thesis on the grounds that this statement ([4.a.3]) is contrary to another statement which is implied by the universality of the thesis.

In order to refute their thesis based on the first meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([4.a.1']), one needs merely to negate the necessary condition for the usage of the word *anyatara* ([5.a]), namely, the possibility for both of the two to be a second. Indeed, according to Dharmottara's interpretation, the chief target of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Cārvākas' thesis is the statement that both of the members referred to by the word *anyatara* can be a thing other than both subjects ([4.a.1']). Dharmakīrti indicates that their thesis does not hold on the grounds that it is not the case that both of the members can be a second, that is, on the grounds that one of the two cannot be a second for both subjects. Concretely: one of the two, the body which is nothing but the person, cannot be a thing other than the subject of the thesis, the pot:

Further (*ca*), even the general establishment (*sāmānyenāpi sādhanam*) [of their property to be proved, being accompanied by a second (*sadvitīya*), i.e., either a pot or a body,] is not possible, when it is not accepted (*anabhyupagama*) that a body of this sort [i.e., the body that has consciousness which is manifested by the material elements,] is a thing other than the pot [as the subject of the thesis]. It is because [the indispensable condition for establishing the thesis taken as a universal –] either of the two [i.e., the pot or the person,] is a thing other [than the pot as the subject of the thesis] (*anyatarāarthāntarabhāva*) – is not [satisfied, as long as the existence of such a material person is doubtful]. When namely it is possible that both of the two [i.e., the pot and the body,] are so [, that is, a thing other than the subject of the thesis, i.e., the pot] (*dvayor hi tathābhāvasambhave*), the word “either of the two” can [have a proper meaning] (*anyataroktiḥ samarthā*), for example, when [it is said] “Provide either Devadatta or Yajñadatta with meals” (*devadattayajñadattayor*

<sup>37</sup> See Dh 25a4–6; note 42.

*anyataram bhojaya*), [the word *anyatara* can have a proper meaning when both of the two can be provided with meals, but it can] not when it is not possible to provide one [of the two] with meals (*naikasya bhojanāsambhave*), or it is not wished (*anākāṅkṣā*) [to provide one of the two with meals].<sup>38</sup>

The example illustrates that when it is possible to establish that both Devadatta and Yajñadatta are provided with meals, then we can establish that an undetermined one of the two persons is provided with meals, and thus the word *anyatara* will have a proper meaning. Since in this context the word *anyatara* means an undetermined (*aniyata*) one of the two ([4.a']), it is presupposed, as in the case ([4.a.1]), that both of them have the possibility to be provided with meals. Therefore, if an arbitrary one of the two could not be provided with meals because of certain causes, the word *anyatara* could not have a proper meaning.<sup>39</sup> In the case of the Cārvākas' thesis also, for the universality of their thesis it is essential that both of the members referred to by the word *anyatara* could be established as a second factor for the subject of the thesis and a thing other than this subject (see [4.a.1']), otherwise the thesis would not hold. However, this condition ([4.a.1']) is not satisfied, for it is certain that for one of the two, i.e., the body, there is no possibility to be a second, since a body of which the existence is doubtful cannot be a second factor for the pot and hence cannot be a thing other than the pot; thus, the thesis taken as a universal cannot be established.

<sup>38</sup> PVin III 289b5–7: <sup>(3)(2)</sup>*nam pa de lta bu'i lus<sup>1</sup> bum pa las don gzan gyi no bor khas mi len na spyi sgrub pa yan mi srid de l<sup>2</sup> gañ yan ruñ ba'i don gzan gyi no bo med pa'i phyir ro l<sup>3</sup>* <sup>(4)</sup>*gñi ga de lta bu'i dnos por srid na gañ yan ruñ ba brjod par nus pa yin te l dper na lha sbyin* (D 191b6; *lhas byin P*) *dañ mchod sbyin* <sup>(5)</sup>*gañ yan ruñ ba žig za'o<sup>5</sup>* (P; *pa'o D*) *žes bya ba lta bu yin gyi l* <sup>(6)</sup>*gañ yan ruñ ba gcig<sup>6</sup>* (D; *cig P*) *za mi srid pa'am 'dod pa med na ni* (P; om. D) *ma yin no l<sup>4</sup>*. <sup>(1)</sup>Skt. ms. (MsII 36a1): *tathāvidhasya ca dehasya* (*ca om.* in Tib.) <sup>(2)</sup>Cf. SyVR 539,14–16 (= Watanabe 1992, 666f.): ... *katham sāmānyasya sādhanam sambhavati. ... puruṣasya ... ghaṭād arthāntarābhāvān-abhyupagamena ...* <sup>(3)</sup>Cf. PV IV 35ab: *tad* (i.e., *sadvitīyatvam*) *evārthāntarābhāvād dehānāptau na sidhyati* /; Tillemans 2000, 58 & n.208. <sup>(4)</sup>Cf. Ci'e SyVR 539,16–20 (=Watanabe 1992, 667–669): *dvayor hi tathābhāvasambhave 'nyataroktiḥ samarthā bhavati, yathā devadattayajñadattayor anyataram bhojayed iti. ... na ... ekatarasya bhojanāsambhave ... anākāṅkṣāyāṃ vā.* <sup>(5)</sup>Tib.: *gañ yan ruñ ba žig za'o* for Skt. ms. (MsII 36a2): *anyataram bhojaya.* <sup>(6)</sup>Tib.: *gañ yan ruñ ba gcig* for Skt. ms.: *ekasya* (*bhojanāsambhave*).

