

34

**Japan's Southern Policy
in the Interwar Period and Hayashi Kyujiro**

Dec. 2006

Goto Ken'ichi

Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies

Waseda University

Introduction

Hayashi Kyujiro (1882-1964) passed the 15th Examination for Diplomatic and Consular Services of 1906, together with Hirota Koki and Yoshida Shigeru, and he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following year. Both Hirota and Yoshida, who graduated from the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University, later became Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. They occupy a very important place in the modern Japanese politics and foreign affairs, although they met conspicuously different ends with one being executed as a class-A war criminal after the Tokyo war crimes trial (December 23, 1948), while the other was given the first state funeral in the postwar period (October 31, 1967).

In contrast, Hayashi Kyujiro, a career diplomat who was one of the very few who graduated from Waseda University, a private institution, spent most of his working life employed by the Foreign Ministry in China. Although he was known as an authority on the Southern Question after leaving the Foreign Ministry, he is almost unknown today. While the other two entrants were star actors in the spotlight of history, Hayashi's life was quite subdued socially, although it was filled with excitement for him personally. Still, when looking back at the relationship between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region in the first half of the 20th century in order both to re-examine the history of Japanese foreign policy concerning neighboring Asia and to look at the future, I think it is suggestive to review Hayashi's career (see the brief biography).

The present paper examines the path of Hayashi's involvement with Asia against the backdrop of Japan's foreign relations with Asia in the interwar period. It uses as guides *Manshu Jihen to Hoten Soryoji* (The Manchurian Incident and the Consul General at Fengtian)¹, which could be called Hayashi's posthumous work, his papers, his records of inspection visits, and other writings, published in journals such as *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), *Nanyo* (South seas), *Unabara* (Ocean), and *Shin Jawa* (New Java).

¹ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Manshu Jihen to Hoten Soryoji* (Manchurian Incident and the Consul General at Fengtian), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978. This book has a detailed "commentary" by BABA Akira.

Brief biography of Hayashi Kyujiro²

1882 (Meiji 15)/10	Born in Mibu-machi, Shimotsuga-gun, Tochigi Prefecture
1903/7	Graduated from the English-Political Science Department, Waseda University
1906/10	Passed Foreign Service Exam
1907/1	Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs, placed in the bureau of political affairs
1907/2	Sent to Jilin in China (Assistant to Consul)
1908/11	Sent to Seattle in the U.S.
1910/6	Sent to Jilin in China, to become Consul in July
1914/5	Married Kono Sadako
1914/10	Sent to Tianjin
1915/7	Became the first-term Consul in Jinan
1917/10	Began to hold an additional position as an officer at the civil division of the defense forces in Qingdao
1918/3	Sent to London in the U.K. (as second secretary to become the first secretary in June 1919)
1919/12	Became Consul General in Fuzhou (to hold an additional position as an officer at the Government General of Taiwan in November 1920)
1923/3	Became Consul General in Hankou
1925/9	Became an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam (Thailand)
1928/3	Became Consul General in Fengtian
1932/1	Became an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Brazil
1936/3	Relieved of his position at his own request
1938/1	Lost his wife, due to illness (at 44)
1938/4	Became chairperson of the board of directors of Nanyo Kyokai (the South Seas Society)
1942/2	Employed as a civilian employee by the Army (belonged to the 16 th Army headquarters)
1942/3	Became civil governor (adviser to the Java military administration), to be dealt with as an officer appointed by the Emperor from May

² Ibid., *Chishoinden teiyomeishin taishi*, 1939 (Hayashi edited it in memory of his wife's death), and Diplomatic History Dictionary Editing Committee, Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Shinpan Nihon Gaiko Jiten* (Japanese Diplomatic History Dictionary New Edition), 1992, etc.

1945/9	Relieved of his position at his own request
1964/7	Died (at 81)

I. Hayashi Kyujiro and China

Hayashi Kyujiro was born in Mibu-machi, Shimotsuga-gun, Tochigi Prefecture, in 1882 (Meiji 15), the same year that Waseda University (called Tokyo Senmon Gakko at the time) was established by Marquis Okuma Shigenobu. He graduated from the English-Political Science Department of Waseda University in 1903. In 1906, the year after the end of the Russo-Japanese war, he passed the Foreign Service Exam. He ranked ninth among the 11 successful candidates of the year, with Hirota Koki coming top and Yoshida Shigeru seventh. The approximately forty years of Hayashi's public life, from his appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the loss of the Greater East Asia War³, can be roughly divided into three periods. The first period lasts until his resignation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1936 (Hirota was appointed Prime Minister the very same month). In the second period, he was chairperson of the board of directors of Nanyo Kyokai (the South Seas Society), which was established in 1915 with government backing to promote a peaceful economic advance toward Southeast Asia. This lasted from March 1938 through to the spring of 1942, following the outbreak of the Pacific War. The third period is the three and a half years he spent as adviser to the Java military administration.

From the viewpoint of the regions that he was involved in, his life could be divided into two periods, with the first being the thirty years of active service for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a China specialist and the second, the ten years he was mainly involved in Nanyo (Southeast Asia). There are two distinctive features about his service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, his service was overwhelmingly in China, with the exception of a two-and-a-half-year period in Siam (Thailand) as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (from September 1925 to March 1928), the period in Brazil as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (from January 1932 to February 1936), and one

³ The GHQ banned the use of the term Greater East Asia War and ordered it to be called the Pacific War (December 15, 1945).

approximately eighteen-month period each in Seattle and London as a young officer. Second, Hayashi did not have any experience of working at headquarters, except for one month at the political affairs bureau just after entering the Ministry.

1. Hayashi Kyujiro's view of Japan's diplomatic history

1906, the year Hayashi Kyujiro embarked on his diplomatic career, was a critical year for the advance of the Japanese army into the Asian continent (the Northern Advance). Japan had just won the Russo-Japanese war and had obtained various interests in Korea and "Manchuria" (the North-East region of China) through the Treaty of Portsmouth.

Hayashi's public service in China, as consul in Jilin, Jinan, Fuzhou, and Hankou, and as Consul General (the first rank of the higher civil service) in Fengtian, can be described as years of conflict with the Army, which, using Manchuria for a base, was speeding up its Northern Advance. Because of this, Hayashi summed up his consistent diplomatic philosophy in the expression "centralization of diplomacy." This is an orthodox view in which diplomacy is conducted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the central player, and in Hayashi it can be clearly seen in his paper, "Gaiko Fushin Genin no Kento" (Examination of the Reason for the Poor Performance of Diplomacy), which he wrote just after leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1936.

In this paper, Hayashi commented on the increasing criticism of Japan's diplomacy at the time; voices were often heard asking questions such as, "Is Kasumigaseki (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) a mere division of Miyakezaka (the Army)?" He wrote, "I am afraid that we might end up committing the same mistake as a quack doctor who gives medicine without finding the cause of a disease unless we first examine from when and how [Japan's diplomacy] has arrived at such a state and then embark on efforts to eliminate the root cause of the problem."⁴ In an attempt to do just this, Hayashi tried to analyze Japan's diplomatic history since the Meiji era.

⁴ "Gaikō Fushin Genin no Kento," *Gaiko Jiho*, No. 772, 1937, p. 35.

Hayashi divides this history into three periods. The first dates from the beginning of the Meiji era through to the Russo-Japanese War. The second follows, lasting until the beginning of the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The third is the period from that incident to the time of his writing in 1937 (the Sino-Japan War broke out in July of the same year).

The first period is seen as a time when the unequal treaties with the Great Powers of the West were revised and there were negotiations with Russia and China (Qing) over Korea. This is a period when Japan's diplomacy was founded on national unity and Hayashi maintains that there were no problems or criticism about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' right as the competent authority to engage in diplomacy. In other words, he understands this period as one when the principle of "centralization of diplomacy" was functioning smoothly.

In the second period, there is "a change in the situation" and Japan moves away from such an ideal system of diplomacy. This came about because, as Japan succeeded Russia in Southern Manchuria, the Kwantung Government (originally the Kanto General Government), the Kwantung Army, the South Manchuria Railways Co., a semi-public entity in Manchuria, and Japan's diplomatic office, the Consulate General, were all wrestling one other for power. This had many harmful consequences, one of which was the new problem of double diplomacy and the quadrumvirate, which Hayashi repeatedly referred to. This paper was written immediately before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Hayashi might have regarded the situation as linked to that of the Manchurian Incident which he had experienced in his days as Consul General in Fengtian. As a free person who had now left government service, he could refer to the Army explicitly and say, "Some of these offices abroad have started to make their own policies and take actions that contradict those of the diplomatic organ. This has led to various discrepancies which have occurred again and again in our policies toward Manchuria and China over a long period."⁵

Hayashi describes the characteristics of the third period as "so-called emergency diplomacy." While criticizing the military, he also blames the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his former employer, for allowing such arbitrary behavior. Criticizing a lack of "statesmanship" on the part of the government which was being dragged along by the military, he wrote, "Even

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

the person in charge called out for such an outrageous diplomatic principle as ‘scorched-earth diplomacy’ [a term used by Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya].” “In our foreign policy after the Manchurian incident, it is unfortunate that in reverse proportion to the increase in aggression by the military people involved in the incident, the actions of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have diminished and the independent presence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been on the wane. This has led some experts to ask, ‘Is Kasumigaseki (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) a mere division of Miyakezaka (the Army)?’”⁶

Hayashi went on to claim that the ideal of the imperial edict, which was issued in March 1933 at the time of Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, was to promote “increased friendship with friendly nations,” and he admonished the army for advocating an actively expansionist policy. In his words, “there are no examples in history of any states surviving for long if they become unreasonably belligerent and start to threaten the weak.” He did not hide his irritation at a situation where many ordinary people were “dazzled by the voice of an advancing Japan,” which was the mood of the public after the Manchurian incident, but they “were not being given information about how their nation was being viewed in foreign countries.”⁷

Hayashi was now living in his own country for the first time in 30 years. After critically reviewing the arbitrariness of the military, the weak attitudes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the lack of an international consciousness on the part of the general public, he stressed anew at the end of his paper that it was most urgent to firmly carry out a complete reform of Japan’s diplomacy through “a thorough elimination of the harmful effects of double diplomacy.”

