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**STATE PROVISION VIA VOLUNTARISM  
THE STATE-VOLUNTARY WELFARE MIX IN SOUTH KOREA**

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# STATE PROVISION VIA VOLUNTARISM: THE STATE-VOLUNTARY WELFARE MIX IN SOUTH KOREA \*

## ABSTRACT

This paper aims to enhance the intersection of state intervention and voluntary contributions in the mixed economy of welfare with the particular reference of the Korean context. Throughout the history of welfare in Korea, we can draw a clear and heuristic conclusion that the Korean welfare system has always included a mixture of welfare providers, in which the state and voluntary agencies have played different roles in providing welfare services at given historical contingencies, even if the balance of power between the two sectors has been moving over time. Another appealing implication is that the strong state has deliberately changed its institutional adaptations in order to mobilise and regulate voluntary welfare contributions, which resulted in enhancing the effectiveness of governance in societal dimensions of welfare. The overriding pattern of state-voluntary links in the terrain of social services in modern Korea, therefore, can be characterised as 'state provision via the voluntary sector' based upon institutional changes and the incorporation of voluntary forces.

*Keywords:* social services, voluntary associations, state intervention, the welfare mix, institutional adaptation, state-voluntary sector links

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## INTRODUCTION

The discovery that Korea has been ruled not only through the well-known coalition of government and business but also through a less well-known coalition of government and civil society, in the form of voluntary agencies, is both surprising and not surprising. It is not surprising in the sense that Korea was governed efficiently during most of the period we are considering and that efficient government never flows directly from the state, however strong that state be. A strong state can on its own be determined, set a direction for society's development and keep order. But if it is to achieve more than this and actually lead its society forward in development it must be able to mobilise other actors to participate in and contribute to a more or less shared project. A government that thinks it can go it alone will fail. Where there is successful governance there are always other contributing actors. In the study of the Korean state, then, it would be near at hand to search for those other actors who would have had to be in on it. That would include the authoritarian period. The authoritarian governments could have been strong on their own but not efficient without partners. We are critical of some of the existing literature in which the Korean state in the authoritarian period has been seen self-sufficient and in a way elevated to an all-powerful command position outside of and above its society. The Korean story could not have unfolded as it has if the state had been only a strong command state, it would have had to be also a collaborative state. As so often, when one is minded to look, one finds. Once we set ourselves to search for the Korean civil society and its contribution to the development of the nation, we found a great deal of activity and contribution to pull into the broader analysis.

However, there is nevertheless also surprise in this discovery. Korea emerged from colonisation, war and civil war a destroyed nation. The very social fabric had been torn apart during the colonial period, the vast peasant class dispossessed and the landlord class both disseminated and discredited. One might think it therefore a nation precisely without much of civil structures to mobilise and for that reason exceptionally dependent on the state, that it became so typically a

state led society because there just were not other actors to offer leadership. But that is not the case. Voluntarism emerged immediately as the nation itself started to emerge. There is also surprise here in that the conventional narrative of Korean political history awards virtually no role to anyone but the state. It is true that the contribution of business is acknowledged, but business then generally being seen an appendix of the state just doing as it was told. The state directed but business did not sell itself cheap. It allowed itself to be directed by extraction from an unwilling state enough space for itself on purely business terms and for very serious profit.

In this paper we will explore the relationship between the state and the voluntary sector in modern Korea. We will see that there from the start has been more to the political fabric of Korea than state and business, there has been equally importantly also a vibrant network of voluntary agencies. Again, the strong state dominated these agencies, but, again, they also, as in the case of business, let themselves be dominated at a price. As business did, voluntary agencies extracted concessions from the state that in turn depended on them as an instrument of its rule. They made effective claim to space of their own for their own activity. The state needed to get social services delivered to a needy population but did not have the means to do so itself without distracting resources from its main strategy of economic development. It was therefore dependent on voluntary agencies to do this part of its job for it. The agencies took this job on, under state direction it is true, but were thereby able to create a domain of their own and to grow and prosper.

The picture of a hard state being dependent on a network of soft agencies is more nuanced than the conventional strong state picture of the Korean polity. The unfolding of this story has been an important inspiration for us in the re-interpretation of the strong Korean state. That re-interpretation has started with showing that the state-business relationship was never a straightforward one of command and obedience but a more symbiotic one. It here continues with the discovery that there was also a similar symbiotic relationship between the state and the voluntary sector. Any voluntary sector is a dangerous enemy of any authoritarian state. The authoritarian state has many natural enemies but most of those, those that can be identified and singled out, it can usually deal with relatively

easily. A structure of voluntary agencies is a different matter. This is not an identifiable enemy but more of, from the regime's point of view, a threatening cancer in the political fabric. The strong Korean state, in need of legitimacy and therefore of having services delivered, was forced to allow this cancer to spread in its own organism. This goes some way to explaining that authoritarianism was eventually unable to sustain itself. When authoritarian rule was gradually relaxed once President Park was gone, Korean civil society was there, ready to assert itself and far from lost or helpless.

## **THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR**

It has been suggested that voluntary organisations managed to become notable social actors in Korea as a result of the democratic transition from the late 1980s and that the authoritarian state had allowed little or no space for an active voluntary sector (Gough 2001: 174). But that is not correct. The voluntary sector was established in Korea before the authoritarian period and was not put out of play by the coming of authoritarian rule. The welfare mix between state and voluntary agencies started to evolve from the very start of the rebuilding of the Korean nation. This mix was present and was developed further in the period of hard authoritarianism, survived and prospered during that period, and has continued to be a characteristic of the Korean system with the re-emergence of democracy. The reformulation of power balance between the state and civil society in given historical settings has been at the centre of the shifting frontiers of structuring the welfare mix which should be understood as the notion of historical relationship located between the state and civil society, rather than a static 'thing' (Thompson 1963; Horowitz 1999; Kim 2008).

Our first task here is to give a relatively detailed description of this relatively unknown component of Korean political life and governance. The voluntary sector itself is one of the least understood and least conceptualised components of social policy studies, having been overlooked for so long in scholarly research, in spite of

its raised profile following the more effective operation of social service delivery. Lack of clear categorisation and definition with respect to the voluntary sector extends to even the variation of the generic terms used to identify the sector in various countries (Kuhnle and Selle 1992; Johnson 1999). The need to avoid becoming entangled in a sterile argument about semantics calls for a bold approach in which the key concepts of the voluntary sector, which have evolved distinctively over time in the Korean context, can be traced while simultaneously making appropriate use of the broad default definitions of the voluntary sector as accepted by international scholars. We therefore adopt, as a broad conceptualisation of the voluntary sector, the definition developed by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, which covers organisations that are formal, nonprofit distributing, constitutionally independent of the state, self-governing and benefiting from voluntarism (Salamon and Anheier 1992, 1997).<sup>1</sup> Within this broad conception of voluntarism, specific explanatory accounts are required for the distinctive elements for the Korean voluntary sector. In general, three distinctions need to be considered when exploring the historical development of the voluntary sector in conjunction with state provision of welfare services.

First, it should be noted that Korea's voluntary sector laid between the state and business is not a single institutional sector (Kim and Hwang 2002). Traditional Confucian culture and successive authoritarian regimes have retarded the development of autonomous and independent voluntary agencies in Korea, so that the voluntary sector, for a long time, was intimately associated with an informal arrangement of social networks based upon family kinship and local communities. In considering the role of voluntary agencies in the domain of service provision, it is therefore necessary to include informal care, community self-help activities, and


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<sup>1</sup> The default definition of the Johns Hopkins Center consists of the five criteria: first, voluntary organizations must hold some form of organizational and institutional structure (formality); second, they must have a certain degree of institutional separation from the government, even though this does not preclude either working collaboratively with the government or the receipt of substantial government funding (constitutional independence); third, surpluses cannot necessarily be ruled out, but the maximizing of profits is not the primary purpose of the organization (nonprofit-distributing); fourth, they decide their own constitutions, administrative structures, and practices, policies and activities (self-governing); and fifth, some meaningful degree of voluntary participation should be included in the actual conduct of the agency's activities or in the management of its affairs (voluntarism). For more details about the Johns Hopkins studies, refer to Salamon and Anheier (1992, 1997).

religiously motivated voluntary work, in addition to more formalised voluntary services. Second, the motivation of most voluntary organisations – at least prior to democratisation – was often involuntarily guided and controlled by strong intervention from the state. Particularly, authoritarian regimes in the period of rapid economic growth in the 1970s redefined the function of the voluntary sector as ‘quasi-nongovernmental organisations,’ and mobilised voluntary contributions to social welfare services to fill the gap left by the statutory agencies. Third, voluntary contributions as social service providers have often been overshadowed and even marginalised by the advocacy-oriented groups that became dominant in Korean civil society in the post-democratisation period. Advocacy groups mushroomed in the wake of the 1987 June Uprising, emphasising proactive advocacy functions, including the broadening of public debate and political participation in the formation of public policy, and sidelining the implementation of social services to the people in need at the local level (Kim 2007: 213). The share of voluntary welfare agencies among civil society organisations took a downturn in the face of strong occupancy of political advocacy groups in the process of democratisation in the late 1980s. Indeed, social policy issues have been deliberately politicised by civic organisations for the purpose of expanding the influence of the voluntary sphere against the government in the democratic transition. Finally, any complete observation of the characteristics of voluntarism in the Korean context requires a further discussion of the relationships between the state and voluntary agencies. The relations which have developed historically between the two sectors account for the organisational, ideological, and service-delivery structure of the voluntary sector in the Korean welfare system.

With respect to the overall size of the voluntary sector, *The Korean NGO Yearbook* (ECKNY 2000) estimates that the number of voluntary civic groups is 4,023 in 2000 and it grows up to 20,000 if their local branches are counted

***Figure 1 Civil Society Organisation Workforce, 1997***



Source: Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Recited from Park *et al.* (2004: 202).

altogether as individual groups. Among them, voluntary associations specified to social services and community development capture 965 which is equivalent to 24 percent of the total civic groups. In addition, the recent research done by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project reports that the voluntary sector is credited as a considerable economic force in Korea, even though its institutional capacity remains still modest by developed country standards (Park *et al.* 2004). With the record of 23.1 billion dollars in expenditure for its 1997 operations, the economic size of the voluntary sector was equivalent to 4.8 percent of the GDP. A simple comparison of the voluntary expenditure to the government's public social expenditure in 1997 (3.80 percent of the GDP) leads us to rethink the value of voluntary contributions in a very positive way. Moreover, the voluntary sector in the post-democratization years represented a sizable workforce in the sense of its labour coverage of 702,523 full-time equivalent workers (both paid employees and volunteers), 3.2 percent of the economically active population, 53.2 percent of public employment, and more job creations than Korea's largest private corporation, Samsung Group (see figure 1). It is also noteworthy that about 82 percent of the voluntary sector workforce is explicitly or implicitly engaged in service delivery such as social welfare services, health, and education. Even with scepticism by the negative fact that the voluntary sector workforce in Korea is much smaller than that



in the developed countries, Park *et al.* (2004: 203) conclude that the Korean voluntary sector is one of the largest civil society sectors among developing countries. In this regard, the voluntary sector has been fairly perceived as an attractive replacement target of the statutory agencies in delivering welfare provisions, particularly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis when public governance was at stake by the IMF rescue plan imposing dire restructuring.

However, this economic utility of voluntary agencies is not necessarily restricted only to evidences of state-civil society partnership in the post-democratised society. Rather, the presence of voluntary welfare contribution, albeit the oscillation of its size and intensity, has been continuously evolving and growing in conjunction with the shifting degree of state control, even from the initial stage of state building in postwar Korea. To this end, exploring the roles and main players of the voluntary sector, which have been changing over time, is an essential step to deepen scholarly understanding of how voluntary agencies in Korea operated, delivered welfare services, responded to state intervention, and promoted social changes. We can begin this historical review of voluntary agencies by marking organisational features of foreign voluntary agencies in the early period of Korea's modern political history.

### **Foreign Voluntary Agencies**

The origins of voluntarism after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 can be traced back to strong influences of foreign voluntary relief agencies which had been dominant forces in transfusing emergency relief aid to the poverty-stricken society. The Korean War in June 1950 not only devastated the government capacity of the young Republic to respond to the massive demands of emergency relief, but also scattered tightly knit village communities which had traditionally undertaken responsibility for mutual aid systems. The outbreak of the war, thus, marked a historical threshold at which public rescue missions for the people thrown into absolute poverty were, for the most part, placed under the attention of foreign voluntary agencies. During and after the war, international voluntary

organisations were instrumental in delivering various forms of emergency relief services ranging from hard cash to aid materials such as grain, clothing and medical supplies. The comprehensive salience of foreign voluntary contributions in the post-war years can be plainly endorsed by a simple comparison between the annual sum of foreign voluntary aid and the annual budget of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA). The increasing rate of foreign voluntary contributions climbed rapidly, from 36.2 percent of the MHSA's budget in 1958 to 61.6 percent in 1960, particularly exceeding 200 percent in 1961 (see table 1). The number of foreign voluntary agencies also reached its peak of 123 in the 1960s. It is no exaggeration to state that the dominant provider of social protection in this war-torn society could be identified with foreign voluntary organisations instead of the Rhee government. The overriding characteristics of foreign voluntary activities in this period are, by and large, outlined by the following three observations.

**Table 1 Foreign Voluntary Aid and the MHSA's Annual Budget**

(unit: million won)

Year	MHSA budgets (a)	Foreign voluntary aid (b)	(b)/(a) (%)	No. of agency
1958	1,098	398	36.2	39*
1961	950	2,055	216.3	60*
1965	3,168	5,256	165.9	120*
1970	8,590	9,083	105.7	93
1975	42,698	14,822	34.7	89
1980	176,957	25,912	14.6	81
1985	352,431	35,712	6.4	79
1991	1,522,203	30,968	2.0	74

Source: WVK(1993); KAVA (1995).

\* Rough estimates based on two references.