<sup>39</sup> See Dh 22b4–6 = Skt. ms. 18a1f. (ad PVin III 289b6): *yathetyādi. devadattayajñadattayor api bhojanavidhisambhave hy aniyata ekasmin<sup>(1)</sup> (2)bhojanam vidhīyate<sup>(2)</sup>, tato <'>nyataroktiḥ saṅgatārthā. na punar ekatarasya<sup>(3)</sup> kutaścīn nimittād bhojanāsambhave ...* <sup>(1)</sup>*ekasmina* ms. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. 22b5: *brjod pa* <sup>(3)</sup>Tib.: *gcig* (*za bar mi srid pa'am*)); Ci'e SyVR 539,18–20, Watanabe 1992, 668f.

In his refutation of the statement ([4.a.1']) Dharmakīrti proves that one of two members referred to by the word *anyatara* cannot be a second factor for the subject. This means the negation of the possibility for one of the two to be a second, and hence the negation of the possibility for both of the two to be a second. When the latter possibility for both of the two to be a second, i.e., the necessary condition for the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([5.a]), is negated, then the indeterminacy itself is negated. That is, the statement – there is no determination with respect to which of the two is a second factor ([4.a.2]) or is a thing other than the subject ([4.a.2']) – is negated. From this angle also, it is proved that the Cārvākas' insistence on the universal property to be proved, *anyatarasadvītīyatva*, can be negated. For when a pot is the subject of the thesis, their statement that a pot is accompanied by a second, either a pot or a person – in other words, that either of the two, a pot or a person, is a thing other than the accompanied pot – has the determination (*niyama*) with respect to being a thing other than the pot in the sense that not the pot but only the person characterized as a body is a thing other than the pot, so that the condition for the universal thesis, the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two, is not satisfied:

For the following reason, too, it is not [possible] that either of the two is a thing other than [the subject]: On the grounds that it is not accepted that the pot [referred to by the word *anyatara*] is a thing other than itself (*ghaṭasya svato 'rthāntarabhā-vāsyānabhyupagamāt*) and it is [otherwise] contradictory (*virodha*), the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*) [which has the determination with respect to a second factor] is fixed (*vyavasthāna*) by way of implication (*sāmarthyena*) in such a way that [of the pot and the body] only the body would be a thing other [than the pot as the subject of the thesis] (*deha evārthāntarabhūtaḥ*);<sup>40</sup> consequently, the word “either of the two” (*anyataragrahaṇa*) [taken generally] is meaningless (*apārthaka*).<sup>41</sup>

Insofar as the word *anyatara* definitely refers to a certain object of the two within the context of their statement, it is senseless to use the word in order to imply the indeterminacy with respect to an object to be established.

<sup>40</sup> See Dh 23a1 = Skt. ms. 18a4f.: *tasmād*<sup>(1)</sup> *deha*<sup>(2)</sup> *evārthāntarabhūta iti dvitīyatvani-yamo vākyārtho* <'>*vatiṣṭhate* (<sup>(1)</sup>*desmād* ms. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib.: *lus* (D 19b6; *lus de* P)).