2. Centralization of diplomacy and the “Manchurian issue”

Hayashi took pride in saying that “The China issue is my life’s work,”⁸ and the main reason he came to his understanding of Japan’s diplomacy was, of course, the conflicts he had

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁸ Hayashi Kyujiro, *op.cit*, p. 2.

experienced with the Army during his placement in China, particularly during his time as Consul General at Fengtian (present Shenyang), the focal point of Manchuria. Hayashi did not have any doubts about the rightness of Japan in maintaining its interests in the north-east of China. He declared that “the development of Imperial Japan in Manchuria is crucial for the survival of Japan.”⁹ He also maintained that “As imperial interests in Manchuria consist of the sacrifice of more than 100,000 of our countrymen lives and military expenses totaling more than 2 billion [yen], together with investment of more than one billion, absolutely no government can step back from the present position.”¹⁰

However, Hayashi felt uncomfortable with the way the military would do anything it deemed necessary to achieve its objectives. Typical in this respect was the murder of Chang Tso-lin, the politico-military leader in Manchuria, as a result of a plot by the Kwantung Army. This took place just after Hayashi’s arrival in Fengtian. Hayashi often expressed his feelings about this in public. His strong insistence on “the principle of not allowing the military to interfere with diplomacy and of not having the military negotiate with Chinese officials without the permission of the Consul General in Fengtian”¹¹ is only one example. Nevertheless, the movement to expand Japan’s interests in Manchuria intensified at the beginning of the 1930’s. This was spearheaded by high-ranking officers of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, such as Ishihara Kanji, who had the understanding and support of people like Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, who was chief of the second department of the General Staff Office. Furthermore, amidst the economic distress of the world depression, “the trend to find a way forward on the Manchurian issue”¹² intensified in the minds of the public, and this atmosphere worked in favor of the military.

In Manchuria, meanwhile, the anti-Japanese movement was getting stronger and demanding a return of their interests. This movement was led by Chang Hsueh-liang, whose feelings against Japan were worsening because of the murder of his father, Chang Tso-lin. In the early summer of 1931, Hayashi observed, “a clash between Japan and China is inevitable.”

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

He “suspected that some kind of action was being planned” by the military.¹³ In fact, in their “judgment of the situation” for FY 1931, adopted around the same time, the General Staff Office reached their determination that “since Manchuria has to be dealt with, it is necessary to be ready to take resolute action if the government does not go along with the opinion of the military.”¹⁴

Shortly after that, on September 18, the “clash between Japan and China” that Hayashi was worried about occurred in the form of the Manchurian Incident. This exercise of Japan’s military power drew the attention of the world. The decision of the cabinet to confirm the policy of not expanding on the incident was conveyed to the commander of the Kwantung Army by the Army Minister the next day. With this, the government made the optimistic assessment that “the incident would not get any bigger.”¹⁵ Hayashi, knowing full well the true intentions of the Kwantung Army, viewed this attitude as a sign that the government did not fully understand the “graveness of the situation.” In fact, on September 30, the General Staff Office developed a “policy on the solution of the Manchurian Incident “ and decided to set up an independent government in order to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from mainland China where Japan to establish itself both politically and economically through internal instruction.

The tense situation right after the Manchurian Incident can be seen in an official and ardent message from Hayashi, who was on the spot, to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro: “The present situation . . . has come to have the utmost importance for Japan and is worsening day by day . . . Although this office is trying its best to prevent a worsening of the situation, the situation has unfortunately reached such a state that with the limited ability of this officer, nothing can be done and there is no choice but to stand by and watch. This officer earnestly hopes that the government, at headquarters, will admonish the military and have their behavior swiftly return to the right track.”¹⁶

In November 1931, two months after the Manchurian incident, Hayashi Kyujiro

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-104.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

returned to Japan temporarily in order to report on the situation to those in authority. During his three and a half years as Consul General in Fengtian, Hayashi returned to Tokyo for short trips six times. This shows not only how important the “Manchurian Issue” was at the time but also the importance of his role as Consul General in Fengtian. On November 20, Hayashi reported to Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro directly. Hayashi was severe on the subject of Wakatsuki, who was far from resolute toward the military. Hayashi said that Wakatsuki’s character was “too poor for a prime minister who has to deal with an emergency unprecedented in the history of Japan.”¹⁷

On the 18th of the same month, Hayashi had met with Army Minister Minami Jiro and strongly proposed the unification of the various official institutions in Manchuria. The minister then made a proposal based on this idea at a cabinet meeting the next day and gained the cabinet’s consent. Hayashi wished to be actively involved as a committee member in such a body, if it was ever established. However, the idea was aborted because of strong opposition from the military in Manchuria. Because Hayashi considered this idea to be the first step towards a “centralization of diplomacy” and was even placing his life on the line in a way, his sense of failure ran quite deep as can be seen in the following remark: “Although I was hoping that I could work hard to turn the military’s actions in the past three months into more politico-economic power for Japan without any loss to the country, I decided to go to a far land in South America and leave Manchuria temporarily while containing my resentment with reluctance.”¹⁸ During his short return to Japan in July of the same year, Hayashi was asked by Foreign Minister Shidehara about his promotion to ambassador (to Brazil), but because of his feeling that he “would venture his life for the Manchurian issue” he replied, “I appreciate the warm recommendation for the ambassadorship, but I would like to stay in Fengtian if my wish was to be granted. However, if my proposal is not accepted, there will be no other choice but to leave Fengtian,”¹⁹ thus leaving the final decision in the hands of the Foreign Minister. Hayashi had great expectations of Foreign Minister Shidehara, who was his senior in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by ten years and is said to have established the “orthodox

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

diplomacy of Kasumigaseki.” Therefore, he was extremely disappointed when Shidehara did not respond positively to his appeal for the need to abolish the quadrumvirate and to centralize diplomacy. Hayashi wrote that Shidehara had “a haggard and very mournful look that made it easy to see how troubled he was without his uttering a word.”²⁰

This period as Consul General in Fengtian proved to be the last occasion on which Hayashi Kyujiro was to be involved in the “Manchurian issue” and China in an official way. However, there is no doubt that China remained the most important foreign country for Hayashi, who took pride in saying that “the China issue is a life’s work for me.” Many of the commentaries written by Hayashi in 1937 regarding Southeast Asia after leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in particular after 1938, when he became chairperson of the board of directors of the South Seas Society, refer to the situation of the overseas Chinese as it related to the conflict between Japan and China. This shows where his true interest lay.²¹

Hayashi was worried about the expansion of the “conflict between Japan and China.” For him, Japan had made a miscalculation regarding the formation by the nationalists and the communists (KMT-communist cooperation) of the anti-Japanese united front, which had come about after Chang Hsueh-liang had plotted the Sian Incident (December 1936). Hayashi had decided to negotiate with Chang Hsueh-liang on the railway issue after the death of Chang Tso-lin. Hayashi then made the following observation on Hsueh-liang: “Although Hsueh-liang, a man of keen intelligence with an incisive and clever mind, always had a smile on his face, I could not trust him. I could not help but think that he wanted to avenge the death of his father, Tso-lin, and that he was cautiously making plans to gradually exercise his vengeance, although he hid this intention in everything he said.”²²

In the paper titled “Nisshi Jihen Shukyoku no Mokuhyo” (Goal of Ending the Sino-Japanese Incident) published immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Hayashi expressed his understanding that the incident was “not a fundamental struggle between the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²¹ For example, “Toashinchitsujo no kensetsu to nanpo no yakuwari” (Building the new order in East Asia and a role of South seas), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 25, No. 2, 1939.

²² Hayashi Kyujiro, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

people of the two nations of Japan and China who had the same language and were of the same race, it was simply a slap that loving parents give their children to admonish them when they have committed some act of delinquency.” He emphasized that the two nations “have the responsibility, which could be called their destiny, to be reconciled and to work together and so become leaders of the colored race of more than one billion people who are oppressed by the whites and make them wake up and improve, and thus to contribute to the true peace of humanity as a whole.”²³ Hayashi, who sharply criticized the despotism of the military who had interfered with the centralization of diplomacy at the time of the Manchurian Incident, stressed an “Asianistic” theory of co-operation between Japan and China in the case of the Sino-Japanese Incident and presented for consideration a framework for a struggle between the Great Powers of the West and the colored race.

