Political Art as *Psychagôgia*
An Interpretation of Political Philosophy in Plato's *Politeia*

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Preface

The Sandman, a short story written by a German writer Ernst T. A. Hoffmann in the beginning of the nineteenth century, has had a great impact on its readers. When the protagonist, Nathanael, was a child, there was a man who visited his father regularly. Every time this man came to his house, his mother told him that there comes the Sandman. One night, his nanny told the story of the Sandman to Nathanael: "He is a wicked man who comes to children when they won't go to bed, and throws a handful of sand into their eyes, so that they start out of bleeding from their heads. He puts their eyes in a bag and carries them to the crescent moon to feed his own children, who sit in the nest up there."[1] Once one has read this story, it is almost impossible to forget it. Just as Nathanael is unconsciously looking for opportunities to recall the Sandman and eyeballs, the readers cannot get rid of the image of the Sandman carrying eyeballs either. The nanny told the story of the Sandman, originally because she had to make him stay in his room and sleep during the visit of his father's friend. However, the story he listened to, especially the image of the Sandman who gathers eyeballs, haunted his entire life and drove him insane.[2]

This story may be an extreme case, but every one of us, I assume, has more or less similar experiences in his or her childhood. For example, parents tell that a bogeyman will come and take children away, if they do not behave themselves. Both of the story of the Sandman and that of a bogeyman are utilized by parents or the elders as a part of education of children, and these kinds of stories function well in most cases. Children start going to bed early at night, and, as a result, parents think that such scary stories are useful as long as children believe them. However, the latter half of *the Sandman* which depicts how Nathanael gets mentally disordered shows another aspect of the power that stories can have. The story which gained a vivid image

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[1] Ernst T. A. Hoffmann, *Der Sandmann*.

[2] Freud analyzes Hoffmann's *The Sandman*, focusing on why Nathanael sees the same image repeatedly from the psychological perspective. See Sigmund Freud, "Das Unheimliche."

through the rich imagination of children sometimes haunts children and it has a life-long effect on them. *The Sandman* hints at such an enormous impact of children's stories on people and makes us wonder: Is it really good that parents or nannies tell scary stories to children for an educational end? What kind of impact would it have on the entire society, if all members would listen to such a scary story? Would not children experience the same thing as Nathanael did?

I found it appropriate to begin this thesis with a small reference to Hoffmann's *The Sandman*, because this story seems to illustrate the fear for education through poetry that Plato expresses in his second most voluminous work, the *Politeia*. It is unquestionable that this is one of the most important works in the field of political thought, but at the same time, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau rightly pointed out in the *Emile, or On Education*, it is also a writing about education.[3] Political science and pedagogy are separately studied nowadays. There are, indeed, some studies on civic education in the field of political thought or political theory, but they mainly concern how citizens, members of a political community, should be educated in order that they can acquire knowledges and skills necessary for the participation in democratic politics.[4] In contrast, Plato's educational system which is discussed in the *Politeia* starts from the recognition of human beings as one species of animals. This education is, as Rousseau calls it, "public education," practiced solely by the polis. There is no room for private education in Plato's pedagogic system. In the *Seventh Letter*, which was probably written by Plato in his later years, he tells that he went to Syracuse because he got chances to "practice (πράττειν)"

[3] "If you wish to know what is meant by public education, read Plato's *Republic*. Those who merely judge books by their titles take this for a treatise on politics, but it is the finest treatise on education ever written." Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Emile or On Education*. p. 8.

[4] Of course, since there are various layers and perspectives in the discussion on so-called civic education or education for citizenship, my formulation here may be oversimplified. However, as Kymlicka argues for example, "citizenship" in the modern world presupposes liberal democratic institutions. (Will Kymlicka, "Education for Citizenship.") In this sense, the condition that the educational system Plato depicts presupposes a different relationship between political science and pedagogy.

politics.[5] He attempted to educate the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius II, and lead him to philosophy. This is what he did in Syracuse and what he thought to be the practice of "the political (*ta politica*)." As his deed shows, the practice of politics for Plato is, first of all, to educate. In addition, this education is not teaching something useful for governing the polis nor for sustaining a biological life, but leading one's soul—that is, *psychagôgia*.

This thesis is an examination of Plato's political philosophy from the perspective of education. The main question of this thesis is how Plato's ideal polis is established and what kind of education is required for its establishment. As the main character of the *Politeia* Socrates tells repeatedly and its structure also shows,[6] it is quite obvious that, in establishing a polis, the cardinal role is given to the education. In other words, educating people in the polis rightly is the main *political* concern of Plato. In this sense, education can be seen as a part of the political art (*politikê technê*) of Plato. The concept of political art is normally understood as a technique of governing a political community, such as a polis or a state. It concerns practice (*prattein* or *ergon*) of politics in most cases. However, the political art of Plato, at least that in the *Politeia*, does not seem to be limited to this meaning. As his practice in Syracuse proves, the practice of politics is almost equivalent to educating people.

In this thesis, I shall address the main question raised above by examining mainly the *Politeia*. This work was written by Plato, when he was around forty to fifty years old. This dialogue has the subtitle "On Justice," which was probably given by later writers. However, in

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[5] Plato tells why he decided to go to Syracuse, although he experienced "the dizziness" after he had seen how politics revolves as follows in the *Seventh Letter*: "Holding this view and in this spirit of adventure it was that I set out from home—not in the spirit which some have supposed, but dreading self-reproach most of all, lest haply I should seem to myself to be utterly and absolutely nothing more than a mere voice (παντάπασι λόγος μόνον ἀτεχνῶς) and never to undertake willingly any action (ἔργου) [&]" (328c). The *Seventh Letter* is sometimes seen as a non-authentic work of Plato, but even if it is not authentic, it seems to be written by someone from the first generation of students in Academeia who knows Plato very well. See: R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Life and Thought*.

[6] The educational program is discussed from the second book to the seventh book with some excursions.

spite of such a subtitle, the theme of this dialogue covers a wide range, from politics to literature. The observation of justice forms, indeed, an undercurrent of this work, but the discussed themes are neither limited to ethical ones nor political ones. It is not a typical ethical or political treatise that one imagines when one hears its title. As Rousseau warns, we should not judge this work only by its title.

The complexity of contents of the *Politeia* is a puzzle that scholars who are engaged in this work necessarily face. This puzzle can also be formulated as follows: What is Plato's political philosophy? Or, where does his political philosophy begin? This question sounds, on one hand, strange, because it is a common recognition that Plato is a political philosopher. On the other hand, however, this question may be provocative, because studying Plato's philosophy from a political perspective contains a peculiar danger. Although there is an enormous amount of studies on Plato's philosophy and those on his *Politeia*, only a few of them among recent studies concentrate on the political aspect of his philosophy. This situation can be seen as a result or a reflection of some studies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that tried to associate his philosophy with totalitarianism.[7] One of the most famous and severest criticizers taking this standpoint is Karl Raimund Popper. It is well-known that he impeaches Plato as the first enemy against "the open society." Popper depicts Plato's ideal polis as a closed society where the tribal hierarchical rule exists, in order to show how incompatible with "the open society" this ideal political community is.[8] A series of studies of the *Politeia* from the political perspective mentioned above and the criticism by Popper and others had—or has had—a great impact on the study of Plato's political philosophy. In response to this trend, there rose another trend in the study of the *Politeia*; this is what Mario Vegetti calls the "de-politicization" of the *Politeia*.[9] According to Vegetti, this trend began already in the late 1960s, and some famous

[7] See 佐々木毅『プラトンと政治』 chapter 1 and 佐々木毅『プラトンの呪　』.

[8] Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume 1: The Spell of Plato*.

[9] Mario Vegetti, "How and why did the *Republic* become unpolitical?"

scholars leading studies of Plato's philosophy in the English-speaking world, such as Julia Annas and Giovanni Ferrari, made a significant contribution to developing this trend.[10] For example, on the ground that "too much stress on the political may lead to misunderstanding of the Republic as a "political manifesto" of an elitist type," Annas tries to avoid locating the *Politeia* in the tradition of political philosophy, to which so-called *political* philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, belong.[11]

Contrary to the trend of "de-politicization," Malcolm Schofield investigates almost exclusively the political aspects that are developed in the *Politeia*. He concentrates on some concepts, such as "democracy," "rule" and "ideology," which are also the main themes in modern political theory, although he admits that "Platonic political philosophy may at this point [that the best form of political community is supported by the Form of the Good, i.e. only one good] look as far removed from the philosophical presuppositions of modern political liberalism as it would be possible to be."[12]

This thesis, however, does not side with either approach. Both of them presuppose "the political" as common recognition that is already given. Annas tries to avoid stressing the political aspects of the *Politiea* too much, but each and every part of the entire dialogue has a connection to "the political" in some way. If, as Burnyeat points out,[13] even the first scene of this dialogue, which seems to be a mere description of Socrates' experience at first glance, hints at the rule of philosopher(s), which part cannot be political? Schofield's approach is not fully rejected in this paper, but if one tries to observe "the political" itself, it is also necessary to pay

[10] The following works of them can be counted as a typical interpretation of this trend: Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's* Republic; Julia Annas. "Politics and Ethics in Plato's *Republic* (Book V 449a-471c)"; Giovanni R. F. Ferrari, *City and Soul in Plato's* Republic. Vegetti names also Norbert Blˆssner and Dorothea Frede as the leading scholars of this trend.
[11] Julia Annas, "Politics and Ethics in Plato's *Republic* (Book V 449a-471c)." p. 108, 118.
[12] Malcolm Schofield, *Plato: Political Philosophy*. pp. 212-218.
[13] Myles F. Burnyeat, "First Words: A Valedictory Lecture 1."

attention to some concepts which contemporary political philosophy or theory tend to ignore in discussing "the political."

In the following examination in this thesis, I refer to Michel Foucault's interpretation of Plato, although he does not comment much on the *Politeia*. In the process of analyzing *parrhêsia*, he emphasizes the difference between governing of others in the polis and governing oneself.[14] What connects of these two forms of "government" is "care of self" or "care" for souls.[15] The care for souls appears as philosophy or governing oneself when it is done within one's soul, but it appears as politics or governing others when its field is politics. The problem in reading Plato's *Politeia* is, therefore, not whether it is political or not; rather, it is how two different dimensions, the political and the individual or psychic dimensions, cross in his thought.

This paper starts by inquiring where Plato's *political* philosophy begins. The aim of this inquiry is, of course, not "de-politicization." It is an attempt to re-politicize the *Politeia*. Chapter I shall show why Socrates introduces the analogy between polis and soul for the sake of finding justice itself. I do not address the question raised above through an examination of the analogy itself, but an examination of the dialogical context which requires on observation of the polis. This examination leads us to the problem of how people in the polis should be educated through *mousikê*, which is a complex concept including music and poetry.

Following the results of Chapter I, Chapter II shall investigate the *conditio humana* and the environment that Plato presupposes for education as well as establishing an ideal polis. This chapter also analyzes many passages from the *Nomoi*, which is regarded as the last work of Plato. Because the themes in which I am engaged are analyzed in more detail and more clearly in the *Nomoi* than in the *Politeia*., the examinations on the *Nomoi* will help us understand the

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[14] Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*. Lecture of 16 February 1983, First hour.

[15] Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*. Lecture of 15 February 1984, First hour.

Politeia. It is often said that the political thought or conception of the polis in the *Nomoi* are different from those in the *Politeia*.[16] While the rule by philosopher(s) is seen as the best and Socrates emphasizes its realizability in the *Politeia*, the best political system—or the best *feasible* political system—in the *Nomoi* is the rule of laws. The continuity or the discontinuity of his political thought which stretches from the middle period dialogues to the later works must be one of the most difficult themes in his political philosophy, but in this thesis, I examine only passages from the *Nomoi* whose contents overlap with the *Politeia* in terms of the understanding of the *conditio humana* and his special attention to music.

The last chapter, Chapter III, shall examine the education through *mousikê*. Based on the understanding of the *conditio humana*, Plato establishes the education through *mousikê*, which includes music and poetry, as the first stage of his educational program. This education is, in contrast to other higher educational programs, such as mathematics and dialectic, open to every child in the polis. It can be, therefore, regarded as fully public and necessary education. The examination of the education through *mousikê*, however, leads us to one difficult problem. It concerns Plato's severe criticism of poetry. At the end of Chapter III, I shall inquire why Plato criticizes poetry in his time so severely, while he deploys it as a means for the ideal education on the ground of its usefulness.

[16] Horn discusses the differences between the *Politeia* and the *Nomoi* in detail. According to him, there are ten differences between them: (i) the position of philosophy, the possibility that all citizens can access virtue and happiness, (iii) the status of citizens, (iv) the importance of laws, (v) the function of political offices, (vi) the educational system, (vii) the role of women, (viii) the thought concerning citizens' properties, (ix) the existence of criminal laws, and (x) the understanding of tyrannies. (Christoph Horn, "Politische Philosophie in Platons Nomoi.")

CHAPTER I.

WHERE PLATO'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEGINS

1. Introduction

Plato is widely regarded as one of the fist thinkers of political philosophy.[17] If one tries to study history of political thought or political philosophy, it is almost impossible to avoid reading Plato's works, especially his *Politeia*. Even if the beginning of political philosophy is found in other contexts, for example in Homer's *Iliad* or Thucydides' *Historiae*, the position of Plato as one of the most important founders of political philosophy is unchallenged. However, if his dialogues are read with an expectation to find out a germination of so-called "political philosophy," one may wonder why Plato is seen not only as a philosopher but also as a *political* thinker, because what is found in his dialogues, such as the *Politeia* and the *Apology of Socrates*, does not fit our images of "the political." Socrates, the main figure of these dialogues,[18] does not develop and show his fixed arguments on, for example, a political system.

There are several reasons why it is difficult to read Plato's works as the starting point of his alledged political philosophy. First of all, he seldom mentions "the political" directly. As we

[17] This understanding is widely accepted not only in English-speaking countries, but also in Japan and Germany. For example: 藤原保信『藤原保信著作集第三巻：西洋政治理論史（上）』); Manfred Brocker (ed.), *Geschichte des politischen Denkens: Ein Handbuch*. Many introductory books begin with the ancient Greek philosophy and its social system. However, Rawls does not include Plato in his lectures on political philosophy. Compare: John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, and John Rawls. *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy.*

[18] When I write "Socrates" without a special note, in this paper it means the main figures of Plato's dialogues.

shall see in this chapter, the discussion developed in the *Politeia*, which is regarded as one of the most political dialogues of Plato, does not begin with a political question. Surely, this dialogue, consisting of ten books, includes arguments concerning political systems, but they do not appear until Book 8. Even though Socrates says that he moves on to the observation of the polis from that of the individual soul, his two perspectives are complexly intertwined. This is not only the case in the *Politeia*. In the *Nomoi*, which is also regarded as a political work of Plato, the mythology, the theology and the cosmology are inextricably intertwined in the discussions on the laws or constitutions. *The Apology of Socrates*, which belongs to the earlier dialogues, does not provide us a political philosophical argument by itself. Rather, what *the Apology* provides us is the difficulty of the relationship between philosophy and politics (cf. 29a). If this difficult relationship is Plato's basic recognition, it would be quite natural that it is not an easy task to grasp his *political* philosophy. In addition, the dialogical form of his works makes it difficult to capture Plato's philosophy in general. The arguments seem to be suspended all the time. Further, since Plato does not appear as a partner of the dialogues,[19] one cannot define which one is Plato's view and which one is not. Normally we understand the statements by the main character, which is played most often by Socrates, as the expressions of Plato's view, but sometimes this understanding is not enough. For example, Callicles, the main interlocutor in the last half of the *Gorgias*, can be seen as a voice of Plato.[20] This is the reason why I pay attention not only to the words of Socrates, but also to those of other interlocutors.

[19] His name is mentioned only twice: in the *Apology* and in the *Phaedo* (59b). But in both of them he does not play a practical role in the dialogue. In the *Phaedo*, Phaedo gives Plato's name in order to explain his absence at the time of Socrates' death. Although Plato does not take part in the discussion, one can interpret that he—or his absence—plays an important role underneath. See Yahei Kanayama, "Socrates' Last Words" (oral presentation).
[20] "One is tempted to believe that Callicles stands for something which Plato had it in him to become (and would perhaps have become, but for Socrates), an unrealized Plato [&]." Eric R. Dodds, *Plato Gorgias*. p. 14.

The interlocutors are there in front of Socrates, not in order to reinforce or affirm his arguments, but in order to inquire the questions together.

The attempt of this chapter is to depict how the political dimension appears in the *Politeia* from the perspective of the relationship of polis to soul. As pointed out above, neither the *Politeia* nor the *Nomoi* discusses political systems or constitutions directly and exclusively. In the *Politeia*, the observations of the political constitution are introduced as a helping medium of the inquiry of justice in the individual soul. Then, the question arises: how and why the problem of considering individual soul is, or should be, treated as the pivotal political question in his philosophy.

2. Polis and Soul

2. 1. Polis as a Large Letter

Before beginning our inquiry into the starting point of Plato's political philosophy, it is not useless to pay attention to the opening scene of the *Politeia*. For, as is often said,[21] the first words of his works are full of allusions and metaphors. Although the task of this chapter is not the observation of the opening scene, we need to begin our inquiry also by taking a look at it. The *Politeia* is not a direct dialogue. While it is a dialogue between Socrates and some interlocutors, mainly with Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimanthus, the entire dialogue is narrated by Socrates. We do not know to whom Socrates reports his experience in the house of Cephalus from "yesterday." Socrates speaks out his report with the following words: "I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, son of Ariston, to pray to the goddess [&]

[21] On the theme of Plato's opening scene, see Myles. F. Burnyeat, "First Words: A Valedictory Lecture 1." After the approach of Proclus, he examines some opening scenes of Plato's dialogues, and finds the connection between the opening scenes and the important theme of each dialogue. As Burnyeat mentions, Leo Strauss and his followers (Straussians) also pay special attention to the opening scenes when they interpret Plato's dialogues. See also Leo Strauss. *The City and Man*. The University of Chicago Press.

(κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ [&])" (327a).[22] There is an ancient anecdote concerning this first sentence.[23] After Plato's death, people found a wax tablet with numerous traces that indicate that he rewrote the first sentence of the *Politeia* many times. This story must be just an "anecdote," but it suggests that the opening scene including the first words seems to allow its readers to interpret the dialogue in an adventurous way.

In the case of the *Politeia*, the very first word "went down (κατέβην)" uttered by Socrates is thought to reflect on "an image of the philosopher rulers going down to the cave to rule."[24] In addition, the place they head to is a port city called Piraeus. It was "the seat of Athenian naval and commercial power" as well as "the place to find all the diversity and disorder that come from foreign lands."[25] Piraeus, as a symbol of Athenian democracy, was a place where diverse cultures and various viewpoints crossed. People lived there with others with various backgrounds. If one takes the approach of Burnyeat—or Proclus—seriously, and I believe it is worth trying, it is reasonable to read this opening scene as a prologue of tragedies. Namely, the opening scene hints at the theme of this entire work and it is about ruling a polis, or more broadly stated, it is about "the political." This expectation is, however, not fulfilled

[22] For the English translation of the *Politeia*, I usually use: Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, second edition. However, I change some words from Bloom's translation in order to make the connection between the translation and the original Greek texts more understandable. In translating, I also refer to: G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.), Tom Griffith (trans.), *Plato: The Republic*. The number and alphabet without title in the parentheses indicates the passage from the *Politeia*. The words in the square brackets are author's addition.

[23] Myles F. Burnyeat, "First words," pp. 5-6.

[24] Myles F. Burnyeat. "First Words." p. 7.

[25] Leo Strauss, *The City and Man*. p. 62; Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, pp. 440-441. Roocknik observes the opening scene in more detail, paying attention to the points that the Piraeus "was the setting of the resistance movement that fought against the Tyranny of the Thirty [&] had overthrown the Athenian democracy, which had been proudly in place for a century," and that "the Piraeus was filled with foreigners." David Roocknick, "The Political Drama of Plato's *Republic*." pp. 156-158.

until Book 2 where the discussion on the polis or the political is first introduced with the well-known analogy between polis and soul.

After Socrates went down to Piraeus in order to pray to the goddess, Polemarchus and his company saw Socrates and Glaucon going back home to the Athens. Socrates and Glaucon were almost forced to stay in Piraeus and finally visited Cephalus, father of Polemarchus, Although their stay in Piraeus was against Socrates' will, he expressed his pleasure to talk with the old men like Cephalus, because he thinks "one ought to learn (χρῆναι πυνθάνεσθαι) from them what kind of path (τινὰ ὁδόν)" on which they have proceeded (328e). The entire endeavor throughout the dialogue is "to learn the path." Since the path on which Cephalus has proceeded cannot be separated from the concept of justice, justice appears as the central theme at the very first phase of the dialogue (330e). The inquiry into the path and that of justice converges in this way. However, as the discussions with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book 1 show, it becomes clear how difficult the inquiry into justice is. In addition, the request by Adeimanthus and Glaucon makes it much more complicated. Then, Socrates introduces the analogy between polis and soul.

> *Politeia* 368c-e
>
> [&], ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ᾽ ὀξὺ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκῶ μοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἶμαι ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. [&] εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν: ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες.

> *Socrates*: It looks to me as though the investigation we are undertaking is no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply. Since we're not clever men, I said, in my opinion we should make this kind of investigation of it: if someone had, for example, ordered men who don't see very sharply to read small letters from afar and then someone had the thought that the same letters somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place, I suppose it would look like a godsend to be able to consider the smaller ones after having recognized these first, if, of course, they do happen to be the same. [&] If you want, first we'll investigate what justice is like in the cities. Then, we'll also go on to consider it in individuals, considering the likeness of the bigger in the idea of the smaller?

"The inquiry (τὸ ζήτημα)" indicates Adeimantus' previous demand of proving not only "by argument (τῷ λόγῳ) that justice is more powerful (κρεῖττον) than injustice," but also "what each in itself does to the man who possesses it" (367e). Adeimanthus and his brother, Glaucon, beg Socrates to prove it, because Thrasymachus, the main interlocutor of Socrates in the first book, insists that injustice is more powerful and more beneficial than justice. If Thrasymachus would be right, a just person will be unhappier than an unjust person because the former is less powerful and enjoys less benefit.

The important point here is that the main and present concern of this passage is the inquiry of justice of a person. Although the analogy between polis and soul can be seen as the starting-point or the emergence of the political dimension of the whole argument in the *Politeia*, it is, as a matter of fact, introduced as an auxiliary or an additional line which helps them to observe justice of the individual more clearly. Socrates explains the easiness of the inquiry of justice in the polis in the passage above, comparing it with bigger letters in a bigger place. In this comparison, the justice in the polis corresponds to the bigger letters (γράμματα μείζω), and the justice in the individual soul to the smaller ones (γράμματα σμικρά). Two steps are required

in order that this analogy functions as an auxiliary tool for understanding the easiness of the observation of justice in the polis. As the first step, let us focus on the size. It is obvious that, for example, recognizing the letter A on a traffic sign is easier than recognizing the same letter in a paperback book, if one has to observe them from a meter distance. Just like in a vision test, the biggest letter or symbol on the top line is easiest to recognize, while the smallest one on the bottom line is hardest to recognize. The analogy, however, does not make it easy to observe justice in the polis, as long as we observe it only from this perspective. The analogy does not seem to embrace only the difference of size between polis and soul. We need to go a step further.

It is noteworthy that Socrates uses the plural form in comparing justice to letter; justice in the individual is analogous to small letter*s* and that in the polis to bigger letter*s*. There can be, at least, two possible explanations why he uses the plural form here. First, the plurality of letters hint that justice is not like a separate and independent symbol or sign, such as A or Ω, but it should be understood as words or a sentence.[26] In other words, letters do not exist randomly but with some meanings. This point is suggested also by the word "ἀναγιγνώσκω (<ἀναγνόντας)" whose precise meaning is "know well," "recognize" or "acknowledge."[27] On the other hand, the plural letters can also imply several conceptions or understandings of justice. In accordance with this view, each individual letter can be understood to represent a definition of justice; for instance, "speaking the truth and giving back what one takes" (331d) is one of various probable definitions of justice. The plural form indicates that there are various definitions of justice that are to be considered in the inquiry into justice. This point seems to hint at their inquiry method using two flints, which will be examined later.

It is difficult to judge only from this passage which connotation the analogy contains. However, both views suggest that the analogy does not imply that justice in the polis and that

[26] Mr. Kanayama mentioned this point in our conversation.
[27] See: Liddel, Scott and Jones, Greek Lexicon. A. Bloom translates this word to "read," but I adopt "recognize" in order to emphasize this aspect of the Greek original word ἀναγιγνώσκω.

in the individual are assumed as one meaningless letter which is something to be discovered or simply read just as a letter or a symbol in a vision test. The analogy implies not only the difference between justice in the polis and that in the individual, but also the commonness between them.

