

Peace Building and State Building of East Timor: What is the Role of Civil Society?

Mitsuru Yamada

Introduction

East Timor on August 30, 2009, celebrated the 10th anniversary of “Popular Consultation” that had rejected the proposal of special autonomy offered by Indonesia and had chosen independence. At the commemorative ceremony of the 10th anniversary, President Ramos-Horta said in the presence of the Indonesian foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, Parliament Speaker of former suzerain Portugal Jaime Gama, and others who attended the ceremony, “Let us stop talking about past tragedies and forgive those who inflicted injury on us.” He made it clear that there would be “no establishment of an international tribunal” to judge relevant Indonesian persons as was being advocated by some quarters in Western countries and said that from now on, “we would rather like to go forward together as good neighbors.”¹

However, the minds of the people whose family members were killed in the turmoil that the pro-Indonesian integration militia caused in the wake of popular consultation have probably not been healed and the infrastructure of the country, 70% of which had been destroyed, is still on the way to reconstruction. The peace building of East Timor was initiated first of all with the support of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The UNTAET was entrusted with the three powers of judiciary, legislation, and administration and undertook the creation of a framework of the governance of East Timor. Specifically, the constituent assembly election was carried out in August 2001, leading to the formation of a second caretaker cabinet and the enactment of the Constitution. Moreover, a presidential election was carried out in April 2002, and long-sought independence was achieved on May 20, 2002.

While independence was achieved through such a process, the politics and

1. See *Asahi Shimbun*, August 31, 2009; the Kyodo News distributed report, August 30, 2009, etc.

society of the country had rapidly been destabilized since around April 2006 commemorating the fourth anniversary of independence. There broke out a quasi-civil war situation in which firefights within the defense force involved even the police to the extent that a request was made again to the foreign forces to help in the maintenance of public order. The situation eventually deteriorated into a political crisis in which the Fretilin strong man Mari Alkatiri was virtually sacked from the post of the prime minister at the end of June of the same year. East Timor revealed itself to still be a fragile state although it had been considered to be progressing well in post-conflict peace building and to have stepped forward in earnest to the development process from the stage of building governance.²

Focusing on the role of civil society, this paper will consider such questions as the following: Why did East Timor, having produced an estimated 150,000 internally displaced persons again, fail in peace-building? What was the “state building” that the political leaders aimed at? What are the necessary standpoints to look at East Timor that revert to dealing with peace building again? Chapter 1 will analyze concrete factors that block the peace building of East Timor. Chapter 2 will confirm the role that civil society and NGOs played from the resistance period to post-conflict peace building. Chapter 3 will consider in reverse the difference in the vision of “state building” among the political leaders in the period leading to the turmoil in 2006, and Chapter 4 will discuss the authoritarian political regime that the Alkatiri government adopted in relation to the accession to ASEAN. Chapter 5 will consider the role of the Catholic Church in the progress of East Timor as a democratic state. The last section will provide conditions required for the building of a democratic state in East Timor. It will appeal to the fact that the role of civil society and NGOs that contributed to the independence of East Timor is still important in its “state building” as well as the fact that the continuous support of the international community is needed in promoting the capacity building of civil society and NGOs.

1. Factors that Block Peace-Building in East Timor

An investigative report was released by the UN on October 20, 2006 as *Report of the United Nations: Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*, detailing several factors leading to the turmoil that occurred from April to June 2006. It shows the developments that culminated in the turmoil in chronological order and the number of victims, but it does not recognize the direct involvement of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in the turmoil, as such failing to elucidate its background.³

2. See, Mitsuru Yamada, “Looking into the backdrop of the East Timor political change: citizens dissatisfied with iron-fist politics,” *Ronza*, August 2006, Asahi Shimbun.

3. *Report of the United Nations: Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*, Geneva, 2

With regard to the direct factors causing the 2006 turmoil, the fact is that an East-West confrontation within the National Defense Force of Timor Leste (F-FDTL) took place, involving the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL), as was reported by media organizations. The official name of F-FDTL is, literally, the “Falintil-National Defense Force of Timor Leste,” which indicates that the Defense Force has been established by integrating the guerrilla organization, the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor (which assumed the military wing of the resistance movement under Indonesian rule) and the Defense Force that was established afterward.

Although the establishment of the Defense Force was not among the mandates of UNTAET (the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor), UNTAET was concerned with the pent-up dissatisfaction of former Falintil soldiers who did not receive a warm welcome as heroes of resistance and, on its own accord, proclaimed on January 31, 2001 a law providing for the Defense Force’s foundation. As a result, it was decided that the FDTL would consist of a 1,500 strong light infantry force and a 1,500 strong reserve force.⁴

Five hundred and ninety-one soldiers, or more than about 40 percent of the whole Defense Force left their barracks in the 2006 turmoil as part of a protest, but their doing so was regarded as desertion, causing them to be discharged by Defense Force Director-General Taur Matan Ruak. Events began early in February 2006 when soldiers from the western region claimed, “Those from the eastern region are being treated favorably, while we are being discriminated against” and, after staging a protest in front of the Executive Office of the President, submitted a petition to the then President Gusmao asking for remedial action to be taken regarding the discriminatory treatment.⁵

This East-West confrontation within the FDTL gradually spread from inside the Defense Force and developed into an internal problem. It escalated into a confrontation between *Lorosae* (those from the eastern region) and *Loromonu* (those from the western region)⁶ among the people, leading to outbursts of looting and arson. As a result, the first internal displacement since the turmoil caused by the pro-Indonesian integration militia in the wake of Popular Consultation in August 1999 took place, involving as many as 150,000 people. Moreover, people from the eastern and western

October 2006, pp. 75–76. Incidentally, for the reason of insufficiency of evidence, prosecutors decided not to prosecute former Prime Minister Alkatiri who was suspected to have supplied former soldiers with weapons during the turmoil (article of *Asahi Shimbun*, February 10, 2007).

4. As for the establishment of the FDTL (National Defense Force of Timor Leste), the author referred to a report by King’s College, University of London, which was making an independent investigation into the issue of the treatment of former Falintil soldiers.