This kind of statement coming from Hayashi, who had left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was now outside the government, might sound a bit surprising. There is a good chance that it arose in part from his first vivid experience of feeling in a foreign country, Brazil, where Japanese people were regarded as a colored race, together with having to face the policy of controlling Japanese immigration during his placement there. However, from another point of view, this type of argument was popular with the public at the time and it might be that Hayashi really wanted to make the following points.

First, when he says “the anti-Japanese movement and the pro-communist groups have come into contact with each other after the Sian Incident,” he adopts the attitude that the precondition for any “cooperation between Japan and China” was the KMT government’s exclusion of the communists which was then to be followed by the dissolution of the anti-Japanese movement. A second point comes with the observation that Japanese technology and capital would change the reality in China, where, though endowed with natural resources, most people were suffering from poverty due to slow development. He demanded that there should be a complete opening of the economic door to Japan. Thirdly — and this is related to the second point and might imply criticism of the military — Hayashi criticized as myopic the

²³ “Nisshi Jihen Shukyoku no Mokuhyo” (Goal of Ending the Sino-Japanese Incident), *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), No. 788, October 1937, p. 288.

“attempt (to use the Incident as an opportunity) to establish autonomous regimes in China’s five northern provinces.” To use Hayashi’s own words, it would be more advantageous for both Japan and China to “secure the stability of East Asia as a whole” “to make the whole of China open up to us and to utilize and develop the resources of the whole country, while minimizing our burden, instead of limiting ourselves to the small area of the northern region.”²⁴

After making these proposals, Hayashi ended his paper again from the “Asianism” point of view: “If we were to consider it useful for East Asia to make China fall apart and to reduce it to its old state of rival chiefs struggling with each other, it would be a cowardly mistake and we would only be regarding somebody else’s misfortune as our own happiness. It is absolutely not to the eternal benefit of East Asia to weaken our neighbor China, which has the same language and is of the same race as ours, in light of the fact that our country tends to be discriminated against as a country of a colored race by people in the West.”²⁵

II. Involvement with the “Southern Question”

It was quite rare before the war for diplomats who graduated from a private university to advance to the position of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Hanihara Masanao, who graduated from the English-Political Science Department of the Tokyo Senmon Gakko (Waseda University) in 1897, passing the Foreign Service Exam in 1898, and who resigned his post as Ambassador to the U.S. during the dispute concerning the 1924 anti-Japanese immigration act of the U.S., was the most successful example. In January, 1932, Hayashi Kyujiro was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Brazil, which had a close relationship with Japan because it was a destination for Japanese emigrants. He arrived in Brazil at the beginning of June still worried about the situation at his previous placement, Manchuria.

I would like to make it my task in the future to study about Hayashi’s time in Brazil.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

His situation was similar to that of Hanihara's; he ended up leaving in February 1935, amidst deterioration in the relationship between the two countries concerning the anti-Japanese immigration law of May 1934. It is interesting to note that the two diplomats who graduated from Waseda ended up leaving their last posts due to immigration issues in the two major countries of the North and South Americas, although this was purely coincidental. This shows, though that the immigration issue was a very important diplomatically for Japan before the war. Table 1 vividly shows the Japanese immigration situation in Brazil which in a way drove Hayashi into a corner and would be a key to any analysis of Hayashi's days in Brazil.

Table 1. Immigrants to Brazil by country 1884-1963

Years	Portuguese	Italians	Spaniards	Japanese	Germans	Russians	Others	Total
1884-93	170,621	510,533	103,116		22,778	40,589	36,031	883,663
1894-1903	157,542	537,784	93,770		6,698	2,886	63,430	862,110
1904-13	384,672	196,521	224,672	11,868	33,859	48,100	106,925	1,006,617
1914-23	201,252	86,320	94,779	20,398	29,339	8,196	63,697	503,981
1924-33	233,649	70,177	52,405	110,191	61,728	7,953	201,120	737,223
1934-43	75,634	11,432	5,184	46,158	17,862	275	40,693	197,238
1944-53	146,647	61,692	46,141	2,340	15,440	1,801	74,382	348,443
1954-63	181,095	53,362	75,036	51,889	9,382	91	88,430	459,285
Total	1,551,112	1,527,821	695,103	242,844	197,086	109,891	674,708	4,998,565

Source: Rollie E. Poppino, *Brazil The Land and People*, NY, London, Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968, p. 193.

1. Period as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam

When Hayashi became chairperson of the board of directors of the South Seas Society after leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he became involved in "Southern Question" in a major way. The South Seas Society was established in 1915 during World War I as an organization to promote Japan's economic push to the south of Japan. It was a joint effort between the government and the private sector. Shibusawa Eiichi and Den Kenjiro were among its sponsors, and the first president was Yoshikawa Akimasa. Because Hayashi had the experience of being an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Siam and had participated in the first South Seas Trade Conference in 1926, he was asked to take the seat of

chairperson of the board of directors of the society. The situation of the overseas Chinese was important for Japan's economic push into the South, so it was necessary to consider issues such as the situation in their mother country, China, and the relationship between Japan and China. Hayashi was presumably chosen then as a China expert.

Before looking at Hayashi's days at the South Seas Society, let us first take review his days as envoy to Siam. When Hayashi was posted to Bangkok between 1925 and 1928, the argument in Japan for the expansion of the country's economic push to the South, which had started with the opportunities presented by World War I, was getting stronger. Against this backdrop, the South Seas Trade Conference mentioned above was held in September 1926, under the joint sponsorship of the government and the private sector after a proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hayashi attended this conference together with other consuls general, representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, and major private companies stationed in the Southern region. This was also the period when, under Rama VII (King Prajadhipok), Siam declared that it "exists as a completely independent country." Siam revised the unequal treaties forced upon it by the Great Powers and succeeded in abolishing extraterritoriality.²⁶

Hayashi arrived in Siam at a time when both sides had a growing desire to build an "equal" relationship. Probably reflecting this situation, Hayashi's views on Siam during his days in Bangkok show that he had a high opinion of the country's potential, and he advocated that Japan carry out a strong economic push into the country.

Hayashi's views can be summarized as follows. First, he truly appreciated the country of his placement saying that Siam "could be called unrivaled in the South Seas both in the political and economic senses."²⁷ He argued against the traditional prejudice of the Japanese, an example of which was the joke to be heard in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "I don't remember doing such a bad thing as to deserve to be sent to Siam." This attitude, he declared, was wrong. Instead, Hayashi praised the Siamese saying that they were "different" from other ethnic groups in the South Seas and possessed "the ability to go independent as a nation."²⁸

²⁶ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Nihonjin no Efutsu wo Motsu Siam to Mexico* (Siam and Mexico with a Japanese Hatchet and Axe), Tokyo: Bunmei Kyokai, 1926, p. 14.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

We should not consider this as “lip service” from an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary or as something coming from the psychology of wanting to consider one’s own post to be “a semi-first class country.” It was an honest view influenced by the excitement of an independent country, Siam, which at the time was hurrying on the road toward modernization.

Second is Hayashi’s proposal for the economic push into Siam. In particular, Hayashi stressed that advances in the agricultural sphere centered on rice growing would be advantageous for the Japanese whose main form of agriculture is growing rice. Siam had permitted foreign ownership of land that year and it had become possible to expand the area of cultivation provided capital and labor was available. Furthermore, since Siam was an independent country, Europeans had not come and gained special rights, and so, Hayashi maintained, the Japanese would have an advantage. Thus, he said, “It can be declared that even if investment is made only in rice growing a return on this would exceed thirty per cent.” He added that if rice polishing was done without having overseas Chinese act as go-betweens, one could expect “further profits,” and he stressed that the push into Siam would not only bring profits to individuals, it would also have a growing importance for the development of the country.²⁹ In other words, Hayashi’s basic idea was to support the international order after World War I and to attempt to bring about economic development in a peaceful way through co-operation and competition with the Great Powers. The fact that the argument for Japanese leadership made in the late 1930’s, which will be examined later, could not be observed in the discussion on the push into the South by Hayashi in the 1920’s might be said to reflect Japan’s foreign policy and the international environment of the time.

2. The Southern economy theory of Hayashi Kyujiro

From time to time, Hayashi, as chairperson of the board of directors of the South Seas Society, published his views on the Southern Question in *Nanyo* (South seas), the organ of the society

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

and in magazines such as *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique). Hayashi criticized the ongoing situation in which the Great Powers with colonies in the South Seas were shifting from free trade to protectionism. He stressed that “one must try to achieve an improvement in culture and happiness for the whole of humanity by developing the still unused treasures of the world through the application of an open door principle, such as through free trade and equal opportunity.” According to Hayashi, if a peaceful economic relationship was established between, on the one hand, the South Seas region, which, while having high productive power, did not have “enough brains and capital to develop and utilize” that power, and, on the other, Japan, who “could send brains and capital to faraway countries,” then the coexistence and co-prosperity of both sides would become possible.³⁰

It was not just Hayashi who proposed this theory of economic complementarity between Japan and Southeast Asia to justify the economic push into the south, the same ideas were common among Japan’s theorists about the South Seas economy in the late 1930’s. At the same time, these theorists had a “view of ignorant peoples” in Southeast Asia which considered them “separate from the center of human civilization and left in an undeveloped or savage state. . .still leading a miserable life.”³¹ This understanding was different from the one Hayashi had shown toward the independent country of Siam ten years earlier, in the late 1920’s.