In this way, the inquiry of justice in the individual as recognizing the small letters is postponed. Socrates begins "first (πρῶτον)" the inquiry of justice in the polis, just like someone trying to recognize the larger letters before reading small ones. This is how the inquiry of the justice "in the poleis (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι)" begins. The question addressed here is "how it is designed (ποῖον τί ἐστιν)" (369a); i.e., it is the question of the mode of justice. Note that the plural form of πόλις, "πόλεις (poleis)," is adopted here.[28] The justice that is inquired at the first stage is not the justice that can be applied only to one particular polis. The inquired justice should be something that appears every time in every polis. In other words, he starts inquiring the definition of justice which is universally valid and does not presuppose any condition. This usage may be also understood as a criticism of the definitions of justice suggested by Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in the first book, because the justice defined by them demands some particular conditions; for instance, justice as "giving back what one takes" demands the condition that its original possessor is not mad.

At this moment, Socrates and his interlocutors do not know whether justice in the poleis and that in the individual resemble each other or not. One must prove afterwards that they do not only seem to be similar but also they really resemble (ὁμοιότης) each other. One may ask, therefore, why Socrates is able to bring the comparison between the justice in the poleis and

[28] As the translation of πόλις, I use "polis" and "poleis" for its plural form, because the concept of the ancient Greek community does not seem translatable. Since it does not fit to the definition of the concept of modern national-state, which is given by Max Weber or Hans Gelner, the popular translation, "city-*state*," seems an inappropriate translation. As for the difference between the concept of modern state and polis, see: 長谷川岳男「『ポリテイア』とポリスの現実—ポリスは「国家」か」pp. 70-82. Additionally, the romanized notation "polis" expresses the direct connection of the gathering of people (polis) and politics.

that in the individual soul.[29] For, one cannot find out the small letters without an auxiliary, but in order to utilize the auxiliary, one has to know beforehand that this comparison is valid because of its likeliness or sameness. A reasonable answer to this question is that they have already an supposition of their sameness, because both of them are called by the same name, "justice." This inquiry is not such an attempt in which one has to read the small letters without knowing at all what are written. They foreknow that the small letters in a book at least look like the bigger letters on the traffic sign, even if they are not exactly the same.

It will be helpful now to turn our eyes onto the *Nomoi*, which is probably the last work of Plato.[30] In the first book of the *Nomoi*, where the Athenian Stranger (hereafter: the Athenian) plays the main role instead of Socrates, the metaphor of "divine marionette (θαῦμα θεῖον)" is introduced, firstly in order to explain the meaning of the statement that "those who are able to rule themselves are good (ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δυναμένων ἄρχειν αὐτῶν)" (644b).[31] Just as is in the case of the *Politeia*, the Athenian uses the metaphor at its beginning in order to explain that goodness of the individual. This metaphor is worth a close examination, but in respect to the relationship with the analogy in the *Politeia*, it is enough to know the following point

[29] This point reminds us of the so-called "Meno's paradox" or "the paradox of inquiry." It means, namely, one cannot inquire the thing about which one does not know at all, while one will not inquire the thing about which one has known already (*Meno* 80d). The decisive difference between the inquiry of virtue in the *Meno* and that of justice in the *Politeia* is that in the *Politeia* Socrates and his interlocutors start their inquiry with the assumption that the things which are called by the same name have similarities (cf. *Politeia* 435a). The inquiry in the *Politeia* is not a search for something which is not known at all.

[30] Except for the Minos, which is often not regarded as an authentic dialogue of Plato, the Nomoi (the Laws) is his last work. (Hamilton and Huntington, ed. (1961). *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. introduction.)

[31] I translate θαῦμα into "marionette" but this marionette can move their own strings. "Although *thauma* is commonly translated as 'puppet,' this translation is misleading if it suggests that humans are mere marionettes whose strings are pulled by the gods. For, as the further descriptions show, the 'puppet's' behavior is not determined by the higher powers; it depends, rather, on the workings of its own strings. Hence, Plato seems to have in mind wind-up toys that move by themselves, rather than marionettes." Drothea Frede. "Puppets on strings: Moral psychology in *Laws* Books 1 and 2." p. 116.

concerning this metaphor. Each living being (ζῷον) is likened to a divine marionette (644e). Since it is a marionette, tendons and strings draw and pull it to different and, sometimes, opposing ways. The strings within each one are sorted to two kinds: iron and hard strings and the golden and soft string.[32] The passions (πάθη) that humans and animals possess inside to belong to the former one, and the *logismos* to the latter.[33] It is in this description of the golden strings that the divine marionette metaphor has the connection with the political dimension.

> *Nomoi* 644e-645a
>
> Μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων συνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης, ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας. δεῖν δὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ συλλαμβάνειν: ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πρᾴου δὲ καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα γένη.
>
> *Stranger*: Now the argument asserts that each person should always follow one of the strings, never letting go of it and pulling with it against others; this string is the golden and sacred pull of *logismos*, and is called the common law of the polis; the other strings are hard and iron, while this one is soft, inasmuch as it is golden; the others resemble a multitude of different forms. It is necessary always to assist this most noble pull of

[32] There is a significant dispute concerning the understanding of the relationship between passions and *logismos* in the *Nomoi* and the *Politeia*. For example: Joshua Wilburn, "Moral Education and the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato's *Laws*."

[33] The λογισμός is normally translated to "the calculation." (For example, Pangle and Bury translate it "calculation.") However, in this paper I use the romanized word, *logismos*, because the point of this word is that the *logismos* does not concern exclusively the function of the individual soul; it is rather the nodal point of the individual soul and the polis.

law because *logismos*, while noble, is gentle rather than violent, and its pull is in need of helpers if the race of gold is to be victorious for us over other races.[34]

According to the Athenian, the *logismos* has two aspects. One is the psychological aspect: it is the ability to calculate which of passions—pleasure and pain, expectation and fear—is better or worse (644d). The other is the political aspect: when the *logismos* forms "the common decree (δόγμα κοινόν)," it is called "law (νόμος)" (*ibid.*). In the metaphor, the *logismos* is expressed as "the golden and sacred (χρυσῆ καὶ ἱερά)" string which one should always follow and never let go of. The adjectives, "golden" and "sacred," of this string indicate three important features. First, since it is gold, it is softer than other "hard and iron" strings, i.e. passions. Second, connected to the first point, since it is softer than others, one needs "the helpers (ὑπηρέται)" in order to follow this string for sure. Note that what or who helps the golden sacred string is described with plural, not singular. This point hints that there are several possibilities to help the golden string. The third point concerns the word "sacred." Why it can be described as such is not clearly explained, although this feature is revealed to have an important meaning if one has an overall view on the entire dialogue.[35] For now, however, let's move on to the further examinations. Although the psychological aspect is more emphasized in the passage cited above, one can see the Athenian's assumption that each marionette has a connection with the polis, because the golden string that each one possesses within itself is the common law of the polis, if it is announced by words (λόγος). Also in the marionette metaphor, Plato presupposes that the individual can be compared with the polis, because the "strings," namely what pushes the whole—the entire individual as a marionette or the entire polis—, are the same, whether they lie in the individual or in the polis. Just as the inquiry of the justice in *Politeia* begins in

[34] For the English translation of the *Nomoi*, I use: Thomas L. Pangle. *The Laws of Plato*.
[35] In the tenth book, the Athenian attempts to persuade the atheistic young people that "he who cares (ἐπιμελέομαι) everything has put all things together with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole, and each part suffers and does what befits it, insofar as it can" (903b).

the political dimension, the Athenian attempts to examine what kind of laws, the golden string, is able to make the citizens good (ἀγαθός) and the entire polis sustainable.

2. 2. Method of Inquiry

The previous examination shows that the political aspect and the individual (or psychic) one are inextricably linked in Plato's thought. As the small excursion to the *Nomoi* in the last section presents, the first appearance of the political observation can be found in the comparisons between the individual soul and the polis, which view is also shared by the *Politeia*. The introduction of the political aspect in the *Nomoi* is, compared to that in the *Politeia*, easy to acknowledge. The analogy between polis and soul, or the metaphor, functions as the nodal point where the psychic aspect combines soul with polis or laws, in order to demonstrate that the political does not and cannot exist separately from the individual soul. However, the emphasis of the analogy seems to lie rather on the political aspect, because the Athenian introduces the theme covering the entire dialogue with words, such as "the originator of the establishment of laws (ἡ αἰτία τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως)," and the figures there discuss directly "laws of your poleis (ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑμῖν θέντος τοὺς νόμους)" (624a-b). In the *Politeia*, on the other hand, the original attempt is to explain and define justice in the individual.[36] Here, it would be false to question which of them, the justice in the individual or that in the poleis, is the main concern in the discussion throughout the *Politeia*.[37] What is peculiar to the argument in the *Politeia* is that justice in the individual has the same specific gravity as that in the poleis, *although* Plato gave a quite political title to this dialogue.

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[36] As to this point, see Jonathan Lear, Inside and Outside The *Republic*.

[37] This kind of question can be found in several studies. For example, Sasaki argues that, since the dialogue ends with the story of Er, the problem of justice is finally regarded as the problem of the individual soul. He concludes that "it is obvious that the entire theme of this dialogue is the soul and there is no place for the polis." 佐々木毅『プラトンと政治』p. 235.

In the *Politeia*, the implicit content of the analogy relates to the method of the inquiry into justice. The following passage displays that the question concerning the justice itself cannot be observed only from the individual-ethical dimension without the political-normative dimension, and vice versa.

> *Politeia* 434e-435a
>
> ὃ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἕνα, κἂν μὲν ὁμολογῆται, καλῶς ἕξει: ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐμφαίνηται, πάλιν ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν, καὶ τάχ᾽ ἂν παρ᾽ ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην: καὶ φανερὰν γενομένην βεβαιωσόμεθα αὐτὴν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.
>
> *Socrates*: Let's apply what came to light there to an individual, and if the two are in agreement, everything is fine. But if something different should turn up in the individual, we'll go back again to the polis and test it; perhaps, considering them side by side and rubbing them together like flints, we would make justice burst into flame, and once it's come to light, confirm it for ourselves.

This passage shows what should be done after observing and finding justice in the poleis. Through this statement, Socrates also tries to answer the question of how one can recognize the correspondence of the two concepts, namely justice in the individual and that in the poleis. What he explains in this passage does not perfectly match to what he said in the introduction of the polis-soul analogy. For, there he needs larger letters only for observing the true object which is described as smaller letters, but this passage makes it clear that the true object of their inquiry is neither the smaller letters nor the larger ones, but the letter or letters. The inquiry of justice in the poleis does not serve as a way-stop before moving to justice in the individual, and so

does that in the individual. The inquiry of justice in the poleis and that in the individual are the components of the inquiry into justice itself.[38] Let us now examine the passage above precisely.

According to the method Socrates explains in the passage, after finding justice in the poleis, one shifts one's eyes "to the individual (εἰς τὸν ἕνα)" in order to examine whether these two kinds of justice are "accorded (ὁμολογῆται)." If it appears to be different, one has to "go back again" to the examination of the justice in the poleis. It is noteworthy that Socrates calls this process "test (βασανίζειν)," which indicates that it is not enough at all to "find" the justice in the individual or that in the poleis separately. The word τρίβειν etymologically means "to rub upon the touch-stone,"[39] which corresponds to refer to the metaphor of "rubbing flints." It is obvious that Socrates and his interlocutors need a pair of "flints" in order to acquire the idea of justice as a spark and this pair consists of justice in the individual and that in the poleis.[40] This explanation, however, implies also the requirement of, at least, two interlocutors.[41] "A pair of flints" for the acquisition of "a spark" of justice functions at two levels. The first and inquiry-oriented level indicates the level of their inquiry on justice. At this level a pair of flints means the inquiry of justice in the individual and that in the poleis. The second and contextual level is the level covering the entire dialogue.[42] A pair of flints at this level indicates the interlocutors

[38] The dialectical inquiry is defined in the seventh book as follows: "Only the dialectical way of inquiry (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος) proceeds in this direction, destroying the hypotheses, to the beginning itself (αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν) in order to make it secure" (533c).

[39] This is the first definition of LSJ. In order to make the English translation close to the original meaning, I translate it rubbing "flints," instead of "sticks" (Bloom's translation) or "dry sticks" (Griffith's translation). "Flint" is "a hard grey rock. It was used "to produce an igniting spark" in ancient times (*Oxford English Dictionary*).

[40] The metaphor of light through an examination or a personal dialogue reminds us of the definition of philosophy in Plato's *Seventh Letter*: "Philosophy cannot teach by words (ῥητὸν οὐδαμῶς) like other studies, but, as a result of continued application of the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself" (*Seventh Letter* 341c-d).

[41] Foucault refers to "*basanos*" as test of souls. Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others*, pp. 366-367.

[42] This connotes the method introduced at the end of the ideal educational program which is apt only for the philosophers (the seventh book).

who are to take part in the inquiry in question. The examination of justice, or the examination—elenctic as well as dialectic—in general, is not a linear motion which enables one to discover something, but an interactive motion which enables one to "look at the two sides (παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες)" and "rub (τρίβοντες)" the flints.[43]

It is also noteworthy that Socrates describes the process of his method with the word ποιέω; "we would create the justice (ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην)." The original task in the inquiry was to recognize the letters which are written large and small; they tried to "read" and "recognize" justice. However, their task shifts from recognizing it to creating it. The "spark" can be gained only through rubbing the flints; if one tries to find the spark without flint, namely neither a pair of concepts nor one's interlocutors, one's inquiry will fail. Here we can find Plato's (or Socrates') declaration of his new challenge in his philosophy. What he tries to "create" is something that has never come to being, just as the spark does not emerge before a rub of flints. The unique point here is that the method introduced above requires two conceptions, namely justice in the individual and that in the poleis. Nevertheless, it is still obscure why Socrates brings the examination on the poleis as one piece of the pair of "flints" for the inquiry into justice. In other words, it is still obscure why Socrates needs to examine justice in the poleis in order to answer the question which seems to be a question concerning only the individual soul.

Apparently this kind of question does not arise in the *Nomoi*, solely because the theme the Athenian firstly introduces to the entire discussion is, as we have seen, what the modern readers see also as "the political," namely the laws of "your poleis." Nevertheless, the discourse concerning intoxication, which appears as the main discussion theme in the latter part of the first book, may seem strange, because we, modern readers, as well as the readers in the ancient

[43] This metaphor corresponds to the explanation of the dialectical method in the sixth book: "making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole" (511b).

time, think it is not the matter to which "the political" has to pay attention. The Athenian, who seems to notice that his interlocutors including the readers wonder about the connection between them, explains the connection of "the political" to individual soul as follows: "This then—the knowledge of the natures and the habits of souls (τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν)—is one of the things that is of the greatest use for the art whose business it is to care (θεραπεύειν) for souls. And we assert (I think) that that art belongs to political art (πολιτικῆς)" (650b). In this sentence in the *Nomoi*, the Athenian intelligibly defines that the political art concerns care for souls.

Note that Socrates does not plainly express this view in the *Politeia*. We can assume that the figure Socrates in the Politeia would have the same view as that of the Athenian, namely, that the political art is caring for soul. For, this is often articulated in other dialogues,[44] therefore we can expect that this view on the political art lies as the background of the *Politeia*. However, even if it is presumable based on a contextual reason, we cannot conclude that the political art is defined as caring for soul also in the *Politeia*; we are in want of a decisive evidence. The reason is, assumedly, that in inquiring justice, they are on the quest for the political art at the same time. He cannot easily submit a definition that the political art is caring for souls. Through the inquiry conducted in the *Politeia,* Plato tries to understand the meaning of the statement that Socrates had held long and expressed at his trial. The contrast found between in the *Politeia* and the *Nomoi* prompts us to forget the easy formulation, or a substitution of words, that the political art is caring for soul. As Plato tries, we have to try to consider its meaning, so that we become able to find the political and the political art in Plato's philosophy.

The requirement by Glaucon and Adeimantus to prove that justice itself brings advantages to its possessors originates from the discussion on justice, which is started by

[44] One of the clearest examples is the following passage of the *Gorgias*: "I think I am one of few, not to say the only one, in Athens who attempts the true art of political art (ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ), and the only man of the present time who practice the political (πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ)" (*Gorgias* 521d).

Cephalus and then developed between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the first book. The statement of Thrasymachus is quite simple: "justice is nothing other than what advantages the stronger (τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον)" (338c). Being led by Socrates' examination, Thrasymachus had to reluctantly add many conditions to his original statement which contradict his own thought eventually. In the end of the Book 1, Socrates is almost finishing the discussion with him. Contrary to Socrates' perception, however, the discussions developed in Book 1 are merely a "prelude (προοίμιον)" (357a). Two brothers of Plato, Glaucon and Adeimantus, are not satisfied with the conclusion Socrates gives in the "prelude." They introduce some arguments opposing to Socrates' thought, so that they can extract a further discussion from Socrates. Their arguments consist of two parts in accordance with the narrators.

The first part, which is introduced by Glaucon, is almost a repetition of the statement suggested by Thrasymachus before.[45] According to him, the origin of justice is only "a compromise between what is best—doing injustice without paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself" (359a).[46] People who are not able to do injustice admire justice, only because they do not want to suffer injustice by people who are able to do injustice. As already shown, people do not practice or admire justice willingly, but unwillingly; in fact, they want to practice injustice to others, but they do not have enough strength nor courage to do so. In order to prove people's unwillingness to practice justice, Glaucon introduces an allegory which tells the story of Gyges, who had been just a shepherd but got a ring with magical power accidentally (359d-360b). The ring that Gyges found had a power to make its owner invisible. Gyges took advantage of its power, killed the

[45] G. R. F. Ferrari adds several comments on the characters of Glaucon (Ferrari. *City and Soul*. pp. 13-14, 21-23), namely the aspects of "man who loves to win (φιλόνικος)," "man who seeks glory (φιλότιμον)" and "the manly man(ἀνδρειότατος)." Although I admit some points Ferrari suggests, I do not believe that these aspects of the description of his character challenge my theses.

[46] I adopted the translation "compromise" by Griffith, instead of "mean," the translation by Bloom.

king and deprived the place of the king. The question Glaucon casts to Socrates is whether there is a difference of the behavior between a just man and an unjust man, if these two people should be placed in the same situation where Gyges was placed. By introducing this hypothetical experiment, Glaucon tries to show that, even if one is a quite just person, if one has enough power with the help of the ring making its owner invisible, one will practice injustice. This experiment discloses the fact that both a just person and an unjust person are willing to do injustice. If one is able to do injustice without being noticed by others, one does rather injustice than respects justice. Since justice is only a compromise with others, as long as others do not notice what one does—for example, robbery or plunder—, one is not seen as doing injustice; the eyes of others are the criterion. The greatest injustice which everyone desires is, therefore, to be seen as a just person in spite of being unjust. Everyone is secretly eager to do injustice, even if they seem just persons. In fact, they pretend as if they are just persons. They do not do injustice, just because they do not have enough power or courage to do injustice. Yet the actuality is that they watch for an opportunity to do injustice to others, or, at least, to break justice.

This description, which is originally Glaucon's repetition of Thrasymachus' statements, omits some points that Socrates mentioned when he tried to refute the statement that justice is what advantages the stronger. There are two points Galucon omits; first, every art (*technê*) aims at the best for the people who receive its effect, not for the people who practice it (346e-347a); second, just people have knowledge and virtue, therefore are superior, but unjust people are ignorant, therefore inferior (350a-c). Why does Glaucon omit these arguments, although Socrates has refuted the statement of Thrasymachus step by step and Thrasymachus seems to admit in some degree the difficulties his thesis includes? The reason is that Socrates' refutations do not seem to Glaucon to be convincing enough to undermine Thrasymachus' claim. Socrates did not refute him enough, especially at the point of the appearance of being just. As long as justice exists in a community, i.e., the others judge whether one is just or unjust, it is plausible

that just people and unjust people enjoy the equal amount of advantage. For, the latter ones may be skilled in pretending to be just or hiding their injustices, or, the criterion of the judgement whether one is just or unjust is entrusted to people who have no ideas on justice itself under democracy. What is even worse is that, because of lacking the skill of appearing to be just, just people cannot save themselves from groundless stigma, if they are said to be unjust by others. The reformulation of the question by Glaucon hints that Socrates' refutations do not consider the difference between being just and appearing to be just. Glaucon's argument introduces one new perspective to the discussion, although it has been already lurked in the assertion of Thrasymachus. It is, namely, that justice and injustice cannot be discussed without considering a community where various people live together, just like in a port city called the Piraeus. In this way, the problem of justice appears as a matter in a community.

2. 3. Emergence of the Political Dimension

At the beginning of the second book, Glaucon urges Socrates to explain what is justice and to persuade the interlocutors that justice brings more advantages to its possessor by itself than injustice does. However, these two are not the only questions that Socrates has to answer. Glaucon demands him also to prove an additional point: being just is better than appearing to be just. It is noteworthy that Glaucon introduces this demand by referring to Aeschylus' poetry. Modifying the line of Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, Glaucon gives a definition of the just person (ὁ δίκαιος) as follows: "a simple and honorable man who wants [&] not to appear to be good, but to be good" (361b).[47] However, Glaucon uses other lines in order to give a definition

[47] The original Aeschylus' text is: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει (Line 592). English translation: For, he does not wish to appear to be the greatest, but to be the greatest (author's modification is added to the translation by Herbert Weir Smyth). The clear difference between the original text and Glaucon's quote is the adjective, "the greatest (ἄριστος)" and "the good (ἀγαθός)."

of the opposite: the unjust man.[48] Actually, this scene composed by Aeschylus illustrates the man claiming that he is the man who wants to be just, not appear to be just. Nonetheless, Glaucon uses the lines in order to "polish" the totally unjust man. This does not necessarily mean that he takes a warped view of the *Seven against Thebes*. This is only one of the possible interpretations that every one could draw from the poetical work which was popular in their times.

Glaucon's quotation from one of the most famous tragedians, Aeschylus, can be seen as the biggest turning point in their earlier discussion. The discussion held inside the house of Cephalus is no more a private dialogue among Socrates and his company. Glaucon enlarges intentionally or unintentionally the range of the members taking part in their discussions; he also invites poets to their discussion. This involvement of poets are observed much clearer in the second part of the passage where the counter-opinion against Socrates is further developed by Adeimantus.

The second part of the counter-opinion is introduced by the brother of Glaucon, Adeimantus. He tries to compensate the point that seems to Adeimantus most important but Glaucon does not include. The principal point of Adeimantus' claim is that people admire justice only because they value what it brings, but not because they value justice itself. Adeimantus turns back to the problem that is casted by Glaucon before. Again he urges Socrates to prove that justice is better than injustice by itself. Differently from last time, Adeimantus brings some powerful supporters who claim that justice is better than injustice only because of what they bring to people practicing justice. The supporters are namely the greatest poets, Homer and Hesiod.

[48] βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος / ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα. "In his mind enjoying the deep furrow's fruit / from which good counsel grows" (*Politeia* 362a; *Seven against Thebes* 593-4).

Politeia 362e-363b

λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε ὑέσιν, καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι, ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσιν. τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθά, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι: ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν [&].

Adeimantus: No doubt, fathers say to their sons and exhort them, as do all those who have care of anyone, that one must be just. However, they don't praise justice by itself but the good reputations that come from it; they exhort their charges to be just so that, as a result of the opinion, ruling offices and marriages will come to the one who seems to be just, and all the other things that Glaucon a moment ago attributed to the just man as a result of his having a good reputation. And these men tell even more of the things resulting from the opinions. For by throwing in good reputation with the gods, they can tell of an inexhaustible store of goods that they say gods give to the holy. And in this way they join both the noble Hesiod and Homer. The former says that for the just the gods make the oaks [&].

First of all, we need to pay attention to the first sentence. It reveals the point Glaucon does not refer to but Adeimantus introduces anew in this part. Adeimantus calls those who encourage others to be just "fathers (πατέρες)" and "those who care for others (οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι)." In the first part introduced by Glaucon, there are no such people who encourage others to be just; there is no distinction between fathers and sons among them. There are only people who are able to choose what they themselves do. It is assumed that all people equally calculate the

difference between advantages and disadvantages that justice could bring, and, according to Glaucon, every one of them concludes that justice never brings more advantage than injustice. Contrastingly, the situation Adeimantus presupposes puts a distinction among people: fathers and sons, or those who care for others and those who are cared.[49] Only fathers and those who care for the cared tell that justice is valuable with regard to its approvals, because their children or the cared have no idea about advantage and disadvantage that justice could bring, as long as they are too immature to judge such a thing. Actually, this claim does not contradict what Glaucon says, but it explains the reason why all people come to have the same opinion that justice is not advantageous by itself. Children accept the saying by their fathers without reflective thinking, because they have not yet acquired language nor reason to understand and deliberate what their fathers say. They accept their fathers' view on justice and eventually it becomes their own view. After they reach adulthood, they tell the view that they inherited from their fathers to their children. The structure surrounding fathers and sons, in this way, can be regarded as circulative.