5. *Daily Berita*, internet newspaper, (<http://www.nikkanberita.com>), published on April 30, 2006.

6. Three districts of Lautem, Viqueque, and Baucau belong to *Lorosae*, and remaining districts belong to *Loromonu*. However, the author heard the opinion that the enclave of Oecussi does not belong to either region.

regions lived separately from each other in refugee camps.⁷

On the other hand, it can be understood easily that it was after all a political confrontation that existed behind the turmoil of the time. The idea of an East-West confrontation was used to agitate the people. As a matter of fact, the East-West confrontation was hardly seen in areas outside Dili, and looting, fire attacks and homicides were staged in Dili. As the UN Investigation Report points out, it was martial art groups connected with Taekwondo, Aikido, Karate, etc. that committed these illegal acts⁸. Moreover, the existence of groups of politicians who master-minded them has been identified as well.

Then, what was the largest factor that brought about the destabilization of politics and society? It is thought to have been the National Assembly election and the Presidential election that were scheduled to be held in 2007.⁹ The power struggle was becoming severe within the Fretilin over the National Assembly election and the Presidential election, also involving the issue of the treatment of former Falintil soldiers, while in the Opposition the strategies which could restore their powers were being developed in the milieu of the intensifying Fretilin rule. Moreover, the Catholic Church needed to defeat the iron-fist rule of the Fretilin that was intensifying, and was already carrying on an anti-Alkatiri government campaign that gave the impression that Australia and the U.S. hand were behind it. As political and social anxiety was growing, the withdrawal of the UN Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL) scheduled to take place in May 2006 resulted in worsening matters still.¹⁰

7. The author visited Dili in East Timor from November 1 to 5, 2006. He conducted interviews with the government, political parties, churches, NGOs, students, etc. Moreover, he went round the city and observed the situation of refugee camps. The coalition cabinet with CNRT (National Congress of Timor Leste Reconstruction Party) President Gusmao as the prime minister that was established in the wake of the 2007 national assembly election paid assistance grants (the maximum of 4,500 dollars) to these internally displaced persons (IDPs) according to the situation of damage. As a result, most of the IDPs returned to their own original areas, and so presently hardly any refugee camps can be found in Dili.

8. As for armed groups in East Timor, a joint survey by Austcare and the Small Arms Survey (TLAVA) was performed, and the detailed *Issue Brief: Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment*, Number 2, April 2009 (TLAVA) has been published.

9. The presidential election was carried out on April 9, 2007, and the runoff vote was carried out on May 9. The national assembly election was carried out on June 30. For the analysis of the elections, see, Mitsuru Yamada, "Political social situation of East Timor that finished the first national election after independence and its prospects for the future," *Kaigai Jijo*, October 2007, vol. 55, no. 10; Mitsuru Yamada, "The first national election of East Timor and political social analysis," in Ken'ichi Goto (ed.), *The Process of "Germination," "Development" and "Transformation" of the "Ethno"-Nationalism of East Timor: Analysis of the Model of International Comparison with "Ethno-National" Conflict*, Basic Research B, Report on the Results of Scientific Research, May 20, 2008.

10. Although the UNOTIL eventually had its term extended 3 times following the deterioration of security situation, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) that supported various fields, such as maintenance of public order, reinforcement of governance, promotion of national reconciliation, implementation of the presidential election and the national assembly election in 2007, training of army and police and development, was established for the period leading to the re-establishment of National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL) on August 25, 2006. Moreover, Special Representative to the U.N. Secretary-General Hasegawa points out the fact that the UNOTIL was not equipped with the capacity to maintain public order as

Finally, while the confrontation between *Lorosae* and *Loromonu* surfaced in this turmoil, there existed a structure of confrontation that could not be seen in rural areas, as residential representatives from ten prefectures made a joint declaration that the regional confrontation within the Defense Force was a “fabrication” by people in power.¹¹ On the other hand, however, there is the fact that people from the eastern region, who has achieved success, had illegally occupied houses and lands in Dili that the Indonesians used to occupy under Indonesian rule, and it was pointed out that this was a factor causing the spread of the turmoil. In other words, I have heard that it is a fact that part of the people who joined this turmoil had been becoming frustrated with the illegal occupation of houses and lands by those from the eastern region.¹² It is clear that the problem of the illegal occupation of houses and lands by people in power and influence, commonly seen in post-conflict situations in developing countries, had arisen in East Timor as well.

Thus, two direct factors that blocked peace-building which became obvious in the 2006 turmoil can be pointed out. Firstly, there was the failure of DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration of soldiers) and SSR (Security Sector Reform).¹³ Secondly, the above-mentioned land problem and the youth employment problem had become more serious than previously thought. The next chapter will consider the cooperation among various actors in the peace-building of East Timor until the period of the independence movement, and will confirm that the independence of East Timor was achieved not by the leadership of the Fretilin, but as a result of the great coalition of resistance movements. Based on that, I would like to reconfirm the role of civil society-NGOs in peace-building and also state-building in East Timor.

2. Cooperation among Actors in the Peace Building of East Timor

Chadwick F. Alger points out the need for a fourfold structure that NGOs should deal with peace building.¹⁴ Firstly, it is necessary to create and mobilize global net-

one of the reasons why the 2006 turmoil was not able to be stopped (Sukehiro Hasegawa, “My proposal: the need for a comprehensive peace-building support,” *Kokuren Forum*, <http://www.unforum.org/teigen>, accessed on September 21, 2009). In addition, the UN Security Council Resolution on the establishment of the UNMIT is Resolution 1704.

11. Internet newspaper, *Daily Berita*, published on May 9, 2006.

12. While the eastern region did not have products like coffee produced in the western region and had a number of poor areas because of mountainous terrain, it produced many hard working people. Moreover, it is said that the region produced a number of people who had been successful in various fields, such as government officials. It is said that discontent with and grudge against the fact that those successful people illegally occupied houses and lands in Dili after the departure of Indonesians led to fire attacks and looting by those from the western region (Interview with Sr. Yoko Nakamura on November 2, 2006).