<sup>41</sup> PVin III 289b7f.: *'di las kyañ gañ yañ ruñ ba don gžan gyi ño bo med pa yin te / bum pa rañ ñid kyis don gžan gyi ño bor khas ma blañs pa'i phyir dañ 'gal ba'i phyir / (P; phyir ro // D 191b7) śugs kyis lus ñid kyi don gžan du gyur pa yin no źes ñag gi don du rnam par gnas pa'i phyir (D; om. P) gañ yañ ruñ ba źes smos pa ni don med do //*. Cf. SyVR 539,21–23 (= Watanabe 1992, 669): *api ca na ghaṭād ghaṭo 'rthāntaram. ... etac caikasmin viruddham iti yathoktapuruṣa evānyataro 'peyaḥ* (read: °*tara upeyaḥ*(?)).

## II.2.2. Refutation of the Cārvākas' thesis taken as a universal on the basis of the second meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., the possibility that an alternative object be established ([4.b], [4.b'])

Of the two meanings of the word *anyatara*, one can safely say, the first one ([4.a], [4.a.1], [4.a.2]) – the indeterminate establishment of an object as a second factor under the condition that both of the two can be a second – is the main concern of the Cārvākas. Since, as Dharmottara explains, they intend that either of the two is indeterminately a second, that is, a pot is a second factor for a wall as the subject of the exemplification and a body is a second factor for a pot as the subject of the thesis, they must have accepted on the one hand the possibility – both of the two, the pot and the body, can be a second factor – and on the other hand the indeterminacy as regards which of the two is a second factor, i.e., a thing other than the subject (*dharmīn*).<sup>42</sup> There is, however, another meaning of the word *anyatara*, namely, the possibility of an object to be a second ([4.b], [4.b']), although Dharmottara interprets that it is not intended by them.<sup>43</sup> When the word *anyatara* is used in this sense, that is, when

<sup>42</sup> See Dh 25a4–6 = Skt. ms. 20a4f. (ad PVin III 290a8): *iha tu sadvīṭyaprayoge ghaṭe-na kuḍyasya dehena ghaṭasya sādhyadharmiṇaḥ*<sup>(1)</sup> *sadvīṭyatvaṃ vādina iṣṭam. tena dvayor apy arthāntaratvam abhyupagantavyam*,<sup>(2)</sup> *aniyamena tu tad arthāntaratvam anyataratra pratipattavyam, dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi ghaṭe sādhyadharmiṇi ca dehe* <sup>(1)</sup>Tib. 25a4: *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos* <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. 25a5: *khas blaṅ no //* (“In this formulation [of the reason for the consequence, being] accompanied by a second, however, it is intended by the proponent [, the Cārvākas,] that [in the case of the exemplification] a wall [as the subject of the exemplification] is accompanied by a second, i.e., a pot [referred to by the word *anyatara*], [and in the case of the thesis] the subject of the thesis, a pot, [is accompanied] by [a second, i.e., the person characterized as] a body [referred to by the word *anyatara*]. Therefore, it should be assumed that both [members referred to by the word *anyatara*, i.e., the pot and the body, are a companion of the respective subject and hence] have [the property,] being a thing other [than the subject (*dharmīn*)], but [in accordance with the difference of the subject] it should be indeterminately cognized that either [the pot or the body] has this [property,] being a thing other [than the subject, namely, in the way that] in the case of the subject of the exemplification the pot [referred to by the word *anyatara*] has [the property – being a thing other than the subject of the exemplification, the wall as the example –]; in the case of the subject of the thesis the body [referred to by the word *anyatara*] has [the property – being a thing other than the subject of the thesis, the pot –]”).

<sup>43</sup> See Dh 25a6f. = Skt. ms. 20a6f. (ad PVin III 290a8): *samprati*<sup>(1)</sup> *tv anabhīpretam api vidhivīṣayasambhavakhyāpanārtham anyataraśabdān abhyupagamyānyatarasya dvīṭyatvaṃ ghaṭasya dehasya vā na sambhavatīti darśitam* <sup>(1)</sup>Tib. 25a6: *de lta na* (P; *na om. D 21b7*) for *samprati*) (“Now, however, assuming that the word *anyatara* is [used] for the purpose of indicating the possibility that an object be established,

it indicates a possible alternative (*vikalpa*), then the relationship between *anyatara* and *dviṭīya* implied by their thesis is as follows: either of the two (*anyatara*) in the sense of the alternative can be a second (*dviṭīya*) ([4.b]). This statement is negated, when the necessary condition for it – at least one of the two can be a second ([5.b]) – is negated. In this way one can prove the negation of the universality of their thesis. In order to negate the necessary condition that at least one of the two can be a second, one must show that neither of the two can be a second factor for the subject (*dharmin*); that is, neither can be a thing other than the subject of the thesis and the subject of the exemplification. Thus, Dharmakīrti proceeds to refute their thesis further on the grounds that neither of the members referred to by the word *anyatara* can satisfy the limitation ([3.b.2]) that *anyatara* is a thing other than both subjects.<sup>44</sup>

