Reviewing the Twenty Years of Japan’s “Human Security”: From Elusive Theory to Sharp Practice

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This article discusses human security as Japan’s unique diplomatic asset. Human security focuses on protection of individuals from a wide range of threats. In author’s observation, Japan’s human security policy has two dimensions. First, it is a global notion accomplished in the UN by Japan’s sponsorship and intellectual leadership. In order to universalize the concept of human security, Japan supported the positions of developing countries by respecting their policies of non-intervention or sovereignty, while mitigating western countries’ criticisms at their non-democratic systems or human rights records. However, when Japan practiced human security as a guiding principle of its ODA or development cooperation, it is more sharply conscious of the aims to promote liberal values such as democracy or human rights based on its national interests. Especially the current Abe administration has demonstrated such a consistent tendency in light of China’s growing influence on regional order or even alternative ideology to western-led “global governance.” This article argues such Japan’s human security policy’s double nature rather might be useful to compromise with China because it could offer flexible options between accommodation by elusive theory and competition by sharp practice.

Introduction

Human security is generally defined to aim to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihood and dignity, and to enhance human fulfillment through protection and empowerment. It basically focuses on individuals who face a wide range of threats including natural disasters, environmental collapse, poverty, infectious diseases, civil wars or conflicts. The idea of human security emerged as transnational responses to such new type of threats or negative by-products of globalization in the mid 1990’s. Japan from the very early stage grasped the opportunity and sponsored human security for recognition as the universal notion in the UN. Meanwhile, Japan itself practiced human security for its foreign policy as one of important diplomatic pillars.

Today, however, amidst the escalating military tensions and changing security environment influenced by China’s rising power, human security seems to retreat from the mainstream of security discussion. Furthermore, China is actively promoting its own notion of “community for shared future for mankind” as an alternative idea or a reform to Western-led global governance.¹ It primarily emphasizes state sovereignty’s priority to civil society’s caring individuals and consequently envisions a picture of state-centric international system, in other words a returning to a classic idea of Westphalia system.² This trend is uneasy to reconcile with Japan-promoted human security concept. For building a regional stability in Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific, China and Japan, two leading nations in the region,

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need to manage the fundamental differences between their security concepts and value issues. From Japan’s perspective, it is desired to involve China with a “free and open” regional order by skillfully using the global notion of human security, which China also subscribed in the UN.

Based on the above viewpoints, this article examines approximately twenty years of history of human security as Japan’s foreign policy from its origin and rethinks its contemporary significance as a useful diplomatic measure. Beginning with reviewing Japan’s early motivation to advocate human security in the postwar global community, the first two chapters focuses on Japan’s efforts of multilateral diplomacy to achieve the universally agreeable notion of human security in the UN. Then the third chapter discusses the evolving processes of Japan’s own implementation of human security into ODA policy, which was gradually shaped in rather strategic way to achieve national interests than just benign idea. Final chapter points out Japan’s human security policy under Prime Minister Abe is even increasing more political values and strategic objectives in reaction to China under Xi Jinping.

Overall it is found that Japan’s human security policy is shifting from non-controversial conceptualization to sharper interpretation and practices. Therefore, Japan could utilize human security as diplomatic wisdom to deal with China in both compromising and competing ways. In author’s observation, this ambiguous dual natures of human security, elusive theory and sharp practice, would be rather useful to defend liberal values without causing decisive clash with China.

1. Background of Advocating Human Security

The term of “human security” was first proposed in the 1994 UNDP report as a necessary new concept. After the end of Cold War, the report wrote that we must seek a new concept of human security and a new paradigm of sustainable human development. The report regretted that for too long the concept of security has been shaped in interstate conflicts and equated with the threats to a country’s borders, and accordingly nations have sought arms to protect their security. The UNDP initially attempted to lay the whole concept for agenda setting of 1995 World Summit for Social Development at Denmark. However, the Summit did not substantially support the new idea because the proposal was regarded as a kind of ideological theory raised by experts on developing economy, otherwise another possible source of troubles between the international organizations and developing countries.