The first character refers to the fact that foreign voluntary agencies created a centralised association at the national level: the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies (KAVA). During the Korean War, in 1952, seven foreign voluntary agencies launched the KAVA, led by Msgr. George Carroll (appointed as the first Chairman), which established a secretariat bureau in 1955 and expanded its member agencies

to 76 in 1970 (KAVA 1995: 67-69). Disorganised and overlapped distributions of foreign voluntary contributions motivated foreign agencies to set up their independent central organ in hopes of enhancing aid effectiveness and coordinating varieties of relief services into a unified chain of command.<sup>2</sup>As table 1 demonstrates, the KAVA's remarkable relief contributions, to the extent that foreign voluntary assistance exceeded MHSAs' budgets in the 1960s, led the Korean population to laud it as "the second MHSAs" (KAVA 1995: 77). The KAVA's domination in emergency relief services ironically turned into a serious challenge to the legitimacy of state authorities whose capability for social protection was at stake. The state's reactions to foreign voluntary activities thus rested upon strict legal and institutional regulations in order to enhance its controlling power. As a typical example, the Park Chung Hee military regime, in 1962, monopolised all channels of policy coordination by installing the National Relief Coordination Committee (NRCC) at the central level and the Provincial Relief Coordination Committee (PRCC) at the local level (ECHKMR 1963: 1291). The consequence of state regulation was not only the stunted foreign voluntary agencies which were coerced into performing their missionary work within institutional constraints, but also the retreat of foreign agencies from the late 1960s (see table 1). The retreat of foreign voluntary agencies culminated in the disorganisation of the KAVA secretariat office in 1976, eventually causing the breakdown of the KAVA system. Nevertheless, the emergence of the KAVA in the early stage of the Korean political history left behind a precedent case of voluntary centralised associations, which was revived later around the historical juncture of democratisation.

Second, the main focus of international relief activities was primarily given to the establishment and expansion of social welfare facilities. More than one-fourth (27.3 percent) of foreign voluntary contributions were devoted to welfare facilities accommodating war orphans, the aged, the disabled, and other war victims. In 1959, 92.7 percent of the total welfare facilities (598 out of 645) was operated

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, the distributional channel of foreign voluntary relief aid was first unified and orchestrated by the Central Relief Committee (CRC) which was jointly launched in 1951 by the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC) and the MHSAs and other government agencies. However, the CRC had, often, tensions with foreign voluntary agencies due to its pro-government nature and its ineffective distributive mechanism of foreign voluntary aid (KAVA 1995: 65)

and financed by voluntary welfare organisations, most of which received financial and material supports from foreign voluntary agencies (Lee 1998). Another distinguishing mark is found in the fact that emergency actions to set up welfare facilities for protecting children became top priority for foreign relief agencies. About 90 percent of social welfare facilities in the 1950s and 1960s took full responsibility for relief services for children, including infant homes, orphanages, day nurseries, child guidance clinics, and reformatory schools. Eight foreign voluntary agencies in cooperation with the UNESCO and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) took the lead of creating 132 feeding facilities to distribute meal services to 42,860 children per day in the early 1950s. The prioritisation of welfare facilities and child relief work as the main mission of foreign voluntary agencies in this period bequeathed two behavioural implications to the next generation of the voluntary sector. Firstly, the traditional culture of welfare services in Korea was transformed from the Confucian elderly-oriented system to children-centred relief services. Secondly and most importantly, emphasising the facility-based solutions as a panacea to any social protection problems ended in voluntary welfare contributions becoming reactive, myopic, and ad hoc repercussions in the sense that accommodating socially excluded and displaced people in custodial facilities was just a temporary expedient by segregating the social underdogs from the society. They were seldom linked with any long-term and macroscopic social policy designed for the rehabilitation process by which inmates could re-enter workplaces and the labour market.

The final point stems from three structural legacies of foreign voluntary agencies and their impacts on the formation of local voluntary organisations in Korea: the predominance of US voluntary agencies, apolitical and charity-oriented services, and the lack of professional social workers (Ch'oe 1996). Given that the majority of foreign agencies – for instance, 74.4 percent in 1955 – came from the United States (among 16 advanced industrial countries), the lasting influence of US voluntary agencies ended in the implantation of American-style voluntarism into the newly emerging voluntary groups in the post-war society. The Korean voluntary sector, thus, shared the essence of American voluntarism emphasising the

philanthropic and individual value of social work rather than the universal design of the statutory welfare schemes. Such a philanthropic aspect of voluntarism was closely interconnected with the Christianity-based religious background of foreign agencies. With the fact that 113 out of 146 agencies (76.9 percent) involved Protestant or Catholic missionary projects, the repercussion of the religious emphasis on voluntary work came up with not only reducing the likelihood of politicising welfare issues, but confining voluntarism to secular charities for posthumous salvation. As for the human resource management, foreign voluntary agencies faced a significant lack of professional social workers, due to dire needs for emergency relief and ad hoc charity-based responses (KAVA 1955).<sup>3</sup> Such unskilled social workers had been increasingly replaced by social work specialists who were trained by the US-based higher educational system or received doctorate degrees from US universities. As a result, the formation of pro-American intellectual circle in the Korean voluntary sector brought about the popularisation of the American standards of social welfare services as a prime model for the Korean voluntarism.

As James Midgley (1984) claims, the developmental paths of social policies in Third World countries are apt to be influenced and even determined by the policy legacies colonial powers or patron forces left. In this process, foreign voluntary agencies played a leading role as an advance party in diffusing philanthropic patterns of social services to the emerging voluntarism in Third World countries. Likewise, reflecting the influence of Western missions and foreign aid organisations, the Korean voluntary sector has long been distinctly oriented toward service provision with the strong emphasis on apolitical, charity-based, facility-centred, and residual assets of voluntarism, and this remains the case today. Apolitical and philanthropic aspects of the voluntary sector led social services to be detached from the public responsibility of the state, thereby moving voluntary groups to the forefront of service provision on behalf of the state (Kim 2007: 77). Such a fragmented profile of foreign voluntary contributions, despite the presence of the

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<sup>3</sup> More than two thirds of foreign staffs were classified as missionary workers, not social workers; the majority of Korean staffs working for foreign voluntary agencies had no previous experience in the field of social welfare services. Most strikingly, only 4 international social work specialists worked at 3 foreign agencies out of 49 in 1955 (KAVA 1955).

KAVA and its efforts to coordinate voluntary activities, allowed the Korean governments to make use of foreign voluntary agencies to replace state welfare by way of the legislative control over their relief activities.

### **Authoritarian Rule**

The advent of the military authoritarian regime in 1961 further heightened the magnitude of state regulation over voluntary groups, as well as the voluntary sector's dependency on public money. The military junta headed by General Park Chung Hee prioritised rapid economic development as the exclusive path for the nation's security, and sanctified state intervention in the market and society. By making the economic growth a top priority of public policy, Park's authoritarian regime successfully justified its illegitimate seizure of political power and continued to marginalise social policy agendas as one of minor issues whose responsibilities had been coercively assigned to the voluntary or other sectors of civil society. Heralding in the 1970s, the intervention of the authoritarian state into civil society culminated in the proclamation of the despotic *Yushin* system and the total mobilisation of social forces for condensed economic growth. Indeed, the state predominantly overpowered civil society with despotic power of a strong state in penetrating society and orchestrating social relations in favour of government's actions (Koo 1993; Mann 1988). In consequence, the role and status of the voluntary sector under authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 1970s had evolved negatively in the face of the state's coercive mobilisation of voluntary welfare contributions.

The first and most salient implication we can see in this period is that strong intervention from the state degenerated the voluntary sector into an extended arm of the statutory sector (Yi 2003; Wolch 1990). There is no doubt that voluntary forces had been tamed and mobilised by the strong state in order to complement the state welfare schemes or deliver welfare services on behalf of the state. The retreat of foreign voluntary agencies further placed the voluntary sector in a difficult situation where voluntary welfare groups encountered the poverty of financial and material assistances from foreign agencies. Accordingly, the voluntary

sector was increasingly bound to rely on government money and comply with the general conditions the government imposed in return for its financial and administrative assistances. The financial sources that voluntary groups, which were, for instance, associated with child welfare facilities, depended on had dramatically shifted from foreign agencies (64 percent in 1965 to 5.7 percent in 1981) to the government (15.5 percent in 1965 to 62.6 percent in 1981). Another evidence of state regulation of social relations involves the public campaign for the mobilisation of people to serve in and financially support their own welfare promotion: 'new community movements (*SaemaulUndong*, NCMs).' With the emphasis on the idea that people should recover economic independence and self-sufficiency without relying on the government, the Park government drove forward NCMs as a mass mobilisation campaign by which the government was able to saddle voluntary groups and local communities with the primary responsibility for service provision, thereby curtailing its involvement in public welfare schemes and denying free handouts to the poor.

The state's institutional design for mobilising civil society resulted in coercing social and voluntary groups into being pro-government or quasi-voluntary associations complying with the general guidelines of organisational behaviours imposed by the state. As involuntarily mobilised under authoritarian rule, the voluntary sector came to be sensitive to rules institutionalised and legitimised by the state, and this tendency came to be routinised as a cultural tradition in the voluntary sector and civil society in general (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). As a result, the structures and functions of voluntary service agencies were increasingly homogenised within operational domains given by the state and increasingly organised around pressures of conformity to state-directed mobilisation.<sup>4</sup> Such a coercive transformation of voluntary welfare associations in this period mostly came to the two modes of quasi-voluntary adaptation to strong intervention from the state: public interest corporations (PICs) and corporate

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<sup>4</sup> Two American sociologists, Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991: 67), identify this kind of social phenomenon as "coercive isomorphism" of organizational behaviour, which "results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organisation function."

welfare foundations (CWFs). PICs usually refer to legally established nonprofit organisations, subsidised and endorsed by the government, which were set up as separate corporate entities legally distinct from the rest of the government, and the largest number of PICs – for instance, 36.3 percent (1,799 out of 4,950) in 1995 – have been working for voluntary welfare services under the guidance of the MHS (Kim and Hwang 2002: 7-8).<sup>5</sup> A classical example of PICs is the organization of the National Council of New Community Movement (NCNCM) which was the driving engine of NCM projects. In the process of promoting NCMs in the 1970s, the Park regime created and mobilised various pro-government PICs aimed to develop the public movement for enhancing welfare conditions and local community development. In October 1976, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA, 1980: 154) established the NCNCM, which acted as the nonprofit representative of 35,031 community-based local members. Another popular pattern of quasi-voluntary organisations, CWF, was a logical outgrowth of private firms' strategic adaptation to authoritarian rule. At the start of the 1970s, the *Yushin* authorities stressed the social responsibility of private companies by asking them to return some portions of their profits to society in general, as well as employees in particular (ECAWP 1980). In response to coercive calls for welfare contributions, private firms brought CWFs to the fore as a defensive vehicle for various strategic concerns in relations to the state. According to the records of the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI 1998), the number of CWFs rapidly increased during the 1970s up to 23, which is equivalent to almost four times as many as existed in the 1960s, and 45.6 percent of their total spending had been exclusively given to the domain of social welfare services.<sup>6</sup> In this sense, the CWF is a quasi-voluntary strategic device that the business sector designed not only for neutralising the pressure of the strong state, but also for turning the voluntaristic nature of corporate giving to the advantage of

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<sup>5</sup> The formation of PICs was governed mostly by Clause 32 of the Civil Code: "an association or foundation relating to science, religion, charity, art or social intercourse or otherwise relating to enterprises not engaged for profit may be made a legal person subject to the permission of the relevant ministries." PICs had a legal right to benefit from tax exemption, but this benefit could be validated only when their activities were permitted and controlled by the government.

<sup>6</sup> Indeed, most big business groups launched CWFs in the period of the Park regime: LG Foundation of the Culture in 1969; Korean Foundation for Advanced Studies of SK Group in 1974; Samsung Foundation of Culture in 1975; and Asan Social Welfare Foundation of Hyundai Group in 1977.




corporate advertisements.

The overarching profile of voluntary welfare services under the Park regime can be described as the duplication of foreign voluntary relief activities, with some notable changes. Child welfare had remained as the primary concerns of the voluntary sector, just like foreign voluntary agencies in the 1950s, and the precedence of welfare facilities had been still at the centre of voluntary welfare contributions. However, such institutional legacies which foreign voluntary agencies had left evolved into a modified configuration with the two developments. First, the 'deinstitutionalisation' of welfare facilities for children was mainstreamed on to the voluntary sector policy agenda. The Park regime, by enacting the 1961 Child Welfare Act, stipulated that accommodating children into welfare facilities be regarded as a secondary solution for childcare by prioritising the return of children lodged in such welfare shelters to their families or communities, as well as the expansion of personalised services for children, such as day care services, nursery homes, and job consultations (ECHKMR 1963: 1303). The number of welfare institutes for children steeply diminished from 523 in 1970 to 279 in 1985, while other facilities underwent relatively small range of numerical reduction (in case of women) or even increased in number (in cases of the disabled and the elderly). The prime intention of the Park regime underlying its deliberate shift of the child welfare delivery from the state to the informal and voluntary sector involves diverting state responsibilities that were increasingly required in the wake of the retreat of foreign voluntary agencies and mobilising women's workforces by introducing day care centres and nursery homes as new forms of child welfare services. Second, the voluntary sector began to diversify its social services beyond the monopoly of child welfare services. 13.2 percent of voluntary agencies under the Park regime were newly established to engage in welfare services for the elderly, and 14.1 percent for the disabled (see figure 2). These new services were still limited to less size of voluntary contributions than child welfare, but the scale and speed of the service diversification, notably services for the disabled, had been further accelerated and consolidated after another military coup headed by Chun Doo Hwan in December 1979.

*Figure 2 Comparison of Voluntary Activities in the Park and Chun Regimes*

(unit: %)



Source: Kim (2007: 112, 165). Modification added. Note that this comparison reflects not the total number of voluntary welfare organisations but the number of newly-established voluntary agencies in each period of Park and Chun regimes by different areas of voluntary activities.