The ideas of “an open door and equal opportunity” were advocated by the Great Powers of the West to constrain Japan’s monopoly in China since the beginning of the century. Hayashi, however, adopted this logic for Japan and asked why the Great Powers applied these principles only to the relationship between Japan and China. It was Hayashi’s view at the time that “if the Great Powers open up what they have to the have-nots, that would solve unnecessary friction in international affairs and avoid the enormous expense borne by the whole of humanity in situations such as war.”³²

It should be noted that at the end of 1938, when Hayashi wrote this essay, the first

³⁰ Hayashi Kyujiro, “Rijicho Shunin ni Saishite” (On the Occasion of Becoming Chairperson of the Board of Directors), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 24, No. 5, 1938, p. 5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³² “Kanto Gen” (Opening Essay), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 25, No. 1, 1939.

Konoe Cabinet was in power. Just after World War I, in 1918, while the young Hayashi was working in London, Konoe Fumimaro published an essay on foreign relations titled “Eeibei Honi no Heiwa Shugi wo Haisu” (Rejecting the Self-Centered Pacifism of the U.S. and U.K.) which attracted great attention. Konoe denounced the pacifism advocated by the two big powers of the U.S. and U.K. as “don’t-rock-the-boat principles advocated by those who consider the status quo to be useful” and argued that, on the contrary, “it was very obsequious” of any pro-Anglo-American Japanese “to be influenced by the self-centered pacifism of the U.S. and U.K. and consider the League of the Nations to be good news” and this attitude “should be abhorred like a viper.” Further, Konoe criticized the “discriminatory movement against the yellow race” in the U.K. and U.S. and the policies of Great Powers such as the U.K. to close the door of the colonies, and he pointed out that if this was indeed to happen, Japan, with little territory and limited natural resources, would face a crisis for its survival.³³

A common feature can be observed between Konoe’s logic, expressed after World War I, and the papers of Hayashi during the Sino-Japanese war period. Although there is no proof that Hayashi was directly influenced by the Konoe paper, the policies of the Great Powers of the West toward Japan after its withdrawal from the League of Nations and his experience of anti-Japanese immigration law in Brazil probably caused Konoe-like thinking akin to “Asianism” to surface in Hayashi’s thought.

Many theorists on the South Seas economy at the time liked to use the pattern of the “Haves vs. Have-Nots” as well as the economic complementarity theory mentioned above. Such logic looked like a challenge to the existing international order in the eyes of the great colonial powers of the West. For example, during the second round of the Japan-Netherlands Commercial Talks (September 1940 to June 1941), the Japanese representative Yoshizawa Kenkichi presented a memorandum to the Dutch side (January 16, 1941), the central point of which was that “most of the vast territory of the Dutch East Indies is rich in natural resources, scarcely populated, undeveloped, and in need of development. The development of these

³³ Konoe Fumimaro, “Eeibei Honi no Heiwa Shugi wo Haisu” (Rejecting the Self-Centered Pacifism of the U.S. and U.K.), *Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin* (Japan and Japanese), December 1918.

regions would benefit not just the Dutch East Indies but also Japan. . . .³⁴ However, the Dutch East Indies government objected squarely to the Japanese memorandum saying that “these views are based on the imaginary idea that the development of the natural resources of the Dutch East Indies was insufficient and on speculation that the Dutch East Indies and Imperial Japan are in a relation of mutual dependence.”³⁵ The argument of Japan was received not just by the Netherlands but also by other colonialists as something that could underpin Japan’s unilateral incorporation of territories into the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

3. Inspection trip to the South in the mid 1940

The change in the situation in Europe with the start of World War II in September 1939 and the victories of Germany, a de facto ally of Japan, at the beginning of the war had a major influence on the political situation of Southeast Asia, the colonies of Western countries, and on the interest shown in the Southern region by Japan. In short, the Great Powers of the West started to worry seriously about Japan advancing militarily toward the south in order to obtain natural resources. In this international context, Hayashi Kyujiro left by air for a long inspection trip of Southeast Asia from the end of March to mid-July 1940 as chairperson of the board of directors of the South Seas Society. The report titled *Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies* by the Dutch intelligence agency in 1942 considered the South Seas Society to be the “coordinator of Japan’s intelligence activities in the South Seas” and referred to Hayashi’s trip south.³⁶ This reflected Dutch suspicions of Hayashi, who entered the Dutch East Indies a week after the exile of the Queen and the government of the Netherlands to London on May 13, 1940.

Hayashi visited all colonies of four countries, the U.S., France, the U.K. and the

³⁴ Aoki Tokuzo, *Taiheiyo Senso Zenshi Dai 2 kan* (Circumstances leading up to the Pacific War, Vol. 2), Tokyo: Gakujutu Bunken Fukyukai, 1933, p. 684.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 699. See also H. J. van Mook, *The Netherlands Indies and Japan*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1944.

³⁶ The Netherland East Indies Government, *Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies*, London: His Majesty’s Office, 1942, pp. 47-48.

Netherlands including the Philippines, French Indochina, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, as well as Thailand (name changed from Siam in 1939), his post of 14 years earlier. Let us here examine his views, focusing on the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies which he referred to in detail in his two trip reports (published in the November 1940 issue of *Gaiko Jiho* and the August 1940 issue of *Nanyo*).

Hayashi arrived in the Philippines and stayed for 16 days, spending most of his time in the capital, Manila, and in Davao in Mindanao. The strongest impression he had during his stay was of the “pro-Japanese sentiments” shown by high officials of the Philippine Commonwealth, including President Manuel Quezon, who granted an audience to Hayashi, “a person without an official position.” As an example, Hayashi noted the following statement: “I do not have any bad feelings against Japan. Rather, I would like to try and develop the industry of the Philippines learning from Japan.”³⁷ However, about six months after this, on August 19, 1941, in a radio broadcast made while relations between Japan and the U.S. were becoming tense, the president, who Hayashi had considered “pro-Japanese,” said: “We owe loyalty to America, and we are bound to her by bonds of everlasting gratitude. Should the United States enter the war, the Philippines will follow her and fight by her side . . .”³⁸

During Hayashi’s stay in the Philippines, the issue of the control of foreign immigrants was taken up in the Philippine parliament and Hayashi heard about criticism from Japan that considered the bill “anti-Japanese.” However, Hayashi pointed out that the true intent of this bill, presented by the government of the Philippines, was to “stop the entrance of the Chinese” and to “control of the entry of the Jews.” The “Jewish” aspect might sound a bit strange, but Hayashi explained the background as follows. The League of Nations had asked the U.S. government to admit 10,000 of the large number of Jewish refugees who had fled from Europe after the start of the war in Europe into the Philippines, and the U.S. had accepted. However, the Quezon administration wanted to control the numbers, if a flat refusal was impossible. Thus, Hayashi said that “the true motive of wanting to prevent in advance” “the

³⁷ “Nanyu Shokan” (Impressions of the Trip to the South), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 26, No. 8, 1940, pp. 3-4.

³⁸ Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-45 Vol. 1*, Quezon City: R. Garcia, 1965, p. 60.

future Jewish issue” was one of the real reasons for the bill.³⁹

Concerning the “Japanese colony” in Davao, Mindanao, which had been an issue for many years for both Japan and the Philippines, Hayashi made the optimistic observation that the renewal of the land contract had left no serious problems. He wrote that it was “quite a good feeling” to see that more than two thirds of the members of the magnificent golf club were Japanese and that the American community was cowering in Davao, a town where 18,000 Japanese immigrants were living.⁴⁰

What interested Hayashi more than the “Japanese-immigrant issue,” though, was the American side of the debate about the independence of the Philippines. The Tydings-McDaffie Act of December 1935, which had led to the establishment of the Commonwealth Government, bestowed a certain degree of self-governance and stipulated that full independence would be given in ten years’ time. However, as the international situation changed with the expansion of the Sino-Japanese war and the outbreak of World War II, some people in the U.S., as well as some Philippine leaders, called for a re-examination of the independence issue. Hayashi named the former High Commissioner to the Philippines, Paul V. McNutt, who in February 1937 had been appointed Director of Insurance Bureau of the federal government, as the first influential person to propose a re-examination of the issue. According to Hayashi, McNutt, on his way back to the U.S. with a candidacy in the Presidential election in mind, said in Shanghai, “if the U.S. wants to continue to have a voice in the Far East and prevent the closure of the so-called open door in the East, it should not fold the U.S. national flag in the Philippines.”⁴¹ Indeed, once back in the U.S. McNutt stressed whenever he had the chance that the independence of the Philippines would not be good either for the U.S. or the Philippines.

Then, in Boston on September 25, 1940, immediately after the advance of the

³⁹ “Nanyu Shokan” (Impressions of the Trip to the South), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 26, No. 8, 1940, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Nanyo Gensei Gaikan* (Overview of the Present Situation in the South Seas), Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko Kyokai, 1940, p. 8.

⁴¹ “Phillipines Dokuritsu Mondai no Zento” (Future of the Philippines Independence Issue), *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), Vol. 862, November 1940, p. 77. For a detailed study on this subject, see Nakano Satoshi, *Philippines Dokuritsu Mondai Shi* (History of the Philippines Independence Issue), Tokyo: Ryukei Shyosha, 1977.