However, Japan found the great potential in the UNDP ideas for own diplomatic future. In fact, in the 1995 Summit, Japanese PM Murayama Tomiichi stated that Japan’s ODA and international cooperation emphasized the social development of “human priority” in line with the UNDP concept. In the 1997 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the world environment, PM Hashimoto also stressed two points: our responsibility to future generations and global human security. Subsequently, it was PM Obuchi Keizo who decisively took a leadership for uplifting the human security concept toward the international community. His brain staffs including academia, politicians, bureaucrats, and NPO members were actively studying Japan’s prospective platform which can promote multilateral diplomacy in the UN. Among all, Vice Foreign Minister Takemi Keizo had
already started the study on the UNDP report for years and strongly recommended human security as an integrated approach to deal with newly emerging various global issues. Particularly thinking of the ongoing Asian financial crisis, Takemi imagined many Asian vulnerable people would face hardship during the overcoming process with the IMF conditionality. Thus, the necessity of human security was mainly referred to in the context of Japan’s responses to suffering Asian neighbors from Asian financial crisis.

In May 1998 in Singapore, Obuchi then Foreign Minister expressed his compassion for socially vulnerable people and emphasized the necessary treatment based on “human security.” Soon after becoming Prime Minister, Obuchi announced a firm commitment in his speech titled “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future of Asia” in December 1998 at Hanoi. He described the coming future as “a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity,” and addressed three areas for which Japan would make efforts. One of them was a policy of “placing emphasis on human security.” Obuchi explained; “human security is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis confronting Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially vulnerable—the poor, women and children, and the elderly—threatening their survival and dignity.” He announced to contribute 500 million yen (US$ 4.2 million) for the establishment of the “Human Security Fund” under the United Nations even during Japan’s own economic crisis.

PM Mori Yoshiro succeeded Obuchi’s strong commitment of promoting human security. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a report with two key words; “Freedom from fear, freedom from want,” stressing the need to tackle the various global threats. The PM Mori declared at the Summit that Japan would uphold human security as one pillar of Japan’s foreign policy and called for the establishment of an international commission on human security to further study its concept. Following PM Mori’s proposal, Mr. Annan announced the establishment of the “Commission on Human Security” when he visited Japan in January 2001. Two leading figures, Sadako Ogata (then UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen (then Master of Trinity College, Cambridge) were appointed Co-chairs. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan organized international symposia on human security to promote public understanding and awareness of this issue.

Thus, at the turn of century, Japan stepped ahead to sponsor human security. There were several important backgrounds. First, as Obuchi’s brains did, Japan was seriously looking for opportunity of international contribution. This was caused by the diplomatic “defeat” of the Gulf crisis and war with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait from 1990 to 1991. Unable to play any positive role in the crisis and war, Japan became the target of international criticism and eventually offered $13 billion in support, which remained the subject of ridicule for its “checkbook diplomacy.” After the end of the conflict it sent four minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. Yet, it was recognized as a case of too little and too late. Therefore, Japan was looking for the ways to recover reputation especially in the UN by international “security”
cooperation.

Meanwhile, Japan coincidentally had an experience to study an innovative concept of non-military
security. In July 1980, one of the study groups under the sponsor of then PM Ohira Masayoshi
proposed an idea of “comprehensive security strategy” (総合安全保障戦略), based on general under-
standing on a new international environment under declining American hegemony and emerging
trends of international interdependence.\textsuperscript{11} The study report paid special attentions to non-military
threats such as energy security, food security, or massive earthquake, and proposed relevant policy
recommendations. For example, policy recommendations for energy security included means of
storing energy, developing alternative energy resources, and strengthening ties with resource exporting
countries. Japan’s severe experience of two “oil shocks” in the 70’s had given actual lessons to rethink
Japan’s fundamentally vulnerability. Although the “comprehensive security” did not go mainstream of
Japan’s security policy after the resignation of PM Ohira, it was partly transplanted as a kind of theo-
retical skeleton to Japan’s mounting ODA policy in the 1980’s.

