However, his interpretation has a slightly revised connotation that the consciousness possessing the [actually non-existent] object in the past and the future does not possess the [actually existent] object.

Finally, in confutation against this interpretation, the proponent suggests his opponent the relationship between cause and effect concealed in the relationship between the object of consciousness and consciousness. Namely, the [actually existent] cause, i.e., the object of consciousness, engenders the result, i.e., the consciousness. Therefore, when the result (i.e., consciousness) is existent, the [actually existent] cause, (i.e., the object of consciousness) is always existent. In other words, consciousness always possesses the [actually existent] object. As a result, the opponent cannot persist in his interpretation of the traditional doctrine by slightly revising his claim.

**About the Definition of ālambana in Ālambanaparīkṣā**

Ito Yasuhiro

As well known, Dignāga (ca. 480-540) discusses the thesis of the cognized objects (ālambana) in Ālambanaparīkṣā. In this work he specifies two conditions which the cognizable objects should fulfill.

The cognizable objects for certain knowledge must fulfill conditions that they consist of the source of the knowledge and have the same images (ākāra) as the knowledge.

These conditions are reasonably supported by the theory of sākāravāda, which states that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object and position. However Dignāga proves the statement scrupulously and thereby develops the argument leading to the conclusion that the theory of "cognition-only" (vijñaptimārtavāda) is drawn inevitably.

This paper aims to interpret the text in detail based on notes, add logical analysis and consideration in terms of the above contents and thereby clarify the definition of cognized objects (ālambana) bibliographically.

**Dharmottara’s Understandings of Mental Perception (mānasa)**

Hayashi Keijin

Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmakīrti’s works, is the first scholar that shows a special attitude toward mental perception. He says that the existence of mental perception is allowed only from
the traditional and dogmatic standpoint. However he comments on Dharmakirti’s its definition because he finds no vital reason to deny its existence.

He analyses its definition in the way no other scholar has ever treated. He says its definition can be considered in three ways as follows:

(1) uniqueness of its cause
(2) uniqueness of its object
(3) uniqueness of itself (=mental perception)

Using this analysis, he judges the cause of mental perception as continuous one (samanāntara-pratyaya) and its object as cooperating factor with sense perception. Taking his own standpoint about mental perception, he refutes the interpretation made by another commentator Vinītadeva.

The Two Meanings of the Word pramāṇa and Their Relationship

MIYO Mai

The word pramāṇa, which is widely used as a key term of epistemology in Indian philosophy, seems to have two meanings in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Namely, it means valid cognition (samyagjñāna) in the context of explaining that pramāṇa falls into two categories, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa). In the context of explaining what is called the theory of non-distinction between pramāṇa and its result (pramāṇaphala), pramāṇa is the fact that cognition has the image of the object (meyarūpta), or the form of the grasper (grāhakākāra), which means that it is the direct factor for determining which object cognition perceives.

In this article, I begin by focusing on how we can understand the two meanings of the word pramāṇa in a consistent manner, and I find that according to Dignāga it is used metaphorically (upacārā) in the sense of valid cognition. That is to say, when pramāṇa as valid cognition, corresponding to perception and inference, is analyzed through the opposing concepts of means of cognition (pramāṇa) and result of cognition (pramāṇaphala), it ought to be equated with the result of cognition. In this case, the word pramāṇa is used in the sense of the result of cognition, that is, the result of pramāṇa.

Secondly, I attempt to compare this usage of the word pramāṇa with that in the Nyāya school. In the case of the Nyāya school, the Nyāyasūtra defined some pramāṇas as cognition, and at the stage of the Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāyavārttika there coexisted two definitions of pramāṇa, one as valid cognition