13. William Maley, “International force and political reconstruction: Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan,” in Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.), *Security Sector: Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, United Nations University Press, 2005, pp. 301–304.

14. Chadwick F. Alger, “Expanding Involvement of NGOs in Emerging Global Governance,” in Oliver P.

works in order to involve NGOs in peace building. Secondly, NGOs themselves must enhance their public participation by organizing these networks and gaining support for their activities. Thirdly, as a result, while such peace-building NGOs become involved in the activities of intergovernmental international organizations (IGOs), they naturally have an influence on IGOs. Fourthly, NGOs must become more deeply engaged in activities in various humanitarian fields.

Based on Alger's fourfold structure of peace-building NGOs, we will look back on the trend of civil society organizations including NGOs in East Timor, focusing on the circumstances through which its independence was achieved.¹⁵ First of all, in the resistance movement towards the independence of East Timor, the First National Conference for the reorganization of the country held from March 1 to 8, 1981, was quite significant. This is because the mode of the conventional Fretilin-led resistance was revised then. There had developed a gap over the mode of resistance between the Fretilin that upheld Marxism-Leninism and promoted a revolutionary course and the Falintil that was the military wing of the Fretilin had actually fought with the Indonesian army.

Under such circumstances, it was decided at the meeting that the resistance movement be centered on the CRRN (National Council for Revolutionary Resistance). In the meeting, Xanana Gusmao was chosen as CRRN Chairman, Falintil Commander, and National Political Commissar and assumed the post of the supreme leader of the independence movement. Furthermore, in this meeting, Falintil was divided into three regions of the East, the Center, and the West with a commander assigned to each of them, and residential organizations were also systematized, made up of residential representatives of the prefectural, county, and village level. It was also decided that the CRRN be considered as a political organization that would control the overall resistance movement with the Central Committee of the Fretilin joining the abovementioned organizations.

Gusmao further formed the CNRM (National Council for Maubere Resistance) in December 1988 as a full-scale national unity organization. While the Fretilin complained that it had been degraded to being a subordinate political organization, the supreme leader of the resistance, Gusmao, left the Fretilin and assumed the post of the chairman of the CNRM. Moreover, one of the Fretilin founders, Ramos-Horta, also followed Gusmao, and it was decided that he conduct lobbying activities for independ-

Richmond and Henry F. Carey (eds.), *Subcontracting Peace: The Challenges of the NGO Peacebuilding*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, pp. 5–14.

15. For the role of civil society and NGOs for the independence of East Timor, there is a detailed discussion in Mitsuru Yamada, "Peace-building of East Timor and the role of civil society," in Chiharu Takenaka, Nobuo Takahashi and Nobuto Yamamoto (eds.), *Contemporary Asian Studies (2) Civil Society*, Keio University Press, 2008, pp. 342–347. Although there are some overlaps in content between that part and this chapter, they are in a sense complementary, and so, I would recommend reading that part as well.

ence as the representative of the CNRM Overseas Representative Office.

At the National Conference held in April 1998, the CNRM was renamed to be the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance) in which the UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) that had rivaled the Fretilin for years had also participated, thereby achieving a great coalition of resistance movements. In this way, towards the East Timor independence movement, various actors such as political parties, including the Fretilin and the UDT, the Falintil as a guerrilla military organization, residential organizations connecting across prefectures, counties and villages, Fretilin-affiliated youth cells, organizations of the young generation by seminary graduates, women's organizations, and churches, participated in the resistance movement.¹⁶

As civil society and NGOs that aimed at the improvement of the life of the East Timorese and provided indirect support to independence, the Caritas and the Justice and Peace Commission affiliated with the Catholic Church and the ETADEP (East Timor Agriculture and Development Project Foundation) were established in the 1980s, and Yayasan Hak (human rights), Yayasan Bia Hula (water and health), FOKUPERS (East Timor Women's Communications Forum), ETAWAVE (East Timor Women Against Violence), the ETSSC (East Timor Student Solidarity Council), etc. followed in the 1990s. Moreover, an NGO umbrella organization, the East Timor NGO Forum, was also established with the support of the AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development), the ACFOA (Australian Council for Overseas Aid), Oxfam, etc.¹⁷

Furthermore, the resistance movement of East Timor was supported by international supporting groups. The organizations that demanded the withdrawal of Indonesia by appealing for a support of the East Timorese right for self-determination were those such as the CDPM (Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People) of Portugal, the TAPOL (Indonesia Human Rights Campaign), and the BCET (British Coalition for East Timor) of the UK, the AETA (Australia East Timor Association), etc. Moreover, among church-affiliated organizations, the abovementioned Caritas and Catholic Justice and Peace Commission introduced an appeal of the East Timor Church to the international community, and human rights NGOs such as the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch reported human rights

16. Sarah Niner, "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of CNRT"; Constancio Pinto, "The Students Movement and the Independence Struggle in East Timor: An Interview"; Arnold S. Kohen, "The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor," in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom (eds.), *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and The World Community*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. Also, see, Akihisa Matsuno, *History of East Timor Independence*, Waseda University Press, 2002, Chapters 4 and 5.

17. See, UNDP, "New roles for civil society," in *East Timor Human Development Report 2002*, Chapter 3; Helder Da Costa, "East Timor: The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding," in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, and Hans van de Veen (eds.), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

abuses by the Indonesia Army. Also, in Japan, the “Forum to Solidarity with Independent East Timor” was launched in Kure YWCA in 1981, showing the spread of the support movement, and the “Free East Timor! Japan Coalition” was formed in 1988.

Thus, in the process leading to the independence of East Timor, domestic civil society organizations and local NGOs supported by international NGOs played an important role for independence, and since independence as well, the NGO Forum has obtained the cooperation of international NGOs and engaged in the capacity building of the staff of central and local NGOs committed to the development of human resources in East Timor. For this reason, these civil society and NGOs have been regarded as major actors in the peace building of East Timor and have been recognized as actors who play a role in state building as well. This may be understood also from the fact that the role of civil society in achieving democracy and good governance is also stressed in the reports prepared by the State Planning Committee, which present the shape of East Timor after independence, such as *East Timor 2020: Our Nation, Our Future*¹⁸ and *East Timor: State of the Nation Report*¹⁹.