Japanese military into northern French Indochina and just before the formation of the Tripartite Pact, McNutt “strongly advocated a hard-line policy against Japan and maintained that it was natural for the U.S. to possess the Philippines.”⁴² Hayashi did not hide his displeasure of McNutt’s behavior. Keeping an eye on policies toward the Philippines in political circles in the U.S., Hayashi pointed out that even a person like Tydings, who had been heavily involved in the Philippines independence bill, was fretfully trying to have the Philippines come up with a proposal for a deferral or cancellation of independence.⁴³

What most influenced the attitude of the U.S. toward the issue of Philippine independence was, needless to say, the security issue in the Asia-Pacific region, namely the feelings of caution over Japan’s advance south. In contrast, the argument for the re-examination of the independence issue that was presented by some in the Philippine parliament was based mostly on economic factors, although there were some political issues, too. In particular, the Philippine side was very worried that U.S. tax rates on Philippine agricultural products, most importantly on sugar, would be set higher after independence. Hayashi understood this dilemma and said, “Although it goes without saying that most people in the Philippines do not want a deferral or cancellation of independence, it would not be easy for them to withstand the threat posed both directly and indirectly by an economic policy which in effect would sever their supply lines.”⁴⁴ He predicted that there would be “a limited independence for a certain period” or “a conditional independence for a limited duration.”⁴⁵

Hayashi attached great importance to economic factors in the Philippine attitude toward independence, and fundamentally he thought that the Japanese attitude toward the Philippines should be friendly. According to Hayashi, as some political leaders of the Philippines thought that dependence on the U.S. would be better than to be invaded by Japan, if Japan took an attitude that would make them feel threatened, they would use it maliciously.

⁴² *Ibid.*, (Hayashi paper).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴⁵ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Nanyo Gensei Gaikan* (Overview of the Present Situation in the South Seas), Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko Kyokai, 1940, p. 27.

In Hayashi's words, "There is a possibility that a little live charcoal will lead to a big fire."⁴⁶ To sum up, the view that the friendly relationship between Japan and the Philippines was a "friendship" under the sword of Damocles was central to Hayashi's understanding about the Philippines. Therefore, Hayashi explained that language like the "anti-Japanese bill" already mentioned would antagonize public opinion in the Philippines and end up worsening attitudes toward the Japanese, and he warned against such a mood in Japan.

As has already been said, it was May 20, right after Nazi Germany occupied the Netherlands, that Hayashi arrived at the last point of his trip, the Dutch East Indies, after going through French Indochina and other countries in the region. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro, who had earlier issued a statement that he had "grave interest in the change in the situation in the Dutch East Indies" issued a second statement on April 15 calling for a "preservation of the status quo in the Dutch East Indies." According to Arita's memoirs, the purpose of these statements was partly to check the strengthening dependence of the Dutch East Indies on the U.K. and U.S. but it was more to warn against the argument among some in the military for a military advance into the Dutch East Indies as well as to move against any German interest in the country.⁴⁷ Hayashi observed that although the leaders of the Dutch East Indies government seemed on the surface to feel relieved by Arita's statements, which declared both for domestic and foreign ears that Japan had no territorial ambitions in the Dutch East Indies, and they even started to show an "attitude of complete friendship," other Dutch officials and people could not drop their suspicions of Japan and dealt with it as a "semi-enemy."⁴⁸ What Hayashi stressed upon his arrival home after his tense stay of three days in Sumatra and one month in Java can be summarized under two points: first, there was the anxiety of Japanese nationals in the Dutch East Indies and the question of relieving that anxiety; and, second, there was the rising interest of Germany and the U.S. in the Dutch East Indies in the context of the international situation of the time.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁷ Two memoirs by Arita Hachiro: *Hitono Meno Chiri wo Miru* (Seeing dust in others' eyes), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1948; *Bakahachi to Hito wa Iu* (They call me "Crazy Hachi"), Tokyo: Kowado, 1959.

⁴⁸ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Nanyo Gensei Gaikan* (Overview of the Present Situation of the South Seas), Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko Kyokai, 1940, p. 61.

After Germany occupied the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies authorities interned Germans as nationals of an enemy country. Many of the internees had held leadership positions in sectors such as agriculture, technology, and medicine. Seeing this, Japanese nationals told Hayashi that they wanted to return home. They feared that in spite of Arita's statements, if the Japanese military participated in the war as a member of the Axis powers, they would also have their assets seized and would be detained. Hayashi told them that as the Japanese government had promised a "preservation of the status quo" not just once but twice they should not worry but should work hard. He said: "The Japanese government has never planned on sacrificing Japanese residents abroad . . . I am convinced that the government will not forget to protect your lives under any circumstances."⁴⁹

There remains some doubt as to whether statements like this were able to set the minds of the Japanese residents at rest. Five years before, the Japanese representative, Nagaoka Shun'ichi, who participated in the first round of Japan-Netherlands Commercial Talks in an atmosphere of worsening economic relations between the two countries, told Japanese business people in the Dutch East Indies, "[the authorities] would not issue outrageous control orders, etc. Please all work hard on your duties and behave cautiously." This was followed immediately afterward by drastic import controls on fifty-six items.⁵⁰

While denying the possibility of a "change in the status quo" through a Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, Hayashi did call attention to the interest in the country shown from both a Japanese ally, Germany, and a potential enemy, the U.S. In particular, Hayashi said that Germany, with 6,000-7,000 residents in the Dutch East Indies, might take advantage of Japan's promise to maintain the status quo in the Dutch East Indies and "snicker to itself saying that keeping the status quo is good. It is my view that we should think hard about this."⁵¹ Hayashi was Foreign Minister Arita's senior by three years in the Ministry of

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁰ Sosa Taneji, "Java Ryoko Dan" (Java trip story), *Yushu*, November 1935, p. 38. For a record by Nagaoka Shunichi, see "Nchiran Kaisho Yori Kaerite" (Returning from the Japan-Netherlands Commercial Talks), *Nanyo Kyokai Zasshi*, Vol. 21, No. 3, March 1935.

⁵¹ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Nanyo Gensei Gaikan* (Overview of the Present Situation in the South Seas), Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko Kyokai, 1940, p. 83.

Foreign Affairs. Both of them were diplomats in a group opposed to the Axis. This statement of Hayashi's is just one example of the anti-German feelings grounded in the Ministry.

About the other country that Hayashi drew attention to while in the Dutch East Indies, the U.S., he pointed out that while its residents in the Dutch East Indies only numbered around 600, one tenth of the German residents, it had invested as much as 320 million dollars (Japan had invested around 80 million dollars), focusing on oil and cultivation companies. Saying that about 40% of the oil of the Dutch East Indies was under the control of U.S. corporations and that Sumatra and British Malaya accounted for more than 90% of the world's production of natural rubber of one million tons with the U.S. consuming about 60%, Hayashi stressed that the South Seas had a life or death importance for the U.S. too. "In other words, it can be said that the defense of the U.S. depends to a certain degree on the South Seas. What would the U.S. do if it saw a danger of these national defense resources being controlled by someone else? We should bear this in mind."⁵²

Thus Hayashi stressed that Japan should be cautious because the world was watching the Dutch East Indies and its relationship to the situation in Europe. Nevertheless, Hayashi thought that the Dutch East Indies was economically very important for Japan, too, but he expected that Japan would be able to obtain the natural resources that it needed through the scheduled Japan-Netherlands Commercial Talks and wrote, "The Dutch East Indies is the best colony in the world. I think that the country who gets it would find it useful to gain supremacy over the world."⁵³

Let us briefly discuss the views Hayashi expressed about places other than the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, which were the first and last point on his trip respectively. Hayashi stayed in French Indochina for about 10 days from the end of April 1940, about a month before France was defeated by Germany. He had the strong impression that the French Indochinese authorities had created a very bad "feeling about Japan" and considered it dangerous. In business also, Hayashi "learned that the Japanese residents were discriminated

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

against more severely than he had imagined.”⁵⁴ This could be seen in “prohibitively high tariffs.” As an example, he mentioned that a Waterman pen made in the U.S. had a tariff of only 30% while a 110% tariff was levied on a Pilot pen, made in Japan, although they were being sold at the same price. As chairperson of the board of directors of the South Seas Society, whose main task was to promote Japan’s economic push south, Hayashi was extremely critical and he expressed himself in an emotional style that was unusual for him, saying, this fact “made me angry. . . I was quite perplexed about the true intentions of the French government. . . Putting the political issues to one aside, concerning the economic issues, it is necessary to call on the French Indochina government to repent and have its attitude corrected.”⁵⁵

In Thailand, the only independent country he visited and a place where he had once spent two years as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Hayashi met Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram from the military. In the meeting, Phibun, who had dealt with Japan “as if it was a potential enemy in his public statements” during his period as Defense Minister, expressed his gratitude to Hayashi saying that under the instruction of Japanese companies it had become possible to refine imported oil and establish a nationwide monopoly, thus the country was “rescued from the tyranny” of Standard Oil and Asia Oil.⁵⁶

At the time, Phibun had a balanced diplomatic approach toward Japan and the Great Powers of the West calmly comparing the power of both sides. Hayashi said that, from his meeting with Phibun, he felt strongly that “Thailand would participate in co-existence and co-prosperity with Japan, and that Japan should co-operate with Thailand as a friendly nation.”⁵⁷

Hayashi understood British Malaya to be the “center of anti-Japanese overseas Chinese” in Southeast Asia and judged that the British colonial government was adopting an