[The limitation implied by the thesis taken as a universal, namely –] *anyatara*'s being a thing other than [the subject] (*anyatarārthāntarabhāva*) –, which [is taken] generally (*sāmānyena*) in such a way that either of the two, i.e., the pot or the body, is a thing other than [both subjects, the subject of the thesis and the example] (*ghaṭaśarīrayor anyatarad arthāntarabhūtam*), could be [what is to be proved], if one of the two [i.e., one of the pot and the body] were accepted to be so (*tayor ekasya tathābhyupagame*) [i.e., to be a thing other than both subjects]. The latter [statement that one of the two, the pot or the body, is a thing other than the pot and the wall],

although [this interpretation of the purpose of the word] is not intended [by the Cārvākas themselves, Dharmakīrti] has shown that it is not possible that either of the two, the pot or the body, is a second [factor for the subject]”).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Dh 23a7f. = Skt. ms. 18b3f. (ad PVin III 290a2): *pūrvam ghaṭapuruṣasamudāyo dṛṣṭāntāt sādhyadharmīnaś ca nārthāntaram, ataḥ sāmānyasādhyābhāva*<sup>(1)</sup> *uktaḥ. sampraty eko 'pi ghaṭaḥ puruṣo <'>pi vā na dviṭīyaḥ, tataḥ sāmānyānāśrayaḥ*<sup>(2)</sup> <sup>(1)°</sup> *bhāvā* ms. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. 23a8: *spyi la* (D 20a5; *pa la*) *brten* (D; *bstan* P) *pa ma yin te l* (“In the former [refutation, i.e., in PVin III 289b5ff., it is shown that] the combination of the pot and the person [which are referred to by the word *anyatara*] is not a thing other than the example and the subject of the thesis; therefore it is said that [with respect to the object of the word *anyatara*] there is no universal [property, i.e., being a second factor,] to be proved. In the present [refutation, it shall be shown that] even one [of the two members referred to by the word *anyatara*], be it the pot or the person, is not a second [factor]; therefore, [the object of the word *anyatara*] has no universal [i.e., the universal property, being a second factor,] as [its] basis”); Bu 364,6f. (ad PVin III 290a2): *yañ* (*ca*) *žes pa śnar lus bum tshogs pa dpe dañ chos can las don gžan bkag nas bsgrub bya 'gog la 'dir lus bum so so bkag nas 'gog pas so //*. In his commentary to Dharmakīrti's concluding remark on the refutation of the Cārvākas' thesis (see PVin III 290b5f.) Dharmottara observes very truly: “Or it is impossible that this particular [member referred to by the word *anyatara*], too, is a thing other than [the object that] pervades both subjects [, the subject of the thesis and the example]” (Dh 26b8 = Skt. ms. 21b4: <sup>(1)</sup>*tad api vā*<sup>(1)</sup> *viśiṣṭam ubhayadharmivyāpyarthāntaram nopapadyate*. <sup>(1)</sup>*de yañ* (P; *ni* D 23a7)).

however, is not [accepted by the Cārvākas themselves] in the case [where one of the two is] the body, because there is a room for doubt as to whether [being accompanied by the body as the companion] might fail to be co-present (*ananvaya-śāṅkā*) [with the reason, being not a blue lotus, in the example, the wall];<sup>45</sup> in the case [where one of the two is] the pot, [the statement that one of the two is a thing other than both subjects is] not [accepted either], because it is contradictory [that the pot is a thing other than the pot that is the subject of the thesis].<sup>46</sup>

Since neither of the members referred to by the word *anyatara* can be a second factor, it is impossible for the Cārvākas to assume a universal property “being a second factor”;<sup>47</sup> this automatically shows that the word *anyatara* cannot be

<sup>45</sup> See Dh 24a1f. = Skt. ms. 19a3f.: *sa*<sup>(1)</sup> *ity arthāntarabhāvo na śarīrasya tathābhū-tasya dṛṣṭānte <'>nanvayaśāṅkayā svayam abhyupagataḥ* (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib. *de ltar*). The doubt arises because the Cārvākas in their indication of the example merely assume that the pot as one of the two is accompanied by the wall and hence a thing other than the wall, but do not in any way say that their version of the material person characterized as the body is accompanied by the wall and is a thing other than it.

