National Government versus Ethnic Minority:
Ethnopolitics and Party Systems in New Europe

A Dissertation by

Ryo NAKAI

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### Abbreviations of Political Parties’ Name

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATAKA</td>
<td>Political Party Atack (Bulgaria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUR</td>
<td>Alliance for Romanian Unity (Romania)</td>
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<td>AWS</td>
<td>Election Action Solidarity (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>Bulgarian Business Bloc (Bulgaria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Democratcd Convention of Romania (Romania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ChD</td>
<td>Christian Democracy (Poland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Democratic Party Saimnieks (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party Slovenia (Slovenia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DU</td>
<td>Democratic Union of Slovakia (Slovakia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Estonian Citizens (Estonia)</td>
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<td>EME</td>
<td>Estonia Country People’s Party (Estonia)</td>
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<td>ERSRP</td>
<td>Estonia Nationalist Independence Party (Estonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERL</td>
<td>Estonia People’s Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURP</td>
<td>Estonia United People’s Party (Estonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Party / Hungarian Civic Union) (Hungary)</td>
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<td>GERB</td>
<td>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (Bulgaria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Slovakia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Homeland (also known as Pro Patria) (Estonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JL (Latvia)</td>
<td>New Era (Latvia)</td>
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<td>JL (Lithuania)</td>
<td>Youth Lithuania (Lithuania)</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>New Party (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Movement (Slovakia)</td>
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<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Christian Democratic People’s Party ( Hungary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDS</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (Czech Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDU</td>
<td>Christian and Democratic Union (Czech Republic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDU-CSL</td>
<td>Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (Czech Republic)</td>
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<td>KE</td>
<td>Coalition Party (Estonia)</td>
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<td>Kesk</td>
<td>Centre Party (Estonia)</td>
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<td>KPN</td>
<td>Confederation for an Independent Poland (Poland)</td>
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<td>KMU</td>
<td>Coalition Party and People’s Union (Estonia)</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td>Equal Rights (Latvia)</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Latvia’s Way (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Lithuania Democratic Party (Lithuania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LKDP</td>
<td>Lithuania Christian Democratic Party (Lithuania)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LKDS</td>
<td>Christian Democrats Union of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LNNK</td>
<td>Latvian National Independence Movement (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LPP</td>
<td>Latvia’s First Party (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>League of Polish Families (Poland)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LSDA</td>
<td>Social Democratic Alliance of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LSDSP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Labor’s Party of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSP’</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LTS</td>
<td>Lithuanian Nationalist Union (Lithuania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LZP</td>
<td>Green Party of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
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<td>LZS</td>
<td>Agrarian Union of Latvia (Latvia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moderates (Estonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Forum (Hungary)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MIEP Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Hungary)
MKDS Modern Christian Democrats Union (Lithuania)
MKE Our Home is Estonia (Estonia)
NKS Moderates Conservatives Union (Lithuania)
NS People’s Union (Bulgaria)
NSi New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party (Slovenia)
ODS (bulgaria) United Democratic Force (Bulgaria)
ODS (czech republic) Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic)
Parem Rightist (Estonia)
PChD Party of Christian Democrats (Poland)
PCTVL For Human Rights in United Latvia (Latvia)
PiS Law and Justice (Poland)
PNTCD National Peasant Party – Christian Democrats (Romania)
PRM Greater Romania Party (Romania)
PUNR Party of Romanian National Unity (Romania)
PZZ Polish Western Union (Poland)
PX Party X (Poland)
Rahva Popular Front of Estonia (Estonia)
RE Reform Party (Estonia)
ROP Movement for Rebuilding Poland (Poland)
RP Res Publica (Estonia)
RZS Order, Law and Justice (Bulgaria)
SC Harmony Centre (Latvia)
SDE Social Democratic Party (Estonia)
SDKU Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovakia)
SDS (bulgaria) Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria)
SDS (slovenia) Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenia)
SK Sajudis Coalition (Lithuania)
SKD Harmony for Latvia (Latvia)
SLS Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenia)
SNS (slovakia) Slovak National Party (Slovakia)
SNS (slovenia) Slovenian National Party (Slovenia)
SPR-SRC Association for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic)
TB For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia)
TB/LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom / LNNK (Latvia)
TP People’s Party (Latvia)
TS Homeland Union (Lithuania)
TSP People’s Harmony Party (Latvia)
US Union of Freedom (Czech Republic)
V Unity (Latvia)
VEE Russian Party in Estonia (Estonia)
WAK Catholic Election Action (Poland)
Zigerist People’s Movement Zigerist (Latvia)
ZRP Zatler’s Reform Party (Latvia)
ZZS Green and Farmers Union (Latvia)
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Qachqynbaev (Kachkynbaev), Katsunori Seki, Shin Toyoda, and Jou Willy.

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is explaining the effect of political party system onto the ethnic confrontation. What is the source of ethnic confrontation? It is neither historical fate of each nation nor unpredictable, unfortunate events. It is the fruit of interest/partisan struggles in politics. This statement does not mean that ethnic confrontations and accommodations are the result of the “failures or successes” of politics. Rather, I argue that both ethnic confrontations and accommodations are predicted, defined, and desired by political actors; moreover, both situations are due to the “success” of strategies and choices made by them.

What is the source of ethnic confrontation? The vast of works (see literature section) have tried to answer this question in terms of ethnic violence, ethnic rebellion, ethnic cleansing, or civil war due to ethnic reasons. Practically, conventional wisdom regarding ethnic confrontation often imagines the tragic, bloody “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, massacre between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, Irish multiple terrorism against Britain in the U.K., Hindu-Muslim-Sikh communal violence in India, and so on. However, armed conflicts or civil wars—violent ethnic confrontations—are ultima ratio to tackle with ethnic questions. Rather, most ethnic problems have taken the form of political disputes in a conventional political process. Gurr (2000) counted 268 active ethnic confrontations all over the world and pointed out that 92% of those struggles progress without high-intensity violent conflicts.
Although I donot deny the importance of investigating wars, armed conflicts, or rebellions based on ethnic reasons, such conflicts are, fortunately, an unusual or extraordinary state for most nations. For most countries and people, ethnic political disputes without violence—ethnopolitical confrontation—are more serious, visible, and conventional.

The domain of this research is the ethnic confrontation in conventional politics in democratic countries. A confrontation without bloodshed does not mean that confrontation lacks importance. Rather, negotiations and confrontations in conventional politics are also a struggle for life. Governments and minority peoples struggle in a conventional political process for their self-consciousness, way-of-life, bases of economic behaviors, and so on. Nowadays, such struggles are going on worldwide. With the progress of globalization, this type of question will become broader and deeper in all democracies. In the contemporary world, there are few countries without any ethnic/national minority questions within their territories. Answering the question about ethnic confrontation in conventional democratic politics, we could obtain new and different implications to tackle and solve ethnopolitical issues.

1.1 Research Question

Most modern democracies have more or less faced problems related to ethnic minorities (including national minority, immigrants and their descendants, metics, etc.), and the pattern (situation) of ethnopolitics has been highly varied cross-nationally and inter-temporally. Some democracies have adopted a politically confrontational pattern in their ethnopolitics, while others show a lack of ethnic
confrontation in the conventional political process. In the former cases, for example, a government comprising mainly ethnic majority parties tries to reduce the minority’s influence by making more stringent the conditions for eligibility to acquire nationality (right to vote) and by repressing the right to use and be educated in the minority language so as to promote assimilation. At the same time, ethnic minority people vote for an ethnic minority party to protect and “voice” their own interests and some ethnic minority parties have taken many seats in parliament; sometimes, however, they show their dissatisfaction by demonstrating outside parliament. In the latter cases, the government admits several rights and privileges for the ethnic minority group, the ethnic minority will then cast their ballot for the parties mainly composed of the ethnic majority group and the ethnic minority parties are not able to win seats. Why have these differences appeared?

1.2 Argument

This thesis explains the variance of ethnopolitical patterns in newly democratized countries, where ethnopolitics blasted/mushroomed after the fall of communism, by paying attention to the political competition in party systems. The domain of ethnopolitics is not a sanctuary free from politicians’ tug-of-wars. Rather, politicians’ tug-of-wars create ethnopolitics in democracies. The key concept in the argument is “fragmentation [separation] of conservatives.” This research discusses ethnopolitics from the perspective of party politics. This is because, the centre-rightist parties tend to become key-decision makers under democratic majoritarian rule, caught in the middle between the far-right/nationalist party that wants to pursue its nation-building project and the leftish/pro-minority parties that want to create pluralistic multinational
countries. When a mainstream and intermediate centre-rightist party agrees with the nationalistic idea, the country will pursue nationalistic policies which lead minorities in their territory to protest inside and outside parliament. On the other hand, when the mainstream centre-rightist party agrees with the pro-minority parties’ policies, the country will adhere to accommodative ethnic policies and minorities thus mute their protests. In a nutshell, the decision making of centre-rightists matters to account for the variance in ethnopoltics, in the democratic conventional political process. When there are many rightist parties including nationalist-conservatives, they all engage in mutual political rivalry on ethnic issues, and they tend to hesitate to support pro-minority policies because they fear losing votes and constituency due to the other political rival criticizing and portraying them as “betrayers of their nation.” They keep the ethnic majority’s support at the polls and they maintain (and sometimes strengthen) the nation-building project. When there are no rival parties in conservative camps, key-player centre-rightists may be more inclined to agree/support pro-minority policies because there will be no substantial criticism from a political rival. Rather, they may obtain new votes from ethnic minority groups.

This analysis brings us an unconventional perspective. Usually, we tend to think that united, strong rightist political party introduces politically confrontational ethnopoltics, whereas segregated, separated, and fragmented weak conservative contribute to the lack of political conflict in ethnopoltics. But the reality is the reverse. This research challenges our conventional intuitions and verifies a counterintuitive thesis, namely, that convergent vital conservative parties bring accommodative ethnopoltics and disunited vulnerable conservatives induce confrontational ethnopoltics.
1.3 Definitions

This thesis discusses ethnopolitics, the relation between ethnic minorities and majorities, and political disputes in a conventional political process that are motivated by ethnic reasons. First, it is necessary to precisely define some pertinent subjects and concepts.

The most common and obvious definition of ethnic groups is societal groups of people who identify themselves with a language, and with regional, cultural, and sometimes racial, features. We can see many ethnic groups in a country’s territory. While the feature of the “majority” and the “minority” is mutually relational and interdependent, it is not just a matter of numbers. This definition of feature is, fortunately, apparent when one considers the unitary nation-state. Every unitary nation-state inevitably favors a particular ethnicity for its nation-building process. Even when a government excludes discrimination against any ethnic groups, the government, de facto or de jure, grants primary status to a specific language, a specific religion, or a specific cultural system. The ethnic group identified with the primary language, religion, or culture is the “ethnic majority” (also known by the term “titular nation” in the post-communist context). The other ethnic groups are all “ethnic minorities.” On the basis of this definition, “ethnic minority” refers to different types of minorities, such as a national minority, immigrants, their descendants, metics that have resided in one place for a long time, and asylum seekers.

1 Logically, the situation could exist that an ethnic group with the primary language, religion, or culture is the minority in terms of population number, and vice versa. In such a case, it would be hard to define which is the “ethnic majority” and which the “ethnic minority.” However, fortunately, none of the cases in this thesis have such an aspect. Moreover, under democratic rule, such a situation would never occur structurally, because official policy is decided by the opinion of a majority in a democratic country. In practice, such a situation is, empirically, very rare all over the world (Rothschild 1981).
This research realizes that these groups are inherently different, but the aim of this research is to investigate the political decisions and reactions of ethnically different social groups in general. Thus, for simplification, this thesis categorizes several ethnic groups under a single definition of “ethnic minority” with a broad meaning. In practice, types of ethnic groups which often burden a national government with ethnopolitical issues are internal/external minorities, including descendants of old-time immigrants, who lived on the territory of the another nations’ state (e.g., Hungarians in Slovakia, Turks in Bulgaria, Russians in Latvia, and Koreans in Japan); and transnational minorities whose living area stretches across several states and who do not have their own ethnic kin-state (e.g., Roma, Kurds, or Ainu). So, this simplification must be acceptable.

As noted in the above, understanding the pattern of relations between majorities and minorities in a conventional political process is the aim of this research. Someone used the term ethnic “conflict” to describe such a relationship, but that word implicitly refers to conflict with arms and violent confrontation. Instead, I pay attention to the ethnic relations that deteriorate into ethnic “disputes” or “tensions” in conventional politics. To describe whether or not such dispute/tension exists in the democratic political process, I use the terms “ethnopolitical pattern,” “the pattern of ethnopolitics,” “ethnopolitical situation,” or sometimes, simply “ethnopolitics.” The situation wherein there exist in the political process apparent disputes/tensions between the ethnic majority and minorities constitutes “confrontational ethnopolitics.” On the other hand, the situation where there are no apparent disputes/tensions between ethnic

2 On the contrary, it seems to be usual that metics, the first generation of immigrant, refugee or asylum seekers are expected to integrate, or to assimilate into the host nation/state and everyone accepts this.
3 Cordell and Wolff (2009) also use the terms “conflicts,” “disputes,” and “tensions,” with a similar meaning.
groups in a conventional political process represents “accommodative ethnopolitics.”

The aim of this research is to investigate the origin of these two ethnopolitical patterns—confrontational ethnopolitics and accommodative ethnopolitics.

When this research uses the words “conservative,” “liberal,” “right,” and “left” to modify political parties or policies, they refer only to ethnic issues. That is, “conservative” policies mean some policies, including nationalistic aspect, and “liberal” parties denotes parties with a pro-minority orientation. When the present study wants to express the political partisanship in the sense of the economic state-market dimension, it adds the word “economic” or “economically” before the other modifying word (e.g., “economic liberal”).

1.4 Methodology and Case Selections

The methodological approach adopted here is what Laitin (2002) and Lieberman (2005) called the “mixed method,” combining quantitative statistical analysis and qualitative case studies, with theoretical argument. By combining these methods, this research will show both the causal effect and the causal mechanism in the party system (fragmentation of conservatives) that leads to ethnic confrontation in a conventional political process. The present study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will discuss the literature and theoretical framework. Chapter 3 will provide a statistical analysis that generates the index specifying the ethnopolitical relations, and will verify the causal effect between this research’s independent variable and dependent variable. Both chapters compose Part 1. Part 2 provides in-depth case studies to show the causal mechanism in this argument. Chapter 3 shows the effectiveness of the study on the Baltic countries, focusing on its similarities and differences. Chapters 4 and 5
show the in-depth case studies which focus on political parties’ effect on the ethnopolitical situations in Latvia and Estonia, respectively. The final chapter sums up the argument and provides its implications.

The units of analysis are newly democratized,\textsuperscript{4} unitary, and European Union (EU) member states, also known as Central and East European (CEE) countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{5} All these countries satisfy the research conditions. All of these countries more or less were faced with ethnic minority or nationalism questions (Ito 1999; Whitefield 2002), and had to deal with them to be an EU member. Moreover, they share a history as part of a multiethnic empire (the Austria-Hungary Empire, the Russian Empire, the Rzeczpospolita, the Swedish Empire, or the German Empire), and experienced domination by communism. It has been said that “postcommunist ethnic mobilization was facilitated by the collapse of Marxist-Leninist ideology that allowed the forging of alternative nationalist ideologies” (Barany 2005: 82), but we can see the salient variance among CEE countries. Nowadays, “every post-communist country has pockets of minorities” (Millard 2004: 226), and “ethnic conflicts that smoldered under the hegemony of communist rule have flared up as that rule has broken down” (Welsh 1993: 43). Hence, a comparison of these 10 countries would be very useful for investigating the alternative independent variables that account for the variance in ethnopolitical situations.

The case studies section compare Estonia and Latvia. They have many

\textsuperscript{4} The definition and measurement of democracies are derived from the Polity IV index.

\textsuperscript{5} This research excludes Croatia, because it was not defined as a democracy by Polity IV in the 1990s.
similarities, but differ nowadays in their pattern of ethnopolitics. Estonia and Latvia regained their independence after the mass nationalistic movement mobilized by their ethnic local elites (Beissinger 2002; Roeder 2008; Komori 2009). Since then, they have shared the same Russian minority question in their territories, the same external pressure from international organizations and the Russian federation, and highly similar historical backgrounds from the medieval era to contemporary independence. Both have shared the proportional representation (PR) electoral rule. Especially, the Russian-minority situation in Estonia and Latvia has been very similar. The Russians have lived in specific areas like the capital and cities in the east—Tallin, Narva, and Sillamäe in Estonia; Riga Rezekne, and Davgavpils in Latvia—and most of them (as well as their parents or grandparents) came to the Baltic states in the 1970s–80s as domestic immigrants. Both national governments once had similar nationalistic policies, often specified as “ethnic democracy,” that were harsh towards their minorities (Smith 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Smooha 2002). Voters’ cleavage structures were also the same. As Pettai and Kreuzer (1999) noted, “[m]ajor cleavage revolves around differences between more nationalistic, conservative social views, and more liberal, secular ones. In many multiethnic post-communist states, like Estonia and Latvia, this division is linked to nationalistic majority and cosmopolitan ethnic minority groups” (166).

Nowadays, Estonia and Latvia have completely different ethnopolitical situations. Figure 1.1 shows the number of mass demonstrations and the share of seats in parliament held by Russian ethnic parties in Estonia and Latvia. This figure illustrates the similarities in the two countries’ situation immediately after independence, and how the two countries’ situations are completely different now.
Figure 1.1: Russian Minorities in Estonia and Latvia Show Different Tendencies

The Number of Protest Movement by Russian Minorities

The Share of Seats Won by Russian Ethnic Minority Parties

Moreover, Table 1.1 shows several indicators that estimate the government’s policies toward ethnic minority groups. MIPEX-III scores governmental openness toward minority groups (especially immigrants and their descendants) in several sections. Unfortunately, we cannot see the inter-temporal change because MIPEX depicts one-shot data, but the information is good enough to allow one to compare and understand the contemporary Estonian and Latvian public policies toward minorities.

Source: Minority At Risk, Chutouou Kyu-Soren Shokoku no Senkyo Deta (Hokkaido University),
Table 1.1: Government Policies’ Openness toward Minorities in Estonia and Latvia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
<th>Access to Nationality</th>
<th>Anti-Discrimination Treatment</th>
<th>Overall Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the other 8 CEE average</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIPEX-III (http://www.mipex.eu/)

As can be seen, while Latvia’s government has adopted a confrontational policy toward ethnic minorities, the Estonian government has now become somewhat moderate or accommodative in its policy toward them. Another vivid contrast between Estonia and Latvia was the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). While the Estonian parliament ratified it after the government signed it in 1997, the Latvian parliament had refused to ratify it over the 10 years (Cordell and Wolff 2004). One work also pointed out that while ethnic politics is no longer an important political agenda in Estonia nowadays, it remains the most important in Latvia, even now (Rohschneider and Whitefield 2009).

In short, both countries now have the same conditions, but different ethnopolitical patterns. Estonia and Latvia are ideal cases to compare and pursue the source of ethnopolitical confrontations and accommodations.

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6 Latvia’s parliament ratified FCNM in Jun 2005, adding a definition of national minorities as “citizens of Latvia who differ from Latvians in terms of their culture, religion, or language, [whose families] have traditionally lived in Latvia for several generations, regard themselves as identifying with the state of Latvia and its society, and wish to maintain and develop their culture, religion or language.” “The addition of a specific definition is not unusual practice for states ratifying the Convention, nor is the non-recognition of non-citizens as separate national minorities. However, this definition in effect discounted Russians as a national minority (http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4963)”

7 An important point to note is that this difference does not reflect a lack of ethnic issues in Estonia or the existence of only one in Latvia. Rather, Estonia experiences ethnic issues even now as the Bronze Night riots in 2007 showed. In both countries, ethnic differences are apparent both socially and economically, even now. For details, see the argument in Part 2.
Part 1 Theory and Statistics
Chapter 2.
Theories: Ethnopolitics is About Interests

2.1 Literature on the Ontological Argument

The literature of ethnopolitics is truly vast, especially since the end of the Cold War, after which the world faced the rise of ethnic conflicts and ethnic antagonism. While some earlier works have argued that ethnic antagonism is essential for human beings, and ethnic confrontations in multiethnic, new countries are inevitable or natural (e.g., Geertz 1963), most current works agree that the concepts and situation of ethnicity have political or economic interest at their core. As a matter of first priority, I have to marshal and set the ontological argument about ethnicity and its effect on ethnopolitical conflicts.

