However, his interpretation has a slightly revised connotation that the consciousness possessing the [actually non-existent] object in the past and the future does not possess the [actually existent] object.

Finally, in confutation against this interpretation, the proponent suggests his opponent the relationship between cause and effect concealed in the relationship between the object of consciousness and consciousness. Namely, the [actually existent] cause, i.e., the object of consciousness, engenders the result, i.e., the consciousness. Therefore, when the result (i.e., consciousness) is existent, the [actually existent] cause, (i.e., the object of consciousness) is always existent. In other words, consciousness always possesses the [actually existent] object. As a result, the opponent cannot persist in his interpretation of the traditional doctrine by slightly revising his claim.

**About the Definition of ālambana in Ālambanaparīkṣā**

ITO Yasuhiro

As well known, Dignāga (ca. 480-540) discusses the thesis of the cognized objects (ālambana) in Ālambanaparīkṣā. In this work he specifies two conditions which the cognizable objects should fulfill.

The cognizable objects for certain knowledge must fulfill conditions that they consist of the source of the knowledge and have the same images (ākāra) as the knowledge.

These conditions are reasonably supported by the theory of sākāra-vāda, which states that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object and position. However Dignāga proves the statement scrupulously and thereby develops the argument leading to the conclusion that the theory of "cognition-only" (vijñaptimātravāda) is drawn inevitably.

This paper aims to interpret the text in detail based on notes, add logical analysis and consideration in terms of the above contents and thereby clarify the definition of cognized objects (ālambana) bibliographically.

**Dharmottara’s Understandings of Mental Perception (mānasa)**

HAYASHI Keijin

Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmakīrti’s works, is the first scholar that shows a special attitude toward mental perception. He says that the existence of mental perception is allowed only from