

Religion and Attitudes toward Family Policies in Japan, South Korea and Singapore

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Introduction

During the past decades Japanese demographers have kept saying that the delay in marriage and the increase in proportion never-married are major causes of fertility decline, but the policy makers have been concentrated their efforts on support for childrearing. This may not have been misdirected, considering the results of the comparative study by Kojima and Rallu (1997/1998), which revealed the larger contribution of marital fertility decline in Japan due to the lack of catch-up births and births by cohabiting couples in comparison with France. More recently, support measures for work-life balance has been occupying a larger share in the Government's policy responses to very low fertility. Even though these support measures may have some effects on facilitating marriages, they are not directly encouraging marriages. Moreover, some scholars criticize the support measures for work-life balance for its tendency to favor only those couples in which both spouses work on a regular basis and consequently to increase socioeconomic inequality (Mackie 2002, Henninger et al. 2008).

However, we have to also examine the feasibility of pro-marriage policy measures because socioeconomic inequality is considered to be a major cause for marriage delay and increased celibacy, while only some local governments in Japan have implemented pro-marriage measures. Other societies in East Asia, including South Korea and Taiwan, have experienced fertility decline more recently, but they tend to have intermarriage (marriage migrant) policy. On the other hand, Singapore has had low fertility during the past three decades and its Government implemented pro-marriage measures as a part of its pronatalistic family policy package. Thus, it would be more productive to compare the possible effects of family policy measures, including pro-marriage policy measures, in Japan and Singapore as well as South Korea. If the delay in marriage and childbearing is a kind of "silent" resistance of younger persons to their expected roles in the society (Riley 2006), we should be able

to assess the feasibility and potential effects of family policy measures by asking their preferences for them.

While religion is a “forgotten” variable in Japanese social surveys except in international comparative surveys, it has been known to affect various socioeconomic and demographic attitudes and behaviors in many other societies. In the case of Singapore, religion and ethnicity (called “race” in Singapore) may have independent effects, but they were not necessarily analyzed simultaneously possibly because of limited access to microdata and the sensitivity. While South Koreans are considered to have more Confucian values than other East Asians, the society seems to be in the process of Christianization. Thus, religion is expected to affect policy preferences in the two countries and possibly in Japan.

This study presents the results of a comparative analysis of the religion’s effects on attitudes toward different types of family policies in Japan, South Korea and Singapore, drawing on microdata from the 2009 Survey on Comparative Study of Family Policies in East Asia (South Korea, Singapore and Japan), which was conducted by the Section for Measures against Declining Birthrate, Director-General for Policies on Cohesive Society, Cabinet Office (Japanese Government). This is also an extension of Kojima (2009a, 2010), which analyzed the correlates of partnership formation and cohabitation using the same data set.

Literature Review

There do not seem to be many studies which directly relate religion to attitudes toward family policies. DellaPergola’s (2007) PAA paper includes logit analyses for determinants (including religiosity) of preferred family policy options which include similar measures with this study, but the relevant part is deleted in the published version (DellaPergola 2009). Kojima (1996) may be one of the earliest multivariate analyses for determinants of attitudes toward population policy in Japan, but the information on religion was not available in the survey microdata.

According to Kojima’s (2005) literature review on the effects of pronatalistic family policy measures in Singapore, some studies suggest that the pronatalist policies as a whole might have had limited effects, particularly among Malay population, but there were not any studies dealing separately with pro-marriage measures except Lee et al. (1991) which shows that match-making services tended to be favored by single men according to their survey among Ethnic Chinese college students. A more recent study by Leong and Sriramesh (2006) finds that their respondents tend to be against “Romancing Singapore” campaign in February 2003. There do not seem to be any multivariate analyses of the effects of religion on attitudes toward pronatalistic family policies in East Asia or in the West.

Li et al. (2011) have recently found that Singaporean women are more materialistic than American women and, thus, they are less likely to favor marriage and childbearing due to lower life satisfaction and higher income standard placed on potential mates. On the other hand, Swinyard et al. (2001) found that in Singapore and the U.S. more materialistic respondents tend to have less life satisfaction, which is partly mediated by religion. Thus, we might examine more direct relationship between religion and attitudes toward family formation, including those related to family policies.

Lesthaeghe (2010) has recently suggested that East Asia is experiencing the “Second Demographic Transition” and has revealed that the effects of value-related factors on the delay in childbearing in Japan, South Korea and Singapore are similar to Western societies, but only in the case of Japan factors related to religion-secularization values tend to have effects in the opposite direction. This is in line with Kojima’s (2006) finding that Japan is different from South Korea and Taiwan for the positive effects of interaction between religion and young age on pronatalistic attitudes. However, there are not many Japanese studies analyzing the effects of religion on demographic attitudes and behaviors partly because it is not a standard question item in Japanese surveys.

Data and Methods

The microdata used in this study derive from the 2009 Survey on Comparative Study of Family Policies in East Asia (South Korea, Singapore and Japan), which was conducted by the Section for Measures against Declining Birthrate, Director-General for Policies on Cohesive Society, Cabinet Office (Japanese Government). The Section conducted a similar comparative survey in 2005 (also in 2010) in Japan, South Korea, France, Sweden and the U.S., but the 2009 survey focused on East Asia in a broader sense and added a few questions relevant to the region and deleted a few irrelevant ones. Singapore was included because it has been conducting an active pronatalistic family policy during the past three decades and it exhibits diversity in terms of ethnicity and religion.

The details about the survey procedure are found in CAO (2009). The survey in Japan used two-stage stratified sampling to randomly select municipalities and the area sampling based on age and sex quota in the sampled municipalities to obtain 1,000 (male and female) respondents aged 20–49. The respondents of surveys in other countries seem to be selected in a similar manner. The policy-related dependent variables to be analyzed in this study are as follows:

Government promotion of marriage among singles (abbreviated as “Pro-Marriage

Policy”)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the idea that the government should implement policies encouraging unmarried people to get married?

1) Strongly agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree; 4) Strongly disagree; and 5) Don't know

Importance of policies encouraging unmarried people to marry

What would be the most important element in a policy that will encourage unmarried people to marry? Please choose **up to two** answers.

- 1) Provide stable work opportunities through employment policy (“Employment Opportunities”)
- 2) Increase wages to make household income stable (“Pay Raise”)
- 3) Provide loans or grants for marriage and housing (“Housing Finance for Newly Weds”)
- 4) Provide match making services (“Provision of Meeting Opportunities”)
- 5) Implement tax policies that favor married couples (“Tax Advantages”)
- 6) Make the workplace family-friendly, so that couples can continue working (“Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples”)
- 7) Implement family policies to encourage young people to get married (“Marriage Promotion Information”)
- 8) Others — Please specify
- 9) None (DO NOT READ)
- 10) Don't know

Marriage support services (“Use of Marriage Services”)

To what extent will you be interested in using public or private marriage support services such as marriage counseling, matching services, and so forth?

1) Definitely interested in using them; 2) Would like to use them; 3) Not so interested in using them; 4) Do not want to use them; 5) Not interested at all; and 6) Don't know

Government policies supporting children (“Support for Childrearing”)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the idea that the government should implement policies to support children?

1) Strongly agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree; 4) Strongly disagree; and 5) Don't know

Demand for Administrative Measures (“Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy” for the choice of 3)

What should be the future direction of the government measures regarding the decline in birth rate? Please choose one answer.

- 1) They should implement measures to increase birthrate.
- 2) They should implement measures to at least prevent further declining of the birthrate.
- 3) They do not need to implement any measures regarding the decline in birth rate because the choice of bearing a child or not is a personal choice.
- 4) Current governmental measures regarding the decline in birth rate are sufficient.
- 5) Others — Please specify
- 6) Don't know

Government policies to reduce the physical and financial burdens of pregnancy and childbirth (“Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth”)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the proposition that the government should implement policies to reduce the physical and financial burdens of pregnancy and childbirth?

- 1) Strongly agree; 2) Somewhat agree; 3) Somewhat disagree; 4) Strongly disagree; and 5) Don't know

Measures to reduce the physical and financial burdens of pregnancy and childbirth

What would be the most important element in a policy to reduce the physical and financial burdens of pregnancy and childbirth? Please choose **up to two** answers.

- 1) Providing grants for childbirth, in order to reduce the financial burdens on the individual (“Grants for Childbirth”)
- 2) Providing grants for infertility treatment (“Grants for Infertility Treatment”)
- 3) Providing free health care and check-ups during pregnancy (“Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy”)
- 4) Extending the leave period before and after childbirth (“Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth”)
- 5) Expanding mother and child nursing services (“Extension of MCH services”)
- 6) Increasing home-helper or domestic services to assist in housework, etc. (“Increase in Home Helper Services”)
- 7) Others — Please specify
- 8) Don't know

The methods used in this study are the bivariate analysis and the binomial logit analysis. For the bivariate analysis, the independent variable is religion: Buddhist and No Religion for Japan; Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant and No Religion for South Korea; and Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Taoist, Hindu and No Religion for

Singapore. The mean of dependent variables for each religion will be presented. For the binomial logit analysis with stepwise selection for Japan, Catholic, Protestant and Shintoist are also included as candidates. The interaction terms for 5-year age groups and each religion are also included as candidates.