The question is, then, how this circulation begins. Differently phrased, who is the forefather that creates such a view on justice. This is the second point that Adeimantus introduces in the discussion for the first time. What fathers tell their children is not limited to human and current-life approvals; they include "the approvals of the gods (αἱ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις)." According to Adeimantus, many poets including Hesiod and Homer tell the story that justice brings the approvals by gods. Note that Adeimantus quotes here Hesiod's *Works and Days* and Homer's *Odyssey*. Hesiod depicts that the just people would receive acorns, [honey gathered by] bees and fleecy sheep heavily laden with wool as the rewards for

[49] "Fathers" and "sons" are used only in the metaphorical sense. As the following expressions show, the emphasis of the distinction among people lies not on the parent-child relationship, but on the relationship between the carer and the cared. Therefore, the "fathers" can be understood to also include, for example, nannies and educators (cf. 373c).

their just lives.[50] In a similar way, Homer describes that their rewards are barley and wheat, trees laden with fruit, sheep and fish.[51] The list of the rewards that just people would receive after their bodily deaths is, as a matter of fact, not so special. Hence, Adeimantus would also be able to count all of these things without quoting the lines of the *Works and Days* or the *Odyssey*. It would be, however, not persuasive enough. The important thing is that Homer and Hesiod, the greatest poets, mention the approvals and rewards of justice and a just life. It would not persuade others, if Adeimantus would list the things that are also listed by Homer and Hesiod *without* quoting them.

After this reference, these two names, Homer and Hesiod, and quotations from their works can be frequently found in the *Politeia*, although, except for one case,[52] no one of the characters appeared in the dialogue refers to these two poets before this passage. This fact indicates the beginning of the debate over justice from a different perspective. Indeed, Glaucon has introduced the verse of Aeschylus and enlarged the range of potential discussion partners. It is, however, not a passage where the poet shows his view on justice. What Galucon comments on the verse is more or less a digression from the subject which the poet generally depicts. Contrastingly, the verses which Adeimantus quotes here represent undoubtedly the rewards that the just people could receive, which theme is exactly what Socrates and the brothers are discussing. The difference of quoting the poets between Glaucon and Adeimantus lies in the aims of their quotations. Although Glaucon tries to "polish" the perfectly just and unjust ones and to enlarge the range of persons discussing justice, he refers to Aeschylus for the sake of

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[50] Hesiod. *Works and Days*, Line 232-234.

[51] This is the words of Odysseus whom Penelope asks who he is. Odysseus answers to this question with the admiration of her, and these words are used in order to compare her greatness with the governance of the best king. Homer. *Odyssey*, Song 19, Line 109-111.

[52] The exception is found in Socrates' words at 328e. There Socrates quotes "the threshold of old age (ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ)" in order to depict the ages of Cephalos. The original expression is found in several passages of Homer and Hesiod, for example: *Iliad*, Song 22. Line 60, *Odyssey*, Song 15. Line 246, *Works and Days*, Line 331 (James Adam. *The Republic of Plato*. p. 5).

reinforcing the ground of the private discussion. On the other hand, Adeimantus refers to the greatest poets in order to show the view on justice which is shared not only among his fellows inside the house of Cephalus, but also people in entire Greece.

We should not overlook that the quotations of their works function as an extension of the discussion that fathers teach their children justice. The greatest poets' coming on the stage relates closely with the first part introduced by Adeimantus. Homer and Hesiod are regarded not only as authorities in the field of poetry, but also as educators in Plato's times.[53] Just as the fathers instill the advantages of justice in their children, these two poets have taught as the forefather of the immature citizens by showing the images of gods and the Afterlife. This point is hinted also by the words "those who care for others (οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι)" at the first line of the passage cited above. The relation between "fathers" and "sons" has the same structure as that between "those who care for others" and those who are cared. Socrates takes up the word "caring for (κήδεσθαι)" afterwards when he describes his education or government.[54] For example, when Socrates explains the importance of the ideal educational system, he calls the people who would grow up under the ideal education "the people whom we say we care for, and who should grow up into the good men (ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι)" (395d). The word "κήδεσθαι" here is understood as almost the same as to educate people. When he emphasizes the effect of using the myth, especially the Phoenician myth on metals embedded in human being, he explains that the myth will help the people "to care more about the polis and one another (πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι)" (415d). This sentence shows that "κήδεσθαι" is used not only to indicate the care

[53] The poet "has educated people in Greece (τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδευκέναι)" (606e). At 606e, however, Socrates mentions only Homer. Havelock explains this point from the cultural background: "[One's] Greek counterpart had to mobilise the psychic resources necessary to memorise Homer and the poets, or enough of them to achieve the necessary educational effect" (Eric Havelock. *Preface to Plato*. p. 45). The education through poetry is performed also in the *Protagoras*.

[54] Socrates uses κήδεσθαι before this passage once (344e).

by the educators for the children or the immature ones, but also to describe the care among people.

When Adeimantus uses "κήδεσθαι" by connecting fathers and poets, apparently Socrates captures the new dimension of the inquiry of justice—although Adeimantus himself does not seem to notice that what he is doing is the watershed in the *Politeia*. This new dimension can be called the "political" dimension, being contrasted with the private or individual dimension. Since Glaucon refers to Aeschylus' verses and Adeimantus takes over the enlargement of the range of the discussion partners, the discussion on justice cannot be handled only as a private matter. For, even when justice comes to an issue in a private quarrel between two persons, what has created their conflicting images of justice is the poets as the carers and educators of the entire Greeks and the community that accepts and has handed down their poetical works to their offspring.[55] Therefore, exactly at the point where Adeimantus quotes the verses of Homer and Hesiod as the representative opinion widely shared among people, it is brought to light that the subject concerning justice is inevitably political. Justice is taught not privately from a father to his children within a house, but rather publicly through the mouth and works of the poets. In this way, in the words of Adeimantus we can find the reason why Socrates introduces justice in the poleis as one piece of a pair of flints for the acquisition of the spark of justice itself.

2. 4. Other Perspectives—*Nomoi*, *Gorgias* and *Apology*

As stated in 2. 2., Plato clearly defines the political art as caring for souls in the *Nomoi*, while we cannot find such a clear definition in the *Politeia* , because one of its aims is to inquire the

[55] Havelock emphasizes this point: "The essential vehicle of continuity was supplied by a fresh and elaborate development of the oral style, whereby a whole way of life, and not simply the deeds of heroes, was to be held together and so rendered transmissible between the generations" (Eric Havelock. *Preface to Plato*. p. 119.)

political art. This section sketches the connection between the political art or politics and caring for souls by analyzing other dialogues.

First, let us consider the following passage of the *Nomoi* which we observed before: "This (τοῦτο) then—to know the natures and the states of souls (τὸ γνῶναι τὰς φύσεις τε καὶ ἕξεις τῶν ψυχῶν)—could be one of the most useful things (τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἓν) for the art whose business it is to care for souls (ἧς ἐστιν ταῦτα θεραπεύειν). And we assert (I think) that that art is the political one (πολιτικῆς)" (*Nom*. 650b). Here the Athenian clearly defines the important thing in "the political art." That is, "to know the natures and the states of souls." Note that the Athenian uses the infinitive form "γνῶναι" to explain "one of the most useful things." He does not say with a noun, "the knowledge (ἡ γνῶσις)."[56] The difference between "to know" and "the knowledge" lies in its dynamic process and activity. This, namely "to know the natures and the states of souls" lies at the basis of the political art. The business of the political art is, "caring for these things (ταῦτα θεραπεύειν)." Again, note here that the Athenian uses the infinitive form "θεραπεύειν" not a noun, θεραπεία. In addition, he does not clearly indicate that the object of care is "souls (ψυχαί)." He says "these things" (ταῦτα, neutral plural of οὗτος). It is indeed clear that "these things" concern almost solely the souls of the citizens, but this word also indicates, assumedly, that the object of care includes not only "the souls" themselves, but also "to know the natures and the states of souls."

Now the question is what "caring for these things or souls" actually means. The word "θεραπεύειν" is used twice one page before the line in question (649b, c). In both sentences, it is used in order to describe the attention to the souls or the emotion (precisely, fear), therefore, one does not find a meaning that is largely different from that used above. However, the Athenian uses this word elsewhere in order to explain "to cure bodies (or their diseases)." For

[56] Cf. "Glaucon's goods, in all categories, are expressed as states or activities or processes. Not pleasure, but 'being pleased' (τὸ χαίρειν, 375b); not 'gymnastics,' not 'the art of medicine' (γυμναστική, ἰατρική) but 'taking exercise,' 'doctoring' (τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ἰάτρευσις, 357c)." Giovanni Ferrari. *City and Soul*. p. 18.

example, he mentions the doctoral treatments as an analogy of the work of lawgiver: "the many command their lawgivers to establish such laws as the populaces and the majorities will accept voluntarily, just as if someone were to command gymnasts or doctors to do what is pleasant as they care for (θεραπεύειν) and cure the bodies they care for (ἰᾶσθαι τὰ θεραπευόμενα σώματα)" (684c). Of course, its fundamental meaning remains the same, namely, "taking care of something." Nevertheless, by using "ἰᾶσθαι" (to heal, cure) together, the physical and curing (not only taking care) aspect of the word is emphasized.

The analogy between the medical treatment and the legislation reminds us of an similar analogy found in the *Gorgias*. Socrates, who tries to criticize the art of rhetoric because of its flattering character, divides arts (τέχναι) firstly in accordance with its objects: body and soul. The art handling bodies can be further divided into two arts, the medical art and the gymnastics, while the art handling souls can be divided also into two arts, the legislation and the judiciary (*Gorg.* 464b-466a). Socrates explains the true arts with the word "θεραπεύειν" (curing *and* caring); "Now there are these four arts, and they always care (θεραπευουσῶν) for the best thing (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον) respectively of the body and the soul" (*Gorg.* 464c). This sentence indicates that caring for bodies by using the medical art and the gymnastics corresponds to caring for souls using the legislation and the judiciary. As the medical art does, the θεραπεύειν means on the one hand "curing and healing" something bad or unhealthy, but on the other hand, it means "caring for" something that is not in a unhealthy condition . The analogies in the *Gorgias*, especially the analogy between the medical art and the judiciary, reveal the meaning of "curing soul," because it prescribes a cure called punishment. However, "curing" is only one aspect of θεραπεύειν. The other aspect is the aspect of "caring for something."

In the *Gorgias*, we can find another word for describing "caring for something:" *epimeleisthai* (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) or *epimeleia* (ἐπιμέλεια). As we have seen, the art for souls to which the legislation and the judiciary belong is called "the political art (ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη)" (*Gorg.* 464b). A person who possesses this art is called "a politician (πολίτης)." Callicles counts

Pericles, Themistokles and others as good politicians (*Gorg.* 515d). Socrates understands these politicians, especially Pericles, under the category of "carer (ἐπιμελήτης)" (*Gorg*. 516a). He asks Callicles whether Pericles was a good politician, using the verb *epimeleia*: "Then, did Pericles *care* the people? (οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;)" (*Gorg*. 516b, emphasis added). These words indicate that Plato uses these two words, *therapeuein* and *epimeleisthai*, in a similar way. Both of them describe the practice in which the politicians have to be engaged. According to Socrates, the care the politicians take of the citizens must involve a certain consequence; that is, "the souls of citizens become as good as possible" (*Gorg*. 503a). If the case of Pericles is compared to this criterion of a good politician, according to Socrates, we can conclude he failed to "care" for the citizens, because the citizens judged him as bad (*Gorg*. 515e-516a). This implies that there is "good" or "right" care on the one hand and "bad" or "incorrect" care on the other hand. Socrates provides two criteria for judging the correctness of "care." First, the consequence: whether the cared—in the case of the political art, the souls of citizens—become better than before. The second criterion is whether one cares the right object. Socrates asserts that the care in "practicing politics" (πολιτεύεσθαι) should concern the question of "how the citizens can become as good as possible," but not "matters or business of the polis (τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα)" (*Gorg*. 515b).

Then, what does Socrates assume with "the matters of the polis" that one has not to care about? It seems natural that one cares about "the matters of the polis" when one uses the political art. This view seems to be solid, because it is mentioned also in other dialogues. The difference between caring for the souls of citizens and caring the matters of the polis would become clearer, when we turn our eyes to the *Apology of Socrates*.

After the first judge reveals that Socrates is guilty, he attempts to explain what he has done in the polis until his trial, or at least, what he wanted to do: "I tried to persuade each of you not to care for the *matters of you* before *caring for yourself* (μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη) so that you could be as best and wisest as

possible, and not to care for the *matters of the polis* before caring for the polis itself (μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως)" (*Apol*. 36c, emphasis added). In this passage, Socrates emphasizes the obliged action with the word "*epimeleisthai*." Also here, Socrates differentiates "taking care of *the matters* of the polis" and "taking care of the polis *itself*." The point that we do not have in the *Gorgias* is that Socrates mentions "the care for oneself" (ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι). First of all, one has to "take care of oneself" so that one can become as good as possible. Taking care of *the matters* of oneself should come after the first "care." Then, it is natural to question what is "the matters of oneself," which is different from "oneself."

The clue to understanding this point can be found elsewhere in the *Apology*. Socrates claims that he would never stop "doing philosophy" through examining the citizens even if he could avoid his death penalty by stopping doing so. If the citizens in Athens require him to stop examining themselves and doing philosophy, he would answer as follows: "Oh my best men, Athenians, [&] aren't you ashamed of yourself, if you care for wealth, fame and reputation (ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς), but neither prudence nor truth, and if you do not care and consider (οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις) how your soul would become as good as possible?" (29d-e). This passage shows the view of Socrates that what is to be cared and what should not be cared. The things one has to "care and consider" is "prudence," "truth" and how one's soul can become as good as possible. The last point is already repeated in this section. Although "prudence" and "truth" appear here firstly, we do not have to think that they are independent from caring for soul; caring for them can be seen as a part of "caring for soul." On the other hand, wealth, fame, reputation are things that one should not care. These things can be regarded as the things that Socrates calls "the matters of oneself" (*Apol*. 36c).[57] This contrast between things concerning oneself and those concerning the matters of oneself is once more emphasized at the end of the trial (*Apol*. 41e).

[57] A similar view is shown also in the *Phaedo*, 64d-e.

This section outlined the concept of “caring for soul,” paying attention to two words, *therapeuein* and *epimeleisthai / epimeleia*. The point is that Plato has defined “the political art” as caring for the soul or oneself in other dialogues, even if (historical) Socrates would not have called his practice “political.” This view seems to always have remained in his thought. However, in the *Politeia*, he does not bring such a plain definition, because, as mentioned before, Plato’s endeavor throughout the entire dialogue is the inquiry into the political art itself.

3. Establishment of Polis

3. 1. Polis of Pigs

The previous sections revealed how the discussion, which has begun with the inquiry concerning justice in the individual within the private interlocutors, comes to that on justice in the poleis. Now the task is to find or to define justice and injustice in the poleis. In order to work on it, Socrates gives a suggestion: “If we should watch a polis coming into being in speech (εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ), would we also see (ἴδοιμεν)” its justice and its injustice coming into being?” (369a). Although it is an inquiry into the origin, it is not historical. What he is doing is to observe the “theoretical” or “hypothetical” origin.[58] This object of the inquiry decides the method; Socrates tries to “establish a polis in speech (τῷ λόγῳ πόλιν ποιεῖν)” (369c). Note again that they do not describe history of a particular polis that exists or existed like Athens or Sparta, but establish a completely new and non-existing polis *in speech* (τῷ λόγῳ). There are several different ways to explicate the reason why Socrates suggests this method for the inquiry. In addition, it is also necessary to keep in mind that he tries to find how “justice and injustice come into being.” In other words, the inquiry in which Socrates is engaged is no more finding the justice but investigating the origin of them. This slight change of the goal of their inquiry

[58] Griffith uses “origin” as the translation of γιγνομένην, while I prefer here the more literal translation by Bloom. Also I do not adopt “theoretical” (369a) and “hypothetical” (369c) for the translation of (τῷ) λόγῳ, which is adopted by Griffith.

seems to hint at Plato's large project to establish a just polis. Socrates does not attempt to remedy an individual injustice in the existing poleis. By establishing a totally new polis in speech, he attempts to depict the blue print of the just polis.

In the second book, Socrates establishes two kinds of polis: "a polis of pigs" and "a luxurious polis" which are not independent from one another. A luxurious polis emerges only after a polis of pigs is established, because the luxurious one needs the basic necessities that a polis of pigs provides. Therefore, it is natural that Socrates begins his inquiry with establishing a polis of pigs.

Polis (πόλις) is, according to Socrates, originally a "joint habitation (συνοικία)" (369c). It is a house (οἰκία) where people live together (σύν). Human beings have to gather and live together, because "we are not, any of us, self-sufficient (οὐκ αὐτάρκης)" (369b). They begin to live together in one large house, namely in a polis, in order to meet the wants which are necessary for sustaining their biological lives. The primitive polis requires only four or five members who are engaged in the primitive and the most important needs, i.e., food, housing, and clothing. Hence, the first group of the inhabitants is a group consisting of the people who take care of these matters: farmer, carpenter, tailor and shoemaker. In this polis, it is recommended that each one be engaged in one job which one is good at; for example, the farmer produces food not only for himself but also for others so that he needs not to take on housing, which he is not good at. This distribution of the roles in the polis is justified from the viewpoint of their natural disposition or *physis* (φύσις).[59] Although this concept comes to be the central issue of justice in the poleis in the later discussion, here Socrates mentions it without a precise examination. The claim that each one has something that one is "naturally" good at is brought not as Socrates' surprising statement, but as a statement appealing to the commonsense of his

[59] The natural disposition is one of the most important concepts in the *Politeia*, especially in the discussion on the education (of the guardians), and I will examine it precisely in the next chapter.

interlocutors and those attending. This observation requires a further enlargement of the polis-members, because, while the farmer is good at producing foods, but they cannot produce the tools they need. Even if they can make them, it might take time and their quality might be worse than that made by the craftsmen who specialize in producing such tools. If the farmer, or other members of the polis, wants to produce more and efficiently, it follows that the polis requires more people. In this way, the second group consists of craftsmen who produce tools the first group uses such as harrows, hammers and looms. Besides, the polis has to import the things which cannot be produced sufficiently within the polis. Now the polis demands not only more people of the first and the second groups in order to provide productions to feed themselves as well as to trade with other poleis, but also a third group engaged in trading business: merchants and experts of seafaring (371a-b). As the fourth group, there are people who take on exchanging the goods which the other groups produce. They are called dealers. They sit in the marketplace, offering a selling and buying service. Finally, there is a kind of people whose physical strength is for sale. They offer their physical strength and receive money as its reward. The fifth and last group is, therefore, "hired labor" (371e). It is noteworthy that the community consisting of these five groups is regarded as the first "true (ἀληθινή)" and "healthy (ὑγιῆ)" polis (372e), because the polis which has been just established does not seem to us to be such a polis. It may be understandable, if the "true and healthy" polis shall consist of only the first and second groups—farmer, carpenter, tailor, shoemaker and craftsmen.[60] However, the imported goods are also counted as the requirements in this polis. The importation includes necessarily the smith art in order to build a ship for foreign trade. This point offers a clear difference between the *Politeia* and the *Nomoi*.

Also in the *Nomoi*, we can find the explanation similar to the establishment of a polis in the *Politeia.* In the *Politeia*, as we have seen, the main question of the inquiry is how a polis

[60] Compare with the natural state which is found in thought of the modern social contract theorists such as Rousseau or Locke.

emerges, but, at least in its second book, the regime, *politeia* (πολιτεία), of a polis does not stand at the center of the discussion. Contrastingly in the *Nomoi*, the Athenian handles the origin of a political regime before examining that of polis. In addition, there is a difference also in the perspective of their examinations. While the polis in the *Politeia* is established "in speech," namely hypothetically and theoretically, the political regime is observed firstly from the descriptive viewpoint in the *Nomoi*. The Athenian tries to portray the origin of the regime as historically as possible. In spite of these differences, the examination of the *Nomoi* will help us understand the discussion on the establishment of a polis in the *Politeia*.[61]

The Athenian begins the description of the polis with "the ancient tales (οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι)," because they seem to contain some truth (*Nom*. 677a). According to these tales, human beings had often been destroyed by "many disasters" including floods. Thereafter, only a few of them survived and most of them were "herdsmen (νομή)" living on the peaks (*Nom*. 677a-b). Even if they had acquired some arts (*technai*) including the political one before catastrophes, people lost them at the time of natural disasters. After numerous destructions, human beings came to live in "a vast and frightening desolation (μυρία μέν τις φοβερὰ ἐρημία)," while they had "a great mass of abundant land (γῆ δ᾽ ἄφθονος πλῆθος παμπόλλη)" with a few herds of oxen and flocks of goats (*Nom*. 677e). Because of the lack of the art to extract metals, they were not able to acquire fresh metals. This led to two consequences: the lack of transportation and that of wars. Since they were not able to engineer the means for transportations, they were "delighted (ἄσμενοι)" to communicate with others, because they were not able to see other humans often; they never regarded others as their enemies. Although they lacked many techniques and their lives were laborious, the Athenian describes the life at that time as "simpler (εὐηθέστεροι) and more courageous and also more moderate (σωφρονέστεροι) and in every way more just (σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι)" (*Nom*. 679e).

[61] As I mentioned in the Preface, there are many different arguments between the *Politeia* and the *Nomoi*, but how a political community emerges (or emerged) is discussed in both works.

The people at this first stage are characterized by having two features. First, "owing to their desolate state, they showed affection (ἀγαπᾶν) and were friendly (φιλοφρονεῖσθαι) towards one another" (*Nom*. 678d). Second, there was no fight among them because they were well supplied not only with foods but also with clothes and houses. They had already met all necessities, and, therefore, they did not have to wage a war against another community in order to gain more foods or lands. In addition, since there was neither poverty nor wealth because of the lack of gold and silver, they never waged a civil strife.[62] They did not try to deprive others' wealth in order to become rich, because there was no means to define who is wealthy. All people in this community have foods and clothes equally enough. What this equality did *not* bring is quite a lot: there emerged neither "insolence (ὕβρις)" nor "injustice" nor "rivalries (ζῆλοι)" nor "jealousies (φθόνοι)," not only because there was no poverty nor wealth over which people attempt to fight, but also because their disposition was characterized with "naive simplicity (εὐήθης)" (*Nom*. 679c). As a result of their "naive simplicity," they believeed what they heard as true; they never suspected that what they heard contains a falsehood, because none of them possessed "wisdom (σοφία)" with which people come to "know (ἐπίστασθαι)" and judge what is true and false.

It is noteworthy that the description of the first kind of people is that this gathering of people is not called "polis." The Athenian does not give the name "polis" to a community until the post-first generation comes into being. It can be understood that the people at the first stage with "naive simplicity" had no polis, i.e., no political community. This non-political community had no need of "lawgivers (νομοθέται);" hence, there was no law (*Nom*. 680a). However, although the Athenian does not regard this community as a polis, it had a regime which is called "dynasty (δυναστεία)" (*Nom*. 680b). The Athenian describes this regime as follows: "the eldest

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[62] In the *Nomoi*, a civil strife (στάσις) is depicted as the worst war among different kinds of war: "[&] that internal war called 'civil strife,' which occurs from time to time and which everyone would wish never come to pass in his polis and, if it does, would wish to end as soon as possible" (*Nomoi* 628a-b)

rules with an authority handed down from the father and mother (ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μεητρὸς), whom the others follow, like birds forming one flock" (*Nom*. 680e). The dynasty is also called "monarchy (βασιλεία)" which is ruled by "paternal laws (πατρονομεῖσθαι)" (*ibid*.).

Now recall the words of the Athenian that "they [i.e. people under the dynastic community] did yet need lawgivers and such a thing [i.e. law] was not likely to occur in those times" (*Nom*. 680a). On the one hand, the Athenian clearly explains that there was neither lawgiver nor law. Just after three paragraphs, on the other hand, he defines the dynasty as a regime "ruled by paternal laws." This point, which apparently contradicts one another, expresses Plato's unique view of the political community.[63] As we imagine from the contract theory in the history of political thought, we normally recognize that regime and laws come after or at the same time that the political communities are established.[64] The community before people make a social contract is only a gathering of the people. In contrast, the predecessor of polis Plato has in mind seems much more "political" than the natural states of the social contract theorists, such as Thomas Hobbes or Jean-Jacque Rousseau, because people under dynastic communities have a regime, ruler(s) and laws, even though the validity of rulers and laws was based solely on its tradition. However, for Plato in the *Nomoi*, what makes a community of human beings into "polis" is neither regime nor laws that are only handed from their ancestors. This observation is important for us, modern readers, who know the social contract theory and the state of nature, because, in reading Plato's works, we tend to see the difference between a political community and a private (or primitive) one in the existence of, for instance, regime or economics that we subsume under the concept of "the political" nowadays. What is clear from the argument above is, however, that the criterion (or criteria) of "polis" for Plato is different from ours.