<sup>46</sup> PVin III 290a4f.: *de bžin du de gñis gcig* (P; om. D 192a4) *de ltar khas len na bum pa dañ lus dag las gañ yañ ruñ ba'i don gžan du gyur pa źes spyir gañ yañ ruñ ba'i don gžan gyi ño bor* (P ; bo D) *'gyur ba yin na /* <sup>(1)</sup>*de lta ma yin te*<sup>(1)</sup> *lus rjes su 'gro ba med par* <sup>(2)</sup>*dogs pa bum pa dañ yañ*<sup>(2)</sup> *'gal ba'i phyir ro //* = Skt. MsII 36a6f.: *tathā ghaṭa-śarīrayor anyatarad arthāntarabhūtam iti sāmānyenānyatarārthāntarabhāvas tayor ekasya tathābhūyupagame syāt.* (<sup>(1)</sup>*sa ca na*<sup>(1)</sup> *śarīrasyanānvaya*<sup>(2)</sup> *śāṅkayā, na ghaṭasya*<sup>(2)</sup> *virodhāt* (<sup>(1)</sup>Tib.: *de lta ma yin te* for *sa ca na*. <sup>(2)</sup>Tib. diviates from Skt.). Against Dharmakīrti's refutation through the argument that none of the two members referred to by the word *anyatara* can be a second in the context of the Cārvākas' inference, an objection is raised: There is no fault of denying two cases when one says that either Devadatta or Yajñadatta is to be provided with meals, but not Devadatta and not Yajñadatta, because one intends that it is not the case that only Devadatta is provided with meals (see PVin III 290a6f.: *lha sbyin 'ba' źig la ma yin no sñam du bsams pa'i phyir* = Skt. MsII 36a7f.: *na devadatta evety abhiprāyāt*). Dharmakīrti replies that according to the context the meaning of the word *anyatara* does not entail determinacy of this kind and admits that here the word is used in the sense of the alternative: “When, for example, one prescribes that either of the two be provided with meals (*anyatarabhojana*), [the word *anyatara* has a proper meaning] when [not only both of the two but also] one [of the two] is provided with meals (*ekabhojane*), because this (word *anyatara*) has the alternative (*vikalpa*) as [its] object” (PVin III 290a7f.: *dper na gcig za* (D 192a7; *zas* P) *yañ*<sup>(1)</sup> *gañ yañ ruñ ba za'o źes brjod pa bžin no // 'di'i yul ni rnam par brtag* (D; *brtags* P) *pa yin pa'i phyir ro //* <sup>(1)</sup>*yañ* has no equivalent in Skt. MsII 36b1, Msl 38a3).

<sup>47</sup> See PVin III 290a2f.: *'di'i phyir yañ spyi la brten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ñid la rigs* (P; *rig* D 192a2) *ñid dam / ... bžin no //* = Skt. MsII 36a4f.: *itaś ca na*

used also in the second sense ([4.b]), namely in the sense of the alternative indicating the possibility for an object to be a second. Consequently their thesis based on the second meaning of the word *anyatara* does not hold.

Dharmakīrti summarizes the above-mentioned two arguments based on the two meanings of the word *anyatara* as follows:

In addition, since it is impossible to establish (*vidher ayogāt*) [any of the two referred to by the word ‘either of the two’ as a second factor], then for [each] one of the two that is to be established (*dvayor ekasya vidhīyamānasya*) [in the Cārvākas’ thesis], neither the alternative [i.e., the disjunctive statement that this one or the other is a second factor] nor the collection [i.e., the conjunctive statement that this one and the other are a second factor] is possible (*vikalpasamuccayāyoge*). How then can [they] now establish (*vidheḥ sāmāthyam*) [generally that either the pot or the body is a second for both subjects]?<sup>48</sup>

The meaning of the word *anyatara* in the context of the Cārvākas’ thesis, as has been pointed out, consists of either the indeterminacy with respect to which of the two is a second ([4.a.2]) under the condition that both of the two can be a second ([4.a.1]) or the possibility for one of the two to be a second ([4.b]). Since the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two implies the possibility for both of the two to be a second (see [5.a]), and the latter means the possibility of the conjunction of the two, broadly speaking, the first meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., an undetermined one of the two ([4.a’]), would imply the possibility of the conjunction of the two. On the other hand the second meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., a possible one of the two ([4.b’]), implies that one of the two can be at least a second (see [5.b]), and does not presuppose the condition necessary for the first meaning of the word *anyatara*, i.e., the