The most common way of characterizing the debate on ethnopolitical literature is debate between “Primordialism” and “Constructivism.” Primordialist (sometimes they are referred to as essentialists) arguments have tended to present pessimistic views for political integration in multiethnic, multinational countries. Some primordialists argue that multinational countries are latently and inherently “defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict” (Smith 1965: xiii). Some also argue that ethnic antagonisms are deeply rooted (Furnivall 1948). Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) exemplify these lines of arguments, and they think multiethnic countries tend to be insurmountable to the threat of the democratic back down. Recent works on psychology have pointed out that people are driven by, and gain selfesteem through a feeling of belonging to a congenital group (Tajfel 1982). However, these arguments have two main weaknesses,
especially when we try to apply them to empirical arguments. First, these primordial arguments fail to explain inter-temporal variance within the same country. If ethnic antagonisms are always natural for human beings and multiethnic societies inherently fall into ethnic conflict, why have ethnic confrontations and conflicts risen and fallen at different times? If inter-ethnic antagonisms always exist in multiethnic democratic countries, how do we explain the lack of inter-ethnic confrontation, for example, in U.S.A., Belgium, New Zealand, and so on. Second, ethnic identities have never been a substantial entity. Ethnic identification and the domain of collective consciousness have been deeply constructed and dependent on mainstream discourses (Anderson 1983). In fact, the logic (or consciousness) of ethnicity has often been mobilized to pursue alternative aims.

The most current researches have paid attention to this aspect. The authors of those researches, constructivists (also known as instrumentalists), argued that ethnicity has no basis in nature, is constructed by social forces, and is a mask for a core or surrogate of real political or economic interests. Ethnicity does not have an objective existence and is socially constructed (Anderson 1983; Laitin 1986). They more or less have agreed that ethnopolitics is a result of the coordination of interests among some actors. Some include the international actor as the stakeholder of

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8 As Wilkinson (2004) found and argued, while Hindu and Muslim groups live in peace in some areas, they often clash in other areas in India. This argument also implies that inter-ethnic antagonism and the historical background of ethnic relations fails to explain the variance of ethnic relations.

9 Some argue that constructivists and instrumentalists mean different things (e.g. Esman 2004, Varshney 2007). Constructivists emphasize that human perception toward ethnicity itself is highly constructed, and such artificial consciousness brings ethnic conflict. Instrumentalists emphasize that ethnicity does not bring directly conflict about, but it is used as a surrogate of economic/political conflict. Constructivists tend to focus on a long-term fluctuation of ethnic groups while instrumentalists tend to focus on a short-term fluctuation of ethnic conflict. Both of them commonly deny the idea that ethnic conflicts are neither deterministic nor fatalistic, and emphasize that those are created by the human beings, especially political or economic elites. In that viewpoint, in contrast with primordialistic arguments, they are often treated in the same ontological arguments’ group.
ethnopolitical confrontation. 10 Regarding this point, many scholars have argued that “leaders strategically manipulate ethnicity” (Varshney 2007) for the sake of extracting state resources, which leads to ethnic violence (Bates 1974; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Hechter 1986; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Lemarchand 2004; Collier et al. 2005; Cederman and Girarding 2007). From this viewpoint, ethnicity is an instrument to satisfy the leaders’ “greed,” and ultimately there is insufficient distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic violence. Here, the source of ethnic conflict is not the multiethnic situation itself, but the uneven distribution of political or economic resources among ethnic groups, or distorted power relations among them. Multiethnicity itself does not bring ethnic conflict. However, if there is disproportionality or relative deprivation of economic or political resources and access that is connected with the ethnicity, it will bring ethnic confrontations (Rothschild 1981; Brown 1993; Brass 1985; Budyta-Budzynska 1998; Wolff 2004; Barany 2005). In fact, Fearon and Laitin verified that the probability of a high-intensity ethnic war is highly dependent on each country’s wealth (GDP/capita), whereas there is no correlation between the probability of ethnic war and ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Laitin 2007; Fearon et al. 2007). It’s

10 Jenne argued that the intensity of international intervention from “minorities’ motherland” plays a crucial role in minorities’ activities and the host government’s responses. Many works pointed out the role of the EU (as well as the Council of Europe [CoE] and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE]) in defining the situation of ethnopolitics in the EU area. I agree that this perspective accounts for some inter-temporal variance in the same countries but completely underestimates the domestic factor. In practice, we cannot explain well the variance, even in CEE countries: the Magyar in Romania and Slovakia, and the Russians in Estonia and Latvia. While the former two and the latter two cases have the same “mother country’s” intervention (Hungary and Russia, respectively) and international intervention from European organizations, respectively, the situation of ethnopolitics in Slovakia and Romania and Estonia and Latvia has been different. International exogenous factors must be treated as supplemental ones, whereas Gurr visualized the relation between many factors and ethnopolitical movement in their works, he also summarize that international factors (whether recommendation or intervention) as supplemental one. (Gurr 2000: 70)  We must pay attention to domestic actors’ behaviors.
because country’s wealth increases the opportunity cost of ethnic rebel and repression, and grasping political hegemony is “the best business” in a poorer country. In other words, violent confrontation with resorting to ethnic mobilization does not “pay”. This instrumentalist’s argument verified that the multiethnic situation itself must not be the origin of ethnic conflict, and power elites’ struggle for resources is the real origin of ethnic conflict, and ethnic discourses are just masks for them. Of course, there have been some critiques of the instrumentalist argument. Some instrumentalist arguments treat ethnicity as a false consciousness, and their conceptual view make an impression that there have not been any ethnic conflicts in the world. In reality, many ethnopolitical conflicts have occurred with struggles relating to language, religion, and ways of life which are tightly connected with the ethnic group itself. Some constructivist arguments have omitted some social realities about ethnic conflicts that have occurred.

Both the primordialist view and the constructivist/instrumentalist view have drawbacks and advantages. However, considering the relation between the ethnicity and conflicts, it is appropriate to say that constructivist arguments have some advantages over primordialist arguments, because primordialist arguments cannot explain the variance about ethnopolitical conflict in multiethnic countries, but constructivists argument suggest that such variance could explain the existence of political or economic conflict behind it. Of course, we cannot fully rely on the Constructivist view, as noted above.

In this point, Hale pointed out the specialty of ethnic identification and its effect on political behavior. Although he admitted that ethnicity could be the political catapult of a political entrepreneur and that ethnicity could more or less be an
epiphenomenal aspect of conflict, he gave more importance to the function of ethnicity than to those of other social categorizations. Hale emphasized that “ethnicity is about uncertainty-reduction, whereas ethnic politics is about run-of-the-mill interests” (Hale 2008: 77). It is the same for ordinary electorates in democratic countries. Changing ethnic policies is likely to be treated as advantageous or disadvantageous treatments for specific ethnic groups’ daily life interests. In practice, ethnicity is a great mobilizer compared with the other social categories, especially in a newly democratized country. Ethnicity is just one social category, but it is the social category that has a great mobilization power. We cannot ignore this point if we talk about ethnicity and its effect on the political process.

The greatest common understanding about ethnicity and its effect on ethnopoli
tical conflict must be the following. Although ethnicity itself or identification with ethnic groups is artificial and greatly constructed, ethnicity will self-reinforce its functional aspect as one of the important social categories by being accepted by people as a given social group. In this regard, ethnicity does not necessarily bring conflict. Ethnicity brings conflict when and where political actors use, mobilize, or re-construct ethnicity as a catapult, medium, or surrogate for their profit, and people understand that ethnicity directly impacts their important interests.

This view gives us an important perspective. First, although democratic leaders hardly exploit and extract a state’s wealth under democratic government and governance, they always want to attract more support and secure more votes from their electorate to maintain and increase their political power. Second, as recent works teach us, mobilization based on ethnicity is a powerfully effective means of garnering electoral support, especially in newly democratized countries (Chandra 2004, 2005;
Birnir 2007). Ethnic information is more visible than other social-belongings’ information like class or occupation, as people determine ethnicity by spoken language, skin color, facial features, and clothes. We must pay attention to the political elite’s electoral incentives in analyzing ethnic relations in democratic countries. The socio-demographic arguments of primordialists do not explain the inter-ethnic antagonism or accommodation in light of cross-sectional or inter-temporal comparisons. Rather, competition for power resources by elites that exploit the ethnopolitical discourses must be observed and analyzed. Analysis based on political incentives will explain the variance of inter-ethnic relations in democratic countries, because the conventional political struggles in democratic countries are the struggle for the electorates.

2.2 Theory on Ethnopolitical Relations

In terms of the dynamics of conflict, the relationship between specific ethnic groups and the government is very important. The pattern of ethnic relations in democratic (multiethnic) countries is a “complex dialectic of state nation-building (state demands on minorities) and minority rights (minority demands on the state)” (Kymlicka 2001: 49). Here, state governments are usually controlled by the ethnic majority group. In that case, “the relationship between minority and host-state coincides with that between minority and host-nation” (Wolff 2004: 7). Of course, an ethnic minority elite sometimes influences the government and affects its policy formation, but such opportunities are usually relatively limited (because they are the “minority”). Normally, the ethnic majority group forms the government and determines the
nation-building policies. If the relationship between minority and host-state [government] coincides with that between minority and host-nation [ethnic majorities], then “[t]hus ethnic conflict can occur either as group-state conflict, i.e. conflict between the minority and the institutions of its host-state [government], or as inter-group conflict, i.e. between the minority and its host-nation [ethnic majorities]” (Wolf 2004, 8). There are two ideal patterns of ethnic relations in this dialectic. In a confrontational ethnopolitical pattern, governments adopt a highly demanding and ethnocentric citizenship policy, language policy, education policy, and other similar policies toward the minority group. In return, the ethnic minority group demands that the government remedy their status by ethnic party representation and mass demonstrations. In an accommodative ethnopolitical pattern, governments adopt a minority-friendly citizenship policy, language policy, and education policy, and the ethnic minority group does not demand their specific interests.

To analyze the ethnopolitical relations, we must start with the consideration of ethnic minorities’ political behavior, because it is a function of the ethnic majority and the government’s behavior.

\[\text{11 This is the very structure to which Lijphart (1977) and its followers (Consociational schools) have paid attention. They set the assumption that ethnic majority groups’ interest always will be represented structurally under the democracy’s majoritarian rule, and they emphasize the utility of institutional design. For example, introduction of PR electoral system, minority special seats, or the other privileged treatment for minority representation help the policy formation which has never repressed overwhelmingly the minority interests, and it reduces the instability of democracy in multiethnic countries. Of course, I admit that these arguments are valid and effective (as Friedman 2007 applied this type of argument into the CEE countries’ cases), but I do not argue in detail here about the effect of institutional design of democracy. Because, technically, such arguments have been already done by many works. More importantly, the fundamental question is, there are clear variances in ethnopolitical pattern even among the unitary nation-state countries.}\]
2.2.1 Minorities Demands on Governments

“[C]ommunal groups often pursue their interests through electoral politics, lobbying, or control of local or regional governments. These are the strategies of conventional politics” (Gurr 2000: 27). While in some countries, ethnic minority voters cast their vote for ethnic minority parties to voice and represent their interests in parliament, other countries do not let ethnic parties win in parliament. Sometimes in some countries, ethnic minorities organize mass demonstrations outside parliament to express their dissatisfaction, but this does not occur in other countries or at other times. Such variances exist even in many multinational countries. What factors determine this variance? The key factor is the government’s treatment of minority groups. It is possible that ethnic minority groups who are excluded from government and are repressed resort to political protest inside and outside parliament. It is reasonable to assume that ethnic minority groups are not irrational or always inherently disposed to ethnic protest action. Many works have agreed with and verified such a perspective (Gurr 2000; Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004, 2009; Nakai 2009). “Perhaps they [ethnic minorities] deem participation in politics unnecessary for their survival and well-being… Ethnic groups forego[sic] political action because they harbor no major grievance, because they are reasonably satisfied with the status quo” (Esman 1994: 17).

When they choose to protest inside parliament, they will cast their vote for the ethnic parties. In terms of ethnic party representation, ethnic groups remained solid societal groups after the atomization in the communist era, and minorities tend to cast their ballot for ethnic minority parties (Kitschelt et al 1999). At the same time, ethnic representations are never “intransigent,” and it is less likely that ethnic minorities will
cast a ballot for ethnic minority parties when the importance of ethnic cleavages defined by governmental policy or ethnic attraction is low (Birnir 2007). Ethnic minorities are dogmatic, nor are they parochial voters who always intend to cast their ballot for ethnic minority parties to represent their ethnic interests. Rather, ethnic minority voters are as rational as ordinary voters. Chandra (2004, 2009) theorized that sometimes minorities will abandon their votes for ethnic parties and seek other parties that would contribute to their political and material interests. In short, ethnic minority voters behave very strategically, and not ideologically. They will react to a government’s policies and its changes, and will try to prevent their vote from being wasted when deciding if they should vote for small ethnic parties.

Such strategic behavior is not limited to voting. Ethnic minorities may also protest outside parliament to show their dissatisfaction. Ethnic minorities sometimes organize demonstrations outside parliament, but this has not happened in all countries, and not every year in multinational countries. Apparently, there is no need for minorities to protest if a government sufficiently takes into account the interests of ethnic minorities.\(^ {12} \) When and where a government does not repress the interests of ethnic minorities, minorities do not have to cast their ballot for an ethnic minority party to represent their interests, nor do they have to voice their dissatisfactions by mass demonstration.

In a nutshell, ethnic minorities’ behaviors and attitudes toward the government is a function of the ethnic policies carried out by the government, which mainly consists of ethnic majority political elites. By understanding the determinant that defines the

\(^ {12} \) Gurr (2000) argued that ethnic minority groups decide to mobilize collective action only when they (1) face collective disadvantages, (2) lose their political autonomy, and (3) experience repressions. In short, they do not protest when they are not alienated from the society and government.
type of government ethnic policy, we could then obtain the determinant that explains the variance in patterns of ethnopolitics (Figure 2.1).

**Figure 2.1: Ethnopolitical Flows**

2.2.2 Government Demands on the Ethnic Minority

In practice, governments in newly democratized countries often put the ethnic majority groups’ interests before those of the ethnic minority group. After democratization and disengagement from “internationalism” imposed by communism’s dogma, every country had to reconstruct and progress with their own nation building. This process of nation building inevitably, more or less, excludes and represses the interests and the way of life of ethnic minority groups. For example, if a government tries to implement a single-language educational system in the hope that every citizen will become fluent in that language, this policy inevitably (intentionally or unintentionally) must repress the right to be educated in the minority’s mother tongue, at one level or another. However, such repression occurs not only because the government is trying to establish a well-constructed nation-state, but also because it is
trying to garner votes from the electorate. Birnir (2007) pointed out that “[i]n some cases, government may also use an antagonistic relationship with a minority to deflect attention from domestic problems such as a sluggish economy and to gain support among nationalists” (121). Thus, we have to pay attention to the electoral incentives of political elites in government, who intend to gain and construct electoral support. Keeping in mind the gain and the loss of votes in elections, they make and implement ethnic policies. If we assume that political elites in the government consider only electoral victories when they formulate ethnic policies, we could treat the government’s ethnic policies as an equilibrium of merit calculation. Every political party latently does this calculation, but moderate conservatives’ actions must be paid attention to account for the variance of government’s ethnic policies, since these are key players.

Generally speaking, every country has passionate advocates and hard-line opponents of minority rights protection. Every country has pro-minority oriented political parties and anti-minority nationalist parties, more or less. Between the minority advocates and the nationalists, moderate parties, which are usually called centre-rightist parties in real politics, have a key role in shaping government policy. If moderate centre-rightist parties, which take a center position in the policy spectrum of ethnic issues, agree with the proposals from minority advocates, government policies become less repressive for the minority. On the other hand, if moderate conservatives do not support minority protection and remain sympathetic to nation-building projects, government’s policies tend to be repressive. Hence, the calculations and decision making of moderate conservatives play a key role in shaping ethnic policies.

Under a unitary state’s nation-building project, when do they agree on the
pro-minority policy proposals? And when do they disagree on the pro-minority policies and agree to the nation-building national project? In other words, when, and under what conditions, do intermediate centre-rightist increase their electoral base by supporting pro-minority policies? And when, and under what conditions, do they win more votes by repressing minority interests? Simply stated, an intermediate moderate agrees to the pro-minority policy when its anticipated gains from the minority electorate in future elections are greater than its loss of the ethnic majority’s vote due to its support for the pro-minority policy. On the other hand, when the loss of electoral support among the ethnic majority (existing supporters) will be higher than the gain, they will not agree to the pro-minority policies, and will instead help the nation-building project.

As this paper argues in the literature review section, many researches pointed out that ethnic consciousness is readily mobilized by political leaders. Thus, the ethnopolitical issue is one of the most important issues in a post-revolutionary, newly democratized situation. This means that every intermediate centre-rightist political party has a chance to make political linkages with ethnic minority groups and increase their votes by showing their accommodative attitude toward minority groups. However, of course, they also take the ethnocentric backlash into consideration when they make a decision about ethnic policy. Centre-right conservative parties fear receiving effective criticism from other rival political parties. Most electorates do not have perfect information about each party’s decision on ethnopolitical issues. Therefore, criticisms from other rival parties play a key role here. The more rival parties exist in parliament, the more criticism will appear at the time of the next elections, and the more electorates will switch their vote for the other conservative
parties. Although each centre-rightist party can control its credit claiming toward ethnic minority groups if they agree to the pro-minority policy change, no centre-rightist party can control the criticism from other rival parties and the other electorates’ disaffection if they agree to the pro-minority policy change. For example, if there is only one conservative political party, and if no other conservatives (and nationalist) did not exist, the centre-rightist conservative party will not be criticized by any rival parties if they agree to the pro-minority policies. On the contrary, if there are many centre-rightist and nationalist parties (I will call them “conservative camps”), they will face harsh criticism from them after they agree to pro-minority policies and many existing supporters affected by this criticism can vote for the other, rival-parties. This is effective criticism. Neither party can predict their rival’s strategies in advance, but the probability of being criticized (and losing votes) by their rival will increase as the number of rival parties increases. Then, as the number of conservative camps increases, the more parties fear the possible (or latent) effective criticism from their political rivals.

To wrap up my theory, conservative political parties play a key role in deciding each government’s policy toward minority groups, caught up in the middle between pro-minority and anti-minority camps, as it were. The key player centre-rightist parties encounter the trade-off between gaining the minority’s votes and losing those of the majority. They fear the critiques and backlash of their rivals, and hesitate to agree to or support pro-minority policies when and where the conservative camp is fragmented. That party system then adopts many nation-building first policies, and minority groups protest against them. This situation results in confrontational ethnopolitics. On the contrary, when and where the conservative camp is unified, they
do not have to fear the effective backlash from their political rivals, and have the opportunity to agree/support pro-minority policies to increase their votes from ethnic minorities. That party system may then adopt pro-minority accommodation, and the minority group mutes its protest against the government. This situation results in accommodative ethnopolitics. The hypothesis of the research is as follows.

**Hypothesis**

*United conservatives lead to accommodative ethnopolitics, and fragmented conservatives lead to confrontational ethnopolitics (in newly democratized unitary states).*

The following section will verify this argument with statistical analysis in this part, and in-depth case studies in Part 2.
Chapter 3.
Statistics: The Effect of Party System on Ethnopolitics

3.1 Statistical Analysis

This section provides quantitative statistical analysis to verify the argument. The theoretical model of the research predicts a strong causal relationship between the party system and the pattern of ethnopolitics. When the party system among the conservatives’ camp is fragmented, they hesitate to support pro-minority policies and sometimes have to demonstrate to the electorate their overt loyalty to the national interest so as not to be beaten by their political rivals. Thus, the government does not adopt affirmative policies to support ethnic minorities, and ethnic minorities protest inside and outside of parliament. This results in a confrontational pattern of ethnopolitics. On the other hand, when the party system in the conservatives’ camp is united or only moderately separated, political parties in this camp do not have to resort to ethnic out-bidding in order to escape electoral defeat. Rather, they will grasp the chance to increase the number of votes they garner from the ethnic minority electorate. This results in an accommodative ethnopolitical pattern in a conventional democratic political process. This section will show the causal relationship between these two variables.