[63] Polis is mentioned at 676a, 676b, 677c, 678a, 679d within Book 3.
[64] For example, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*; John Lokce's *The Second Treatise of Government*; Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract*.

Now let us turn our eyes back to the discussion in the *Politeia*. In contrast to the first community whose regime is called "dynasty" in the *Nomoi*, Socrates and his interlocutors designate the first form of the community "a polis." There seems to be the art of extracting the fresh metals, since there are transportations, especially ship for the importation and gold and silver for payment. In spite of these developed remarks, Socrates describes this first polis as a "true" and "healthy" one, and Glaucon calls it a "polis of pigs (ὑῶν πόλις)" (372d). The healthy polis seems to Glaucon to be a polis for animals. Although "polis" is widely understood as a community which only human beings are able to establish, the polis which lacks of things that "people today (οἱ νῦν)" have is almost the same as a community of animals like a herd (*ibid.*). If one takes this into account, one would understand the reason why Glaucon (and Socrates) do(es) not find justice and injustice in this first form of polis. Glaucon hints, in fact, that there might be justice and injustice in this polis, saying "I can't think [&] unless it's somewhere in some need these men have one another." In short, he speculates that justice and injustice can come into being through the birth of exchange or trade of productions. Socrates replies with "perhaps (ἴσως)" (372a). This passage can be interpreted to be pointing at the origin of justice and injustice. However, taking into consideration that Socrates never turns back to this theme, we should rather understand that there are no justice and injustice in this "true and healthy" polis. Since this polis is a community of animals, Glaucon, a human, cannot find justice and injustice there.

3. 2. Luxurious Polis

Being encouraged by Glaucon, Socrates goes forward and attempts to establish another polis whose residents possess what people today have, so that they can "see the point where justice and injustice come into existence" (372e). These words of Socrates also demonstrate that there is neither justice nor injustice in the "true and healthy" polis. Socrates calls this new polis "the swollen and inflamed polis (φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις)," contrasting it to the true and healthy one.

This polis is “luxurious (τρυφῶσα-τρυφάω: live luxuriously),” because people there “lie on couches, eat off tables, and have the cooked dishes and desserts” (372d), so that they do not have to feel they are living in the polis of pigs. They insist on more than the bare necessities. This luxury is likened to heat or fire (φλέγμα); the heat swells endlessly, because, unlike the desire for the necessities, that for luxury knows no limits.[65] This polis swells with the heat of people’s desire for luxury, which makes this polis “luxurious,” “swollen and inflamed.” People in this polis are never satisfied with the necessities. The luxury comes only from people’s greediness. Although Socrates does not use the word “greediness (πλεονεξία)” to illustrate this polis, it is plausible that Socrates takes greediness into account when he describes this polis with heat which makes the polis continue to swell endlessly. Actually, the greediness has been mentioned already when Glaucon repeated Thrasymachus’ claim: the greediness i.e., “a desire to get the better” is “what any nature naturally pursues as good” (359c). Exactly this greediness makes even the good people do injustice. Socrates does not say clearly yet, but it is almost obvious that the greediness has a strong connection with the origin of justice and injustice. This feature is further emphasized in the discussion on the origin of wars, which shall be examined later.

Now the question is what the concrete difference between the swollen luxurious polis and the true healthy polis is. As stated before, the greediness prevailed in the luxurious polis requires more people who are engaged in the luxurious productions which are not equivalent to bare necessities. Hence, the first difference between two poleis is the list of members. In the luxurious polis, there are people who are added newly in this polis.

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[65] The image of fire is always associated with heat (θερμός / τὸ θερμόν). In the *Philebus*, where Socrates discusses the endlessness (τὸ ἄπειρον), heat is given as an example of the limitlessness, or things that has no limit (πέρας). Socrates says: “But always, we affirm, in the hotter (θερμοτέρου) and colder there is the more and less. [&] Always, then, the argument shows that these two have no end (τέλος); and being endless, they are of course infinite” (*Philebus* 24a-b). By describing the luxurious polis with “heat,” Socrates tries to show that the luxury this polis longs for is infinite.

Politeia 373b-c

οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν: ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἃ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἵ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες οἵ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα: ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιτθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα: τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν—ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν—ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται: ἦ γάρ;

Socrates: Then the polis must be made bigger again. This healthy one isn't adequate any more, but must already be gorged with a bulky mass of things, which are not in poleis because of necessity—all the hunters and imitators, many concerned with figures and colors, many with *mousikê*; and poets and their helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors and craftsmen of all sorts of equipment, for feminine adornment as well as other things. And so we'll need more servants too. Or doesn't it seem there will be need of teachers, wet nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, and, further, relish-makers and cooks? And, what's more, we're in addition going to need swineherds. This animal wasn't in our earlier city—there was no need—but in this one there will be need of it in addition. And there'll also be need of very many other fatted beasts if someone will eat them, won't there?

This polis is both geographically and numerally much larger than the healthy polis, since it has to provide more things that are not requisite in that polis. Therefore, “to enlarge the polis (μείζονα ποιεῖν)” in the first line indicates not only geographical enlargement but also quantitative enlargement of its members and productions. Compared to things and people that fill the healthy polis, “mass and multitude of things (ὄγκος καὶ πλῆθος),” with which the luxurious polis filled, are prepared not for necessity but for luxury. When the need of “mass and multitude” of luxurious things combines with the formulation that each one is engaged in one job which one is naturally good at, this polis requires not only goods but also people who serve them. It is now important to observe the people who firstly appear in this polis.

Let us observe the Table 1 below. It categorizes the members of the luxurious polis in accordance with their jobs and productions.

Tabel 1

Category	**People**	**Individual Job**	**Main Productions**
I	Hunters of all kinds	Hunting	Meat of animals, Clothing
	Craftsmen of all sorts of equipment	(For example: Jeweler, Dress weaver, Craft worker)	Feminine adornments (such as jewelry and dress)
	People in service	cook, barber, beauticians	Livelihood
	Swineherds	Farming	Meat of pigs
II	Imitators	Those using figures =Sculptor, Painter	Sculpture, Painting
		Those using *mousikê* =poets, assistants of poets	Poetry, Play, Dance
		Those engaged in stage plays =Contractors of plays, Craft workers (For example theater painters)	
	People in service	Educator, Nanny	Education, Care

As the citation above shows, Plato himself does not make a distinction between category I and category II. However, if we divide the members of the luxurious polis into two categories, the

difference between the luxurious polis and the healthy one will stand out. All the people in the Table produce something different from the productions or service that people in the healthy polis produce. However, the productions and service that people in the category I engaged in necessities in some way: for instance, hunters, cook, swineherds are engaged in food, i.e., one of the necessities that exist, of course, in the healthy polis. The only difference is that the foods required in the luxurious polis are not only vegetables but also various kinds of meat. In the same way, dress weavers and craft workers are engaged in one of the necessities, namely clothing and housing. The difference of craft workers in the healthy polis and those in the luxurious one is that the productions in this polis are "decorated and painted" (373a). Therefore, the new thing of houses or clothing in this polis is "decoration (ζωγραφία)" and "colorfulness (ποικιλία)." Although the decoration on housing or clothing are given by each maker, such as weaver or carpenter, this is under the influence of imitation, which is, as a matter of fact, a part of the job of "imitators" in category II.

People sorted under category II appear in this polis for the first time. They do not exist in the healthy polis at all. The first kind of them is imitators (μιμηταί). They are divided further into two types, as the passage shows: those using "figures (σχήματα)" and "colors (χρώματα)," namely those engaged in things appealing to the visual sense, and those using *mousikê*, which appeals mainly to the auditory sense. Painters and Sculptors belong to the former, while "poets (ποηταί)" and "their assistants (τούτων ὑπηρέται)," including "rhapsodes, actors and choral dancers" belong to the latter. There are also other "assistants" of poets who are active on the border between things appealing to the visual sense and those appealing to the auditory one. They are "contractors" and we can also add "craftsmen of all sorts of equipment" who are engaged in creating the theatrical play into this kind of people." Note that there are no "imitator" in the healthy polis at all; there are neither painters nor poets. Even when adults and children

"eat lying on straw beds" and "drink wine after their meals, wearing garlands on their heads," people in the healthy polis never enjoy dance and music, because they do not have any.[66]

There is, in addition, a kind of people who appear in the luxurious polis for the first time: people who take responsibility to take care of others, especially children. "Educator (παιδαγωγός)" is the representative one of this type; they are those who lead (ἀγώ) children (παῖδες). We can also include "wet-nurses" and "nannies" under this category, because they are also responsible for caring for infants and children. Note that there are no such people engaged in care and education for children as far as we can know from the text, *although* people have without doubt infants and children in the healthy polis too. Rather, Socrates does not say anything about education in the healthy polis. Since some people there engaged in commerce, they must have a minimum knowledge of mathematics, but there is apparently no educational system. We can imagine, then, that education in the healthy polis never appears as a political or a common matter, but a private matter; family members or neighbors might teach mathematics or something required in daily life to their children. The education is not established firmly and politically in the healthy polis, because the teaching in the private sphere is enough for the maintenance of the healthy polis. Contrastingly, the luxurious polis requires the education and educators other than families. It is not a private matter anymore; it comes to concern the entire polis.

It is not accident that the imitators *and* the educators appear for the first time in this polis. As we shall see, the basic education in the luxurious polis is necessarily connected to imitation and *mousikê*. The educators, including wet-nurses and nannies, play the role to narrate

[66] Although there is no imitator, people in the healthy polis know hymns, because Socrates describes the life of people in the healthy polis: "they sing of the gods (ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς)" (372b). However, hymns are not included in *mousikê*, or a part of imitation. In addition, at the end of the discussion of poetry in the tenth book, hymns are counted as poetry that is admitted in the polis: "But you must know that only so much of poetry as is hymns to gods or celebration of good men (ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) should be admitted into a city" (607a).

stories and myths composed by poets (377c). Without imitators, children in the luxurious polis cannot be nurtured nor educated. Now recall the reason why Socrates needs to establish the luxurious polis, in addition to the healthy one. He says, "in considering such a polis too, we could probably see in what way (ὅπῃ) justice and injustice naturally grow (ἐμφύονται) in poleis" (372e). The reason of its establishment is namely to find where justice and injustice are born. If we take together the fact that there are neither imitations / imitators nor education / educators in the healthy polis and the description that justice and injustice do not yet exist either, we can assume that the lack of imitation and education has some connection with the lack of justice and injustice. For, people in the first category provide, in actuality, the necessities whose simple versions exist also in the healthy polis. Then, it seems reasonable to understand that the origin of justice and injustice can concern the people of category II and their productions and service.

3. 3. War, Guardians and Purification of Polis

The luxurious polis is, as Socrates describes, the "swollen and inflamed" polis; it continues to swell. As previously mentioned, the character this polis has can be described with the "greediness" of its members. Adeimantus introduced the concept of greediness as the motor that makes both just and unjust people do the same, when both of them have freedom and strength to do whatever they like (359b). Its extreme example is the story of Gyges' Ring. The greediness, regardless of whether it lies in a just person or in an unjust person, enables its possessor to rob others' property so that they are able to outdo others. Just as a greedy person tries to take others' property away in order to fulfill one's desire, a polis attempts to "cut off a piece of our neighbors' land (τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον)" (373d). The luxurious polis is almost compelled to do this, because it needs to nourish its greedy members. However, this is not successful, if their neighbors do not offer their land easily, especially in a case where the neighbors are also luxurious poleis and have enough military power. This is the beginning of war (πολεμεῖν). Note that war is not depicted as an example of injustice or evil itself. Socrates

reserves the ethical judgement on wars, saying "let's not yet say whether war works evil (κακὸν) or good (ἀγαθόν)" (373e). Socrates' silence on the moral judgement on wars implies that wars themselves have little relation to the origin of justice and injustice that Socrates is searching for. Rather, it is the consequence of the characters of people in the luxurious polis, namely the greediness.

Wars bring a further need of its member as an inevitable consequence: "a whole army" (374a). Socrates argues that the army should not consist of normal residents in this polis, such as farmers or shoemakers, but of people specialized in warfare. Also here the rule agreed before has an effect: each one has to be engaged in one thing that one is good at, or, in other words, "no individual was capable of practicing several arts properly" (374a). Just as a shoemaker cannot be farmer at the same time, the task of warfare has to be assigned to people who are able to fight well and, as a consequence, specialize in fighting. The introduction of the warfare and the need for the people engaged in fighting can be seen as the second watershed in the *Politeia*,[67] because the warfare requires the guardians in the polis.

The concept of "guardian (φύλαξ)" has already appeared twice before the description of warfare in the luxurious polis.[68] Adeimantus argues that "each would be his own best guardian (αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος ἄριστος φύλαξ), afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil," if each one would be persuaded that justice is advantageous by itself (367a). Just after the words of Adeimantus, Socrates does not consider the concept of "guardian" for a while. However, by referring to the kind of people called "guardians," Socrates tries to respond to Adeimantus to some degree. It is necessary to "keep guard over" (φυλάττειν) people, if justice is required among people, and those who take the role of keeping guard are called "guardians." This point hints that there is injustice over which some guardians have to keep guarding,

[67] The first watershed is the point where Adeimantus quotes the verses of Homer and Hesiod.
[68] 334a and 367a. In 367a, Adeimantus mentions "self-guardianship." This is, according to Ferrari, "instead of watching against and over others one will watch against and over oneself, impose discipline on the potentially recalcitrant elements within." Ferrari. *City and Soul*, p.20.

although their primary job is to fight against the enemies and guard people in the polis. Socrates emphasizes that their job should be considered as special.

Politeia 374d-e

οὐκοῦν, [&] ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσούτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν εἴη καὶ αὖ τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον.

οἶμαι ἔγωγε [&].

ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα;

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

Socrates: Then, [&] to the extent that the work of the guardians is more important, it would require more leisure time than the other tasks as well as greater art and care.

Glaucon: I certainly think so [&].

Socrates: And also, a natural disposition fit for the pursuit?

Glaucon: Of course.

The category of "guardian (φύλαξ)" here includes both the soldiers and the rulers, although the category of guardian is later divided into two groups, soldiers and complete guardians; the class engaged in the actual fights are later called differently.[69] For now, however, let us understand the people called "guardians" as soldiers *and* complete guardians.

[69] "This is the first occurrence of φύλακες in the technical sense which it bears throughout the Republic. it is important to remember that the name includes not only the soldiers, but also—after they have been introduced—the rulers; when it becomes necessary to distinguish between the two classes, the former are called ἐπίκουροι (first named in III 414b), the latter φύλακες παντελεῖς (III 414b), τέλεοι φύλακες (IV 428d) or the like, or more commonly ἄρχοντες (first alluded to in III 389b, but not expressly separated off until 412b ff., and finally and fully described only in Books VI and VII)" (Adam 2009: 105).

Those who engaged in warfare have to be released from other activities because their job (ἔργον) has the greatest importance. As shoemakers cannot do farmers' job from the viewpoint of their natural dispositions and efficiency, guardians cannot do other jobs, either. The rule that Socrates follows in establishing a polis in speech is required especially in the case of the guardians, because their job is "the most important (μέγιστον)." Additionally, as a consequence of it, the required "skill or art (*technê*)" and "care (*epimeleia*)" have also the highest level. The point here is that Socrates requires of the guardians not only skill but also "care." Art, or *technê*, has been mentioned several times, especially in the last half of the first book, where Socrates defines the feature of *technê* by criticizing the argument of Thrasymachus (344a ff.). The point of Socrates' criticism is that each art, as long as it is an art in the precise sense, does not pursue "the good of anything other than that of which it is the art" (342b). In the same way, people with the art of ruling never pursues "what is best for themselves (αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον)," but only "what is best for the ruled person (τῷ ἀρχομένῳ)." Although Socrates has in mind the art of fighting in battle (ἡ περὶ τόν πόλεμον ἀγωνία) as the art that the guardians should have (374b-d), the art of fighting and the job of the ruler (ὁ ἄρχων) (342b) are closely connected. This aspect of art, i.e. to pursue what is the best for the object which the art concerns, can be understood as what Socrates calls "care (ἐπιμέλεια)." However, he does not count "care" as something that other craftsmen should have, while art—which must be perceived in the precise sense—is named as a requirement. Since Socrates does not explain it here, we are faced with a question: to whom or to what is this care directed? Taking into consideration that the subject that needs this care is "the work of the guardians," we can understand that the work of the guardians is required to have special attention paid to and to be taken care of. One of the decisive elements that contain the content of this care is, as Socrates adds, "suitable natural disposition." Now the gravity of their inquiry shifts to the suitable "natural disposition (φύσις)" of the guardians.

After introducing the most important job in the polis in speech, Socrates starts discussing "which (τίνες) are the natural dispositions, and what kind (ποῖαι) they are that fit for guarding of the polis" (374e). After the explanation of wars and the introduction of guardians, the establishment of the polis in speech is suspended and their inquiry starts to focus on the character of guardians. It is first in the middle of the fourth book that Socrates comes back to the theme of justice in poleis. In a passage following the examination on the natural dispositions suitable for the guardians and the educational system for children in the polis, he defines justice as follows:

> *Politeia* 433a
>
> ὃ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατῳκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. [&] ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.
>
> That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be done in everything when we were founding the polis—this, or a certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice. [&] Each one must practice one of the functions in the polis, that one for which one's nature made one naturally most fit.

This definition of justice is proved to be adequate also for the individual soul (443d). Nevertheless, this result seems to be inconsistent with the discussion throughout the establishment of the healthy polis, because, if it is the definition of justice that Socrates has been looking for and whose lack makes the polis unjust, one could see the germination of justice and injustice also in the healthy polis. As we have already seen, Glaucon cannot find justice nor injustice in the healthy polis, and Socrates does not even try to find them in the healthy polis. The problem is, then, why Socrates turns back to the rule set at the beginning of the entire

discussion of the polis-in-speech establishment after moving on to a further investigation of justice by enlarging and swelling the healthy polis.

This problem will not be difficult anymore, as soon as we consider Socrates' formulation of injustice in the polis. He says, "meddling among the classes (πολυπραγμοσύνη), of which there are three, and exchange (μεταβολή) with one another is the greatest harm (μεγίστη βλάβη) for the polis" (434c). Three classes include the guardians who rule the polis, the auxiliaries of the guardians who are also called soldiers and the other members, such as farmers and shoemakers. This definition of injustice of polis—precisely, "the greatest harm" for the polis—implies a surprising root of injustice in the polis. Since the guardian including the ruling class and its auxiliary class appears only in the luxurious polis, "meddling" and "exchange" with another class can occur also only in the luxurious polis. The existence of the guardian class is, in reality, the root of injustice in the polis, although the role of the guardian is, whether it is set in the polis as a job or it is within oneself, to "keep guard over people [because the guardian is] afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with the greatest evil" (367a) However, this fact can be seen as a hint to what justice is, because injustice exists always as the opposite of justice: injustice can exist only when justice is found. Hence, injustice is defined as the opposite to the justice that each one does one's job without meddling nor exchanging with one another. In this sense, the polis which Glaucon calls "the polis of pigs" is surely "healthy" and "true," but not a "just" polis. Just as injustice can be found only in the luxurious polis, also justice can be found only in the luxurious polis. The question is, then, how one can remake this "luxurious," "swollen and inflamed" polis into the just polis, if there is no choice to become the healthy polis. Because there is neither justice nor injustice in the healthy polis, the healthy polis lacks the concept "just/unjust" itself. The reconstruction of the luxurious polis is called "purification (διακαθαίρειν or καθαίρειν)."

Let us turn our eyes back to the explanation of wars. The reference to wars leads Socrates and his interlocutors necessarily to an examination of the guardians of the polis,

especially from the perspective of their natural disposition and the educational program for them. These two subjects shall be examined in detail in the following chapters, but it is necessary for now to understand the reason why Socrates pays attention to these points for the sake of searching for justice and injustice in the luxurious polis.

The descriptions of the luxurious polis by Socrates already contain many negative images; they are observable especially in the presentation of the feature that people there have: greediness. The luxurious polis entails some seeds or origins of injustice from its very beginning and it is unavoidable that this polis involves these seeds. The task of Socrates is not only to illustrate how the luxurious polis comes into being, but also to remove the elements that make the polis unjust so that the purification of the luxurious polis succeeds. For, by which means can the luxurious polis purified? It is, according to Socrates, through education. After discussing the content of poetry and its musical elements (*mousikê*), Socrates claims as follows: "And by the dog, [&] unawares we have again purified (διακαθαίροντες) the polis that while ago we said was luxurious" (399e). Socrates has "purified" the luxurious polis by discussing and instituting the educational program related to *mousikê*. In other words, the establishment of the educational program in the luxurious polis can be understood as removal of the seeds that cause injustice. What Socrates calls "purify" is not correcting unjust elements; he does not put something right that has already appeared unjust. What he is doing in the process of the purification is to uproot things that shall become the motivation of injustice, i.e., exchanging among three classes. "Purify" here does not mean rushing out everything in the luxurious polis so that one can acquire the healthy polis. Rather, Socrates tries to pluck the seeds of injustice, namely something that is not yet injustice but will highly probably become injustice in the future. According to Socrates' observation, most seeds of injustice can be found in the education, especially that using *mousikê*.

This point has been already alluded to, when Socrates gave the names of people who appear first in the luxurious polis. Recall Table 1 where two categories of people in the luxurious

polis are described. People in category I produce something which have direct connection to the necessities, while those in category II produce something that does not exist in the healthy polis at all. Education and imitation—it cannot be understood separately from the concept of *mousikê*—belong to the product of those in category II. In this way, Socrates handles education and imitation as a clue to the inquiry of justice in poleis or the just polis. When the roots of injustice in education and imitation are able to be removed, the polis will become just, while it is characterized as "luxurious."

4. Summary

This chapter attempted to find out how Plato's political philosophy begins, or, formulated more precisely, how the political dimension emerges in the *Politeia*, which begins with a private dialogue about justice in the individual despite its title. Even though we share the understanding that Plato's *Politeia* is one of the masterpieces in the field of political philosophy or political thought, it is worthwhile to address this question. For the question of "the political" in Plato's philosophy makes us consider or reconsider the border of the political and the non-political. The fact that the inquiry into the political dimension serves firstly as an auxiliary means to observe the individual soul shows us the close relation between a polis and an individual soul. We cannot discuss the political without concerning the psychic dimension of the members of the polis.

In order to address this question, I took up firstly the analogy between soul and polis, which is normally recognized as the starting point of the observation on the political in the *Politeia*, comparing the similar analogy found in the *Nomoi*. This chapter revealed that the analogy between soul and polis is, contrary to its appearance, not the starting point or the first introduction of the political dimension in the *Politeia*. This analogy is the consequence of the discussion that follows from the foregoing discussion on justice and a just man. The analysis in the Section 2 showed that the discussion on justice in the individual has already included the

political dimension. The discourse firstly developed between Socrates and Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book 1 concerns almost exclusively the individual life, because the first question appeared in the dialogue is whether a just man is able to receive a suitable reward for a just life. In order to deepen this theme, however, it should be questioned how the individual acquires the view on justice which is more or less consented among people in the polis. The citations by Glaucon and Adeimantus from some poetical works indicate that one acquires the view(s) on justice from poetry to which they grow accustomed, because they have heard them told by their fathers and carers since their childhood. Fathers and carers use poetry as the ethical examples and models for just persons and, as a result, children learn why justice is praised; a just person receives rewards and happiness. The works of the great poets, Homer and Hesiod, have an especially great influence, because they have been known to almost all of the ancient Greeks. Fathers and carers tell stories of these poets to children, sometimes just for fun, but sometimes in order to instill courage or justice in children. In the moment when the carers tell the prevailed stories to the cared, the private dialogue between fathers and children becomes political, even if it is told within a house. It is for this reason that this chapter saw the reference to the poetical works by Adeimantus as the beginning of "the political" in the *Politeia*.

