

# Self as Wave - New ontological paradigm

— ΝΩΘΙ Σ ΑΥΤΟΝ (Know thyself) —

Akihiko Morita \*

## 1. Introduction

This paper aims at presenting a new self model and one accompanying social ontological conception as a methodological framework for discussing about issues of social philosophy, including multiple modernities.

Taylor mentioned that de-centering of the subjectivity and increasing suspect on ultimate goodness of the world as creation by God have caused the serious spiritual crisis since 19<sup>th</sup> century in the Western world (Taylor, 1989: 448 & 462-463). In his view, within Christian theology, it is never possible to escape altogether the notion that the creation is ultimately good (C.Taylor, 1989: 448).

In my interpretation, these two phenomena are closely inter-related in a sense that it is the notion of the modern self, which has been formulated in the Western intellectual tradition with the Christianity and the ancient Greek Philosophy, that contains the intrinsic limit of the Western paradigm of thought and has placed the assumption of the ultimate goodness of the world at risk as the modern science has developed and transformed the worldview of the Western world. On the contrary, most of the ordinary Japanese people don't feel the same dilemma. In my understanding, it is because the Japanese have no same self model as the Westerner.

In other words, my proposition is that the Western modernity is unique, but definitely not a single possible model of modernity and that its uniqueness can be understood by exploring its concept of the self.<sup>(1)</sup>

However, at the same time, I have no intention to insist that the Japanese model of modernity is superior to and more advanced than the Western one. On the contrary, it seems to me self-explanatory that the Japanese modernity is one of the unfinished projects and we, the Japanese, are facing the serious challenge of modernizing Japan now, which is being imposed by globalization. It is my another proposition that the challenge which we have to tackle with is how we could develop a common understanding or collective self-consciousness as autonomous subject which is a fundamental unit of the modern social imaginaries in the society which has no tradition of examining and formulating the individuals-society relationship empirically and normatively.

In order to examine multiple modernities, it seems that we have to build up a new methodological framework. As Thomas P. Kasulis pointed out, human understanding uses unconsciously built-in grid and if the grid itself has critical blindspot, we will have to re-examine and readjust the grid.<sup>(2)</sup> In my

---

\* 早稲田大学大学院社会科学部 博士後期課程5年 (指導教員 古賀勝次郎)

understanding, it is the dualistic framework that makes it difficult for the Western thinkers to treat mind-body and individual-society relations as evolving process and holistic system.<sup>(3)</sup> On the other hand, lack of such a dualistic framework makes it difficult for the Japanese to examine their empirical and normative relation from a disengaged stance .

In this paper, first, I would like to describe the concept of modern social imaginaries and present my proposition that a notion of the modern self is a fundamental unit of the modern social imaginaries.

Second, I would like to take up the challenges which the modern self in the West has been facing since 19<sup>th</sup> century and the following crisis and its root-causes.

Third, I would like to present the new notion of self as wave and particle at the same time as a new methodological framework for describing the modern self in the more universal basis.

Fourth, I would like to examine the new notion of the self in a concrete philosophical topic.

## 2. Modernity and self

### 2-1. Modern social Imaginaries and self

As Taylor insisted, the central issue of modern social science has been modernity itself (C. Taylor, 2004: 1). We may talk about modernity from several angles. In terms of institutional changes, although we have different modernities in the Western and non-Western states, we can easily identify the common features among them such as the rapid growth of GDP , total population and GDP per capita, urbanization, expansion of international trade and so forth (S. Kuznets, 1955).

However, if we look at the modern social imaginaries<sup>(4)</sup> and the ways in which such imaginaries have been evolved, we can instantly recognize the difference in their trajectories and current political cultures.

We may have various ways of exploring multiple modernities in terms of their social Imaginaries. I would like to propose a notion of the self as the key concept in this paper.

Usually, in the West, the movement toward modernity is understood as transformation from the way of seeing the world as a meaningful order reflecting the divine universe to the one perceiving the world as consisting of ultimately contingent correlations. This process is often referred as secularization. Taylor contended that this common way misses the central issues which are relevant in our contemporary world and presented, instead, the way of seeing this movement as a revolution in the categories in which we understand self. In his view, the essential difference between the modern and the pre-modern is that the modern subject is self-defining while the pre-modern subject is defined in relation to a cosmic order (C.Taylor, 1975: 5-6). This self-defining subject has the following three characteristics as the identities.