First, it is necessary to operationalize the pattern of ethnopolitics and to create an index that represents the intensity of political confrontation according to ethnic
relationships as dependent variables. Next, this research prepares a well-constructed independent variable that represents the fragmentation of conservative political parties in a party system. Finally, this research analyzes the causal effect between this new independent variable and dependent variables.

The unit of analysis will be country-electoral term data. For example, country A held elections in 1992, 1996, and 2000, providing two units of analysis—countryA9296 and countryA9600. While every country has more than two ethnic minority groups in its territory, this research mainly focuses on the relationship between the government supported by the majority group and the largest minority group in each country. As mentioned in the introduction, this research set the CEE countries as the targets of analysis, because they have similar historical, international, and domestic situations. The inclusion criteria for countries in the analysis is that they be democratic, EU members, and unitary states. As already noted, 10 countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria—satisfied these conditions. The largest minority group in each country just after democratization was as follows: Russians in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,\(^{13}\) Germans in Poland, Roma in the Czech Republic,\(^{14}\) and Hungary, Magyars in Slovakia and Romania, Serb-Croats in Slovenia, and Turks in Bulgaria (table 3.1). Because of the end/change of the coding rules of the MAR project in 2004, this statistical analysis confines the term of analysis to the period

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\(^{13}\) Recently and traditionally, the largest minority group in Lithuania has been Polish. However, according to the 1989 census, the Russian minority (9.4%) was larger than the Polish minority at that time (7.0%).

\(^{14}\) Officially, the number of Roma in the Czech Republic is smaller than that of Slovaks (0.3% and 3.1%, respectively, in the 1991 census). However, Roma tend to list their ethnicity as “Czech” or be registered as “Slovaks” in the census; the EU estimated that the true number of Roma in the Czech Republic was around 300,000 in 2001 (Elster et al. 1998: 258; Clark 2004). This number is higher than that of Slovaks in the country in 2001 (193,190). Hence, the present study treats Roma as the largest minority group in the Czech Republic.
from 1990 until around 2004.

Table 3.1: Major Ethnic Minority Groups in CEE Countries and their Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Major minority groups after the 1990s</th>
<th>Demographic composition (census year)</th>
<th>When did they start to live there? *</th>
<th>Do they have kin state?</th>
<th>Where do they live reside many? [major cities or areas]</th>
<th>Geographical cohesion (Gini Index on NUTS-3 level)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Russian (Russophone)</td>
<td>30.3% ('89)</td>
<td>1908-1950</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Capital and eastern area [Tallinn, Ida-virum]</td>
<td>.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Russian (Russophone)</td>
<td>34.0% ('89)</td>
<td>1908-1950</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Capital and eastern area [Riga, Daugavpils, Rezekne]</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Russian (Russophone)</td>
<td>9.4% ('89)</td>
<td>1908-1950</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Capital and southeastern area [Vilnius, Utena]</td>
<td>.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>German (including Silesian)</td>
<td>1.0% ('02)</td>
<td>no record/indigenous</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Southern area [Opole]</td>
<td>.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>2.9% ('00)</td>
<td>before 1800</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Northwestern area [Karlovycvary, Usu-nad-Labem]</td>
<td>.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Hungarian (Magyar)</td>
<td>10.8% ('91)</td>
<td>no record/indigenous</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Southwestern area [Nitra, Trnava]</td>
<td>.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>1.8% ('91)</td>
<td>before 1800</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Northeastern area [Borsod, Szabolcs]</td>
<td>.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Serbo-Croat Speaker</td>
<td>5.2% ('91)</td>
<td>1950–</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Capital and southern area [Ljubljana, Ohun-kraaka]</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Hungarian (Magyar)</td>
<td>11.7% ('92)</td>
<td>no record/indigenous</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Central area and western area [Harhita, Covasna, Satu-Mare]</td>
<td>.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>9.4% ('92)</td>
<td>before 1800</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Eastern area [Kardzhali, Razgrad, Silistra]</td>
<td>.597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to MAR question number GC13 (“Length of group’s residence”) and the author’s comprehension
** Calculated by the author, using each country’s census around the 2000s. Because of the lack of data, the index for Poland is based on NUTS-2 population data.

3.2 Dependent Variables

It is needed to combines several numerical indicators into one index that represents a situation of ethnopoltics. To illustrate and grasp the relationship between the government and minorities, this research uses two indicators that represent governments’ ethnic policies and two indicators that represent the minorities’ responses toward the governments. I see (1) political discrimination against minority groups by governments, (2) language restrictions imposed on minority groups by governments, (3) the share of parliamentary seats held by ethnic minority parties, and (4) the number of mass demonstrations, rallies, and protests by ethnic minorities.
One way to repress ethnic minorities’ activities is to restrict their political rights. By depriving ethnic minorities of the right to vote, run for election, or work in public affairs, governments are able to exclude the influence of ethnic minorities from their policy making. Such a treatment seems to alienate minorities. On the other hand, governments can guarantee ethnic minorities the same rights of political participation enjoyed by the ethnic majority group; it is appropriate to define such a governmental attitude as an integration-oriented one. This research uses the Minority At Risk (MAR) project’s index for this aspect. POLDIS scores in the MAR index represent evaluations of each country’s policies with regard to political discrimination for each minority group and each year. A POLDIS score of 0 means that the government never restricts the political participation of ethnic minorities and has a remedial policy for minority groups; a POLDIS score of 4 (the maximum score) means that a government restricts the political participation of ethnic minorities who legally live in its territory with high-intensity exclusionary policies. This research uses this indicator to operationalize political discrimination.

Governments are also able to restrict or guarantee the activities of ethnic minorities in the field of language. If a dominant ethnic group uses language as a basis for the integration of ethnic minorities, then language might be a base for a political and linguistic conflict that can escalate into an ethnic conflict. “Language is the most frequent basis of division and conflict within multinational states, even where it is not the only or the main source of group identity, it may be a major cause of conflict between group” (MacIver 1999: 9). Some governments restrict the use of minority languages in public affairs, the economy, and even in private spheres, and some try to reduce minority language education. Other governments, on the contrary, permit the
expansion of minority language education and allow minority languages to be official languages of the state. The MAR dataset contains indicators evaluating the situation with regard to minority languages. The MAR’s CULPO2 and CULPO3 indicators evaluate the relative situations surrounding “use of language” and “language education,” respectively. A score of 0 on both indicators means that there is no repression of the minority language, and score 3 on both indicators means that the government officially represses it. I summed these two scores into one indicator with a range of 0–6. Here, a score of 6 means that the government completely represses the use of a minority language and the right to education in the minority language.

When ethnic minorities challenge the government and ethnic majority group, there are two ways to express their dissatisfaction. One way is by letting ethnic parties represent them in parliament and provide input according to their ethnic interests in parliamentary debates. Defining an ethnic party on the basis of several datasets, we can understand the share of seats held by ethnic parties representing the largest minority groups’ interests. The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Bern University Comparative Politics Dataset III (CPDS-III) are suitable to define the party families. I do not observe privileged seats for ethnic minorities, like the one seat reserved for an Italian in the Slovenian parliament, because these seats are perpetually ensured in parliaments, regardless of governmental policies or the dissatisfaction of minorities. It seems that ethnic minorities cast their votes for ethnic parties after they experience dissatisfaction with the governments’ policies; hence, I observed the share of ethnic seats in parliament at t + 1 electoral time. For example, if some country held elections in 1992 and 1996, I consider the government’s policies between 1992 and 1996 and the ethnic parties’ share of seats in 1996. The target of analysis is the largest
ethnic minority group in each country.

Alternatively, minorities can organize demonstrations, rallies, and mass protests to express their dissatisfaction with government (and society). This research again uses the qualitative MAR dataset to summarize the history of events with regard to ethnic minorities; the dataset contains many descriptions of demonstrations, rallies, and mass protests. I count their number and use it as an indicator of ethnic minorities’ protests outside of parliament (see appendix for details). It seems that these numbers are not perfect for enumerating all demonstrations, rallies, and mass protests for each country, but still good enough, because one dataset counts the number of demonstrations under a single, unitary rule. It is appropriate to compare cross-sectional and inter-temporal variances using this data.
3.2.1 Creating a general Dependent Variable

Table 3.2 summarizes each indicator in each analysis unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Discrimination*</td>
<td>Language Discrimination**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governments’ political discrimination toward the largest minority group (liberal: 0 – 4: restrictive), based on MAR’s POLDIS score.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Governments’ language discrimination toward the largest minority group (liberal: 0 – 6: restrictive), based on MAR’s CULPO2 score and CULPO3 score.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a strong, co-linear positive relationship between government repression of minorities and minority protests against governments. For statistical analysis, we need to generate a single indicator that represents the ethnic confrontation. Employing principal component analysis (PCA), this research synthesizes four indicators present above into one index that represents ethnic confrontation and political dispute in each...
country and each time period (see appendix for the results of PCA). The first principal component is positively related with every indicator, so it seems that this first component represents the intensity of ethnic confrontation between governments and minorities. This factor is henceforth called the “Ethnopolitical Confrontation Index” (EPCI). The EPCI will be used as a dependent variable in the following statistical analysis.

The MAR project lacks an evaluation/score for Slovenia, but many works have pointed out there has been systematic, low-intensity discrimination against former Yugoslavian population (mainly Serbo-Croatian-speaking) minorities in Slovenia. Hence, I create an original index for Slovenia similar to that employed in the MAR project.

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15 This analysis obtains a component that has positive relationships with every indicator; this also verifies the assumption made in the thesis that the repressive policies of governments bring about the protests of ethnic minorities. Statistical treatment is also important to verify this idea.

16 While the Slovenian government has given the Italian and Hungarian languages privileged status, it has not done so for other languages, including Serbo-Croatian. Then, “[the latter’s] speakers do not receive education in their own language” (Mercator Research Center, Minority Language in Slovenian Education [http://www.mercator-research.eu/minority-languages/language-factsheets/minority-languages-in-education-in-slovenia/]). Therefore, I assign a score of 1 for language discrimination because some lack the right to be educated in their language. Regarding political discrimination, the “erased” problem has been severe in Slovenia. Just after independence from the former Yugoslavia, the Slovenian government intentionally erased the register of former Yugoslavian (mainly Serbian) residents from their public register, and approximately 20,000 people were thereby deprived of their citizenship (Zorn 2003, 2009). Apparently, in the early 1990s, the Slovenian government quietly condoned this situation. It is therefore appropriate to assign a score of 4 for political discrimination in Slovenia in the early 1990s. After the constitutional courts’ rulings in 1999 and 2003, the government started to re-register the majority of erased people, but the application window was open for only three months. Now, approximately 6,000 people remain deprived of their citizenship. During the current term in office, the government has tried to remediate the Serbo-Croatian erasure problem, but there remains systematic political discrimination. Thus, it is appropriate to assign a score of 1 for political discrimination.
3.3 Independent Variables

To estimate the fragmentation of conservatives, we need to (1) operationalize the “conservatives” and (2) calculate the intensity of fragmentation in the conservatives’ camp.

In this research, party definitions are based on the definitions of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), and Bern University Comparative Political Data Set III (CPDS-III). The parties categorized as “nationalist” or “conservative” in these works were selected for analysis. Table 3.3 shows all of the parties in the conservative camps. Though some agrarian and economic liberal parties sometimes have conservative aspect with regard to ethnic issues, this tends to be highly dependent on country-specific context. We could not easily determine this aspect properly for all political parties in a large-N dataset. Hence, this analysis does not count the seats of these parties (instead, case studies in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 comprehensively deal with this aspect). For the large-N database, this analysis uses a minimum definition of conservative political leanings. Table 3.3 shows the list of conservative parties used for statistical analysis (see the detailed numbers of seats in the appendix).

One exception is Poland’s POC [Civic Centre Alliance] (1991). Although the CMP treated POC as conservatives, there was some confusion regarding the alliance between POC and its core member, PC [Centre Alliance], because these two different organizations had very similar names and abbreviations. PC had some conservative aspects, as indicated by the fact that its leader (Kaczyński) later formed the nationalist PiS, but POC itself did not have a specific party affiliation. In practice, CPDS-III defines POC as simply an “alliance”, which means that it did not have specific policy leanings or affiliation, while other alliances (such as AWS) are defined as conservative ones. At any rate, if we include POC as conservative camp, the results of statistical analysis maintain their implications and robustness. The correlation coefficient (as is in section 3.4) is .419 (p < .01), and the country-specific correlation in Poland is .843. Whether or not POC is included in Poland’s conservative camp does not affect my argument critically.
To estimate the intensity of fragmentation among conservative camps, I use the basic Herfindahl index. This index is also known as the Laakso-Taagepera index\(^{18}\) for evaluation of the effective number of parties in parliament. By counting the share of all seats held by conservative parties in the conservative camp \(P_i (i \in 1, 2…n)\) and calculating
\[
N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i^2},
\]
we can obtain the effective number of conservative parties \(N\) in each period and country. For example, if a parliament has only one conservative party, the effective number of conservative parties in that parliament is 1. If a parliament has conservative party A with 15 seats and conservative party B with 10 seats, the effective number of conservative parties in that parliament is around 1.92.\(^{19}\) Please see the appendix for the detailed number of seats won by conservative camps and fragmentation among conservatives.

\(^{18}\) See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for details.

\(^{19}\) \(1 / (0.6^2 + 0.4^2)\)
3.4 Preliminary Results

First, I examine the preliminary correlation between independent variable (fragmentation of conservative camp) and dependent variable (EPCI) without the control variables. Figure 3.1 shows the scatterplot, which represents fragmentation of conservatives on the X-axis and confrontation in ethnopolitics on the Y-axis. From this figure, we can see the correlation between the two variables.

Figure 3.1: The Relationship between Fragmentation of Conservatives and EPCI

![Scatterplot showing correlation between fragmentation of conservatives and EPCI score.]

Apparently, where and when fragmentation among conservatives is high, ethnopolitical situations tend to be confrontational. The coefficient of correlation between Fragmentation of Conservative camp and EPCI score is .482 (p < .01). This
correlation is statistically significant. Slovakia’s cases (sk9294 and sk9498) deviated slightly from the mean but show inter-temporal correlation within the Slovakian cases. Accommodative ethnopolitical cases in which conservative parties are united are concentrated on the left side of the figure. Especially, where and when the effective number of conservative parties is 1, which means that there is only one dominant conservative party, the EPCI score is very low. Of course, a low number of effective conservative parties does not directly indicate a low level of support for conservatives. For example, the level of fragmentation of conservative camp in case bg9194 is 1, but at that time, the Bulgarian conservative economic liberal party SDS won 110 / 240 seats and became the ruling party. Hungary’s effective number of conservative parties during the period 1990–1994 was 1.54, quite a low figure, but at that time, the conservatives controlled the majority of parliament (208 / 386 seats).

These tendencies are also found in inter-temporal variances (Figure 3.2).
In a country where the historical background, the type of ethnic minority questions, and national identities are the same, inter-temporal changes to the party system explain each country’s inter-temporal variances in the ethnopolitical pattern. The results of the research indicate that all 10 CEE countries share this tendency. For example, Latvia’s parliament had moderate effective number of conservatives in 1993–1995, and its EPCI also had a middling level. As Latvia’s effective number of conservative increased in the late 1990s, the ethnopolitical situation became a highly confrontational one. Then, when the effective number of conservative parties in Latvia decreased in the 2000s, ethnopolitical confrontation relaxed slightly.

These correlations do not reflect that confrontational ethnopolitical situations

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20 The coefficients of correlation in each country are following: Bulgaria .928, Czech Republic .609, Estonia .958, Hungary .921, Latvia .641, Lithuania .522, Poland .714, Romania .616, Slovakia .664, and Slovenia .354. All countries had positive correlation coefficients between fragmentation of conservatives and EPCI scores. It is not appropriate to consider p-values here, because the sample size for each country is quite low (three or four).
cause fragmentation in each conservative camp. My causal assumption is true if we fail to find significant correlations between the ethnopolitical situations at times t - 1 and the fragmentation of conservative parties at times t. Correlation itself does not provide information about the temporal anteroposterior relationship between two variables. Therefore, here, I check two viable correlations: 1) that between fragmentation of a conservative camp at time t and change in EPCI from time t - 1 to time t (our hypothesis); and 2) that between EPCI at time t and the change in fragmentation of a conservative camp from time t - 1 to time t. The results are the following.

Table 3.4: Correlation Test Regarding Causal Anteroposterior Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Change of EPCI</th>
<th>Rate of Change in Fragmentation of Conservatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(significant in 5% level)</td>
<td>(.453) (insignificant)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As table 3.4 shows, there is a statistically significant correlation between the fragmentation of conservatives and the rate of change of EPCI, while the correlation supporting the rival hypothesis is not significant. In other words, fragmentation among conservative camps is the cause of EPCI results; EPCI is not the cause of fragmentation among conservative camps. Therefore, the rival hypothesis about the causal relationship between fragmentation in conservative camps and EPCI is rejected.
3.5 Controlling for other variables

We have already seen the correlations between fragmentation of conservatives and EPCI and verified that there is not just a correlation but also a causal relationship between these two variables. However, there are two possible rival hypotheses here. First, some might contend that the aggregated share of seats held by conservative parties is more important than the fragmentation of conservatives. They might claim that the more often conservative parties win seats in parliament, the more likely their governments will be to adopt confrontational ethnopolitics. To capture and control for this effect, this analysis estimates the total number of seats held by conservatives during each electoral period in CEE countries. Second, some might say that the effective number of conservative camps is simply a proxy for the overall effective number of political parties in parliament. They might claim that this research mistakenly finds the relationship between polarization of parliament and ethnopolitical confrontation. To capture and control for this effect, this research calculates the LT index for all electoral results in CEE countries.

To appropriately determine the effects and significance of the variables mentioned above, we also need to control for effects specific to individual countries. This research addresses this issue in two ways. First, we employ three country-specific variables that might represent the features of each country’s ethnic minority situation (as shown in Table 3.1): (1) the proportion of each minority group population, (2) the residence newcomeriness of each ethnic minority group (ordinal: 1–6), and (3) the geographic cohesion of ethnic minority groups. Moreover, I added average GDP growth (in each term) as one of the control variables because some
might think that the government and politicians tend to mobilize ethnonationalistic discourses and use ethnic minorities as a scapegoat when and where economic situations are bad. This research incorporates these variables through the random effect model assuming that the other possible country-specific intercepts are generated stochastically. Second, I control for each country’s fixed effects with the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression model. I perform simple linear regression modeling using country-clustered standard robust error (CRSE). I are thereby able to obtain results that are robust against country-specific heteroskedasticity.

The results are as follows. I skip reporting the covariance and standard errors of the LSDVs in model 3.
The results show that only our hypothesis has good explanatory power for EPCI. The variable representing fragmentation of conservatives has a statistically significant (p < .05) positive effect in all of the tested models, whereas the other intraindividual variables do not explain the dependent variables at all. The results showed that economic growth does not affect the ethnopolitical situation directly. Some country-specific control variables show intuitive results. The higher the demographic ratio of an ethnic minority, the more confrontational ethnopolitics will exist in a conventional democratic process. Moreover, the longer an ethnic minority group has been living in a country, the more confrontational the ethnopolitical situation in the
country will be. At any rate, even without such country-specific (or problem-specific) effects, fragmentation of conservative political parties has a statistically significant effect on the variance in ethnopoli
tical confrontation in CEE countries.

This research succeeded in verifying the causal effect between fragmentation of conservatives and ethnopoli
tical confrontation. The analysis backs our hypothesis: where and when conservative camps are fragmented and segregated, such countries or cases tend to incite confrontational ethnopoli
tics. On the other hand, where and when conservative camps are united, such countries or cases tend to invite accommodative ethnopoli
tics. This effect exists cross-sectionally and inter-temporally irrespective of the share of seats held by conservatives or the polarization of parliaments.