The second part of this chapter examined how Socrates and his interlocutors establish a polis by speech and where they find the germination of justice and injustice in the polis. This examination lead us to the conclusion that the primitive polis is not an ideal polis at all, although it is called "true and healthy." The firstly emerging polis is named "the polis of pigs" by Glaucon. While it is described as a healthy one, there is neither injustice nor justice. Therefore, Socrates has to establish one more polis for the sake of seeing how justice and injustice come into being in the polis. The secondly emerging polis is called "the swollen and inflamed polis," that is, the luxurious polis. The members of this polis can be sorted into two categories, as is shown in Table 1. Those in category I are engaged in the jobs providing something relating to

the products that are consumed also in the healthy polis. In category II, there are two kinds of people who are engaged in the jobs providing something that does not exist in the healthy polis but is newly added in this polis: one is imitators engaged in imitation including poetry and the other is educators. If we consider the fact that there are neither justice nor injustice in the healthy polis, people in category II and their product can be understood to contain the germination of justice and injustice. Thus, it is inevitable to scrutinize and control imitators and educators in order to "purify" the luxurious polis. This point is also related to the guardians, who do not exist in the healthy polis either. The swelling and greedy feature of the luxurious polis causes wars. Originally in order to wage wars and fight against enemies well, it requires the class specialized in fighting: the class of guardians. However, the guardians also have the role of governing the entire polis. The role of the guardians and the combination of education and imitation (especially *mousikê*) converges at the first stage of the ideal education program of the luxurious polis. Thus, we now have three elements of the ideal polis: the guardians, education and *mousikê*. If children are rightly raised and educated through *mousikê*, some of them will become guardians who are able to rule the entire polis in an appropriate way. If the polis has right guardians in the future, it will not repeatedly demand "purification." In this way, education and *mousikê*, or, more concretely, education through *mousikê* appear as the central concern of Plato's political philosophy.

CHAPTER II.

CONDITIO HUMANA AND ENVIRONMENT FOR EDUCATION

1. Introduction

As the examinations in the previous chapter showed, the roots of injustice in the polis exist in the people and the productions that do not exist in the first healthy polis; they are guardians, education and imitation, especially *mousikê*. In the words of Socrates, the right establishment of education through *mousikê* for children, which necessarily include future guardians, is the purification of the luxurious polis. Justice in poleis is expected to be found in the purified luxurious polis.

Before investigating the content of education through imitation in Chapter III, this chapter concentrates on the inquiry into the preparatory conditions of education: that is, human nature as the object of education, and the environment under which children should be educated. Actually, Plato refers to these two points *after* discussing the content of education. The order of the examinations in this paper is, therefore, opposite to that in the *Politeia* itself. This relocation of the discussion aims at clearly demonstrating the reason why upbringing and education through *mousikê* is set on the very first stage of the pedagogic program in the just polis. As this chapter shall prove, upbringing and education through *mousikê* is directed not only toward the children who are to become guardians of the polis. It is potentially open to all children living in the polis. However, because Socrates originally attempts to define the pedagogic program only for guardians, education through *mousikê* as its first step tends to be interpreted also as a program only for guardians. It seems useful to remove this misunderstanding before the observation on the content of education, so that readers would be

able to read the first stage of Plato's educational program in a different way from the interpretation that it is the educational program only for guardians.

This chapter deals with two themes: *conditio humana* and environment of education. Although these are different themes and I discuss them separately in different sections, they are closely interconnected to one another. The goal of this chapter as a whole is to illuminate Plato's view on human being, especially children who are to be educated. The question that will be addressed in this chapter can be formulated as follows: Who are the children that are to be nurtured and educated, and what kind of place is it where they are educated? Education defined by Socrates in the *Politeia* plays the role of educating children to become human beings before becoming members of the polis, because they do not have any difference from beasts. In this way, the question above includes necessarily the more general question of who are human beings. This is the question of *conditio humana*.

The concept "*conditio humana*," whose English translation "human condition" became famous by the work of Hannah Arendt,[70] is observable from, at least, three perspectives, more precisely, three different dichotomies, in the ancient Greek world (the seventh to fourth centuries B.C.E.).[71] First, the relationship between humans and gods; in this perspective, the *conditio humana* functions as the line differentiating humans from gods. The relationship between gods and humans in the Greek mythology is quite different from, for example, that in the Christianity. Since gods intervene in human lives constantly, one needs the clear boundary between gods and humans. In this dichotomy, the basic *conditio humana* can be found in the words of Tiresias to Creon in the *Antigone*, the masterpiece of Sophocles: "Realize that once more now you are walking on fortune's razor-edge."[72] The crucial point of this dichotomy is

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[70] Hannah Arendt. *Human Condition*.

[71] Jonas Grethlein. "Die Griechen-Barbaren Dichotomie im Horizont der *conditio humana*."

[72] Φρόνει βεβὼς αὖ νῦν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ τύχης. (*Antigone*, Line 996). As for the more detailed examination of "τύχη," see Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, revised edition. She devotes Chapter 3 to interpretation of the *Antigone*.

that human beings can do nothing against fortune or luck, which was normally understood as divine will in the ancient Greek world.

The second perspective for *conditio humana* concerns the relationship between humans and animals. The most famous argument discussed from this perspective is Aristotle's *Politics*. At the beginning of the *Politics*, Aristotle defines humans as animals with logos—reason and language—, while other animals possess only voice.[73] This perspective has been attractive especially for political philosophers, because among animals only humans gather and make "political" communities, although some animals can also be called "political".[74] The task that Plato and Aristotle engage by distinguishing humans from other animals is to prove that humans are especially political animals. Plato examines *conditio humana* also from this perspective.

Finally, there is also the dichotomy of the Greeks and the barbarians; this is known especially from Aeschylus' *Persians* and Herodotus' *Histories*.[75] Unlike the previous two perspectives, this perspective concerns only humans. For the Greeks who faced the oriental people at the Persian War, the separation of "us," the Greeks, from the barbarians, the Persians, is of great significance. The dichotomy between them appears mostly in the political sense: the Greeks living under democracy, in free-poleis, versus the barbarians living under despotism, in

[73] "And why human being (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) is a political animal (πολιτικὸν ζῷον) in a greater measure (μᾶλλον)than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well [&] but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong." Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a. διότι δὲ πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων.

[74] As the passage of the *Politics* in the previous footnote shows, some animals, such as bee, are also regarded as political, but human being is *more* political.

[75] For example, line 584-597 of Aeschylus's *Persians*: "Not now for will those who dwell throughout the length and breadth of Asia abide under the sway of the Persians, nor will they pay further tribute at the compulsion of their lord, nor will they prostrate themselves to the earth and do him reverence" (584-589). Herodotus describes the dichotomy between the Greeks and the Persians vividly in the seventh book (Polymnia) of the *Historiae*, section 102-104, in the dialogue between Demaratus, th king of Sparta, and Xerxes.

slavery. In spite of such a polarization, however, the descriptions in the *Persians* and in the *Histories* reveal that the barbarians are not only the enemies of the Greeks, but also "fellow human beings (Mitmenschen)," who share the *conditio humana* with the Greeks.[76] In this perspective, the *conditio humana* functions not as a dividing line just as the previous ones do, but as the commonness which lies behind the dichotomy.

The *conditio humana* that shall be discussed in this chapter connects somehow with all of these perspectives, but it relates especially closely to the second one. Since Plato's attempt in the *Politeia* is to establish a just polis or to purify the luxurious polis, the first task is to observe human beings themselves in order to confirm who the members of the polis are and what kind of feature they have. While Aristotle sees the special feature of humans in their possession of *logos*, the observation of Plato roots in the perceptions.

2. *Conditio Humana*

2. 1. Perception of Rhythm and Harmony

I start this section by interpreting some passages from the *Nomoi*. The concepts examined in this section are rhythm and harmony, and the auditory and visual perceptions that are used for sensing them. They are also referred to in the *Politeia*, but Socrates discusses them in a vaguer way. As the third section shall show, when Socrates sets the adequate environment of education, he surely presupposes the perceptions proper to human beings, that is, the auditory and visual senses as the ability to perceive orders and disorders in motions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to interpret some passages appeared in the *Nomoi* parallel to *Politeia*, at least in terms of the perceptions of human beings.

[76] Glethlein, "Die Griechen-Barbaren Dichotomie im Horizont der *conditio humana*." pp. 145-146.

In the first book of the *Nomoi*, the Athenian and his interlocutors handle the question of how the good laws should be established, inquiring the existing laws in Crete and in Sparta. This inquiry in Book 1 contains also the question of “the right education (ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία),” because the laws must concern pleasure and pain whose education can be called “right” education (*Nom*. 653a). The aim of the discussion developed in Book 2 is to define “the right education” for children. We can find the description of the *conditio humana* that makes humans different from animals in the inquiry of the right education.

At the beginning of the second book, the Athenian explains clearly the difference between animals and humans in respect of the perception.

> *Nomoi* 653e-654a
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> τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ζῷα οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀταξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία: ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς, ᾗ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας, χορούς τε ὠνομακέναι παρὰ τὸ τῆς χαρᾶς ἔμφυτον ὄνομα. πρῶτον δὴ τοῦτο ἀποδεξώμεθα;
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> *Athenian*: The other animals the argument goes, lack perception of orders and disorders in motions (the orders which have received the names of “rhythm” and “harmony”); we, in contrast, have been given the aforementioned gods as fellow-dancers, and they have given us the pleasant perception of rhythm and harmony. Using this they move us and lead us in choruses, joining us together with songs and dances.

We notice firstly that two things are compared (through the expression “μέν& δέ& ” in this passage): “other animals” on the one hand, and “we” on the other hand. Therefore, this passage

indicates how the human race as a species of animals is distinguished from other animal species. What brings the dividing line between them is, according to the Athenian, "the perception of orders and disorders in motions," which is also called "rhythm" and "harmony." By describing rhythm and harmony as "orders (τάξις) and disorders (ἀταξία) in motions," the Athenian hints that there are "good" rhythm that fits to the original arrangement (τάξις), and "bad" rhythm that unfits to it. Because the word "τάξις" reminds us of something arranged in a line,[77] when he sys "ἀταξία" in motions as its opposite, the readers think not only something unpleasant but also something wrong with its motion. While other animals lack of the perceptions of such orders and disorders, i.e., rhythm and harmony, "we," namely human beings, are able to perceive them. It can be noteworthy that the Athenian does not say that other animals have neither rhythm nor harmony. They may have them; for instance, we may find harmony in the twittering of birds. However, the Athenian does not think that other animals, such as birds, sense that their voices (φωνή) have rhythm and harmony. The criterion that distinguishes humans from other animals is *not* the possession of rhythm and harmony, but the perception of them. In contrast to other animals, "we" the human beings have the perception. The Athenian explains the reason why only humans came to be able to have this kind of perception by referring to gods; humans are "fellow-dancers" (συγχορευτής) of gods.[78] That the Athenian defines humans as "fellow-dancers" of gods plays an important role in the discussions following this passage. In the later part of Book 2, the Athenian discusses the "dance" (χορεία) and the education for it (*Nom*. 665a ff.). I translate χορεία (*choreia*) here "dance," but it is noteworthy that this word is the etymon of "chorus." The *choreia* in the ancient Greek world includes not only chorus, which indicates almost exclusively singing, but also dancing, which concept I will discuss in detail in Chapter

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[77] See Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek English Lexicon*. The first meaning of this word is "drawing up in rank" or "a single rank or line of soldiers" in military sense.
[78] This image can be compared with the myth of the chariot in the *Phaedrus* (246a-257b). In the Phaedrus, some people cannot follow gods, but in the *Nomoi*, there is no mention that there are some people who cannot be the members of "fellow dancers."

III. For now, we have to know that the "fellow-dancers" who are also singing, and therefore humans as dancers need both rhythm and harmony.

In addition to the point above, one has to pay attention to the expression of "accompanied with pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς)." The "pleasure" here should not be confused with the various kinds of pleasure which are described as iron strings in the metaphor of marionette. These kinds of pleasure are said to be overcome, just as desire, because they are pulling humans against the direction the divine *logismos*, the soft and golden string, pulls them into. This expression "with pleasure" indicates that humans are not only able to perceive rhythm and harmony, but also to feel "pleasure" when one senses "orders" in motions. This pleasure seems to implie two abilities. First, humans are pleased when they perceive or discover orders and disorders in motions. This pleasure can be understood also as the ability to have pleasure in the perception of rhythm and harmony.

The second meaning of pleasure is the ability to dance. As mentioned before by the Athenian, humans are able to sense rhythm and harmony because they are "fellow-dancers" of gods; humans are made to dance together with other people. This point suggests not only that dance itself is regarded as a pleasure based on its divinity (it is given by gods, Apollo and the Muses). It emphasizes also that people are "joined together (ἀλλήλοις συνείρειν)" through the perception of rhythm and harmony. In order to dance together, it must be premised that the dancers, i.e. humans, share the perception of rhythm and harmony. If some perceive orders in motion which others regard as disorders, it will be impossible to dance together. The "fellow-dancers" or dancing together entails the commonness of the perception of rhythm and harmony among people who are "joined together." If the members of the group sense orders and disorders in motion differently, they cannot dance together, therefore, the group will unavoidably collapse. It is also noteworthy that the Athenian describes rhythm and harmony using two antonyms "orders (τάξις) and disorders (ἀταξία)." As mentioned before, τάξις indicates originally "a rank or line of soldiers" in the military sense as well as "arrangement" in the

ordinary sense. In addition, it also means "political order" or "constitution."[79] We can interpret that these words hint at the order, arrangement or rule in the community. Hence, the pleasure as the ability to dance can be formulated as the pleasure of being a member of the group or community.

In this way, the *conditio humana* that distinguishes humans from other animals is characterized with the following features: first, the perception of orders and disorders in motions which are called rhythm and harmony, and second, this perception is accompanied by pleasure. The pleasure consists not only in sensing rhythm and harmony, but also in sensing them with other members of the group. The *conditio humana* defined in the *Nomoi* can be regarded as one of the preconditions for the gathering of people and making a community.

However, what is shown above does not necessarily mean that human beings possess the ability to perceive orders and disorders in motions by nature, or by birth, *although* it is considered as the *conditio humana*. While this ability distinguishes humans from other animals, the Athenian does not see it as something that all humans possess by birth.

> *Nomoi* 808d
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> ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον: ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμὺ καὶ ὑβριστότατον θηρίων γίγνεται.

[79] See Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, the usages of τάξις in II. 5. Aristotle uses τάξις as "constitution" or the structure of the political system in his *Athenian Constitution*: "The form of the ancient constitution (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχάιας πολιτείας) that existed before Draco was as follows. Appointment to the supreme offices of state went by birth and wealth; and they were held at first for life, and afterwards for a term of ten years" (Chapter 3. Section 1).

> And the child is the hardest to handle of all beasts, because insofar as it has within it, to a high degree, a not yet disciplined fount of thought, it becomes fierce, sharp, and the most insolent of beasts.

The description that "the hardest to handle of all beasts" in the first sentence has a great impact on readers. The impact may be explained by two elements. First, Plato uses "beast (θήρ)" instead of "animal (ζῷν)." Since "beast" connotes a ferocious and flesh-eating animal, the image of baby and child, such as powerlessness and helplessness, seems to be the opposite to the characters of beasts. Second, he uses the superlative form of the adjective "hard to handle (δυσμεταχείριστος)." Indeed, children, especially infants, are hard to handle. But this difficulty is not similar to that in handling beasts. Comparing children to the beast hardest to handle seems counter-intuitive. Now we have to consider the reason why the Athenian describes children thus, observing the sentence following the impressive expression. The important peculiarity of children is that their "thought" (φρονεῖν) has not yet been "disciplined" or "trained" (καταρτύω). The expression "the fount of thought" implies that thought is abundant in children. This *phronein* or *phronêsis* has a large amount of capability; as the Athenian discusses in Book 1 of the *Nomoi*, it functions as one of the most important virtues of humans (cf. *Nom*. 631c). However, if it is not disciplined, the children remain animals, or even beasts. The Athenian explains elsewhere the consequence that the lack of disciplined thought or prudence brings about as follows: "During the time in which it lacks the prudence, that is proper to it, every being is completely mad (πᾶν μαίνεταί) and cries out in a disorderly way (βοᾷ ἀτάκτως) (*Nom*. 672c2-4)." The lack of prudence makes every being "completely mad and cry out in a disorderly way." Note that the Athenian indicates all animals including human beings by expressing πᾶν ζῷον. He does not see any difference between humans and other animals, when they are in the "time in which they lack the prudence," namely when they are infants or children. It is also noteworthy that he uses the word "disorderly" twice in the same passage: "it cries out in a

disorderly way" and "it jumps in a disorderly way (ἀτάκτως πηδᾷ)" (*Nom*. 672c5). This word has a relation to "order (τάξις) and disorder (ἀταξία)" in the passage where the perception of rhythm and harmony is explained. Therefore it clearly hints at the lack of rhythm or the lack of the ability to observe rhythm. The observation of rhythm is, as we have seen in the previous subsection, defined as the *conditio humana* that differentiates humans from other animals. The Athenian argues also here that the lack of rhythm or that of the ability to observe or perceive rhythm is equal to the lack of prudence, which is common to all animals while they are children.

In this way, to acquire the ability to observe rhythm is depicted as the prerequisite for disciplining the prudence. This is the only way that children do not become fierce beasts. There are, of course, the physical or biological differences between animals and humans, but the Athenian prompts us to see humans and animals only from the viewpoint of the ability to observe and perceive orders and disorders in motions, i.e., rhythm and harmony. If we see children only from this perspective, we will find that children and other animals are not so much different. This ability, which is depicted as the *conditio humana*, now appears as the goal at which upbringing and education for children aim for the sake of making them not the most insolent beasts, but humans.

I examined hitherto only the passages of the *Nomoi*, but the similar basic recognition concerning children is found also in the *Politeia*. As the observation above elucidates, the task in raising children is to make them move not in a disorderly way. The order in motions is, as the Athenian defines, called rhythm and harmony. This indicates that the first stage of upbringing and education for children should be practiced through *mousikê*. Socrates in the *Politeia* shares this recognition with the Athenian. He sets two subjects as "the first step (ἀρχή)" of the upbringing and education: the physical training (gymnastics) for bodies (γυμναστικὴ ἐπὶ σώμασι) and the *mousikê* for souls (μουσικὴ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ). He pays special attention to the setting of these two subjects, because he sees the childhood as the most decisive time in a human life.

Politeia 377a

οὐκοῦν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ.

Don't you know that the beginning is the most important part of every work and that this is especially so with anything young and tender? For that stage it is easiest to be fashioned, and each thing assimilate itself to the model whose stump anyone wishes to give to it.

At first glance, it may be difficult to find a similarity between this passage and the second last citation from the *Nomoi*, because here children are depicted as something "tender" or "straightforward (ἁπλόος)." They are quite soft and simple, which description does not fit to the Athenian's characterization of "the hardest to handle" (*Nom*. 808d). However, the feature this time, that is being "easy to be fashioned," hints at the possibility that children become everything, even "the most insolent beast."

The characterization of children with the softness and simplicity is shared by the Athenian in the *Nomoi*. The Athenian says; "Least of all the newborn, if one can help it, for that is the age when, through habituation (διὰ ἔθος), the most decisive (κυριώτατον) growth in the entire character (τὸ πᾶν ἦθος) occurs for everyone " (*Nom.* 792d-e). Instead of the expression "the most important (μλεγίστον)," the Athenian uses the superlative form "the most decisive" to describe the importance of the childhood. The reason of this importance is, according to him, that "the entire character" of children is decided in their earliest time of life, i.e., in their childhood. It is obvious that what is done in "the time of newborn" can be seen as the "beginning" of "every work", which is, as we saw in the citation, mentioned by Socrates in the *Politeia*.

In addition, the quotation from the *Nomoi* above shows an interesting view on education. According to the Athenian, the entire character (ἦθος) grows (ἐμφύεται) in the beginning of life, especially in the time of newborn, through habituation (διὰ ἔθος). While this explanation seems to accord with our *sensus communis* quite well, the usage and the choice of words by Plato are worth noting. For, he uses "habituation" and the word ἐμφύω, which is related to nature (φύσις) at the same time, although "nature" is normally understood as something that one possesses by birth, not as something that one acquires through habituation. Then, we should use from now on "physis," the simple latinized Greek word, for the translation of the φύσις to indicate "nature" or "natural disposition" in Plato's sense, because the normal usage of "nature" does not seem to fit to the concept of φύσις.

The combination of habit and *physis* is found not only in the passages quoted above. For example, in the passage where the Athenian explains what kind of character in the poetical works brings the audience pleasure as follows:

Nomoi 655d-e

ἐπειδὴ μιμήματα τρόπων ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς χορείας, ἐν πράξεσί τε παντοδαπαῖς γιγνόμενα καὶ τύχαις, καὶ ἤθεσι καὶ μιμήσεσι διεξιόντων ἑκάστων, οἷς μὲν ἂν πρὸς τρόπου τὰ ῥηθέντα ἢ μελῳδηθέντα ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν χορευθέντα, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τούτους μὲν καὶ τούτοις χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ προσαγορεύειν καλὰ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷς δ᾽ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα συνήθειαν, οὔτε χαίρειν δυνατὸν οὔτε ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχρά τε προσαγορεύειν.

Athenian: Choral performances are imitations of characters, in all sorts of action and fortune, and each brings to bear both his habitual dispositions and his capacity to imitate. Now those whose character is in accord with what is said and sung and in any way performed—*because of physis or habit or both*— are necessarily delighted by the

things, and led to praise them and pronounce them fine. Those, on the other hand, who find that the things go against *physis, character, or a certain habituation*, are unable to delight in them or to praise them, and must necessarily pronounce them ugly. (emphasis added)

In this passage, the Athenian puts "*physis*" and "habit (ἔθος)" or "habituation (συνήθειαν)" in a row. While they are described as different things, their functions seem to be similar; both *physis* and habit or habituation have the role of forming one's character (ἦθος). *Physis* and habit or habituation are equally "most decisive" in the character formation. This understanding of *physis* and habit is shared in the *Politeia*.

In the last part of this subsection, I focused on the combination of *physis* and habit, because, being always considered together with the description of "the most decisive time," what is formed seems to be not only habit but also *physis*, namely natural disposition, of children. Surely, however, this interpretation is not easily acceptable, firstly because it sounds strange or contradictory that *physis* , which should be understood as something equipped in each one by birth, is formed. Besides, if one reads the famous myth of the *Politeia*, the concept of *physis* appears as something that one possesses by birth and something unchangeable. Then, what does *physis* actually indicate in the argument on education?

2. 2. *Physis*

Physis, nature or natural disposition, has, in reality, been already mentioned in the previous chapter; that is the basic assumption lying in the rule of the establishment of the polis, which came to appear as justice in poleis.

Let us read again the passage where Socrates introduces the basic rule in the polis established in speech as the prerequisite; "In the first place, each of us is actually not quite like

anyone else, but rather diverse in his *physis* (διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν); different men are apt for the accomplishment of different jobs (370a-b).”.

All human beings are born differently, and what makes them different from each other is their *physis*. An adequate activity is assigned to each and every one. This *physis* does indicate the essence for the core of human beings, but the range this word covers here is narrower than the word *physis* generally has. Normally we understand *physis* from the viewpoint of its Latin translation, *natura*.[80] The *physis* of human beings depicted in the words of Socrates above, on the other hand, does not seem to be the *conditio humana*, which, as observed before, distinguishes humans from other animals. Rather, he uses this word as disposition of each person through which each of the members of the polis acquires the adequate job. If someone possesses the disposition fitting to shoemakers, he or she should work as a shoemaker, but not as a farmer or weaver. The *physis* in this context can be called the occupational disposition, because it concerns exclusively one’s occupation. However, in spite of such description (cf. 370c-d), this occupational disposition does not seem to be subdivided precisely; it is divided only into three categories, namely the *physis* of guardians, that of auxiliaries or soldiers and that of producers as well as craftsmen. This means, there is little difference between the *physis* of shoemakers and that of weavers or farmers, as far as these occupations belong to the same category, i.e., the producers. Then, it is necessary to thoroughly observe the *physis* as such, considering whether it is, just like the *conditio humana* in the *Nomoi*, not determined by birth, or, as we understand under the ordinary translation of “nature,” it means something that is determined by birth.

[80] Although there are various kinds of the definition of nature / *natura* / *physis*, it can be observed from the following two perspectives: the “quantitative” perspective and the “qualitative” one. The understanding of the *physis* as the opposite to *technê* or nomos belongs to the former, while the understanding of it as the unchanging essence (was einem Seienden auf unveränderliche Weise zukommt) belongs to the latter. See Petra Kolmer, “Natur,” p. 1560-1561.

As some passages in the *Nomoi* show, the word "*physis*" is coupled with "habit" and the Athenian seems to consider that both *physis* and habit play an important role in forming one's character. In contrast to the rule that each one has to do one job which one is naturally good at, the passages in the *Nomoi* quoted above imply that something that one possesses by birth cannot form one's character by itself. The combination of physis and habit seems to contradict the statement that the *physis* determines the occupation, or at least the class to which each one is to belong. This point becomes decisive in investigating education, because if we understand the *physis* as natural disposition which is already determined by birth and if the *physis* is powerful enough to assign each one a single job in the polis, upbringing and education would play a small role. For, if this were the case, the task concerning every child in the polis would not be to educate them, but differentiate the future guardians from others. Although the length of the pedagogic programs stretching from Book 2 to 7 shows the importance of education, the myth Socrates tells at the end of Book 3 seems to reinforce the so-called deterministic view of the *physis*, because its story tells that the occupational category to which one is to belong is determined by god when he fashioned humans.

