

Aspects of the Islamic Engagement of a Kyrgyz Tribal Chieftain in Russian Central Asia¹

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I. Introduction

Central Eurasia is a vast arid zone that spans the inner region of the Eurasian continent. From ancient times to the early modern period the main actors in its history were nomadic peoples; tribes that had taken the initiative and prevailed over the surrounding sedentary people. However, from the 18th century, the nomads of Central Eurasia were absorbed into empires, such as the Russia Empire.

When we examine the historiography of Central Eurasian nomads, it becomes clear that great emphasis has been placed on the pre-modern period; however, in this article, modern events that occurred in the region will be considered. In regard to the modern history of the nomads who lived under the rule of the Russian Empire, the framework of “oppression and resistance” played a prominent role, as this describes the binomial confrontation between the nomads and the empire. Of course, there is no doubt that in modern Central Eurasia various rebellions occurred, and local nomads were willing participants.

However, the relationship between the Russian empire and nomads was not always antagonistic. In historical research of the Russian Empire, which has flourished since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been argued that Russian rule had a pluralist character. While Russian authorities did attempt to patronise Russian Orthodox Christianity and the Russian language, they also, on the whole, pursued co-existence with local cultures and religions.² However, their motivation for pursuing this strategy is somewhat ambiguous; there does not appear to have been many positive reasons for the Russian Empire to

wholeheartedly adopt a pluralist policy, in fact there were negative reasons for doing so, including the placing of limitations on Russian governing prowess and assimilative power. Central Asia is a particularly conspicuous example of such a phenomenon. While the Russian Empire may have intended to Russify the local populations of Central Asia, it failed to make substantive progress towards this goal.³ This is evidenced by the fact that throughout the period of Russian rule, the subject populations of Central Asia had the legal status of *inorodtsy* (“aliens”). Indeed, a significant gulf lay between Russian settlers and locals in terms of religion, culture, and language.

Against this backdrop of partial and incomplete integration, one must consider the people who operated between the Russian Empire and local communities. The role of “collaborators” during imperial rule has already been the subject of much attention in historical research on Western imperial expansion in Asia and Africa.⁴ Recent findings in relation to the history of the Russian Empire have shed some light on those who played similarly collaborative roles under Russian rule.

These local collaborators can be broadly divided into two groups. The first were the modern educated class, the so-called “intellectuals”, and the second were the traditional local elites. Of the two, the former has been researched most,⁵ although there has been a sudden increase in interest in the latter. It is an unmistakable fact that Russian imperial rule would not have been possible had it not been for the collaboration of such local elites. Research from this standpoint is making great strides; research on the settled areas of Central Asia is making the most progress,⁶ but there have also been interesting findings concerning the

situation among nomads, particularly the Kazakhs.⁷ However, research that attempts to conduct a more positive analysis of local traditional elites, such as the nomads of Central Asia during the period of Russian imperial rule, remains inadequate.

In view of this inadequacy, this article will focus on the chieftains of the Kyrgyz⁸ nomads, who inhabited the highland areas of the Tian Shan Mountains. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the intellectuals among the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks gradually asserted themselves as the leaders of their respective people. By comparison, the appearance of similar Kyrgyz intellectuals occurred much later.⁹ Until the early 20th century, chieftains of the tribes—known as *manaps*¹⁰—continued to maintain a strong presence as the substantive leaders of Kyrgyz society.

In my last articles¹¹, I examined the conditions that enabled *manaps* to thrive under direct Russian rule by investigating the quality of Russian governance. From the beginning of Russia's conquest of Central Asia, Russian colonial military authorities¹² consistently considered *manaps* to be impediments to colonial rule. However, they found themselves unable to undermine their power and so, conversely, *manaps* proved useful in supplementing the weaknesses in Russian rule. However, this does not mean that Russian military authorities were pro-actively recruiting, protecting, or nurturing *manaps* as collaborators. Rather, they were in largely “passively dependent” on *manaps* in that they were more or less obliged to accommodate them. Consequently, the *manaps* were incompletely integrated into the Russian Empire. While evidence has revealed the proximity of *manaps* and Russian military authorities, a closer examination shows a deep gulf between the two groups. For Russian military authorities, *manaps* remained “close, yet far”.

Building on my previous investigation into the policy of the Russian Empire toward the *manaps*, this article aims to examine the activities and attitudes of *manaps* under the Russian rule. In order to achieve the aim of this article, focus will be placed on one particular *manap*, Shabdan Jantay uulu (1840–1912). As can be

seen from his dates of birth and death, Shabdan lived during the military expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia. During his lifetime, Shabdan was famous as a prominent collaborator with the Russian Empire. Indeed, he participated in the empire's military campaigns in Central Asia, including the conquest of the Khanate of Khokand and, as a result, was granted the military title of *Voiskovoi Starshina* (Lieutenant Colonel) in 1883.