The first one is a sense of inwardness which has been formulated through Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Montaigne and the other philosophers in the Western world(C.Taylor, 1989: 177). Disengaged from the medieval hierarchical order, the Western thinkers have articulated the notions of disengaged subject and rational control through the radical reflection based on the inward turn developed from Plato thorough Augustine to Descartes. According to Taylor, it is Descartes who situated the moral sources within us (Taylor, 1989: 143). Then, Locke and the Enlightenment thinkers finally developed the notion of subject of disengagement and rational control, which Taylor called "punctual self" (Taylor, 1989: 160).

On the other hand, the inward turn brought about the new idea of self-exploration and a sense of individual particularity that each person has his or her own original way of being, which was inaugurated by Montaigne and fully developed by the thinkers of Romanticism later (Taylor, 1989: 181-182 & 184).

Taylor contended that these two main streams of the western modern thought, the subject of disengagement and rational control represented by the Enlightenment and the deeper engagement in individual particularity formed by the Romanticism have been at odds up to this day (C. Taylor, 1989: 182).

The second feature is the affirmation of ordinary life. By rejecting the mediation role of the Catholic and its hierarchical understanding of social order, the movement for modernity represented by Protestantism paved the way for affirming daily life, production through labor and reproduction through family (C. Taylor, 1989: 211-218). The scientific revolution in the 17<sup>th</sup> century also facilitated this attitude by shifting the goal of science from contemplation to productive efficacy (Taylor, 1989: 230-233).

The third feature is the expressivist notion of nature as an inner moral source. Those who were liberated from the medieval hierarchical society, which was supposed to reflect the divine universe, have explored the meaning of life on their own and since any given framework was lost, finding a sense to life depends on how to create the adequate framework by their own meaningful expressions (Taylor, 1989: 11-14). Along with this expressive view of human life, a sense of nature as internal moral source has developed. Then, as the notion of nature was internalized, human inner sentiment has become a moral source and the expressivist notion of nature as alternative moral source within their own sentiment has finally formulated.

The self-defining subject, or the modern self equipped with these three features, has become the subject of rights in the evolution of the new theories of Natural Law in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in the Western world. In the pre-modern civilizations, the people were supposed to be given certain immunities under law in a sense that each individual was the object of law. In contrast, the self-defining subject has to take on their shoulder responsibility to realize them. Taylor mentioned that a subjective right is something which the possessor can and ought to act on to put it into effect and that the natural law theories in the 17<sup>th</sup> century made the notion of rights the universal moral norms (C. Taylor, 1989: 11).

The proposition which I would like to put forward in this connection is that a notion of the subject of rights is a fundamental unit of the modern social imaginaries. Institutional modernities are always supported by social imaginaries. Of course, it doesn't mean that the relation between social institutions and social imaginaries is one-sided. As Taylor mentioned, the understanding makes the practice possible while the practice largely carries the understanding (C. Taylor, 2004: 25). Therefore, it is true that any social institutions or practices can not sustain without proper common understanding among their members. In the modern society, we have three major social imaginaries, the market economy, the public sphere and the self-governing people (C. Taylor, 2004: 2).

Disengaged from the medieval hierarchical social order, the people ceased seeing the world as designed and governed by God. Instead, the notion of the spontaneous and hence autonomous economy has emerged, in which individuals acting for their interest ultimately realize the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers of the society through division of labor and exchange of products without any interference from outside. Behind this social imaginary, we can see the notion of individual with particularity and self-autonomy, respecting labor and family life and carrying a moral sense in internal

sentiment. In other words, the market economy as a social imaginary consists of self-defining subjects, modern selves.

Turing to the public sphere, an extra-political and secular space from which elaborated opinions come out as a result of free discussion where potentially anyone can engage and express his opinion, we also realize that independent individuals with different particularities and self-determination capability are an indispensable constituency of the public sphere.

The third social imaginary, the self-governing people are apparently a collective notion of self-defining subjects.