Among the reasons for the difficulty of achieving independence for East Timor was the fact that international relations of the East-West Cold War structure had become a serious obstacle as the structure contributed to the support of the Suharto dictatorship by Western countries. However, the Suharto regime collapsed with the onset of the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and the issue of the independence of East Timor surfaced again. Needless to say, behind such a development was the existence of the abovementioned global networks of international NGOs playing an important role. Therefore, these global networks of international NGOs are significant also in the full-scale peace-building process that has been expected to take place after the 2006 turmoil, and the fourfold structure of peace-building NGOs that Alger points out is expected to function.

3. Triangular Political Power Structure in East Timor

The current political power structure in East Timor is made up of a triangular structure of GHA that shows the initial letters of Xanana Gusmao, Ramos-Horta, and Mali Alkatiri. The relationship of the three political leaders who influence the political society of the post-independence East Timor has not been the relationship of a troika system aiming at state building, but rather a triangular relationship in which they check one another or the relationship of rivals.²⁰

18. *East Timor 2020: Our Nation, Our Future*, Planning Commission, Dili, April 2002.

19. *East Timor: State of the Nation Report*, Planning Commission, Dili, April 2002.

20. Dennis Shoemith, “Timor-Leste: Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System,” *Asian Survey*,

Gusmao and Alkatiri are at opposite poles and have been opposed to each other over the shape of the resistance. They may be compared to two points on the base that supports the apex of a triangle. This triangle may not necessarily be a regular triangle, but can be any type of triangle depending on the position of Ramos-Horta. It is presently an awkward shaped triangle, with G and H being near to each other as Ramos-Horta and Gusmao are in mutually close positions. Nevertheless, it will maintain the GHA triangular structure and will never become a straight line.

Let us look back upon the careers of the three political leaders here.²¹ Gusmao is the former Falintil Commander and the supreme leader of the independence movement with national charisma. Gusmao was born in Manatutu in 1946 to a father who was a primary school teacher. At the First National Conference held in March 1981 for the purpose of reorganizing the resistance, he was selected to be CRRN Chairman, Falintil Commander, and National Political Commissar and achieved the position of the supreme leader of the resistance. Moreover, with the establishment of a National United Front in view, he formed the CNRM and assumed the post of its Chairman, leaving Fretilin that became part of the CNRM. The CNRM was renamed to be the CNRT at the National Conference held in Peniche, Portugal in April 1998, and Gusmao and Ramos-Horta took office as its chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Gusmao achieved the position of the charismatic supreme leader, concurrently serving as chairman of the CNRT, in which the Fretilin and the UDT that had fought a civil war with each other in 1975 officially participated, and as Falintil Commander.

Next, Ramos-Horta was born to a Portuguese father and Timorese mother in 1949. At the age of 20, he criticized the colonial policy of Portugal and had been banished to Mozambique for two years. On the other hand, Alkatiri was born in the family of Arab Muslims from Yemen and went for overseas study at a geographic institute in Angora in 1970, graduating from it as a surveyor.

Moreover, 1970 was the year when a youth organization to cooperate with the overseas East Timorese youth and study the future of East Timor, including national liberation struggles in Portuguese colonies, was formed in Dili. Alkatiri and Ramos-Horta were also among its members. Both of them had a debate in a journal called *SEARA* over the question of whether or not the underdevelopment of East Timor was due to the indolence of the East Timorese. It has been said that Ramos-Horta criticized the East Timorese people's dependency on Portugal, indolence, and dependency on the powerful, while Alkatiri made an issue of structural factors that East Timor was subject to.²²

Vol. XLIII, No. 2, March/April 2003. This Shoesmith paper also refers to the rivalry and adversary relationship between Gusmao and Alkatiri, looking at its historical background.

21. See, Matsuno, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 28–40, where it is discussed in detail.

Through the bloodless revolution of Portugal in April 1974, a new government was born, advocating national democratization and colonial liberation. In response, the UDT was established in East Timor that aimed at a step-by-step independence from Portugal and had a support base among anti-communist groups, such as civil servants, rich planters, and the Catholic Church. Also established were the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) that aimed at an immediate and full independence and had a support base among the urban intellectuals and the lower classes and, furthermore, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI) that aimed at the merger with Indonesia while maintaining autonomy and had a support base among *Liurai* (feudal chiefs), etc., thereby giving birth to three major political parties during this period.²³

The ASDT was renamed to be the Fretilin about six months later, and Ramos-Horta and Alkatiri were the founding members of the ASDT. While the Fretilin won the civil war and once declared independence, Ramos-Horta and Alkatiri left East Timor just before the invasion of Indonesia. Fretilin set up its Overseas Representative Office in Lisbon, and while Ramos-Horta worked from his bases in New York and Sydney, Alkatiri established his base in Mozambique. However, as mentioned above, with the establishment of the CNRM, the Fretilin became one of the political organizations that constituted the resistance. Alkatiri was opposed to it, while Ramos-Horta accepted it. They thus differed in political position, and Ramos-Horta left the Fretilin like Gusmao.

After that, they were to work in different areas: Alkatiri would be gradually assuming power within the Fretilin and Ramos-Horta would be engaged in lobbying activities for the independence of East Timor in the international arena as vice-chairman of the CNRT. In 1996, Ramos-Horta won a Nobel Peace Prize together with Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo for his contribution to the peace of East Timor. Ramos-Horta became the most famous East Timorese in the international community.

4. ASEAN Type State Building that East Timor Aims at

The three political leaders are all highly motivated to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter referred to as “ASEAN”). East Timor already became a member state of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005. With accession to ASEAN in view, it has been an observer since 2002 and in the 39th regular ministerial meeting held in Kuala Lumpur from July 25, 2006, Ramos-Horta who had just assumed the post of the prime minister made an application to officially join

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–39.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–50; Ken'ichi Goto, “East Timor ‘state’: the way to independence,” in Ken'ichi Goto (ed.), *Indonesia: Archipelagic State in Tremor*, Waseda University Press, 2000, pp. 148–152.