The myth is one of the evidences on which some scholars rely when they try to claim that the social structure of Plato's ideal polis is reflected on the determinism of the natural disposition. The myth, which originates, according to Socrates, from the Phoenician story, consists of two significant elements. First, all people in the polis are said to have been "fashioned (πλάττεσθαι)" and "reared (τρέφεσθαι)" under the earth (414d-e). The earth is the mother from which all citizens are born, therefore, all citizens in this polis are like brothers and sisters.[81] This first points concerning the earth being their origin and mother can be seen as an

[81] Socrates mentions only brothers (ἀδελφοί), but it may not be impossible to include sisters under γεγενής, which means originally "earthborn." In addition it is clear that there are women in the ideal polis and they play an important role. For example, note the following words of Socrates: "we use the women for the same things as the men, they must also be taught the same things" (451e).

emphasis of the commonality among citizens in the polis in spite of their different physical or psychic features.[82] Second, when god had fashioned them (ὁ θεὸς πλάττων), he mixed gold in those who are competent to rule. He mixed silver, on the other hand, in those who are capable to help the full guardians, and iron and bronze in those who are skillful at farming and the other craftsmanship (415a).[83] Unlike the first point, the second point emphasizes the clear dissimilarity under three categories of the citizens in the polis: the guardians as rulers of the polis, the auxiliaries and, as the third category, producers such as farmers as well as craftsmen. It explains that the citizens are different from each other and unequal in accordance with metals that god mixed in fashioning them under the earth. In this way, the Phoenician myth explains why some are able to rule while some are to be ruled, and how the occupational dispositions are assigned before their births. The assignment of the occupational disposition is portrayed as a kind of divine will.

This myth seems, at first glance, to be an evidence of Plato's deterministic view on the *physis*, especially the occupational disposition, of humans. Each one has an occupational disposition, which is likened to three kinds of metal, but it is assigned only by god before one's birth. This implies that human kinds could do nothing against it. Even though one does not believe in such a divine creation story, this description has enough power to persuade us somehow, because it is compatible with our *sensus communis*; for example, some physical features, such as height, are very often regarded as a part of heredities. Then, is the occupational

[82] The emphasis of the commonality among citizens is the first aim of this myth, but it is not the only aim, although Canto-Sperber and Brisson regards this myth as such. (Monique Canto-Sperber & Luc Brisson, "Zur sozialen Gliederung der Polis," p.72.) The comparison of citizens with brothers seems to function of recalling the worst war, civil strife. Simon refers to this point, associating it with the prohibition of private property: "Private property is associated with jealousy and ultimately with civil strife. Fratricide will inevitably replace fraternal love if any brother thinks another has more or better than he." (Bennett Simon, *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece*, p. 177.)

[83] This is not genetic. Normally a child has the same metal as his or her parents but sometimes there is an exception; it happens that parents with gold have a child with silver.

disposition really determined before one's birth and is this what Socrates tries to argue for, using this Phoenician myth?

I pose this question several times since the previous section, firstly because the deterministic view on the natural disposition does not seem compatible with the length of the discussion on upbringing and education. In addition, the three-fold classification of citizens—the guardians, the auxiliaries and others—has often induced some unjustified misunderstanding of Plato's political philosophy, especially the structure of his ideal polis.[84] In the rest of this section, I will try to prove that Plato (and Socrates) does not see the occupational disposition as the only decisive element for determining one's role in the polis.[85]

It is noteworthy that, whereas Socrates tells that "gold" is assigned to those who are competent to rule the polis under the earth before their birth, he emphasizes at the same time the necessity of physical training in order that they become true full guardians, even if they are by birth physically gifted (403c ff.). The physical features are often seen as the most innate dispositions, but Socrates argues that the innate strength is not enough for the work of guardian; they need also training for bodies. This implies the importance lies on the training or upbringing as well as on the natural disposition. For, if "gold," or the occupational disposition that each one possesses before one's birth, would be so powerful to determine one's occupation or role in the polis by itself, those who have, for example, strength suitable to the work of guardians would become guardians anyway. In order to observe this small contradiction deeper, let us closely examine the relationship between the occupational disposition described in the myth and that assumed in the educational program.

The subject on upbringing and education for the guardians comes up in the discussion, after Socrates defines the *physis* that "the future good and virtuous guardians (ὁ μέλλων καλὸς

[84] The extreme case is Karl Popper.
[85] In my forthcoming paper "Die Physis der Philosophen und der Nicht-Philosophen," I discuss this problem in more detail.

κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως)" should possess. The *physis* of the guardians is defined from three aspects: the physical, the psychic and the intellectual perspectives. Physically, the guardians must have sharp senses, speed and strength (375a). These physical characteristics necessarily require further psychic characteristics: courage and spiritedness (θυμοειδής / τὸ θυμοειδές). If one lacks courage, one cannot fight good. Thanks to the courage, "every soul will be fearless and invincible in the face of everything" (375b). It is obvious that the physical and psychic characteristics above are set for the sake of beating enemies. Note that in the description here Socrates does not separate "the full guardians (φύλακες παντελεῖς)" from their "auxiliaries (ἐπίκουροι)" of the guardians. Although these two characteristics seem to be enough, they cannot make people guardians of the polis. For, whether they are humans or animals, they cannot help becoming "wild" or "atrocious" (ἄγριος) against others including their friends. Socrates assumes the possibility that they attempt to wage wars so that they can conquer others *ad arbitrium*, when they come to know that they are stronger than others and, in addition, more courageous to attempt to attack them. In other words, the strength in their bodies and the courage in their souls make people enemies of the weaker ones in the polis. This consequence is the opposite of what Socrates is looking for, because the guardians should be friends of people in the polis. Therefore, he adds the third and intellectual characteristic to the *physis* which the full guardians should own. This is called the "philosophical (φιλόσοφος)" characteristic which is described also "loving of learning (φιλομαθής)" (375e). When these three features are combined adequately, one is ready to become a full guardian. However, these characteristics of the *physis* for the future guardians are only prerequisites of the guardians. Even if one is gifted by birth in terms of physical strength, the psychic virtuousness and the philosophical feature, when one is educated in an unjust way, one cannot become a guardian.

This point is fully presented in the passage cited before. In explaining the importance of "the beginning (ἀρχή)" of upbringing and education, Socrates uses the same word which is found also in the Phoenician myth. As quoted before, the beginning of every work is important,

because in “that stage it is easiest to be fashioned, and each thing assimilate itself to the model whose stump anyone wishes to give to it” (377a). The expression “be fashioned (πλάττεσθαι)” reminds us of the sentence in the Phoenician myth, where Socrates says that god “fashioned” humans under the earth. It should not be underestimated that Plato uses the same word both in the analysis of the psychic education and in the myth, although what is explained there seems to imply the opposite. For, in the passage describing the importance of the first step in the education, using the word πλάττεσθαι, Socrates tries to explain how poets easily influence the children’s souls. Since the souls of children are “young and tender,” people can give forms whatever they wish. This understanding leads to the introduction of a kind of censorship of poetry which children hear quite often. Here, the souls of children are described as soft and sensitive to everything that they perceive. In contrast, the process of “fashioning” in the myth seems to emphasize the immutability of one’s disposition. To “fashion” a human being is, unlike the explanation in the passage concerning the beginning of education, a task that only god can handle.

If we try to understand this contradiction, it is necessary to pay attention to the addressee to whom each of the discussions are directed at. In fact, the Phoenician myth does not address the people who listen to this story. As Glaucon points out, it is not persuasive enough for them. Rather, it is directed to “the rest of the human beings who come afterwards (οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστεροι),” namely the next generation, which comes after the first generation (415d). On the other hand, the passage where Socrates emphasizes the importance of the beginning of every work explains how the educational program should be established.[86] In terms of educating

[86] The difference of style is also worth considering. The passage 377a is a normal explanation, while the story of metals is a myth or narrative. In fact, it is obvious the story of metals is a falsehood. I agree with the view of Brisson that myths play a role of establishing a paradigm: “myth plays the role of a paradigm, and it is by means not of education but of persuasion that all those who are not philosophers—that is, the majority of human beings—are led to embrace this paradigm in order to adapt their behavior to it” (Luc Brisson, *Plato the Myth Maker*, p.121). Note that whether a story includes falsehood is not the criterion of myth. In the *Gorgias*,

children in the polis in question, it must be reasonable to assume that Socrates sees the souls of children as quite soft and sensitive, and if one fails to educate them rightly, their souls are easily to be formed just like those of fierce beasts.

3. Environment for Education

3. 1. Healthy Place

The previous section revealed that the perception of order and disorder in motions is counted as the *conditio humana* in Plato's theory of education. We also observed that Plato places stress on habit or habituation as well as *physis*, or natural disposition, in his pedagogy. Now the question is how the habit or habituation which is appropriate for a member of the purified luxurious polis is made. In order to make such habit, not only the content of education, but also the environment where children are raised up is of importance.

This section, therefore, shall observe what kind of environment Socrates presupposes for the sake of the ideal education. The order of the discussions in the *Politeia* is, as stated before, reversed: Socrates examines firstly the content of the education through *mousikê* and after its examination, he discusses the ideal environment for the education he defined. This paper, however, does not follow the order of the *Politeia*, because it is necessary to prepare the ideal environment before the establishment of the content of the education, and this is also Socrates' basic recognition. For, even if the content of the educational program, for example, what should be told in stories that children often listen to, would be defined precisely, education would fail unless there are possibilities that some pleasant stories, *mousikê* in general, sneak into the polis. Hence, although the order of the discussions is reversed, it is reasonable to observe the environment for educating children before examining its content.

Socrates calls the story which Callicles thinks as a fable (*mythos*) but Socrates himself thinks as a true account (*logos*) (*Gorgias* 523a). See also: Diskin Clay, "Plato Philomythos," pp. 210-211.

Let us start our examination by reading the following passage from the *Politeia* where Socrates explains, using similes, how the environment surrounding children should be set.

> *Politeia* 401 c-d
>
> [&] ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα;
>
> [&] so that, just as they live in a healthy place, the young can draw improvement from every side, whenever things which are beautifully fashioned expose their eyes or ears to some wholesome breeze from healthy regions and lead them imperceptibly, from earliest childhood, into affinity, friendship and harmony with beauty of speech and thought.

In this passage, Socrates uses similes twice which are introduced with "just as (ὥσπερ):" "just as they live in a healthy place" and "just as some breeze bring health from good regions." The remarkable point here is that Socrates uses the words concerning "health" in both similes. It is, therefore, clear that "health" is one of the key characteristics which the environment for the ideal education should equip. The usage of the word "health" or "healthy" reminds us of the description of "the polis of pigs." The first polis that has been established in speech is also expressed as "healthy:" it is "true (ἀληθινή)" and "healthy (ὑγιῆ)" polis (372e). By using the same word, Socrates attempts to get the luxurious polis closer to the healthy one, at least with regard to the environment surrounding children.

I wrote this healthy environment is prepared for "children" instead of "young guardians" or "future guardians" in spite of the following description which is found shortly before the

quoted passage: "we must not permit to practice the craft of the incapable craftsman among us, so that our guardians (ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες) won't be reared (τρεφόμενοι) on images of vice" (401b-c). However, as we observed in the previous section, *physis* or "gold" that one possesses by birth is not powerful enough to determine one's future role in the polis. One will be able to become a true guardian only after one acquires appropriate habits, but it takes long time. If it cannot be determined which children will become true guardians during their childhood, how can this place be reserved only for the future guardians? The question can be also reformulated: For whom is Socrates preparing this healthy place? The answer is quite simple; actually, this environment is prepared theoretically for all children in the polis. This interpretation is supported also by the reason that the ideal education set by Socrates functions also as a touchstone for testing (βάσανος) whether "one will be able to bear the greatest studies (τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα)" (503e-504a). Hence, it is reasonable to see the environment discussed here as that for all children in the polis, who are potentially future guardians.

According to Socrates, the situation in which the young people are educated in the polis can be likened to a place where "they live in a healthy place." The healthy place is contrasted to the "bad pasture (κακὴ βοτάνη)" (401b-c). The bad pasture is harmful for those who "browse and feed (δρεσπόμενοί τε καὶ νεμόμενοι)" from the pasture where they are. When they "browse and feed" every day, even if each time they take "little by little (κατὰ σμικρόν)," it leads to accumulation of bad influences.[87] The words "pasture," "browse" and "feed" make us imagine livestock, such as sheep and goats, which are in need of care. It is interesting here that, although it is a simile of the environment where the future or potential guardians should be raised, those in the pasture are livestock that are in need of care. This awkward discordance becomes more vivid, if we recall the analogy between guardians of the polis and a pedigree hound. In order to explicate the natural disposition of the guardians, Socrates compares "a young man of good

[87] This feature is emphasized by Myles Bernyeat, " Culture and Society in Plato's *Republic*."

birth (νεανικὸς εὐγενής)" to "a young pedigree hound (γενναῖος σκύκαξ)" (375a). He regards this analogy valid, because their dispositions are the same, "when it comes to acting as a guardian" (*ibid.*). At this point, Socrates does not mention what the pedigree dogs are to "guard." However, because we can find expressions like "dogs caring the herds (κύνες ἐπίκουροι ποιμνίων)" at the end of Book 3 (416a) and "[watchdogs (φύλακες κύνες)] take care of the herds (πᾶσαν ἐμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποίμνια)" at the beginning of Book 5 (451d), it is obvious that the pedigree dogs or the watchdogs take care of the herds of livestock; they are, in other words, shepherd dogs.

We now return to the relevant passage. If we take into account the description that the dogs as shepherd dogs take care of the herds of sheep, the passage in question looks awkward. Although Socrates tries to explain the ideal environment of the education for potential guardians who were previously likened to watchdogs, those which Socrates portrays here are, actually, the herds of sheep, which are in need of being guarded. There seems to be only a small contradiction between Socrates' descriptions, but it includes the decisive point: that is, guardians are in need of being guarded or cared when they are "young (νέοι)." This statement may seem obvious, because no one thinks that children can be raised without parental care. However, "the care (ἐπιμέλεια)" required here does not solely indicate such care that adults take in order to raise their children biologically. This point becomes clear when one takes into account the explanation that one has to prepare not only a place (τόπος) to raise children, but "a healthy place (ὑγιεινὸς τόπος)" which enables them to raise them better. This point can be also a proof that the occupational disposition that one posesses by birth does not solely determine whether one becomes a guardian or not.

As the comparison of the future guardians to herds of sheep shows, children are, even though they have "gold" by birth, in need of special care, and without such care, they can never become guardians. The natural disposition fitting to the work of guardians is powerless in front of the bad pasture, i.e., the unhealthy environment. Their innate disposition will easily corrupt

in the bad pasture. Again, this point proves that the healthy place is prepared not only for some selected children, but for every child in this polis. For, when people are small and they are in need of care, they are in the process of "test" whether they are really suited for the work of guardian. There is little difference among three categories when people are children, therefore the healthy place for guardians is necessarily equal to the healthy place for all children. According to this interpretation, "the healthy place" is not a kind of closed place where only selected children are able to be trained and educated. This place is almost equal to the entire polis. Setting the place adequate for the ideal education is, for Socrates, almost the same as establishing an ideal polis. Underneath, as it were, the discussion on education, he continues to establish his ideal polis.

3. 2. Breeze Bringing Health

In order to examine the healthy place, which is revealed that it is prepared for all of the children in this polis, this section shall focus on the breeze that blows in the healthy place. Let us read the sentence again where Socrates illustrates the breeze blowing in the ideal polis: "from this place, something from beautiful works delivers them into eyes or into ears (ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν), just as some breeze brings health from good regions (ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν)."[88] First, it is necessary to recall that this is the second simile in the entire passage in discussion. As previously observed, the place where children live is likened to a healthy place, which is described to be opposed to the "bad pasture." By taking this point into consideration, "good regions" can be understood as a kind of good "pasture," where herds are allowed and able to feed themselves on everything they find, because every plant and grass

[88] "Partly on grounds of style, and partly for grammatical reasons, I believe that Plato wrote τις not τι. [&] Translate: 'Whensoever from beautiful works of art there smites upon their eyes or ears as it were a salubrious breath from healthful regions." (Adam, *The Republich of Plato*, Part I, p.166.)

is healthy and good for them. In this sentence, Socrates does not use "healthy (ὑγιεινός)" as the adjective for this place; instead, he uses "good (χρηστός)," which means in precise sense "useful," "serviceable" or "effective."[89] On the other hand, he calls the thing that this place brings "health (ὑγίεια)." Hence, a new characteristic is added to this healthy place: "usefulness" or "efficiency". This place is not only "healthy," but also "useful" in terms of education, because it produces "health."

Although Socrates does not define what "health" is, we can deduce two implications from this word. One is, as mentioned before, an implicit reference to the first stage in establishing the ideal polis. The first polis was, although it was described as a polis of animals, i.e. for pigs, called "the healthy polis." While the healthy polis does not fit to the inquiry into justice and injustice, it is no doubt a "true" polis. Even though the purification of the luxurious polis is not equal to a retrogression to the healthy polis, the ideal polis—it is equal to the purified luxurious polis—should share some features with the true and healthy one. For, people in the healthy polis "will live out their lives in peace with health (ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας)" (372d). If one of the aim of establishing an ideal polis is to set "poleis and human kind free from ills" (473d), the life in the true and healthy polis where people "live out their lives in peace" should function as a role model of the state of being free from ills. What Socrates attempts in the passage above is to make the place surrounding children "healthy" in this sense.

The other implication of "health" is expressed in the last sentence of the relevant passage. This place leads children into "likeness, friendship and accord with beautiful *logos* (εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ)." It might be wrong to interpret "likeness [&] with beautiful logos" as an equivalent to "health," but it is obvious that these two things are internally and closely related. Note that "health" is not a metaphor of one of the virtues that one should possess, such as knowledge or prudence, but it is a basis which enables

[89] See Liddell, Scott and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*.

them to accept the beautiful *logos* without wrong resistance. It is, of course, problematic how the word "λόγος" here should be interpreted. The *logos* here means practically the content of poetry which is allowed to be told in the ideal polis. It would, therefore, not be a failure to translate it "speech" or "words."[90] On the other hand, this seems to have also a wider range and it can mean "reason" in oneself. Regardless of the translation of "beautiful *logos*," however, things that are listed as the things children ought to acquire have similarity with "harmony" as justice. Having the second meaning added to the word "health" in this passage, "health" is no more a special feature that only the "healthy" true polis has.

Now let us see the medium that brings health from good regions: "breeze (αὖρα)." The question to be addressed is what Socrates intends with this word. In order to understand this figurative description, we should pay attention to two sensory organs. They are, namely, eyes and ears, as stated in the quoted passage. Eyes and ears are the organs for the visual and auditory perceptions, and "breeze" is also what one is able to perceive through one's sense organs. The emphasis on the sensory organs, especially eyes, seems a little strange, because the visual perception is normally considered to be underestimated in Plato's philosophy, and this is also the case in the *Politeia*. As is well-known, in Book 6 and 7 Socrates divides the world into two realms: one is the realm of what can be understood (νοητός) and the other is that of what can be seen (ὁρατός) (509d). To the latter belong not only shadows and reflections in water but also "the animals we see every day, the entire plant world, and the whole class of human artifacts" (509e-510a). Here Socrates denies that visual perceptions are the means by which one ascends to the idea of Good. Nevertheless, the visual and the auditory organs are counted in the relevant passage as the first things the healthy place should care for. This view is, in fact, compatible with the description of the *conditio humana* observed in the previous section. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the sensory perceptions, especially the visual and the auditory ones, are

[90] Bloom and Griffith translate this "λόγος" to "speech."

of importance, when children are very small. Then, what can this "breeze" do to the sensory organs?

We cannot find the word "αὔρα" neither in *Politeia* nor in *Nomoi* except here. Therefore, we must imagine what it implies only from this passage. According to the Lexicon, αὔρα means "breeze, especially a cool breeze from water, or the fresh air of morning."[91] But first, let me try to give some general characteristics, which are not limited to the ancient Greek world. Breeze is inevitable; as an existence living on the earth, every being, as long as it lives on earth, not under water, cannot escape from breeze. Maybe someday in the future, artificial human being would be born in a building without windows and doors and would live there until the end of one's life, but for us living in the twenty-first century, it is quite difficult to imagine a life without breeze. However, although we feel breeze every day through our sensory organs, breeze itself does not have any definite form nor sound. We notice breeze only by hearing leaves rustle, by seeing branches swaying and by feeling how it touches our skins. One cannot sense breeze *itself* through sensory organs, but at the same time, we are able to feel breeze only through the perceptions of something in the breeze. In addition, we are able to give these characteristics of breeze, only after we think back about it, because breeze is so natural that one cannot easily recall it; for example, it is not easy to answer the question what kind of breeze one felt today morning. This is also one of the biggest characteristics of breeze: it is hard to be noticed, although people feel and experience it every day through their senses.

Now let's turn our eyes back to the relevant passage. Breeze, which is normally unnoticed by people, blows in the place where good pasture grows. This breeze helps this place to remain healthy, because it brings "health" from good regions. It is perceived by children

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[91] For examiple, Homer, *Odysseey*, 5. 469. When the first α is capitalized, this concept is personalized and becomes the name of a goddess, who is a daughter of Leas and Peiboea. However, its mythology is found first in *Dionysiaca*, which was composed in fourth to fifth century A. D. by Nonnus. Therefore, one needs not pay attention to its mythological meaning at the moment. Heinrich Stoll, "Aura," p. 733.

through their sensory organs, especially their eyes and ears, and people there get used to the breeze in the healthy place unconsciously. The health that the breeze brings is accumulated little by little, but with certainty, in the souls of people there. Since Socrates uses this simile just after the discussion on the first stage of education, namely education through *mousikê*, "beautiful works," to which their eyes and ears are exposed, indicate poetical and musical works children hear in the polis. These materials have, as this simile shows, a power to appeal to children's auditory and visual perceptions.

3. 3. Penetration

As the last part of the observation of the environment surrounding children, this section focuses on the way the "healthy place" where "breeze that brings health" blows effects on children. As seen in the previous examinations, the ultimate aim of the healthy place is formulated as follows: "to lead [people] imperceptibly, even from their childhood, into affinity, friendship and harmony with beautiful *logos*." Note that Socrates emphasizes that the healthy place should be prepared "even from their childhood." The addition of "even (ἐυθύς)" stresses the importance of this point more. Interestingly, however, the healthy place should be prepared secretly; it must stay "imperceptible" or "unnoticed" (λανθάνῃ). As pointed before, although each animal living on the earth including human beings cannot escape from breeze, it is difficult for them to always remember and notice what kind of breeze blows. Those who do not notice that breeze blows are exactly those who are in the place where breeze blows. People do not notice it, since it is too natural.[92] In the same way, those who are in the healthy place should not notice that they are led into "affinity, friendship and harmony with beautiful *logos*." People in the healthy place,

[92] The word "unnoticed" corresponds to this characteristic of breeze on one hand, but at the same time "λανθάνῃ" seems to indicate that one has to hide the fact that children live in the healthy place, because the first meaning of this word is "to escape notice." (Liddell-Scott-Jones.)

namely children in the polis, are expected to have an inclination to beautiful *logos*, but they themselves should not know that they were led to such inclination. They are to believe that they acquire their inclination to beautiful *logos* by themselves, therefore of their own free will.

The ultimate aim of the healthy place is not teaching or telling “beautiful *logos*,” rather it should be prepared to provide children and young people with a basic inclination toward “beautiful *logos*.” In other words, the role of the healthy place is set as the preparatory stage for the stage of understanding “beautiful *logos*.” I call it preparatory, because the words “affinity,” “friendship” and “harmony” are used in order to separate this stage from the stage “before grasping (λανβάνειν) *logos*” (402a).[93] The passage quoted above deals with the education for children and young people. As its last sentence describes, the affinity, friendship and harmony with “beautiful *logos*” have to be brought even from their childhood. We have already seen that Socrates emphasizes the point that people should be led to the affinity to the beautiful *logos* “from childhood” by adding the word “even.” If we pay attention also to “grasping *logos*” at the same time, we can presume that Socrates here has two stages in childhood in mind: the period when children including infants cannot understand or speak language (*logos*), and the period when children, who are not called infants any more, are able to grasp language and thought. The point discussed in the quotation above is how children at the first stage can be educated. If they are not able to understand language yet fully, which kind of means are effective for their education? It is, as the discussion coming before the simile clearly shows, *mousikê*.

Mousikê is able to appeal to the visual and auditory senses, just as infants and children are able to feel breeze through eyes and ears. Here the definition of the *conditio humana* converges on the first stage of education, because the main elements consisting of *mousikê* are

[93] Until now I use, “logos” without assigning it a fixed English translation, because in this context it seems difficult to give it single proper translation. Griffith translates “καλὸς λόγος” to “beauty of speech and thought,” while Schleiermacher gives “schˆne Rede (beautiful speech)” as its translation.

rhythm and harmony. Socrates explains the reason why these two elements are of special importance as follows:

> *Politeia* 401d-e
>
> ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον;
>
> So, Glaucon, I said, isn't this why the upbringing in *mousikê* is most decisive? Because rhythm and harmony most of all penetrate into the inmost part of the soul and most powerfully lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make a man graceful if he is correctly brought up, if not, the opposite.

