following five meanings. The first meaning of asādhanāṅgavacana is īṣṭasyārthasya siddheḥ kāraṇasyāvacanam. The second meaning is trirūpahetuvacanasamudāyasya avayavasyāvacanam. The third meaning is trirūpahetuvacanasamudāyasya anavayavasya vacanam. The fourth meaning is īṣṭasyārthasya siddher akāraṇasya vacanam. The fifth meaning is asādhanāṅgasyāprastutasya vacanam. Furthermore, these five meanings are explained in more detail by use of logical concepts, for example, trividhaṃ lingam, trirūpahetu, hetvābhāṣa and so forth. In this way, Dharmakīrti gives his own original definition to "the condition of defeat".

An Inquiry into Kamalāśīla’s Influence on the Definition of bodhicitta

SATO Akira

This paper inquires into Kamalaśīla’s influence on the definition of the mind that aspires to enlightenment (bodhicitta) in late Mahāyāna Buddhism. It consists of two parts. In the first part, I reconfirm Kamalaśīla’s understanding of bodhicitta in his First Bhāvanākrama (BhKr I). Then, in the second part, I consider Jñanakīrti’s understanding in his Pāramitāyānabhāvanākramopadeśa (PBhU).

Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), a scholar representative of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school, shows in his BhKr-I the course for Bodhisattvas to realize enlightenment. This course consists of three stages, namely, compassion (karunā), the mind for enlightenment (bodhicitta), and practice (pratipatti). He classifies bodhicitta into two types, namely, prāṇidhicitta and prasthānacitta. The first (prāṇidhicitta) is the practitioner’s will to realize enlightenment for the salvation of all beings. This prāṇidhicitta is connected with karunā. The second (prasthānacitta) is the mental foundation for practitioners who strive for self-control (saṃvaragrahāṇa) and to collect supplies for entering into practice (pratipatti). This prasthānacitta is connected with pratipatti. Kamalaśīla seems to systematize the course for Bodhisattvas (i.e., karunā ⇒ prāṇidhicitta — prasthānacitta ⇒ pratipatti) by defining bodhicitta in this way.

Jñanakīrti (ca. 9c.), who is presumed to have been a scholar of the Vajrayāna, wrote the PBhU on the basis of the BhKr I. However, his understanding of bodhicitta differs from that in the BhKr I. Jñanakīrti classifies bodhicitta into 22 types (i.e., three types of prāṇidhicitta and 19 types of prasthānacitta). Further, these 22 types are distinguished according to the practitioner’s mental stages, including the final stage (buddhabhūmi). In this understanding, we can regard the completion of meditation on bodhicitta as the cause of attainment of the final stage. But Jñanakīrti states that the cause
is two practices (i.e., knowledge (prajñā) and means (upāya)). Therefore, in the PBhU we can regard 1) meditation on bodhicitta or 2) knowledge and means as the cause of attainment of the final stage. How, then, does he associate these two ideas? Jñānakṛtī defines prasthānacitta as the mental foundation for practitioners who strive to collect supplies (samabhāra) such as giving (dānādi) for entering into practice (pratipatti). This definition is based on Kamalaśīla’s definition. In Jñānakṛtī’s definition, the important point is that samabhāra is defined as dānādi, which are connected with upāya. Therefore, we can consider that prasthānacitta is connected with upāya. And Jñānakṛtī regards prajñā as the cause for ascertaining the right state of upāya.

Jñānakṛtī’s definition of prasthānacitta was based on Kamalaśīla’s definition. In Jñānakṛtī’s understanding, samabhāra is limited to that which is relevant to upāya. From this point, we can understand that prasthānacitta is connected with upāya in Jñānakṛtī’s PBhU. This understanding is not found in Kamalaśīla’s BhKr I.

### The Demonstration of Cognition as Being Self-luminous by Śrīharṣa

MANABE Tomohiro

Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) argued that Brahman is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) in the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā (Kh), which he wrote from the position of the Advaita Vedānta. In this case, he proved that Brahman is self-luminous by proving that cognition (vijñāna), which is the nature of Brahman, is self-luminous.

In the Kh, the demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous mainly consists of criticism of the Nyāya school, the opponent, and at the beginning he proves positively that cognition is self-luminous. He replaces the self-luminousness of cognition with its being self-proved. Further, he considers it to be established through a process of self-luminosity. It is proved as follows that cognition is established through a process of self-awareness.

Experientially, when knowledge arises, there is for no one who seeks to know the object any doubt (saṃśaya) or error (viparyaya) or the valid cognition that cognition does not exist (vyatirekapramā). This implies that the cognition which exists in them is known correctly. By converting this empirical fact into a logical relationship, it is concluded that the cognition is known correctly when there is neither doubt nor error nor the valid cognition that it does not exist regarding that which exists in those who seek to know the object that is wished to be known. Otherwise, there would be doubt or error or the valid cognition that the cognition does not exist for those without the