The binomial logit analysis with comparable predetermined models includes, as independent variables, Buddhist (and its interaction with marital status) for Japan, Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant for South Korea and Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Taoist, and Hindu for Singapore. The models also include, as control variables, age (25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, and 45–49 with 20–24 as the reference category), partnership status (Married, Ever-Cohabited, Partner Loss and Never-Partnered with Others), education (Higher and Lower with Medium), employment status (Agriculture/Self-Employed, Professional, Public Sector Employee, Private Sector Employee and Unemployed with Others), employment type (Non-Regular with Others) and urban/rural residence (Metropolitan and Rural with Medium Size City) for Japan and South Korea and race (Malay and Indian with Others) and nationality (Expatriate with Others) for Singapore.

Results

1. Bivariate Analyses

1) Pro-Marriage Policy and Measures

Tables 1a and 1b show the mean proportion of support for each policy or measure. The first column of Table 1a reveals that the level of support for “Pro-Marriage Policy” is a little less than 50% in Japan and South Korea, but 81.2% in Singapore. In all the three societies, the level of support is higher among men than among women, but the gender difference is relatively large in South Korea.

In Japan Buddhists are slightly more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy” than those without religion. In South Korea Protestants are most likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” followed by Buddhists, while Catholics are least likely to support the policy. But such an effect of Catholicism is not observed in Singapore where Hindus, Taoists and Muslims are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” followed by Buddhists and Catholics. In Singapore, however, Protestants are much less likely to support the policy following closely those without religion.

The second through eighth columns of Table 1a show that the support levels for each measure of “Pro-Marriage Policy” are not too different among the three societies. Both “1) Employment Opportunities” and “2) Pay Raise” are generally most often chosen in all the three societies except that “3) Housing Finance for Newly Weds” is much more favored in South Korea and that “7) Marriage Promotion Information” is relatively more favored in Singapore. The first exception for South Korea may be due

Table 1a Proportion of Support for Family Policy Measures by Religion in the Three Countries

Country Sex Religion	Pro- Marriage Policy	1. Employ- ment Opportunities	2. Pay Raise	3. Housing Finance for Newly Weds	4. Provision of Meeting Opportunities	5. Tax Advanta- ges	6. Better Work Env. for 2- Earner Couples	7. Marriage Promotion Information	Use of Marriage Support Services
Japan									
Total (N)	46.2% 999	34.2% 999	36.5% 999	24.3% 999	12.9% 999	23.9% 999	31.0% 999	4.6% 999	13.1% 999
Buddhist	48.0%	34.4%	35.8%	23.3%	15.1%	23.5%	33.2%	4.2%	13.9%
No Religion	45.9%	33.7%	37.5%	25.3%	11.3%	25.1%	29.8%	4.1%	12.3%
Male (N)	47.0% 508	28.9% 508	39.6% 508	26.8% 508	13.2% 508	28.7% 508	24.4% 508	6.5% 508	14.6% 508
Buddhist	48.4%	27.9%	39.7%	25.1%	16.4%	28.8%	24.7%	5.9%	14.6%
No Religion	47.5%	28.7%	39.1%	28.7%	11.5%	28.4%	24.5%	6.5%	13.8%
Female (N)	45.4% 491	39.7% 491	33.4% 491	21.8% 491	12.6% 491	18.9% 491	37.9% 491	2.6% 491	11.6% 491
Buddhist	47.6%	41.3%	31.6%	21.4%	13.6%	18.0%	42.2%	2.4%	13.1%
No Religion	44.3%	38.7%	36.0%	21.7%	11.1%	21.7%	35.2%	1.6%	10.7%
South Korea									
Total (N)	48.0% 996	45.7% 996	26.8% 996	55.7% 996	11.6% 996	21.2% 996	19.9% 996	8.4% 996	27.4% 996
Buddhist	50.3%	42.6%	30.8%	57.9%	11.8%	18.5%	20.5%	8.2%	26.7%
Catholic	35.9%	46.2%	19.2%	56.4%	9.0%	26.9%	21.8%	9.0%	25.6%
Protestant	54.8%	47.4%	26.3%	58.3%	11.8%	20.2%	18.9%	9.2%	31.1%
No Religion	45.6%	46.2%	26.8%	53.5%	12.0%	21.9%	19.9%	7.9%	26.4%
Male (N)	51.6% 510	48.4% 510	26.9% 510	57.1% 510	11.2% 510	18.8% 510	18.6% 510	8.2% 510	28.8% 510
Buddhist	56.6%	44.6%	33.7%	55.4%	12.1%	19.3%	19.3%	4.8%	31.3%
Catholic	41.2%	38.2%	11.8%	61.8%	14.7%	29.4%	17.6%	14.7%	23.5%
Protestant	57.8%	55.9%	26.5%	57.8%	8.8%	15.7%	19.6%	10.8%	36.3%
No Religion	49.0%	48.3%	26.9%	56.9%	11.4%	18.6%	18.3%	7.6%	26.2%
Female (N)	44.2% 486	42.8% 486	26.7% 486	54.3% 486	12.1% 486	23.7% 486	21.2% 486	8.6% 486	25.9% 486
Buddhist	45.5%	41.1%	28.6%	59.8%	11.6%	17.9%	21.4%	10.7%	23.2%
Catholic	31.8%	52.3%	25.0%	52.3%	4.5%	25.0%	25.0%	4.5%	27.3%
Protestant	52.4%	40.5%	26.2%	58.7%	14.3%	23.8%	18.3%	7.9%	27.0%
No Religion	40.9%	43.3%	26.6%	48.8%	12.8%	26.6%	22.2%	8.4%	26.6%
Singapore									
Total (N)	81.2% 998	41.3% 998	43.8% 998	27.4% 998	11.1% 998	15.8% 998	24.5% 998	21.2% 998	22.4% 998
Buddhist	83.8%	39.8%	42.4%	30.8%	13.3%	14.6%	23.3%	21.5%	19.6%
Catholic	82.8%	45.3%	37.5%	32.8%	9.4%	12.5%	25.0%	25.0%	28.1%
Protestant	73.7%	33.7%	42.1%	22.1%	14.7%	21.1%	25.3%	23.2%	25.3%
Muslim	85.5%	48.5%	56.4%	24.2%	9.1%	12.1%	19.4%	16.4%	23.6%
Taoist	86.7%	57.8%	35.6%	17.8%	8.9%	17.8%	26.7%	20.0%	15.6%
Hindu	89.7%	50.0%	37.9%	29.3%	5.2%	20.7%	19.0%	25.9%	25.9%
No Religion	71.2%	33.5%	41.9%	25.7%	9.9%	17.8%	32.5%	22.0%	24.6%
Male (N)	82.6% 506	45.5% 506	44.3% 506	27.1% 506	10.5% 506	17.4% 506	20.4% 506	20.8% 506	22.5% 506
Buddhist	83.1%	45.0%	38.6%	31.7%	14.3%	16.4%	19.6%	22.2%	22.2%
Catholic	84.4%	50.0%	43.8%	34.4%	6.3%	18.8%	18.8%	18.8%	28.1%
Protestant	79.6%	32.7%	38.8%	20.4%	16.3%	24.5%	18.4%	20.4%	26.5%
Muslim	83.1%	55.1%	64.0%	22.5%	5.6%	10.1%	18.0%	12.4%	24.7%
Taoist	95.8%	66.7%	33.3%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	20.8%	16.7%	8.3%
Hindu	90.0%	50.0%	36.7%	33.3%	0.0%	20.0%	13.3%	26.7%	33.3%
No Religion	76.1%	35.9%	44.6%	25.0%	8.7%	18.5%	28.3%	26.1%	17.4%
Female (N)	79.7% 492	37.0% 492	43.3% 492	27.6% 492	11.8% 492	14.2% 492	28.9% 492	21.7% 492	22.4% 492
Buddhist	84.6%	34.6%	46.3%	29.8%	12.2%	12.8%	27.1%	20.7%	17.0%
Catholic	81.2%	40.6%	31.2%	31.2%	12.5%	6.3%	31.2%	31.2%	28.1%
Protestant	67.4%	34.8%	45.7%	23.9%	13.0%	17.4%	32.6%	26.1%	23.9%
Muslim	88.2%	40.8%	47.4%	26.3%	13.2%	14.5%	21.1%	21.1%	22.4%
Taoist	76.2%	47.6%	38.1%	23.8%	4.8%	9.5%	33.3%	23.8%	23.8%
Hindu	89.3%	50.0%	39.3%	25.0%	10.7%	21.4%	25.0%	25.0%	17.9%
No Religion	66.7%	31.3%	39.4%	26.3%	11.1%	17.2%	36.4%	18.2%	31.3%

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Table 1b Proportion of Support for Family Policy Measures by Religion in the Three Countries