Unusually for nomads, who generally leave few written texts, there is a relatively large number of historical materials on Shabdan, many of which are official documents composed by the Russian colonial military authorities. While these materials reflect the policy of the Russian Empire toward Shabdan, they also include rich, significant information that enables us to understand his activities under Russian rule beyond the dichotomy between himself and Russia. Indeed, while he held Russian military status, he also remained aware of the traditional values of Central Eurasian nomads and emphasized his authority as a *baatyr* (hero)¹³ throughout his life.

In addition to his nomadic heritage, we must not forget his connection with Islam. Although recent studies on the social history of Russian Central Asia have shed light on the spread of Islam in the sedentary



Fig.1 Shabdan with his family (in the early 20th century)
(Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kinofotofonodokumentov Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [TsGA KFFD KR], no.0-29766)

region,¹⁴ thus far investigation on the dissemination of Islam among nomads has been insufficient.¹⁵ Of course, there is no doubt that, in comparison with sedentary people, the spread of Islam among nomads was relatively small; however, the Islamic revival that originated with the Tatars of the Volga-Ural region during the latter half of the 19th century reached not only the sedentary peoples of Central Asia, but also the nomads, including the Kyrgyz.

In fact, among the Kyrgyz of Semirech'e, Shabdan functioned as a representative of the new Islamic movement. While he managed to emphasize his authority as a *baatyr* throughout his life, as mentioned above, he was also a devout believer in Islam. According to the ethnographical materials that were collected by S. M. Abramzon in the early 1920s, Shabdan strictly observed Islamic practices. He would rise before dawn in order to take a bath and to perform morning prayers. On one occasion, a strong earthquake occurred while he was attending a prayer service in a mosque. Although all of the other people in the mosque immediately left, Shabdan remained and completed his prayers.¹⁶ These anecdotes show not only that Shabdan as an individual was a devout Muslim, but also that he managed to promote his image as a devout Muslim to the local society.

Consequently, this article will examine Shabdan's engagement with Islam, mainly during the early 20th century. The materials used for this article include not only the official documents of the Russian colonial military authorities, which are currently stored in the national archives of Kazakhstan and Russia, but also books and manuscripts written by Kyrgyz people as well as Shabdan's tombstone and private archive, which was bequeathed to his descendants. To supplement these sources, I also refer to official gazettes, newspapers, and magazines that were published during the period in question.

II. Shabdan as a *Murid*

The Kyrgyz embraced Islam in the 16th century. It is well known that they clearly identified themselves as Muslim because they engaged in a long series of confrontations with non-Muslims, including the Qalmaq.¹⁷ On the other hand, in reality, the form of Islam they adhered to was unique as it was influenced by pre-Islamic characteristics, including local customs and shamanism.¹⁸ In regard to this point, ethnographer Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, a Kazakh scholar who visited the Kyrgyz in the middle of the 19th century, stated the following: "...[the Kyrgyz] identify themselves as Muslim despite the fact that they don't know the doctrine of Islam. Their every ritual preserves the character of Shamanism. [...] Among them there are few who understand the fundamental principles [of Islam] [...] or who summon the faithful five times a day and observe a fast".¹⁹

As can be expected, the unique characteristics of their form of Islam influenced the tribal chieftains or *manaps*. In this regard, Valikhanov also related the following account: When Kazakh chieftains asked Kyrgyz *manaps* the name of the prophet, "after serious thought, they were unable to answer".²⁰ In other words, they did not know the name of Muhammad. During the mid-19th century the activities of *manaps* were influenced by Shamanistic aspects. For instance, according to a folktale, Umid Ali, a *manap-baatyr* of the Sarybagysh tribe, would kill war prisoners in order to drain their blood and offer them as sacrifices.²¹ Indeed, he was called *bakhsbi*, a title that was granted to Shaman priests.²² A similar connection with shamanism can also be found in the case of a *manap-baatyr* named Jantay, who was Shabdan's father. According to an elegy for Jantay, which was recorded by a famous Turkologist, V. Radlov, in 1869: "...when Jantay was alive, [...] without crossing it, he was used to roughen a river (*kechpei suuni tolkutkan*) to scare the enemy...".²³ From this passage, it can be guessed that Jantay was believed to be able to perform *yada*, a shamanistic form of magical weather control.