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*sāmānyāśrayaḥ, sarvavyakti<sup>(1)</sup>sambhavābhāve tatsāmānyāyogāt, yathābrāhmaṇāditve<sup>(2)</sup> varṇatvasya<sup>(3)</sup> ...* (<sup>(1)</sup>vyakti° MsI; vyakta° MsII <sup>(2)</sup>brāhmaṇāditve MsI; ’bāhmaṇatvāditve MsII <sup>(3)</sup>varṇatvasya MsII; varṇṇasya MsI) (“For the following [reason], too, [the object of the word *anyatara*] has no universal [i.e., the universal property ‘being a second factor’] as [its] basis, [namely it is] because, as far as there is no possibility for all substances [i.e., members referred to by the word *anyatara*, to have their particular properties ‘being a second factor’], it is impossible [for them to have] the universal of the [particular properties], for example, when [for people] there is no [particular properties] to be Brahmins and so on, [it is impossible for them to have the universal] to belong to a class”, translated in Tillemans 2000, 62, n.216).

<sup>48</sup> PVin III 290a8–b1: *sgrub pa mi ’thad pa’i yañ phyir te / gñis gcig la bsgrub* (D 192b1; *sgrub P*) *pa la yañ<sup>(1)</sup> rnam par brtag pa dañ bsdu ba yañ<sup>(2)</sup> mi ’thad pa yin na da ci žig sgrub par nus te /* (<sup>(1)</sup>yañ has no equivalent in Skt. Ms II 36b1 = MsI 38a3 <sup>(2)</sup>yañ has no equivalent in Skt. Ms II 36b1: *vikalpasamuccayāyoge*; MsI 38a4: °*samuccayo yoge* /).

condition that both of the two can be a second. In this sense the second meaning of the word *anyatara* ([4.b']) might roughly correspond to the possibility of the disjunction of the two. In their thesis, however, none of the meanings can be established. This is the logic of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Cārvākas' thesis taken as a universal.

### II.2.3. Refutation of the Cārvākas' thesis on account of the nonexistence of *anyatara* in general or its qualification *arthāntara* "a thing other than" in general

We may note, in passing, that there is another type of refutation of their thesis taken as a universal. According to the limitation ([3.b.2]) – either of the two (*anyatara*) is a thing other than (*arthāntara*) both subjects (*dharmin*) –, *anyatara* is qualified by "a thing other than". In order for their property to be proved, *anyatarasadviṭīyatva*, to be universal (*sāmānya*), *anyatara* in general is to be assumed. Let us look at it from the angle of the universality of its qualification. The latter means the invariance of the content of the qualification "a thing other than the subject".

When the property to be proved, *anyatarasadviṭīyatva*, is universal, the content of the qualification of *anyatara* – a thing other than (*arthāntara*) the subject – must be invariable regardless of which member of the two is referred to by the word *anyatara*. [6]

In the context of their inference, however, the content of the qualification "a thing other than the subject" is variable in accordance with the difference whether *anyatara* is the pot or the body. This is because they do not accept that both of the two members referred to by the word *anyatara*, the pot and the body, are qualified by the same qualification, namely, both of the two are a thing other than one and the same subject. Rather they maintain that each member is a thing other than its own corresponding subject. In consequence, there is no universality of the qualification of *anyatara*:

It is because it is impossible that both [of the pot and the body] are a thing other than [the same subject (*dharmin*)]. When namely [the subject is] the example [i.e., a wall], the pot [referred to by the word *anyatara*, being a companion of the wall,] is a thing other than [this subject as the wall], but when [the subject is] the subject of the thesis [i.e., the pot], the body [, being a companion of the pot, is a thing other than this subject as the pot]; therefore, [each member, which is] a thing other than [its own corresponding subject,] is specific [and hence] not universal.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Dh 26b7f. = Skt. ms. 21b3 (ad PVin III 290b5f.): *arthāntarabhūtasya* (<sup>1</sup>*dvaya-syā*)<sup>1</sup>*nupapatteḥ. dṛṣṭānte hi ghaṭo <'>rthāntaraṃ sādhyadharmiṇi ca dehaḥ, tena viśiṣṭam evārthāntaram, na sāmānyam* (<sup>1</sup>Skt. words (*śarīraṃ ghaṭo vā*) which contextually

Thus, the property, being a thing other than the subject, becomes different in accordance with the difference of the member referred to by the word *anyatara*, as mentioned before ([4.a.3]); therefore, *anyatara* qualified by “a thing other than the subject” is not universal. In consequence, their universal thesis based on the word *anyatara* is not established.