ASEAN in about five years time.²⁴

However, although the three political leaders share a common ground in their wish for East Timor to join ASEAN, there seems to be remarkable differences among them in their images of ASEAN. ASEAN is divided into the group that wants to maintain the traditional “ASEAN WAY” that strictly observes the principle of noninterference in internal affairs of member states and the group that aims at a “new ASEAN” that intends to modify the “ASEAN WAY” by respecting human rights and promoting democratization, among others.²⁵

The ASEAN that Alkatiri considers has been the traditional “ASEAN WAY,” which is a regional organization embracing noninterference in internal affairs as a basic principle. It seems that the political system that Alkatiri regards as an ideal of state building has been an authoritarian system and a developmental dictatorship that has ensured economic development. Therefore, the one party ruling system of the Fretilin is Golkar of the Suharto era in the past and considers the Barisan Nasional (National Front) of Malaysia as a model. Or possibly, a Cambodian People’s Party may have been envisaged.

While the Fretilin won 55 seats out of a total of 88 seats in the constituent assembly election held in August 2001, it was at that time regarded not as a political party, but as an organization with the credit and fame of having led the independence movement. In the momentum stemming from the fact that independence would be achieved in the next year, the organization won an overwhelming victory. On the other hand, the Democratic Party (PD) having been established just before the constituent assembly election was expected to make gains as a political party for the young generation that looked forward to the next general election. However, the East Timorese politics after independence brought about the reinforcement of the one-party rule by the Fretilin, rather than policy discussion among two or more political parties as had been expected by the founding members of the PD. The Fretilin unflinchingly achieved the position of the “State Party,” and showed the penetration of power by winning the majority in village chief elections held from June to September 2005.²⁶ Secretary-General and the most powerful man, Alkatiri further strengthened the rule of the Fretilin across East Timor.²⁷

24. *The Jakarta Post online*, <http://www.thejakartapost.com>, July 27, 2006 (accessed on July 27, 2006).

25. See, Yoneji Kuroyanagi, “Rethinking the ‘ASEAN WAY,’” in Kuroyanagi (ed.), *Asian Regional Order and the Challenge of ASEAN*, Akashi Shoten, 2005. Also see, Yoneji Kuroyanagi, *35 Years of ASEAN History*, Yushindo, 2003.

26. Interview with Joan Boavida, a founding member of the Democratic Party, on March 10, 2006.

27. At the time of Declaration of Independence in November 1975, the Fretilin had already announced the following policy statements: cooperativism, management of distribution systems by the Timore people, and the realization of economic decolonization in the economic field; provision of literacy programs, making Portuguese the official language, and research and development of the Tetun language in the education field; free medical service and state control of health service in the welfare field; phasing-out of exploitation, etc. in the social justice field; and being based on nonalignment and the good-neighbor policy in the national defense

On the other hand, the image of ASEAN that Ramos-Horta endeavored to participate in was the “new ASEAN” of President Yudhoyono’s Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand that advocated “flexible engagement” in departure from the policy of noninterference in internal affairs and would allow the advancement of democratization and respect for human rights. Distancing himself from the old guards who insist on the traditional “ASEAN WAY,” he envisages a “new ASEAN” that can discuss with the Western society at the same table.

As its concrete example, responses of the three leaders to the military government in Myanmar are revealing. While Alkatiri supports the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, Ramos-Horta supports an end to the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the same Nobel Peace Prize as himself.²⁸ In response to a Myanmar court judgment on August 11 that found Ms. Suu Kyi guilty of violating the National Defense Law for having allowed an American male to stay at her house without permission in May 2009, Ramos-Horta who assumed the post of the 2nd president after the final presidential vote in May 2007 issued a presidential statement the next day on August 12, saying that it was a judgment “unjust and unrighteous without any basis in whatever legal system, and unacceptable at all.” Incidentally, Ramos-Horta does not call the country “Myanmar,” but still adheres to the country name “Burma” from the position of criticizing the military government.

On the other hand, Gusmao has not clearly expressed his own view on this issue, but he once criticized the Myanmar government personally from his experience of having been put under house arrest himself by the Indonesian government in a similar manner.²⁹ In the national assembly election held in June 2007, Gusmao challenged the Alkatiri-led Fretilin to all-out confrontation and founded his own political party the CNRT (National Congress of Timor Leste Reconstruction Party). The CNRT has the same initial letters as the coalition organization CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance), as mentioned above, and clearly shows Gusmao’s determination against the Fretilin. As a result, although the CNRT was not able to take over Fretilin’s position as the largest party in the assembly, a CNRT-led coalition cabinet was established, replacing the Fretilin which was not able to obtain a majority.

and diplomatic area. As for the political system, the party envisaged a system similar to the socialist system of one party rule. It had certain features, such as there being no reference to basic human rights or democracy (Matsuno, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–60).

28. At the regular ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting in 2002, East Timor’s participation as an observer was opposed by Myanmar. For the reasons for the opposition, it was reported that a cautious opinion was raised by Indonesia, while it is also said that it was because Ramos-Horta collected petition signatures to seek the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest during a centennial memorial event on the establishment of the Nobel Prize in December, 2001 (*Southeast Asia Monthly*, August 2002, p. 145; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 21, 2002). Also see, Mitsuru Yamada, “Various challenges of the new East Timor and Japan’s contribution,” *Kaigai Jijo*, March 2003.

29. He once expressed his solidarity with Suu Kyi when he was under house arrest near the Cipinang prison in Jakarta (Interview on June 2, 1999).

