the traditional and dogmatic standpoint. However he comments on Dharmakīrti’s its definition because he finds no vital reason to deny its existence.

He analyses its definition in the way no other scholar has ever treated. He says its definition can be considered in three ways as follows:

(1) uniqueness of its cause
(2) uniqueness of its object
(3) uniqueness of itself (=mental perception)

Using this analysis, he judges the cause of mental perception as continuous one (samanāntara-pratyaya) and its object as cooperating factor with sense perception. Taking his own standpoint about mental perception, he refutes the interpretation made by an another commentator Vinītadeva.

The Two Meanings of the Word pramāṇa and Their Relationship

MIYO Mai

The word pramāṇa, which is widely used as a key term of epistemology in Indian philosophy, seems to have two meanings in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Namely, it means valid cognition (samyagjñāna) in the context of explaining that pramāṇa falls into two categories, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). In the context of explaining what is called the theory of non-distinction between pramāṇa and its result (pramāṇaphala), pramāṇa is the fact that cognition has the image of the object (meyarūptā), or the form of the grasper (grāhakākāra), which means that it is the direct factor for determining which object cognition perceives.

In this article, I begin by focusing on how we can understand the two meanings of the word pramāṇa in a consistent manner, and I find that according to Dignāga it is used metaphorically (upacārāt) in the sense of valid cognition. That is to say, when pramāṇa as valid cognition, corresponding to perception and inference, is analyzed through the opposing concepts of means of cognition (pramāṇa) and result of cognition (pramāṇaphala), it ought to be equated with the result of cognition. In this case, the word pramāṇa is used in the sense of the result of cognition, that is, the result of pramāṇa.

Secondly, I attempt to compare this usage of the word pramāṇa with that in the Nyāya school. In the case of the Nyāya school, the Nyāyasūtra defined some pramānās as cognition, and at the stage of the Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāyavārttika there coexisted two definitions of pramāṇa, one as valid cognition
and the other as means of cognition, but ultimately the means of cognition came to be referred to as pramāṇa and the result of cognition as the result of pramāṇa. However, the result of pramāṇa is always established separately from pramāna, and so the result of pramāṇa is consciousness of what is to be abandoned and so on (hānādibuddhi) when pramāṇa is cognition of an object. Therefore, it is not specific to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school to use the word pramāṇa in the meaning of cognition, but we can acknowledge its distinctiveness in that, while regarding pramāṇa as cognition, they avoided establishing the result of pramāṇa separately from cognition through the metaphorical usage of the word pramāṇa.

**Dharmakīrti’s Interpretation of nigrahasthāna (1): On asādhanāṅgavacana**

**SASAKI Ryo**

It is well known that Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660) explains "the condition of defeat" (nigrahasthāna), which is the traditional concept of debate, in detail in the Vādanyāya. However, it had not been sufficiently clarified by preceding studies that the definition of "the condition of defeat" in the Vādanyāya is original and differs from that of the Nyāya school. Dharmakīrti divides "the condition of defeat" between the asādhanāṅgavacana, which is the "the condition of defeat" for a disputant, and the adosodbhāvavacana, which is the "the condition of defeat" for an opponent. The purpose of this study was to analyze the asādhanāṅgavacana.

On analysis, it becomes clear that Dharmakīrti interprets asādhanāṅgavacana as having five meanings according to the following criteria: (i) a case relation between sādhana and āṅga, (ii) the meaning of the word sādhana, (iii) the meaning of the word āṅga, and (iv) the method of adding the prefix a-. To be specific, the findings are as follows. In the case of (i), in the first, second, third and fourth interpretations sādhanaṅga is interpreted as a case-determined compound (tatpuruṣa) and in the fifth interpretation it is interpreted as a possessive compound (bahuvrīhi). (ii) In the first and fourth and fifth interpretations sādhana is interpreted as siddhi and in the second and third interpretations sādhana is interpreted as karanasādhana. (iii) In the first and fourth interpretations āṅga is interpreted as kārana and in the second and third interpretations āṅga is interpreted as avayava and in the fifth interpretation āṅga is interpreted as dharma. (iv) In the first and second interpretations the prefix a- is added to vacana and in the third, fourth and fifth interpretations the prefix a- is added to sādhanaṅga.

On the basis of these four sets of criteria, Dharmakīrti interprets asādhanāṅgavacana as the