So, if my argument is correct, we could conclude that the self-defining subject, the subject of rights, in other words, the modern self is a fundamental unit of the modern social imaginaries.

## 2.2. Contemporary challenge to the modern Self in the West

Taylor contended that the two mainstreams of western modern thought, the Enlightenment and the Romanticism had formulated the modern self (C. Taylor, 1989: 393-394). Out of the two streams, the significance of ordinary life, the ideal of universal benevolence and the notion of the free, self-determining subject have been developed. Then, the idea of universal benevolence, together with the notion of the self-determining subject, has created another idea of universal justice, expressed in the language of subjective rights. Dignity as a foundation of the self-defining subject and freedom as a pre-condition for its existence, together with the idea of affirmation of ordinary life has promoted democracy as a legitimate system for the self-defining subject, the modern self (C. Taylor, 1989: 394-395). In line with the above-mentioned development, the notion of nature as an internal moral source has emerged from the early Romanticism, which was articulated by Rousseau (C. Taylor, 1989: 356-363).

However, a notion of the nature as an internal moral source has gradually faced serious challenge since 19<sup>th</sup> century. In the highly industrialized and mechanized world, the image of nature as a source of goodness has become more and more untenable and together with the overwhelming mechanistic worldview developed by the modern science and technology, the notion of nature has shifted to the one of amoral force as depicted by Schopenhauer (C. Taylor, 1989: 457).

This shift has been a root cause of the moral crisis which the Western world is facing up until now. As Taylor clarified, the negation of the goodness of nature is not a marginal problem in the Western world in which the idea of creation by God as being ultimately good is the basis of the public moral order (C. Taylor, 1989: 448).<sup>(5)</sup>

But, this shift does not seem to have created the same degree of moral dilemma in the non-Western world such as Japan. Unlike Hegel who wished to find a way of thought which could unite two powerful aspirations, one to the unity with nature and the other to the radical moral autonomy (C. Taylor, 1975: 76), most of the Japanese people do not seem to feel such aspirations. In my understanding, this is because most of the Japanese people have no notion of the self like the modern Westerners. As Taylor mentioned, the two mainstreams of the western modern thought, the enlightenment, represented by disengaged reason, and the romanticism both rely on a notion of unitary self in a way that the disengaged reason requires a tight centre of control which dominates experience and is capable of constructing the orders of reasons by which we can direct thought and life and that the romantic fulfillment sees the originally divided self come to unity in the alignment of sensibility and reason (Taylor, 1989: 462).

However, along with the development of natural science and the resulting industrial progress, this image of unitary self has become no more sustainable and the age of de-centering subjectivity has begun.

In my interpretation, the self-understanding of modern Westerners as SELF is closely connected with the combination of epistemological dualism and ontological monism which assures the subjective independence of the person and the goodness of the universe created by God.<sup>(6)</sup> It seems to me that this self-understanding reflects both the Christian tradition and the dualistic epistemology of ancient Greek philosophy, particularly, that of Plato. Taylor mentioned that the position which affirms the goodness of nature has all the depth in the European civilization of the combined weight of Christianity and Platonism (C. Taylor, 1989: 448).

This is the reason why de-centering of the subjectivity for the Westerners leads to the negation of the basis of the public moral order in the Western world. On the contrary, most of the Japanese people who hold the belief of non-dualism which is central of many Asian cultures don't feel such a dilemma. According to Yasuo Yuasa (Y. Yuasa, 1987), most of the Eastern philosophies are based on the notion of oneness of body-mind, generally treated as an achievement, which can be realized by the exceptionally trained individuals such as religious and artistic masters. On the other hand, Modern Western thinkers tended to exclude bodily movement from cognition and were always satisfied with investigating only the universal or normal state of affairs about mind and body as separate entities. This Western view tends to ignore the possibility of changing the connection between mind and body through personal development and the mind-body complex interactivity.