It goes without saying that the ASEAN diplomacy by the combination of President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao is naturally the cooperation with the “new ASEAN.” As for joining ASEAN, while a high official of the foreign ministry frankly admitted that “East Timor has a number of obstacles such as the shortage of human resources who could participate in relevant meetings and the shortage of facilities where ASEAN meetings would be hosted,” he nonetheless revealed his pride, saying, “even though East Timor is a small country, it can play an advanced role in human rights issues.”³⁰

With regard to the accession to ASEAN of East Timor that prides itself on being a “human rights advanced country,” the Myanmar government shows its intention to oppose the country’s accession. On the other hand, I heard that Singapore was also reluctant on this, saying that they did not want to expand the economic gaps within ASEAN further.³¹ It is true that if its per capita GNP of 370 dollars is compared with that of Singapore, there is the gap of 50 times or more. Besides these financial issues, the shortage of human resources who can be sent to more than 700 various kinds of ASEAN ministerial meetings every year, as the person affiliated to the foreign ministry pointed out; especially, the shortage of human resources who have a good command of English poses an even more serious problem, considering the fact that Portuguese is designated as the official language of the country. I heard that the country had sent a few thousand young people to relevant countries for human resource development.

So, what is the current status of East Timor that is aiming at accession to ASEAN, compared especially with ASEAN’s latecoming member countries? Let us compare socioeconomic indicators between East Timor and ASEAN’s latecoming member countries (CLMV: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Comparison of various indicators can be regarded as helpful in considering the future “state building” of East Timor and in predicting the position of East Timor within ASEAN to a certain degree.

According to *Human Development Report* in Table 1, while East Timor is ranked at the bottom in the human development index (HDI) in comparison with ASEAN’s latecoming member states, it has been raising the figures of HDI every year, being ranked higher than Cambodia in average life expectancy index and higher than Myanmar in GDP index. While major industries have not grown yet in East Timor, income from petroleum and natural gas continues to increase. For example, the annual revenue of the initial budget in the 2008 fiscal year was 1,379 million dollars;

30. Based on interviews on the occasion of a visitation to East Timor by the ASEAN Study Group led by Professor Yoneji Kuroyanagi of Daito Bunka University in March 2009 (with Constancio Pinto, Director General for External Affairs on March 25 and with Zacarias Albano Da Costa, Foreign Minister on March 26).

31. Above-mentioned interview with Director General for External Affairs, Constancio Pinto on March 25.

Table 1: Comparison of UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) between ASEAN's latecomers and East Timor (the 2005 year)

Name of country (HDI ranking/177 countries)	Average life expectancy at birth (age). 2005	Adult literacy rate (% : aged 15 and over) '95-'05	Total school attendance rate for primary, secondary, and tertiary education (%) 2005	Per capita GDP (PPP US\$) calculated using purchasing power parity (PPP). (2005)	Average life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI value) (2005)
Cambodia (131)	58.0	73.6	60.0	2,727	0.550	0.691	0.552	0.598
Vietnam (105)	73.7	90.3	63.9	3,071	0.812	0.815	0.572	0.733
Myanmar (132)	60.8	89.9	49.5	1,027	0.596	0.764	0.389	0.583
Laos (130)	63.2	68.7	61.5	2,039	0.637	0.663	0.503	0.601
East Timor (150)	56.0 49.3 59.7	40.4 58.6 50.1	59.1 75.0 72.0	337 478 —	0.517 0.41 0.578	0.466 0.64 0.574	0.203 0.26 0.390	0.395 0.436 0.514

Source: prepared from *UNDP Human Development Report 2009/2008* and *2004, EAST TIMOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002* (<http://www.undp.east-timor.org>). The numeric values of the upper, middle, and lower columns of the East Timor column correspond to FY1999, FY2002, and FY2005, respectively.

while revenue from petroleum amounts to 1,358 million dollars, domestic revenue such as tax revenues is as little as about 20 million dollars (Republic of Timor-Leste, *Draft Budget Book No. 1*, Table-2. 3, p. 16).

It seems that the vision of the “state building” of East Timor greatly depends on how such economic indicators of East Timor should be judged. It is not a socialist state like CLV (the Fretilin used to be advocating Marxism-Leninism) nor is it a garrison state like Myanmar. However, if East Timor is considered as representing a low development situation with no industrial basis, the authoritarian state building that Alkatiri aimed at or the course of developmental dictatorship seems to be compelling to a certain extent.

On the other hand, if they use income from petroleum and natural gas resources that continues to be generated for the time being as a spark for industrial development for the future³², the HDI will certainly increase and the path will be paved for joining

32. The East Timor government has begun to build thermal power stations in Manatutu and Same and is planning another one in Hera as well. Planning for petroleum and natural gas related facilities is going on for Suai, Betano, and Beasu. Besides the area of joint extraction with Australia in the Timor Sea, inland

ASEAN, without adopting the authoritarian system. Moreover, it may be possible for the country to join the “new ASEAN” camp that will play the role of “human rights advanced countries,” as Foreign Minister Da Costa pointed out.

Samuel P. Huntington observes that political stability can naturally or necessarily be obtained when economic development succeeds first and social reform is achieved next. And, economic development means the elimination of poverty, disease, and illiteracy, and he points out that these kinds of eliminations are indispensable to political development and political stability.³³

Moreover, Huntington cites in *The Third Wave* “higher literacy rate, the high level of economic and social welfare that leads education and urbanization, the larger the middle class and the development of values and attitudes that support democracy”³⁴ as factors to the reformation of the one-time authoritarian states into democratic system in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, as Huntington states in *The Third Wave* that the GNP per capita of the state that has gone through democratization was between 1,000 dollars and 3,000 dollars³⁵, it can be said that the current status of East Timor sands at the threshold of a transition to a democratic state according to Huntington’s requirements.

5. Toward a Democratic State Building

Huntington points out that there is a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. He observes that as a matter of fact Catholicism or Protestantism was a dominant religion in 39 out of 46 democratic countries until 1988.³⁶ Especially, in the 1970s and the 1980s that saw the third wave of democratization, three quarters of the states that shifted to the democratic system were Catholic states.