Country Sex Religion	Support for Childrearing	Non- Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	1. Grants for Childbirth	2. Grants for Infertility Treatment	3. Free Health Care and Check- ups during Pregnancy	4. Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth	5. Extension of MCH Services	6. Increase in Home Helper Services
Japan									
Total (N)	69.0% 999	11.3% 999	71.5% 999	71.3% 999	22.9% 999	46.5% 999	17.2% 999	21.0% 999	5.0% 999
Buddhist	68.9%	9.6%	70.8%	70.8%	22.8%	46.1%	19.3%	20.5%	4.7%
No Religion	68.5%	12.3%	71.4%	72.2%	23.3%	47.1%	15.0%	21.8%	5.3%
Male									
(N)	67.7% 508	13.6% 508	72.6% 508	74.2% 508	18.9% 508	44.3% 508	17.7% 508	21.9% 508	4.7% 508
Buddhist	69.4%	12.3%	71.2%	74.0%	19.6%	43.4%	19.2%	19.6%	5.9%
No Religion	65.9%	14.9%	73.2%	76.2%	18.4%	44.8%	16.1%	23.0%	3.8%
Female									
(N)	70.3% 491	9.0% 491	70.3% 491	68.2% 491	27.1% 491	48.9% 491	16.7% 491	20.2% 491	5.3% 491
Buddhist	68.4%	6.8%	70.4%	67.5%	26.2%	49.0%	19.4%	21.4%	3.4%
No Religion	71.1%	9.5%	69.6%	68.0%	28.5%	49.4%	13.8%	20.6%	6.7%
South Korea									
Total (N)	51.1% 996	5.8% 996	41.4% 996	62.3% 996	10.0% 996	34.8% 996	40.1% 996	21.6% 996	23.6% 996
Buddhist	53.8%	7.2%	39.5%	64.6%	9.7%	32.8%	40.0%	21.5%	22.6%
Catholic	50.0%	5.1%	37.2%	57.7%	6.4%	39.7%	43.6%	30.8%	19.2%
Protestant	53.9%	5.7%	41.7%	62.3%	12.7%	32.5%	42.5%	19.7%	21.5%
No Religion	48.9%	5.3%	42.8%	62.3%	9.5%	36.1%	38.3%	21.1%	25.6%
Male									
(N)	51.6% 510	6.7% 510	42.2% 510	63.1% 510	8.6% 510	37.5% 510	39.4% 510	22.0% 510	22.0% 510
Buddhist	51.8%	7.2%	36.1%	67.5%	7.2%	36.1%	48.2%	20.5%	13.3%
Catholic	50.0%	2.9%	38.2%	50.0%	5.9%	38.2%	44.1%	26.5%	32.4%
Protestant	57.8%	5.9%	43.1%	60.8%	13.7%	40.2%	35.3%	18.6%	22.5%
No Religion	49.7%	6.9%	44.1%	64.5%	7.6%	36.9%	37.6%	23.1%	23.1%
Female									
(N)	50.6% 486	4.9% 486	40.5% 486	61.5% 486	11.5% 486	32.1% 486	40.7% 486	21.2% 486	25.3% 486
Buddhist	55.4%	7.1%	42.0%	62.5%	11.6%	30.4%	33.9%	22.3%	29.5%
Catholic	50.0%	6.8%	36.4%	63.6%	6.8%	40.9%	43.2%	34.1%	9.1%
Protestant	50.8%	5.6%	40.5%	63.5%	11.9%	26.2%	48.4%	20.6%	20.6%
No Religion	47.8%	3.0%	40.9%	59.1%	12.3%	35.0%	39.4%	18.2%	29.1%
Singapore									
Total (N)	55.0% 998	6.0% 998	40.8% 998	68.0% 998	20.7% 998	57.4% 998	23.4% 998	11.5% 998	7.1% 998
Buddhist	54.1%	7.4%	42.2%	67.6%	19.6%	61.8%	18.0%	9.5%	8.8%
Catholic	57.8%	4.7%	48.4%	67.2%	26.6%	51.6%	32.8%	10.9%	6.3%
Protestant	51.6%	5.3%	33.7%	69.5%	22.1%	46.3%	26.3%	20.0%	4.2%
Muslim	61.2%	4.2%	45.5%	72.1%	15.8%	63.0%	24.2%	6.7%	5.5%
Taoist	55.6%	6.7%	40.0%	73.3%	26.7%	48.9%	17.8%	11.1%	13.3%
Hindu	58.6%	8.6%	41.4%	58.6%	31.0%	53.4%	22.4%	15.5%	8.6%
No Religion	50.3%	4.7%	34.6%	67.0%	20.4%	53.9%	30.4%	14.1%	5.2%
Male									
(N)	55.7% 506	5.3% 506	42.7% 506	69.4% 506	21.1% 506	57.1% 506	23.5% 506	10.9% 506	5.9% 506
Buddhist	56.1%	5.8%	46.6%	64.6%	21.7%	61.4%	18.0%	9.0%	10.6%
Catholic	65.6%	6.3%	50.0%	68.8%	31.2%	50.0%	28.1%	15.6%	3.1%
Protestant	53.1%	6.1%	36.7%	77.6%	24.5%	46.9%	18.4%	16.3%	2.0%
Muslim	60.7%	3.4%	43.8%	73.0%	14.6%	62.9%	27.0%	7.9%	3.4%
Taoist	54.2%	4.2%	45.8%	83.3%	33.3%	54.2%	20.8%	4.2%	0.0%
Hindu	60.0%	13.3%	40.0%	66.7%	20.0%	50.0%	26.7%	13.3%	6.7%
No Religion	46.7%	3.3%	33.7%	69.6%	18.5%	53.3%	32.6%	13.0%	3.3%
Female									
(N)	54.3% 492	6.7% 492	38.8% 492	66.7% 492	20.3% 492	57.7% 492	23.4% 492	12.2% 492	8.3% 492
Buddhist	52.1%	9.0%	37.8%	70.7%	17.6%	62.2%	18.1%	10.1%	6.9%
Catholic	50.0%	3.1%	46.9%	65.6%	21.9%	53.1%	37.5%	6.3%	9.4%
Protestant	50.0%	4.3%	30.4%	60.9%	19.6%	45.7%	34.8%	23.9%	6.5%
Muslim	61.8%	5.3%	47.4%	71.1%	17.1%	63.2%	21.1%	5.3%	7.9%
Taoist	57.1%	9.5%	33.3%	61.9%	19.1%	42.9%	14.3%	19.1%	28.6%
Hindu	57.1%	3.6%	42.9%	50.0%	42.9%	57.1%	17.9%	17.9%	10.7%
No Religion	53.5%	6.1%	35.4%	64.6%	22.2%	54.5%	28.3%	15.2%	7.1%

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

to the custom of “Jeonse” which is lump-sum deposit (about a half of property value) for rental housing in place of monthly rent. The second exception may be due to translation because it is marriage promotion information activities in the Japanese questionnaire as the abbreviation indicates.

In Japan “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” and “6) Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples” are distinctively more favored by Buddhists than those without religion, while financial measures tend to be more favored by those without religion. In South Korea Protestants do not exhibit any distinctively stronger preference for specific measures even though they are most likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy” as a whole. Buddhists are most likely to favor only “2) Pay Raise” as a specific measure and least likely to favor “1) Employment Opportunities.” Catholics are least likely to favor “2) Pay Raise” and “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” but most likely to favor “5) Tax Advantages” and “6) Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples.”

In Singapore those with each religion have their favorite measures. Hindus are most likely to favor “7) Marriage Promotion Information,” while Taoists are most likely to favor “1) Employment Opportunities” and Muslims “2) Pay Raise.” Buddhists are not likely to favor any measures, while Catholics are most likely to favor “3) Housing Finance for Newly Weds” and Protestants “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” and “5) Tax Advantages.” On the other hand, Singaporeans without religion are most likely to favor “6) Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples.”

The last column of Table 1a reveals that the level of “Use of Marriage Support Services” is 13.1% in Japan but about the double in South Korea (27.4%), and in-between in Singapore (22.4%). In Japan and South Korea, the level of use is higher among men than among women, but almost no gender difference is found in Singapore for the total. The English translation of this item may not be too appropriate because it includes marriage counseling (for married couples) possibly due to the literal translation of “Kekkon Sodanjo” and because it is mainly the actual use of match-making services in the Japanese questionnaire. In Japan Buddhists are more likely to use marriage support services. In Korea Protestants are most likely to use the services, while Catholics are least likely, but the religious differences are smaller among women. In Singapore Catholics are most likely to use marriage support services while Taoists are least likely, followed by Buddhists.

2) Pro-Birth/Child Policy and Measures

The first column of Table 1b shows that the level of agreement to “Support for Childrearing” is higher for Japan at 69.0%, while it is a little over 50% in South Korea and Singapore. In Japan the level of agreement is higher among women than among men, but the opposite tendency is found in the other two societies. In Japan the

religious difference does not seem to be large in the total, but Buddhist men are more likely to favor childrearing support than men without religion, while Buddhist women are less likely. In South Korea Protestants and Buddhists are most likely to favor the support and those without religion are least likely in the total while Catholics are in-between. Protestant men and Buddhist women are most likely, while women without religion are distinctively least likely. But Catholic men exhibit a similar level with men without religion and Catholic women with Protestant women. In Singapore Muslims are most likely to favor childrearing support, followed by Hindus, while those without religion are least likely, closely followed by Protestants. Among men Catholics are much more likely to favor it than Muslims and Hindus. Among women, however, Catholics, together with Protestants, are least likely to favor the support, while Muslims are most likely, followed by Taoists and Hindus.

