is two practices (i.e., knowledge (praJnā) and means (upāya)). Therefore, in the PBhU we can regard 1) meditation on bodhicitta or 2) knowledge and means as the cause of attainment of the final stage. How, then, does he associate these two ideas? Jñānakīrti defines prasthānacitta as the mental foundation for practitioners who strive to collect supplies (saṃbhāra) such as giving (dānādi) for entering into practice (pratipatti). This definition is based on Kamalaśīla’s definition. In Jñānakīrti’s definition, the important point is that saṃbhāra is defined as dānādi, which are connected with upāya. Therefore, we can consider that prasthānacitta is connected with upāya. And Jñānakīrti regards prajñā as the cause for ascertaining the right state of upāya.

Jñānakīrti’s definition of prasthānacitta was based on Kamalaśīla’s definition. In Jñānakīrti’s understanding, saṃbhāra is limited to that which is relevant to upāya. From this point, we can understand that prasthānacitta is connected with upāya in Jñānakīrti’s PBhU. This understanding is not found in Kamalaśīla’s BhKr I.

The Demonstration of Cognition as Being Self-luminous by Śrīharṣa

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Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) argued that Brahman is self-luminous (svaprakāśa) in the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādyā (Kh), which he wrote from the position of the Advaita Vedānta. In this case, he proved that Brahman is self-luminous by proving that cognition (vijñāna), which is the nature of Brahman, is self-luminous.

In the Kh, the demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous mainly consists of criticism of the Nyāya school, the opponent, and at the beginning he proves positively that cognition is self-luminous. He replaces the self-luminousness of cognition with its being self-proved. Further, he considers it to be established through a process of self-luminosity. It is proved as follows that cognition is established through a process of self-awareness.

Experientially, when knowledge arises, there is for no one who seeks to know the object any doubt (saṃśaya) or error (viparyaya) or the valid cognition that cognition does not exist (vyātirekāpramāṇa). This implies that the cognition which exists in them is known correctly. By converting this empirical fact into a logical relationship, it is concluded that the cognition is known correctly when there is neither doubt nor error nor the valid cognition that it does not exist regarding that which exists in those who seek to know the object that is wished to be known. Otherwise, there would be doubt or error or the valid cognition that the cognition does not exist for those without the
disturbances of drowsiness, etc. But this cannot happen, and so the above logical relationship is established. Thus, when the cognition perceives itself, it is proved that it is settled because of its being self-awareness.

The above demonstration incorporates the self-recognition (svasamvedana) theory of the Yogācāra school and the self-proved truth theory (svatapratīcyavāda) among truth theories, and this is a distinctive feature of Śrīharṣa’s demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous.