

## **A Japanese Translation of *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* by Takashi Iwata (3)**

FUJIMOTO Yosuke and MIYO Mai

This paper is a sequel to “A Japanese Translation of *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* by Takashi Iwata (2).” It deals with Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s example of *prasaṅga*, i.e., reduction to absurdity.

Dharmakīrti, one of the most brilliant Indian logicians, illustrates *prasaṅga* in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* with the following example: If the single entity (the universal, etc.), which is considered to be really existent and to subsist in many different individual things by the non-Buddhist opponent, were connected with a particular thing (a), then an unwanted consequence would follow that the single entity cannot connect with any other things (b, c, d, ...) because it possesses a property of being related exclusively with that particular thing (a) and therefore loses the other property (the property of subsisting in many individual things, i.e., the omnipresence). Probably because of the difficulty of grasping the logical structure in the example above, Dharmakīrti’s successors show totally different views on whether the example should be regarded as *prasaṅga* or as *prasaṅgaviparyaya* (the contraposition of *prasaṅga*). Dharmottara and Jñānaśrībhadrā consider Dharmakīrti’s example to be a form of *prasaṅga*, whereas Prajñākaragupta interprets the example as both *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, reformulating it respectively according to whether or not the subject of reasoning is existent.

First, Prajñākaragupta interprets Dharmakīrti’s example as follows: If the single entity (the universal, etc.), which is considered to be reified in many individual things within the opponent’s system, were based on a particular thing (a) [and hence confined to this thing (a)], then it would follow that the single entity cannot connect with any other things (b, c, d, ...). This is a *prasaṅga* reasoning because the subject of reasoning is not accepted by the proponent (Buddhists), and hence the logical reason is not established.

Secondly, introducing the hypothesis that the universal is nothing but objects of the sense such as form (*rūpa*), Prajñākaragupta puts forward the following reformulation: If the single entity (the universal, etc.), which is *rūpa* itself and considered not to be omnipresent by the proponent (Buddhists), were recognized to be based on a particular thing (a), then it would follow that the single entity cannot connect with any other things (b, c, d, ...). Here in this second case, contrary to the first one, the existence of the subject of reasoning, i.e., *rūpa*, is accepted by the proponent himself, so the logical reason is fundamental (*maula*). Additionally, the

conclusion denies the opponent's doctrine and at the same time is in accordance with the proponent's system. Therefore, Prajñākaragupta's second reformulation can be seen as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

Through the second half of chapter 2, Professor Iwata carries out an analytical investigation into Prajñākaragupta's interpretations with the help of Yamāri's commentary and successfully elucidates the difference of opinions between Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta in the formulation and application of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. Moreover, at the end of this chapter, he even brings to light a slight discrepancy between Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri concerning the interpretation of *vyāpakānupalabdhi* (non-perception of a pervading property).