The second column of Table 1b reveals that the level of “Non-Support for Pro-natalist Policy” is a little more than 10% in Japan but around 6% in South Korea and Singapore. In Japan and South Korea the level of non-support is higher among men than among women, but it is lower among men in Singapore. In Japan Buddhist men and women are less likely to choose non-support than those without religion. In South Korea Buddhists are most likely to choose non-support while Catholics are least likely. Among men it is the same, but among women Catholics closely follow Buddhists in the choice of non-support while women without religion are least likely to choose it. In Singapore Hindus are most likely to choose non-support, followed by Buddhists and Taoists, while Muslims are least likely, followed by Catholics and those without religion. Among men Hindus are by far most likely to choose non-support followed, by Catholics, but among women Catholics are least likely, followed by Hindus. Among men those without religion are least likely to choose non-support, closely followed by Muslims, while among women Taoists are most likely, followed by Buddhists.

The third column of Table 1b shows that the support level for the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” is 71.5% in Japan but a little over 40% in South Korea and Singapore. In all the three societies, the level of support is higher among men than among women, but the gender difference is relatively large in Singapore. In Japan Buddhists are less likely to support it than those without religion among men, but Buddhists are slightly more likely among women. In South Korea those without religion are most likely to support the policy, followed by Protestants, while Catholics are least likely. Among Korean women Buddhists are most likely to support the policy, but among Korean men they are least likely. In Singapore Catholics are most likely to support it, followed by Muslims, while Protestants are least likely, followed by those without religion. Among Singaporean men and women similar patterns are observed.

The fourth through ninth columns of Table 1b show that the support level for each measure option for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” is somewhat different among the three societies, except that “1) Grants for Childbirth” is most often chosen at a similar level. The second most favored measure is “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy” in Japan and Singapore, but “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is slightly more favored in South Korea, possibly because the maternity leave period is perceived as shorter. On the other hand, the least favored measure is “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” in Japan and Singapore, but it is “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” in South Korea.

In Japan where Buddhists are less likely to support the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” than those without religion, only “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is more likely to be chosen by Buddhists. In South Korea where those without religion are most likely to support the policy as a whole, only “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is most often chosen by them. While Catholics are least likely to support the policy as a whole, “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy,” “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” and “5) Extension of MCH services” are most often chosen by them. On the other hand, “1) Grants for Childbirth” and “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” are least often chosen by Catholics, while the former is most often chosen by Buddhists and the latter by Protestants. In Singapore where Catholics are most likely to support the policy as a whole, only “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is most often chosen by them. “1) Grants for Childbirth” and “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” are most often chosen by Taoists, while “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” is most often chosen by Hindus, “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy” by Muslims, and “5) Extension of MCH services” by Protestants.

All the above results of bivariate analyses are confounded by the effects of demographic and socioeconomic variables. In all the three societies, there are gender differences which may at least partly reflect socioeconomic differences. In the case of Singapore, effects of religion may be reflecting at least partly the effects of ethnicity. Therefore, multivariate analyses by gender are preferable.

2. Logit Analyses with Stepwise Selection

Before examining the results of logit analyses with comparable predetermined models, we might look at the results of logit analyses with stepwise selection by sex. Only the effects of independent variables (religion and its interaction with age) will be mentioned below even though they become statistically significant only in combination with other selected variables.

1) Pro-Marriage Policy and Measures

Table 2a Correlates of Support for Family Policy Measures in the Three Countries: Results of Binomial Logit Analysis (Stepwise Selection)

Country Sex	Pro-Marriage Policy	1. Employment Opportunities	2. Pay Raise	3. Housing Finance for Newly Weds	4. Provision of Meeting Opportunities	5. Tax Advantages	6. Better Work Env. for 2-Earner Couples	7. Marriage Promotion Information	Use of Marriage Support Services
Japan Male	Buddhist × 3034 (-) NoRelig × 2529 (+) 2140WW × 2024 (+)	Ever-Cohabited (+) Buddhist × 2024 (+) HighEdu × 4549 (+) Agric (+) Public Sector (+) Unemployed (+) PrivateS × 4044 (+) RegEmp × 2529 (+)	Highsch × 4549 (+) PrivateS × 2529 (+)	Ever-Cohabited (+) Partner Loss (+)	—	Cohabiting (+) Partnered (+) 30-35M Committer (-)	Highschool (+) Public Sector (+) Student (+) 4150WW × 3034 (+) 5160WW × 3539 (+)	—	Ever in Union (+)
Female	Partnered (+) Metropolitan (-) PrivateS × 3034 (-) 51-60Work Wk (-) NonRegul × 2529 (-) <15M Committer(+)	NonRegul × 3539 (+)	Ever-1C (+) 21-40Work Wk (+) 4150WW × 2529 (+)	—	In Union (+)	Ever-2C (-) <20WW × 3539 (+)	NonRelig × 2529 (-) 51-60Work Wk (+) 2140WW × 2529 (+)	—	Self-Emp(+)
South Korea Male	51-60Work Wk (+) 4150WW × 4549 (+) 60+ WW × 3539 (-)	Medium City (+) Religious × 2024 (+) 15-29M Committer(-)	25-29 (+) Catholic (-) Highsch × 3539 (+)	20-24 (-) Buddhist × 4044 (-) Highsch × 3539 (-)	Partnered (-) Non-Regular Emp (+) 2140WW × 3539 (+)	Catholic × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 2024 (+)	Direct Mar (+) RegEmp × 3034 (+)	5160WW × 2024 (+) 1-2H Committer (+)	Rural (-) 60+ WW × 3034 (+)
Female	Medium City (+) Protest × 3034 (-) Protest × 4549 (+) 15-29M Committer (-)	Highschool (+) 5160WW × 2529 (+) <15M Committer (+) 15-29M Committer (-)	Highschool (+) 41-50Work Wk (+) 5160WW × 2529 (+) 30-50M Committer (-)	Religious (+) 41-50Work Wk (+) 30-50M Committer (-)	Protest × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 4549 (+) PrivateS × 3034 (+) 5160WW × 4549 (+)	Eves-Cohabited (+) HighEdu × 4044 (-) RegEmp × 3539 (-)	Catholic × 3034 (+)	Metropolitan (-) Professional (+) NonReg × 2024 (+)	Medium City (+) Non-Regular Emp (-) 51-60Work Wk (+)
Singapore Male	—	Cohabiting (-) Partner Loss (-) Indian (+) Taoist (+) Higher Edu (-) Highsch × 3539 (+) 2+H Committer (+)	Muslim (+) Catholic × 3539 (+) Higher Edu (-) PublicS × 2024 (-) 61+ WW × 3539 (+)	—	Post-Cohabit Mar (+) Chinese (+) Buddhist (+) Muslim × 2529 (+) Higher Edu (+) <21WW × 3034 (+) 2140WW × 4549 (+) 4150WW × 3034 (+) 61+ WW × 4044 (+)	Partnered (-)	No Religion (+) HighEdu × 3539 (+) Private Sector (-) PrivateS × 3034 (+) 5160WW × 4044 (+)	Ever-3C (+) Catholic × 4549 (+) Religious × 2024 (-) NoRelig × 2024 (+) Low Edu (-) Unemployed (+) 2140WW × 3034 (+) Low Income (-)	Expatriate (+) Religious × 3034 (+)
Female	Protestant (-) No Religion (-) Highschool (+) Student (-) Regular Emp (-)	35-39 (-) Div/Wid (+) Ever-Cohabited (-) Never-Partnered (-) Highsch × 3539 (+) 4150WW × 4044 (-)	Unmarried Partner (+) Higher Edu (-)	Highsch × 3539 (-) High Income (-)	Ever-3C (+) Catholic × 3539 (+)	Muslim × 3539 (+) High Edu (+)	Protestant (-) Protestant × 3539 (+) Protestant × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 3034 (+) HighEdu × 4549 (+) Regular Emp (+) 2140WW × 2024 (+) 2140WW × 2529 (+) 2140WW × 3539 (+) 5160WW × 4549 (+) 15-29M Committer (+) 1-2H Committer (+) 2+H Committer (-)	—	Medium Income (-)

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: (+) Significant and positive effect; (-) Significant and negative effects.

The first column of Table 2a shows the results for “Pro-Marriage Policy” among men and women in the three societies. In Japan Buddhist men aged 30–34 are less likely and men without religion aged 25–29 are more likely to support the policy. In South Korea Protestant women aged 45–49 are more likely to support the policy. In Singapore Protestant women and women without religion are less likely to support the policy.