While the Park regime excused itself for its illegitimate accession to power by standing on rapid economic development, the Chun regime, second military-backed authoritarian regime(1980-1988),also advanced “the construction of the welfare state” as one of national catchphrases in order to engage seriously with the social challenges to its lack of legitimacy. The Chun regime’s pledge of proactive public welfare programmes resulted in not only an increase, even of a narrow range (1 percent of the GDP), in government’s welfare spending, but the revision or legislation of a series of social service laws whose coverage was further expanded to reach a wider range of socially excluded groups, including the disabled, the elderly, single mothers, education, children, and vagrants. The corresponding development in the voluntary sector during the Chun regime represents two interrelated distinctions: the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ expansion of voluntary welfare associations (Kim 2008: 832-833; Kendall 2003: 7). As noted above, the horizontal expansion via the increasing number of voluntary groups contributed to deepening the diversification of service contents, thereby widening the range of service recipients. Most strikingly, one of main concerns of the voluntary sector was given to welfare services for the disabled which seized 41 percent of newly-established agencies during the Chun

regime in contrast to the shrinking of child welfare (see figure 1). Meanwhile, the small number of voluntary agencies, based upon horizontally expanded local branches, began to establish 'vertical' networks of centralised voluntary associations aimed to promote the coordination of voluntary welfare activities. As a case in point, the Korean National Council on Social Welfare (KNCSW), established in 1952, set in motion its vertical channels by orchestrating 16 regional offices and 90 local branches in 1985. Likewise, in 1986, the Korean Association of Social Workers (KASW), established in 1967, hosted the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Social Workers Conference where its national council decided to develop 16 regional bureaus into liaison offices in order to facilitate more effective communication and coordination between local and central agencies. These national umbrellas of the voluntary sector played a significant role in marshalling and synchronising a variety of welfare interests and concerns in the sense that the KNCSW bore a comprehensive function to coordinate a wide range of voluntary organisations all over the country, and the KASW undertook training programmes for social workers and the protection of their rights and interests against external interventions (Kim 2007: 175-177).

Such an embryonic expansion of voluntary networks in the mid-1980s conveyed dual images of the voluntary sector to the state: a latent warehouse of social challenge against the authoritarian government, on the one hand, and a potential bank of human resources for service delivery in cooperation with the statutory sector, on the other. The resultant reaction from the Chun regime was the incorporation of key voluntary national networks into the MHSAs-controlled delivery system of social services. Furthermore, the financial shakiness and amateurish staff of the voluntary sector undermined confidence in its operational capacity of voluntary activities, independent from state intervention. Consequently, some vertical networks of voluntary groups in this period deepened their dependency on state inducements, eventually acting as an extended ladder of the integrated delivery channels combining the central government and local service groups. This nascent form of state-voluntary partnerships ushered some voluntary umbrellas into becoming conservative supporters for state policies even after the coming of democratisation in the late 1980s.

## **The Democratic Transition**

With the June Uprising for the democratic breakthrough in 1987 and the following breakdown of authoritarian rule, the overall landscape of state-voluntary relations crystallised into the manifestation of an assertive and organised civil society and the retrenchment of the strong state. As Stein Ringen (1987: 80) aptly articulates, the very concentration of power which the strong state seeks to win control over society has the perverse effect that it loses control over politics at a given critical juncture of social change. Indeed, the mushrooming coalition of trade unions, religious groups and university students and the emergence of new social movements catalyzed the end of the Chun authoritarian regime and its public pledge for the democratic transition on 29 June 1987. There is no doubt that the arrival of a strong society reshaped the role of the voluntary sector in the terrain of social policy, which had been long dominated by the state. The voluntary sector in this transition was not seen any longer as a simple reactive replacement of the public sector in providing social services, but developed into a much more proactive actor to enhance its political influence on the public discussion about social policy agendas by mobilising its political advocacy via national peak organisations and social welfare movements (SWMs) (Lim and Kong 2001). The development of voluntary welfare associations in the democratised society passed the following three milestones.

The first marked feature of the voluntary sector in the wake of democratisation was anchored in the politicisation of welfare agendas (Kim 2007: 218-222). The democratic transition paved the way for civil society's political development with the explosion of civic organisations concerning new social issues such as human rights, environmental degradation, women's rights, and social justice, in tandem with the strong presence of old social movements by labour and agrarian associations. New social groups translated the public's changing values and issue-based interests into a new political form of collective action, known as 'new social

movements' (Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin).<sup>7</sup>Challenging the widely held assumption that new social movements have been apolitical in Western societies, the Korean case demonstrated that the blurred distinction between new and old social movements enabled new social groups to adopt the struggle policy of radical old movements as a key organisational principle and politicise their demands through political advocacy activities and deliberate coalition with other advocacy groups (Lim 2001; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In the field of social welfare, SWM emerged as a variant of new political movements, organised by the voluntary sector in order to remedy inequalities in redistribution and reform the deficiencies of the public welfare schemes (Piven and Cloward 1979). In this sense, SWM *per se* are best described as a result of democratisation, rather than as a cause contributing the coming of the democratic transition. As described in the foregoing section, the overt politicisation of welfare agendas in the form of SWMs marginalised the service provision functions as a secondary concern of the voluntary sector but brought about an unexpected outcome that most advocacy groups accepted social policy issues as one of their main tasks in search of the realisation of social rights. Therefore, the actual implementation of SWMs in the post-democratised society put more emphasis upon political advocacy of the voluntary sector and overshadowed its conventional

***Table 2 Historical Development of Social Welfare Movements***

Year	Contents
1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● SWM for the protection of the rights to life.</li> </ul>
1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Petition movements for Employment Promotion Act for the Disabled, Welfare Act for the Mentally and Physically Disabled, and the Basic Law for the Youth.</li> <li>● Political struggle for the poor in the slum districts.</li> </ul>
1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● SWM for the democratic operation of welfare facilities.</li> <li>● SWM for signing the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.</li> </ul>
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Political struggles for securing welfare facilities.</li> <li>● Petition movements for the Childcare Act (particularly, social care for infants).</li> </ul>

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<sup>7</sup> According to Claus Offe (1985), a new social movement is defined as collective action regarding new kinds of problems that result from the negative side-effects of industrial growth and technological development. It is neither part of existing interest-groups nor governmental structures.

- 1992 ● SWM for the protection of the educational rights of the disabled.
- 1994 ● First petition to the National Assembly for the adoption of the Community Chest Law.  
● PSPD's movements for securing the government budget for social welfare programmes.  
● PSPD's lawsuits against the mismanagement of the National Pension Programme, the Livelihood Protection Programmes, etc.
- 1995 ● The public hearing organised by 59 civic groups for the petitions concerning the legislations associated with the Volunteer Act, Community Chest Law, the Voluntary Movement Aid Act, and the Ban on Charitable Fundraisings.  
● Petition movements for the Basic Law for Women's Development, and the revision of the Welfare Act for the Elderly and the Livelihood Protection Law.  
● The second petition to the National Assembly for the adoption of the Community Chest Law.
- 1996 ● The third petition to the National Assembly for the adoption of the Community Chest Law.  
● SWM for a regular-based national network promoting the rights of the disabled.  
● SWM for aiding a model centre of the self-support programme in the slum districts.  
● SWM for securing the professional status of social workers.
- 1997 ● Petition movements for the revision of the 1991 Childcare Act and Social Welfare Service Act.  
● Petition movements for Regulations Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Welfare Facilities for the Disabled, the Elderly, and Expectant and Nursing Mothers.  
● SWM for the promotion of convenient facilities for the disabled.
- 1998 ● Petition movements for the NBLSA: the launch of the National Convention of the Petition for Enacting the NBLSA (NCPEN).  
● SWM for supporting the unemployed and the homeless: launch of the CCMOU.  
● SWM for the protection of mothers with part-time jobs & maternity welfare.
- 1999 ● Integrated SWMs for the NBLSA: the launch of the Solidarity for Enactment of the NBLSA (SEN).
- 2000 ● SWM for self-support programmes aimed at women and the poor.  
● PSPD's movements for the reform of the existing institutional regulations about the public welfare schemes.
- 2001 ● SWM for securing the safety of the disabled with particular emphasis on public transport.  
● SWM for self-support programmes aimed at the disabled.  
● Petition movements for the Handicapped Discrimination Prevention Act.
- 2002 ● Open hearing of the presidential candidates organised by the Korean Association of Social Workers (KASW) and the Disabled Coalition for the Presidential Election (DCPE).
- 2004 ● Anti-national pension movements

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Sources: Kim (2007: 221, 295); Yi (2005: 43-61). Modification added.

role of service provisions on behalf of the state in the previous years.<sup>8</sup>

As table 2 outlines, SWMs have contained a wide spectrum of collective actions to enhance civic engagements for welfare reforms: political efforts pressing the government to increase public welfare spending; petition movements calling for legislative reforms; political struggles for securing social rights; and the launching of

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<sup>8</sup> For example, women groups such as the Korea Women's Association United and the Korean Women Link, more often than not, utilized women's welfare agendas for maternity and single motherhood as political leverages to enhance women's political and social rights, rather than to improve the real quality of women's lives.

national centres of voluntary sector federations. In particular, the voluntary sector adopted the litigation for the public good and the petition for legislations as the two main strategies of SWMs in its political struggles to expand the sphere of influence on state policies. Interestingly, many cases verify the fact that most lawful appeals from voluntary associations, in turn, were acceded to by the state's reactions with subsequent legislative measures: for instance, the enactment of the Employment Promotion for the Disabled and the revision of the Welfare Act for the Mentally and Physically Disabled in 1989, in response to petition movements for legal reforms concerning people with disability (see table 2). Along with these legal claims, voluntary organisations, when expressing their demands for welfare reforms, were au fait at many other channels of collective demonstrations varying in accordance with the magnitude of welfare issues at stake: press interviews; information sharing through publications, regular brochures, and internet networking; public forums; signature campaigns; protest statements; and public rallies (Yi 2005). The final point we need to note with regard to SWMs is the rise of national networks for voluntary coalitions, which have been at the core of the development of SWMs. Characteristically, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), founded in 1994, played a pioneering role in bringing the redistribution problem to the front of its political advocacy movements, and set in motion the Committee on Social Welfare under the slogan of "welfare is not a social benefit, but a social right."<sup>9</sup> By utilising its nationwide network and independent finance, the PSPD mobilised SWMs for securing the government expenditure no less than 5 percent of the GDP in May 1995, and submitted a proposal for the government's budget reform to the National Assembly in November 1996 after hosting a series of workshops on the government budget for social welfare programmes. Nevertheless, the PSPD's welfare activities were limited to advocacy missions, rather than the actual delivery of welfare services to the people on the ground.

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<sup>9</sup> Prior to the PSPD, some newly formed national umbrellas, especially the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), proclaimed welfare justice to be one of its political and economic objectives and pioneered SWMs by establishing the Sub-committee of Social Welfare in 1989. However, it is widely known that the CCEJ failed to build a proper link between new social movements and social welfare agendas, and put more weight on its political advocacy activities than on welfare issues

Second, some key voluntary organisations began to participate in the decision-making process of social policies. Given the politicisation of welfare issues, the state reactively accommodated some leading voluntary federations into the policymaking procedures on the two different levels. The first track of voluntary involvement refers to its agenda-setting functions that the voluntary sector contributed to designing and proposing new service programmes or lawful petitions at the public forums in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) or against the government policies (Kim 2007: 223). In three consecutive years from 1994 to 1996, 59 voluntary associations came together to marshal their political influence through public hearings aimed to petition a legal action for the Community Chest Law (CCL) stipulating the safe redistribution of voluntary donations to the needy. The entailing result was the enactment of the CCL by the National Assembly in March 1997 and the establishment of the Community Chest of Korea (CCK) as a national umbrella organisation with 16 local branches under the guidance of the MOHW in November 1998. The second track could be found in the joint committees of government agencies and voluntary associations in that they reflected new voices of civil society with the reference to welfare services. Immediately after the June Uprising of 1987, the Roh Tae Woo administration set in motion the Welfare Policy Committee for the Disabled in 1988 and the Welfare Policy Committee for the Elderly in 1991, both of which consisted of the Prime Minister as the head of the Committees, and civilian experts and representatives of voluntary organisations as official commissioners (MHSA 1992: 9-10). Furthermore, the role of voluntary associations in these governmental committees had been further developed, during the Kim Young Sam administration, as more active participants to discuss and review the general direction of the state welfare. In 1995, the MOHW established the Consultation Committee on Social Security in which government officials and civic groups were assembled to revise welfare reforms every five years (MOHW 1996: 407). In the same year, the Planning Committee on Citizens Welfare was also launched in order to encourage some key voluntary groups to join the debate over how to make the state and civil society work together for service delivery (PCGC 1998: 344). All in all, the participatory engagement of the



voluntary sector in the public discourse of social policy facilitated voluntary contributions to constructing new institutional arrangements of welfare programmes and state-civil society partnerships for them.

The final development of the voluntary sector during the period of the democratic transition is related to the unanticipated consequence of its politicisation, which emerged from the organisational discord of voluntary associations. Now that the domination of the political advocacy groups in revving up the public concerns about welfare democracy had an adverse effect on the conventional functions of voluntary welfare services, the politicisation of welfare issues generated the disunity of voluntary organisations. As a consequence, the bifurcation of the voluntary sector was resolved into the two opposed fronts of voluntary centres at the national level: (1) new voluntary national associations; and (2) conventional welfare networks (Kim 2008: 836). Given a longstanding scholarly debate on the different roles of civil society from Max Weber's speech at the World Congress of Sociology on the negative effects of voluntary sector's politicisation to Robert Putnam's emphasis on the importance of associations' participation in political arena in recent years, the Korean experience in the coexistence of conventional and progressive civic sectors since the late 1980s presents a unique model of state-society relations that would be identified with a condensed advancement of its rapid modernisation projects of economic growth and democratisation. While new voluntary associations represented comprehensive political advocacy groups (e.g. PSPD) with a multifunctional, nationwide and reformative networks and mobilised SWMs to challenge the existing welfare regime, conventional welfare networks (e.g. KNCSW, KASW), most of which used to cooperate with the authoritarian regimes prior to democratisation, emphasised their traditional roles as service providers, rather than political advocacy activities (Yi 2005).<sup>10</sup> Such an internal disjointedness and the lack of common grounds

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<sup>10</sup> In particular, conventional networks for the service provision in this period were further nurtured by the emergence of social welfare centres (SWCs) that served the purpose of revitalising local community development. Centring on SWCs, regional voluntary agencies addressed local welfare problems which kept dormant under the authoritarian regimes in spite of the imbalanced underdevelopment of rural areas (Lim and Kong 2001). The service range of SWCs was comprehensive enough to cover all kinds of social services for children, women, the elderly, the disabled, vocational training and counselling, which were

between old and new voluntary groups deteriorated the unified voices of the voluntary sector in calling for the restructuring of public welfare services. Rather, such a split of the voluntary sector opened windows of opportunity for the government entrapped by the democratic transition to incorporate conventional welfare groups in favour of state policies under the strategic partnership of the state and voluntary associations by differentiating institutional arrangements for handling the two distinctive voluntarisms.