Through the results of statistical analysis, this research has certified the causal effect between the IV and DV of the argument. The following sections illustrate the detailed causal process using specific case studies and verify that its processes are consistent with the theoretical argument of this research.
Part 2: Case Studies
Chapter 4.
The Baltic States as a Wonderland

Estonia and Latvia once were notoriously dubbed nations of “ethnic democracy” (Smith 1996, Linz and Stepan 1996, Smooha 2002) after the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. These countries granted certain rights only to ethnic Baltic people and their descendants and simultaneously restricted the way of life of Russian immigrants and its descendants. Estonia and Latvia appeared to adopt largely similar ethnopolitical policies. Indeed, while many scholars have paid attention to the differences between these two Baltic countries and neighboring Lithuania, this latter of which took a completely different stance toward the treatment of its ethnic minorities (Lane 2001), post-independence Estonia and Latvia have been widely grouped together. Practically, they have shared many similarities: in institutional design, socioeconomic situation, historical background, the nature of the ethnic minority problem, international relations with the EU and Russia, and so on. It is natural to think that these similarities have generated a political resemblance between these two Baltic countries.

However, nowadays, the ethnopolitical situations in Estonia and Latvia differ completely. Ethnopolitical relations in Estonia have accommodative features. Public policies toward the minority group have been relatively ethnically liberal (see Chapter 1), and ethnic minority Russian voters do not vote for their own ethnic parties. The government and cabinet do not overwhelmingly repress ethnic minorities generally, and the minorities do not engage in political movements to protest. On the contrary,
ethnopolitical confrontations remain salient in Latvia’s political scene even now. The support for the ethnic minority party in Latvia has increased and holds steady. Mass protest movements and public petitions by the Russian minorities have often occurred and have sometimes escalated to the point of being major, disruptive events. The Latvian government’s public policies have retained nationalist features.

Ethnopolitical relations are not heated in contemporary Estonia. The work of Lauristin and Vihammm (2009) shows that ethnic issues no longer feature as important topics in recent electoral campaigns and political debates. By contrast, in Latvia, as Zepa et al. (2005) pointed out, “[p]olitical parties still continue to have political confrontation in ethnopolitical issues, and they do not contribute to, but prevent integrations . . . In Latvia’s case, representatives of the political elite still continue to exploit/operate ethnicity to mobilize support for their own groups in elections. Thus, it becomes a main catalyst in promoting ethnic tensions.”

Estonia has developed accommodative ethnopolitical relations, while Latvia suffers a confrontational ethnopolitical situation. What has contributed to this difference? The theoretical sections of this thesis have argued that the status of conservative parties, and the party system broadly, matter. Before assessing the effect of party systems on ethnopolitical relations in Estonia and Latvia, it is more appropriate to characterize the precise ethnopolitical situations in both countries. This chapter shows how these two countries are, in fact, similar in a number of practical respects. This argument would suggest that seemingly viable alternative arguments (e.g. an historical explanation, demographic explanation, economic explanation, etc.)...
international intervention explanation, human discourse explanation or the like) cannot explain concretely and consistently the variance between these two Baltic countries.

4.1 How Different in Detail?

In fact, ethnopolitical relations in Estonia and Latvia bore true similarities until the end of the 1990s. The governments repressed ethnic minority rights in both political and language aspects, and ethnic minorities protested inside and outside the parliament. At this time, Estonia and Latvia sometimes were referred to as ethnic democracies (see Chapter 1), whose common tendencies were often explained by their similarities in historical, socioeconomic, or institutional aspects (particularly considering the latent differences when compared with Lithuania, their Baltic colleague). However, this thesis emphasizes the differences between Estonia and Latvia, ethnopolitically speaking.

Beginning in the late 1990s, Estonian government policy gradually became more moderate and Russian minorities’ political resistance has not escalated since then. At least in the political sphere, ethnic confrontation all but disappeared in Estonia except for certain isolated incidents. Lauristin and Viialmm (2009) argue that the political agenda in Estonia has changed over time, pointing out that the presence of ethnic issues has gradually diminished. The political agenda changed with the 2003 and 2007 general elections, when none of the parties relied on ethnic mobilization via the promotion of minority interests. Although the ethnic majority-minority problem is not yet solved in the society of Estonia, political relations in Estonia have appeared much more integrated compared to the situation in Latvia. The Estonian government
nowadays has adopted moderately conservative citizenship and language policies toward ethnic minorities, and recently Russian minorities have not expressed their dissatisfaction by public protest movements or petitions to parliament.

On the contrary, Latvia exhibits a confrontational ethnopolitical pattern even now. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, although the government reluctantly modified some ethnic policies due to external pressures from the EU, the OSCE, and NATO, among others, Latvian public policies against ethnic minority groups remained nationalist. As noted in the introductory chapter, the dataset MIPEX codes Latvia’s public policies towards minority peoples as the strictest in the EU. Voting rights in local elections have never been granted for noncitizen Russians in Latvia (while Estonia granted voting rights for noncitizen Russians). The government intervened in the private sector labor market, banning Russians not fluent in Latvian from getting a job in nearly 1,300 private sector posts (Woolfson 2009: 961). Facing these vast deprivations under the “regime of discrimination” (Hughes 2005; Woolfson 2009), Russian minorities have kept active in political confrontation. Several Russian political parties have won seats in parliament, and they have mobilized rallies, demonstrations, and movements.

Contemporary Estonian and Latvian public restrictions directed toward Russian minorities include the following, respectively. Citizenship laws demand five years’ residency for Russian adults in Estonia, compared to ten years’ residency in Latvia; language fluency is necessary to acquire citizenship in both countries, but Estonia grants citizenship to stateless children without any language test, while a language certification is needed in Latvia. Electoral laws allow someone who is not fluent in Estonian to run for national and local elections in Estonia, yet fluency in the national
language is required of all Latvian candidates. Language laws restrict the language that can be spoken at work and the level of fluency in Estonian that is required for speech in public and in the emergency sector, but no such laws regulate activities in the private sector, including the language spoken in shops, companies, and by the self-employed. One can guess the pattern: similar Latvian laws also regulate the private sector.

Here we must note the effects of international intervention and mediation designed to change the political situation (especially the public policies adopted by the both countries’ governments). There is no doubt that external pressures from the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union (hereinafter the “EU”) have encouraged the Estonian and Latvian government and political elites to liberalize some policies and laws. At the same time, the government has consistently ignored external recommendations pertaining to some policies and laws, and has instead implemented more nationalist versions despite international pressure. There have been large and discernible differences between Estonia and Latvia. External international recommendations cannot directly explain the variations that have developed in these two Baltic nations, although they partially explain the inter-temporal variance in the individual situation of a given county.22

4.2 Similar Historical Backgrounds and Demographic Compositions

Both countries share a largely similar historical background in the sense that both were restored to independence and both have historically had Russian minority

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22 Moreover, it must be noted that more than half of these countries’ citizens in the latter years of the 1990s did not have positive attitudes toward the EU (Nakai 2012). Accordingly, it is fair to consider that external pressure from the EU did not work as a decisive influence. At any rate, a detailed description of the contents, processes and effects of these international actors will be mentioned in the following Chapters 5 and 6.
problems. Present-day Estonia and the central and northeastern portions of Latvia became the part of the territory of Russian Empire after the Treaty of Nystad in 1721. The remaining part of what is now Latvia—what was then the Duchy of Kurland and Polish Livonia—also became part of the Russian Empire during the 18th century due to the Partitions of Poland. They became separate independent nation-states following WWI when the Bolshevik revolutionary government renounced its territorial claims on these areas in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Their status as separate entities was short-lived: Estonia and Latvia were annexed by the Soviet Union per the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret pact during WWII.

Estonia declared the restoration of its independence on August 20, 1991. Latvia also regained it after the Latvian Supreme Council declared independence on August 21, 1991, an act which the Soviet Union accepted on September 6, 1991. The historical background of ethnopolitics in Estonia and Latvia is truly similar. After Latvia and Estonia became republics of the USSR, they experienced mass deportations and immigrations. During this era, especially from 1945 to the 1960s, Latvia and Estonia experienced the mass immigration of Russophone people. They came to these countries mainly as workers “to develop the economy and compensate for wartime losses” (Lieven 1994: 183). After this, the demographic composition of the two countries radically changed. In Estonia, where Russians had comprised 8.2% of the general population in 1935 before the annexation, this percentage rose to 20.1% in 1959, and had further increased to 30.3% by 1989. In Latvia, the percentage of Russophones in the population in 1939 was 10.6%; by 1989, it had increased to over 34% (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Key Indicators of Latvia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and Electoral System</th>
<th>Parliamentarism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unicameral [100 seats, PR system]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,472,612</td>
<td>2,094,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Composition</td>
<td>Latvian 75.5%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian 10.6%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian/Belorussian 1.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socioeconomic indicators

GDP/capita (2000) 2,242
Mean Household Income (Latvian/Russian) [1996] 120 Lat / 116 Lat
Unemployment Rate (Latvian/Russian) [1995] 16.1% / 23.4%


Table 4.2: Key Indicators of Estonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and Electoral System</th>
<th>Parliamentarism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unicameral [101 seats, PR system]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>992,520</td>
<td>1,197,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Composition</td>
<td>Estonian 88.2%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian 8.2%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian/Belorussian - 3.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socioeconomic indicators

Mean Household Income (Estonian/Russian) [1996] 4,333 Kroon / 3,548 Kroon
Unemployment Rate (Estonian/Russian) [1995] 5.8% / 14.1%

Thus, following the restoration of independence and during the ensuing democratization, Estonia and Latvia faced the question of how to treat the Russian minority groups and their descendants. They faced the problem of how to treat Russian-speaking immigrants and their descendants. It was not an easy question. For Estonian hard-line nationalists, ethnic Russians and their descendants were considered illegal immigrants staging an illegal “occupation”; therefore, they must not be given any rights. Ethnic Russians and liberal politicians rejected the “illegal immigrants” label because they and their parents had merely moved freely within their own country. Of course, this struggle was not just a matter of historical perception, but it was also a political struggle. Each political elite had its own attitude. Some discussed granting the full spectrum of rights to Russian minority groups, and some considered depriving their rights and deporting them. After a long dispute among communist party elites, Soviet bureaucratic elites, and popular front elites, in the end, nationalist groups won the political struggle and formed an initiative to make policies just after the restoration of Estonia’s independence. The nationalists’ victory resulted in highly exclusion-oriented policies to build national unity based on ethnic principles. They decided not to grant Russian minorities suffrage, as they were considered “illegal immigrants.” It was natural that Russian minorities would protest inside and outside parliament. The situation was similar in Latvia. Upon the restoration of Latvian independence, there were many political opinions contending for dominance. Some political elites sought a coalition with Russian minorities by promising to give them equal rights. Some elites claimed that political rights of Russian immigrants and their descendants must be deprived or regulated because they had entered Latvia under the auspices of an illegal secret pact during WWII and had therefore been “illegal
immigrants.” As in Estonia, the nationalist camp won in Latvia, and the newly emergent political elites depended on the mobilization of nationalist discourses to keep their political ascendancy. Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and his Popular Front had been conciliatory towards the Russian minority question, but support for the government flagged, and the Popular Front gradually disintegrated. The Godmanis government “swung sharply in a nationalist direction” (Lieven 1994: 298), and this tactic worked, since Godmanis was able to survive politically. After this, Latvia principally deprived Russians of suffrage and the right to use their mother tongue in public life—a move which Estonia also made at this time. Russian groups protested both inside and outside parliament. In the early 1990s, the ethnopolitical situation in Latvia was very similar to that in Estonia.

Local nationalist advocates sometimes argued that depriving Russian immigrants of citizenship constituted “‘proof’ of being a ‘real patriot’” (Pabriks and Purs 2001: 72). Such nationalists appeared very sensitive about the ethnic (im)balance. For example, in Latvia, they justified the language regulations because “there is a disappointing situation in Latvia which badly increases the number of Russian and other ethnic group people” (Kušķis 2006: 12). However, is it true? From a comparative perspective, this type of argument is empirically inadequate. Actually, 24.2% of cities and districts in Latvia of the early 1990s had ethnic minority residences as a demographic majority group, but this figure is very similar to that of Estonia during the same time period (21.7% cities and districts). The demographic situation in the two countries was quite similar.

23 Author’s own translation. The original text is “bēldīgāks stāvoklis ir Latvijas pilsētās, kur arī stipri pieaudzis kuriēvu un citu sveštautiešu daudzums.”
24 Both figures are derived from Ishiyama and Breuning (1998).
Both Estonia and Latvia share the same historical background, which brought about a similar demographic situation in the early years of independence for the two nations. There was no great variance between them at the time. This means that historical context alone does not explain the divergent ethnopolitical situations in Estonia and Latvia nowadays. Historical background usefully explains the common tendencies and situations in Estonia and Latvia just after independence, but it fails to explain the policy variance. Historical and demographic factors are controlled.

4.3 Social Public Opinion in Vain

It must be noted that the sharp differences between the ethnopolitical situations in Estonia and Latvia today are not reflections of different ethnic discourses or popular public opinion in these two countries.

In Estonia, the public opinion of both the ethnic majority and largest minority have shown strong hostility and intransigence. Traditionally, ethnic Estonians have felt that the Russian minority, or the Russian Federation itself, has posed the greatest threats to their society. Most of the time, the majority of Estonians have thought that Russian minorities, and their conflict with Estonians, constitute major threats to Estonia (Figure 4.1). Ethnic Estonians have always felt this more strongly than have ethnic Latvians. Even recently, about 80–90% of Estonians think that the Russian Federation is also a threat (Figure 4.2). Russian minorities in Estonia, generally speaking, have made their own demands. For example, Russian residents living in Estonia have tended to think that they ought to be educated in their mother tongue. This tendency has been stronger in the Estonian case than among Russian minorities in Latvia (Figure 4.3). Nevertheless, in the formal and practical political process,
Russian residents in Estonia have not protested harshly. In essence, on the level of ordinary citizens’ opinions, ethnic relations between Estonians and Russians in Estonia have actually been confrontational. However, this situation has not been directly connected to nor transformed into political confrontation in the democratic process.

Compared to Estonians, ethnic Latvian people appear to exhibit less hostility against Russians or other minority groups. Survey research showed that the number of ethnic Latvians in Latvia who thought that “Russian minorities are a threat for their society” was less than the number of ethnic Estonians feeling similarly (Figure 4.2). At the same time, Russian minorities in Latvia have tended to be “less demanding” in exercising their own rights than ethnic minorities in Estonia (Figure 4.3). In addition, practically speaking, most Russians have not reported feeling informal discrimination in Latvian society. One study found that only one third of Russians (in Riga) responded that they think that there are informal personnel practices favoring Latvians, while the majority (58%) of them felt that there are formal discriminatory policies (Commercio 2010: 93). Therefore, these primordialistic factors do not provide an effective explanation for the unique ethnopolitical situation in Latvia. Here, we must evaluate elitist politics.

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25 This situation might be partially related to the historical fact that many Russian residents lived in Latvian territory before its annexation to the Soviet Union. The port city Riga, especially, was a large and important city for the Russian Empire (the Empire’s third largest city, in fact) and many Russian residents started to live there in the early modern period. The long tradition of coexistence between Russians and natives (not only Latvians, but also Baltic Germans) might be one factor why many Latvian people have borne less hostile attitudes toward Russian people even now.
Figure 4.1: The Proportion of Ethnic Baltic Citizens Who Think That (Conflict with) the Russian Minority is a Threat

Source: Rose and Maley 1994; Rose 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005

Figure 4.2: The Proportion of Ethnic Baltic Citizens Who Think That the Russian Federation is a Threat

Source: Rose and Maley 1994; Rose 1995, 1997, 2000, 2005
### Figure 4.3: The Proportion of Ethnic Russians Who Think that All Residents should Enjoy the Right to be Educated in their Mother Tongue

![Graph showing the proportion of ethnic Russians who think that all residents should enjoy the right to be educated in their mother tongue over time.](image)


#### 4.4 Non-Politicized Economic Inequalities

Economic factors also do not provide concrete explanations, even considering that there are few differences between Estonia and Latvia with respect to the economic integration between the ethnic majority and minority groups. Rather, the economic gap among ethnic groups in Estonia has resulted in accommodative ethnopolitical relations, and yet the lack of such a gap in Latvian society has not prevented the development of confrontational ethnopolitical relations.

Estonia’s contemporary accommodative political situation is not a reflection of a high degree of social integration. Rather, the social integration of Russian minorities in Estonia has largely failed. For example, there have been significant differences in household income between Estonians and Russians, and the unemployment rate of
Russians is about 2.4 times higher than that of Estonians (Table 4.2). A research found that Russian minorities without citizenship are more at risk of exclusion from the labor market and poverty compared to Estonian citizens (Aasland 2002). These economic gaps and poor levels of integration, however, have not correlated with escalated ethnopolitical conflict in Estonia. On the contrary, in neighboring Latvia, the economic gap has not been so great between ethnic Latvians and Russians (see Table 4.1). The income gap, specifically, has been almost negligible between Latvian and Russian segments of the population. Aasland (2002) could not find a statistically significant incidence of economic disadvantage for Russian minority groups in Latvia. However, in truth, ethnopolitical conflict has reigned in Latvia despite the relative economic equality enjoyed by ethnic groups.

So, we cannot assume that the respective socioeconomic situations in the two countries have naturally generated mutually antagonistic or conciliatory ethnic discourses according to the level of deprivation suffered by minorities, which in turn determine the ethnopolitical situation. Many scholars have pointed out (see Chapter 2) that political or economic imbalances foster ethnopolitical conflict by magnifying ethnic differences. Given that economic imbalances do not clearly explain the ethnopolitical variance between Estonia and Latvia, it is time to turn our attention to politics.

**4.5 Arriving at the Political Explanation: Static or Dynamic Factors?**

Although historical factors, demographic factors, international relations, and socioeconomic statistics provide the contextual background for ethnopolitics in Estonia and Latvia, they cannot adequately explain the different courses the two
Baltic countries have taken, ethnopolitically speaking. The remaining field that could explain and define ethnopolitical relations in Estonia and Latvia is politics. Nonetheless, which aspect of politics must be observed in our study? Static aspects, like the nature of the political regime in each country, their legislative processes, electoral systems and so on, or dynamic aspects, such as the party systems and behaviors of elites?

This dissertation argues that the latter, dynamic aspects are much more salient to the ethnopolitical question at hand. Estonia and Latvia simply do not differ significantly when it comes to static political and electoral institutions. The macro-political institutions of both states are grounded in parliamentaryism with symbolic indirect presidential elections. Both parliaments are unitary and the MPs are supposed to be elected through proportional representation systems. The electoral threshold to win a seat is the same in both countries, standing at 5%. Moreover, the laws of both countries do not ban the organization of ethnic parties, but do not provide any special privileges for such ethnic parties. In parliament, reading systems have been used as standard procedure in the legislatures of both countries. Thus, the static political aspects of these two Baltic countries are indeed similar and do not provide an explanation for the variance between ethnopolitical relations in Estonia and Latvia. Dynamic political aspects, however, including party systems, remain as possible explanatory factors to consider. In fact, the party systems in Estonia and Latvia, respectively, are completely different. The situations in each country coincide with the argument which was developed in the theory chapter; contemporary Estonia has an integrated and less volatile party system, while Latvia has the most fragmented party systems.

26 It should be noted that Estonia uses the D'Hondt method of vote-counting while Latvia uses the Saint-Lague method of vote counting.
system among Europe’s post-communist countries.

We must pay attention to the domestic political process and political elites’ incentives (as the theory section has predicted) to explain the policy processes that define the political ethnic relations. To show the clear case of ethnic mobilization by political elites, this thesis considers the Latvian case first. Chapter 5 summarizes the party system in Latvia, and the following sections describe the party system’s effect on the debates about ethnic policies. Chapter 6 then summarizes the party system in Estonia, and the following sections describe the party system’s effects on the debates about ethnic policies.
Chapter 5.