The significant point here is that the effect "rhythm" and "harmony" possess is described as "penetration." Note that he uses adjectives with superlative forms three times in this one sentence: "most decisive," "penetrate into the innermost part" and "most vigorously." These superlative adjectives have an effect of pulling readers' attention, and they indicate the importance of this passage.

First, Socrates demands an agreement with the reasons of Socrates' emphasis on *mousikê*. "Isn't it right? (ἆρ᾽ οὖν)" implies Socrates' belief that his statement is highly acceptable also for Glaucon. By taking into consideration the fact that the education in the ancient Greek world began traditionally with *mousikê*, it must be almost obvious for Socrates as well as for his interlocutors that *mousikê* is important. His belief is that "upbringing in *mousikê* is most decisive." Two points are noteworthy. Socrates names it "upbringing (τροφή)," not "education (παιδεία)." The former, τροφή, indicates, first of all, "nourishment" and "food,"

and Socrates uses this word also in this sense elsewhere (cf. 369d, 372b). As Socrates says that τροφή is prepared for "human being's existence and life (τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα)" (369d), it is closely connected to the biological life maintenance. This point can be emphasized, because some people translate τροφή here as "education."[94] Although τροφή can be understood as a part of education, it does not seem to be the substitute for παιδεία.[95] For example, after he finishes not only the discussion on the music elements, but also that on the content including languages of poetry, he sums the discussions up and says "so much for the patterns of education *and* upbringing (οἱμὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἄν εἶεν)" (412b).[96] Having taken these points into consideration, it is not unreasonable to think that Socrates uses intentionally only τροφή here. On this ground, I use "upbringing" as the translation of the τροφή in this paper, when Plato selects this word. This usage implies that the upbringing using *mousikê* is actually one of the necessities which include nourishment and food.

If we understand the upbringing through *mousikê* in this sense, we notice that this description corresponds to the simile of herds feeding pasture in the healthy place where some breeze bringing health from good regions blows. The upbringing through *mousikê* is a kind of a nourishment for the children or the young people, just as pasture is prepared for some herds. The reason Socrates thinks it "most decisive" becomes clear, when one recalls this simile. Since herds feed pasture every day, the influence of pasture gradually, but, without fail, accumulate

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[94] Griffith translates it "education." Bloom translates it "rearing," which I also find appropriate for a translation of τροφή.

[95] In the *Crito*, Socrates uses the pair of τροφή and παιδεία, when he answers to the imaginary question casted by the Athenian Laws whether "the *upbringing* of the child after he is born and his *education* (περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν) which you received" have a fault (*Crito* 50d, emphasis added). The upbringing here seems to indicate the practice for newborn children. However, the Laws also say that he told Socrates' father to "*educate* Socrates in mousikê and gymnastics (σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν)" (*Crito* 50d-e, emphasis added). Therefore, it is not wrong, if one understands τροφή under the category of education, but it includes a connotation of its original meaning of "nourishment."

[96] He arranges these two words in a row also at 423e. Besides, at 376c, the verbal forms of these words stand in a row.

within them, although the amount they eat every day is not very much. Secondly, in the sentence where it is said that "rhythm and harmony most of all penetrate (μάλιστα καταδύεται) into the inmost part of the soul," the expression "most of all penetrate " should be noted. The general meaning of καταδύω is, first of all, "plunge into" or "sink into," but here I follow the translation of Griffith, i.e. "penetrate."[97] "Penetration" can be seen as a concept to explain how pasture "accumulate" in the herds feeding pasture every day "little by little" (401c).

By using "penetration," Socrates tries to imply the following two characteristics of rhythm and harmony. One is that it is quite difficult to remove rhythm and harmony to which people get used. The other is that it takes a long term that certain rhythm and harmony become familiar to one's soul. The word "penetration" elucidates that rhythm and harmony have to affect for a long period of time, the point at which "each and every day (ἑκάστης ἡμεράς)" and "little by little (κατὰ σμικρόν)" hinted. In addition, the adverbs "most of all (μάλιστα)" and "most powerfully (ἐρρωμενέστατα)" emphasizes its effect with regard not only to time but also to the depth, since he uses the expression "into the innermost soul."[98] What supports such influential penetration is "the most powerful effect" of rhythm and harmony. The important point is that rhythm and harmony in *mousikê* can be perceived only through sensory organs, especially through the auditory and visual senses.

4. Summary

This chapter inquired what kind of *conditio humana* is presupposed as the object of education in the purified luxurious polis and how the environment under which children should be educated is depicted. In order to address these inquiries, this chapter focused not only on the

[97] Bloom translates "insinuate," which sounds a little negative. Schleiermacher translates "eindringen," which also means "penetrate."

[98] Therefore, this sentence can also be translated as follows: "rhythm and harmony penetrate into the innermost soul."

Politeia but also the *Nomoi*., because two elements of music, rhythm and harmony, are referred from the perspective of education more clearly in the *Nomoi*. As the words of Socrates imply, if one acquires right rhythm and right harmony, one will be able to have right disposition, because disposition follows rhythm and harmony (399e). Because rhythm and harmony are two essential components of *mousikê* , it is necessary for children, especially those who cannot understand language and thought (*logos*) yet, to learn them through the auditory and visual senses.

What was revealed through the examinations in this chapter can be also formulated as two steps of the purifying process of the luxurious, swollen and inflamed polis. The observations in this chapter had two parts: the examination of *physis*, which is generally understood as "natural disposition" of humans, and that of the ideal environment for upbringing and education.

The first examination related to the object of education. The question addressed here was which part of children or what exactly is to be educated in Plato's pedagogic program. I first paid attention to the concept of the *conditio humana* that differentiates human beings from other animals, referring to some passages from the *Nomoi*. The Athenian in the *Nomoi* explains the possession of the perception of orders and disorders in motions is the distinguishing mark of human beings. The orders and disorders are called rhythm and harmony. Therefore, the *conditio humana* that Plato presupposes is that the human's ability to perceive and observe rhythm and harmony in musical or physical motions. It is also important that humans are able to feel pleasure in observing them in two different ways. First, they are pleased when they find rhythm and harmony in motions. Second, they are pleased to dance with other people, because, through dancing, they understand that they share the perception of rhythm and harmony. However, according to Plato, such perception is equipped in human beings by birth. People have to acquire this perception in order to become human beings, not insolent beasts.

This aspect of the *conditio humana* led us to examine what *physis* is. For, the perception of rhythm and harmony is supposed to form one's character and the formation of character is performed through *physis* or habit or both of them. The usage of the combination of *physis* and habit seems strange at first glance, because *physis* normally indicates something that one possesses by birth, while habit indicates something that one acquires for a long time. The analysis of the Phoenician story in this chapter revealed that the *physis*, especially the occupational disposition, does not determine one's role in the polis by itself. In education, habit or habituation plays also a decisive role in determining one's role in the polis. This is the reason why Plato emphasizes the establishment of the educational program as a process of the purification of the luxurious polis. The ideal educational program is required for making an adequate habit in each one, so that they will not ruin their *physeis*.

The second part of the examination in this chapter inquired what features the the ideal environment for upbringing and education has. This environment can be characterized by two elements. First, it is likened to a healthy place or pasture, which is the opposite of a bad pasture. Since the herds on the pastures can be understood as those in need of care, this expression implies that this place is prepared to all in need of care, i.e., all children in the polis. In other words, the healthy environment is prepared not only for some selected children who are regarded to possess "gold" by birth. The second feature of the ideal environment is the breeze that brings health to the place from good regions. The breeze plays an important role in the healthy place, firstly because it appeals to the sensory organs, especially to eyes and ears, and secondly because it appeals to them without being noticed. It is obvious that these peculiarities of the breeze relate to the visual and auditory perceptions for observing rhythm and harmony, which are defined as the *conditio humana*. Thus, the examinations in this chapter revealed that the healthy place where the breeze bringing health from good regions blows is prepared for all children whose visual and auditory senses are in the immature state of development. Their

senses develop in the process of the penetration of rhythm and harmony into the innermost part of the souls of children.

As it came to light in Chapter I, education and imitation, especially *mousikê* including poetry and music, have the decisive role in the luxurious polis and they overlapp with the education through *mousikê*. However, this is not enough to establish the content of each educational program in detail. In order to let education function and utilize the program fully, Plato also considers the environment surrounding children who are to be educated, because an inadequate environment will easily sneak into the polis and ruin children's *physeis*. The healthy place functions not only as the most appropriate environment for education, but also as the protective wall against "bad pasture."

CHAPTER III.

EDUCATION THROUGH *MOUSIK*Ê

1. Introduction

Chapter I showed that poetry can be considered as the starting point of "the political" in the *Politeia*. When Galucon and Adeimantus referred to the greatest poets in their times, Homer and Hesiod, the subject in discussion became necessarily political, because these two poets had created the social norms and moral standards. The role of poetry was brought into light, when Socrates started establishing the luxurious polis in speech. In this polis, poetry, or *mousikê* as its generic term, relates to education. Based on these examinations, Chapter II revealed that Plato considers the perception of rhythm and harmony as the *conditio humana* that distinguishes humans from other animals. We also observed that the ideal environment for education is set to appeal to the visual and auditory senses. As the inquiries into the *physis* of a child and the environment showed, the target of upbringing and education established in the luxurious polis is all children in the polis, not selected children.

This chapter concentrates on the content of education. We shall address the question of how Plato attempts to lead the souls of children, i.e. the future generation of the ideal polis, to a just life. According to Socrates, "the only and most important thing (ἓν μέγα)" in establishing one united polis is the upbringing and education (423e). These words of Socrates indicate that educating children rightly is the cardinal point in establishing a polis and to institute the laws of the polis or the political system is of secondary importance. On this ground, upbringing and education of children in the polis established by Socrates in speech should be conducted neither by parents nor by private nursery, because it is the task concerning the entire polis. A similar viewpoint is revealed through the statement of the Athenian in the *Nomoi*. The Athenian argues:

"every man and child insofar as he is able must of necessity become educated (παιδευτέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης), on the grounds that they belong more to the polis than to those who generated them (τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν γεννητόρων)" (*Nom.* 804d). Thus, the establishment of the educational program becomes the pivotal task in politics.

The educational program begins with the education through *mousikê* and ends with the philosophical dialogue which is called "dialectic (διαλεκτική)" (532b). It is important to recall the point that the entire program functions not only as a part of upbringing or an education, but also as a touchstone of the *physis* that judges whether one's disposition is suited for the work of guardians in the polis or not. Because of this aspect of the educational program, as showed before, all of children in the polis can theoretically enjoy the same educational program.[99] Plato's educational program is open to everyone. However, since this education functions as a touchstone, if one is judged that one's *physis* is not suited for the further higher learning, one cannot continue to be educated under the program which is set in the polis.[100] This education is, indeed, open to all children, whether they are born from guardian parents or from craftsman parents, but this program can be regarded also as a closed one, if we consider the fact that those who are judged cannot enjoy the higher learning. Nevertheless, it is certain that the first preparatory stage of the program is established for all children of the polis.

The first stage of the educational program consists of two parts: education through *mousikê* and *gymnastikê*. This chapter concentrates solely on the first one. It is not unusual that the education begins with *mousikê* of Plato's time in the ancient Greek world. It is also usual that music is used to bring up children in our time; children and infants listen to music and

[99] Kersting argues also that the education through *mousikê* is for all of the children in the polis. Kersting, *Platons Staat*, p. 139.

[100] The educational program in the ideal polis has three stages: the preparatory stage where one learns *mousikê* and *gymnasitikê*, the middle stage which is called "preludes (προοίμια)" including mathematics (531d), and the last stage is where one learns dialectic. See also 522a-b.

sometimes sing a song together in kindergartens, and especially in the Christian ones they learn the ethical and religious doctrines through music and hymns. Although most children do not understand what exactly they are singing, music and its lyrics stay in their memories for a long time.

Before examining Plato's views on education through *mousikē*, we ought to know its etymology. Although this word reminds us of the modern Indo-European terms such as "music" in English or "Musik" in German, the concept itself covers not only music in modern sense, but it also contains many forms of performances which are nowadays not called "music." *Mousikê* indicates the union of song, dance, and poetry. It was recognized as the "realm of the Muses," who are, according to some ancient Greek myths, daughters of the supreme god Zeus and the goddess of memory Mnêmosynê. There are several features in the concept of *mousikê*.[101] Firstly, "*mousikê* represented for the Greeks a seamless complex of instrumental music, poetic word, and co-ordinated physical movement." Secondly, its range was so broad that it was performed "in the private home to elaborate festival in which an entire polis was involved." This feature is also shared with "music" in our times, but it must be emphasized that the festival concerning *mousikê* had a special relationship with the polis or politics. Thirdly, it was so variegated that it could show its own regional or local traditions as a means for exchange and interaction. Finally, and most importantly, it functioned as a medium of social connection and of passing on traditions. "It was a medium through which ideals of behavior were developed and enforced—the morality of individuals and collectives, notions of proper or ideal corporeal types, political principles and pragmatics."[102] Besides, it was also a medium through which societies related to their past, as the myth of Muses' origin implies. *Mousikê* is the most important and useful tool for memorization, because it made people remember the stories of

[101] As to the account of *mousikē* in this paragraph, I follow: Murray and Wilson, "Mousikê, not Music," pp. 1-4.
[102] Penelope Murray and Peter Wilson, "Mousikê, not Music," p. 2.

their ancestors—whether historical or mythical—through eyes and ears.[103] Musical performances including myth and poetry made it possible for members of polis to remember their past, their tradition, and their religion. Especially in Athens in the Classical Age (from ca. fifth to fourth centuries B.C.E.), where its political structure, direct democracy, sculpted its culture, participation in musical activities implied that people inherit the legacies of their polis and reproduce them. Activities concerning *mousikê* were crucial for citizens' involvement in the polis in both political and cultural (or social) senses and for their recognition by others as members of citizens in Athens.

Thus, the role of education through *mousikê* in the ancient Greek world was much more significant for the entire political community than that in our times. In the following, I shall first examine the upbringing through harmony and rhythm, then the education though poetry, which sequence is reverse to the discussion in the *Politeia*.[104] It is however, easy to understand Plato's discussion on the upbringing and education with reference to the *conditio humana* as the perception of rhythm and harmony. Plato does not discuss rhythm and harmony first, because the content of the works of *mousikê* should be defined on the ground that these musical elements have to follow the content of works, namely the speech or language (*logos*). Nevertheless, it is sometimes pointed out that infants and small children are not able to understand language, while musical elements, especially rhythm and harmony, are useful for people in such ages. Therefore, I examine the ideal education in accordance with children's growth.

[103] This function of *mousikē* is emphasized by Havelock (1963).

[104] I use "upbringing" for the education through harmony and rhythm, while I use "education" for that through poetry. Although Plato himself does not distinguish these two words (upbringing and education: τροφή and παιδεία) clearly, the former indicates a primitive educational stage. This is the reason why I use here "upbringing" for the education through musical elements.

2. Upbringing through Harmony and Rhythm

2. 1. Habit, Pleasure and *Mousikê*

As examined in Chapter I, the key for the purification of the luxurious polis, which is equal to the inquiry into justice, is found in the combination of education and imitation. The first stage of the educational program concerns the *conditio humana* for Plato, i.e., the perception of rhythm and harmony. Because the concept of *mousikê* entails singing, dancing and poetic words, all of which necessarily contain rhythm and harmony, the first stage of the ideal education should be practiced through *mousikê*. In this stage, *mousikê* is not taught in such a way that children are simply told which one is good and which one is bad. Rather, good rhythm and harmony are set in the healthy place to penetrate into the innermost part of souls of children, as observed in Chapter 2. In the process of the penetration of rhythm and harmony into the souls, as we shall see throughout this chapter, imitation (or mimesis) and habit play an important role. As pointed out in Chapter 2, "habit" is depicted as one of two decisive elements for one's character formation in the *Politeia*. This element is sometimes regarded as more powerful than the *physis* that one possesses by birth, because habit can ruin the golden *physis*. In the following, I examine "habit (ἔθος)" more deeply, analyzing some arguments in the *Nomoi*.

According to the Athenian, habit concerns primarily pleasure and pain. In the passage where the Athenian explains choral performances, which is cited before, he explains the relationship between pleasure and habit as follows: "those whose character is in accord with what is said and sung and in any way performed—because of nature or habit or both (ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ ἔθος ἢ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα)—are necessarily delighted (χαίρειν) by the things [&]" (*Nom*. 655d-e). On the other hand, people find the things "ugly (αἰσχρά)" which are "against nature, character, or a certain habituation (παρὰ φύσιν ἢ τρόπον ἤ τινα συνήθεια)" (*Nom*. 655e). Indeed, one's *physis* plays a role, but one's "habit" or "habituation" plays a role in judging something as delightful or ugly. This implies that the task concerning habit is to make an inclination to an appropriate pleasure in children's souls. As the healthy place likened to a good

pasture is full of "beautiful works," if children get used to "beautiful works" in the healthy place, they will feel familiarity to the things similar to them and feel unfamiliarity—or hate—to those which did not exist in the place where they grew up. This familiarity is, when it emerges in *mousikê* and poetry, called pleasure and its opposite is called pain. The Athenian in the *Nomoi* and Socrates in the *Politeia* try to lead children's souls to appropriate pleasure through forming habit or familiarity. Note that children are not compelled to feel pleasure to certain songs or poetical works. Children who grew up in the healthy place will feel pleasure to things that the Athenian or Socrates admits as appropriate works. They come to feel pleasure in certain *mousikê*, because they are used to it. This kind of pleasure is powerful, because it is supported by children's willingness.

What was described above sounds completely incompatible with our understanding on education. If this project of Plato's is observed from the democratic perspective, the conflict between Plato's educational project and modern democratic pedagogy becomes more vivid. It is by no means unacceptable. Aesthetic judgement does not belong to the moral and political judgement in modern political thought, and it should not happen that some artworks are rejected on the ground that they do not fit to the criterion of beauty the government establishes. Even under democracy, however, some expressions—extreme violent scenes or sexual scenes of movies, for instance—are strictly limited by governments, especially when small children have access to these expressions or representations. Adults think that children, when they are small, are strongly influenced by such expressions, because their "thought" is not yet stable. This is the reason why Cephalus, the host of the house where the discussion in the *Politeia* is held, leaves in the middle of the dialogue with Socrates and others, although he was eager to talk with Socrates.[105] This behavior is an evidence of him being afraid of the Afterlife, whose image

[105] In the middle of the discussion Cephalus leaves in order to "offer a sacrifice to the divine (πρὸς τὰ ἱερά)" (331d).

has been brought to him by the stories he has heard since his childhood.[106] The stories of the Hades that Cephalus has heard haunt his life. In this way, habit, pleasure and education are internally connected in Plato's philosophy, although its connection appeared to be unusual at first glance.

In the *Nomoi* and the *Politeia*, Plato tries to set up an institution that removes the possibilities that children access inappropriate expressions, because "children belong more to the polis than to those who generated them" (*Nom*. 804d). To bring up and educate children is, for Plato—or for the Athenian and Socrates—, first of all, the task of polis. Because this education concerns the *conditio humana*, its program and its environment should be thorough. As pointed out before, the ideal education must be protected from inappropriate *mousikê* that attempts to sneak into the polis. Therefore, no space is left for private education or education practiced outside of the polis. Maybe sometimes the private one could succeed to raise children exactly in the way that Plato aims, but it would rarely happen. If they are not raised by the polis, their thought stay "undisciplined" and they are almost the same with "the hardest to handle of all beasts" (*Nom*. 808d) or "the wildest beasts (πάντῃ ἀγριώτατα θηρία)" (*Nom*. 875a). The upbringing and education conducted by the polis is the reformation from one spices of animals to human beings who are able to establish a political community with others. This is the point where the *conditio humana* as the perception of rhythm and harmony and education cross.

It is useful to take a look at the original meaning and usages of "harmony" and "rhythm" in the ancient Greek world, before investigating what kind of rhythm and harmony Socrates and the Athenian set as the means of upbringing. Unlike the concept of "harmony" in European classical music, such as major keys and minor keys, ἁρμονία (*harmonia*) in the ancient Greek world means rather "tuning" or attunement." In ancient Greek music, accompaniment was mostly homophonic: "the instrument(s) normally repeated the singer's notes, or doubled them

[106] Jonathan Lear, "Allegory and Myth in Plato's Republic."

in the upper or lower octave."[107] However, the use of this term is not limited to its music-technical sense. It is "also used in connection with cosmology, ethics, metaphysics, and other branches of Greek philosophy."[108] Especially in Plato's philosophy, it is explicit that he chooses this term in order to refer to the character formation, without restricting its meaning to the music-technical sense.

The meaning of ῥυθμός (*rhythmos*) is, on the other hand, not so far from our daily use in modern ages. Although it was not used to designate a musical element in the fourth century B.C.E., "it was conceived and used as musical term" afterwards.[109] In quoting the words of Aristoxenos, Michaelides points out that *rhythmos* is composed by "the words, the *melos* [melody: my addition], and the motion of the body." The important point is that *rhythmos* relates not only to *mousikê* but also to sports (*gymnastikê*). In other words, *rhythmos* played its role and was considered important in the sphere both of *mousikê* and *gymnastikê*, which are the pair of the first stage of Plato's educational program. When it appears in the bodily motions, it leads to dance, while it leads to pleasant poetry, when it appears in the musical motions. The difference between these two things is little, because dance is accompanied with language in tragedies. Another important concept for understanding the *rhythmos* of words is "meter." Rhythm and meter are closely interrelated, but "with a few exceptions, the ancient theorists mark a clear distinction between rhythm and meter and are consistent in their conception of rhythm,"[110] whereas "meter" or "metrics" is "a tool by which a pattern of rhythmic *chronoi*

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[107] Battezzato, "Metre and music," p. 143. Also Adam mention the same point: Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Part I, p. 156. They suggest "(music) modes" as the translation of Greek *harmonia*. Mathiesen states that the word "harmoniai" was used originally just as "tonoi" which refers to "a note, an interval, a position of the voice, and a pitch," but Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers and music theorists use "harmoniai," including "many of the ethnic names" which are applied to the *tonoi* within it (Mathiesen, "Greek Music Theory," pp. 125-127).

[108] Mathiesen suggests that scholars understand ancient music theory on two levels, depending on the approach (Mathiesen, "Harmonia and Ethos in Ancient Greek Music," p. 266).

[109] Solon Michaelides, *The Music of Ancient Greece*, pp. 291-292.

[110] Thomas Mathiesen, "Rhythm and Meter in Ancient Greek Music," p. 160.

[time or duration of syllable: my addition] might be determined" and "a means of measuring quantity in syllables."[111] They are not the same, but meter or metrics can be seen as a component of *rhythmos*. Meter is a tool or a means that determines the rhythm of music. Since the ancient Greeks have "a melodic accent," the rhythm which is led by metrical pattern of short and long syllables is necessarily an important element in composing works of *mousikê* or poetry.[112]

These are the backgrounds of the first stage of Plato's educational program: upbringing through *mousikê*. As the explanations above show, rhythm and harmony are inseparable from poetry including epics and tragedies. In the following, I use "harmony" for the translation of *harmonia* and "rhythm" for that of *rhythmos* for the sake of convenience, but note that the connotations they imply are different from our usage of these words.

2. 2. Harmony for Auditory Sense

The question concerning harmony is introduced first after the discussion on the content of poetry. Therefore, one should not forget that the question is not "what kind of harmony children have to or are allowed to hear," rather "what kind of harmony should follow the appropriate content or language (*logos*) of poetry."[113]

According to Socrates, the appropriate poetry for the education is not allowed to evoke some powerful emotions, such as "mourning (θρῆνος)" and "lamentation (ὀδυρμός)." On the basis of this viewpoint, the harmonies, such as the Mixolydian and the Syntonolydian modes that express these passions are to be excluded from the ideal polis (398d-e). In addition to

[111] Mathiesen, "Rhythm and Meter in Ancient Greek Music," p. 162.
[112] Battezzato, "Metre and Music," p. 143.
[113] Harmony in *Politeia* is understood only within the scope of "melody (μέλος)," since harmony is one of the elements that compose melody. It is also possible to understand that μέλος, which I translate here "melody," is almost equivalent to harmony. Before the word "lyric (λυρικός)" did not appear, this word was of importance. "[μέλος] is used by various early lyric poets to refer to their compositions, and Plato occasionally distinguishes 'songs' from other poetic forms, like epic and tragedy." (Felix Budelmann, "Introducing Greek Lyric," p. 2.)

mourning and lamentation, “drunkenness (μέθη),” “softness (μαλακία)” and “idleness (ἀργία)” are also not allowed for the poets to express in their works, as long as they are willing to compose poetry for the polis. Glaucon, responding to this statement of Socrates, gives some “relaxed” modes, such as the Ionian and the Lydian, as the modes that arouse idleness and softness (398e).