### *II.3. Application of the idea of the refutation of the sadvitīyaprayoga to another case*

The logical analysis of the refutation of *sadvitīyaprayoga* holds also in other cases, for example, when an opponent formulates an inference that sound is eternal because it is either of the two, i.e., the subject of the thesis or the similar instances (*pakṣasapakṣānyatara*), Dharmakīrti negates this reason based on the expression “being either of the two” in the same way as mentioned above:

In addition, if it were not contradictory that [one and the same subject of the thesis (*sādhyadharmin*), i.e., sound,] could be [each of] the two [i.e., the subject of the thesis and the similar instances] (*dvayor api sambhavāvirodhe*), [then] this [reason, *pakṣasapakṣānyataratva*,] would thus be [established in the sound as the subject of the thesis]; otherwise, however, this would not be established (*asiddha*) at all [as present] in sound, because the sound in question is exclusively the subject of the thesis (*pakṣa eva*), but not either of the two, i.e., the subject of the thesis or the similar instances (*na pakṣasapakṣayor anyataraḥ*), since it is contradictory that [it is on the one hand] an [arbitrary] alternative [of the two] and [on the other hand] simply determined [as a specific one of the two] (*vikalpaikapratīnyamayor virodhāt*).<sup>50</sup>

Here the meaning of the word *anyatara* presupposes not the possibility for the subject of the thesis to be an arbitrary one of the two ([4.b']), but the indeterminacy with respect to one of the two ([4.a']), namely, the possibility for the subject of the thesis to be both the subject of the thesis and the similar instances (as in [5.a]). In short, the word *anyatara* is used not in the disjunctive but in the conjunctive sense. Dharmakīrti negates the opponent's reason using

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belong to the preceding phrase are translated together with *dvayasya* in Tib.: *lus sam bum pa gñis ...*).

<sup>50</sup> PVin III 290b2f.: *gzan yañ gñi gar yañ srid pa mi 'gal na de de ltar 'gyur gyi / (1)de lta ma yin na ni de sgra la ma grub pa ñid do // (1) 'di ltar rnam pa de lta bu'i sgra de ni phyogs ñid yin gyi (P; te D 192b2) / phyogs dañ mthun pa'i phyogs dag las gañ yañ ruñ ba ni ma yin te / (P; no // D) rnam par brtag pa dañ gcig tu so sor ñes pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro // (1)anyathā tv asiddham (MsI 38a5; athānyatvasiddham MsII 36b2) eva tac (MsII; etac MsI) chabde*). For the various usage of the *sadvitīya*-type argumentation see Tillemans 2000, 59.

the word *anyatara* on the grounds that the presupposition for the usage of the word *anyatara* – the subject of the thesis can be both the subject of the thesis and the similar instances – does not hold.

## Summary

Dharmakīrti introduces a new interpretation of the word *iṣṭa* in the definition of the thesis, which is not found explicitly in Dignāga. Through this interpretation, namely the rule that what the proponent really intends to prove is the thesis, not anything that is merely stated, he intends to refute those theses which are stated ambiguously with a view to avoiding a criticism. In his PVin III he gives several examples of the inference in which the thesis is stated ambiguously and shows that, if the above mentioned rule were not accepted, it would follow either that the opposite of the intended property to be proved is proved or that the proof itself is useless. He illustrates the first undesirable consequence, namely the proof of the opposite, by means of an argument formulated by the Avyutpattivādins against the Vyutpattivādins in favor of the thesis based on *Vākyapadīya* I 67 that the word has its proper object before its connection with the named. As for the second undesirable consequence, uselessness of the proof, he exemplifies it in his refutation of the Sāṃkhya's inference of the existence of the Self. Further, he takes as an example the Cārvākas' formulation of the proof of their thesis – “A pot is accompanied by a second (*sadvitīya*), namely by either of the two (*anyatara*) – a person characterized as a body, or a pot” – in order to show that on the basis of his interpretation of the word *iṣṭa* such pseudo-proofs formulated by means of the word *anyatara* can be refuted. He divides the property to be proved into two types – the particular property to be proved and the universal property to be proved – and indicates faults in these two forms of the thesis.