Latvia: Confrontational Ethnopolitics in an Amicable Society

This chapter explains the process by which Latvian political parties have exploited ethnic issues in an ethnocentric way, resulting in political protest from ethnic minorities. As argued in Chapter 4, Latvia experiences confrontational ethnopolitics even now, despite the fact that public opinion among each of Latvia’s ethnic groups is less hostile. Although economic inequality is also low, ethnopolitical confrontation between ethnic Latvians and Russians has been strong. This chapter describes the type of political elites that exist in Latvia and how they have mobilized heated confrontation by playing up the ethnopolitical issue.

5.1 The Party System after the Restoration of Latvia’s Independence

Latvia has a highly fragmented party system. There have been many political parties in the Latvian parliament (*Saeima*), competing for 100 seats in total. The Latvian political sphere has never witnessed stable, lasting political parties, like the “effective five parties” in Estonia (see Chapter 6). Several factors are behind this chaotic party system in Latvia. At any rate, scholars have tried to define and categorize various political parties in different ways (see Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Minority</th>
<th>Social Democrats/Post-communist</th>
<th>(economically) Liberal</th>
<th>Agrarian</th>
<th>Christian Democrats</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>LC, JL</td>
<td>LZS</td>
<td>LKDS, LPP</td>
<td>LNZ-LKDS</td>
<td>TB, LNNK, Zigerist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDS-III</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LC, DPS, JP</td>
<td>LZS</td>
<td>LKDS, LPP</td>
<td>TP, LNZ-LNNK, Zigerist</td>
<td>TB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis 2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LC, TP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>TB-LNNK</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These typologies have been generated not only according to party stance on ethnic issues, but considering the full policy spectrum, including the market-state dimension. Considering the classifications posited by existing scholarship, we can divide these parties into three groups in terms of ethnic policies: nationalist, moderate, and minority-friendly.28

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27 An exception is the hard-line nationalist party “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB/LNNK).
28 Smith-Sivertsen (2004) also classifies Latvian political parties into three categories. His classification essentially matches that used in the present study.
In general, the members of the electorate who bear the strongest nationalist sentiment tend to vote for the For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvia National Independent Movement (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/ Latvijas Nacionālā Neatkarības Kustība) (hereinafter “TB/LNNK”). Formerly two separate nationalist parties (TB and LNNK) that later merged, this group has kept its seats in the Saeima since Latvia regained its independence in 1991. In 2011, TB/LNNK merged with the ultranationalist party, All for Latvia! (Visu Latvijai!). In addition, some studies see the People’s Movement for Latvia—“Zigerists” (Tautas kustība Latvijai-Zīgerista partija) as nationalist, given that its founders were former members of the LNNK who had been expelled. However, I do not define the Zigerists as nationalist, and I exclude this party from our analysis because its leader, Joahims Zīgerists, was illiterate in Latvian and often sought support from non-Latvian ethnic minorities (Bugajski 2002).29

Ethnic minority parties and pro-minority parties have also been vigorously active in Latvia, and they have often protested against the nationalist Latvian government while protecting their own ethnic interests. Just after Latvia regained independence, the Equal Rights Movement and the People’s Harmony Party were the two main political parties representing Russian minorities’ interests. The Equal Rights Movement formed the Latvian Socialist Party and won five seats in the 1995 elections (the Harmony Party won six seats). They saw the Latvian citizenship law as “unequal” and wanted to simplify the naturalization process (Rikken 1996, November 21). Before the 1998 general elections, they formed a unified coalition called “For Human Rights in United Latvia” (hereinafter “PCTVL”).30 In 2002, some members of the

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29 In addition, the Zigerists won seats only in the 1995 general elections. It is most appropriate that we view this party as a short-lived populist group.
30 In the 1998 elections, PCTVL ran under the name TSP.
PCTVL founded another alternative ethnic minority party, Harmony Centre. These ethnic minority parties have always won seats in parliament.

Table 5.2: Party Typology on Ethnic Issues

| Attitude on Ethnic Issue |
|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Minority-friendly/Moderate | Conservatives | Latvian Nationalist |
| Latvia’s Way | [economically liberal] | |
| Green and Farmers | [country agrarian/regional] | |
| Democratic Party Saimnieks | [economically liberal] | |
| Christian Democrats (-2000) | [christian/economically liberal] | For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK [nationalist] |
| People’s Party -> For Good Latvia | [conservative/economically liberal] | |
| New Era -> Unity | [economically liberal] | |
| Zatlers Reform Party (2010-) | [economically liberal] | |

Between these two anti-minority and pro-minority camps, there are many political parties who have intermediate positions on ethnic issues. In the past twenty years, segments of the electorate with market-oriented attitudes and moderate values could choose from the following parties: Latvia’s Way, New Era, the New Party, the First Party, the People’s Party, the Democratic Party Saimnieks, Green and Farmers, Unity, or Zatler’s Reform Party.
The prewar Democratic Centre Party revived after Latvia regained independence and changed its name to the Democratic Party Saimnieks (DPS) in 1994. Latvia’s Way was founded in 1993 and embraced many members of the popular front. Its main political supporters have been middle-class Latvian voters (Nakai 2010). The centre-right parties, with their catch-all style, gradually lost political support, but began to regain seats in parliament after they merged with the First Party. The Latvian First Party’s de facto predecessor was the New Party. The New Party was also founded by popular front members with a centre-right political orientation and a Christian influence. It served to catapult the political career of ex-businessman and political oligarch Ainārs Šlesers. When the New Party lost its popularity after the government corruption scandals, Šlesers founded Latvia’s First Party. Šlesers’s rival oligarchs, Andris Šķēle and Aivars Lembergs, had founded and taken over the People’s Party and Green and Farmers Union, respectively. The People’s Party had electoral success in 1998 as a newly founded centre-right conservative party. The Green and Farmers Union, dominated by Lembergs, was originally composed of two different political affiliations, the Latvia’s Farmers’ Union and the Latvia’s Green Party. It still draws its regional electoral base from the city of Ventspils in the Kurzeme area, which is Lembergs’s political base. New Era, founded in 2002, is the alternative centre-rightist party in Latvia, which holds political appeal for those who wish to resist the control of the oligarchs. The ex-President Valdis Zatlers also founded another centre-rightist party, the Zatler’s Reform Party, after he was defeated in a political struggle with the oligarchs. These more moderate parties have appeared

31 The Green Party originated in the Latvian nationalist movement of 1988, which opposed Moscow’s plan to build a new dam in Latvia. Unlike what many people assume, it is not an environmental party (Galbreath and Auers 2009). It has had affinities with TB/LNNK, and, in the 1995 elections, the two formed a political alliance.
and disappeared, and with them, truly complex seat distributions have varied from
election to election.

Table 5.3: Numbers of Seats for Political Parties in Latvia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCTVL (TSP +LSP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSDSP (LSDA)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>LPP (JP)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL (V)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZRP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>LPP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (ZZS)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZZP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNNK</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission of Latvia, Parties and Elections in Europe

As noted, political corruption, strong oligarchs, and the low barriers to found a new
(or to revive a prewar) political party all have contributed to the highly fragmented
Latvian party system. Latvians form new political parties not because of differences
in economic policies or in ethnopolitical stances, but out of personal antagonism and
to avoid blame in corruption scandals implicating existing political parties. “Another
unique characteristic of Latvia’s political culture has been the significant trust in
individual political personalities . . . Consequently, this has stimulated the formation

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32 “. . . [P]olitical instability is not ideological divergence but the close links between economics
and politics that characterize Latvia’s political scene” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000).
of relatively small and weak parties around well-known political leaders” (Pabriks and Štookenberga 2006: 56), as these leaders do not rely on different social classes or ideological groups, but inevitably scramble for votes from the same segments of the electorate. This means that each centre-right political party has had many “rivals” in its range of the political spectrum. In practice, these parties had “much in common in broad policy terms. This potential partnership, however, foundered on a clash of leadership” (Davies and Ozolins 2001: 137-8).

In such a situation, no conservative party tried to gain the minority vote by agreeing to pro-minority policies, because such an agreement would yield fertile ground to political rivals and give them ammunition to criticize the party as “a betrayer of the Latvian nation.” Such criticism has traditionally proven effective because Latvian voters have readily changed their voting behavior in response to such criticism, particularly given the number of parties with centrist political orientations from which to choose. We can guess that this particular feature of the political system will continue to halt the centrist parties’ agreement to pro-minority policies and will encourage harsh criticism when a given centrist party does agree to pro-minority measures.

5.2 The Latvian Elites’ Decisions about Citizenship Policy and Elections

Whether or not to grant citizenship to all residents has also been a major issue in Latvia, because this decision effectively determines the political influence of non-Baltics at the ballot box. Just after the restoration of Latvia’s independence, the Latvian parliament (as well as the Estonian parliament after the restoration of
Estonia’s independence) adopted a highly exclusion-oriented and “Latvian first” approach as its integration policy. Its logic was similar to that of Estonia. Latvia enfranchised citizenship rights only for descendants of people who had lived in Latvia before the 1940s (Pettai 2001; Purs 2004; Weum 2008). Soviet-era immigrants and their descendants who were born and raised in Latvian territory were offered citizenship only through an elaborate naturalization process, which had strict resident and language requirements.

There have been several changes to Latvia’s integration policy over the years, especially in regards to the citizenship law and the treatment of language. Rigid policies, such as mandating an examination to acquire Latvian citizenship, were simplified in October 1998 (Budryte 2005). However, this policy was revised at the initiative of President Viķe-Freiberga and following a national referendum, which came about as a result of pressure from the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Thus, most political parties could not make appeals for Russian minorities and could not function as the guardians of Russophones’ interests. Moreover, Latvian party politics has never granted local suffrage to Russian minorities. Several leftist parties have tried to make this appeal on behalf of Russian minorities (Plakas 1997; Pabriks & Stokenberga 2006), but they have never gotten such an initiative to be past a vote in parliament.

A pro-minority party submitted an amendment plan in 1997, but its proposals did not pass parliament due to lack of support from the other intermediate conservative parties (Baltic News Service 1997a, 1997b). Although the OSCE and the EU applied

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33 Of course, the pressure from European organizations to change policies is applied equally to EU member countries, not only to Latvia. It is applied to all new EU candidates from Eastern Europe, which potentially includes Lithuania (Budryte 2005, Kelley 2004).
greater pressure on the Latvian parliament to amend the citizenship law after the pro-minority party submitted its amendment plan, the Latvian party system again declined to amend the citizenship law in February 1998 (Baltic News Service 1998a). No conservative got into line with pro-minority parties’ proposals to liberalize the citizenship law and grant citizenship to Russian minorities. Juris Dobelis, MP of TB/LNNK, explained that the reason for their objection was because “aliens [Russian descendant without citizenship] did not show any true will to integrate into Latvia’s society” (“Alien Children,” 1998). But Janis Jurkans, leader of the People’s Harmony Party, pointed out that the conservative side had blocked amendments to the citizenship law because it was “only taking care of its own interest as it might lose voters in case the circle of citizens is expanded” (Baltic News Service 1998a). Political elites subjectively were aware of that taking a stance on this ethnic policy issue represented winning or losing votes.

The situation changed. During this time, multiple bombings of the Russian embassy and public statues, coupled with the government’s support of the nationalist event Legionas Diena on March 16 1998, strained Russian-Latvian diplomatic relations severely. Some political parties worried about the negative repercussions for economic, industrial, and commercial relations between Latvia and Russia. The Democratic Party Saimnieks changed their mind and started to support the amendment of the citizenship law. This finally resulted in the adoption of the amendment, even though the amended law was more ethnocentric in content than that of Estonia. At the same time, this move spelled political death for the Democratic Party Saimnieks. Before the amendment, the Democratic Party Saimnieks had held the vast support of both Latvian and Russian voters, but when the Democratic Party
Saimnieks withdrew from the coalition (Krats cabinet) and worked closely on the pro-Russian line, their public support waned (Davies and Ozolins 2001). In the electoral campaign for the 1998 general elections, some parties expressed a more nationalistic view, and such campaign came along (Council of Europe 1998).

Even though most MPs in the government were willing to amend and liberalize the citizenship law proposed by the Saimnieks, TB/LNNK strongly and continually indicated their objections in anticipation of the upcoming general elections in October. Aigars Jirgens, MP of TB/LNNK, claimed that the “existing citizenship law complied with international liabilities . . . . Moscow and Brussels were exerting political pressure on the government to amend” (“PM Resist No Change,” 1998). They wanted to maintain stricter citizenship criteria in order to maintain the maximum proportion of Latvian voters among the general electorate. TB/LNNK’s Krasts cabinet did not hesitate to repress violently the Russian elders’ demonstration held in March and tried to express its inflexible nationalistic stance to voters. Latvian nationalism surged, and a parade that honored and hailed the Nazi-era Latvian SS unit was staged. Participants insisted that they were not marching for German Nazis, but against the Russian invasion. No conservative party attempted to control the demonstration; rather, some MPs attended it. A month later, a bomb exploded in a park next to the Russian Embassy in Riga. The Russian government, commenting about the incident, said: “[T]his act of terrorism is a result of increasing anti-Russian hysteria in Latvia” (Jansson and Johnson 1998). The Democratic Party Saimnieks was revolted by this anti-Russian fervor and bolted from the ruling coalition. Saimnieks progressed the amendment of the citizenship law. The newly founded People’s Party voiced strong criticism against Saimnieks (and Latvia’s Way) and TB/LNNK insisted that the
naturalization process must be with strict control for “the protection of the Latvian nation” (LETA 1998a, 1998b). When President Ulmanis criticized them for “threatening Latvia’s image among EU nations,” they countered that they did not “understand why we must pass these amendment so quickly . . . we have many problems in our state and they have to be addressed before EU and NATO membership” (Johnson 1998a). Some citizens held a demonstration on the day of the final reading in parliament in concert with the conservatives’ protest. By this time, the Saimnieks were already seen as the betrayers of the Latvian nation in the eyes of citizens (Figure 5.1). Finally, TB/LNNK gathered signatures to hold a referendum to withdraw the amendment. This signature collecting campaign, which began in July, practically functioned as early electoral campaigning and agenda setting for October. The MP Janis Lagzdins described that the “attempt to organize the referendum is part of the TB/LNNK party’s election campaign using state money” (Baltic News Service 1998b). Before the elections, the Saimnieks urged voters to support the amendment, while the newcomer People’s Party kept a guarded silence about its position (Birzulis 1998). These actions resulted in the utter defeat of the Saimnieks in the 1998 general elections. The Democratic Party Saimnieks, which had been the strongest party in the 1995 general elections, lost all of their seats in parliament after the ethnic backlash mobilized by conservative parties. By contrast, the new conservative People’s Party emerged as winners of the election.
Figure 5.1: Latvians Who Criticized the Saimnieks Based on Nationalistic Discourses

The signs read: (left) Saimnieks’s gift for Latvia [a hangman’s beam]  
(original text: Saimnieka davana Latvijai)  
(right) Republic of Latvia’s citizenship – No stranger from CIS [can] have it!  
(original text: LR pilosonība [ir] – nevienam ieklūdenim no NVS!)
Conservative parties tapped Latvian ethnocentric sentiments and discourses and put the ethnic citizenship issue at the center of the 1998 general election. Most of the conservative parties who did not favor the amendments of the citizenship law, like LNNK and Latvia’s Way, succeeded in raising their share of seats in parliament. The Democratic Party Saimnieks, which suffered from the ethnic backlash unleashed by the other conservative parties, lost the support of Latvian voters and lost their all seats in the Saeima.

5.3 Latvian Elites’ Decisions about Language Policy and Elections

In Latvia, about 30% of the population speak Russian as their mother tongue, and yet the use of the Russian language has been consistently strictly restricted even in the private sphere. The first attempt to curtail the use of Russian occurred in 1999 at the urging of nationalist parties. They intended to set up a “Language Inspectorate” to demand that employers terminate labor contracts with employees who did not demonstrate a sufficient command of Latvian. TB/LNNK proposed the measure and its MP Juris Dobelis said that “inspectors would run around trying to find and lay off other people with poor [Latvian] language skills” (“Speak Latvian or Risk,” 1998). This first attempt ended in failure, but by 1999, Latvia’s parliament (Kristopans cabinet) attempted to regulate the use of language in the private sphere. A new bill allowed any business owner to lay off his or her employees who were not fluent in Latvian. This policy violated workers’ rights, and western international organizations expressed their concern. Although President Ulmanis returned the bill to the Saeima,

34 Higashijima and Nakai (2011) analyzed inter-temporal survey research and verified that ethnic mobilization by Latvian nationalist parties does appear to raise the ethnic Latvians’ awareness of ethnic identities (temporarily) around the election time.
the MPs resubmitted it under the new President Vike-Freiberga, who came into office in July 1999 (Galbreath 2005). Considering the criticism by international organizations, President Vike-Freiberga also vetoed this bill and asked parliament to reconsider it. Yet a coalition government formed by the People’s Union, Latvia’s Way, and TB/LNNK did not ease their “Latvian first” position. The MPs argued that the Latvian language had to be strengthened because it was endangered during the Soviet period. Even an MP from the opposition party TP said that this law was “affirmative action—to overturn past discrimination” (Budryte 2005: 121).35 Parliament finally passed a revised version of the bill in December 1999. Although the restrictions in the private sphere were reduced, thirty-four private positions (Komori 2005) were regulated by this new law. A Russian newspaper argued that the government was attempting to launch language discrimination in the labor market (Galbreath 2005: 183). In addition, the contents of the new language law did not contain a provision allowing a municipality with many language minorities in its demographic to permit use of the minority language in workplaces (as the present Estonian language law does).

Domestic political players heatedly debated the law. Pro-minority parties, of course, tried to stop the amendment, but the government did not reverse its stance even after the collapse of the Kristpans cabinet (the new Skele cabinet was composed of the People’s Party, Latvia’s Way, and TB/LNNK). Notably, TB/LNNK took part in the successive coalition governments (the Kristopans cabinet in 1998 and the Skele cabinet in 1999) only after they had extracted the promise from their centre-rightist

35 Referring to their Soviet past is a peculiarity of the Latvian government’s official stance. In their integration program submitted to the EU, they included references to the Soviet past, unlike Estonia. Budryte (2005) pointed out: “The Estonians decided to keep national integration . . . and coming to terms with the past separate. The Latvians . . . decided that addressing the past must become part of the official discourse about nation building” (123).
partners “[that] they would vote for a strict language law that would make the use of Latvian compulsory in most public and private dealings” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2000). Furthermore, most of the centre conservative parties did not have any incentives to prevent the passage of a strict language law, or to cooperate with the pro-Russian camp. Rather, both the People’s Party and Latvia’s Way were blessed by the emergence of a strong nationalist movement prior to the 1998 general elections. Many Latvian voters who had centre-rightist sentiments stopped supporting the Democratic Party, which had once tried to attract Russian voters, and instead voted for the alternative centre-rightist People’s Party or Latvia’s Way. For them, cooperating with the nationalist camp was rewarding, but cooperating with the pro-minority camp was not. This situation resulted in a hard-line nationalist coalition with “. . . a high priority on ‘protecting Latvia’s language and culture,’ listing that priority above strengthening relations with the EU” (Kelly 2004: 82). In other words, advancing towards participation in the EU was less important for Latvia’s political parties than making a coalition along domestic nationalistic policy lines.

Another language argument was widely broadcast around 2001–2002 just before the general elections. It was about language in the education system. In Latvia, no minorities, including non-Russians, had the right to be educated in their native language (Spolsky 2004). The 1998 amendment to Latvia’s education law demanded that Latvian be the primary instructional language in all state-founded secondary schools (Galbreath and Muiznieks 2009). This amendment was initiated by TB/LNNK. In June 1997, one year before general elections, TB/LNNK adopted a new

36 The unamended law had mentioned just the right to be educated in Latvian. It did not contain a provision about education in a minority language, so the rights of other ethnic groups regarding the language to be used in education were ambiguous (Kelly 2004: 77).
party program that pursued the preservation of the “purity of the Latvian language.”