Lastly, Japan’s proactive diplomatic efforts regarding human security especially around 2000
included “hidden agenda.” It was related to an important step to realize the desire to gain a permanent
membership of Security Council in the UN. As the UN basically comprised traditional military
“collective security” system, in which Japan found no possibility of active role, broadening of the new
horizons was essential for Japan.\textsuperscript{12} In the early 2000’s, parallel to advocacy of human security, Japan
struggled for the reform of the UN to include Japan as a member of enlarged Security Council.
However, it was in vain that in 2005, the same year the UN officially adopted the notion of human
security after Japan’s strenuous efforts, the G4 Proposal jointly with Germany, India, Brazil was
opposed by China, Korea, and even the US. Japan’s another goal to gain the membership failed.

\textbf{2. Competing Concepts and Japan’s Leadership in the UN}

As of 2000, Japan’s initial effort was to define human security as a concrete concept, which should
be acceptable to all countries and practicable primarily for Japan itself. One of the reasons why Japan
was attracted by the 1994 UNDP report was that human security’s focus was mainly “freedom from
want” on socio-economic front rather than “freedom from fear” on civil and political front. Japan, as a
pacifist trading nation, was confident of own feasibility in initiative of the former front. However, there
were other competing alternatives to the traditional military security concept. For example, in 1995
the UN Commission on Global Governance introduced different two concepts; “security of people”
and “security of the planet.” The report indicated the “primary goals of global security policy should be
to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of the planet’s life-support systems….\textsuperscript{13} It
clearly prioritized “freedom from fear” to “freedom from want.”

Other western nations such as Canada and Norway actively reacted to conceptualize human security
by incorporating with more civil and political interpretation in line with conventional “human rights
diplomacy.” Especially, Canada became Japan’s rival in the definition competition at the UN. The 1999
first Canadian policy documents entitled “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World” had shown a much narrower picture on human security.14 In other words, human security is a wide and demanding security program which focused on general individual protection and empowerment and has been transformed into a post-conflict program for building peace. The Canadian definition put aside the question of reducing poverty and other issues of human development.

Japan initially hoped to insert “human security” to the outcome documents of 2000 Millennium Summit. However, during the robbing process, Japan learned that developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil showed anxiety that the concept would invite foreign intervention, otherwise abuse their “Right to Development.” Therefore, Japan believed Canadian interpretation of human security would be difficult to gain the agreements from developing country group. Facing these problems, Japan postponed the use of the notion of “human security,” while continuing the efforts of inserting the substance of human security. Instead, Japan proposed to establish the Committee on Human Security as a study group. Meanwhile, Canada set up the International Commission for Interventions and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which had designed the concept of “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” as a main element of human security. Actually, the 2001 ICISS report asserted “the principle of non-interference will be withdrawn before the international responsibility to protect,” in the case that states are unable to protect their citizens, or they themselves are jeopardizing their citizens.15 This reflected deep concerns for the reality of ethnic cleansing such as Rwanda case.

Despite Canada’s strong criticism,16 Japan did not change the original stance. In 2003, Japan-sponsored Commission on Human Security submitted the final report to the Secretary General. The report defined human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” and called for a strategy of “protection and empowerment” to secure people’s lives, livelihood, and dignity. In response to the submission of the Commission report, Japanese government quickly lobbied and campaigned to insert the notion of “human security” into the outcome document of 2005 World Summit. The main issue was to remove R2P from the general definition of human security. With support by Mexico and Chile, Japan successfully gained the UN official definition in accordance with its original interpretation. As a result, the Japanese and Canadian definitions were distinguished and separately mentioned in different paragraphs. The paragraph 143 mentioned Japan’s version of human security.17 This was the first appearance of the notion of “human security” in the official document of the United Nations. Canadian interpretation of human security was inserted as R2P in paragraph 138 and 139.

Nonetheless, some developing countries such as Brazil and Cuba still complained of the ambiguity of human security. In order to continue persuasion, in 2006 Japan, with cooperation of Mexico, established “The Friends of Human Security.” It followed up the movements and mainstreamed Japan’s interpretation of human security. Meanwhile, Canada and Norway also established “Human Security Network” and started the similar activities to maintain their interpretations. The conceptual debate continued even after 2010. Responding to further concerns expressed by developing countries, in 2012
the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the notion of human security.\textsuperscript{18} The resolution agreed that human security is an “approach” to assist Member States and adopted a “common understanding” on the major controversies.