⁵⁴ “Nanyu Shokan” (Impressions of the Trip to the South), *Nanyo*, (South seas), Vol. 26, No. 8, 1940, p. 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

“attitude similar to that of inciting”⁵⁸ the existing anti-Japanese movement among the overseas Chinese. At the same time, Hayashi argued that there had been a change in the British attitude toward Japan and its policy toward overseas Chinese as a result of the outbreak of war with Germany in the fall of the previous year. He was now wary of the fact that conflicts, even violent ones, had begun to occur among the social movement of the overseas Chinese. He pinned the cause of the social movement and of the anti-Japanese movement of the overseas Chinese on the worsening relationship between Japan and China, in particular, on Japan’s heavy-handed policy toward China after the “Twenty-one Demands to the Chinese Government” in January 1915. In other words, he thought that it was the Japanese military that had incited the anti-Japanese nationalism of the overseas Chinese by intensifying its interference with Japan’s policies toward China and ignoring “centralized diplomacy.” Therefore, he argued, in order to solve the problems of the anti-Japanese movement completely, it would be necessary in relation to China to “correct this on our side, make efforts not to repeat our mistakes, establish control of our various organs, show true intent that decrees home and abroad will never be violated, and thus make the prestige of our government clearly understood both at home and abroad.”⁵⁹

III. As adviser to the Java military administration

1. Understanding the situation around the time of the beginning of war

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hayashi Kyujiro, as will be described later, was close to the group including Arita Hachiro and Amou Eiji which, critical of the Axis, had tried to avoid war with the U.S. and the U.K. On the other hand, regarding the start of the war with the U.S. and U.K. on December 8, 1941, Hayashi showed an “Asianistic” view saying that “this war is truly a holy war and a life-or-death battle to free the peoples of East Asia — no, all the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁹ “Nihon no Shorai” (Japan’s Future), *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), No. 841, December 1939, p. 88.

oppressed peoples who account for two thirds of the world's population.”⁶⁰

This view of history concerning the “Greater East Asia War” is an extension of the idea of co-operation between Japan and China that was expressed in the paper Hayashi published just after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, in which he argued, “[the two nations] have the responsibility, which could be called their destiny, to be reconciled and to work together and so become leaders of the colored race of more than one billion people who are oppressed by the whites and make them wake up and improve, and thus to contribute to the true peace of humanity as a whole.”⁶¹ There was a contradiction within Hayashi, in that while he had a loathing for the despotism of the military in China, he could justify the war against the U.S. and U.K. which was initiated by that same military in terms that looked at the international situation of the time from an “Asianistic” point of view.

Let us sort out Hayashi's arguments on this point and cite some examples. Hayashi thought that because “co-existence and co-prosperity is a destined relationship” for Japan and the “South Seas countries” (which, for Hayashi, meant the same as the great colonial powers) it was unforgivable to “engage in loud and irresponsible talk and call thoughtlessly for an advance south. This only hampered friendly relations between Japan and the South Seas countries.”⁶² Hayashi understood Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war to be a turning point for military interference in Japan's diplomacy. Nevertheless, in the midst of the lingering euphoria that followed the victories in the early stage of the war, Hayashi, interpreted the history of Japan since the arrival of Perry, in particular, after the Russo-Japanese war, from the point of view of the white peril. He argued, “Starting with a thorough rejection of immigrants, racially discriminatory treatment, followed by various constraints such as the proposal for a neutral Manchuria, the rejection of the Sino-Japanese treaty, the Washington Conference, the four-country loan, etc., in the last 10 years there is almost nothing that does not aim at outright

⁶⁰ “Kanto Gen” (Opening essay), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 28, No. 1, 1942, p. 1.

⁶¹ “Nisshi Jihen Shukyoku no Mokuhyo” (Goal of Ending the Sino-Japanese Incident), *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), No. 788, October 1937, p. 288.

⁶² “Gakan Nanpo Saku” (My View on the South policy), *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue diplomatique), Vol. 860, January 1940, p. 23.

control of our foreign policy.”⁶³

Based on this understanding of the situation immediately after the start of the war, it seems that Hayashi was giving advice on the formation of administration policies in the occupied territories from the point of view of a specialist on issues in the South. Although I have not seen concrete original sources on this, I would like to make a couple of points concerning Hayashi’s activities around the time of the start of the war.

First, Hayashi was appointed, with Kodama Hideo (former Interior Minister) and Kitajima Kenjiro (former Director of the South Seas Islands Government Office), as an adviser to the military administration of the 16th Army (First Commander: General Imamura Hitoshi) of the Southern Area Army, which had jurisdiction over the occupation government of Java, and he arrived in Java in April 1942. Hayashi, Kodama, and Kitajima were each chosen as experts with experience in diplomacy, domestic administration, and colonial administration, respectively. However, in the administration of the occupied territory which was under military control, the power of the “military administration adviser” was limited. This is clear from a frank recollection by Okazaki Seizaburo, the first head of military administration: “I did not usually consult with Hayashi and when I did it was after I had made my decision.”⁶⁴ Nevertheless, it should be noted that Hayashi in Java played an important role in the process leading to the issuing of the “Koiso statement,” as will be described later.

An interesting point in relation to the position of military administration adviser during the “Greater East Asia War” is that in the memoir he wrote during his days as ambassador to Brazil, Hayashi made the following proposal, based on his bitter experiences in China. It sounds as if he is foretelling his position in ten years’ time: “I always think that whenever we dispatch forces abroad we should have an influential diplomat accompany them. I feel strongly that unless this diplomat has a considerable say as the supreme adviser to the military commander we will end up having deep regrets over diplomatic affairs.”⁶⁵

⁶³ “Kanto Gen” (Opening essay), *Nanyo* (South seas), Vol. 28, No. 1, 1942.

⁶⁴ George S. Kanahale, *The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), p. 283.

⁶⁵ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Manshu Jihen to Hoten Soryoji* (The Manchurian Incident and the Consul General at Fengtian), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978, p. 12.

Second, prior to his arrival in Java, Hayashi was active as a member of the “ten-member group,” which consisted of former members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ten-member group, with former Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro (passing the Foreign Service Exam in 1909) as a central figure, maintained close communication among the members, many of whom had experience as ambassadors (Hotta Masaaki [1910], Horiuchi Kensuke [1911], Matsudaira Tsuneo [1902], Debuchi Katsuji [1902], Yamakawa Tadao, Tanaka Tokichi [1898], Matsuda Michikazu, Amou Eiji [1912], and Hayashi Kyujiro). It functioned like an advisory organ for the Foreign Minister.⁶⁶ Although this group is said to have been started in the mid-1930’s at a convivial meeting for free discussions about current affairs, it kept a “pro-U.S./U.K.” position on the eve of the war, giving advice to Ambassador J. Grew and Ambassador to the U.S., Nomura Kichisaburo, in order to find a way forward for the relationship with the U.S.

After the start of the war, the ten-member group addressed the “Greater Asia Organization issue” from the viewpoint of diplomacy with the USSR and the centralization of diplomacy. Their idea of a new organization that would place importance on the diplomatic initiatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was incompatible with the idea of a Greater Asia Ministry that was advocated by Prime Minister Tojo. According to Hatano Sumio, their view (Hayashi had left for Java in April) “might have had a considerable influence on (Foreign Minister) Togo’s decision to resign [September 1942].”⁶⁷ Incidentally, the Foreign Minister considered a wider recognition of “independent countries” as a precondition for the “centralization of diplomacy.” Hayashi’s proposal in 1944 to “allow the independence of Java” was definitely not unrelated to the fact that he was a member of the “ten-member group.”

2. Concerning the idea of the “independence of Java”

Two months after his arrival as military administration adviser in Java, “the rivet of the fan” of

⁶⁶ Hatano Sumio, *Taiheiyo Senso to Ajia Gaiko* (The Pacific War and Asia Diplomacy), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996, p. 61.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

the occupied area that Japan called the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere, Hayashi gave a talk titled “Java ni Tsuite Kataru” (To Talk about Java) over the Batavia (Jakarta) radio station to various places in the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” including Japan, Manchuria, and China. While the occupation in Java was developing gradually and the situation of the war had not yet deteriorated, Hayashi talked about conditions in Java in optimistic tones. In particular, Hayashi stressed that Java, the “center of the Greater South” was a fertile land where “almost complete self-sufficiency is possible” and the residents there “have a considerable culture” and “have shown a wholehearted intention to cooperate with Imperial Japan.”⁶⁸

Insisting that it was imperative for the Japanese to lead Java and establish a “relationship of co-existence and co-prosperity with the natives” in order to establish the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Hayashi gave a positive evaluation of Japan’s occupation. “While the 50 million natives of the territory of Java, as a conquered people, were suffering from discrimination both politically and socially under the repression of the Dutch, after the advance of the imperial army, they, like plants enjoying the sun that rises from the east, are gladly receiving our political instruction, and friendly contacts between the officers of the imperial army and the natives can be observed all over the island.”⁶⁹

However, as the occupation regime became stricter and the war situation deteriorated in various places, the exploitation in Java, the “treasure house of human and natural resources,” quickly became worse. Although Hayashi had the title of a military administration adviser, he was not given any real power. This is why he was relatively free to meet with nationalist leaders, like Sukarno and Hatta, who offered strategic “co-operation” to the military administration.