In 1998, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities (hereinafter “HCNM”) engaged with this issue and expressed his own concern that this pursuit was incompatible with international norms. He met and sent letters to Latvian politician several times, to encourage politicians to allow ethnic minorities to be educated in their mother tongue. However, this effort did not work at all. “[H]is efforts fell on deaf ears” (Kelly 2004: 79).

After the 1998 general elections, parliament passed a new education law in October. The new education rule demanded all general schools to switch to Latvian-only instruction as early as 2004. Only private schools were allowed to educate students in the Russian language (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 1998). Kelly (2004) noted that Professional exams and academic theses would only be accepted in the state language. According to him, some pro-minority parties proposed amendments in 2000 and 2001, but these did not succeed. We can assume that these parties could not acquire enough support from conservative parties to pass the proposals in parliament. During this time, the pro-Russian PCTVL held sixteen seats in parliament, and the centre parties, including the People’s Union, Latvia’s Way, and the New Party, had total fifty-three seats (twenty-four, twenty-one, and eight seats, respectively). Since then, decisions by the conservative parties voting for Latvian-first policies and against accommodative policies have determined the Latvian government’s uncompromising education policy.

With the approaching deadline to switch to Latvian-only instruction, a vast amount of criticism was directed toward the amendment around 2003–2004 (see details in Section 5.4). In spite of multiple harsh protests, the Repse government did
not postpone the deadline. However, it compromised by introducing the “60-40 principle,” which requires public secondary schools to hold at least 60% of class instruction in Latvian, with the remaining in the ethnic minority’s language, which is mainly Russian. After this compromise in 2004, Repse was forced to resign from his post as prime minister and his party, New Era, was excluded from the incoming coalition of the People’s Party, the First Party, and Green and Farmers. Here it must be noted that the latter three parties have been famously known as the “oligarchy’s parties,” and they excluded New Era, which had a stated goal to challenge the oligarchs. The next prime minister was Indulis Emsis, from Green and Farmers.

During this ethnic dispute over education policy, the newly formed Emsis cabinet sought political cooperation with Harmony Centre because his government was a minority government (42/100). The People’s Party instantly excluded this oligarchic rival party from government in the name of the exclusion of pro-Moscow parties (Ikstens 2005). The opposition party New Era also followed suit. As a result, Emsis was forced to resign, and Green and Farmers failed to win seats in the coming European parliamentary elections in 2004. On the contrary, the People’s Party succeeded in taking the reins of government, and New Era succeeded in winning seats in the government. This turn of events told that cooperating with the ethnic minority group only allows political rivals room to criticize and to play for ethnic discourses. Even in the 2006 general elections, these conservative parties, including the People’s Party, New Era, First Party/Latvia’s Way, and the nationalist TB/LNNK, continued their political success.
5.4 Reaction by Minorities: Political Protest

**Inside Parliament**

Meanwhile, minority voters had realized that several ethnic pro-Russian parties could win enough seats and enough power that their votes would not be wasted. At the same time, they realized that there were no ordinary non-Russian “ethnic” parties who intended to protect Russian minorities’ interests politically. From the Russophone minority voters’ perspective, no political parties except the Russian ethnic parties had been receptive to them. Related to the theoretical and statistical analysis above, one could note that the Latvian government has not opened its political arena to Russian minorities and has maintained a law that levies fines for using the Russian language in social activities. Therefore, it is natural, and in accordance with the theories noted in the previous chapter, that ethnic parties have kept on winning seats in Latvia.

**Figure 5.2: Party Support Rate among Each Ethnic Group in 1995 (%)**

Note: In calculating percentages, the author excluded those respondents who answered DK and NA and those who could not vote (N=216).
Source: Rose (1997)
Figure 5.3: Party Support Rate among Each Ethnic Group in 2004 (%)

Note: In calculating percentages, the author excluded those respondents who answered DK and NA and those who could not vote (N=956).
Source: Rose (2005)

Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the significant differences between ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians in terms of their attitudes of support for political parties. It verifies that the Russian minority voter has continued to maintain support for Russian minority parties even in recent years. In fact, this tendency seems to have grown stronger recently. Comparing the support distribution of 2004–2005 to that of 1995, we can clearly see that ethnic Latvians and Russians supported completely different parties. Latvian voters preferred the People’s Party, Green and Farmers Union, Latvia’s Way, New Era, and TB/LNNK. Russian voters preferred the Harmony Party or PCTVL. There are no parties that both ethnic groups support.37 Such an ethnically divided situation contrasts quite sharply with that in Estonia.

In Latvia, ethnic confrontation in the political process is reinforced by, rather than calmed by, the behaviors of political elites. As this thesis has shown in the preceding sections (5.2 and 5.3), many political parties, including the centrist People’s Party,

37 An exception is LSDSP, but its total popularity is rather low.
Green and Farmers, Latvia’s Way, and New Era, among others, have hesitated to support minority-friendly bills and proposals. Of course, this is not because all were nationalist, but rather because they rationally feared the loss of support from Latvian voters. However, such a situation has accelerated Russian voters’ disappointment toward centrist parties. This phenomenon has strengthened Russians’ political support for Russian parties like PCTVL and Harmony Centre and thereby resulted in the ethnically divided party support distribution of today.

Outside Parliament

Russian protest movements in Latvia are still active, politicized, and sometimes escalated by the existing political parties. “In response to antagonistic policies,” as Commercio (2010) wrote, “Russians adopt a confrontational posture, which manifests itself in demonstrations and letters of protest.” For example, around 1998, when the nationalist Krasts government conducted several Latvian-first style policies (as argued in Section 5.2), Russian political dissatisfaction increased and provoked several major demonstrations. One major rally occurred in March. Most of the participants were elderly pensioners and other socially marginalized people. About 10,000 people participated in the demonstration, which aimed at drawing the government’s attention to the problems of Russian minorities. Krasts’s cabinet, consisting of TB/LNNK members, decided to mobilize the police to suppress these uprisings with rubber batons (Johnson 1998b; Jeffries 2004, 192). The Socialist Party urged the Prosecutor General to investigate whether the police had violated the law (Galbreath 2005, 148). Political parties aggressively committed and politicized such movements more and more. In May and June in 1998, Russian youth organized rallies and demonstrations
to protest against the ongoing discussion about the language law and education laws (Baltic News Service 1998c, 1998d). Youth activists sent letters to several media and human rights organizations and expressed their disadvantageous situation, especially voicing their demands that the Russian language be recognized as a second state language (Baltic News Service 1998e). During this period, before the general election in 1998, the ethnic issue had been salient even in Russian residents’ discourses. Several Russian organizations and political parties played upon this sentiment. Finally, on October 3, the day of the general election, a fight between Russian demonstrators and Latvians broke out in central Riga (Minority At Risk 2010a).

We can see another example around 2003–2004. When the education reform was implemented, opposition from minority groups peaked (Galbreath and Muiznieks 2009). Rallies and demonstrations protesting against the education reform occurred on the following days (and perhaps on more): May 9, 2003; May 23, 2003; September 4, 2003; September 24, 2003; October 13, 2003; October 29, 2003; January 23, 2005; February 11, 2004; March 25, 2004; April 15, 2004; May 1, 2004; and February 10, 2005. All of these demonstrations and rallies broke out to protest against the government’s education reform. In fact, research conducted in 2004 reported that 70% of Russians and 60% of other nationalities opposed this education reform (Zepa et al. 2005: 39–40). We can say that such demonstrations happen not just because the participants are ethnic minorities, but because they have dissatisfaction with the specific policies of the government. Protest movements by ethnic minority groups represent reactions against ethnic policies by governments.

The protests on May 23, 2003 were initiated by Latvia’s Russian-Language School

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Support Association (LASOR). They announced that they would stage an empty school protest if the government did not postpone or reverse the school reform restricting the use of Russian in secondary schools (Baltic News Service 2003g). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia also expressed their support for this movement, which caused certain Latvian political elites to consider these Russian protest movements not as reflecting the genuine discontent of local residents, but rather as an informal conspiracy from an “external hostile [enemy] to Latvia” to harm Latvia (Baltic News Service 2003h, 2003i). The government did not change the content of its educational reform, and so Russian protesters kept voicing their opposition by holding rallies and demonstrations again and again. The headquarters of the demonstrators adopted a resolution in March 2004 which stated that the people “fear the loss of ethnic identity and deteriorating quality of education after the forced change of the tuition language,” and some Russian political parties supported and utilized this view (Baltic News Service 2004c).

After the educational reform was completed in October 2004, the number of Russian protest movements decreased rapidly. It was no use protesting outside the parliament once the law had entered into force. Russian political parties nevertheless succeeded in garnering political support from Russians via participating in these movements. PCTVL and Harmony Centre won 20.4% of the ballots in the 2006 general election, which was higher than in 2002 (19.1%). Their political support has grown still stronger (26.0% in 2010 and 28.4% in the 2011 general election).

5.5 Chapter Conclusion

Latvian society has faced serious ethnic questions since the restoration of its
independence. Although the economic gap between Latvians and Russians has become smaller, and most people in both ethnic groups have a less hostile attitude toward one another, the ethnopolitical situation in Latvia has been and remains confrontational. Ethnic issues have been politicized for a long time, the government has adopted highly exclusive ethnic policies compared to other European countries, and Russian minorities have protested both inside and outside of parliament.

Party politics have helped to bring about this situation. Latvia has a highly fragmented and polarized party system and an especially high number of centre-rightist parties. These centre-rightist parties form coalitions and governments, and they pass and block laws to make (and to keep) ethnic policies nationalistic. In response, Russian minorities protest both inside and outside of parliament. Of course, there have been several pro-minority parties in Latvia’s party system, but they cannot change the law and policies without the cooperation of the centrist parties, which do not lend their cooperation. It must be noted that the centre-rightist parties’ decisions have not been based on a sincere ethno-nationalist sentiment, but on political survival. In the Latvian party system, few party has had incentives to liberalize ethnic policies. Such a move on the part of some parties has given ammunition to political rivals to criticize them on ethnic issues, which in turn has spelled political death.

Nationalist policies have triggered protest by ethnic minority Russians all too often. Although most Russian people in Latvia are less intransigent than Russians in Estonia (see Chapter 4), their disagreement and general dissatisfaction with government policies has often been politicized and escalated. They have voted for Russian parties (that most Latvians have not supported) and organized and participated in picketing and protest demonstrations. Such movements reinforce the
caution that some Latvian citizens and elites have toward Russian minorities. It is a
daisy chain of mutual antagonism, politicized by Latvian elites.

The fragmented conservative camp with its numerous parties that have very
similar policy orientations has been dominated by the rivalry among Latvia’s
oligarchs. New parties have been formed to avoid the backlash from Latvian voters
fueled by the other rival parties. Criticism from other conservative parties is far more
significant, indeed fatal, than the promised reward of additional Russian voters. Many
factors, including the culture of oligarchy, loose restrictions in founding new parties,
the conglutination of companies and political elites, and the revival of historical
parties, among other things, have formed the very unique Latvian party system. This
thesis does not intend to specify the true origins of the fragmented party system in
Latvia. However, this thesis has reviewed the ways in which the fragmented party
system has heightened ethnocentric government policies and provoked ethnic
minority protests. The nature of the party system in Latvia has contributed to the
nation’s confrontational ethnopolitics. In Latvia, ethnic confrontation in the political
process is reinforced by, rather than calmed by, the behaviors of political elites.
Chapter 6.

Estonia: Accommodative Ethnopolitics in a Polarized Society

Although ethnic Estonians and Russians have never been fully socioeconomically integrated in Estonia (see Chapter 4), ethnopolitical relations in Estonia are not politicized nor confrontational now. This chapter explains how the Estonian party system has contributed to the political integration of ethnic majorities and minorities in Estonia.

6.1 The Party System after the Restoration of Estonia’s Independence

Just after the restoration of independence and in the ensuing period of democratization, the Estonian party system faced chaos. Vast numbers of political parties sprung up at the time. In the 1992 general election, nine parties won seats in parliament (Riigikogu) of the total 101 seats available. It was a common tendency in postsocialist countries. This situation gradually began to change in the late 1990s. The Estonian party system has been progressively consolidated and five political parties consistently gain representation: The Reform Party, Pro Patria Union (also known as Fatherland Union), the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party (also known as the Moderates in the 1990s), the People’s Union (and its political ally the Coalition Party). Vogt described these as “five effective parties” in Estonia (Vogt 2003: 83). In the past, there have existed ethnic minority parties, but they only won seats in the elections of 1995 and 1999.

There has not been a general consensus in the relevant scholarship concerning each party’s typology; earlier works have categorized each political party in a different way, as Table 6.1 shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Minority</th>
<th>Social Democrats/Post-communist</th>
<th>(economically) Liberal</th>
<th>Agrarian</th>
<th>Christian Democrats</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MKE, EURP</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>Kesk, RE, KE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I, RE, ERL, Parem</td>
<td>EK, EURP, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKE, EURP</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>Kesk, KE, RE</td>
<td>KE, KMU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I, EURP, RE, Parem</td>
<td>EK, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKE, Kesk, EURP</td>
<td>KE, SDE</td>
<td>KMU, ERL</td>
<td>RE, IL, Parem</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

One can describe each political party’s colors as follows. First, Pro Patria Union is an unquestionably nationalist party. Two separate nationalist parties, Fatherland (I) and the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP), merged into the single party, Pro Patria Union, in 1995. The combined party has won a significant number of seats in every election and have had much influence on policy formation in Estonia. Pro Patria Union has fought its electoral campaigns “with [a] strong nationalist line, [and] its aims include re-creating Estonian nationality . . . favoring the return of people brought to Estonia by Soviet powers [Russians] to their historical homeland [Russia], and defending national interests in citizenship, language, and migration policies” (Albrighton 1999a).

The Reform Party is an economically liberal party. Originally, it was founded in 1994 by Siim Kallas, the president of the Bank of Estonia, and has since promoted neo-liberal policies that do not advocate higher social spending. For example, one of their political achievements was the abolishment of the corporate income tax in 2000 under the Mart Laar cabinet (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004). While the Reform Party has a centre-rightist conservative leaning, their attitude toward ethnic issues has not been not so nationalistic in practice (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999) compared to Res Publica. The Reform Party’s main support base has been generally higher-educated, young, and predominantly Estonian. The Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party have been centre-leftish parties.

While both the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party have similar economic policies, their support bases have been completely different. The elderly, urban, low-educated, and low-paid segments of the electorate tend to support the
Centre Party. On the contrary, the young, countryside residents, and the well-educated among the electorate tend to support the Social Democratic Party (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004, Nakai 2010). Moreover, many Russian voters tend to vote for the Centre Party (Nakai 2008). Although the Social Democratic Party also has had less of a nationalist tone in its political manifestos, many Russian-speaking populations have voted for the Centre Party. This is because its leader, Edgar Savisaar, has undertaken many minority-friendly activities; more importantly, it is because the ethnic Russian electorate living in urban areas, including Tallinn, Narva, and Sillamae, has learned that the Centre Party more or less represents the interests of ethnic minorities (as will be explained in later sections). The People’s Union is a rural-based agrarian party, which, with its de facto predecessor the Coalition Party, formed a political alliance named Coalition Party and People’s Union (KMU) in the 1990s. Both parties share many similarities as their support bases are located in rural areas and their managers and administrators during the Soviet era (ex-nomenklatura Arnold Ruutel of the People’s Union and Tiit Vahi of the Coalition Party) were leading figures in these parties (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999: 154, Raun 1997: 361).

Table 6.2: Party Typology on Ethnic Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority-friendly/Moderate</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party [new left]</td>
<td>People’s Union (Coalition Party) [country agrarian]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
As mentioned above, Estonian party politics have been organized by five main political affiliations, which have continually retained their seats in the parliament: the Reform Party, the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party, Pro Patria Union, and the People’s Union. Each political party draws from specific social or ideological groups as its support base. Their support bases do not overlap. There have been no significant conservative political parties with economically liberal platforms excepting the Reform Party. There likewise have been no significant conservative political parties with rural-based agrarian policy lines except KMU (and the People’s Union). The concrete numbers of seats won by each party are presented as follows (see Table 6.3). The data reinforces the claim that the Estonian party system of recent years consists of only several politically relevant parties in parliament.

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MKE or EURP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDE (M)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERL (EME)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL + ERSP</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee, Parties and Elections in Europe.

What are the implications of this political party system for the national ethnic policy?
What does this party system portend on a practical level? One readily available
answer is that the parties are fearless regarding their support of minority-friendly policies. Both the conservative parties have made decisions without fear that their supporters will vote for alternative economic liberals or alternative agrarians. Even if supporters of the Reform Party do not support its ethnic policies, they do not have alternative economically liberal political parties from which to choose. Even if certain farmers supporting the People’s Union feel anxious about the party’s ethnic policy, they do not have an alternative agrarian party for which to vote. This situation has allowed conservatives to make decisions without fear of losing constituent support.

In essence, there are only two significant political parties in the conservative camp. Their main supporters are completely different from those of the two moderate conservative political parties, the Coalition Party (latterly the People’s Union) and the Reform Party, which do not have to fear the loss of Estonian supporters even if they agree with Russian minority-friendly policies. The next section provides the history of policy changes concerning ethnic issues and minorities’ responses to these changes.

6.2 Estonian Elites’ Decisions about Citizenship Policy and Elections

The political doctrine of the Estonian independence movement advocated legal restoration of the nation’s status before the “Soviet occupation.” This means that automatic citizenship could be accorded only to prewar citizens and their descendants, not to Soviet-era immigrants and their descendants (Pettai and Kallas 2009). This idea crystallized in a new Citizenship Law in September 1992. Under this rule, only someone who possessed Estonian nationality before June 16, 1940, and whose parents possessed Estonian nationality before June 16, 1940, could acquire Estonian citizenship. This meant that about 455,000 adults among the voting electorate (about
40% of the total adult population living in Estonia) were deprived of their basic political rights. The Law also produced a vast number of stateless residents without any status whatsoever. While the Law on Aliens passed in 1993 gave these peoples official status as stateless aliens, the basic principles of the citizenship policies were incorporated into the new version of the 1995 Citizenship Act, and the language test for naturalization was very strict so as to prevent many Russian minorities from acquiring Estonian citizenship.

This law has since changed, informed by both international and domestic political debates. Internationally, the HCNM worried about the situation, Max van der Stoel recommended that the Estonian government grant citizenship to Russians in 1992. The CoE, EU, and UN also started to commit to this problem, because this minority problem “risk[ed] escalating to the point of threatening European stability” and represented a “dangerous situation” (Birkenbach 2000: 2–3). In 1997, the EU Commission informed the Estonian government that it must promote the collective rights of ethnic minorities, for the Citizenship Act at the time was still restrictive and discriminatory (Budryte 2005: 79). In the same year, the OSCE’s van der Stoel visited Estonia again and strongly recommended that the government liberalize the Citizenship Act and grant citizenship to stateless children (Kelly 2004: 105; Budryte 2005: 80).

Considering such external pressure, domestic political actors started to argue in support of the amendment, and played a decisive role in determining whether such a move would progress smoothly or not. While there was harsh resistance from Pro Patria to amend the law, the Riigikogu passed the amendment of the citizenship law39

in December 1998 to grant citizenship automatically to stateless children (Baltic News Service 1998f). A major advocate of the amendment of the citizenship law was the Centre Party and its leader Edgar Savisaar. The Centre Party officially expressed its desire to liberalize the Citizenship Act in August 1997. At that time, some of the other parties faulted the Centre Party’s stance, as they just wanted votes from Russians (Baltic News Service 1997c). It meant that Estonian politicians recognized that the amendment of this law was caught up with the struggle for votes.

Centre-rightist parties, which is to say the Coalition Party and the Reform Party, played a key role at this time because the Centre Party and the other Russian minority party could not take a simple majority in the Riigikogu only with their seats alone. At this point, the critical juncture was that the members of the Coalition Party and the Reform Party agreed on this motion. As they held a middle position on the ethnic issues’ spectrum, whether they would agree or not was the key decision for the citizenship policies amendment at that time. The Reform Party eased party restrictions and allowed deputies to decide whether to support or oppose the bills. The Coalition Party formally changed its policy in a party congress held in October 1998, stating that it would support the amendment plan (Santana 1998a; Baltic News Service 1998g).