This is due to the fact that the Catholic Church had since the middle of 1960s changed the position of complying with and in many cases even justifying the authoritarian regime and that most of the churches had engaged in structural change in order to oppose the authoritarian regime. In other words, the Catholic Church brought about a change in its own structure, transforming itself from being the defender of the authoritarian regime to being the defender of the democratic system and became a force to support the democratic system.³⁷

extraction areas are being developed. The pace of resources development projects by foreign companies from South Korea, Malaysia, etc. is faster than ever.

33. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, pp. 5–6.

34. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 (translated into Japanese by Minoru Tsubogo, Toshikazu Nakamichi, and Yuzo Yabuno and published by Sanrei Shobo, 1995, p. 104).

35. *Ibid.* (translation), p. 62.

36. *Ibid.* (translation), p. 72.

37. *Ibid.* (translation), pp. 75–76.

The role of the Catholic Church as a force to support democratization is large also in East Timor where more than 90 percent of the people are Christians (most of them being Catholics). The Catholic Church under the Indonesian occupation stood on the side of the residents, accused the Indonesian side that carried out a crackdown, and emotionally supported the residents. Since Tetun language was used in mass from 1981 instead of Portuguese, which was forbidden, the number of believers who comprised the 30 percent level of the population before the annexation rapidly increased to 90 percent in the 1980s.³⁸

In such a de facto Catholic state of East Timor, only the Catholic Church opposed Fretilin's one party ruling system led by Alkatiri that increasingly strengthened the authoritarian system after independence and demanded for the building of a democratic state of East Timor. What particularly showed the imperative presence of the Catholic Church were the large-scale anti-government and anti-Alkatiri demonstrations held in the national capital Dili that commemorated the third anniversary of independence in 2005.

The direct cause of these demonstrations was a demand to recall the decision of the Alkatiri government in February of the year to drop religious education as a mandatory subject of public schools and make it an elective. Under the circumstances of the country in which the Catholic Church played a role in the independence movement, emotionally supported the residents under the Indonesian occupation and 90% of the people were Catholics, the side of the Catholic Church had no choice but to consider the decision of the government of that time as a clear attempt to contain the Catholic Church. Actually, as already mentioned, the Alkatiri government was promoting authoritarianism politics and was poised to restrict activities of civil society.

For this reason, it was quite true that the Catholic Church perceived the governmental decision to drop a religious subject as a mandatory subject to be a challenge to the Catholic Church and took it as the greatest crisis of the building of a democratic state. Father Domingo Soars who was the spokesperson of the Dili diocese of the Catholic Church criticized the Fretilin, saying, "They are ultra-left with strong communist tendencies... Those people who had defected to Mozambique where dictatorial governments continued are dominant." Moreover, speaking of the purpose of the demonstrations, saying, "In order to put an end to an ultra-left government, the residents and the Catholic Church joined peaceful demonstrations. I would like to demand for the resignation of the government and ask the Fretilin to select a new leader."³⁹

Furthermore, Bishop Albert Ricardo of the Dili diocese made clear the intention

38. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (eds.), *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*, Cassell Wellington House, 1995, pp. 120–133 (Chapter 8). See, Goto, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–185.

39. Internet newspaper, *Daily Berita*, published on April 25, 2005.

of the Church side on the mobilization of the demonstrations, saying, “The demonstrations were performed not only for the purpose of making a demand to the government concerning religious education but we may also say for the purpose of demanding for legal justice for humanitarian crimes and seeking clarification of the government’s posture on the issues of the people’s concern, such as food security, health, education, poverty, corruption, freedom of press, and freedom of speech.”⁴⁰

In response to the anti-government demonstrations that were carried out by mobilizing between 3,000 and 5,000 people everyday with a maximum of 10,000 people, Prime Minister Alkatiri eventually attended the dialogue with the Catholic Church and sought a compromise deal. As a result, religious education was kept as a regular subject to be taught in the school classes. In other words, a compromise was reached by leaving it to the discretion of the parents of a student whether he or she should attend a religious lesson.

Although the Catholic side’s call for the resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri was withdrawn, deep distrust still remained among them. It was the then president Gusmao who put an end to the impasse of the confrontation. Although Gusmao signed the compromise deal as the representative of the government, he had from the beginning appealed to both sides to solve the difference of opinion and misunderstanding through dialogue and played a role of an intermediary of a neutral position.⁴¹

Huntington points out that “the leaders and organizations of a church from time to time make a political intervention at crucial moments in the process of democratization”⁴² and this was also the case in East Timor. His observation that “Catholicism [as a feature of the Third Wave] was second to economic development as a force contributing to democratization”⁴³ may also provide a powerful hint for the “state building” of East Timor where the role of the Catholic Church is strong.

On the other hand, however, the Catholic Church is not only the largest landowner in East Timor but also an organization that wields large power in all areas of the

40. *Ibid.*

41. Gusmao is the president as a symbol of national unity. The contents of the post of president were specified by the leadership of the Fretilin that won majority seats in the 2001 constituent assembly election. Thus, the top power holder in the management of the state is the prime minister, and it was specified in the Constitution that the prime minister is selected from the head of the ruling party. In accordance with this provision, Alkatiri firmly consolidated his own position. On the other hand, the people expected Gusmao to be more than the symbolic position of the Constitution. Petitions were being made directly to Gusmao from a wide range of the people from ordinary citizens to Catholic Church-related people. See, Yamada, *op. cit.*, *Ronza*.

42. Huntington discusses the role of the church in Central and South America in such cases as an accusation of the church against the illegal votes for President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1978, an accusation against Noriega’s hijacking of election in Panama in 1989, the organization of anti-Sandinistas in Nicaragua and a struggle against the Pinochet regime. Furthermore, he also refers to the role of the church in pro-democracy movements in South Korea and the Philippines in 1986 as examples from Asia (Huntington, *op. cit.* (translation), pp. 82–84).

43. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

country, such as school education. The problem of religion being excessively involved in politics is pointed out on many occasions. Here lies the reason why Gusmao took a neutral position. Getting a fresh start in the democracy of East Timor may need, after all, the birth of a democratic government and the promotion of a democratization policy by such a government. In order to ensure them, it seems important more than anything else to clearly specify a path to economic development as Huntington points out.