This resulted in explaining human security in “is not” formats to distinguish from other concepts and actions. Main points are selectively summarized as below. First, human security primarily upholds the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. Second, the notion of human security is distinct from the R2P and its implementation. Third, human security does not entail the threats or the use of force. In line with the UN Charter, full respect for sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference should be maintained. Fourth, human security does not replace State security. Fifth, solutions should be embedded in local realities and based on national ownership. Lastly, governments retain the primary role, and the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their requests.

Thus, overall, the human security approach resulted in maintaining an orthodox Westphalian order which put first emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference. Clearly, it defended claims of developing countries’ state-centric position. For Japan, the policy of antagonizing no country was necessary to complete an intellectual leadership in the UN. Thus, through such considerate procedures human security became the “Japan brand” concept, yet the substantial content became rather elusive by its all-inclusive nature, which is difficult to carry out at the practical level to produce the fruitful result.

On the other hand, Japan soon integrated human security with its national ODA policy. The nature of human security became more strategic and specific according to the evolution of Japan’s ODA policy practice as the next chapter describes.

3. Implementation of Human Security in Japan’s ODA Policy

Japan’s ODA started in 1954 when it joined the Columbo Plan as a donor of technological assistance, while it had been a recipient from the World Bank until 1966. Such experience of dual status of donor and recipient for years had shaped Japan’s later unique ODA policies such as putting emphasis on self-help of the recipient country.\textsuperscript{19} Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, based on postwar national strategy or political aims for economic recovery, Japan’s yen-loan required Japanese companies’ participation. Japan-tied assistance was criticized by both recipient and other donor countries as “egoistic economic animal” or “neo-colonialism.”\textsuperscript{20} In the 1970’s, with an emerging sense of international responsibility as a trade-surplus nation, Japan finally made yen loan untied and shifted its ODA policy to more recipient-oriented ideas and practices. In 1977, the government announced the “five-year doubling plan” of ODA and next year even modified into “three-year doubling” and initiated massive projects. Accordingly, Japan changed the nature of ODA into more emphasis on BHN (Basic Human Needs) and human resources development.

In 1989 Japan’s ODA amounts surpassed the US and from 1991 to 2000 Japan remained the world top donor status. Succeeding the above-mentioned idea of “comprehensive security,” Japan’s ODA was
recognized as an important Japan’s diplomatic means. Meanwhile, the diplomatic failure of the Gulf War especially gave an impact on reframing ODA policy to be more externally accountable as Japan’s international contribution. In 1991, Japanese government announced guidelines of its economic assistance to developing countries. The government was to pay full attention to the following points; (1) the trends of the military expenditures of recipient countries, (2) the trends of their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, (3) their export and import of arms, and (4) their efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms.21

The last guideline evidently showed that before Japan started to advocate human security in the UN, Japan’s ODA policy already prepared the framework of supporting western country group’s argument. Furthermore, on June 30, 1992, Japanese government announced ODA Charter. In addition to the above four guidelines, the Charter addressed basic philosophies of ODA; (1) humanitarian considerations, (2) recognition of interdependence among nations of international community, (3) environmental consideration, and (4) support for self-help efforts of recipient countries. Japanese government explained its first ODA Charter as a meaningful product of combining Japan’s nearly 40 years’ ODA history with post-Cold War international trends.22 However, soon it faced more serious needs to shape the policy again. Since the late 1990’s, owing to Japan’s economic downfall and financial difficulties, its ODA budgets decreased and consequently went under serious reconsideration. With limited financial resources, the nature of ODA was asked to be in more accordance with national interests.

It was under such situation that Japan started to connect human security with its ODA policy. In 2003, while Japan’s UN diplomacy was very active, Japanese government reviewed ODA Charter. The three international trends namely “peace building,” “human security,” and “international development goals” were decided to be adequately stated in the new version. The 2003 Assistance Charter stipulated three basic policies which should be strategically pursued; (1) Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, (2) Perspective of “Human Security,” and (3) Assurance of fairness.23 Then, Japan for the first time openly used the term of “strategically.” Since the 1970’s Japan’s ODA had emphasized altruistic nature or recipients-centric ideas, hesitating to express its self-centric aims. However, in 2003, Japan was finally becoming a nearly “normal” country to reveal its “strategy.” Yet, inserting the notion of “national interest” was still carefully postponed after heated debate.