For the Coalition Party and the Reform Party, there was not a great risk that they would be criticized on ethnic issues. During the period of the 1999 electoral campaign, after the easing of the citizenship law, political parties fought on issues such as agriculture, information technology, the EU, and small business (Fitzmaurice 2001). Policy arguments and criticism of ethnic issues simply did not arise as a main topic of

40 Previously, they had acted under the name of KMU (as coalition with Rural People’s Union).
Although the Coalition Party lost its seats in the 1999 elections, its loss was not owing to criticism over its ethnic policies, but rather to the internal conflict. The party’s de facto successor, the People’s Union, succeeded in keeping its seats in parliament.

Even when Estonian politicians had to amend the citizenship law due to the external pressure they faced in the late of 1990s, the “issue was not a matter of [political] contention on the elite level in Estonia [in contrast to Latvia]. Legislation was passed without significant upset” (Duvold and Berglund 2003: 257). At that time, the MP of the Social Democrats, Liia Hanni said, “Not so many political factions are interested in putting it on the top of the political agenda” (Santana 1998b). The nationalist group Pro Patria, however, did express their objections, as citizenship “should be used as reward for those who have already integrated, not a tool to spur others to integrate” (Santana 1998c); yet still, this issue did not become the center of the electoral campaign for the next general election in March 1999. The local newspaper The Baltic Times wrote a series featuring each party’s campaign, policy papers, and general stance in February, but one cannot find any evidence of policies or their articulations based on ethnic issues except in the case of Pro Patria (Albrighton 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e; Santana 1999). Conservative parties did not criticize each other in their electoral campaigns, but instead made a promise to form a coalition government among conservatives (Pro Patria, Reforms, People’s, and Social Democrats).

6.3 Estonian Elites’ Decisions about Language Policy and Elections

While the Estonian government had adopted ethnically exclusive qualifications in the
elections just after the restoration of independence, its nationalist taste muted as time passed. Urged by recommendations from international organizations, political parties in parliament played a decisive role.

A controversial issue was the regulation of fluency in the Estonian language in the private sector. Generally speaking, it is not controversial if a law demands that workers in the public sectors and in the emergency sector be fluent in the national language. However, the Estonian government once tried to regulate and control the working language even in the private employment sectors (as Latvia currently does). In February 1999, the amendment of the language law was passed at the initiative of the nationalist group Pro Patria. The amended language law mandated the use of the Estonian language even in the internal affairs of private enterprises. This amended law provoked the antagonism of minorities directly and helped Russian minority parties take seats in an election held the following March. International organizations responded with their own concerns. The head of HCNM, van der Stoel, visited Estonia in June of that year, and the EU demanded that Estonia postpone the enactment of language regulation in the private sectors.

External pressures encouraged the Estonian political and administrative elites to readjust the restriction of language laws. The ministry of foreign affairs of Estonia made a new amendment plan, which would not contradict the rules of the EU. Although Prime Minister Laar and his nationalist party Pro Patria criticized the new amendment, some of the other parties started to accommodate it. The ministry not only tried to abolish the amendment in 1999, but they added the provision that employees and proprietors in the private sector must be fluent in Estonian if it is in the public interest. Due to this provision, most of the workers in the private sector would
be free from the language restrictions enacted by the state. At the same time, some conservative political elites felt it reasonable to agree to the new amendment plan because it demands private sector workers in the public interest to be fluent in Estonian. At that time, the Russian ethnic party United People’s Party (EURP) and the Centre Party held 34 seats in parliament, and the nationalist Pro Patria held 18 seats. Accordingly, the decisions of the Social Democratic Party and the Reform Party, who had a total of 36 seats between them, were key to whether this new amendment would pass (the People’s Union did not have many seats at that time). Both parties did not appear to have any objections to the amendment. Rather, many supporters of the Reform Party embraced the economic-liberal oriented political view, and would welcome the integration of Estonia’s market into the EU if and when Estonia joined. Finally, not only the MPs of the EURP and the Centre Party, but also the MPs of the Social Democratic Party and the Reform Party agreed on the bill containing the new amendment of the language law in June 2000. The final amendment abolished the language restriction in the private sector with no exceptions for the public interest.

After this process, parliamentary political parties in the conservative camp (especially the Reform Party) did not have to face any sort of ethnic backlashes. Most MPs supported the amendment, and it would not be fruitful if some centre-right political party had criticized the other parties’ agreement to amend the language law in 2000. Even if the People’s Union had criticized the Reform Party’s agreement, the agrarian People’s Union could not have attracted the economic liberalist supporters of the Reform Party. In addition, if the Reform Party accused the People’s Union or the

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41 Although we looked at the reports from the Baltic News Service and all the articles in the *The Baltic Times* around this time, we cannot find a single sentence that touched on the Reform Party’s criticism of the new amendment plan in the language law.
Centre Party of being “a betrayer of the Estonian nation,” they would not be able to attract the redistribution-oriented voters who tend to support the centrist parties, nor the farmers who support the People’s Union, because the Reform Party’s political orientation has been consistently directed toward market-oriented liberals. Rather, it was more fruitful to agree to the amendment and appeal to the Russian voters to maximize their voting shares in future elections. For example, it is apparent that the Reform Party sought Russian ballots, since the Reform Party later merged with the Russian Baltic Party.

As a result, ethnic issues were not among the biggest issues in the electoral campaign of 2003. Arguments about taxation, family issues, and corruption dominated the 2003 electoral season (Pettai 2004). Regarding the language issues, conservative parties in Estonia, to maximize their political support, chose strategies that would not rob the other conservative parties of their supporters. Thus, the conservative parties agreed to the liberalizing treatment, which attracted minority votes, instead of mobilizing ethnocentric discourse. In fact, the Reform party started to see an increase in representation after the 2003 election (even though their rival RP ran for election at that time). Although their success amongst minorities was not the biggest factor which could explain the Reform Party’s positive results in the election, it did stand as one of many contributing factors to the Reform Party’s victory. The leftish Centre party also steadily has kept its seats in parliament, before and after the 2003 general election. This phenomenon has also been explained by the political support of minorities, among other reasons.

The question of whether minority children should be taught in their mother tongue or in the national language is also a major issue in contemporary ethnopolitics.
As this research discusses, Latvia has experienced vivid political confrontations on this issue, while Estonia has never seen major political upheavals waged on this point.

The Estonian government introduced the 1993 language law, a significantly nationalist (and unrealistic) education policy, which demanded that all students in public high school\(^{42}\) be taught only in Estonian by 2000. Although President Meri vetoed this bill, the parliament under the Laar cabinet, in conjunction with Pro Patria, finally passed this law despite the protests of the President. This policy brought with it negative consequences not only for Russian minorities, as they could not be educated in their mother tongue, but also on the Russian-speaking teachers who would lose their jobs by 2000 if they did not become proficient in the state language. The head of curriculum at the Educational Ministry, Kersti Kaldma, pointed out that “[t]he biggest problem is that . . . there are not enough Estonians teaching Estonian to Russian speakers” (Carrol 1996). Then in 1997, this unrealistic and nationalistic provision changed. The Estonian parliament under the Siiman cabinet (comprised of the Coalition Party with the Centre Party’s support from outside the cabinet) amended the law to prolong the transition to Estonian language education in Russian language schools to 2008 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 1997). Moreover, in 2002, the Kallas cabinet (comprised of the Reform Party and Centre Party) amended the language law and introduced a gradual integration plan under which all high schools were to use the Estonian language in at least 60% of their classes. At the same time, this plan allowed Russian schools to continue full-time Russian language education until 2007 (this is one of the biggest differences compared to Latvia’s education policy; see Chapter 5). Nowadays, due to a large number of exceptions, many Russian

\(^{42}\) 1993’s education law allowed the minority language to be used at the elementary school level.
schools have not fulfilled the 60% conditions (and do not have to). Even now, the Estonian government still does not demand that the Estonian language be used exclusively in minority schools.\(^{43}\) In short, all of these amendments and promotions were accomplished by the coalition between the pro-minority Centre Party and conservatives (Coalition Party or Reform Party), without the nationalist Pro Patria (Gunter 2002). Thanks to its treatment of this issue, the Centre party succeeded in keeping its political power even in the 2004 general election.

### 6.4 Reactions by Minorities toward Policies: Political Accommodation

#### Inside Parliament

Russian minorities in the early 1990s presented a confrontational attitude in the political arena when Estonian politicians tried to repress, exclude, or assimilate Russophone minorities. They formed their own pro-Russian political organization (comprised of Our Home is Estonia, the Russian Party of Estonia, and the United Russian People’s Party) and voted for it. Once, in the city of Narva, they actually gained control of parliament and expressed their will to secede from Estonia. Even though this attempt was rejected by the court, such a move, which had the possibility of provoking a civil war or an unrecognized-state problem, shocked Estonian society.

Figure 6.1 shows the attributions of party support by ethnic Estonians and Russians in the mid-1990s. During this period, Russian voters and Estonian voters supported different political actors. Russian voters favored their own ethnic Russian

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\(^{43}\) Needless to say, many minorities want their children to be educated in the Estonian language, as their children will have better chances at securing jobs. However, instruction in a minority language does not always restrict minorities. It is just a matter of selection (usually by their parent). If the government prohibited all instruction in a minority language and demanded that all schools instruct only in the state language, it will apparently restrict minority residents to choose a school based on the language of instruction.
party to express their dissatisfactions, to protect their own ethnic interests, and to voice their protests. In the 1995 general elections, the number of eligible voters increased reflecting the growing number of non-Estonians who were acquiring citizenship. The ethnic Russian share of eligible voters rose to over 10% (Aklaev 1999: 171) in that election, which contributed to the electoral success of Our Home is Estonia.

Figure 6.1: Party Support Rate among Each Ethnic Group in 1995 (%)

Note: In calculating percentages, the author excluded those respondents who answered DK and NA and those who could not vote (N=143).
Source: Rose (1997)

However, as noted above, the Russian minorities’ discordant political actions began to abate in the late 1990s. The Russian electorate stopped voting for Russian minority parties and has not taken serious political action outside of parliament. Russian parties lost seats in parliament because many Russian voters started to support the centre-leftish Centre Party after 2000. The Centre Party and its chairman Edgar
Savisaar had appealed to Russian minority voters with their policies and their credit claiming to be the guardians of the ethnic minorities’ interests (Jeffries 2004: 160–1; Nakai 2009; Toomla 2011: 198–203). After the 2003 general elections, no minority parties have been able to win seats in parliament. Figure 5.2 shows the change in Russian voters’ preferences.

**Figure 6.2: Party Support Rate among Each Ethnic Group in 2004 (%)**

![Bar chart showing party support rates among each ethnic group in 2004.](chart.png)


Note: In calculating percentages, the author excluded those respondents who answered DK and NA and those who could not vote (N=940).

Source: Rose (2005)

It is evident that the Centre Party has been consistently very popular among Russian voters. This is because the Centre Party has initiated several policies and laws, which have protected Russian minorities’ ethnic interests. Many Russian voters have changed their party affiliation to support the Centre Party. In addition, Russian minority voters now vote even for the People’s Union, the Social Democratic Party, and the Reform Party. Russian minority voters have generally reacted to changes in
ethnic policy in Estonia by switching party affiliations. Of course, most Russian members of the electorate do not vote along nationalist lines. Many Russians now prefer the Centre Party, but some prefer the People’s Union or the Reform Party. This is a strategic success for the People’s Union and the Reform Party, as they have calculated the tradeoff from the gain of Russian votes and the loss of their existing Estonian votes. Cooperating to establish pro-minority laws (the citizenship law, education law, and language law), the conservative Reform Party and People’s Union have increased in popularity among Russian voters. If we compare Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, we can understand the changes in support for the Reform Party and the People’s Union among ethnic Estonians and Russians. In the 1990s, no Russians supported the coalition parties, and the proportion of Russians who supported the Reform Party was about one-tenth of the proportion of Estonians who supported the Reform Party.\(^{44}\) A study by Toomla (2011) stated that Russian minorities tend to vote not only for the Centre Party, but also for the Reform Party and the People’s Union.

**Outside Parliament**

Russians did stage several protest riots, strikes, and demonstrations in the 1990s in Estonia. Most of these occurred in the capital Tallinn and the town of Narva. Narva is located in Estonia’s northeastern region (the Ida-viru district) on the Russian borderland, and 90% of its population is Russian. The first-recorded large collective action took place in Narva in October 1992. Rallies were held by ethnic Russians “protesting discrimination by the Estonian authorities” (Minority At Risk 2010b). After this event, there were several actions in the Ida-viru area (May 1996, July 1996,

\(^{44}\) Toomla (2011) also found that some Russian voters in Estonia support the Reform Party.
October 1997, and May 1999), and in the capital, Tallinn (April 1995 and June 1995), but they diminished after around 1998–2000. It was during this period that the Estonian parliament started to amend several laws in order to accommodate Russian minorities on ethnic issues.

Subsequently, there have been only small, sporadic rallies by Russian minorities in Estonia. Of course, some Russian organizations have remained active (they have held rallies sometimes), but most Russian minorities in Estonia are no longer actively participating in such political demonstrations. There seem to be two main reasons. First, for Russian minorities, there has been no great need to voice their dissatisfaction via a movement because the government has never extremely restricted minorities’ ethnic interests. Second, there have been political parties who represented minorities’ interests and that functioned in parliament. Granted representation in parliament, minorities have not bothered to act outside of parliament.

An exceptional movement was the April 2007 riot, well known as the “Bronze Night” or “April Unrest.” On the nights of April 26–27, many Russian young people rallied, protesting the relocation of the historically controversial “bronze soldier” statue in Tallinn. The government forced through the crowd to finish the relocation, and the Russian protesters turned to violence. The relocation followed just after the general election in 2007 without any dialogue with minority groups. In other words, at that time, the government (Ansip cabinet) was exceptionally nationalist according to the standards of recent Estonian politics, and Russian minorities protested the government’s nationalist policies. The work of the present study can explain this

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45 These dates have been retrieved from Baltic News Service (1996a, 1996b, 1997d, 1999a, 1999b) and Minority At Risk (2010b).

46 For the older generation and the Russian minority, this statue was the symbol of victory against Nazi Germany and fascism, but for most of the Estonian people, it symbolized the start of the occupation by Soviet Communists.
exceptional event. The important point is that the Reform Party, which had once attracted Russian voters, changed its stance and mobilized in support of Estonian nationalism around this time. In fact, there had been an exceptional change in the party system before the event.

Before the 2007 election, the newly formed political party Res Publica gained many seats and much broader support in Estonian party politics. Res Publica’s main political supporters were young, educated, rich, and economically liberal-minded people. This meant that Res Publica appeared as a viable political rival to the Reform Party. This situation made the Reform Party become more nationalistic. If the Reform Party did not promote nationalist discourses and continue attracting Estonian voters, most Estonian supporters who had voted for the Reform Party but hated its pro-minority line would start voting for Res Publica. This would be political death for the Reform Party. Then, before the general election in March 2007, Andrus Ansip and the Reform Party determined to use the historically controversial issue of the “bronze soldier” statue for the Reform Party’s electoral campaign (Smith 2008; Ehala 2009).

6.5 Chapter Conclusion

Estonian society has faced serious ethnic questions since its independence was restored. There have been economic inequalities between the ethnic majority Estonians and the ethnic minority Russians. Russian minorities’ living area is concentrated in a specific area of the country. Each ethnic group has shown negative attitudes towards one another. Despite this, which could be assumed to be a plausible origin of ethnic conflict, ethnic issues are not politicized now, and the ethnopolitical situation is now accommodative. The governments that are usually composed of
ethnic Estonian-backed parties have taken relatively liberal policies toward Russians, and Russian minorities have not engaged in acts of political protest inside or outside of parliament.

A factor that has had a clear impact on the ethnopolitical situation is party politics. Estonia’s consolidated party system has allowed the government to amend several policies to embrace more minority-friendly positions, and the minority groups have thus muted their political protest. Since Estonia regained its independence, some political parties have had pro-minority policies, but these have not been sufficient to change the national laws by themselves. The decisions of some centrist parties contributed to the changes of law in Estonian ethnopolitics. The important point is that these centrists’ decisions were not based on their cosmopolitanism, or on altruism toward ethnic minorities. Rather, they made these decisions simply for their own selfish aims—namely, the maximization of votes. Some political parties intended to gain Russian votes without the ethnocentric backlash from ethnic Estonians, thanks to the consolidated party system, and this succeeded.

As this thesis has already argued in previous sections, most of the moderate ethnic Estonian elites have not had to fear an ethnic backlash due to the party systems’ structural composition, and they could sometimes agree on the pro-minority policies proposed by minority-friendly parties. Unfortunately, we cannot show directly that “there have never been ethnic backlashes among them” because the establishing of the non-existence of such conflicts is probatio diabolica. However, instead, there are two types of evidence that indirectly support this argument. Firstly, many scholars have pointed out that nowadays ethnic issues are never central topics in Estonian electoral campaigns. Secondly, in reality, the laws adopted by the successive Estonian
governments are more liberal than Latvia’s. The amended rules incorporated minority-friendly aspects and softened minorities’ protests and intransigency. Minority voters stopped voting for their own ethnic parties and stopped participating in mass protest movements outside parliament. Finally, many political parties in Estonia tried to include the Russian elites and members of the voting public in their power bases. Recently, the Social Democratic Party merged with the Russian Party in Estonia (Smutov 2012), and this assimilation has contributed to increased support for the Social Democratic Party by Russians. Nowadays, most Russian voters can express their political will by supporting political parties that Estonians also support.

Although there has been persistent socioeconomic inequality between Russians and Estonians, Russians’ dissatisfaction is not politicized nowadays in a polarized manner. The consolidated conservative camp (one nationalist party, one economic liberal party, and one agrarian party), allows political elites to strategically pursue the ethnic minority votes. Each of its political parties holds a completely different support base. This means that it would be ineffective even if a political party criticized the other conservative parties’ behaviors based on ethnic discourses. This thesis does not and cannot specify the origin of the Estonian consolidated party system, because there are too many factors which define it: party registration law, lack of personal antagonism among the elites, the pattern of the party system before WWII (and its restoration), the mode of relations between parties and enterprises, and so on. However, the Estonian party system defines the pattern of ethnic policies which have developed in the country and the ensuing reactions of ethnic minorities. In sum, the party system defines the pattern of ethnopolitics in the conventional political process in Estonia.
Part 3: Conclusions
Chapter 7.

Conclusion and Implications

7.1 Ethnopolitics is also politics, and it is not exceptional

At academic and non-academic levels, ethnopolitical questions have often been treated as fatalistic phenomena bounded by multinational situation, historically rooted ethnic hatred, or inescapable karma. Although it is true that such views are shared by people where and when ethnic confrontation has erupted, it is not true that such factors generate ethnic confrontation. In fact, there are many multiethnic nations that have never experienced significant interethnic violence and some multiethnic nations that once experienced political unrest based on ethnic confrontation but have managed to maintain interethnic peace afterwards (and, conversely, some countries have experienced ethnopolitical conflict despite having been peaceful up to that point). If multietnicity itself brought ethnopolitical conflict, Canada would have experienced its second or third October Crisis by now, South Africa would still have its Apartheid policies and protests by black residents, every state in India would have its version of the Ayodhya dispute, and Nigeria would suffer from an unceasing Biafran civil war, but this is not the case. The important fact is that decisions made by human beings change situations, and generate results.