Miyoshi Shunkichiro, who was also originally from the Foreign Ministry and was an official Dutch interpreter for the military administration, remembered that nationalist leaders “whenever possible, through people like Adviser Hayashi, made appeals” about their ardent desire for independence. He said that it was Hayashi who set up a meeting with nationalist

⁶⁸ “Java ni Tsuite Kataru (Ge)” (To Talk about Java [last installment]), *Unabara* (Ocean) (The 16th Army Propaganda division), June 9, 1942.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, (first installment), June 7, 1942.

leaders for the Minister for Greater Asia, Aoki Kazuo, when he came to inspect the occupied territory. In this meeting, Mohammad Hatta, representing the group of the nationalists (Sukarno was out of town), said that the independence and liberation that they wanted was the independence of the whole of Indonesia, without any separation of Java and Sumatra, and that if this was not possible to achieve they would choose extinction as a people. Although Hayashi was very well acquainted with such long-cherished desires on the part of the nationalists, he began to take the position of giving “independence” to Java, slicing it off from the rest of the country, as will be explained later.⁷⁰

Through these relationships with leaders like Sukarno and Hatta, Hayashi presumably felt that the Japanese military administration had gradually drifted away from the people and was becoming an object of resentment. One can find testimony to this effect in Hatta’s memoir. The military police had for some time considered Hatta to be a communist and they had targeted him for assassination. However, through the mediation of Miyoshi Shunkichiro, who thought that a meeting would make it clear that he was not a communist, Hatta was made to meet with Murase, the chief of the military police, in mid-1943. In his recollection of this incident, Hatta, touching on Hayashi’s view of the war, said, “Even Hayashi agreed that the Japanese war was in a sense imperialistic.”⁷¹

The frustration of Hayashi Kyujiro, who was originally a government official, grew stronger in 1944, and this became the background for his proposal to approve of independence for Java. When the Java Patriotic Service Association was established in order to react quickly to the policy of all-out war in March 1944 with the head of military administration as its president and the director of general affairs department of the military administration as its vice president, a subordinate organization called the Central Council of Patriotic Service was

⁷⁰ Miyoshi Shunkichiro, “Java Senryo Gunsei Kaikoroku (9)” (The Java Occupation: a Memoir of the Military Administration [9]), *Kokusai Mondai* (International Affairs), March 1966, p. 67.

⁷¹ Mohammad Hatta (translated by OTANI Masahiko), *Hatta Kaikoroku* (Hatta memoir), Tokyo: Mekong, 1993, p. 433. The plan to assassinate Hatta is vividly described in the following memoir by Terada Kiichi, who, was originally from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was an official interpreter together with Miyoshi Shunkichiro: “Indonesia no Omoide” (Memory of Indonesia), Jagatara Tomo no Kai ed., *Yuai Dayori*, No. 193, August 1999.

also established. This council consisted of representatives from regional patriotic service associations. Hayashi became a chairperson and Hatta was vice chairperson for the council. Although the council meeting was held only once and did not play any substantial role, Hayashi now had the forum of an official organization in which to express his views. Three weeks after the establishment of the Java Patriotic Service Association, Hayashi said that there was a shortage of both food and clothes in various local areas. This was causing hardship and leading to social unrest, and he warned that, if left alone, the situation would get worse. In fact, in February, the first major anti-Japanese uprising led by a local Islamic leader, Kiyai Zainal Mustafa, broke out in the rural village of Singaparna in the suburbs of the city of Tasikmalaya in western Java, greatly shocking the military authorities.⁷² In such a situation, Hayashi maintained that Japan had to promise independence for Java to make the population co-operate with the military administration, and that the earlier this was done the better.

This idea was proposed in an essay titled “Java Tochi ni Kansuru Ichi Kosatsu” (A Study on Governing Java) dated March 20, 1944. In the essay, Hayashi argued: (1) Now that the “counter-offensive by the U.K./U.S. is being prepared, it is essential to make the best possible use of the resources of the occupied area of the south in order to carry out our war efforts; (2) For this, it is necessary to ensure security and win the hearts of the people in Indonesia and they should be made to cherish the hope that Indonesians will also be liberated through victory in the current war. In this context, Hayashi proposed that the approval of an independence limited to Java should be promptly declared. However, Hayashi’s view of independence as being premised on Japanese leadership is shown in his argument that since Java did not have the ability to be independent immediately, it is necessary to “establish a fine, independent country in the South Seas under the instruction of Imperial Japan.”⁷³

As is well known, Japan had approved “independence” in Burma and the Philippines,

⁷² For the Singaparna incident, see: Goto Ken’ichi, *Nihon Senryoki Indonesia Kenkyu* (Study of Indonesia during the Japanese Occupation), Tokyo: Ryukei Shyosha, 1989, Chapter 2; Kurasawa Aiko, *Nihon Senryoka no Java Noson no Henyo* (Changes in Java’s Rural Villages under the Japanese Occupation), Tokyo: Soshisha, 1992, Chapter 12.

⁷³ “Java Tochi ni Kansuru Ichi Kosatsu” (A Study on Governing Java), Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo ed., *Indonesia ni Okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyu* (Study on Japan’s military administration in Indonesia), Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959.

albeit only in name, in August and October 1943, respectively, and had invited the representatives of these two “independent countries,” Prime Minister Ba Maw and President Jose P. Laurel to the Greater East Asia conference in Tokyo in November of the same year. For Indonesia, the policy of determining to make it an Imperial territory (May 1943 “Greater East Asia Political Strategies Guideline”) had already been worked out although it had not been announced officially. It was quite remarkable for Hayashi to propose the approval of independence under these circumstances. However, as was mentioned earlier, it is also true that Hayashi’s idea of independence had serious limitations. He underestimated the increase in Indonesian nationalism over more than 30 years in the following ways; (1) independence was not to be for the whole of the former Dutch East Indies, the long-cherished desire of the nationalists. Instead, it was to be limited to the three islands of Java, Madura, and Bali. (2) Although Hayashi called for independence, in his appeal there were connotations of a system like a puppet government in the sense that Hayashi’s proposal was premised on “internal instruction,” for example, the spread of the Japanese language and the instigation of the Japanese spirit in younger people. (3) The proposal also did not approve of the name Indonesia for the new country, again a strong demand of the nationalists. Instead, Hayashi declared that their concept of Indonesia was quite vague.

A pioneering study on the independence issue during the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, mainly from the point of view of the navy (here the Naval Liaison Office in Jakarta headed by progressive Rear Adm. Maeda Tadashi), considered Hayashi’s proposal as the “greatest concession away from arguments for eternal possession” of the islands, but the study concludes that in reality it was only an idea for a Java-centered independence; it severed Java from the other regions, and, in terms of substance, it completely failed to take into account what the nationalists wanted.”⁷⁴ The study considered the various independence ideas presented by the army after 1944 as passive policies about nationalism in response to the pressure of the positive attitude of the Naval Liaison Office.

With the “Java independence idea” in mind, Hayashi made a second short trip home for three months on June 20, 1944 (about the same period as the previous year). This was just

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

before the Tojo cabinet fell apart with the devastating fall of Saipan; after this Army General Koiso Kuniaki was to form a new cabinet. On August 17, oddly enough one year before the declaration of independence of Indonesia, Hayashi was invited to the Southern Area Committee, headed by former Foreign Minister Arita and consisting mainly of people related to the Foreign Ministry. The meeting was held at the official residence of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Matsumoto Shun'ichi. There Hayashi reported on "The Issue of Governing Indonesia." Since the meeting occurred at his old place of work with chiefs of bureaus and sections who were his juniors, it can be imagined that considerable in-depth discussion on the Java military administration took place but there exist no official records of this meeting. According to the "diary" of the former Japanese Minister to the Netherlands, Ishii Itaro, the essence of Hayashi's report was, "Unless independence was granted to Java, too, the people of Java who are co-operating with us at present will be disappointed and their co-operation cannot be expected to continue as the situation becomes tenuous."⁷⁵ It is natural to think that Hayashi's "idea of independence for Java" was basically accepted at the top level of the 16th Army in control of the local area and at the office of the head of Java military administration (the military commander at the time was Lieutenant General Harada Kumakichi) since he was a military administration adviser. The new Prime Minister, Koiso, was concerned about winning the hearts of the people of Java, an island regarded as being the lynchpin of the "Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere," and as the war situation deteriorated further, there would have been no reason to reject Hayashi's idea. So, on September 7, at the 85th Imperial Diet, the Prime Minister publicly issued the promise of "independence for Java in the near future" ("the Koiso Declaration").

Although concrete measures for the independence of Java on the Japanese side went very slowly, with the establishment of the Independence Preparatory Investigation Committee in March 1945, and of the Independence Preparatory Committee on August 7, the concrete procedure for granting independence became an issue, partly because the war was entering its final stages. Normally, as was the case with the approval of "the independence" of Burma and the Philippines, the Emperor would have given an order to the representative of Java in Tokyo.

⁷⁵ Hatano Sumio, *op.cit.*, p. 219.

However, this became impossible due to the worsening situation of the war, so it was decided that Supreme Commander Terauchi Hisaichi, representing Japan, would give the order in Da Lat, in the suburbs of Saigon, where the Southern Expeditionary Army Group was located. Thus, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Nomura and Interpreting Officer Miyoshi of the Java military administration, chairperson Sukarno and Vice-chairperson Hatta of the Independence Preparatory Committee left Jakarta on August 9 and officially received the approval of independence from Terauchi on the 11th.