Although an element of Shamanism remained noticeable among the Kyrgyz, their Islamization proceeded slowly but surely. Sufism played an important role in this process. As previous research has shown, *ishans* (Sufi masters) of the Naqshbandi order, which was based in the sedentary areas of Central Asia, including the Feraghan valley, travelled into the Tian Shan Mountains to recruit *murid* (followers) from among the Kyrgyz.²⁴

In fact, Shabdan remained a *murid* throughout his life, and evidence of this can be found in various materials. For example, in a report sent to the military governor of Semirech'e oblast in 1897, A. Talyzin, a Pishpek uezd commander, wrote: "Shabdan has come to pay more respect to *ishans* and *khojas* and he collects large numbers of cattle from ordinary people in order to make contributions to them".²⁵ According to the ethnographical materials that were collected by S. M. Abramzon during the early 1920s, Shabdan surrounded himself with many *ishans* for a number of years.²⁶ In this regard, a passage from Shabdan's obituary in the local official newspaper of Semirech'e oblast is interesting; it reads: "...around Shabdan there were dozens of poor and they were fed by him".²⁷ In this passage, "dozens of poor" refers to *ishans*, who disguised themselves as poor people, which can be proven by the following passage from Abramzon: "the poor people, who were fed by Shabdan, used to travel into villages of nomads in order

to praise the great undertakings of Muhammad and Shabdan".²⁸

III. From *Baatyr* to *Baatyr Hajji*

In addition to this traditional style of Islam based on Sufism, Shabdan's engagement with Islam began to assume a more visible character. Clear evidence of this is the fact that Shabdan ordered the construction of a mosque at the beginning of the 20th century. [Fig.2]

In this regard, we must refer to a description of Islam among the Kyrgyz that was written by the first uezd commander, G. Zagryazhskii, in the final months of 1860. It reads as follows: "...the Kyrgyz are totally indifferent to mosques. They believe that mosques belong to Sarts [i.e., the sedentary people of Turkestan] and they never find any value in mosques".²⁹ Thus, it is clear that over the half-century period under Russian rule, the Kyrgyz version of Islam had certainly begun to change.

Besides the construction of mosques, we must not



Fig.2 Shabdan's mosque
(TsGA KFFD KR, no.2-5293)




Fig.3 A sample of passport issued for hajj.
(TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.2463, l.338)



Fig.4 An impression of Shabdan's seal (1905)
(TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.8815, l.10)



Fig.5 Shabdan in *ihram* (TsGA KFFD KR, no.0-60978)



Fig.6 Tombstone of Shabdan

forget *hajj*, or pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. It is well known that from the latter half of the 19th century many pilgrims from remote areas of the Islamic world, such as the Muslims of Russian Central Asia, began to make *hajj*, availing themselves of improved transport infrastructure such as steamships and railways. According to the archive documents of the colonial military authority of Semirech'e oblast, between 1902 and 1906 there was an average of 50 passports issued annually in Pishpek uezd for *hajj*.³⁰ Shabdan himself embarked on *hajj* from December 1904 to May 1905.

It is well known that those who returned from *hajj* were respected and given the honorific title *hajji*,³¹ which also applied to Shabdan. In fact, when we examine an impression of his seal attached to a document from 1905, it reads "Shabdan *hajji* Jantay".³² [Fig.4] Another example is a tombstone erected after his death in 1912, in which his genealogy and great deeds are engraved. [Fig.6] It is noteworthy that on this tombstone he is called *baatyr hajji*, in contrast to his descendants, who are called *baatyr*. Thus, it can be supposed that the new title, *baatyr hajji*, was created by adding the new Islamic honorific title, *hajji*, to the existing nomadic one, *baatyr*. Of course, we cannot be certain of the popularity or importance of this new title; however, if we consider the fact that it can be found in other contemporary materials,³³ it seems clear that it was acknowledged in local society to a certain extent.