### **The Economic Crisis**

Following the democratic transition in 1987, state engagement in civil society has further greatly diminished in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The social distress resulting from the crisis and its entailing welfare vacuums called into question the existing public welfare system, which was incapable of softening the massive layoffs of breadwinners and the homelessness in the face of the structural adjustment imposed by the IMF bailout. In 1998, unemployment rate was soaring up to 6.8 percent, leading to an alarming increase in the incidence of poverty – reaching almost 20 percent of the population immediately after the crisis.<sup>11</sup> Undeniably, these developments in the aftermath of the economic crisis heralded the mass impoverishment and the call for social security nets targeted for people who were deprived of the acceptable living standards. In response, the new democratic Kim Dae Jung government, which was launched in February 1998, devised an alternative welfare paradigm of ‘productive welfare,’ which stressed the participatory contributions of civic actors in fostering community renewal and development in conjunction with the state’s active welfare programmes (Kim, Y.

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most of all properly tailored to local communities. Such multiform services of local SWCs began to be collectively coordinated by the launching of the Korean Association of Social Welfare Centres (KASWC) in 1989. Obviously, the SWC’s direct service delivery was perceived as a most attractive welfare network for welfare collaborators with the state.

<sup>11</sup> The significant increase of the *Gini* coefficients from 1995 (0.284) to 1999 (0.320) serves to prove the deterioration of income distribution, caused mainly by the widening income inequality between the rural and urban poor. Particularly, marginal workers – young, less experienced and less educated workers, recent school dropouts, and first-time job seekers – rather than primary workers were more likely to bear the burden of adjustment to external conditionality of the IMF standby agreements (Lee and Rhee 1999).

2008). The voluntary sector in the post-crisis years, on the other hand, kept doing its dual roles as a welfare reformer and a service provider, just like what it had done in the period of democratisation, but the pressing social fallouts of the crisis motivated the voluntary sector to place more weights on its functions of voluntary relief contributions aimed to protect the socially excluded who had felt the full brunt of the state's structural adjustment. In this regard, we can explore the changing profiles of the voluntary sector at the critical juncture of the financial crisis by considering three different fronts respectively – as political advocacy, service delivery, and dialectic moves for the integration of the first two fronts.

In the terrain of the advocacy functions, the voluntary sector was bound to seek for a new comprehensive definition that would cover the new-found poverty stemming from the decline of the middle class in the aftermath of the economic crisis, thereby pushing forward the realisation of 'social rights' as a new common goal for the collective action of SWMs. In fact, unemployment, declining wages, lone parenthood, as well as growing inequality and insecurity in this period were seen as corroding the idea of citizenship as a whole, not only for the lower social strata (Yi 2005). This new phenomenon should be interpreted as poverty as a form of 'unfreedom' that comes from both actual deprivation and the fear of deprivation, rather than only low income (Ringen 2007: 125). It focuses primarily on the breakdown or malfunctioning of the major social systems that guarantee social citizenship – namely, social exclusion from one's society or community, and the lack of social integration and participation (Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud 2002). Accordingly, the political solution that voluntary associations adopted was to champion T. H. Marshall (1964)'s notion of social rights by mobilising SWMs in order to prevent social exclusion through reforming inferior public welfare schemes. With the emphasis on more political negotiation than confrontation, the post-crisis SWM changed its earlier *modus operandi* from advocacy-dominated movements to a balanced mix of political advocacy and the practicality of service delivery.

As table 2 demonstrates, the active involvement of voluntary groups in the legislative processes of the National Basic Livelihood Security Act (NBLSA) is widely accepted as an archetypal case for post-crisis SWMs. The first attempt of the PSPD-

led petition movements for the NBLSA, by launching the National Convention of the Petition for Enacting the NBLSA in 1998, ended in failure. However, the second coalition, the Solidarity for Enacting the NBLSA (SEN), by 64 major voluntary associations in March 1999, succeeded in calling the government's attention to the universal protection of minimum livelihood. The regular discussion meetings and public hearings with the relevant government ministries resulted in promoting mutual understanding and consensus-building between the government and the SEN, which eventually agreed to propose the NBLSA bill and passed in the special session of the National Assembly in August 1999. The SEN (1999) clearly stated that its pursuit of the NBLSA was aimed to secure the very basic fabric of social protection for all citizens in the context of the realisation of social rights. However, it is also important to remember that the state's recognition of the NBLSA as a manifesto of social rights reflected not only the voluntary sector's persistent push for welfare reforms, but also the government's strategic intention to integrate social forces into the private-public welfare partnership, which would allow the pro-welfare Kim Dae Jung government to utilise voluntary contributions to NBLSA projects (MOHW 2002: 28).

As a service provider, the voluntary sector in the post-crisis period played a critical role in providing crisis-driven welfare contributions in three aspects. The first task had been continuously focused on its conventional work, particularly the development of local communities. A large number of local welfare groups endeavoured the proliferation of local welfare movements (LWMs) aiming to promote self-support programmes – primarily, vocational rehabilitation services such as job training plans, job consultations, and the introduction of job opportunities – for the unemployed and the new poor in local areas in the sense that social rights could be achieved by the citizens' voluntary participation in local welfare services, along with the political solidarity for civic intervention in local governments (Yi, I. 2005). The second target of the voluntary sector was the increasing homeless on the streets of urban areas, who were severely exposed to the welfare deficits. Emergency relief services to protect and rehabilitate the homeless had been delivered by voluntary welfare associations with financial

supports from the government, immediately after the financial crisis. By establishing the National Council of Religious and Civic Organisations for the Homeless and Unemployed in May 1998, the voluntary relief mission was further more effectively coordinated and systematised in providing wide-ranging welfare services such as emergency shelters, free meals, medical supports, and self-help programmes for two targeted groups of the jobless and the homeless. Likewise, the Food Bank, devised by the MOHW and operated by its collaboration with the voluntary sector, was another institutional channel for voluntary groups to deliver free food services to most seriously marginalised people in the post-crisis society. The final pattern of the voluntary participation in service provisions can be found in self-support aid programmes (SAPs), which were introduced as a supportive device to promote the NBLS and invited voluntary organisations as a key partner to work for SAPs. The SAP itself was designed as a hybrid scheme combining the welfare-to-work programme with the comprehensive income protection of the NBLS, and the voluntary sector took the responsibility for assisting self-employment programmes for the poor who wished to receive income support from the NBLS but were deemed able to work (Hahn and McCabe 2006). To this end, self-support aid centres (SACs) have been set up by local welfare groups with the financial and administrative supports from the MOHW, and its number dramatically increased from 20 in 1999 to 242 in 2005. All in all, social provision via the voluntary sector in post-crisis Korean society could be seen as crisis-driven micro-productive contributions intended to supplement the macro-distributive level of the state-run welfare schemes (Deakin 2001).

On top of the voluntary sector's dual roles, the social fallouts of the financial crisis acted as a catalyst in stimulating the voluntary sector to advance a dialectical integration of its sectoral bifurcation caused by the democratic transition in the previous period (Kim 2007: 302). The resultant sectoral integration, by and large, had the two ramifications: (1) *intra-sectoral* cooperation between conventional and new voluntary agencies; and (2) *inter-sectoral* cooperation between state agencies and the voluntary sector. Under the common goal of containing the social distress, the politicisation of SWM has been geared to a more softened stance towards state

policies, whereas conventional voluntary groups have been more likely looking for possibilities to work with voluntary federations at the national level.

Several observations on the Committee on the Citizen's Movement for Overcoming Unemployment (CCMOU) help us understand the first pattern of sectoral cooperation. The CCMOU was launched in June 1998, with the imperative aim of 'combating unemployment,' by a wide range of societal groupings such as religious relief groups, civic associations, trade unions, professional scholars, and apolitical local welfare organisations.<sup>12</sup>The internal cooperation between the CCMOU's central governing body and more than 130 local voluntary groups synthesised various political orientations and voluntary experiences in a coordinated fashion, thereby minimising insidediscontents regarding its advocacy campaigns, fund-raising, and service provision. The most remarkable development of intra-sectoral cooperation culminated in the division of labour in the process of the CCMOU's social provision. While the full responsibility for collecting alms and endowments from individual donors and private companies, not relying on state subsidies, was given to the national headquarters, the actual delivery of its relief services was primarily assigned to local welfare groups in cooperation with the board of executive directors at the central level. It is reported that charitable donations collected by the CCMOU in 2002 amounted to 114,213 million won, which was redistributed to 2.91 million jobless people through 435 projects designed to relieve the unemployed from extreme poverty (CCMOU 2003). However, the CCMOU's integrated profile of old and new voluntary organisations ended in June 2003 by its disbandment and reorganisation to the National Foundation for Overcoming Unemployment (NFOU), whose political rationale was firmly rooted in the reinforcement of inter-sectoral cooperation, particularly with the state. Accordingly, the NFOU's reshuffle of sectoral relations destined its voluntarism to be controlled under state intervention, and such a partnership with state agencies eventually caused many voluntary organisations to refuse their affiliations to the

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<sup>12</sup> The three religious leaders – Cardinal Kim Su-Hwan of the Korean Catholic Church, Reverend Kang Wŏn-Yong, and Executive Chief Song Wŏl-Ju of the Korean Buddhist Chogyŏ Order – spearheaded the public campaigns to set in motion the CCMOU by mustering all civic relief groups from political advocacy agencies to conventional welfare groups.

NFOU (Yi 2005: 58).

Inter-sectoral cooperation between the state and voluntary agencies, on the other hand, was popularised as another mode of voluntaristic transformation in the post-crisis years. Characteristically, historical tracks of the CCK show how state agencies and the voluntary sector have been cross-fertilised for the purpose of inter-sectoral integration. The origins of the CCK grew from the social request for excluding the government's long involvement in the private-money mobilisation via the Help-Your-Neighbour Fund Campaign which started from 1975. The underlying principle of the CCK, therefore, was to guarantee civil society's direct management of its voluntary donations and charities, and proscribe the government's arbitrary hoarding and appropriation of the voluntary money.<sup>13</sup> The Kim Dae Jung government also agreed with the need for more transparent culture of fund-raising, and supported the launching of the CCK in the context of the state-society partnership. The state's endorsement of civic autonomy notwithstanding, the actual results of the CCK's fund allocation appeared to attenuate its independence from the influence of the state. 58.9 percent of the CCK fund was distributed to 18 social service proposals designed by the MOHW, while voluntary agencies had to share the rest of the fund (41.1 percent) through fierce competitions – only 149 out of 625 survived in the 1999 competition. The main reason for this would be due to the indirect state interference in the composition of the CCK's board of trustee – by appointing the First Lady to the honorary chair and the former Prime Minister to the chair – which would downgrade its trusteeship to a 'rubber stamp board' acting on behalf of the government. Also, the CCL requires the CCK to work in coordination with the government, by stipulating that all voluntary activities which the CCK carries out should be reported to the attention of the MOHW. In a nutshell, the general picture of the voluntary sector in this period contains not only the considerable degree of its autonomous manoeuvres in providing social services but also the increasing degree of its cooperative efforts to integrate itself with the statutory sector in the mixed forms of welfare services.

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<sup>13</sup> As Clause 2(1) of the CCL stipulates, the CCK is endorsed to undertake its independent management of citizens-donated funds, from the charity collection to its allocation to voluntary welfare organizations for social services.

## **Voluntary Failure**

As explored above, it is now fair to conclude that the Korean voluntary sector has always played a significant role in delivering social services and hence often substituting for government welfare provision at different historical junctures, even if key voluntary actors in civil society have been differently formed in accordance with the balance of power between the state and voluntary agencies. One question we might ask in this point of fact is why the voluntary sector has related itself to the state over time in the face of the state's regulative penetration into the sphere of voluntarism. The central rejoinder converges into the side effects of 'voluntary failure' (Salamon 1995: 44-48). The tenets of voluntary failure present the inherent limitations of the voluntary sector – rather than the inherent limitations of the state or market – as the main causes for its restrained position which leads to collaborate with the state in order to overcome its resource deficits. The voluntary sector, in this sense, is seen as inherently fragmented, variable at the local level, devoid of hierarchical authority, amateurish with the lack of professionals, and capable of being readily mobilised for urgent implementation of national policy (Kim 2007: 234-236). The 'loose and baggy' nature of the sector generates resource inadequacy, creating the difficulties in fostering self-reliance, and hence calling for the government support (Kendall and Knapp 1994). Voluntary failure, thus, results in deriving cooperative relationships between the voluntary sector and the state in addressing public problems by exchanging the government's financial support for the voluntary activities as service providers.

As such, it is properly understood why the voluntary sector in Korea's political history has been constantly tied up with its practical demands for securing a lucrative contracts for government funding, despite attempting, simultaneously, to grapple with its countervailing power of political advocacy for social change and social justice. However, it should be also rightly recognised that the magnitude of voluntary failure depends upon the voluntary sector's reactions to external influences and constraints from the state, which remain the predominant factor in



determining the general shape of voluntary restraints. To this end, the voluntary failure thesis put much more analytical weight on the processes of mutual penetrations between the voluntary sector and the state, rather than on the lopsided emphasis on inherent drawbacks of voluntary agencies.