On the 10th, when Sukarno and Hatta arrived in Saigon, Hayashi, who was waiting in the city because there was no flight home, met their group. Hayashi told Miyoshi, who had returned from Da Lat, that Japan had sent the U.S. a message accepting the Potsdam Declaration on condition that the retention of the national policy (emperor system) was guaranteed and it was now waiting for America's reply. Hayashi advised Miyoshi that it would be honest to tell the truth to Sukarno and his colleagues before they left for Jakarta and that Japan had no alternative but to do this.⁷⁶ On August 12, Lieutenant Colonel Nomura and Miyoshi explained the situation to Sukarno and Hatta and communicated the intention of the Southern Army that "there would be no change in Japan's policy of executing the war." Sukarno and Hatta faced fierce pressure from young leaders demanding a declaration of independence that was unrelated to Japan's military after the Japanese surrender, but they stuck to a position on independence along the lines of the promise made by Japan. Hayashi's advice through Miyoshi resulted in being a guideline for the cautious behavior of the two leaders.

Incidentally, while the main purpose of Hayashi's short return home in the summer of 1944 was to make a proposal on "the Java independence issue" to those in positions of power in Japan, he also paid a great deal of attention to the atmosphere of the population in wartime.

Upon returning to Java in the fall of 1944, Hayashi, who thought that "the present war is truly a holy war" at the outbreak of the "Greater East Asia War," felt, on looking back at the "Imperial edict to start the war" issued three years earlier, "a deep emotion close to a shudder.

⁷⁶ Miyoshi Shunkichiro, "Java Senryo Gunsei Kaikoroku (14)" (The Occupation of Java: a Memoir of the Military Administration [14]), November 1966, p. 66.

I was keenly aware that it would be difficult to win the war unless the empire could attain a state in which one hundred million people with one mind felt a sense of selfless devotion to the nation.”⁷⁷ Hayashi, a Meiji person with the view that the ruler and the ruled could be reduced to one, felt, during his official trip home in 1943, that there was “not enough awareness about the absolute necessity of selfless devotion to the nation by all 100 million people.” In his own words, although there was a change in the tense atmosphere which was loosening due to the “turning point at Guadalcanal,” it would be “impossible to completely prosecute the holy war under conditions” where many people were “looking out for themselves, their positions, assets, and profits.”⁷⁸ In short, Hayashi, in 1943, felt something one might term resentment about western individualism and liberalism.

Behind such a view of Japanese society was a feeling that “even the illiterate Indonesian masses were co-operating with the Greater East Asia War.”⁷⁹ However, during his return home in 1944, when there were signs of the enemy coming to Taiwan and the Philippines following the fall of Saipan, Hayashi felt relieved, sensing that there was, among the people, “a thick atmosphere of the war being fought by the whole nation that could be seen everywhere, at home and on the streets. Signs of this could also be observed in the increased production of weapons and food.”⁸⁰

On the other hand, upon returning to Java just after the announcement of the “Koiso Declaration,” Hayashi, while feeling gratitude for Indonesian co-operation with the war effort, experienced the same kind of frustration he had felt during his return home in 1943 over the lack of any sense of a decisive battle among Japanese officials and private citizens living in Java. He wrote: “I found it quite deplorable to find among fellow countrymen, military government personnel wanting to go home and private people in charge of business operations not being able to get rid of the idea of seeking profits.”⁸¹

As far as this author knows, this essay of the fall of 1944 is the last thing Hayashi

⁷⁷ “Naichi no Yoso” (Situation of the Mainland), *Shin Java* (New Java), Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1944, p. 66.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

wrote before the end of the war. Seeing ever clearer signs of defeat, Hayashi seemed most worried about the decline in traditional views of the nation of Japan and her society. Although he had nothing to do with any fanatic anti-Western ideology, when Hayashi tried to look at the world war in the framework of Europe versus Asia, there was a relation between that ideology and his thoughts about what a person's attitude towards nation and family should be. Hayashi considered the war to be a "war of world reformation with the same significance as the Napoleonic wars"⁸² and expected that its conclusion would bring about a great change for both the allies and their enemies both economically and socially. Although he did not write anything concrete on this point, Hayashi predicted that the liberal economy advocated by Adam Smith and J. S. Mill would eventually die in every country, and in his critique of the situation in Japan at the time, he depicted its future as follows: "It would be a great mistake to think that when the war ends, the age of almighty capital and profit-seeking observed in the 19th century will return. The society that comes after the war will be a wonderful and greatly improved one and an age of smaller complaints and frustration for our 100 million countrymen will come about."⁸³

Conclusion

The present paper has investigated the path of the diplomat Hayashi Kyujiro's involvement in China and the Southeast Asia through an analysis of his writings. The forty years from just after the end of the Russo-Japanese war when Hayashi entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the time when he left his position as Java military administration adviser with the loss of the war was a period when the foreign relations of Japan were defined to an unprecedented extent by the international environment while at the same time Japan greatly influenced that same environment. In such a situation, whether to attach importance to the advance north (the Chinese continent) or to the advance south (Southeast Asia), or to go both ways, was an important issue for Japan's foreign policy. Hayashi was one of the few diplomats who were

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

deeply involved in both the north and the south. Let us summarize the features of his involvement in Asia in the following way.

First, Hayashi's life as a diplomat for close to twenty years in the North Eastern region of China, Manchuria, was a period of friction with the military, in particular the Army, which defined this area as a lifeline, or sphere of interests, for Japan and for itself. The biggest issue for Hayashi comes from this experience in Manchuria in terms of Japan's diplomacy with Asia as a whole. This was how to recover "centralization of diplomacy" under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It should be noted here that throughout his 30 years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he seldom participated in decision making at headquarters. Hayashi was a diplomat like a field commander who was always at the forefront of diplomacy. Therefore "centralization of diplomacy" was not just a slogan but a deeply felt demand. As one example of his attempts to realize "centralization of diplomacy," he co-operated with Arita Hachiro and others to try and avoid war with the U.S. and U.K. on the eve of the outbreak of the "Greater East Asia War" as a member of the "ten-member group" consisting mainly of former officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, during the war, it was impossible to realize "centralization of diplomacy" in a classical sense, although there were efforts by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and others to recover some diplomatic independence with the post-war period in mind.

The second feature is also related to "centralization of diplomacy." In the early 1930's, Hayashi pointed out that in dispatching forces abroad it was imperative to "have an influential diplomat accompany them." Hayashi, who stressed the importance of giving the diplomat "a considerable say as the supreme adviser to the military commander," ended up, by chance, assuming the position of "military administration adviser" in the military administration of Java during the war. However, the occupation government was penetrated to its core by an ideology of military supremacy and Hayashi was never allowed to have "a considerable say" in Java. Nevertheless, it seems that Hayashi thought that, in clearly showing the basic direction of "Java independence" and by gaining a certain amount of support for his ideas at the upper levels of the 16th Army, he could point to a success which he could take pride in as a former diplomat. In particular, because the "ten-member group," which can be called a moderate faction in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, considered the recognition of

“independent countries” in various places of “Greater Asia” as the premise of “centralization of diplomacy,” one can imagine that Hayashi considered the achievement of gaining the promise of “Java’s independence” from the 16th Army to be a small contribution to “centralization of diplomacy.”

Third, “Asianism” became a clearer concept in Hayashi’s diplomatic theory in the late 1930’s. Although he loathed the military’s interference with diplomacy, he viewed the period between the Sino-Japanese war and the beginning of the “Greater East Asia War,” which developed under the leadership of the military, in the framework of the haves vs. the have-nots and of the oppressor peoples vs. the oppressed peoples. He argued that the haves should open their colonies in Southeast Asia to the have-not Japan and apply the principle of equal opportunity. The fact that most of the people who engaged in this logic, including Hayashi, ignored, knowingly or not, that Japan was a member of the “oppressor peoples” is something that needs to be pointed out. In other words, Japan raised the ideal of war for the “liberation of Asia,” when in reality this was an expedient “liberation” for Japan to become one of “the haves” by replacing the Great Powers of the west and to gain for itself an important resource for the waging of war.

The fourth feature, Hayashi’s view of the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), can be seen on the “independence” issue. Hayashi thought of limiting independence to Java, Madura, and Bali. The main reason for this was his view that the concept of Indonesia still did not exist in substance and was nothing but a one-sided belief on the part of the nationalists. Furthermore, the “independent country” that he had in mind was a nation of “natives” armed with the Japanese spirit and the Japanese language under intense guidance from Japan. To simplify, for Hayashi as a military administration adviser, the reason he approved of independence was not because he sympathized with Indonesian nationalism and viewed it in a positive light. His first priority was the national objective of Japan to run its military administration smoothly so that it could carry out the “holy war.” To sum up, when considering the situation at the time, one can discern some progressive thinking in the “Java independence” argument of Hayashi Kyujiro, but it cannot be denied that this was outweighed by the limitations of his argument.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Although not discussed in the present paper, for the activities of Hayashi as chairperson of the Committee for the Study of Traditional Customs and State Forms (established November 1942), see: Goto Ken’ichi and Yamazaki Isao, *Sukarno*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2001, pp. 90-100.