6. Conclusion

The vision of state building by authoritarian means as envisaged by Alkatiri suffered a setback for the time being when he resigned from the post of the prime minister in the political change of June 2006. However, against the background of the acquisition of a large number of seats after the constituent assembly election in 2001, Alkatiri aimed at realizing Fretilin's one party rule while consolidating his own rule within the Fretilin. He seems to have had the intention to advance the state building of East Timor in the traditional "ASEAN WAY," establishing an authoritarian regime that would tighten up restrictions on civil society and NGOs.⁴⁴ In the first presidential election in April 2007 that was the first national election after independence, Lu-olo (Francisco Guterres, alias Lu-olo), who was the candidate from the Fretilin, acquired the largest number of votes, but failed to gain majority. After all, an anti-Fretilin coalition was formed in the runoff vote in May, and Ramos-Horta was elected to be the second president.

Although the Fretilin firmly maintained the position of the comparative dominant party in a subsequent national assembly election in June, it failed to gain majority in a parliament and was forced to allow the election of Gusmao as the prime minister in a coalition of the CNRT and others. In the beginning, based on the interpretation of the Constitution on the election of the prime minister, the Fretilin did not accept Gusmao who was from the next largest party assuming the post of the prime minister, but asked for the rerun of the election. However, although the Fretilin refuses to accept Gusmao assuming the post of the prime minister, it presently recognizes the validity of the results of the election and has switched to the strategy to aim at recapturing the government in the next election.⁴⁵ There seems to be a perception that more anti-

44. The Malaysian army was included in the request for four countries to send forces for the maintenance of public order in the turmoil of this time. As the Malaysian army also participated in the suppression of the turmoil in the wake of the referendum in 1999, Alkatiri's management of politics seemed to be in parallel with the political system of Malaysia. In addition, for conflict prevention and peace building in Malaysia, see, Mitsuru Yamada, "Efforts of peace-building in Malaysia: conflict prevention of a multi-ethnic state," in *The Peace Studies Association of Japan* (ed.), *Peace Studies: Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building*, Waseda University Press, 2005.

45. See, Mitsuru Yamada, *Kaigai Jijo*, October 2007.

government movement would cause social unrest, which would result in not only criticism from foreign countries but also alienation from public opinion. In that sense, East Timor has certainly taken a first step towards democracy.

The Gusmao government that captured power from Alkatiri faced three major challenges in connection with the 2006 turmoil.⁴⁶ Firstly, there was the problem of the treatment of renegade soldiers including Military Police Chief Alfred Reinado which contributed to the 2006 turmoil. However, this problem was put to an end accidentally by the incident in which an armed group led by Major Reinado attacked President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao on February 11, 2008. While the attacked President Ramos-Horta escaped death despite having been hit, Major Reinado was shot to death on the spot, thereby more or less settling the problem of renegade soldiers. Secondly, there was the problem of the repatriation of internally displaced persons that were displaced in the 2006 turmoil. Thirdly, there was what was called the problem of “petition soldiers” who left their units because of the “East-West problem” of the Defense Force that was the direct factor to the 2006 turmoil and were discharged. Prime Minister Gusmao used income from petroleum and natural gas to cope with the 2nd and 3rd problem and settled them by paying to the former assistance grants according to damage and by offering to the latter a choice between reinstatement to the Defense Force and becoming civilians, with three years’ unpaid salaries being paid according to rank. Moreover, Gusmao paid pension to former Falintil soldiers according to service period and merit and somehow settled the greatest challenge for the government.⁴⁷

East Timor that learnt the Western style nation state building⁴⁸ under the U.N. transitional government steered towards an authoritarian political regime under the Alkatiri government. However, with the onset of the 2006 turmoil, the country has

46. Interview with Inacio Freita Moreira, former Transportation and Communication Minister of the Ramos-Horta Cabinet (Fretilin member) on February 28, 2008.

47. It is said that the maximum 4,500 dollars are paid to the IDPs, that the three years’ unpaid salaries that the petition soldiers receive are, according to rank, 5,006 dollars at the lowest and 7,260 dollars for highest paid majors (Morito Aoyama, *East Timor Dayori*, 2008, no. 30) and that the monthly pension of 85 dollars to 550 dollars are paid to former Falintil soldiers according to service period, rank and merit. Anyway, the Gusmao Cabinet sought to settle various problems, using money. In passing, as for the income from petroleum and natural gas that Gusmao uses, the maximum amount taken out annually to the national budget from the petroleum fund specified in the petroleum fund law correspond to 3 percent of the gross asset of petroleum. This amount of money corresponding to 3 percent is referred to as “Estimated Sustainable Income” (ESI). For example, since the gross asset of petroleum as of January 1, 2009, is 13,600 million dollars, the ESI of 2009 fiscal year would be 408 million dollars, which the government can spend. On the other hand, former Prime Minister Alkatiri is critical saying that it is the Gusmao government’s “pork barrel policy,” which will eat up the future asset of East Timor (interview with Alkatiri, former prime minister on February 26, 2008).

48. Roland Paris points out that if the Wilsonian political system (liberalization, democratization, and market economy) is introduced to a post-conflict fragile state at an early stage, it will rather relapse into conflict. Paris asserts the need for the “institutionalization before liberalization” Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

taken the Ramos-Horta-Gusmao line through the 2007 elections and has been actively accepting again the framework of the Western-style good governance, such as promotion of democracy, rule of law, and respect of human rights. The prospects for the building of a democratic state have been opened, especially due to the orientation of the government that stresses the enhancement of the role of civil society and NGOs.

From now on, the requirements for a shift from an authoritarian state to a democratic state that Huntington pointed out, that is, reduction of poverty, improvement in literacy and rise of industry, and furthermore the avoidance of the corruption, collusion, and nepotism of the government that have already begun to become problematic. In other words, “good governance” will be strongly called for. Besides, a long-term support of the international community is needed for the country to escape from the status of a fragile state, and this will become an important issue in the building of a democratic state in East Timor.