What did the change in title from *baatyr* to *baatyr hajji* mean for Shabdan? As Russian colonial military authority over the region meant that Shabdan could no longer act as a nomadic hero, the new Islamic element must have appeared a very attractive means of reinforcing his traditional authority as *baatyr*. In relation to this, it is interesting that Shabdan recommended that others embark on *hajj*. Most remarkably, he recommended it not only to his relatives, but also to his bodyguards, who were known as *jigit*.³⁴ In fact, when Shabdan made his *hajj*, he was accompanied by one of his *jigit*, Bayake,³⁵ who had been serving Shabdan since his youth; in other words, his right-hand man. Fig.7 shows one of the privately-owned

documents that have been bequeathed to Shabdan's descendants.³⁶ It appears to be an illustrated plan of Mecca and Medina. Although its origins are unclear, it is supposed that Shabdan brought it on his *hajj*. In the lower part of this plan we can find the names “Bayake *hajji* Kuntughan” and “Shabdan *baatyr hajji* Jantay”. If we take into account that the nomadic hero, *baatyr*, and his bodyguards, *jigit*, formed the core of Kyrgyz nomadic societies' military organizations and represented the traditional values of nomads in Central Eurasia, this illustration appears to be genuine evidence of the circumstances under which they began to adopt Islamic authority.

However, Shabdan was not the only *manap* to make *hajj*. As a colonial military official highlighted in his report to the military governor of Semirech'e in 1910, *hajj* become popular among other *manaps* and it was a convenient way for them to maintain and strengthen their authority as tribal chieftains; specifically, he stated: “...in order to keep their influence among the populace, they began to rely on a remarkable method. These days, the number of people who make *hajj* has increased drastically. Having returned from *hajj*, they call themselves *hajji* and assume a special position”.³⁷ In fact, the *manaps* managed to take advantage of the Kyrgyz adoption of Islamic, including *hajj*. According to the text of a *prigovor* (resolution) that was seized by the Russian colonial military authority in 1911, the *manaps* of the main Kyrgyz tribes appointed individuals to collect contributions from each tribe in order to allow the *manaps* to construct their own residences in Mecca and Medina. As part of this process, a son of Shabdan, Aman Shabdanov, was responsible for collecting donations in the areas belonging to the Sarybagysh and Sayak tribes.³⁸

In parallel with the attempt to seek a new source of authority through *hajj*, it was natural for the *manaps* to attempt to identify themselves in the expanse of the Islamic world, beyond not only Central Asia, but also the Russian Empire. In this regard, an episode from a biography of Shabdan written by another of his sons, Kamal Shabdanov, is interesting. According to



Fig.7 An illustrated plan of Mecca and Medina.

this report, when Shabdan made *hajj* he donated 2000 roubles to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire for the construction of the Hejaz Railway. In return, he was rewarded with a certificate and a gold medal, which he wore on his kaftan.³⁹ While this does not mean that there was a special political relationship between Shabdan and the Ottoman Empire, it can be said that he managed to distinguish himself in the Sunni Islamic world, which was led by the Ottoman Empire at the time.

IV. Shabdan as a Representative of Islam

As seen above, Shabdan used Islam to reinforce his authority as a tribal chieftain. On the other hand, he also attempted to play the role of a representative of Islam in his local society, beyond the traditional level of a tribal leader, which can be clearly seen from his activities after the 1905 Russian Revolution.

As previous studies have highlighted, the 1905 Russian Revolution, which originated in St. Petersburg, also reached Central Asia. For instance, in July 1905 an assembly was held in the city of Semipalatinsk on the Kazakh steppe to debate the policies of the tsarist government, including topics such as religion, Russification, colonization, and education.⁴⁰ Concurrently, in Semirech'e oblast Shabdan attempted to send a petition to the central tsarist government. It is interesting to note that he prefaced the petition with the following statement: "Lieutenant Colonel Shabdan Dzhantaev [sends this petition] as a representative of the Muslim people, including kara-kirgiz [i.e., the Kyrgyz] of the Turkestan region and kirgiz-kaisak [i.e., the Kazakhs] of Semirech'e oblast...".⁴¹ From this passage, it is clear that Shabdan was emphasizing his identity as a Muslim, which was reflected in the contents of the petition. Indeed, in the petition Shabdan requested the establishment of a *Dukhovnoe sobranie* (Muslim spiritual directorate) for the Kyrgyz of the Turkestan region and the Kazakhs of Semirech'e oblast and also requested that various matters be entrusted to the *Dukhovnoe sobranie*, including making judgements on legal disputes concerning marriage, family, and inheritance, the management of clergymen (*mufti*, *qadi*, *imams*), the granting of approval for the construction of mosques, the establishment of educational institutions such as *Maktab* and *Madrasa*, and the appointment and dismissal of teachers.⁴²