Thus, unlike the attitude in the UN, Japan’s interpretation of human security in practicing as foreign policy was formulated in more strategic ways with political objectives. This gap or contradiction became even more obvious when China emerged as Japan’s immediate security concern.

Throughout the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, China launched the New Security Concept (新安全保障観), which emphasized non-traditional security and multilateral cooperation. In such a liberal atmosphere, when the SARS epidemic activated the discussions in 2003, human security was not totally
rejected, rather often positively introduced. However, Chinese academia soon found more negative dimensions. There two types of criticism appeared. One is about human security’s operational limitation due to its conceptual vagueness. The other argument is usual one among developing countries, which concerns the frictions with sovereignty, state security, and right to development. However, Chinese versions have unique additional tendency. They view that human security discourses have tangible Western value orientation and the acclaimed paradigm-shift from the state to individual excessively downgrades the positive role of the state in dealing with various security agendas. Typical argument is that government as a “necessary evil” is very much Western invention and it is not a Chinese idea.

Even though the definition at the UN sided with China’s understanding, China was always cautious to use the notion of human security. Externally, Chinese government preferred the notion of mankind security (人類安全), carefully avoiding the indication of individuals. Domestically, China promoted similar conceptual guiding principle of “people-oriented” (以人为本). This fact may lead an observation that even though human security is not frequently used as a term, there have been significant discussions leading to the consideration and implementation of various human security practices in China. However, it is also pointed out that the “Sinicized” form of human security does not result in a pattern of civil society empowerment.

Xi Jinping’ China has actively reformed security concept and policy. During the Third Plenum held in November 2013, the creation of a new National Security Commission was announced. Xi stated that China is currently faced with the dual pressure of externally safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests and internally maintaining political security and social stability. He explained all kinds of increasing risks demand to establish a powerful and capable platform to coordinate the whole national security work. The notion of security which the initiative refers to became “national comprehensive security” (总体国家安全), covering traditional and non-traditional, internal and external threats. Presupposedly the rule of Communist Party must be foremost secured.

In April 2014, at the first meeting of the new National Security Commission, President Xi stated that the security of people had to be the main objective and state security should in every sense serve the people and rely on people. However, as the security system primarily protects the Chinese Communist Party, it cannot be compatible with human security whose prior objective is individuals. Rather, in de-emphasizing state security, human security has possibilities to provide a “back door” toward human and ethnic rights or individual freedom within state, which China would firmly oppose.

On the other hand, Japan found own security environment in traditional sense increasingly severer. Amid the culmination of deteriorating China-Japan relations after Japan’s nationalization of Senkaku island in September 2012, PM Abe Shinzo immediately after his inauguration in December of the same year started a fundamental reform of Japan’s national security policy. In such new security environment, human security as Japan’s foreign policy was reexamined with more strategic definition. In February 2015 the Abe administration announced the Development Cooperation Charter. It even
changed the Charter’s name by omitting the notion of ODA. The reviewed points were influenced by whole strategic consideration decided by National Security Strategy on December 17, 2013. The basic philosophy, policies and approaches of the new Charter were harmonized with the “Legislation on Peace and Security” adopted later in March 2015.

In the new Charter, human security became a “guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan’s development cooperation.” It was fixed as one of the philosophies lined up with “cooperation for non-military purposes” and “equal partnership with developing countries.” Accordingly, “promoting human security” is listed as the second basic policy after “contributing to peace and prosperity through cooperation for non-military purposes,” before “cooperation aimed at self-reliant development through assistance for self-help efforts as well as dialogue and collaboration based on Japan’s experience and expertise.” Compared to the 2003 Charter, human security came prior to the self-help efforts of recipient countries, switching their orders in basic policies.

Japan’s strategic word choices are found in other places. This is in accordance with Japan’s priority issues of “sharing universal values and realizing a peaceful and secure society,” which is clearly described in the same Charter. Universal values are defined as the establishment of the rule of law, the realization of good governance, the promotion and consolidation of democratization, and respect for basic human rights including women. Relevantly, the Charter sharply defined human security as “a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment.” The tone was quite different from the 2012 “common understanding” of the UN, which emphasized state security’s supremacy over individuals. Instead, the Charter declared that Japan’s development cooperation focuses on individuals especially those liable to be vulnerable. It also states that Japan will proactively contribute to promoting basic human rights, although seemingly women’s rights are most featured. Thus, Japanese government purposefully employed human security for a policy tool of Japan’s “value diplomacy.”