## **STATE STRATEGIES**

If the voluntary sector requires the state in order to circumvent its own impasses, why does the state need voluntary agencies? Principally, the best answer comes from the formulation that the transaction costs involved in mobilising governmental responses to shortages of welfare goods and services tend to be much higher than the costs of mobilising voluntary actions (Kendall 2003). Such an 'off-loading' feature of societal partners in voluntarism economises state resources in some ways: information gathering; pressure groups working for the statutory policies; and the policy implementation on behalf of the government. In doing so, the voluntary sector and civil society in general contribute to not only curing a range of social and economic ills left by failures of government and marketplaces, but also enabling the state to maintaining the low level of public expenditure for welfare provision. In particular, social services have consistently failed to be of any real importance in the government's social policy agenda, while both public assistance and social insurance have constituted the state's main institutional arrangements for welfare schemes. It can be assumed that the predominant entity taking over the state's task of social services would be referred to the voluntary sector and local communities. It can be also presumed that such a low share of government spending in social services reflects the state's institutional capacities in mobilising and maintaining alternative sources for service provisions, rather than relying on the statutory sector. To enhance the degree of service provision via voluntary agencies, the Korean state, as Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum (1983) envisage, has always struggled to design and promote strategic instrumentalities whose purpose was to make the action of the state effective. Macroscopic lens from the

perspective of the state, alongside micro-level observations on the evolving functions of the voluntary sector that we already looked through in the foregoing section, are required to investigate the changing contours of strategic apparatuses that the Korean state differentiated in relation to the power of civil society. The ensuing consequences are categorised largely into three pillars: ideas for integration, legal foundations, and institutional adaptations.

### **Corporatist Ideas for Social Cohesion**

Enhancing and consolidating social cohesion has been a longstanding rationale of the welfare state in Western societies. Bismarck's social insurance legislation in the 1880s can be interpreted as an attempt to deal with the political backlash of social forces in the process of modernisation and hence conserve social cohesion. It is in this context that Richard Titmuss (1968) developed the normative ideas and offered a powerful moral justification for state welfare by stressing its role in giving expression to people's altruistic feelings and promoting social integration for a caring and just society. Likewise, the very fabric of strategic schemes that the Korean governments have commonly pursued at each historical juncture also boils down to the advancement of social cohesion, but it has been mostly moulded by ideological underpinnings, which had seldom been accompanied with substantial programmes of state welfare to shore up such ideas.

The state's ideological engineering, with the lack of welfare provision, entails the *corporatist* strategies that the Korean governments relied on when incorporating the voluntary sector. Strategic ideas embedded in corporatism involve the blurring of boundaries between civil society and the state. As Charles Taylor (1995: 207) argues, the virtues of corporatist culture capture the integrated processes in which civil institutions merge with the state and lose their separate identities, and boundaries between the two sectors are for practical purposes obliterated. Historically, corporatism has been long used as an alternative institutional device to integrate conflicting social actors into a compromised synthesis (Wiarda 1997). Tailoring corporatist ideas to varying landscapes of social

forces, the Korean state attempted to shift welfare responsibilities on the voluntary sector or make voluntary associations share service provisions which should otherwise have been solely filled by the statutory sector. In any case, corporatist ideas, even in part, resulted in keeping the voluntary sector at arm's length from the state (McNamara 1999; Streeck 2006).

Under the Park authoritarian regime, the corporatist idea for social cohesion was undertaken in order to inspire the call for a spirit of sacrifice for the state in the grand economic design for industrial modernisation, establish social policy as a secondary element to the larger and more important policies of economic performance, and mobilise welfare contributions from local voluntary groups by campaigning for the value of self-help in local communities (Deyo 1992). From the outset, the Park regime prioritised rapid economic growth as an exclusive path for the nation's security by launching the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966). Indeed, economic policies overrode social policies, which could be valid only within such a purview of economic policies as no conflict could exist with the general architecture for economic growth. The advent of the *Yushin* regime in the early 1970s led to a further intensification of state-corporatist ideas crystallising into the embarkation of NCMs. Through this comprehensive social campaign, the Park regime assigned the main responsibility for implementing and financing community development projects to the villagers and local voluntary groups by emphasising 'assiduity,' 'self-help' and 'cooperation' as the three principles of the NCM. The ideological campaigning politically culminated in Park's 1974 New Year Address in which it was catapulted to the public that "the October *Yushin* is *Saemaul* Movement and *Saemaul* Movement is the October *Yushin*" (PSRK 1978: 374). Such a powerful ideological drive of the developmental authoritarian state served to sanctify state intervention into society and integrate voluntary agencies as one of key welfare contributors on behalf of the state. The result was the successful mobilisation of local communities and the minimisation of the public expenditure for social services (about 2 percent of it).

Just like the Park regime, the military usurpation of power burdened the new military-backed Chun regime from its inception with the pressing task of

restoring the legitimacy of government. Together with social purification and economic stabilisation, the idea of a new welfare state was brought to the fore by the Chun government in order to secure legitimate rule and social cohesion. Despite the catchword of the “construction of the welfare state” asserting that the state should bear responsibility for promoting social security and welfare, this new idea was not totally free from the powerful logic of economic stabilisation and individual’s share of welfare responsibilities. In this regard, Chun proclaimed a blunt direction for new welfare ideas in the following remarks:

In the societal field, welfare would be improved so tremendously that every individual would physically notice... The majority of the people may have felt already that economic stability is the very core of welfare. But, when we enter an advanced stage, the speed of that development would be further accelerated... We must pursue growth, but we must not repeat the mistake of letting growth stand in the way of welfare, a mistake we made in the 1970s. Nor should we follow the Western social security system which may be called anti-welfare as it has resulted in bringing growth to a standstill and high jobless rates. A system of welfare that is both mistake-proof and suited to our realities, I think, should be based on stable economic growth and equal job opportunities for all the people (Chun 1984: 8, 26).

Criticising not only the previous regime’s formulation that economic growth could be achieved only at the expense of stability but also the government-led welfare failure in the West, the Chun government paved the way for a new welfare design which should be suited to Korean realities that combining economic growth and welfare promotion prompted the state to look for social partners who could share service provisions. Accordingly, social policy was an integral part of economic stabilisation and the construction of the welfare state, in the context of state-voluntary sector relations, primarily rested on the state cooptation of a few key voluntary associations (Kim 2007: 190).

In the post-democratisation period, boundaries between the state and civil society, once blurred by the unilateral intervention of authoritarian regimes, have been over again flattened out due to the mutual interpenetration between a democratised, assertive society and state reactions based upon the corporatist ideas incorporating social challenges. The Roh government responded to social demands for welfare reforms by appealing to “citizens from

all walks of life to tighten their belts and work even harder” for enhancing the productivity of the economy, while stressing the important roles of individuals, families, and communities in providing social services (Roh 1990: 191). Roh’s benign neglect in proposing a new welfare idea, despite the governmental efforts to expand welfare programmes, hampered the Roh government to keep its distance from the previous Chun regime, and such an ideological drag of economic predominance over social policy concerns outlasted the request for democratic reforms of state provisions. Even the Kim Young Sam government, which identified itself as the first democratic civilian government since 1961, duplicated the economy-centred schemes in dealing with the voluntary sector in the face of both external pressures of globalisation and internal challenges from SWMs. The 1994 declaration of the globalisation strategy as a key policy idea of the Kim administration defined increased international competitiveness as a national priority which was to affect all state policies including social policy (Kim 1995: 272). By establishing the Presidential Committee on the Globalisation Campaign (PCGC) in 1995, the government devised the ‘New Korean Welfare Model (NKWM)’ with the five principles rooted in neo-liberal values.<sup>14</sup> In particular, the diversification-of-service-providers principle triggered the state’s deliberate emphasis on the role of the voluntary sector in the context of the localisation of welfare responsibility. The PCGC publicly announced a new slogan of ‘welfare partnerships with civil society,’ which ended in recognising voluntary groups as one of qualified partners with whom the government could jointly design welfare blueprints. Some scholars conceptualises the state-voluntary partnership as a corporatist arrangement in the sense that government solicits the voluntary sector to undertake welfare functions which have traditionally been within the public domain, in return for advantages conferred upon the private parties by government (Lewis 1990). Such a new welfare paradigm facilitated the

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<sup>14</sup> The Model’s five principles include (1) the coordination of welfare with economic growth, (2) the consideration of Korea’s unique situation – domestically and internationally, (3) the consolidation of productive and preventive welfare, (4) the diversification of welfare providers, and (5) the pursuit of both spiritual happiness and material satisfaction (PCGC 1995: 158-160).

sectoral cooperation between the state and voluntary associations, thereby promoting social cohesion and leading to the reduction of the public welfare spending.<sup>15</sup>

At the peak of integrated social policy is the corporatist idea of 'productive welfare' invented by the Kim Dae Jung government in the aftermath of the financial crisis. President Kim's vision of a new constructive system of productive welfare, elaborated in his Liberation Day speech on 15 August 1999, rested on the post-crisis institutional reform, assuming that the Korean economy, to some degree, would manage to master the crisis, so that the government could direct its policy attention to welfare issues concerning the social inclusion of displaced people. The idea of productive welfare created a blueprint for social integration illustrating why and how a balanced and harmonious interaction of democratic, market, and social forces could provide a model for the desired future of the Korean welfare society (Kim 1999; PSRK 1999). In doing so, the Kim administration was keen to develop a new middle way incorporating some of the ideas of the neo-liberals whilst maintaining the social democratic commitment to social justice (Giddens 1998). The productive welfare policy, thus, consisted of a positive-sum combination of economic growth and the augmentation of social protection which would be achieved by circulating expenditures for the welfare sector to the economic sector and reinvesting the fruits of economic growth into the promotion of welfare. All in all, the underlying rationale of productive welfare converged into the search for integrated social policy of all social actors, for the most part, by strengthening the role of civic groups and voluntary associations, and hence lowering the barrier to free passage between the state and the voluntary sector (Leisering and Leibfried 2001).

### **Legislating Social Accountability**

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<sup>15</sup> As a result, it is essential to note that the government budget for social welfare programmes – 4.1 percent as the mean of five years (1993-1997) – during the democratic Kim Young Sam administration was ironically much lower than that of the Roh regime – 4.5 percent as the mean of five years (1988-1992).

In either mobilising service contributions from the voluntary sector or controlling its reformative movements, the state has, more often than not, counted on legal strategies encumbering voluntary agencies with social accountability for service provisions (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006: 11). Furthermore, legal measures have been vital to the state's accommodation policy to embrace organised civic sector in the post-democratised society. The shape and targets of legislative strategies have been varying in accordance with their historical embeddedness in social and political landscapes surrounding the voluntary sector. It is, however, essential to stress that the common feature of the state's welfare laws in the field of social services is that judicial actors accountable for service provisions have always been specified in the mixed form of the state and other non-state entities, primarily individuals, families and voluntary associations, rather than the state alone. Consequently, such legal strategies, aimed to share social accountability with the voluntary sector, leave the state a loophole in the sense of institutionalising its lawful buck-passing of service responsibilities. A brief exploration of some core social service laws suffices to understand the historical development of the state's legislation strategies.

Throughout the 1950s, the absence of state welfare and the consequent predominance of foreign voluntary agencies in the terrain of emergency relief activities, as noted earlier, drove the Rhee government to perceive them as a potential challenger to its legitimate governance and thus position itself astride the flow of foreign relief assistance by enacting a series of laws for regulating them (Kim 2007: 88-90). In other words, the focal point of legal strategies in this period was how to mobilise foreign relief contributions as a replacement for state welfare under the state regulation. The first step was to mandate the registration of foreign voluntary agencies. Shortly after the Korean War, in August 1953, the UNCAC and the MHSa concluded the Memorandum on Relief Supplies and Packages of Foreign Voluntary Agencies in order to control the inflow and outflow of the gross foreign voluntary relief services (Reeve 1963: 24). According to the Memorandum, foreign agencies must register at both the UNCAC and the MHSa if they benefit from

preferential treatment, including duty-free entry for relief supplies and packages. The state's controlling power was further upgraded and strengthened by concluding the Agreement of the US-ROK Voluntary Relief Activities and its auxiliary Understanding in April 1955, under the good offices of the UNCAC (Ch'oe 1996: 127). Although the Agreement stipulated secure preferential treatment for US voluntary agencies, the Understanding contained procedural preconditions for those benefits and reinforced legal rights of the Korean government. Clause 4 of the Understanding clearly codified that US voluntary agencies should register, exclusively, at the MHSA, no longer the UNCAC, and report their activities to the MHSA on a regular basis. Foreign agencies were also obliged to appear at the MHSA when they were called upon to answer inquiries related to their voluntary activities. In addition, the MHSA could provide advice or even cautions to foreign voluntary agencies concerning the general directions of relief work, and to call upon them to provide additional relief assistance, particularly when natural disasters or emergency crises would unpredictably emerge. As a result, the Rhee government had the legitimate rights to monitor foreign relief activities by enjoining foreign agencies to comply with required processes for the registration in return for preferential treatment for their relief work.

The Park regime in the 1960s rendered legal regulations of foreign voluntary agencies much harsher by enacting the 1963 Foreign Voluntary Relief Agencies Act, which stipulated a standard definition of foreign voluntary agencies and controlled their relief activities in a systematic fashion (ECHKMR 1963: 1291-1292).<sup>16</sup> With the pretext of facilitating the communication with 83 foreign voluntary agencies, the military junta set in motion the NRCC at the central level and the PRCC at the local level, and dispatched 40 civil servants to the PRCC at every local post and 21 to the NRCC in order to supervise and coordinate the performance of foreign relief works under the institutional chain of command. As a result, foreign

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<sup>16</sup> According to Clause 2 of the Foreign Voluntary Relief Agencies Act, the legal definition of foreign voluntary activities came within the purview of foreign agencies satisfying the following four criteria: (1) headquarters should be in foreign countries; (2) voluntary activities should be operated by financial support from the headquarters; (3) foreign agencies should be non-profit organizations working for social welfare services; and (4) foreign agencies should be substantially managed by foreign members dispatched by the headquarters.



voluntary agencies were required to present quarterly work plans to both Committees three months in advance, while the MHSA allocated welfare tasks to individual foreign voluntary agencies. Such a strong command of the Park government eventually triggered many foreign agencies to retreat from Korea. The second legal measure we need to note in this period was the 1970 Social Welfare Service Act (SWSA), widely known as a political result of the National Assembly Members of the ruling party in response to social demands for a systematic integration of scattered laws related to social welfare services (ECAWP 1972).<sup>17</sup> However, the fundamental rationale could, in fact, be identified with the state's intention to impose legitimate burdens of social welfare services on the voluntary sector or other non-governmental actors, thereby establishing a unique delivery system of social services between the state and civil society (Lee 1998). The SWSA first broadened the purview of principal actors responsible for social welfare services by stipulating that the first and foremost accountability should be assumed by central and local authorities (Clause 4(1)), but individual citizens and voluntary organisations – especially 'nonprofit welfare corporations' – also should share welfare duties with the statutory sector (Clause 4(2)).