Of course, it remains unclear to what extent the contents of the petition reflected the intentions of Shabdan, because it seems possible that it was written under the influence of the Tatar *Jadids*, or Muslim modernist reformers, with whom Shabdan had a

relationship, as will be mentioned later. At any rate, it is certain that Shabdan acknowledged himself as a representative of Islam and that he was regarded as such in his local society. Above all, we can find evidence of Shabdan's Islamic orientation by examining his engagement in education. Indeed, in the petition he required that Islamic education be introduced in gymnasiums for Muslim students. In this way, by requesting the introduction of Islamic education into Russian schools, he managed to help develop Islamic education himself. As mentioned before, he was involved in the Muslim modernist movement, or *Jadidism*. As is commonly known, this movement aimed to introduce a modern style of education. It had originated from the Tatars of the Volga-Ural region, but by the beginning of the 20th century it had begun to extend along the commercial network of Tatars into Central Asia, including the area of inhabited by the Kyrgyz. Regarding the arrival of this movement, 'Uthmān'Alī Sīdīkov wrote as follows: "...from 1901 to 1902 an aged man named Zakir Wahab came to Tokmak from the city of Toroitsk. At that time the number of students [who wanted to learn from the man] so increased that our tribesman, named Chavokov, ordered the children not seek education in Tokmak and began to evict the children from the city. However, thanks to the petition of Shabdan and the efforts of Zakir the children were not punished. From year to year the number of students increased. [...] There were those who went to the city of Ufa to enter the Galie *madrasa*, and there were those who invited teachers from the large cities...".⁴³ From this statement it seems obvious that Shabdan sympathized with the educational movement of Zakir, who appears to have been a Tatar *Jadid*. Indeed, according to the ethnographical materials that were collected by S. M. Abramzon during the early 1920s, Shabdan invited Tatar *imams* to his local area and, furthermore, one of his sons, Khisametdin Shabdanov, established a school that adhered to the *Jadidist* style and invited Tatar teachers from Kazan to teach there.⁴⁴

V. Dilemmas Concerning Shabdan's Engagement with Islam

How did the Russian colonial military authority attempt to address Shabdan's strengthened relationship with Islam? As can be seen above, the Russian colonial military authority was clearly aware of Shabdan's engagement with Islam. Among the Russian colonial military officials, there were those who regarded it as dangerous and wished to prevent its development; one such figure was S. M. Dukhovskoi, who was appointed Governor-General of Turkestan after the Andijan uprising of 1898. Dukhovskoi was famous for fostering a sense of crisis in regard to the threat of "pan-Islamism", which included the Islamization of nomads in the Turkestan region.⁴⁵ Having heard that Shabdan was attempting to construct a mosque, Dukhovskoi gave orders to the military governor of Semirech'e oblast to prevent its construction.⁴⁶

However, while it is certain that there were those who wished to suppress Shabdan's engagement with Islam, these were exceptional cases. On the contrary, the Russian colonial military authority generally regarded the *manaps*, including Shabdan, not as members of the "pan-Islamic" power, which was hostile and dangerous to Russian rule, but rather as breakwaters that could prevent "pan-Islamism" from penetrating into local society. In this regard, a report from 1909 by the chief of the police of Tokmak district is interesting; it reads: "...the influence of local clergymen is totally dependent on the *manaps*. The local *mullabs* are right-hand men of the *manaps* and without their influence they could not occupy their present position. They are messengers of the views of the *manaps* and their personal and social interests. For this reason, the local *mullabs* can never gain political influence over the local population".⁴⁷

The sense of crisis among the Russian colonial military authority in relation to the threat of "pan-Islamism" was closely connected with the ongoing policy of planting Russian peasants in the nomadic areas of Central Asia, especially Semirech'e oblast. In order to enforce this policy, it was required to confiscate land

from local nomads, which, the Russian colonial military authority feared, could lead to an uprising instigated by the "pan-Islamic" movement.⁴⁸

In this regard, it is necessary to review the matter of the special allocation of land to Shabdan. In order to dissuade the nomads from engaging in resistance to the confiscation of their lands, the Russian colonial military authority, including the Governor-General of Turkestan, A. V. Samsonov, managed to placate Shabdan by allocating land to him. On the other hand, the central tsarist government, including the *Glavnoe upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliya* (the Main Directorate for land use and cultivation), disagreed with such special treatment. In order to address this situation, in July 1909 Samsonov sent a letter to A. V. Krivoshein, the director of the Main Directorate for land use and cultivation. In the final section of the letter, Samsonov stated: "...as far as we are short of a police force, Shabdan Dzhantaev is an extremely desirable counterforce to fight against the agitation of the Kazan-Tatars".⁴⁹ Of course, Samsonov must have understood Shabdan's relationship with Islam, including his connection with Tatar *Jadids*. Nevertheless, he did not consider him an enemy that should be defeated. On the contrary, he managed to position Shabdan as an able collaborator in the fight against "pan-Islamism".