I would like to present another hypothesis that the unitary self is not the only possible notion of the modern self. As appeared typically in the Freudian conception of the psyche, the western self model is imagined as a punctual dualistic entity. However, Kohut clarified that the dualistic psyche, consisting "the Conscious" (later the conscious part of ego and super-ego) and "the Unconscious" (later the ido and the unconscious part of ego and super-ego), reflected the socio-cultural dual structure in the age of Freud, in which a formally recognized area was controlled by logic and reason while the other socially hidden area was oppressed (H. Kohut, 1984: 59-60). This dual punctual self was apparently inherited its dualistic and self-existent nature from the conception of God as the absolute spirit with its own will and reason in the Christian tradition and the dualistic epistemology of ancient Greek philosophy.

However, as Kohut clarified, the psyche of the person since 60's has become more and more enfeebled, multifragmented, vertically split and disharmonious (H. Kohut, 1984: 60). According to Taylor, it may take us beyond the self as usually understood to a fragmentation of experience which calls our ordinary notions of identity into question or beyond that to a new kind of unity, a new way of inhabiting time (C. Taylor, 1989: 462). What the modern Westerners have to do in order to overcome the crisis is, therefore, to invent the new self model.

In this connection, it should be noted that even within the Western intellectual circle, efforts of re-examining its tradition of thought has begun. For instance, Taylor insisted that the synthesis of reading the goodness of the Christian notion in terms of Plato's order of Ideas has been the locus of tension, disputes, and ultimately painful ruptures in Christian civilization (Taylor, 1989: 220). Richard Rorty's persistent criticism against Platonism can be also understood from this perspective (R. Rorty,

1982).

On the contrary, the most serious challenge which the Japanese are currently facing is how we can develop self-consciousness as an autonomous subject which is a fundamental unit of the modern social imaginaries in the society in which there has been no strong tradition of examining the individuals-society relationship empirically and normatively from the disengaged stance. As the case of Tetsuro Watsuji, one of the most prominent modern Japanese philosophers, clearly demonstrated, those who strive to overcome the conflict stemming from the dualistic perception of subject-object through personal self-cultivation can be easily attracted by the so-called communitarian discourse in a wrong sense, holding the absolute supremacy of the society over individuals if they do not have the objective stance disengaged from society. In the Japanese case, we have to invent the self model which can develop and retain a sense of dignity as individual in the non-theistic tradition and a perception from disengaged stance.

In the next section, I would like to present the new self model which may be useful in dealing with both the Western and the Japanese problems.

### 3. Self as Wave

#### 3-1. Language as wave and linguistic turn

The scientific experiment with oscilloscope discovered that language has specific wave form. It means that language is some sort of wave. In fact, language in speech is a set of sounds, the vibration which travel through air and can be heard by humans. Even written language is transmitted as a set of optical wave between humans when they are being read. In the history of linguistics, we can also find the wave theory, developed by a German linguist, Johannes Schmidt.<sup>(7)</sup> Schmidt insisted that new features of a language spread from a certain point in continuously concentric circles, similar to the waves created when a stone is thrown into a body of water.<sup>(8)</sup> His Wellentheorie (wave theory) aimed at challenging a theory of the family-trees model for linguistic change, which, according to R. M. W. Dixon, can be applied only for the intermediate periods with dynamic social-cultural change between longer periods of punctuated equilibrium (R. M. W. Dixon, 1994). It is easy to imagine that Schmidt's wave theory, insisting the continuity among languages, was not widely accepted at the age of nationalism in which language was considered as symbol of national identity with distinctive characteristics in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. I don't go on to the more detailed exploration about the correlation between nationalism and the wave theory. At this point, it is sufficient to note that there was a linguistic theory which considered language as wave, which has been developed and is still widely utilized, particularly in the linguistic geography nowadays.

On the other hand, the linguistic turn in the 20<sup>th</sup> century has introduced a view that language is not a transparent medium by which a human being as a subject can depict the environment as an object. In this newly introduced view, language is practice or activity which constitutes reality by producing meanings (C. Ueno, 2001: i). Taylor gave a proper account about this transformation that from where we stand, we are constantly forced to the conception of man as a language animal, one who is constituted by language (C. Taylor, 1985: 246). If we follow this argument, I wonder if we may contend that the notion of the self is constituted as activity of language.