Under the rosy rhetoric of the construction of the welfare state, the Chun regime proactively passed a series of social welfare acts in response to its legitimacy deficits and the growing influence of voluntary associations. The Elderly Welfare Act was first enacted in 1981 and revised in 1984, and the Law for the Education of Preschool Children was newly introduced in 1982. The Disability Welfare Act was legislated in 1981 and revised in 1984. The Child Welfare Act, first enacted in 1961, was revised in 1984 to incorporate the universal perspective of child welfare services. The Mother and Child Health Act was prepared as a supplementation to the Child Welfare Act in 1986. Indeed, it was not until Chun's authoritarian regime that the tri-polar structure of social welfare services – children, the elderly and the

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<sup>17</sup> Prior to the enactment of the SWSA, there were several social laws dealing with social welfare problems: Livelihood Protection Act (1961); Orphan Adoption Special Act (1961); Law of the Prevention of Prostitution (1961); and Child Welfare Act (1961). However, those legal measures were taken largely in the temporary and improvised patterns without a systematic coordination for long-term plans. Social demand for a systematic basic law coordinating the existing Acts pushed 15 Members of the National Assembly to bring up the SWSA for discussion in December 1966, and the SWSA was endorsed by the National Assembly in 1969 and activated in 1970.

disabled – was completed by legal measures articulating operational guidelines that social welfare corporations or other voluntary welfare associations had to follow. On top of this, the SWSA, a pivotal and comprehensive set covering various social services, was revised in 1983 in order to enhance both autonomy and responsibility of voluntary actors in operating social welfare corporations and facilities. Accordingly, the five major legislative acts juxtaposed individuals, families, or social welfare organisations to central and local governments as the legal bodies accountable for service delivery in every subfield of social services.

The democratic transition in the late 1980s and the financial crisis in the late 1990s generated organised social forces and their active participation in the public debates over legislative reforms via the mobilisation of SWMs. Responding to the request for democratic reforms of service provisions, the state has utilised legislative proceedings as strategic instruments to accommodate the voluntary sector into being cooperative or at least neutral to state provision via non-state actors. A large number of legal measures have been intensively enacted or revised in conjunction with petition movements and political advocacy mobilised by the voluntary sector. As discussed in the foregoing section, the two cases of CCL and NBLSA confirm the interactive development of the voluntary sector's involvement in legislative processes and the government's reactive accommodation. In doing so, the Kim Dae Jung government launched the Regulatory Reform Planning Board (RRPB), in May 1998, designed not only to rescind or revise the existing administrative decrees, regulations, and laws concerning social welfare service, but also to include voluntary forces in the integrated welfare schemes (MOHW 1999: 29). Even with its comprehensive coverage, the RRPB's main targets remained in the terrain of welfare services for people with disability. By publicly proclaiming the Five-Year Plan for Welfare Promotion for the Disabled (1998-2002) and reforming disability-related laws (e.g. the Disabled Human Rights Charter), the RRPB and the MOHW strove to establish durable arrangements that would promote the social integration of people with disability and encourage the voluntary sector's participation in the rehabilitation services for the disabled, with cash benefits, services in kind, and extra subsidies (MOHW 2001: 127). Another evidence of the state's legal strategies

in the post-crisis years includes the systematic mobilisation of voluntary contributions through the Nonprofit and Voluntary Organisations Assistance Act (NVOAA), which stipulates the state should provide its statutory supports for voluntary and civic organisations both administratively and financially (MOHW and KCSW 2000: 118-119). Enacted in January 2000, the NVOAA was intended to bring tax reductions, subsidies, and the curtailment of postal fees in return for increased voluntary participation in public welfare programmes. The lack of financial resources, on the other hand, locked the voluntary sector in institutional shackles where it needs to comply with the NVOAA and its related conditions. In a nutshell, the state strategies of legislative reforms, aimed at the reactive accommodation of a strong society, have been used as effective tools contributing to a legal foundation that allowed the state to share its welfare responsibilities with the voluntary sector.

### **Institutional Adaptations**

Along with a series of legislative actions, the comprehensive and elastic foundation of state strategies for integrating voluntary agencies as a social partner for service provisioning is institutional adaptations to the varying circumstances embedded in state-society relations at the macro-level. The stability of welfare systems is a matter of the stability of the institutions by which sources of variability, which if they go far enough, would change the structure of welfare systems, can be neutralised and remain constant (Goodin 1996). If institutional processes are not successful, new transformations of institutional settings may arise in order to accommodate new demands (Nee and Ingram 1998: 39). The possibility of institutional adaptation when new demands arise from civil society is related to the available resources of the state and effective tools of influence and control. On the other hand, as Morris Janowitz (1977) articulates, the consequences the welfare state has had on institutional arrangements, in turn, have altered social structures, which have transformed and strained the previous systems of social control. In the context of Korea, such unintended consequences of social changes, which result in modifying

the existing institutional structure, can be, in many cases, identified with the advent of associative democracy by the democratic transition in the late 1980s(Hirst 1997).The state's social policy aimed at institutional adaptations, therefore, needs to be understood as an integral constituent of state-society relations, not just as an optional 'add-on.'

Prior to democratisation, the Korean state had played an exclusive role as a regulator in achieving welfare goals by controlling and mobilising social actors—here, our focus is on the voluntary sector—without high levels of public welfare expenditure(White and Goodman 1998: 13; Jacobs 2000). Under the authoritarian developmental regimes, the notion of state-provided or state-guaranteed welfare as a social right of citizenship had been underdeveloped and almost impossible to be included in institutional arrangements. Instead, social policy was institutionalised in lines with one of components subordinated to economic policy. In dealing with the voluntary sector, the state institutions in this period stretched out its controlling power via the two forms of regulation: 'mobilisation' and 'cooptation,' both of which were adaptively formulated to maintain legitimacy and social cohesion in the face of societal challenges under the authoritarian rule (Kim 2008).

The first category of mobilisation mostly corresponds to the Park authoritarian regime in which the strong state confronting the weak solidarity of social forces intended to mobilise human and financial resources from civil society, which were then used as a substitute for welfare services that the state would otherwise have provided. The absence of a severe backlash from voluntary organisations, as well as the retreat of foreign voluntary agencies, resulted in deepening the Park regime's penetration into the society and the voluntary sector's dependency on the public money, to the extent of the creation of quasi-voluntary associations which acted as extended arms of the state. As well known, the NCNCM, launched in 1976 by the MHA, represents a state strategy that institutionalised pro-governmental associations with the mission to coordinate the mobilisation of voluntary contributions for the promotion of NCMs. Given the fact that the NCM itself was an institutional device comprised of the welfare mix between local communities and government agencies, many other pro-governmental voluntary

associations were mobilised to undertake a task of community development and its entailing service delivery on behalf of the state or in cooperation with the state. The second channel of institutional instruments under the Park regime was the financial mobilisation that a few quasi-voluntary associations, institutionalised by the relevant ministries, participated in collecting private donations aimed to relieve displaced people. For instance, the combined authorities of the MHA and the MHSA, by legislating the Disaster Relief Act in 1962, established the government-sponsored nonprofit organisation, the National Association for Disaster Relief (NADR), whose purpose was to collect the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) in lieu of the government. In 1974, the MHA took the initiative in preparing a pro-governmental association working for the Help-Your-Neighbour-Fund (HYNF), which was used as public assistance for people in need (ECAWP 1978: 406-407).

With the enactment of the Social Welfare Service Funds Act in December 1980, the Chun regime further encouraged the financial mobilisation, so that the NADR succeeded in dramatically increasing the total amount of the DRF to over 40

**Table 3 The Collection of the DRF and Relief Activities**

(inmillion Won)

	Amount of collection (A)	Voluntary spending on disaster relief				(A)-(B)
		Housing relief	Emergency relief	Others	Total (B)	
1971	161	81	50	18	149	12
1978	134	174	63	8	245	-111
1980	6,309	2,227	2,330	166	4,723	1,586
1981	6,079	1,276	2,941	10	4,227	1,852
1984	17,128	7,934	9,250	57	17,241	-113
1987	33,075	12,129	18,227	96	30,452	2,623

Source: NADR (1987).

**Table 4 The Help-Your-Neighbour Campaign**

(in million Won)

	Total amount			Expended	Balance
	Previous year surplus	New collections	Total		
1976	154	2276	2,430	2,318	112
1977	112	2452	2,564	1,414	1,150

1978	1,150	1588	2,738	2,137	601
1979	601	1405	2,006	1,832	174
1980	174	2650	2,824	2,299	525

Source: BOK (1985).

times the average amount of past collections before the Act was passed (see table 3).<sup>18</sup> In close cooperation with the government, an average of 300 million won of the DRF was annually redistributed to flood victims and the afflicted people by natural disasters (NADR 1987: 210). Despite a smaller increase than that achieved by the NADR, the HYNF also demonstrated that the Act had a positive influence on the funding of voluntary charities that help those who were in urgent need of support for their living expenses (see table 4). At this point, it should be noted that the Korean government appropriated some parts of the DRF and HYNF for its public assistance schemes that otherwise should have been financed by its own budget (MHSA 1985: 403). Given that the differential surplus between the amount collected by the HYNF and the amount spent was kept and managed by the Bank of Korea (BOK) in close coordination with the MHSA, it can be inferred that a share of the annual surplus and interests could be used for public welfare programmes as a part of the government expenditure. In 1981, the BOK integrated the DRF and HYNF into the 'Fund for Social Welfare Programmes' and armed itself with the legitimate power to administer and control the whole process of financial transfers of voluntary donations. It was not until the enactment of the 1997 CCL that the voluntary sector was legally entitled to decide for itself how to use and redistribute the funds it collected.

The Chun regime's institutional design for regulating voluntary welfare activities, in tandem with mobilisation, became refined in the form of cooptation, most of which takes place in a transitional period of the social structure in which the

<sup>18</sup> In the past, independent collections of voluntary money had been strictly controlled and monitored by the government with reference to the 1951 Ban on Charitable Fundraisings. However, the passing of the Social Welfare Service Funds Act on 31 December 1980 by the National Assembly was a watershed, after which the voluntary sector was allowed to collect welfare funds for its own programmes by means of fund-raising campaigns. The 1980 Act guaranteed the freedom of voluntary collection of welfare funds on the condition that these funds were spent on voluntary activities that contributed to social welfare services. It did not, however, exclude a special clause stipulating that the collection campaigns of voluntary organisations, if necessary, could be controlled by the MHA (MHSA 1985: 378).

state still remains in a powerful position but faces a rising challenge from civil society in the pre-democratisation years (Cawson 1982; Etzioni 1968). Cooptation through 'participation' is a familiar mechanism of institutional adaptations, which is aimed to mute social disorder, rather than to promote social reform. Participation, thus, is actually manipulation in the sense that the underlying objective is not to empower people in the process of planning and decision-making, but to enable power holders in government to incorporate, selectively, the limited number of influential participants from some key voluntary organisations (Piven and Cloward 1971). As explored earlier, the voluntary sector in the 1980s was enclosed in a civil society in transition, where social actors fostered their embryonic challenge to the state, particularly through the vertical expansion of voluntary national networks. In response to this shift in civil society, the Chun regime emphasised the importance of integrating service delivery systems between the state and voluntary organisations for a more effective coordination for social provisions (MHSA 1985: 265-271). The MHSA officially selected the institutionalisation of an integrated delivery system as one of the key tasks of the Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan. Criticising the previous practice of service delivery systems which failed to modify its fragmented coordination between service actors to social changes, caused by industrialisation and urbanisation, in the process of rapid economic growth, it strongly stressed the sectoral cooperation between the state and voluntary agencies, as well as active participation of key voluntary associations in the integrated delivery system.

Indeed, the politics of cooptation led the Chun government to afford favourable treatment to particular groups – mainly, the KNCSW and the KASW – sometimes to the extent of constituting them as the sole legitimate spokesman of the integrated delivery institution concerned. The KNCSW played a significant role in bridging the central government and local voluntary groups, whereas the KASW took the part in supporting the training programmes of social workers in the chain of service delivery networks with the government agencies. The political rhetoric of cooperative relations between the two sectors notwithstanding, the underlying rationale was to secure the strategic cooptation of large national voluntary

associations, in the hope of diluting the potential challenge posed by the vertical network of voluntary agencies, enhancing social regulation for legitimate governance, and lowering the level of public welfare expenditures. The subsequent governments, even after the democratic transition, continued to utilise institutional arrangements for cooptation in contending with the voluntary sector, despite the varying degree of scale and strength.


Even with the democratic transition in which the state, in the face of an upsurge in assertive civic groups, is assumed to deteriorate into passive acceptance of social demands for reforming public welfare schemes, the state function of institutional adaptations was much more sophisticated and deliberately developed by juxtaposing or combining two different paths of the accommodation strategy – *reactive* and *proactive* – for regulating voluntary agencies in the democratised society (Kim 2008: 837). Against the assumption that the process of democratisation is reverse to the extension of state power into the non-state sphere of civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996), the Korean case shows a non-linear relationship between the democratic transition and state power, with the observation that the state, even in part or to a lesser degree, has still exerted its influence in terms of state provision via the voluntary sector (Whitehead 2004). The rationale behind the dual character of accommodation is rooted in the fact that the state's social governance in the post-democratisation period rested upon the manipulation of internal bifurcation of the voluntary sector – conventional and new national networks, as discussed earlier. By differentiating the intensity of accommodation, the state kept incorporating voluntary agencies as a facilitator who localised public welfare services on the one hand, and as a social partner who cushioned the pressure of welfare reforms, on the other.