In this way, the matter of the special allocation of land to Shabdan can be contextualized not only as a measure to prevent the resistance of nomads, but also as part of the "fight against the pan-Islamism". Concurrently, this matter seems to clearly indicate the dilemma of the Russian colonial military authority. That is to say, the fear of unrest meant that the Russian colonial military authority was obliged to materially support Shabdan.

In this regard, we must highlight that Shabdan's relationship with Islam was encouraged by the Russians themselves. As is well known, the construction of railroads in Central Asia did not so much help to incorporate local people into the central part of the empire as encourage them to make *hajj* and to connect with the Islamic world, Shabdan also used the railroad

when he made *hajj*.

In addition, we must not forget that Shabdan participated in the Russian Empire's military campaign in Central Asia, which included the conquest of the Khanate of Khokand and, as a result, he was granted the military title of *Voiskovoi Starshina* in 1883. In order to develop his Islamic relationship, including constructing mosques and making *hajj*, a great deal of money was required. How Shabdan raised funds for his engagement with Islam remains uncertain, but the annuity that was granted to holders of the title *Voiskovoi Starshina* may have contributed. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that from the late 19th century into the early 20th century Shabdan attempted to acquire as much financial aid from the Russian Empire as possible by emphasizing his past military exploits. In fact, at the end of the 19th century he demanded a raise in his pension.⁵⁰ In addition, in 1903 he demanded that for the *voennyi orden* (a military decoration) he was awarded in 1876, which he received for his participation in the Fergana expedition, the *Glavnyi department gosudarstvennogo kaznacheistva* (the National treasury) pay him the corresponding pension for 26 years.⁵¹

Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the honorific title *baatyr hajji* was a by-product of the Russian Empire's military conquest and rule of Central Asia. Despite this, the question of whether Shabdan's collaboration with the Russian rulers impeded his relationship with Islam remains. Above all, we cannot overlook the fact that Shabdan participated in the Fergana expedition during the 1870s and helped the Russian army conquer the Khanate of Khokand, which means that, directly or indirectly, he was involved in the slaughter of local Muslims under the orders of the

Russian general M. D. Skovelev. Of course, it is unclear how Shabdan himself regarded his participation in the expedition at that time. It is possible that, similar to the contemporary intelligentsias of Turkestan, he justified it using the logic that "even if he is a non-Muslim, he is better than a Muslim tyrant".⁵² It also seems possible that he was driven by the local nomadic sense of justice to protect tribesmen from the Khanate of Khokand.

However, by at least the beginning of the 20th century Shabdan's participation in the slaughter of local Muslims must have cast a dark shadow on his relationship with Islam. Although there appears to be no extant contemporary materials on this matter, in the biography of Shabdan written by Kamal Shabdanov we can find a suggestive passage in regard to Shabdan's consideration of this problem: "...for those who obeyed Russia anew, Shabdan endeavoured to support them as much as possible and never did them harm. When the city of Namangan was captured, [the Russian General Skovelev] ordered the shooting of 35 local Muslims, including *khojas*, *mullabs*, and *aksakals*. When Shabdan *baatyr* appealed to Skovelev, the latter rescinded the order and released them".⁵³ As can be seen from this passage, Shabdan was depicted not as a slaughterer, but as a saviour of Muslims. It is not clear whether such anecdotes were prevalent during his lifetime; however, if we take into account that the biography was written by his own son, it is likely that Shabdan managed to employ this logic to make his participation in the Russian expedition compatible with his relationship with Islam. At any rate, it is certain that Shabdan experienced emotional turmoil in regard to his engagement with Islam.

NOTES

- 1) This article is an English translation, with some revisions, of Chapter 6 of my book *Yūboku Eiyū to Roshia Teikoku: Aru Kuruguzu Shuryō no Kiseki* [Nomadic Hero and the Russian Empire: The Path of a Kyrgyz Leader] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2016).
- 2) Shiokawa Nobuaki, *Minzoku to Neison: Nashonarizumu to iu Nanmon* [Ethnicity and Nation: Hardship Called Nationalism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008), p.58.
- 3) Uyama Tomohiko, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscriptation in Central