We also have the quantum mechanics theory which clarifies that at atomic and subatomic levels,

entities have properties of both wave and particle at the same time. If we recall that a notion of the modern self evolved in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in which Isaac Newton laid the ground work of classical mechanics, it seems worth examining whether we could build up the new notion of the self by using the quantum mechanics theory in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. By using the analogy of the quantum mechanics theory, we may get a schematic notion of the self as wave and particle at the same time, analogous to matter-wave and particle-wave.

### 3-2. Self as wave

The notion of the self as wave and particle at the same time solves several problems, stemming from a notion of the western self model as a disengaged particle-like object.

First, we could overcome the tradition of the Western thought which has neglected a role of body in constructing the theories of perception, cognition and language for a long time (R. W. Gibbs, Jr., 2006: 3). It is the western epistemological tradition, which separated the mind from the body, that has brought about the other dichotomies such as subjectivity-objectivity and spirit-matter. However, if we consider the self as entity with properties as wave and particle at the same time, we don't have to stick to the dualistic epistemology with the mind as a rational, thinking, immaterial and the body as an emotional, sensory and physical. The self can be considered as spirit and body at the same time.

Second, as the theory of wave in physics clarifies, we can explain human cognition and understanding as phenomenon of interference and resonance between waves while the theory of particle can not make it. Yujiro Nakamura holds that human cognition and understanding presuppose the resonance of rhythm. In Nakamura's theory, everything is rhythm and rhythm is form grasped by an acoustic sense or a somatic sense and form is vibrating sound, namely wave (Y. Nakamura, 1991: 50-51). If we follow his theory, we can consider the process of human cognition and understanding as resonance and interference between waves. In this way, we can overcome one of the central problems in the Western modern epistemology, how individual recognize his environment and himself. If we consider human agent only as a disengaged particle-like entity, we have to assume certain internalized stand-alone cognition mechanism which, at the same time, enables the inter-subjective common understanding, which has not yet to be discovered.

On the contrary, James J. Gibson insisted that our sense as the self is grounded on our bodily interaction with the physical/cultural world (J. J. Gibson: 1979). In his theory, our perception of our environment is given to us through "affordances", a resource that the environment offers us. If we consider our brain, body and our environment as waves, we can understand Gibson's theory of direct perception more easily as interference and resonance among waves.

Third, we could shed new light on the long-standing ontological debate between "atomists" and "holists". In Taylor's account, the ontology of social philosophy concerns the ultimate factors to account for social life (C. Taylor, 1997: 181-182). In this area, we have two competing schools, holism and atomism. Holism contends that human society has its own autonomy and characteristics which can not be explained as a simple sum of individual actions while atomism insists that social life can be understood in terms of properties of individuals. Holists consider human inter-subjectivity or relationality as ultimate factor while atomists support the supremacy of individuality. However, if we consider individual human agents not only as a disengaged particle-like entity but also as wave, we may

apply the theory of wave. According to the theory of wave, particularly the theory of non-linear wave, for which the principle of superposition<sup>(9)</sup> can not be applied, the form of superposed waves may change and become different form of wave. This phenomenon is analogous to the character of the society being distinct from the ones of individuals.

Fourth, the self as wave and particle at the same time can be imagined as fragmented, decentralized self which still maintains certain consistency because wave, linear or non-linear, has certain wave form which we can consider as integrity as self.

At the end, I would like to emphasize that I don't intend to insist that the self has same properties as electromagnetic waves like light or that social phenomenon can be explained by the quantum mechanics theory. What I would try to examine here is whether we could apply the idea of wave-particle duality as an analogous notion of the self.

#### 4. Free will, consciousness and determinism

Even if we accept the new notion of the self as wave and particle at the same time, we can't escape from the moral questions. We have to take responsibility as a human agent<sup>(10)</sup> for our own action and its consequence. For examining this topic further, the argument of Isaiah Berlin about free will is worth re-examining. As Berlin formulated quite properly, if every act of will or choice is fully determined by its antecedents, the concept of responsibility is undermined because the concept of responsibility is depend on the assumption that human agents could have behaved differently as they did (Berlin, 2005: 5-6).<sup>(11)</sup> In this connection, the experiment by Benjamin Libet and his interpretation should be re-considered.. In his experiment, it is observed that unconscious electrical processes in the brain precede conscious decisions to perform volitional, spontaneous acts, which means that unconscious neuronal processes precede and potentially cause volitional acts which are retrospectively felt to be consciously motivated by the subject.<sup>(12)</sup> The interpretation of his experiment has been one of the major topics for philosophical argument until now.