First, 'reactive accommodation' was intended to handle the politicisation of new voluntary networks by way of institutional reforms of a symbolic nature (see figure 3). The reactivity of state institutions resulted from a situation in which the state receptively accommodated the assertive civic claims for welfare reforms. The state, therefore, was required to improve public welfare programmes, even at minimal level, thereby forestalling controversy surrounding democratic reforms of



service provisions. The very first move toward reactive accommodation was found in the rushed dispatch of 49 social work specialists by the Roh government, right after the June Uprising of 1987 (MHSA 1988). However, it is not difficult to recognise that such action was the government's makeshift solution to avoid the trenchant demands for welfare services, in that the Roh government was reluctant to promote social workers' status from contract-based low rank to full-time workers on a higher salary, and the Kim Young Sam government even suspended the recruitment of social workers in 1995 for financial reasons. Another good example of reactive accommodation comes from the fact that governments in the post-democratisation society permitted the involvement of key new welfare groups in the statutory institutions accountable for social policy decision-making – for instance, the Welfare Policy Committee for the Disabled in 1988, the Welfare Policy Committee for the Elderly in 1991, and the Consultation Committee on Social Security in 1995. Finally, the Kim government spearheaded administrative reforms related to welfare services, aimed at the removal of ineffective bureaucratic slacks, by launching the Presidential Committee on Public Administrative Reforms (PCPAR) in 1995, where the general direction of sectoral bureaucratic reforms including the MHSW was discussed and determined by consultations with some political advocacy groups of the voluntary sector as well as the PCGC (PCPAR 1996: 291). With the main focus on social policy for the disabled and the elderly, the PCPAR devised a number of administrative benefits for them, such as cash benefits and subsidies, tax deductions, discounts of public transportation fees, exemptions from TV subscription fees, and so on. However, it is important to remember that all institutional reforms in this period did not mean the birth of the state as a service provider with the full-scaled public spending, but only institutional adaptations to neutralising social demands in a temporary manner so that government could avoid for the most part implementing substantial reforms.

*Figure 3 The Dual Process of Accommodation*



Source: Kim (2008: 838).

By contrast to reactive accommodation, ‘proactive accommodation’ required the state’s active intervention in the bifurcated rift of the voluntary sector (see figure 3). Such intervention was intended to utilise the targeted conventional voluntary organisations as a major partner for the delivery of social welfare services. In a broad sense, proactive accommodation can be seen as a variant of cooptation the previous Chun regime had held on to. Localised, dispersed, pro-governmental groups with narrow interests of service provisions seemed more acceptable to the general idea of the NKWM than broad and encompassing groups potentially competing with the state for the definition of the common good (Lewis 1990). The NKWM, designed by the Kim Young Sam government in 1995, stressed the role of conventional voluntary networks and local communities in delivering welfare services tailored to local conditions and mobilising financial resources for self-sufficiency (PCGC 1998: 175). Stripped of its essentials, this movement amounts to the state’s off-loading traditional welfare functions back on to groups of citizens. Throughout the process of this institutional adaptation, although exclusion was not normally apparent, there was, in most instances, either an umbrella or lead organisation which received favourable governmental treatment and support. The institutions chosen for this shift were

mostly identical to those in the previous regime: conventional networks of the KNCSW, the KASW, and the KASWC.<sup>19</sup> By the institutional drag of incorporating conventional voluntary actors into a coordinated channel of service delivery, the Korean state was able to share welfare responsibilities with the voluntary sector, even a lesser degree of mobilisation than the previous regimes, in the face of democratic challenges of political advocacy groups.

The Kim Dae Jung government, after the financial crisis, redefined itself as a risk controller or social integrator by advancing the productive welfare policy as an institutional apparatus combining the neo-liberal active policy of welfare through work with the reinforcement of social security nets and welfare as a right of citizens. The best achievement of the productive welfare policy is the NBLIS, a new comprehensive income support programme, which aimed to cover a larger part of the population and provided a higher level of living allowances than previous schemes. Given that this new scheme was designed as a set of universal rights in that all citizens living under the poverty line were entitled to claim public relief assistance from the government, many Korean scholars acknowledged that the NBLIS reflected not only the nature of social rights, but also the expanded role of the government as a service provider for protecting citizens against the social fallouts of the financial crisis (Kim, Y. 2008; Shin 2003). In a similar context, Ramesh Mishra *et al.* (2004) argue that the Korean welfare regime in the post-crisis years was building the foundations of a modern welfare state; it was even moving in the direction of a social democratic, Scandinavian type of welfare regime. However, such an assertion ignores counterfactual evidences in two ways. Most importantly, it is vital to realise that Korea's public social expenditure, despite a considerable increase after the crisis (from 3.80 percent of the GDP in 1997 to 5.15 percent of the GDP in 1998), constantly ranked as the lowest among the OECD countries. Also, the Kim

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<sup>19</sup> According to the official whitepapers of the MHS (1993, 1994) and MOHW (1995, 1996), the Kim Young Sam administration advanced, from 1993, the KNCSW as a central voluntary association that could foster, utilize, and monitor all sorts of volunteers working for social welfare services in a systematic fashion. The KASWC was also ushered to join the state-guided chain of service delivery because it contributed to the successful management of service provision to localities and the avoidance of unnecessary overlaps when services were distributed. The KASW, as it did during the Chun regime, play a role as the supplier of social workers in cooperating with the MOHW and other voluntary associations within the network of service provisions.

Dae Jung government put relatively little emphasis on social services when compared with public assistance and social insurance. The decline in the percentage of the MOHW budget on social welfare services after the 1997 crisis endorses the second point that the state has been still sharing the task of service provisions with the third sector – primarily, voluntary agencies – in the terrain of social services. In this sense, we understand why the Kim government stressed the importance of state-voluntarism partnerships as one of critical backbones for the realisation of productive welfare. All in all, institutional adaptation in this period converged on the promotion of the welfare mix between the statutory and voluntary sectors under the name of social integration.

## **THE STATE-VOLUNTARISM WELFARE MIX**

An important observation on state strategies in association with the voluntary sector throughout the Korean welfare history evinces the constant existence of the welfare mix, even though changes in actors representing voluntarism and roles of voluntary associations. There has been a voluntary sector, and the state has responded to it. What then has come out of that exchange in the form of voluntary activity, in particular in social provision? The central problem with the theory of the welfare state, as it has applied to the Korean context, is its failure to differentiate the government's role between a provider of funds and direction, and a deliverer of services. In point of fact, it is largely in the former capacity that government has grown in Korea. When it comes to the actual delivery of services, by contrast, the state has turned extensively to other institutions, primarily voluntary agencies in this section, making use of a wide variety of third parties to carry out governmental functions. By changing and selecting social partners in providing social services, as well as by adjusting the relational pattern of regulation, the state has been able to keep its regulatory authorities in the sense of 'state provision via others'.

The middle-ranged outcomes of state-voluntary sector links are identified with a series of institutional arrangements of the welfare mix between the two

sectors. The notion of the welfare mix in this section, by definition, is primarily concerned with the narrower relations between the state and voluntary agencies (or sometimes local communities included), rather than the multiple stakeholderism. An array of the welfare mix takes place within a constellation of forces and interactions shaped by the dominant political settlement in the society, so that it is bound to reflect the empirical and historical diversity of welfare systems which have *de facto* been always 'mixed' (Rose 1986; Evers 1993; Johnson 1999). As voluntary organizations are linked to broader inter-sectoral crossover, they are more likely to turn to the interdependent welfare mix, assimilating into the dominant rules of the statutory sector or market mechanisms (Ware 1989). As a result, the welfare mix thesis assumes that the relationship between the state and the voluntary sector is not necessarily one of conflict or disjunction. Rather, partnership and cooperation between the two sectors may be a more preferable pattern for the concept of the welfare mix, whatever the scope and type of the welfare state (Kuhnle and Selle 1992: 5).

The Korean case, also, demonstrates that there is no necessary zero-sum relationship between states and voluntarism in providing social services. The voluntary sector can receive financial and administrative supports from the state in exchange for cooperating with state policies, whereas the state can utilise voluntary forces as a service delivery replacement on behalf of the state. Nevertheless, the overriding role of the state in the mixed economy of welfare has been materialised within the purview of a regulator incorporating voluntary agencies into the government-initiated service programmes. The magnitude of state regulation, conversely, is bound up with the voluntary sector's stance toward the state at a given historical contingency: collective actions based upon participatory solidarity during the democratic transition would constitute potential threats to the existing public welfare schemes; and the financial crisis drove the state into a corner in the face of social demands for welfare reforms. Thus, the equilibriums of the welfare mix have been shifting in accordance with power relations between a hard state and soft agencies in the society. The Korean welfare mix can be, by and large, classified as the four different modes by focusing on three dimensions of the mixed functions:

(1) the general guidance, (2) financing, and (3) service delivery.

### **Foreign agency-based welfare mix**

The first pattern of the welfare mix is located between foreign voluntary agencies and the war-stricken state of the Rhee government in the 1950s. The supremacy in governance of emergence relief services is best captured as the general description of foreign voluntary contributions. Foreign relief activities covered the immense scale of war victims, which had been financed and implemented, mostly, by foreign agencies themselves without institutional backups from the Korean state. Given that foreign voluntary agencies had a considerable leeway of the autonomous authorities (or responsibilities) on both financial disposals and service implementations, it can be argued that the voluntary sector in the post-war years constituted one critical channel of the social provisioning in a parallel motion with the state welfare. However, if we look at who framed the general guidance of voluntary welfare contributions, we recognise that the direction of voluntary actions, which should have been self-regulating, was regulated by legal measures the state designed. As discussed earlier, the state's legal restrictions on foreign relief activities – such as the mandatory requirements of registrations, reports of actual performances, and the readiness for additional tasks requested by the government – resulted in severe damage to voluntarism of foreign agencies, and coerced their financing and service delivery systems into becoming compatible with the broad directions of state policies.

On the other hand, the public services in this period presents the very residual welfare schemes in which the main targets of public welfare were limited only to employees of the state, such as civil servants, the military and police, and teachers, rather than poverty-stricken citizens. By enacting the Military Assistance Act in 1950 and the Police Assistance Act in 1951, the Rhee government established public assistance schemes for war veterans, police servicemen, and their dependents. The Civil Servant Pension Scheme was also proposed in 1959, covering about 250,000 civil servants working for central and local governments. Due to the

lack of public resources for social provisions, the Rhee government rested upon the outdated Chosun Poor Law, established by the Japanese colonial government for the purpose of controlling the poor in 1944, as the main instrument for social policy rather than introducing new public welfare schemes. In this regard, the state was incapable of being an independent actor who provides social services for the poor in parallel to foreign voluntary agencies.

Consequently, the very spot where the welfare mix took place in this case mostly converge on the state's legal strategies aimed to control and balance foreign voluntary challenges. Neither a financier nor a deliverer of services was main concerns of the state. Foreign agencies took over this dual function of financing and delivering services under the general directions the state enforced by its legal intervention. Such a state supervision made foreign relief services geared to the supplementary contributions filling in welfare vacuums that the state left, but gave way to relatively autonomous manoeuvres of voluntary agencies in implementing service provisions. This brings us to confirm that the actual contribution of the voluntary sector prevailed (or replaced) that of the state, but its actual direction was bound to curve towards state-regulated tracks of social provisioning.

### **State-imposed Welfare Mix**

The second type of the welfare mix is the typical and longstanding framework which the authoritarian governments used to mobilise quasi-voluntary associations for the purpose of the government-designed public campaigns. The roadmap of general directions and campaign goals was deliberately invented by the state as one of decisive policies for national modernisation. In terms of financing, the state attempted to mobilise financial contributions from the voluntary sector and local communities in combination with its financial and administrative assistances for the mass mobilisation campaigns. The task of service delivery was claimed as the share of people in rural communities, rather than the public sector, under the powerful logic of promoting self-reliance. The best example for this state-imposed

welfare mix can be found in the NCM and its associated pro-governmental voluntary agencies in the 1970s.

The fundamental rationale behind the community development scheme, as noted earlier, was to help local communities in rural areas improve their living standards *by themselves*. Given that the greater part of the public spending was invested for economic growth projects, the Park Chung Hee regime crafted a mass mobilisation campaign in the early 1970s by which individuals, families and villages could improve living conditions through their own efforts or mutual assistance without the government's full engagement. The government introduced the competition system among village communities and active education programmes for leadership training in order to maximise the positive outcomes of the NCM (MHA 1973). Approximately 16,000 out of 35,000 villages showed good performance, and further government supports of additional funds and raw materials such as cement were preferentially given to these villages. Through the

**Table 5 Key Indicators of the NSMs in the 1970s**

	Participants (millions)	Number of projects (thousands)	(A) Government investment (million ₩)	Investment of local communities (million ₩)	(C) Total investment (million ₩)	(A)/(C) [%]
1971	72	385	4,100	8,100	12,200	33.6
1972	320	320	3,300	28,000	31,300	10.5
1973	693	1,093	21,500	76,900	98,400	21.8
1974	1,069	1,099	30,800	102,000	132,800	30.2
1975	1,169	1,598	165,300	130,600	295,900	55.9
1976	1,175	887	165,100	157,500	322,600	51.2
1977	1,372	2,463	246,000	220,500	466,500	52.7
1978	2,709	2,667	338,400	295,800	634,200	53.4
1979	2,421	1,788	425,200	333,000	758,200	56.1

Source: MHA (1980).

NCM campaign, the income levels of farm households caught up with those of urban workers, particularly in the mid-1970s, although the actual income gap between rural and urban households began to widen again in the late 1970s. The main tasks



of successful cases covered a wide range of community improvement activities: (1) developing local infrastructures, such as widening roads, constructing bridges and washing facilities, and repairing ditches; and (2) constructing community care facilities, orphanages, old folks' homes, and local welfare centres. The state's efforts to instil the general direction of the NCM culminated in the dispatch of NCM leaders who were educated by the central government agencies for the purpose of supervising community development projects. People with various social backgrounds, such as farmers, church ministers, intellectuals, chief community administrators, and provincial officials of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, were selected and educated by the MHA and its related PICs (MHA 1980).