Among seven measure options for “Pro-Marriage Policy” presented in the second through eighth columns of Table 2a, “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be favored by Buddhist men aged 20–24, while “6) Better Work Environment for 2–Earner Couples” is less likely to be favored by women without religion aged 25–29 in Japan. In South Korea men with religion aged 20–24 are more likely and Protestant women aged 30–34 are less likely to choose “1) Employment Opportunities,” while Catholic men are less likely to choose “2) Pay Raise.” Buddhist men aged 40–44 are less likely and women with religion are more likely to opt for “3) Housing Finances for Newly Weds,” while Protestant women aged 40–44 and women without religion aged 45–49 are more likely to opt for “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities.” Catholic men aged 40–44 and men without religion aged 20–24 are more likely to choose “5) Tax Advantages,” while Catholic women aged 30–34 are more likely to choose “6) Better Work Environment for 2–Earner Couples” in South Korea.

In Singapore Taoist men are more likely to opt for “1) Employment Opportunities,” while Muslim men and Catholic men aged 35–39 are more likely to opt for “2) Pay Raise.” Buddhist men, Muslim men aged 25–29 and Catholic women aged 35–39 are more likely to choose “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities,” while Muslim women aged 35–39 are more likely to choose “5) Tax Advantages.” Men without religion, Protestant women aged 35–39/40–44 and women without religion aged 30–34 are more likely to choose “6) Better Work Environment for 2–Earner Couples,” while Protestant women aged 20–34/45–49 are less likely. Catholic men aged 45–49 and men without religion are less likely to opt for “7) Marriage Promotion Information,” while men with religion aged 20–24 are less likely in Singapore.

As for the “Use of Marriage Support Services” in the last column of Table 2a, no religion-related variables have significant effects in Japan and South Korea. Only Singaporean men with religion aged 30–34 are more likely to experience it.

2) Pro-Birth/Child Policy and Measures

As for the “Support for Childrearing” in the first column of Table 2b, Protestant men aged 20–24 in South Korea are less likely to favor it, while Buddhist men aged 30–34 in Singapore are more likely. The second column of Table 2b reveals that “Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy” is favored by Buddhist women aged 25–29 in South Korea as well as Hindu men aged 20–24, Buddhist women aged 45–49 and Muslim

Table 2b Correlates of Support for Family Policy Measures in the Three Countries (Continued)

Country Sex	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	1. Grants for Childbirth	2. Grants for Infertility Treatment	3. Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy	4. Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth	5. Extension of MCH Services	6. Increase in Home Helper Services
Japan Male	Partnered (+) Partner Loss a (-) Rural (-)	20-24 (+) Ever-Mar (-)	NoRelig × 2024 (-) HighEd × 3539 (-) 5160WW × 4044 (-) 61 + WW × 3034 (-) 61 + WW × 3539 (+) 15-29M Commuter (+)	Ever-Cohabited (+) 2140WW × 3539 (-) 4150WW × 2529 (-) 5160WW × 4044 (-)	In Union (+) Professional (+) 30-59M Commuter (+)	30-34 (+) Post-Cohab Mar (+) Rural (-) Evert-1C (+) Rural (+) NoRelig × 2024 (+) NoRelig × 4044 (-) Higher Edu (-) 4150WW × 2529 (+) 30-59M Commuter (-) Low Income (+)	Post-Cohab Mar (-) Rural (-) Shintoist (+) PublicS × 2529 (+)	<15M Commuter (-)	—
Female	20-24 (-)	—	Ever-Cohabited (+)	Private Sector (+) <21WW × 3539 (-)	Low Edu (+)	In Union (+) 21-40Work Wk (-) 51-60Work Wk (-) 1-2H Commuter (+)	Highsch × 3539 (+) Public Sector (+) Regular Emp (+)	In Union (-) Highsch × 4549 (+)	—
South Korea Male	30-34 (+) Partnered (+) Rural (-) Protest × 2024 (-) 61 + Work Wk (+) NonRegul × 2529 (+) 15-29M Commuter (-)	—	Rural (-) Protest × 3034 (+) 61 + WW × 2529 (+) <15M Commuter (+)	Highsch × 3539 (+)	Protest × 4549 (+)	Partnered (-) 2140WW × 2529 (-) 30-59M Commuter (+) Highsch (-) 4150WW × 3539 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+) 2 + H Commuter (+)	Catholic × 3034 (+) PrivateS × 4044 (-) 61 + Work Wk (-) 2140WW × 3539 (+)	Ever-2C (+) Catholic × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 2529 (+) HighEd × 3034 (+) Highsch × 2024 (+) 4150WW × 3539 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+) 2 + H Commuter (+)	Ever-2C (+) Catholic × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 2529 (+) HighEd × 3034 (+) Highsch × 2024 (+) 4150WW × 3539 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+) 2 + H Commuter (+)
Female	1-2H Commuter (-)	Partnered (-) Buddhist × 2529 (+) HighEd × 4549 (+) 5160WW × 3034 (+) 5160WW × 4044 (+)	PrivateS × 4044 (-) 15-29M Commuter (-) 1-2H Commuter (-)	Ever-2C (+) Rural (-) 21-40Work Wk (+) RegEmp × 3034 (-) 1-2H Commuter (+)	Post-Cohabit Mar (+)	NonRelig × 3034 (+) Highsch × 2529 (+) 2140WW × 4549 (+) <15M Commuter (+)	Ever-Mar (-) RegEmp × 4044 (+)	Catholic × 4044 (+) RegEmp × 3539 (+) NoRelig × 3539 (+) 4150WW × 2529 (-) NonRegul × 4044 (+)	Buddhist (+) NoRelig × 2529 (+) NoRelig × 3539 (+) 4150WW × 2529 (-) NonRegul × 4044 (+)
Singapore Male	Ever in Union (+) Buddhist × 3034 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+)	Post-Cohab Mar (+) Hindu × 2024 (+) Highsch × 4044 (+) <21WW × 3034 (+) <21WW × 4044 (+)	HighEd × 3539 (+) 51-60Work Wk (+) 2140WW × 3034 (+)	Ever-2C (+) Student (-) PrivateS × 3034 (-) High Income (-)	—	HighEd × 2529 (-)	Buddhist × 4044 (-) 5160WW × 2024 (+)	30-34 (+) Private Sector (-) Student (+) High Income (+)	Buddhist × 2529 (+) Buddhist × 3539 (+) Catholic × 2529 (+) Hindu × 2024 (+) PrivateS × 3034 (+) High Income (+)
Female	—	40-44 (+) Buddhist × 4549 (+) Muslim × 2024 (+) 5160WW × 3034 (+) Low Income (-)	Religions × 4549 (-) 2140WW × 2529 (+)	High Edu (-) PrivateS × 4549 (-) RegEmp × 3539 (-)	40-44 (+) Unmarried Partner (+) Hindu (+) Protest × 3034 (+) NoRelig × 4549 (+) Professional (+) Unemployed (+) 4150WW × 4549 (+) RegEmp × 3539 (+) NonRegul × 3034 (+)	In Union (+) NoRelig × 3539 (-) 41-50Work Wk (+) HighEd × 2529 (+) 4150WW × 4044 (-) High Income (-)	Professional (+)	Never-Partnered (+) Protest × 3034 (+) Protest × 4044 (+) Hindu × 4044 (+) NoRelig × 3034 (-) NoRelig × 3539 (-) Highsch × 2529 (+)	Malay (+) Muslim × 2529 (+) Taoist × 4044 (+) Taoist × 4549 (+) HighEd × 2024 (+) 2140WW × 3539 (-) High Income (+)

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: (+) Significant and positive effect; (-) Significant and negative effects.

women aged 20–24 in Singapore.

As for the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” in the third column of Table 2b, Japanese men without religion and Singaporean women with religion aged 45–49 are less likely to support it, while Korean Protestant men are more likely. Among six measure options for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” presented in the fourth through ninth columns of Table 2b, no religion-related variables have significant effects on “1) Grants for Childbirth” in the three societies.

In Japan “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy” is more likely to be chosen by men without religion aged 20–24, but it is less likely to be chosen by men without religion aged 40–44, while “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is more likely to be chosen by Shintoist men.

In South Korea Protestant men aged 45–49 are more likely to opt for “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” and Catholic men aged 30–34 are more likely to opt for “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth,” while women without religion aged 30–34 are more likely to opt for “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy.” “5) Extension of MCH services” is more likely to be chosen by men without religion aged 40–44 and Catholic women aged 40–44, while it is less likely to be chosen by men without religion aged 35–39. “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is more likely to be favored by Catholic men aged 40–44, men without religion aged 25–29 and Buddhist women without religion aged 25–29/35–39.

In Singapore Hindu women, Protestant women aged 30–34 and women without religion aged 45–49 are more likely to opt for “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment.” “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy” is less likely to be chosen by Singaporean women without religion aged 35–39. “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is less likely to be chosen by Buddhist men aged 40–44 in Singapore. Protestant women aged 30–34/40–44 and Hindu women age 40–44 are more likely to favor “5) Extension of MCH services,” while women without religion aged 30–34/35–39 are less likely. “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is more likely to be favored by Buddhist men aged 25–29/35–39, Catholic men aged 25–29 and Hindu men aged 20–24, while it is more likely to be chosen by Muslim women aged 25–29 and Taoist women aged 40–44/45–49.