In order to examine this case, I would like to refer to the observation presented by Yasuo Yuasa. He noted as follows;

Modern Western epistemology saw the cognitive subject as fundamentally capable of understanding and sensibility. Specifically, "understanding" is a judgemental function utilizing thinking, and "sensibility" a perceptual function utilizing the sense organs. Modern philosophical epistemology took these functions of the subject to be conscious capacities that completely excluded bodily modes from cognition (Yuasa, 1987: 162).

Yuasa suggests that consciousness has double-layers, which he calls the surface consciousness and the base consciousness respectively. In his contention, the surface consciousness corresponds to the cerebral nerves and the base consciousness to the autonomic ones. These two consciousnesses are connected each other through the emotions and they are mutually permeated (Yuasa, 1987: 186 & 209).

Following his theory, I may contend that the unconscious neuron process, identified by Libet, can be considered as a part of the base consciousness and schematically, it may be described as resonance and interference between waves of the self and of its surrounding, or environment, defined by J. J. Gibson. Then, we may obtain the schematic description of the decision-making process as resonance and interference among waves. Compared with the description based on the self-model as particle like



entity with two layers, the conscious part and the unconscious part, in which we have to imagine certain mechanism of interaction between these two layers, the self model as wave gives us much simpler and holistic picture of the process based on the notion of mind-body unity.

In concluding this section, I would like to emphasize that I do not intend to make any mathematical formulation for the self-model as wave, which, I believe, can be only another example of pseudoscience.

## 5. Conclusion

It is my proposition that the notion of the self as subject of rights is unit concept of the modern social imaginaries and we can examine the features of different modernities by exploring the characteristics of the notion of the self.

Then, I introduced a new notion of the self as wave and particle at the same time. As Alicia Juarero pointed out, modern philosophy has taken its cue from Newtonian science and retained its mechanistic view of causality since then.<sup>43</sup> So, I insist that it is worth examining if we could conceptualize a new notion of the self based on the discoveries of modern natural science

Finally I took up the issue of moral responsibility to test my proposition. As Berlin noted, every act of will or choice is fully determined by its antecedents, the concept of responsibility is undermined. In this sense, the argument on mental events and actions remains as a crucial issue for philosophy. I tried to demonstrate if the new notion of self could shed new light on the argument.

For further study, there remain a lot of unexamined questions. For instance, as J. Knobe and J.M.Doris clarified, people do not apply one single universal, invariant criterion for making moral responsibility judgment in daily life while assuming that there exist certain invariant criteria that can account for all moral judgments in all cases (J. Knobe & J. M. Doris, 2006: 2). It may be true that as Michael Ignatieff insisted, systems of values are never internally consistent and the conflict of values is intrinsic to human life (M. Ignatieff, 2000: 285). It is worth examining the complex relation between the moral judgment and the context, environment.

We should also explore the moral principle and its ethical foundation in the rapidly evolving cyberspace. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we have got a new social imaginary, the space of fashion, which in Taylor's account, is of a horizontal, simultaneous, mutual presence (Taylor, 2004: 167-171). Then, the development of information and communication technology makes this space meta-topical where the meaning of our social participation might be changing. So, it is worth examining whether the conventional concepts of social philosophy can deal with the moral issues in the newly evolving public space. In this context, I would like to test the applicability and viability of the new notion of the self as well.

[投稿受理日2006. 5. 26/掲載決定日2006. 6. 8]

## NOTES

- (1) Charles Taylor noted "we understand the European model as the first, certainly, as the object of some creative imitation, naturally, but at the end of the day, one model among many, a province of the multiform world we hope (a little against hope) will emerge in order and peace". C.Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke university, 2004, 195-196.
- (2) See Editor's introduction in YUASA Yasuo, T.P.Kasulis ed., translated by Nagatomo Shigenori and T.P.Kasulis, *The Body – toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory*, State University of New York Press, 1987.