- Asia,” in Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Slavic Eurasian Studies, 14) (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), p.59.
- 4) Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” in Roger Owen & Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), pp.117-142.
 - 5) See, for example, Hisao Komatsu, *Kakumei no Chūōajia: Aru Jadido no Shōzō* [Revolutionary Central Asia: A Portrait of Ābdurāuf Fitrāt] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996); Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
 - 6) See, for example, Alexander Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand: 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
 - 7) Virginia Martin, “Kazakh Chinggisids, Land and Political Power in the Nineteenth Century: A Case Study of Syrymbet,” *Central Asian Survey*, vol.29, no.1, 2010, pp.79-102; Gulmira Sultangalieva, “Kazakhskoe Chinovnichestvo Orenburgskogo Vedomstva: Formirovanie i Napravlenie Deiatel’nosti (XIX),” *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, vol.27, 2009, pp.77-101; Zh. Dzhampeisova, *Kazakhskoe Obshchestvo i Pravo v Poreformennoi Stepi* (Astana, 2006).
 - 8) According to their autonyms, they called themselves “Qırghız”; however, in this article I use “Kyrgyz”, in accordance with customary practice. In official documents dated to 1925, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs were generically called *kirgiz*. Occasionally, while Kazakhs were called *kirgiz-kaysak* or *kirgiz-kazak*, Kyrgyz were called *dikii kirgiz* (wild Kirgiz), *kamennyi kirgiz* (mountain Kirgiz), and *dikokamennnyi kirgiz* or *kara-kirgiz* (black Kirgiz).
 - 9) Benjamin H. Loring, *Building Socialism in Kyrgyzstan: Nation-Making, Rural Development, and Social Change, 1921-1932* (Ph.D Thesis, Brandeis University, 2008), pp.20-32.
 - 10) According to Kyrgyz ethnography, this title is said to have originated from the name of a leader of the Sarybagysh tribe during the 17th century. At the beginning of the 19th century, the use of *manap* as the title of a tribal chieftain was common among neighbouring tribes, including the Solto, Bugu, and Sayak. S.M. Abramzon, *Kirgizy i ikh Etnogeneticheskie i Istoriko-kul’turnye Svyazi* (Bishkek, 1990), pp.168-169.
 - 11) Tetsu Akiyama, “Nomads Negotiating the Establishment of Russian Central Asia: Focusing on the Tribal Chieftains of Kyrgyz Nomads,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, vol.71, 2014, pp.141-160; Tetsu Akiyama, “Why Was Russian Direct Rule over Kyrgyz Nomads Dependent on Tribal Chieftains “Manaps”?”, *Cahiers du Monde Russe* vol.56, no.4, 2015, pp.625-649.
 - 12) From its establishment in the middle of the 19th century until 1917, Russian Central Asia, including the Governor Generalship of Turkestan, was under the authority of the Ministry of War. For this reason, the individuals who governed the area were members of the Russian Empire’s military. Taking this into consideration, I use the expression “Russian colonial military authority” to describe these governors.
 - 13) *Baatyr* [*baghatyr* (Mongolian); *bahadur* (Turkish, Persian); *batyr* (Kazakh)] is a historical Turco-Mongol honorific title, originally a term for “hero” or “valiant warrior”. Sir Gerard Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-thirteenth-century Turkish* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.313.
 - 14) See, for example, Arapov D., Larina E., “Sredneaziatskie Musul’mane v 1914 godu (Po Materialam Turkestanskogo Raionnogo Okhrannogo Otdeleniya),” *Rasy i Narody*, vyp.32, 2006, pp. 278-304; Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Hisao Komatsu, “Dār al-Islām under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals”, in Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007), pp.3-21; Allen J. Frank, *Bukhara and the Muslims of Russia: Sufism, Education, and the Paradox of Islamic Prestige* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012).
 - 15) For example, on the Islam in the Kazakh Steppe under Russian rule, see, Remnev A., “Rossiiskaya Imperiya i Islam v Kazakhskoi Stepi (60-80-e gody XIX veka),” *Rasy i Narody*, vyp.32, 2006, pp.238-277; Tomohiko Uyama, “The Changing Religious Orientation of Qazaq Intellectuals in the Tsarist Period: Shari’a, Secularism, and Ethics”, in Niccolò Pianciola and Paolo Sartori, eds., *Islam, Society and States across the Qazaq Steppe (18th – Early 20th Centuries)* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013), pp.95-118.
 - 16) Abramzon S.M., “Manapstvo i Religiya”, *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, no.2, 1932, p.3.
 - 17) Radlov V.V., *Iz Sibirii* (Moskva: 1989), pp.349-350.
 - 18) On this, see, for example, Minoru Sawada, “16-seiki kōhan no Kirugisu zoku to Isurāmu [The Kirghiz and Islam in the latter