3) Results for the Unmarried

Tables 3a and 3b present the results for unmarried men and women aged 20–49. “Pro-Marriage Policy” in the first column of Table 3a is less likely to be supported by unmarried Protestant men aged 20–24 and unmarried religious men aged 40–44 in Singapore. The results for unmarried persons’ choice of measures for “Pro-Marriage Policy” are presented in the second through eighth columns of Table 3a. No religion-related variables have significant effects on “6) Better Work Environment for 2–

Table 3a Correlates of Support for Family Policy Measures among the Unmarried in the Three Countries

Country Sex	Pro-Marriage Policy	1. Employment Opportunities	2. Pay Raise	3. Housing Finance for Newly Weds	4. Provision of Meeting Opportunities	5. Tax Advantages	6. Better Work Env. for 2-Earner Couples	7. Marriage Promotion Information	Use of Marriage Support Services
Japan Male	PrivateS×3034 (+) 21-40Work Wk (+)	Buddhist×2024 (+) Unemployed (+)	25-29 (+) Buddhist×4549 (+)	Never-Partnered (-) Highsch×3034 (+) RegEmp×4044 (+)	20-24 (+) Highschool (-) NonRegul×2529 (+) Medium Income (+)	Cohabiting (+)	Student (+) 21-40Work Wk (+) 4150WW×3034 (+)	—	Ever-Cohabited (+)
Female	30-34 (-)	Medium Income (+)	Ever-Cohabited (-) Highsch×2529 (-) PrivateS×2529 (+) PrivateS×4044 (+)	Public Sector (+)	NoRelig×4044 (+) 2140WW×2024 (+) 4150WW×2529 (+) 4150WW×3539 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+)	35-39 (+)	—	PrivateS×4549 (+)	PrivateS×4044 (+)
South Korea Male	Metropolitan (-) 41-50Work Wk (-)	Protest×2529 (-) Religious×2024 (+) 21-40Work Wk (-)	—	20-24 (-) 21-40Work Wk (+)	Catholic×2529 (+) Religious×3539 (+) Highsch×2024 (+) 4150WW×3539 (+) 61+WW×3034 (+) 15-29M Commuter (+) Medium Income (+)	Catholic×3034 (+) NoRelig×2024 (+) 21-40Work Wk (-) 2140WW×2529 (+) 61+WW×2529 (+) 15-29M Commuter (+) Medium Income (+)	—	Rural (+) Catholic (+) Highsch×4044 (+) PrivateS×4044 (+) 5160WW×2025 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+)	Buddhist×2024 (+) PrivateS×4044 (+) 5160WW×2024 (+) 1-2H Commuter (+)
Female	Medium City (+) Medium Income (+) High Income (+)	41-50Work Wk (+)	5160WW×2529 (+) 5160WW×3034 (+)	Religious (+) 21-40Work Wk (-)	Protest×3034 (+)	Medium City (-) Highsch×2024 (+)	35-39 (+)	15-29M Commuter (+)	—
Singapore Male	Ever-Cohabited (-) Protest×2024 (-) Religious×4044 (-) 4150WW×2024 (-) 4150WW×4549 (-)	No Religion (-)	Indian (+) Low Edu (+) Highschool (+) PublicS×2024 (-)	—	—	—	—	20-24 (-) Cohabiting (+) Partner Loss (+) NoRelig×2024 (+) High Income (+)	Religious×3034 (+) PublicS×2529 (+)
Female	51-60Work Wk (-)	Ever-2C (+)	Higher Edu (-) Professional (+) High Income (+)	Buddhist×4044 (+)	—	NoRelig×2529 (+)	2140WW×2529 (+)	Never-Partnered (+) Catholic×2529 (+)	2140WW×2024 (+)

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: (+) Significant and positive effect; (-) Significant and negative effects.

Table 3b Correlates of Support for Family Policy Measures among the Unmarried in the Three Countries (Continued)

Country Sex	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	1. Grants for Childbirth	2. Grants for Infertility Treatment	3. Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy	4. Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth	5. Extension of MCH Services	6. Increase in Home Helper Services
Japan Male	Never-Partnered (-) 20-24 (+) 4150WW × 4044 (+)	NoRelig × 2024 (-) 4150WW × 2529 (-)	NoRelig × 2024 (-) 4150WW × 2529 (-)	Buddhist × 2024 (+) Professional (+)	Buddhist × 2024 (+) Professional (+)	40-44 (-) 30-39M Commuter (-)	PrivateS × 4044 (+)	---	---
Female	20-24 (-) 1-2H Commuter (-)	Never-Partnered (-) 21-40Work Wk (+)	Never-Partnered (-) 21-40Work Wk (+)	---	Religious × 3034 (+) NoRelig × 4044 (+) Low Edu (+) NonRegul × 3539 (+)	---	Regular Emp (+)	---	Buddhist × 2529 (+) Buddhist × 3034 (+) HighEd × 4549 (+)
South Korea Male	Partnered (+) Protest × 2024 (+)	4150WW × 4044 (+)	61 + WW × 2529 (+)	---	---	HighEd × 3539 (+) 21-40Work Wk (-)	Rural (+) Religious × 3034 (+)	Ever-Cohabited (+)	2 + H Commuter (+)
Female	---	Buddhist (+) Catholic × 3034 (+) HighEd × 2529 (+) Highsch × 2024 (+) 5160WW × 3034 (+)	2140WW × 3034 (-)	---	---	51-60Work Wk (-) NonRegul × 2529 (+)	---	Medium City (-) Catholic (+) Self-Emp (+) Unemployed (+) RegEmp × 3539 (+)	NoRelig × 2529 (+)
Singapore Male	Ever in Union (+) Expatriate (+) NoRelig × 2529 (-) HighEd × 3034 (+)	Buddhist × 2024 (+) Buddhist × 4044 (+) Hindu × 2024 (+) Highsch × 3034 (+)	---	21-40Work Wk (+)	Buddhist × 2024 (+) Buddhist × 3539 (+) HighEd × 2529 (+)	Malay (-) HighEd × 2529 (-)	Malay (+)	Student (+)	Buddhist × 3034 (+) Hindu × 2024 (+) 30-59M Commuter (+)
Female	---	Muslim × 2024 (+) NoRelig × 2529 (+) NoRelig × 4044 (+) HighEd × 4549 (+) 2140WW × 4044 (+)	---	Low Edu (+)	---	HighEd × 2529 (-)	Professional (+)	Buddhist × 2529 (+) HighEd × 2529 (-)	4150WW × 4045 (+)

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: (+) Significant and positive effect; (-) Significant and negative effects.

Earner Couples” in the three societies. Among the unmarried in Japan “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be favored by Buddhist men aged 20–24. Buddhist men aged 45–49 are more likely to opt for “2) Pay Raise.” “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” is more likely to be chosen by women without religion aged 40–44 in Japan.

Among the unmarried in South Korea “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be favored by men with religion aged 20–24, while it is less likely to be favored by Protestant men aged 25–29. “3) Housing Finances for Newly Weds” is more likely to be chosen by women with religion. “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” is more likely to be favored by Catholic men aged 25–29, men with religion aged 35–39 and Protestant women aged 30–34. “5) Tax Advantages” is more likely to be chosen by Catholic men aged 30–34 and men without religion aged 20–24. Catholic men are more likely to opt for “7) Marriage Promotion Information” in South Korea.

Among the unmarried in Singapore “1) Employment Opportunities” is less likely to be chosen by men without religion, while “3) Housing Finances for Newly Weds” is more likely to be chosen by Buddhist women aged 40–44. “5) Tax Advantages” is more likely to be favored by women without religion aged 25–29. “7) Marriage Promotion Information” is more likely to be chosen by men without religion aged 20–24 and Catholic women aged 25–29. As for the “Use of Marriage Support Services” among the unmarried in the last column of Table 3a, no religion-related variables have significant effects in Japan, while Buddhist men aged 20–24 are more likely to opt for it in South Korea and men with religion aged 30–34 are more likely to favor it in Singapore.

As for the “Support for Childrearing” among the unmarried in the first column of Table 3b, no religion-related variables have significant effects in Japan, while Protestant men aged 20–24 are more likely to choose it in South Korea but men without religion aged 25–29 are less likely to choose it in Singapore. The second column of Table 3b reveals that “Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy” is favored by Buddhist women and Catholic women aged 30–34 in South Korea as well as Buddhist men aged 20–24/40–44, Hindu men aged 20–24, Muslim women aged 20–24 and women without religion aged 25–29/40–44 in Singapore.