The situation is similar in the new European democracies, on which this research has been focused. The new European democracies, having previously been communist countries, experienced the rise of ethnonationalistic discourses in the process of democratization, but they also show us the differences in the pattern of
ethnopolitics nowadays. Although the ethnopolitics of Hungarians in Romania is even now somewhat confrontational, the Hungarians in Slovakia, with the same historical background, show, to some extent, accommodative aspects. The Hungarian situation in Slovakia was truly confrontational in the 1990s, but it became less confrontational in the 2000s. The Russian situation in the Baltic States is a genuinely confrontational political dispute even now in Latvia, but not so much in Estonia. The Russian situation in Lithuania has been more accommodative since the early 1990s, even though these three Baltic nations have faced this question with the same historical background and under genuinely similar socioeconomic situations. Roma politics was once truly confrontational in the early 1990s in the Czech Republic, a relatively ethnically homogeneous country, when there was unstoppable organized violence against Romani and huge organized protests by them, but it ceased after that. Hungary, another relatively ethnically homogeneous country, has also faced Roma politics, but it has been less confrontational compared with the early 1990s in the Czech Republic. At any rate, here, neither historical fate nor socioeconomic background explains the cross-national and inter-temporal variance in the ethnopolitical situation among Central and Eastern European countries. What about institutional design or international intervention? Those might have an effect on the ethnopolitical situation, as some literature has pointed out, but they do not provide us with an adequate explanation for the ethnopolitical differences in these new European democracies. All ten Central and Eastern European countries that this research examines adopted fully democratic institutions, with proportional representative system, and they all more or less satisfied the demands of western European countries or the other international organizations for the protection of minorities. These institutional and
macro-international situations are more or less similar for these new European democracies.

Here we need to pay attention to the actors in the political arena, and those who set the stage for politics. Ethnopolitics is not like a crystal grown in a test tube; it is a product created by human beings and their intentions. Again, this research emphasizes that decisions by human beings change the ethnopolitical circumstances, and decisions by human beings generate results in ethnopolitics. As politics is all about competing interests and struggles to satisfy them, so is ethnopolitics about competing interests and the struggles to satisfy them. As politicians initiate and execute economic policies considering their own interests, they initiate and execute ethnic policies considering their own interests. As people react to economic policies with political action to satisfy their own interests, so they react to ethnic policies with political actions to satisfy their own interests. Of course, the word “interest” used here does not refer only to material interest. Ethnopolitics is a phenomenon dealing with identities, and the stakes that ethnopolitical disputes fight over include non-material factors. That is one way ethnopolitics differs from other political issues, but they are all the same in the broader sense that they are all about the struggles among various players for material and non-material interests.

7.2 The elite decide policies, and people react to these policies

What, then, leads and sets the decisions made by actors? In addition, who are the actors? This research pays attention to the fact that the relation between an ethnic majority and an ethnic minority overlaps the relationship between the government and ethnic minority groups. The ethnic majority group is the majority in the demographic
sense, so their political representatives usually grasp political power under democratic
democratitarian rule. Although an ethnic minority group cannot grasp political power and
set the rules alone, they can express their political attitudes under democratic freedom.
Because this is the case, this research pays attention to the maneuvers of the
government and the ethnic minority group and identifies them as analytical actors.

The ethnic minority group chooses its political actions based on the government’s
ethnic policies. When the government represents and respects the ethnic minority
group’s interests adequately, minority residents do not have to protest in the political
arena; political protest may come at a price for them. When the government represses
and ignores the interests of the ethnic minority group, however, minority residents
will protest both inside and outside parliamentary political movements. Then, who
and what defines government policies? In democratic parliaments, it is usually the
political parties and MPs. Political parties must survive politically, as *homo politicus*,
which means in a democratic country that they have to keep and maximize their share
of the vote in endless elections. Under the democratic political process, the decision
of the moderately positioned political parties, supported by the ethnic majority groups,
is important in defining the ethnic policies of the government and its varying effects
on the ethnic minority’s behavior. If the moderate intermediate parties adopt a
nationalistic line, the government’s policies become nationalistic and the minority
group protests. If they adopt a minority-friendly line, the government’s policies
become pro-minority, and the minority group will not protest. So, what will affect
their decision? It is the number of their political rivals. This was my hypothesis. The
key players in the parliament, the moderate center-rightist parties, make decisions by
considering the number of their political rivals. They will take a minority-friendly line
by considering the increase in the vote from the minority group, when political rivals do not exist, because their minority-friendly line will not be criticized by any political rival and existing voters will not punish them. They will keep a nation-building-first line when considering the need to secure the vote from their existing political supporters—the ethnic majority—when many political rivals exist, because they do not want to lose the ethnic majority’s votes after being criticized by their political rivals using ethnocentric discourses. The latent political rivals are conservative parties and nationalist parties; we call them simply “conservative camps.” Therefore, when and where conservative camps are fragmented, it creates a confrontational ethnopolitics. When and where conservative camps are integrated, it brings an accommodative ethnopolitics. This is a main argument of the present study.

Carefully executed statistical analysis verified that this understanding is valid and significant while showing that other viable alternative explanations are invalid. Observing several aspects of the ethnic policies adopted by governments and several aspects of ethnic protest by ethnic minorities, this research constructed a unified index that majors the degree of ethnopolitical confrontation from country to country and from time to time. Using the index, which I have called the EPCI, the specifications and verifications of the causal effect between the dependent variables and the main and viable rival hypothesis can be assessed. The preliminary analysis apparently showed that the level of political fragmentation in conservative parties has a strongly and statistically significant effect on the level of ethnopolitical confrontations, EPCI. This covariant relation is never a spurious correlation, nor based on reverse causality. Additional analyses made it clear by using lagged data. Ethnopolitical confrontation does not produce political fragmentation in conservative camps; political
fragmentation in conservative camps produces ethnopolitical confrontation. Moreover, we tested this hypothesis’s robustness by multiple-regression analysis controlling the other hypotheses’ variables. The hypothesis survived. The results showed that, in fact, the more the community is ethnically polarized and the longer its ethnic minority question’s history is, the more confrontational the ethnopolitics tends to be. After controlling for these other factors’ effects, ethnopolitical confrontation tends to be confrontational inter-temporally and cross-nationally when and where the fragmentation in conservative camps is strong. The truly important political factor that determines the ethnopolitical situation is not simply the quantitative size of political conservatives but the qualitative difference—the fragmentation of political conservatives.  

The case studies in Part 2, from the Baltic countries of Latvia and Estonia, provided the concrete causal process revealing how the fragmentation of conservative camps and the political struggle between these political elites affected the ethnic policies of the governments and resulted in reactions from the Russian-minority groups. The comparison between these two countries seems to be one of the best and ideal case selections for the consideration of ethnopolitical conflict and an exploration of the factors that determine it. Both countries have faced Russian-minority questions, which have evolved out of annexation by the Soviet Union, and both have had highly similar institutional, international, and socioeconomic situations yet today have completely different ethnopolitical situations. Ethnic issues are not politically

47 On this point, the size of the nationalist party alone has the possibility of affecting the ethnopolitical situation. Nakai (2012) verifies that government citizenship policies tend to be nationalistic when and where the share of seats of the nationalist party is large, and tend to be minority-friendly when and where the share of seats is small. This finding is not inconsistent with the findings of the present study, because the rise of the nationalists resulted in the increased fragmentation of the conservative camps as a whole and vice versa.
disputed any more in Estonia, but they have been a leading cause of political confrontation in Latvia, even though ethnic hatred levels in public opinion are high in Estonia and low in Latvia (see chapter 4 for details). One of the most different aspects in Estonia and Latvia has been its party politics.

Latvian party politics has been highly fragmented. There have been many political parties, especially those supported by ethnic Latvian voters. Under this fragmented situation, political parties in conservative camps compete against one another, and if a party once shows a pro-minority line, the rest of them start to criticize that party as a betrayer of the nation, in order to steal the party’s votes and political support. The Democratic Party Saimnieks lost its seats after showing a pro-minority line in the citizenship policy dispute. Green and Farmers Union were evicted from political power when they pursued cooperation with a Russian-minority party at the time of the language policy dispute. The parties in the conservative camps never tried to attract Russian voters by making government policy more accommodative toward Russian. Russian residents have maintained and strengthened their political protests inside and outside the parliament, pursuing seats in the parliament and initiating several demonstrations, pickets, and rallies. This has resulted in a confrontational ethnopolitics in Latvia, even though there is less ethnic hatred among the citizens.48

The Estonian party system, by contrast, became integrated after the democratization process. The main moderate parties were and are the Reform Party and the People’s Union (and its predecessor, the Coalition Party). They did not have to fear any big loss of existing voters after they adopted minority-friendly laws, with the

48 On this point, please see also footnote 25.
cooperation of the pro-Russian Centre Party, because there were no political rivals to criticize the accommodative attitude of their ethnic policies. Rather, they increased the votes they received from Russian voters and consolidated their political survival. General agreement of parties about citizenship policies and language policies made the Estonian government’s ethnic policies liberal. These policies comfort Russian residents, and they mute political protest. Nowadays, the ethnic issue is never politically salient. Although mutual ethnic hatred is stronger in Estonia, this does not escalate into ethnopolitical conflict thanks to the structuring of interests contextualized by the integrated party system.

7.3 Limitations and viable further research

Of course, the finding of this research is not the best or the only one that appropriately explains ethnopolitical conflict in the democratic process. It attempts merely to account for one of the factors determining it. Theoretically and empirically, this research is limited, in that it focuses on the post-communist European countries in its analysis, in order to control the various factors and make clearer the importance of ethnopolitical issues. This setting brings to light three assumptions that may limit the applicability of the research, especially with regard to the external validity of the hypothesis. The three assumptions are that ethnic issues are salient, there is a similar international structure, and majority-minority relations are apparent.

Post-communist European democracies were newly democratized countries. Under the young democracies, as I argued in the theoretical chapter, political

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49 Of course, there was an exception. As we argued, once the Res Publica party appeared as a political rival for the Reform Party, the latter changed its ethnic policy approach and adopted an Estonian-nationalistic line (see section 6.4).
mobilization or the representation of interests tend to be connected with ethnic or other kinds of group identity, because voters and elites can use them as a frame of reference that make electoral decisions easier.\(^\text{50}\) In practice, every CEE country experienced the rise of ethnonationalism, as I noted in the theoretical chapter. “[I]n East-Central Europe...the political issues connected with these sorts of collective identities were among the most controversial, even overshadowing conflicts over the economic reform strategy” (Kostelecky 2002: 163). On that point, in every country where I carried out this research, ethnic issues are and were apparently salient or latently important. This assumption might not be shared all over the world, especially for those countries with well-consolidated, historically lengthy democracies. Although ethnic issues have the possibility of erupting even in developed democracies’ politics, it is less plausible that political elites sincerely care about or fear a change in political support and votes based on ethnic issues mainly. This research assumes that political elites care about the volatility of political support based on ethnic policies and that voters rely on the ethnic issue to cast their ballot. This assumption might not be valid in developed democracies.\(^\text{51}\) It is one limitation of the present study, with regard to its external validity.

In addition to this, in the matter of universe of cases, we can omit the effect of international interventions with regard to ethnic conflicts as an explanation. As regards the CEE countries, all of them progressed simultaneously in the EU accession

\(^{50}\) On this point, several works have verified that in young democracies, ethnonationalistic identities tend to increase when elections draw closer (Eifert et al. 2010, Higashijima and Nakai 2011, Nakai and Higashijima 2012).

\(^{51}\) However, Howard (2009) assumes that political elite, even in developed democracies, also fear and care about changes in political support based on citizenship policies, which is an ethnic issue. He tries to account for the variation on citizenship policies, and he argues that the liberalization of citizenship policies generates major opposition from ethnic-majority voters based on ethnic sentiment, when and where far-rightist parties have the seats in the parliament.
process and have all been monitored by the Council of Europe, OSCE, and so on. All these international interventions would account for variations in the pattern of ethnic conflict that existed and exists in these new young democracies. However, if we set the broader and wider universe of cases, this international situation could be different from country to country, so it might be possible that this international intervention explains better the broader and bigger variations in the pattern of ethnic conflict. Of course, social phenomena are determined by various factors. On that point, the views from domestic politics and international politics to account for the ethnopolitical situation are not opposed but are supplemental. We ought to include consideration of the international political structure when we seek a broader comparison and wider empirical research, beyond the CEE cases.

Moreover, this research assumes a specific type of multiethnic country. The community has an ethnic majority group and an ethnic minority group. Here, whether the group is dominant or dominated is clear. Although this is the most common type of multiethnic situation, it is not necessarily universal for multiethnic countries. For example, in some countries, the biggest ethnic group is not the simple majority in a demographic sense. Here, the political parties supported by voters from this ethnic group cannot control the government and its policies without the agreement of ethnic minority groups under democratic majoritarian rule. The assumption of this research’s theory cannot apply directly in such cases. As another example, some countries have highly fragmented ethnic societies composed of ten, twenty, or even more ethnic groups (it might be more appropriate to call them tribes). In these situations, another subordinate group identity might function as the proxy of the “ethnic groups,” but it is not clear whether the theoretical framework shown in this research can be applied.
There is also an empirical matter regarding the external validity of this research.

At any rate, I hope that further work can be done in future to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis, the variables, and the method that this research (especially its statistical analysis) adopted can be applied not only to the CEE cases but also to other nations and regions. In this respect, the following point must be noted: This thesis never intended to say that the political situation in parliament is the best explanatory factor for defining the ethnopolitical situation in democracies. Such a factor may not be the best nor the only factor but one of the concrete factors that determine ethnopolitical confrontations and accommodations. I aim to verify this fact in this research.

### 7.4 Implications for analysis, perspectives, and institutional design

The biggest and main message of this research is that political interests and their relations define ethnopolitics. The pattern of ethnopolitics has never been historical fate or the result of mass antagonism. It is the product of a struggle of interests among the elites and the people under democratic rule.

When we consider the relation between democracy and ethnopolitical problems, it seems that there is a conceptual tension between democracy and ethnic peace. Democracy does not necessarily escalate ethnic confrontation, but sometimes it may do. This thesis provides a new additional implication for these questions. Under what conditions does the implementation of democracy escalate ethnopolitical confrontation? There have been many works trying to determine this. For example, Wilkinson (2004) said that democracy generates ethnic violence when and where democratic electoral competitions are highly competitive. Chua (2003) said that
democracy generates ethnic confrontation when and where a demographically minority group dominates economic power. The present study says that democracy generates ethnic confrontation when and where party competition among ethnic majority parties is fragmented. It seems to be fair to say that my argument presents a new, additional perspective when we consider the tension between democracy and ethnic peace. Democracy and democratic elections provoke ethnic conflicts under certain conditions but mute them under other conditions. Democracy and elections are not necessarily a magic bullet for peaceful governance in certain situations. Democracy and elections can cure ethnopolitical relations at times, but they can poison ethnopolitical disputes at other times.

This implication leads to a consideration of electoral institutions that have been at the core of democracy. Classically, Lijphart (1977) argued, institutional design that introduces, for example, proportional representation and cooperation between elites based on ethnic group can secure interethnic peace and good governance in democratic countries. Ironically, however, even Belgium—which Lijphart relied on heavily to argue and verify his argument—experienced the longest ever recorded absence of a government because of disagreements between political parties based on ethnic divisions. Now we are faced with the same question concerning the conditions under which democratic practice can be exercised in multiethnic communities without unrest. We need to reconsider the idea that simple institutional design can secure interethnic peace. Actually, proportional representation and other institutional rules guaranteeing the representation of an ethnic minority make it easier

---

52 Chua (2003) did not say that it is the only factor that generates ethnic confrontation. She argued and verified that it is one of the factors that cause it.

53 The confrontation between two ethnic groups was not the only factor in this event but apparently was one of the factors that shaped it.
for the numerically repressed ethnic minority group to bring its interests into the political sphere because it lets the ethnic minority party win seats in parliament more easily. At the same time, however, that system might make it easier for several small parties mainly supported by the ethnic majority group to win seats in parliament, which might result in conflict among these small, but mutually competitive parties, which may trigger ethnopolitical confrontation, as this research has shown.

It seems to be fair to say that protecting the opportunity and occasion for representation of ethnic minority interests is not enough to avoid ethnopolitical conflict under democratic rule. It is also necessary to avoid and suppress the rise of chauvinistic ethnocentric political mobilization by ethnic majorities, as well as the subsequent ethnic repression by the government. For example, the banning of hate speech in political campaigns makes it harder for political elites to mobilize ethnic majority voters to win the elections. Restriction to found new parties, with an exemption for an ethnic minority party, might contribute to ethnopolitical peace, because, under this situation, the number of political parties supported by the ethnic majority group will decrease, and the government with such a party system tends to be less nationalistic, based on this study’s findings. Reducing the frequency of elections by holding elections of different levels on one day, might contain the rise of ethnonationalistic repression that results in ethnic minority protests because, as many works have pointed out, elections generally have the function of increasing the focus on ethnic identity, especially in newly democratized countries.

Some might feel that these proposals are biased in favor of protecting the rights of the minority or of ethnic minorities, but this is unfounded. The implications of these proposals are also significant for those who think that national integration based
on the way of life of the ethnic majority group is important, or who believe the interests of the ethnic majority group should be given priority over all. For the interests of ethnic majority group, the biggest violation is the attack on their material interests that might result from ethnic demonstrations, the non-material effects of the rise of ethnic minority parties, or the secessionist movement and its execution. There are no guarantees that protests from the ethnic minority group evoked by repression from the government will not, in turn, violate the material and non-material interests of the ethnic majority group. For example, it is not always true that the ethnic minority party represented in parliament will endorse moderate political views. Some ethnic parties might be strident and violate the ethnic majority group’s interests materially and non-materially. Some demonstrators from ethnic minorities might exhibit attitudes that are more radical. An accommodative ethnopolitical situation, by contrast, has merits for the ethnic majority group as well as the minority. Allowing ethnic minority protests to get everything they demand may trigger the tragic results also for ethnic majority group’s way of life, so it is more desirable to coordinate and adjust the different ethnic groups’ interests in the existing political process peacefully. A stable ethnopolitical situation brings win-win results for both ethnic majorities and minorities.

Ethnopolitics is a politics. It is neither an inescapable historical fate, nor a simple reflection of sociodemographic substructures, even though they may affect it. Actors’ choices and behaviors define, form, and construct it. Benign human nature does not result in accommodative ethnopolitics, nor does malign human nature result in confrontational ethnopolitics. Such understanding is just arrested thinking. The political elite and people act, under given conditions and various interest structures, to
make situations better. When examining ethnopoli
tical peace and conflict, the most
important thing to consider is what kind of interest structure results in a
confrontational situation and what results in the move toward an accommodative
situation. This study has done that.
## Appendix A: The Movements of Ethnic Minorities Outside of Parliaments

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<tr>
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<th>Types and aims of the movements (Source: Minority at Risk Project)</th>
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<td>Protest with Signatures (in Dagavpils) against language policy</td>
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<td>1998. Apr.</td>
<td>Rally and Demonstration against educational policy</td>
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<td>1998. May</td>
<td>Demonstration against educational policy</td>
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Appendix B: Results of the Principle Component Analysis

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## Appendix C: Electoral Result of Conservative Camp

[FoC = Fractionalization of Conservatives, SSoC = Seats Share of Conservatives]

### Estonia

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<td>18 RP</td>
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</table>

**FoC**

- 1992: 3.13
- 1995: 2.85
- 1999: 1.68
- 2003: 2.30
- 2007: 1.40

**SSoC (%)**

- 1992: 61.39
- 1995: 21.78
- 1999: 24.75
- 2003: 47.52
- 2007: 34.65

*The number of seats by EME in electoral alliance KMU (Day et al 2002:204).*

### Latvia

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<td>7 TB-LNNK</td>
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**FoC**

- 1993: 2.64
- 1995: 3.65
- 1998: 2.58
- 2002: 3.46
- 2006: 3.42

**SSoC (%)**

- 1993: 28.00
- 1995: 46.00
- 1998: 49.00
- 2002: 49.00
- 2006: 59.00

### Lithuania

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<td>MKDS</td>
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**FoC**

- 1992: 2.26
- 1996: 1.60
- 2000: 2.56
- 2004: 1.00

**SSoC (%)**

- 1992: 37.59
- 1996: 64.54
- 2000: 10.64
- 2004: 17.73

### Poland

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**FoC**

- 1991: 2.69
- 1993: 1.00
- 1997: 1.06
- 2001: 1.99
- 2005: 1.42

**SSoC (%)**

- 1993: 4.78
- 1997: 45.00
- 2001: 17.83
- 2005: 41.09
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*The number of seats by PNL in electoral alliance PNL-PD

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Source: Chutouou Kyu-Soren Shokoku no Senkyo Deta (Hokkaido University), Parties and Elections in Europe.
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Perpetual

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