- half of the 16th century]”, *Tezukayama Gakuin Tankidaigaku Nenpō*, vol.43, 1995, pp.149-176; David Somfai Kara, “Religious Traditions among the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz”, in Thierry Zarcone and Angela Hobart eds., *Shamanism and Islam: Sufism, Healing Rituals and Spirits in the Muslim World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp.47-57.
- 19) Valikhanov Ch.Ch., “Zapiska o Kirgizakh”, *Sobranie Sochinenii v Pyati Tomakh*, tom 2 (Alma-Ata: 1985), p.72.
- 20) Valikhanov, “Zapiska o Kirgizakh”, pp.72-73.
- 21) Abramzon, “Manapstvo i Religiya”, p.86.
- 22) Valikhanov, “Zapiska o Kirgizakh”, p.73.
- 23) Radlov V.V., *Obraztsy Narodnoi Literaturny Severnykh Tyurkskikh Plemen. Chast' V. Narechie Dikokamennykh Kirgizov* (St. Peterburg: 1885), p.592.
- 24) Hisao Komatsu, “Andijan Hōki to Ishān [The Andijan Uprising and Īshān]”, *Tōyōshi-Kenkyū*, vol.44, no.4, 1986, p.12.
- 25) Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGA RK), f.44 (Semirechenskoe Oblastnoe Plavlenie), op.1, d.695, l.5ob.
- 26) Abramzon, “Manapstvo i Religiya”, p.93.
- 27) Rovnyagin V., “Voiskovoi Starshina Militsii Shabdana Dzhantaeva (Nekrolog)”, *Semirechenskie Oblastnye Vedomosti*, no.96, 1912.
- 28) Abramzon, “Manapstvo i Religiya”, p.93.
- 29) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.29215, l.4.
- 30) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.1710, 2133, 2205, 2463.
- 31) *Sbornik Materialov po Musul'manstvu* (St. Peterburg: 1899), pp.33-34.
- 32) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.8815, l.10.
- 33) See, for example, ‘Uthmān’Alī Sidīkov, *Ta’rikh-i Qirghiz-i Shādmāniya* (Ufā: 1914), p.62; Šābir ‘Abd al-Mannuf, “Tiyānshān tāwīning tiran chūqurlarindan,” *Sbūrā*, no.4, 1913, p.127.
- 34) *Jigit (yigit)* originates from a Turkic word and means “a young man, strong, or vigorous”. Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-thirteenth-century Turkish*, p.911.
- 35) Abramzon, “Manapstvo i Religiya”, p.93.
- 36) I would like to express my gratitude to Janyl Abdyldebek Kyzy, a great-granddaughter of Shabdan for permission to use the privately-owned documents.
- 37) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.10253, l.42ob.
- 38) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.12702, l.5.
- 39) Kamal Shabdanov, “Atabiz Shabdan Baatir Tuuralu Jazilgan Tarikhi”, Rybach’e, 1947 (Rukopisnyi Fond Natsional’noi Akademii Nauk Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, no.1713), ll.23-24.
- 40) Tomohiko Uyama, “20 seiki shotō ni okeru Kazafu Chishikijin no Sekaikan: M. Duratofu ‘Mezameyo Kazafu’ wo chūshin ni [Weltanschauung of the Kazakh Intelligentsia at the Beginning of the 20th Century: An Analysis of Mir-Yaqub Dulatov’s Awake, Kazakh!]”, *Surabu Kenkyū*, vol.44, p.5.
- 41) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.8815, l.5.
- 42) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.8815, l.5ob., 6ob.
- 43) ‘Uthmān’Alī Sidīkov, *Ta’rikh-i Qirghiz-i Shādmāniya*, pp.47-48.
- 44) Abramzon, “Manapstvo i Religiya”, p.92.
- 45) Hisao Komatsu, “Torukisutan ni okeru Isuramu: Sōtoku Duhofusukī no Nikorai 2 sei ate jōsō bun [Islam in Turkistan: Governor-General Dukhovskii’s memorandum to Nikolai II]”, *Tōkai Daigaku Kiyō (Bungakubu)*, vol.50, 1988, pp.30-60.
- 46) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.20752, ll.98-98ob.
- 47) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.10253, l.28ob.
- 48) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.38202, ll.10-10ob.
- 49) Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, f.391 (Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie), op.3, d.925, l.19.
- 50) TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.659, ll.21-21ob.
- 51) Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv, f.400 (Glavnyi Shtab, Aziatskaya Chast’), op.1, d.3275, l.13.
- 52) Komatsu, “Dār al-Islām under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals”, pp.4-9.
- 53) Kamal Shabdanov, “Atabiz Shabdan Baatir Tuuralu Jazilgan Tarikhi”, ll.8-9.