No religion-related variables have significant effects on “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” as well as its two measure options, “1) Grants for Childbirth” and “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy,” among the unmarried in the three societies as presented in the third, fourth and sixth columns of Table 3b. Among the unmarried in Japan “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” is more likely to be favored by Buddhist men aged 20–24, women with religion aged 30–34 and women without religion aged 40–44, while “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is

more likely to be favored by Buddhist women aged 25–29/30–34. Among the unmarried in South Korea men with religion aged 30–34 are more likely to choose “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth,” while Catholic women are more likely to choose “5) Extension of MCH services” and women without religion aged 25–29 are more likely to choose “6) Increase in Home Helper Services.” Among the unmarried in Singapore Buddhist men aged 20–24/35–39 are more likely to opt for “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” and Buddhist men aged 30–34 and Hindu men aged 20–24 are more likely to favor “6) Increase in Home Helper Services,” while Buddhist women aged 25–29 are more likely to opt for “5) Extension of MCH services.”

3. Logit Analyses with Predetermined Models

Tables 4 through 6 show the results of binomial logit analyses, with predetermined models, for the support of family policies among each sex in Japan, South Korea and Singapore. The results reveal the effects of religion after controlling for age, partnership status, education, employment status, employment type and urban-rural residence (ethnicity and nationality for Singapore). Only for Japan, interaction between marital status (married) and religion (Buddhist) has been included as an additional independent variable because only one major religion (Buddhist) has no significant effects on attitudes toward family policies or measure options among men or women.

1) Japan

The first through fifth columns of Table 4 present the results for Japanese men and the sixth through tenth columns for Japanese women. Among men, married Buddhists are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” while they are more likely to experience the “Use of Marriage Support Services.” Married Buddhist men are less likely to favor the “Support for Childrearing,” while other Buddhists are more likely. Married Buddhist men are less likely to support the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth.” On the other hand, no religion-related variables have significant effects among Japanese women. Even though the results for each measure are not presented in Table 4, among options for “Pro-Marriage Policy” measures only “3) Housing Finances for Newly Weds” is less likely to be chosen by married Buddhist men. Among measure options for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth” only “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is less likely to be chosen by married Buddhist women.

2) South Korea

The first through fifth columns of Table 5 present the results for Korean men and

Table 4 Determinants of Support for Family Policies among Reproductive-Age Japanese: Results of Binomial Logit Analysis

Indep/Control V. Categories	Male				Female					
	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth
Constant	-0.634&	-2.328***	0.467	-0.498	0.490	-0.098	-2.988	-0.032	-1.187*	0.446
Age										
25-29	0.136	0.448	-0.111	-1.290**	0.640&	-0.464	0.049	1.189**	-0.698&	1.123*
30-34	0.156	0.335	-0.156	-1.698**	0.365	-0.565&	0.402	0.695#	-0.112&	0.276
35-39	-0.218	0.716	-0.577&	-0.790&	-0.102	-0.164	1.159	0.976*	-0.788	0.391
40-44	-0.138	0.553	-0.637&	-0.728&	0.184	-0.112	1.622	0.613&	-1.063	-0.107
45-49	-0.135	0.357	-0.498	-1.513*	0.184	-0.095	1.516	0.057	0.068	-0.107
Partnership										
Married	-0.078	0.242	0.796*	-0.778&	0.389*	0.534&	-0.261	0.375	-0.888#	0.201
Ever-Cohabited	-0.168	0.272	0.241	-0.051	0.290	0.487#	0.536&	0.668*	-0.396	1.019**
Partner Loss	0.473&	0.119	-0.679	0.330	-0.354	-0.315	-1.557&	0.202	-0.104	-0.575&
Never-Partnered	0.356	-0.245	-1.398**	0.176	-0.778#	-0.349	0.627	-0.587	-0.593	-1.526*
Education										
Higher	-0.101	-0.158	0.131	-0.008	-0.247	-0.014	0.480&	0.105	-0.424	-0.245
Lower	-0.467	-0.179	0.094	0.321	-0.014	-0.131	-7.911\$	0.872	0.616	-0.084
Employment Status										
Agri/SelfEmp	0.404	0.149	0.384	0.167	0.590	-0.457	0.741&	-0.768#	0.568	-0.494
Professional	0.869&	-0.149	-0.244	-1.384	0.237	-0.597&	-10.458\$	-0.200	-0.185	0.673
Public Sector	0.395	-0.494	0.040	-0.086	0.300	0.378	-0.869	-0.097	-0.506	-0.199
Private Sector	0.525	-0.356	0.054	-0.055	0.392	-0.190	-0.235	-0.208	0.189	0.392
Unemployed	0.283	0.554	0.529	-0.343	0.985&	0.203	0.526	0.226	-0.434	0.920
Employment Type										
Non-Regular	0.599&	0.429	-0.074	0.258	-0.071	-0.157	0.154	0.131	-0.434	-0.577#
U/R Residence										
Metropolitan	0.059	0.344	0.444#	-0.349	0.094	-0.557*	-0.497	-0.231	0.691#	-0.022
Rural	0.390&	0.501&	0.071	-0.643&	0.052	0.049	-0.105	0.127	0.615	0.304
Religion										
Buddhist	-0.394	-0.591	0.700*	0.013	0.263	0.205	0.301	-0.011	-0.672	0.429
Interaction										
Married × Buddhist	0.823*	0.822&	-0.839*	-0.189	-0.652&	-0.197	-0.218	-0.056	0.510	-0.317
N	508	508	508	508	508	491	491	491	491	491
d.f.	308	308	308	308	308	297	299	297	297	297
Chi-square	435.84***	279.82&	394.95***	242.43	360.64*	401.29***	205.9	363.65**	209.1	318.77&

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: & p<0.20, # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, \$ few cases.

Table 5 Determinants of Support for Family Policies among Reproductive-Age South Koreans: Results of Bionomial Logit Analysis

Indep/Control V. Categories	Male				Female					
	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth
Constant	0.131	-0.943*	0.120	-1.710*	-0.012	-0.225	-1.189*	-0.162	-5.438**	-0.191
Age										
25-29	-0.242	-0.051	-0.602&	1.024	-0.057	-0.016	-0.095	-0.317	0.583	0.276
30-34	-0.217	0.399	0.059	1.448&	0.138	-0.287	0.237	-0.648&	0.583	-0.117
35-39	-0.038	0.292	-1.013*	0.639	-0.692&	0.142	0.266	-0.388	0.338	-0.159
40-44	0.165	0.321	-0.934#	0.822	-0.496	0.189	0.633	-0.341	0.533	-0.218
45-49	0.493	0.287	-0.795&	-8.779\$	-0.584	0.561	0.563	-0.286	2.363*	-0.223
Partnership										
Married	0.008	0.260	0.251	-1.374*	0.301	-0.051	-0.060	0.134	-0.402	0.001
Ever-Cohabited	0.455&	0.422	-0.356	0.018	0.402	-0.999	-0.243	-0.083	-5.310\$	-0.802
Partner Loss	0.072	0.221	-0.554#	-0.690&	-0.468&	-0.292	-0.154	-0.192	0.998&	-0.212
Never-Partnered	0.189	-0.067	-0.944*	-1.649&	-0.467	0.087	0.472	0.394	1.337%	0.691
Education										
Higher	-0.048	0.123	0.285&	-0.640&	-0.128	-0.088	0.440#	0.160	0.466	0.021
Lower	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employment Status										
Agri/Self-Emp	-0.372	-0.707&	0.179	-0.228	-0.042	-0.197	0.270	0.164	-0.421	0.284
Professional	0.233	-1.025	0.348	-7.393	0.678	-0.766	0.170	0.131	0.422	0.910&
Public Sector	-0.284	-0.487	-0.044	1.367	-0.188	-0.818	-7.164	0.657	-5.087	-0.672
Private Sector	-0.118	-0.443	0.116	-0.078	0.006	0.349&	0.255	0.348&	0.947&	-0.106
Unemployed	-0.606	-8.506\$	-0.281	-6.571	-0.346	1.291&	0.074	-0.004	1.955&	0.623
Employment Type										
Non-Regular	-0.013	0.335	0.971*	-0.350	0.018	-0.272	-0.764&	-0.418	-0.093	-0.535&
U/R Residence										
Metropolitan	-0.116	-0.221	0.313	-0.517&	0.192	-0.412*	-0.672**	0.299&	0.712&	-0.143
Rural	0.445	-2.249**	-0.776&	-1.052	-1.025#	-0.353	-2.022#	-0.214	-6.813\$	-0.231
Religion										
Buddhist	0.260	0.247	0.119	-0.050	-0.403&	0.146	-0.189	0.285	0.797&	0.059
Catholic	-0.310	-0.158	-0.043	-1.257	-0.258	-0.514&	-0.148	0.078	0.392	-0.216
Protestant	0.339&	0.458#	0.376&	-0.002	0.028	0.484*	-0.026	0.357	1.955&	-0.036
N	510	510	510	510	510	486	486	486	486	486
d.f.	282	283	282	285	282	270	271	270	273	270
Chi-square	398.44***	347.89***	347.41***	155.68	379.56***	360.9***	303.59#	404.62***	121.80	398.94***

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: &p<0.20, #p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, \$ few cases.