Although the government provided raw materials and financial support, the local communities, in principle, took on the main responsibility for implementing and financing their own development projects. In 1972, 28 billion won worth of labour and financial resources – 89.5 percent of the total investment – was invested by local villagers themselves (see table 5). State-provided financial support did not surpass the expenses of local communities until 1975; even after 1975, government subsidies remained around half total investment. As for the achievements of the NCM, the state was able to enjoy on average a 200 percent return on its investment in the NCM campaigns. Contrary to the government propaganda that the state's intense efforts for financial backings made it possible for rural communities to improve and increase household incomes (MHA 1980), the real financial contributions for rural development had been mobilised from individual household budgets. In fact, the role of the state, despite its financial contributions, was confined to a regulator or usher of the NCM, whereas local communities played a significant role in financing and achieving modernisation projects for rural communities.

Finally, the state-driven welfare mix brought about the emergence of quasi-voluntary agencies as a main locomotive mobilising voluntary resources from rural communities. First of all, the NCNCM played an intermediate role in coordinating NCM projects between the government and local communities, and acted as a vanguard for government policy in a hierarchical chain of command by taking over

the public interests and missions of the Government Committee on New Community Movement. Several NCM-related pro-government associations had been established and lined up under the NCNCM's intimate coordination: Central Association of Rural Leaders in 1971; Central Association of *Saemaul* Women Leaders in 1980; Central Association of *Saemaul* Leaders in 1980; Central Association of Factory *Saemaul* Movement in 1980; and Central Association of *Saemaul* Young Leaders in 1981.

Such a hierarchical relationship among the strong state, quasi-voluntary associations and local community groups appears to constitute successfully the division of labour in social provisions. However, it should be reconsidered as the 'forced division of labour,' as Emile Durkheim defines (1997: 310-22), which is based upon the eventuality that the voluntary sector was involuntarily obliged to serve for the task of welfare provision that was designed and imposed by the state, whereas the state mobilised and regulated voluntary welfare contributions via its financial and administrative inducements. In doing so, the voluntary sector and community-based groups served as extended arms of the state in order to meet individuals' needs instead of the public sector; the state effectively laid welfare responsibilities on voluntary and religious charities and the family in rural communities. However, state involvement in the welfare mix, even if it was made under authoritarian rule, was expanded from a controller of general directions to a partial financier for service provisions, in comparison with state-voluntary sector relations in the previous period.

### **Integrated Welfare Mix**

The most catholic pattern of the mixed economy of welfare in modern Korea is the 'integrated welfare mix,' which is founded on the premise that voluntary welfare production is integrated in the overall welfare state system, regardless of various modes of integration mechanisms – pluralist cooperation or strong regulation. As Stein Kuhnle and Per Selle (1992: 30) articulate, the multiple fronts of the state-voluntary sector integration in the field of service provisions can be mostly reduced

to the two relational patterns: 'integrated autonomy' and 'integrated dependence.' The former can be interpreted as ideals of pluralism in the sense that groups of people organise themselves and try to make an impact upon public policy on issues which affect them, but without becoming integrated into the decision-making or implementation processes. It is possibly stated that the corresponding actor to integrated autonomy would be new voluntary associations which emerged as political advocacy groups, equipped with SWMs, challenging against the existing welfare regime in the post-democratised Korean society. Unlike the notion of integrated autonomy, some peak associations of new social groups became integrated into the government-led consultation institutions under the slogan of state-society partnerships, even though they had no serious participation in the processes of service implementations. The mixed cases of integrated autonomy, therefore, are best described by new groups' participation in the corporatist institutional arrangements where the general directions of welfare programmes would be determined.

*Table 6 The Integrated Welfare Mix in Social Welfare Services*

(as of 1993; unit: %)

		Delivery	Finance	Patterns of division of labour
Services for child care	Voluntary sector	74.7	55.5	● Voluntary-sector-dominated delivery
	Government	25.3	44.5	● Mixed finance
Services for the elderly	Voluntary sector	99.9	24.4	● Voluntary-sector-dominated delivery
	Government	0.1	75.6	● Government-dominated finance
Services for the disabled	Voluntary sector	99.9	17.9	● Voluntary-sector-dominated delivery
	Government	0.1	82.1	● Government-dominated finance
Local community development	Voluntary sector	97.6	43.2	● Voluntary-sector-dominated delivery
	Government	2.4	56.8	● Mixed finance

Source: Paek (1994: 113). Modification added.

The notion of integrated dependence constitutes the second pattern of the integrated welfare mix: voluntary agencies are financially dependent upon government and degree of organisational autonomy as a service provider is

relatively weak. Overall, conventional voluntary associations in the 1980s and 1990s are applicable to the formulation of integrated dependence that the voluntary sector is mostly integrated into the government-controlled service implementations, rather than the decision-making processes, by state intervention with financial inducements and strategic cooptation. As table 6 shows, the actual results of the welfare mix endorse integrated dependence, in which the task of service provisions is implemented, almost entirely, by the voluntary sector, whereas the mission for service financing is undertaken by the state in most areas of social services but financial contributions from the voluntary sector, to a considerable degree, are necessarily required in some specific areas such as childcare and local community development. In a broad sense, it can be said that the state relies upon the voluntary function as a provider of social services in return for its financial supports, and the other way around is also viable. Nevertheless, a closer look at such symbiotic relations of government and voluntary welfare service organisations presents a nuanced implication: the state's priority of social policy entails the variation of the welfare mix in the dimension of financing and delivery of services (see table 6). The government's strong concerns over welfare services for the disabled and elderly people, since the 1980s, led to the increase in public financing (82.6 percent for disability welfare, and 75.6 for the elderly), but the absolute transfer of service delivery responsibilities to the voluntary sector (99.9 percent for both services). By contrast, relatively conventional issues of social services – child welfare in the 1950s onwards, and community development in the 1970s onwards – failed to receive more attention for public financing from the state, thereby generating the growth of voluntary financing.

A further advanced form of the integrated welfare mix emerged from voluntary contributions to the welfare-to-work programmes linked to the NBLs in aftermath of the financial crisis (Hahn and McCabe 2006; Kim 2007). It is important to emphasise that this welfare mix *blurred* the traditional boundary between social welfare services and public assistance by integrating the voluntary sector into SAPs, an institutional device supplementing the NBLs. In 1999, launching the NBLs and its associated SAPs was publicly spotlighted as the state's universal

attempt to combat social exclusion as part of the Productive Welfare programme (MOHW 2002). The cooperation of the state and the voluntary sector via SAPs could be presented as a good example of integrated social policy. However, the main task for implementing SAPs was assigned to voluntary welfare organisations and small community-based groups in coordination with the MOHW or local governments (MOHW 2002: 76-80). SAPs under the control of the MOHW consisted of three sequential stages that corresponded to the participants' ability and willingness to work. The first stage primarily focused on rehabilitation service programmes designed to encourage participants whose desire to work was very low to regain their motivation to work. All services in the first stage of SAPs were delivered to about 5,000 beneficiaries through existing SWCs and local welfare facilities. The second stage specialised in 'self-help to work', which was designed to improve the basic work skills of participants who were taught how to establish their own small-size profitable enterprises and thereby achieve self-reliance in the near future. The largest number of participants – 83 percent of all participants in SAPs – joined self-help to work programmes that made a profit of 4.7 billion won contributing, indirectly, to their net income earnings (MHSW 2002: 80). Voluntary welfare groups in local communities played a significant role in implementing self-help services at the second stage, but the general guidelines for the delivery of services were determined under the control of concerned local authorities. The third stage attempted to cultivate the so-called 'self-support aid community' programmes, defined as a joint investment enterprise for self-employment and profit-sharing among a group of participants in local communities. As key voluntary institutions at the local level, SACs were responsible for the supervision of this project, which, however, failed to usher many participants – only 2.1 percent of all SAP participants – in this programme.

All in all, it is no exaggeration to argue that the implementation of SAPs could not have been achieved without the voluntary sector's participation. It is vital to note that the indirect income transfers that the SAP projects had produced, particularly through the second and third stages, resulted in transforming social services into public assistance (income support). This functional expansion of the

voluntary sector in SAPs is marked as the integrated welfare mix beyond conventional distinctions between public assistance and social services, and the blurred frontiers further signify the role of the voluntary sector as a service provider, rather than other functions like a provider of directions or financing.

### **Competition-based Welfare Mix**

The underlying roles of the state, in the competitive welfare mix, can be identified as the two characters: first, a 'rule-setter' enforcing the rules of the game under which the organisational patterns of voluntary associations are decisively shaped and controlled by state-designed guidelines; and second, a provider of public financing on the basis of the contract-based competition processes. The voluntary sector, as a 'rule-taker,' needs to customise its voluntarism and organisational principles to the requirements the rule of competitive contracts stipulates for, if it wants to obtain financial benefits from the government. The resulting task for voluntary agencies in the competition-based welfare mix, more often than not, is focused upon the implementation of service provisions. A good example for this welfare mix is the introduction of the 'quasi-market' system based on the contract-based distribution of voluntary services in 1999.<sup>20</sup> Referred as to the Nonprofit and Voluntary Organisations Aid Projects (NVOAP), the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MGAHA) administered the operation of the contract system, distributing public funds to suitable voluntary and nonprofit candidates by using the competitive selection procedures (MGAHA 2003a). According to the *White Paper* of the MGAHA (2002: 192), the official rationale of the NVOAP was to promote grassroots participatory democracy by supporting voluntary activities designed to foster the public good, and to utilise the voluntary sector as an advance party who would provide various services in unexplored areas that the bureaucratic outreach

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<sup>20</sup> 'Quasi-markets' are defined as markets in social services set up by administrations to encourage different providers to compete with each other in the hope that this would motivate them to increase the quality of their services, or at least to cut costs, and that customers would have a greater choice as a result (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Glennerster 1991). They are not full markets, since there are many areas where natural monopolies operate, and where real prices are difficult to set for complex services.

could not cover. In 2002, the MGAHA set up eight broad service clusters to which voluntary organisations could submit applications for public funds, and suggested formal guidelines and requirements for eligibility. The final decision on the number and dimension of funded projects demonstrated that the priority was given to proposals concerning 'social integration' (21 percent of all accepted proposals). Given that the successful proposals from the sphere of social integration mainly concentrated on welfare provisions for the new poor in the post-crisis society (MGAHA 2003a), the share of social service agendas on the NVOAP list amounted to 38 percent in total, due to two additional clusters of voluntary services (8 percent) and disaster relief (9 percent). Therefore, it is fair to assume that the state's main interest in the introduction of the quasi-market system was to facilitate and encourage voluntary participation in specific focal areas, particularly social welfare services on behalf of the government.

The positive justification of the NVOAP notwithstanding, a closer look at the institutionalisation of the quasi-market scheme and its related contract-based welfare mix in the domain of social services, as Ralf Dahrendorf (2001) warns, reveals negative effects on the voluntary sector: voluntary associations linked to the government or its subsidies are subject to all sorts of controls and rules, and represent voluntarism only in name. The growth of contract arrangements formalised a collaborative but divided structure between voluntary organisations responsible for the provision of services and the state's preservation of its control over finances and regulatory roles. Contracts with government agencies mean that voluntary organisations are legally expected to be accountable for service provisions, and this competitive welfare mix is bound to lapse into clientelism and the state's corporatist regulation (Leat 1996; Kim 2001: 132; Söng 2001: 280). Government financing, therefore, prevents voluntary organisations from abiding by the principle of independent fund-raising, which, in turn, fosters state control (Wolch 1990).

The deepening of the clientelistic management of the NVOAP resulted in the increasing propensity for narrowing the gaps between voluntary agencies and government directions in the competition-based processes. The dual fact that the number of voluntary organisations that applied for the NVOAP had been

incrementally decreasing but the number of voluntary organisations accepted by the MGAHA had been on the increase reveals the paradoxical culture of contracting in the quasi-market system: the more contracting, the less participation from the voluntary sector. Another fact that the size of government funding had been constantly tied up to 7.5 billion won during the Kim Dae Jung government but the number of accepted voluntary projects and agencies had been increasing confirms our anticipation that the NVOAP would be no longer seen as an attractive programme to the voluntary sector; in fact, the actual number of voluntary applicants diminished. The pressures from the competitive contracting and the shrinkage of allocated funds due to the increasing number of beneficiaries at the fixed amount marred the secular incentives that would lead the voluntary sector to sacrifice the purity of voluntarism. Over time, many voluntary associations therefore increasingly adopted 'exit' as a way of ensuring their responsiveness to the state's introduction of quasi-markets rather than remained as the sub-contractors of government-funded welfare programmes. Nevertheless, the state derived some benefits from the manipulation of the NVOAP in that it was able to identify who would be pro-governmental voluntary associations and winnow them from the others, and direct them to take the lead in sectoral cooperation for the provision of welfare services.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS: STATE PROVISION VIA VOLUNTARY AGENCIES**

In conclusion, all four types of the welfare mix in table 7 demonstrate that *state provision by voluntary agencies* is the common feature of state-voluntary sector links in Korea, characterising how the state enhances the effectiveness of its governance in mobilising social partners for the purpose of delivering social welfare services. First, it is fair to state that voluntary agencies have been continuously undertaking the role of service provisions, regardless of the fact that the voluntary counterpart to the state and its resultant type of the welfare mix varied according to the shifting



power balance between the two sectors at a given historical condition. Secondly, the state constituted the welfare mix by excluding the task of service delivery from statutory responsibilities and assigning it to the voluntary sector in return for providing the general direction or public financing. It is important to emphasise that public financing would not necessarily entail strong governmental control over the voluntary sector and the welfare mix as a whole. Degree of control can be independent of degree of financing. Even with no public financing, governmental regulation can be logically strong: all four categories of the welfare mix verify the state's active involvement in the section of the general directions of the welfare mix, rather than public financing. The final point we need to consider, therefore, is that the further investigation of the state's institutional devices and ideological social engineering, together with how to mobilise public financing would be at the centre of success or failure in state provision via voluntary agencies.

*Table 7 A Typology of the Korean Welfare Mix*

	General direction	Financing	Delivery
Parallel bars mix	● Voluntary agencies under state guidance	● Foreign voluntary agencies	● Foreign voluntary agencies
State-imposed welfare mix	● State agencies	● Voluntary domination ● State supplementation	● Voluntary sector
Integrated welfare mix	● Mixed planning under state initiatives	● Mixed financing	● Voluntary sector
Competitive welfare mix	● State agencies	● State agencies	● Voluntary sector

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