The term of “national interests” was explicitly inserted in the introduction part. Unlike the reviewing process of 2003 revision, no serious opposition occurred from the public. This means the notion of “national interests” was already familiar and acceptable to Japanese people. It was understandable because escalating territorial disputes with China became enough common concerns among majority of Japanese. Thus, logically connected to national interests in the governmental document, human security came to represent Japan’s policy to maintain liberal democratic values and even protect universal values such as human rights and individual freedom.

Conclusion

As reviewed in this paper, Japan’s human security policy had two dimensions. One is a demonstration of Japan’s intellectual leadership to achieve the universal notion of the 21st century in the UN. This efforts were done up until around 2010. It was perceived that Japan’s global diplomacy carefully considered the needs of developing countries while disregarding the western countries’ substantial
“human right” diplomacy. The other is Japan’s foreign policy to strategically ponder and carry out human security based on national interests. Since 2010, human security has evolved into the concept to represent Japan’s liberal political values in the international community. China’s growing influence on the regional and global order prompted Japan to reactively demonstrate own political values in connection with national interests.

Today, Japan’s interpretation on human security seems to return to “Conclusion of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers” (Cologne, June, 1999), before Japan started to conceptualize human security. It simply stated; “We emphasize that crucial cornerstones of human security remain democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and human development.” 30 It is interesting that, after nearly twenty years’ experience of human security diplomacy, Japan arrived in the old starting point. Yet, this paper does not argue that Japan’s human security should align only with western developed countries’ sides. Instead, it argues that human security, Japan’s unique global diplomatic asset, may have more potential to reconcile with China and explore compromising space in dynamic changes of regional and global order.

Human security is a unique wide and flexible concept. It can check China if used sharply, while it can still accommodate China if used loosely. Such Japan’s diplomatic ambiguity or multi-faceted character reminds us postwar Japan’s three diplomatic principles declared in 1957; (1) Assigning central importance to the UN, (2) Cooperating with the free world, and (3) Strengthening Japan’s position as a “member of Asia.” 31 Harmonizing three rather contradictory principles was not easy, however at that time postwar Japan’s government intentionally left three agendas reflecting people’s wishes of those days in time of returning to the international community. Today more than 60 years later, Japan is also facing the similar puzzles and challenges. Human security could be positively reconsidered to solve Japan’s consistent diplomatic dilemma.

Notes
1 On Oct 18, 2017 in the speech at the 19th National Congress of Communist Party of China (CCP), Xi Jinping emphasized that CCP had an eternal mission to contribute to human kinds and China as a responsible major country would actively participate in reforming and building global governance system by China’s wisdom.
2 On January 18, 2017, in the speech at the UN Office at Geneva, Xi Jinping explained that “community for shared future for mankind” would respect fundamental principles of “equality and sovereignty” established by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), as well as principles of Geneva Conventions (1864), UN Charter (1945), and the Five Principle for Peace (1954) and the spirits of Bandung Conference (1955).
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It stated; “We stress the right of the people to lie in freedom in dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular the vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discuss and define the notion of human security in the General Assembly.” Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (16 September, 2005) 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome.


Japan’s assistance policy toward Southeast Asia was the most typical case. See more in Sudo Sueo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (ISEAS, 1992)

See note 19.


See note 19.

For example, Wang Yizhou explained that human security is understood as ‘core of all securities.’ He Zhongyi described that human security is ‘final goal of national security’ within the category of non-traditional security. Cited in Goi Takanori, ‘The Development of Non-traditional Security discussion and Human Security in China,” International Public Policy Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2011)


Ibid.


It stated; “Amid all these changes, a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community is increasing intertwined with the national interests of Japan. To secure its national interests, it is essential for Japan, as a ”Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, to work together with the international community including developing
countries to address global challenges.”


31 Japanese Foreign Ministry, Diplomatic Bluebook 1957. It was the first bluebook published in the next year of Japan’s accession to the UN.