Table 6 Determinants of Support for Family Policies among Reproductive-Age Singaporeans: Results of Binomial Logit Analysis

Indep/Control V. Categories	Male					Female				
	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth	Pro-Marriage Policy	Use of Marriage Support Services	Support for Childrearing	Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy	Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth
Constant	1.268 *	-2.503 ***	-0.349	-4.177 ***	-0.538	0.893 #	-0.610	0.166	-3.389 ***	-0.389
Age										
25-29	-0.182	0.542	-0.087	-1.739 #	0.310	0.048	-0.420	-0.160	-1.134	0.022
30-34	-0.511	1.512 * *	0.646 &	-1.073	0.675 &	0.562	-0.282	-0.122	0.349	-0.636 &
35-39	-0.803 &	1.107 #	0.245	-2.374 * *	0.442	0.697 &	-0.180	-0.022	-0.190	-0.554
40-44	-0.469	1.275 * *	0.108	-1.214 &	0.160	0.619	-0.309	-0.313	1.274 &	-0.642 &
45-49	-0.976 &	1.011 #	-0.167	-3.007 +	0.248	0.429	-0.142	-0.284	0.785	-1.220 * *
Partnership										
Married	0.778 #	-0.445	0.469 &	2.150 #	0.248	0.069	0.216	0.022	-0.113	0.338
Ever-Cohabited	-0.877 * *	-0.222	0.290	1.233 * *	-0.709 * *	-0.467	-0.264	-0.646 #	0.410	-0.333
Partner Loss	-0.037	0.108	0.161	1.354	-0.373	-0.439	-0.693	-0.416	0.386	-0.601
Never-Partnered	-0.073	0.239	0.092	1.776 &	-0.148	-0.082	0.177	-0.028	0.449	0.659 &
Education										
Higher	-0.122	0.093	0.332	0.259	0.263	-0.741 * *	0.001	0.137	0.266	0.005
Lower	-0.694 * *	-0.062	0.183	-0.039	0.018	-0.615 #	-0.297	0.080	0.259	0.204
Employment Status										
Agri/SelfEmp	1.107 &	-0.024	-0.885 #	-0.154	-0.751 &	-0.723	0.259	0.053	0.601	0.205
Professional	-0.166	0.421	-0.531	-0.382	-0.671 &	0.049	0.123	-0.121	0.449	0.311
Public Sector	0.019	0.461	-0.208	-8.686 \$	-0.105	-2.206 #	-8.088	-0.084	-5.590	-0.624
Private Sector	0.215	-0.103	-0.271	0.292	-0.471	-0.541 #	0.056	0.231	-5.590	0.161
Unemployed	0.368	0.929 &	-0.623	-0.871	-0.300	-0.142	0.618	0.392	0.182	-0.054
Employment Type										
Non-Regular	-0.634	1.010	-0.826	-6.264 \$	-0.382	1.548 * *	0.267	0.328	0.604	-0.056
Race										
Malay	-0.603	-0.198	-1.239 &	0.989	-1.216 &	-0.251	-0.213	0.202	2.032 * *	-0.442
Indian	-0.196	-0.569	-0.972	7.459 \$	-0.655	0.343	-0.831	0.546	-0.685	0.074
Nationality										
Expatriate	0.727 &	0.776 * *	-0.345	-1.347 &	-0.567 #	0.707 #	-0.078	0.178	-0.206	-0.162
Religion										
Buddhist	0.589 #	0.289	0.354 &	0.901 &	0.479 #	1.172 * * *	-0.771 * *	-0.110	0.531	0.025
Catholic	0.520	0.388	0.851 #	0.904	0.767 #	0.931 #	-0.148	-0.126	-1.264	0.704 &
Protestant	0.206	0.573 &	0.240	0.444	0.153	0.218	-0.434	-0.147	-0.617	-0.284
Muslim	1.007	1.218 &	1.500 #	-7.188 \$	1.059	1.282	0.418	-0.133	0.297	0.415
Taoist	2.324	-0.567	0.425	0.616	0.653 &	0.472	-0.445	0.095	0.617	-0.227
Hindu	1.488 * *	0.735	1.782 #	1.047	1.519 &	1.414 &	-0.490	-0.124	-2.533 #	0.853
N	506	506	506	506	506	492	492	492	492	492
d.f.	319	319	319	323	319	303	304	303	304	303
Chi-square	314.26	357.85 #	455.8 * * *	138.11	460.55 * * *	330.37 &	343.97 #	429.86 * * *	159.3	399.44 * * *

Source: The author's own analysis of CAO 2009 survey microdata.

Note: & p<0.20, # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, \$ few cases.

the sixth through tenth columns for Korean women. Among men, Protestants are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy” and more likely to experience the “Use of Marriage Support Services,” while they are more likely to favor the “Support for Childrearing.” On the other hand, Buddhist men are less likely to support the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth.” Among Korean women, Catholics are less likely and Protestants are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” while Buddhists are more likely to choose “Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy.”

Even though the results are not presented in Table 5, among measure options for “Pro-Marriage Policy” and the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth,” “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be chosen by Protestant men, while “2) Pay Raise” and “5) Tax Advantages” are more likely to be chosen by Catholic men. “7) Marriage Promotion Information” is more likely to be favored by Catholic men but it is less likely to be favored by Buddhist men. However, “3) Housing Finances for Newly Weds” is more likely to be chosen by Buddhist and Protestant women. “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities” is less likely to be favored by Catholic women, while “5) Tax Advantages” is less likely to be favored by Buddhist women. On the other hand, “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth” is more likely to be chosen by Protestant women, while “5) Extension of MCH services” is more likely to be chosen by Catholic women. “6) Increase in Home Helper Services” is less likely to be favored by Catholic and Protestant women.

3) Singapore

The first through fifth columns of Table 6 present the results for Singaporean men and the sixth through tenth columns for Singaporean women. Among men, Buddhists and Hindus are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” while Protestants and Muslims are more likely to experience the “Use of Marriage Support Services.” Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants and Hindus are more likely to favor the “Support for Childrearing,” but Buddhists are more likely to choose “Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy.” Buddhists, Catholics, Taoists and Hindus are more likely to favor the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth.” Among Singaporean women, however, Buddhists, Catholics and Hindus are more likely to support “Pro-Marriage Policy,” but Buddhists are less likely to experience the “Use of Marriage Support Services.” Hindus are less likely to choose “Non-Support for Pronatalist Policy,” while Catholics are more likely to favor the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth.”

Even though the results are not presented in Table 6, among measure options for “Pro-Marriage Policy” “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be chosen by Catholic and Taoist men, but “2) Pay Raise” is less likely to be chosen by Buddhist and Taoist men. Buddhist men are more likely to opt for “3) Housing Finances for

Newly Weds” and “4) Provision of Meeting Opportunities,” while Catholic and Protestant men are less likely to opt for “6) Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples.” “7) Marriage Promotion Information” is more likely to be chosen by Muslim and Hindu men. On the other hand, “1) Employment Opportunities” is more likely to be favored by Taoist women, but “5) Tax Advantages” is less likely to be favored by Buddhist and Catholic women. Buddhist women are more likely to opt for “6) Better Work Environment for 2-Earner Couples,” while Catholic and Hindu women are more likely to opt for “7) Marriage Promotion Information.”

Among measure options for the policy for “Less Burden of Pregnancy and Birth,” “1) Grants for Childbirth” is more likely to be favored by Taoist men, while “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” is more likely to be favored by Catholic and Taoist men. Buddhist, Protestant and Taoist men are less likely to opt for “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth.” While Taoist men are less likely to favor “5) Extension of MCH services,” Catholic and Hindu men are less likely to favor “6) Increase in Home Helper Services.” On the other hand, “2) Grants for Infertility Treatment” is more likely to be chosen by Hindu women, while “3) Free Health Care and Check-ups during Pregnancy” is more likely to be chosen by Buddhist women. Buddhist and Taoist women are less likely to opt for “4) Extension of Leave Period around Childbirth,” but only Taoist women are more likely to opt for “6) Increase in Home Helper Services.” Buddhist women are less likely to choose “5) Extension of MCH services,” but Muslim and Hindu women are more likely.

Conclusion

In sum, there do not seem to be too many commonalities among the three Asian societies in the effects of religion on attitudes toward family policies partly because of limited role of religion in Japan and partly because of differences in religious composition of each population. In the case of Japan, the effects of religion seem to be occasionally mediated by marital status and, possibly, other demographic variables. In the case of Singapore, religion seems to have independent effects from ethnicity. The effects of the same religion on men and women are not always the same. Even among Christians, the effects of Catholicism and Protestantism are sometimes different in South Korea and Singapore.

While the effects of partnership status in Tables 2a through 6 were not discussed in this article because of its focus on the effects of religion, they clearly show the effects of interaction between partnership status and age (reflecting the life course stage). In addition, the effects of interaction between educational level and age as well as the effects of interaction between work-related variables and age are also relatively large, as suggested by Kojima (2009b) for the timing of family formation

behaviors in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, the attitudes toward family policies in the public sphere should be reflecting life course strategies of individuals in the intimate sphere in East Asian societies. At the same time, the life course strategies are affected by values including religion, the family and the market as well as public policies including family policies which moderate the interrelationship among the three.

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