- (3) See Andrea Semprini, *Le Multiculturalisme*, Universitaires de France, 2000.
- (4) C. Taylor holds that social imaginaries are the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations. C. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke University, 2004, p.23.
- (5) Taylor noted "Within Christian theology, it is never possible to escape altogether the notion that the creation is ultimately good." "The position which affirms the goodness of nature isn't a marginal one. It is the basis of the most widespread secular ethics and political views, those which descend from the Enlightenment as well as those in full continuity with the original Romantics." C. Taylor, 1989:448.
- (6) Prof. J. Habermas suggested a combination of epistemological dualism (which leaves room for the phenomenon of freedom) with ontological monism (which satisfies our quest for a coherent view of the universe). J. Habermas, *Freedom and Determinism-Is Human 'Freedom of Will' an Illusion?* in the booklet of the 2004 Kyoto Prize Workshop in Arts and Philosophy, Nov., 12, 2004.
- (7) Johannes Schmidt was a German linguist, born in July 29, 1843 and passed away in July 4, 1901. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes\\_Schmidt](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Schmidt)>
- (8) Johannes Schmidt, *Die Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der indogermanischen Sprachen (The relationship of the Indo-European languages)*, H. Böhlau, 1872.
- (9) In algebra, the principle of superposition implies that the net result at a given place and time caused by the two or more independent phenomena is the sum of the result which would have been caused by each phenomenon independently, meaning that it is possible to analyze the behavior of linear physical systems by considering the behavior of each component of the system separately, and summing the separate results to find the total result. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superposition\\_principle](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superposition_principle)>
- (10) Michael Ignatieff noted that by agency, I mean more or less what Isaiah Berlin meant by "negative liberty," the capacity of each individual to achieve rational intentions without let or hindrance. Michael Ignatieff, *Human rights as politics and idolatry*, Princeton University Press, 2001, p.59.
- (11) According to Joshua Knobe and John M. Doris, we have competing two schools about moral responsibility. The first one, incompatibilism, claims that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. The second one, compatibilist, rejects it and claims that determinism is not relevant to moral responsibility. This school has two subgroups. The first one, the real self view, claims that people are only morally responsible for behaviors that stem from the part of the self which we are identified or that stem from our values. The second one, the normative competence theory, contends that people are responsible for behaviors that were produced by a process that is appropriately sensitive to reasons. Joshua Knobe & John M. Doris, *Strawsonian Variations: Folk Morality and the Search for a Unified Theory*, in J.M. Doris et al. (eds.), *Moral Psychology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- (12) See Benjamin Libet <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Libet](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet)>
- (13) "Taking its cue from Newtonian science, modern philosophy conceptualized efficient causality as the push-pull impact of external forces on inert forces." Alicia Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action*, MIT press, 2002

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, 1975
- C. Taylor, *Human agency and language – philosophical papers I*, Cambridge University Press, 1985
- C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self – the Making of the Modern Identity*, Harvard University Press, 1989
- C. Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, Harvard University Press, 1997
- C. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke University Press, 2004
- Chizuko Ueno, *Kouchiku-shugi towa nanika? (What is the constructionism?)*, Keiso-shoboh, 2001
- Heinz Kohut, *How does analysis cure?*, the University of Chicago Press, 1984
- Isaiah Berlin, Henry Hardy ed., *Liberty*, Oxford University Press, 2005
- James Jerome Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979
- Michael Ignatieff, *A life Isaiah Berlin*, vintage, 2000

Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., *Embodiment and cognitive science*, Cambridge University Press, 2006

Richard Rorty, Introduction :Pragmatism and Philosophy in *Consequences of pragmatism*, the University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Robert Malcolm Ward Dixon, *The Rise and Fall of Languages*, Cambridge University Press, 1994

Simon Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth (Study in Comparative economics)*, Yale University Press, 1955

Joshua Knobe & John M. Doris, Strawsonian Variations:Folk Morality and the Search for a Unified Theory in J. M. Moris et al (eds.), *Moral Psychology*, Oxford University Press

YUASA Yasuo, T. P. Kasulis ed., translated by Nagatomo Shigenori and T.P.Kasulis, *The Body – toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory*, State University of New York Press, 1987

Yujiro Nakamura, *Katachi no odyssey (Odyssey of form)*, Iwanami-shoten, 1991