It is typical of his reasoning that in some cases without alluding to a detailed explanation he uses examples which are quite difficult to grasp. In this paper I have analyzed examples of this sort, namely the above-mentioned first and third examples, with the help of commentaries. In my analysis of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Cārvākas' statement, with a view to clarifying his refutation, I have enumerated the limitations which context imposes on the terms, *anyatara*, *dviṭīya* and the subject of the thesis, as used in their statement. These limitations serve as the basis for explaining Dharmakīrti's reference to contradiction or inconsistency in the Cārvākas' statement. For the determination of the limitations, Dharmottara's extensive discussion is very useful. In particular, his interpretation of the key word, *anyatara*, by means of the introduction of the modal concept of possibility (*sambhava*) facilitates our analysis of Dharmakīrti's method of refutation. That is, his interpretation

allows us to grasp that his long excursus on the refutation in PVin III, which seems at first glance to be verbose because of the repetitive treatment of similar topics, in fact reflects a systematic aim to refute the Cārvākas' thesis from two angles that are based on two meanings of the word *anyatara*.

## Abbreviations

Ci' Ci'e Ce'e	For the types of the citation see Lasic, Horst. <i>Jñānaśrīmitras Vyāpticarcā</i> . Wien 2000: 25ff.
D	Derge edition of the Tibetan canon
ms.	manuscript
P	Peking edition of the Tibetan canon
Skt.	Sanskrit
Tib.	Tibetan
{ }	deletion
<>	emendation
<	insertion in the margin
Jñ	<i>Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā</i> (Jñānaśrībhadrā): P 5728.
Dh	<i>Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā</i> (Dharmottara): P 5727; Skt. ms.: photocopies from microfilms kept in the library of the China Tibetology Research Institute, Beijing.
NBṬ(Dh)	<i>Nyāyabinduṭīkā</i> (Dharmottara): Malvania, Dalsukhbhai, ed. <i>Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa</i> . Patna 1971 (second edition).
NBhūṣ	<i>Nyāyabhūṣana</i> (Bhāsarvajña): Yogīndrānandaḥ, Svāmī, ed. <i>Śrīmadācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣanam</i> . Vārāṇasī 1968.
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> (Dharmakīrti): Miyasaka, Yūsho. "Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)." <i>Acta Indologica</i> 2 (1971/72): 1–206.
PV IV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> (Dharmakīrti), chapter IV ( <i>parārthānumāna</i> ): see PV and Tillemans 2000.
PVin III	<i>Pramāṇaviniścaya</i> (Dharmakīrti), chapter III ( <i>parārthānumāna</i> ): P 5710; Skt. ms. = MsI and MsII (photocopies from microfilms kept in the library of the China Tibetology Research Institute, Beijing).
PVṬ(Ś)	<i>Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā</i> (Śākyabuddhi): P 5718.
PVP	<i>Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā</i> (Devendrabuddhi): P 5717b.

- PVBh *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (Prajñākaragupta): Sāṅkṛityāyana, Rāhula, ed. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Patna 1953; ms. = Watanabe, Shigeaki ed. *The Sanskrit Commentaries on the Pramāṇavārttikam from the Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana's Collection of Negatives I. Sanskrit Manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam. Facsimile Edition*. Patna/Narita 1998.
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Shastri, S. Dwarikadas, ed. *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin*. Varanasi 1968.
- PVV<sup>1</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin): Sāṅkṛityāyana, Rāhula. "Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* with a commentary by Manorathanandin." Appendix to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24–26 (1938–1940): 1–531.
- Bu *Tshad ma rnam par nes pa'i ṭik tshig don rab gsal* (Bu ston Rin chen grub): Chandra, Lokesh, ed. *The Collected Works of Bu ston*, Vol. 24. New Dehli 1971.
- VP I, III *Vākyapadīya*, chapter I, chapter III, see Rau 2002.
- VPV Iyer, K. A. Subramania, ed. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*. Poona 1995.
- SyVR *Syādvādaratnākara* (Vādidevasūri): Lādhājī, Motīlāl, ed. *Śrīmad-Vādidevasūri-viracitaḥ Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāraḥ tadvyākhyā ca Syādvādaratnākaraḥ*. Poona 1926–1930.
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