In this way, according to Glaucon, the Dorian and the Phrygian modes are left in their hands. However, Socrates responds to him and says, “I do not know these harmonies (οὐκ οἶδα τὰς ἁρμονίας)” (399a), although Glaucon affirms again after Socrates’ words that the harmonies that Socrates is searching for are these two modes. This ignorance about the names of harmony expressed by Socrates implies his indifference to the traditional or prevalent modes. It does not matter for him by which name the appropriate harmonies are called; what matters is what kind of character they have or what kind of character they are related to.

Now let us examine the two modes that Socrates proposes to be left in their ideal polis. The first one that corresponds to the Dorian modes represents courage and courageous people.[114]

> *Politeia* 399a-b
> ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσῳδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἴς τινα ἄλλην συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην.
>
> Just leave that mode which would appropriately imitate the sounds and accents of a man who is courageous in warlike deeds and every violent work, and who in failure or

[114] Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Part I, p. 156.

when going to face wounds or death or falling into some other misfortune, in the face of all these things stands up firmly and patiently against luck.

In this passage, Socrates explains the modes from two perspectives: the situation in which courageous persons happen to be and the attitude that they have in such situation. First, the situation people could face is explained with some examples. The situations are; "in warlike deeds" and "in every violent work," in facing wounds and death, and in falling into some other misfortune. The point shared among these examples is that these situations are beyond control of an individual human being. Each situation is regarded as "(mis)fortune" or "luck" (τύχη), which originally means "an act of a god."[115] Since they are beyond human control, these situations are considered as "externally imposed crisis."[116] Note that the harmony that Socrates and his interlocutors are searching for has to reflect people's attitudes in such situations. Their attitudes are reflected in their "sounds and accents (φθόγγος τε καὶ προσῳδία)." What should be represented is one's "courageous" attitude and how one "stands up firmly and patiently against luck" under such situations.

The second kind of the harmonies that Socrates demands, which corresponds to the Phygian mode, is explained as follows: "leave another mode for a man who performs a peaceful deed, one that is not violent but voluntary (ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑκουσίᾳ πράξει). [&] as a result, [he acts] intelligently, not behaving arrogantly (μὴ ὑπερηφάνως), but in all these things acting moderately and in measure (σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως), and being content with the consequences" (399b-c). The situation described here is the opposite to the previous one; in

[115] Τύχη is one of the most difficult Greek words to translate in modern languages. As Nussbaum points out, it does not imply "that the events in question are random or uncaused. What happens to a person by luck will be just what does not happen through his or her own agency, what just happens to him, as opposed to what he does or makes." (Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, p. 3.)
[116] This is the translation of ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ by Griffith.

a peaceful and voluntary deed. These examples indicate that the situation itself or its consequence is "in accordance with one's mind (κατὰ νοῦν)" (399b). If one acts "moderately and in measure" and "not arrogantly" in such situations, the attitude of this actor is called "moderate," which should be represented in the harmony.

Hence, Socrates shows two harmonies as the models. One represents the attitude of courageous people under unfortunate situations, and the other one expresses that of moderate ones under fortunate situations. The question that now arises is how it is possible to express their attitudes such as "courageous" or "moderate" attitudes in the harmony. There are two elements that are represented in it: "voice and sound" (φθόγγος) and "accent and pitch" (προσῳδία)."

We have to understand the original meaning of φθόγγος and προσῳδία first, because they are also peculiar words in the ancient Greek world.[117] φθόγγος means mainly "sound and voice," but in music it indicates "a distinct sound with definite pitch produced by the voice or any musical instrument." On the other hand, προσῳδία, which can also be translated into "prosody" as a technical word, means "the particular accent on the words in speech." It is also regarded as "speech rhythm and its relationship to versification."[118]

Since Socrates uses φθόγγος and προσῳδία, i.e., sound and accent, in order to explain the harmony, it is clear that the harmony he has in mind is not a kind of melody, but an imitation of people's voice under certain circumstances. It is also not a scene or image of wars but the manner of their speech. The *harmonia* in this sense implies a kind of spoken language, because the harmonies that Socrates has in mind reflect courageous and moderate manner of people's speaking. The important point in relation to the previous and later examinations is that the modes as the manner of speaking can be perceived through our auditory sense. As long as the

[117] See Solon Michaelides, *The Music of Ancient Greece*, p. 256; 273-4.
[118] Luigi Battezzato, "Metre and Music," p. 130.

harmony is defined to represent the voice and pitch of courageous and moderate ones, it is imperceptible through the visual sense.

The prerequisite that harmonies follow or should follow the content of poetry, that is language and speech, is also present in the *Nomoi*. For example, the Athenian criticizes some poets who "present rhythm and harmony without words," because without language one can hardly understand what is intended in such works (*Nom*. 669e). And he also regards it "terrible (δεινός)," when "one sings something discordant with the harmony as a whole" (*Nom*. 802e). Therefore, it is obvious that the priority lies always in the speech or the content of the poetry both in the *Nomoi* and in the *Politeia*.

However, unlike in the *Politeia*, the definition of harmony is explicitly given in the *Nomoi*. First, harmony is one of the objects of human's perceptions; it cannot be perceived by other animals (cf. *Nom*. 672c). Elsewhere, as we saw, harmony, as well as rhythm, is defined as "orders and disorders in motions" (*Nom*. 653e). Nevertheless, the Athenian defines it later in a different way, separating it from rhythm: "The name for order in movement (τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει) is "rhythm," and for order in voice (τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς), the mixture of sharp and deep, the name is "harmony"; the two things together (τὸ συναμφότερον) are called "a chorus" (*Nom*. 664e-665a). In this passage "order of movement" is assigned to rhythm, while harmony is explained as "order of voice (φωνή). φωνή means "principally the human voice or the sound of the human voice," although it is also used to indicate "the sound of any musical instrument" by extension.[119] This definition clarifies that the harmony in this context indicates not only the general sound but especially human voice. Furthermore, this point implies that harmony is perceptible only through the auditory sense, which point is proved also in the *Politeia*.

[119] Michaelides, The Music of Ancient Greece, p. 252.

In relation to the character of human peculiarity, harmony in the *Nomoi* has a further feature, which is not found in the *Politeia*; that is, harmon< as an element composing "a chorus (χορεία)." The chorus, whose meaning is different from "chorus" in the modern sense, should be understood as a complex musical and physical performance. It consists of two aspects, namely "the vocal aspect (τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν)" and "the aspect that pertains to bodily movement (τὸ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν)" (*Nom*. 672e). Harmony belongs only to the former, while rhythm belongs to both the former and the latter since it is an element of human voices as well as an element of bodily movements. If one recalls the first stage of education that consists of *mousikê* and *gymnastikê* (376e), the chorus can be seen as the fusion of these two educational programs for soul and body, although the chorus is scarcely discussed in the *Politeia*.[120] It is also noteworthy that the Athenian said that the pleasant perception of harmony is given by gods (*Nom*. 653e-654a). The chorus is made by harmony, the gift from gods, and in this performance gods lead humans, and gods and humans join each other.

2. 3. Rhythm for Auditory and Visual Sense

In the *Politeia*, the word *rhythmos* appears almost exclusively in the discussion concerning lyrical poetry. First of all, rhythm is defined as one of three "elements" that constitute the "melody or song (μέλος)."[121] The other two elements are language or speech (logos) and harmony (398d). Rhythm in the *Politeia* seems, however, to be used in close relation to metric. Let us see the words of Socrates which follow after the examination on harmony.

Politeia 399e-400a

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[120] For instance, Socrates mentions "chorus" at 412b, in order to explain that the examination on it as well as hunting etc. is unnecessary.

[121] The word μέλος means originally "limb" or "part," especially in music "song, tune, choral or lyric song; melody generally." (Michaelides, *The Music of Ancient Greece*, p. 202.)

ἑπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν: οὓς ἰδόντα τὸν πόδα τῷ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ μέλει.

Now, following on harmonies would be our rule about rhythms: we mustn't seek subtle ones nor all sorts of meters, but we'll see which are the rhythms of an orderly and courageous life; and when we have seen them, we'll compel the meter and the melody to follow the speech of such a man, rather than the speech following the meter and the melody.

Just like the discussion on the harmonies, Socrates begins to examine the rhythm of certain "lives (βίοι)," not the rhythm which is theoretically defined, such as the dacthylus. He entrusts the task of naming the ideal rhythm to Damon, the most famous and remarkable theorist of *musikê* among his contemporaries.[122] Just as the discussion on the harmonies, the important point here is, again, which kind of character the rhythm has. The entrusting or ignorance on harmony and rhythm Socrates confesses can be understood as his distance from the traditional educational program. He does not know what the harmony and the rhythm (metric) should be called. The criterion of the adoption in the polis does not refer to the music theory nor to the ordinary education.

According to Socrates, the rhythm they are looking for is "the rhythms of an orderly and courageous life (βίου κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες)." One has to pay attention to two points here. The first point is the adjectives that are used to describe the ideal rhythm. The latter adjective "courageous (ἀνδρεῖας)" was also used in the inquiry of harmony which represents

[122] Solon Michaelides, *The Music of Ancient Greece*, p. 71-72.

the attitude of persons facing dangerous or misfortunate situations. The former adjective, "orderly" or "decent" (κόσμιος) was, however, not used in the inquiry of harmony. The word used there is "prudent" or "moderate." The reason why Socrates uses another word here might be related to the second point to which we should pay attention. Unlike the harmonies, what rhythms express is not the sound or voice of courageous or decent persons, but their "life (βίος)." The expression "life" can be regarded as the extension of one's attitudes which are represented through harmony, i.e., sound and accent. The important point of "life" is that it covers not only one's voice. Sound and accent that the harmony concerns are perceived only through the ears, which is the auditory organs. Sound and accent are, however, not enough for the upbringing of children's perceptions, because they do not appeal to their visual perceptions. Based on this point, the representation of "life" is required in the rhythms. "Life" includes not only how one speaks, but also how one moves—walks, eats, sleeps and postures. These motions are perceived only through eyes, the visual organ. It is no doubt that voice and accent are essential components of one's life and identity, but one's motion occupies a large portion of one's life. Voice and Motion, when they are combied, are the components of one's life, and character. In this sense, "the right harmonic mode (εὐαρμοστία)" and "the right rhythm (εὐρυθμία)" follow from "the right disposition (εὐηθεία)." Hence, the right disposition requires the right harmony and rhythm.

The Athenian explains the point that the rhythm has a connection not only with the auditory perception but also with the visual perception more clearly in the *Nomoi*.

> *Nomoi* 672e-673a
>
> Ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ᾽ αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν. [&] τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δὲ ἴδιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις.

> Presumably the choral art as a whole is for us the same as education as a whole, and the vocal aspect of this is rhythms and harmonies. [&] Now the aspect that pertains to bodily movement has rhythm, which is shared by the movement of the voice, and posture, which is peculiar to it alone; while peculiar to the movement of the voice is melody.

The first sentence is easy to understand, because the same statement can be found also in the *Politeia*; rhythm and harmony concern the part relating to the voice. The second sentence, however, shows a point that is not mentioned in the *Politeia*, although, as stated before, what is represented through rhythm in the *Politeia* hints at this point. That is, rhythm is able to appeal also to the visual perception. He understands *rhythmos* here as an element concerning "the motion of the body" which also includes "shape" or "posture" (σχῆμα). Contrasted to the explanation in the *Politeia*, the rhythm in the *Nomoi* is depicted as a thing that concerns almost solely the visual sense. Here one cannot find an aspect of rhythm that appeals to the auditory sense through the meter. The "motion of the body" can be perceived through the visual sense, not the auditory one. In the *Nomoi*, the Athenian regards rhythm as the musical element that bridges the gap between the two perceptions.

It is obvious that the rhythm in the *Nomoi* is defined differently than in the *Politeia*, because the rhythm in the latter is almost exclusively equal to meter. The rhythm that the Athenian has in mind in the *Nomoi* is, rather, beat which is closely related to the choral dance. As explained in the passage cited above, the chorus has a special meaning in the educational system (παίδευσις) in the *Nomoi*, although it does not play the main role in the upbringing or educational program in the *Politeia*. The change or the widening of the meaning of the rhythm corresponds to the emphasis of the chorus. The chorus appeals to both the auditory and the visual senses. The remarkable point is that the Athenian discusses rhythm by connecting it to "shape (σχῆμα)" which is perceivable only through the visual sense. For example, the Athenian

explains how the poets should compose the ideal poetry as follows: "to create poetry correctly by depicting in rhythms and harmonies the postures and songs (ἔν τε ῥυθομοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη) of moderate, courageous, and wholly good men" (*Nom*. 660a). While their way of speech is composed in the melody (μέλος), their shape is in the rhythm. The Athenian elsewhere also uses the expression "rhythm and shape of the freemen (ῥυθμὸς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον)" (669c).

It is not easy to grasp what the σχῆμα exactly indicates.[123] Its original meaning is "shape," but in the case where Plato uses this word in the discussion on the chorus, "posture" or "gesture" would be an adequate translation. As long as it concerns rhythm, the σχῆμα is probably gesture. If rhythm expresses, for instance, freemen or slaves, and if one recalls the definition of rhythm as the "order in the motion," the rhythm of such character can be found in their gesture, rather than in their appearance.

Thus, harmony and rhythm that should be represented in *mousikê* are defined as voice, accent and gesture of persons who are courageous in facing difficult situations and are moderate in peace. While they represent persons in a particular situation, they present also the orderly life of such persons. Harmony and rhythm in the upbringing through *mousikê* does not only portray a momentary scene, but it concerns the entire life of people.

3. Education through Poetry

3. 1. Verbal Falsehood

Harmony and rhythm, which we observed in the previous section, are two elements that constitute *mousikê*. Since their primary concern is not speech (*logos*), they appeal to the perceptions, especially the auditory and visual senses. These elements are, therefore, effective

[123] σχῆμα represents mostly exterior appearance. See Lillian B. Lawler, "*Phora*, *Schêma*, *Deixis* in the Greek Dance."

for even infants and small children who do not understand speech or language. This does not mean, however, that children listen only to harmony and rhythm without lyrics. Socrates emphasizes often that harmony and rhythm have to follow the content or the language. In other words, even if infants and small children do not understand the content of the poetry, they have to listen to the musical elements *with* speech (*logos*). Children, especially infants, perceive only the musical elements of poetry in their early ages. This section shall concentrate on the other important aspect of *mousikê*: speech (logos).

Socrates counts speeches (*logoi*) as a part of *mousikê* (376e). This understanding is not peculiar to Plato, but it comes from the wide meaning the word *mousikê* has, as we saw in the Introduction of this chapter. The important point here with reference to the educational program in the *Politeia* is that the concept of *mousikê* is understood to be almost the same as the genre which is called "poetry" in our times. I use "poetry" as a generic term including epics, tragedies and comedies, hymns and so on. In the *Politeia*, some epic works and epic writers are understood as a part of tragedies. In addition, myth or story (μῦθος) is also understood as one kind of poetry. If these points are taken into consideration, it comes to be obvious that *mousikê* should be accompanied by speech. Note that the word "*logos*" which I translated hitherto as "speech" has another meaning, namely reason or ratio. Unlike the upbringing through harmony and rhythm target at infants and small children, the education using *logos* presupposes that the children are able to understand the speech or content (*logos* or *logoi*). The period when humans understood speech or language corresponds to the period when humans became able to acquire reason or ratio. In the following, Iuse "speech" as the translation for *logos*, but the connotation of this word is too profound to cover with a single English word.

Since *logos* is such a complex term, Socrates examines it carefully. First, he divides speeches into two forms: true one (ἀληθές) and false one (ψεῦδος) (376e). Despite the fact that both kinds of speech are used in the education, this division is necessary, because there is a sequence of which speech proceeds the other. According to him, the false speech should be told

first, which Adeimantus cannot easily understand. Then, Socrates tries to explain what is included under the false speeches. The speech that Socrates calls “false” is “stories” or “tales” (μῦθοι). The stories that people narrate to children are “fictional (ψεῦδος)” as a whole, even if they contain some truth (377a).[124]

The definition of “stories” as “the false or fictional speeches” provides the framework for considering the education through poetry. Note that Socrates does not always use ψεῦδος (*pesudos*) in the negative sense, as the famous concept of “noble lie” indicates. When it “comes into being in case of need (ἐν δέοντι),” *pseudos* can be “noble (γενναῖον)” and useful (414b). Socrates attempts to utilize this character of *pseudos*. However, there is another sort of *pseudos* which is, on the contrary, to be hated. It is, hence, important to distinguish which one is useful and which one is hateful among many falsehoods and fictions. The *pseudos* called “true falsehood (τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος)” is, on one hand hated by “gods and humans” (382a). Socrates explains this kind of falsehood as follows:

> *Politeia* 382a-b
>
> οὕτως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι.
>
> οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μανθάνω.
>
> [&] ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

[124] The discussion on falsehood and truth should assume that the people who establish this program have to know what is false and what is true. This point is inquired in the *Hippias Minor*.

> That surely no one, I said, voluntarily wishes to lie about the mostsovereign things to what is most sovereign in himself. Rather, he fears holding a lie there more than anything. "I still don't understand?" he said. [&] But I mean that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, and to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least accept; and that everyone hates a lie in that place most of all.

This hateful falsehood is formulated again as "the ignorance (ἄγνοια) in the soul of the person who has been deceived" (382b). For Socrates, the true falsehood is equal to ignorance. This formulation seems bizarre not only for modern readers but also for the interlocutors, because Adeimantus asks Socrates what Socrates means by "the true falsehood." This definition of "the true falsehood" implies that the other one, namely "the falsehood in speeches" or "the verbal falsehood" (τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις [ψεῦδος])," is not ignorance. When one uses "the verbal falsehood," one knows that it is a falsehood and there is a truth elsewhere, which is different from the falsehood. The verbal falsehood does "not deserve hatred." Rather, it is "useful (χρήσιμος)" "as medicine (ὡς φάρμακον)," when it is used against enemies, or to stop friends who are trying to do something wrong because of their madness or ignorance (382c). If one thinks of Odysseus in Homer's *Odyssey*, it is easy to understand why Socrates says the verbal falsehood, or lie, is useful when it is used to deceive the enemies. The strategy devised by Odysseus in the Trojan War can be seen as one of the greatest and successful lies that led his companions and his fatherland to victory.[125]

On the contrary, it is not very easy to understand why the verbal falsehood is also useful, when it is used for the friends or the company, and as a result of it, it should be utilized in the education. The reason for the usefulness of the verbal falsehood which is shown here is its

[125] Plato takes up the problem concerning truth and falsehood or lie (ψεῦδος) in his earlier *Hippias Minor* by examining Achilles and Odysseus.

function that it stops the friends who are trying to do something wrong because of their madness or ignorance. In other words, in order to lead people to just action, the verbal falsehood is allowed; it is even recommended. However, this does not mean that everyone is allowed to lie and deceive one another. Here one has to pay attention to the expression "ὡς φάρμακον." The verbal falsehood functions as a medicine and medicine should be handled only by its experts, doctors; it may not be used by "ordinary people" or "laypersons" (ἰδιῶται) (389b). In this way, one more condition is added to the useful verbal falsehood.

> *Politeia* 389b
>
> τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἁπτέον τοῦ τοιούτου:
>
> Then, it's appropriate for the rulers, if for anyone at all, to lie for the benefit of the polis in cases involving enemies or citizens, while all the rest must not put their hands to anything of the sort.

Here are two necessary conditions clearly given which make the verbal falsehood allowable. First, it is used for "the benefit of the polis (ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως)," whether it is used against its enemies or toward its company. In this passage, Socrates does not clarify what can be "beneficial" for the polis, but it is noteworthy that here he cares for "the polis," not the individual. This argument recalls the formulation of "the true rhetoric" in the *Gorgias*: the true rhetoric, distinguished from the rhetoric which is called a "shameful mob-oratory (αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία)" (*Gorgias* 503a)and is used by Gorgias, one of the most famous and powerful orator in the fifth century B.C.E. in Greece, because orators who use (or are able to use) the true rhetoric "speak always with a view to what is the best (τὸ βέλτιστον), with the single aim of making the citizens as good as possible (ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται) by their

speeches" (*Gorgias* 502d). Although there is a difference between the theme discussed in the *Gorgias* and that in the *Politeia*—the former deals with rhetoric, while the latter with the verbal falsehood—, they share the viewpoint of the aim of speech directed at the people in the polis. It is noteworthy that Socrates, the main figure in the *Gorgias*, uses "citizen (πολίτης)" as the addressee of the true rhetoric; this kind of speech has to orientate people *in the polis*. It is able to make people as good as possible, namely it can produce "order (τάξις)" and "regularity (κόσμος)"in their souls (*Gorgias* 504b). If it is allowed to interpret that the "benefit" in the words of Socrates in the *Politeia* indicates the usefulness of the true rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, as I believe there is a strong connection between the useful lies and the true rhetoric, we can understand that the verbal falsehood is useful because it has an ability to make the citizens as good as possible by producing order and regularity in their souls. The "order (τάξις)" is the element that human beings, as a species different from other animals, have to observe in motions through their auditory and visual senses, because it becomes the basis of the commonality in the polis.

The second condition of the allowable verbal falsehood is as follows; it is used only by the rulers of the polis, and other people are not allowed to "touch" or to "do with" it (οὐχ ἁπτέον). Note that Socrates does not call the persons who use the falsehood "guardians" but "rulers (ἄρχοντες)." This point implies that there is not yet any difference or separation among three categories of citizens at this stage of the discussion, which supports my interpretation that the first education through *mousikê* is open to all children in the polis. This usage of "rulers" relates to one of the prohibitions which is embraced in the second condition. It is, as Socrates explains, the prohibition of lying by ordinary people to the rulers (389c). This prohibition is justified through two analogies: the relationship between a patient and a doctor, and that between a sailor and a pilot. The first analogy of doctor-patient is actually not perfectly fit for the prohibition in question from the perspective of "the benefit of the polis," because there is no layer of the community to which both doctor and patient belong. If the patient lies to the

doctor, person who suffers because of lies is the person who lies. In contrast, the analogy of pilot-sailor fits to the prohibition Socrates intends. If one sailor tells a lie about something concerning the navigation, the entire ship including the pilot and other sailors suffer from the consequence of the lie. However, the first analogy hints at another prohibition. It is the prohibition of doubting or criticizing the verbal falsehood used by the rulers. The expression "one should not touch it (οὐχ ἁπτέον)" indicates not only an action that ordinary people lie to their rulers, but also an examination on the verbal falsehood of the rulers. For, to accept the verbal falsehood of the rulers can be equal to "being obedient to their rulers (ἀρχόντων ὑπήκοος εἶναι)" (389e). Just as the patients must follow the description of the doctors who know health and illness much better than the patients, the ruled citizens have to follow the rulers. The rulers of the polis must be specialists in governing the polis.

3. 2. Comparison of Poets with Lawgivers

As the previous examination shows, poetry is categorized into the verbal falsehood, but this falsehood should not be equal to ignorance. The tellers of the falsehood have to recognize that the poetry told in the polis is false or lie only in terms of speech. In addition, Socrates sets one criterion for the acceptable poetry: whether it can be benefit of the polis or not. We took a look at a small passage from the *Gorgias* where the aim of "the true rhetoric" is explained, in order to understand the concept of "the benefit of the polis." Actually, Socrates discusses the benefit of the polis also in the *Politeia*, but not in the context of education, but in the context of criticizing imitation as a whole. The concept of imitation (*mimêsis*) shall be examined later, but in the following, I concentrate on the relationship between benefit and poetry.

The definition of "acceptable poetry" suggests evidently that there is an unacceptable poetry as its opposite. The unacceptable poetry should not be told in the polis, especially in the process of education, because it does not bring any benefit to the polis. On the contrary, when children's "young and tender" souls receive it, it will form their souls and stay almost forever.

In contrast to the vague definition of acceptable poetry, Socrates defines the unacceptable poetry very clearly. The two biggest poets who have written unacceptable poetry are Homer and Hesiod. Among them, Socrates casts an especially stern eye on Homer. For, he is said to "have educated the Greece (τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν)" and to be "the most poetic and first of the tragic poets (ποιητικώτατος καὶ πρῶτος τῶν τραγῳδοπιῶν)" (606e). People at this time regarded poets as extraordinary persons, because "these men know all arts and all things human that have to do with virtue and vice, and the divine things too" (598e). Among poets as such, Homer is widely regarded as the most prominent poet. Because Homer is said to be the prominent poet by people with praise, poets and tragedy writers after him also try to be like Homer by imitating him, although, according to Socrates, his works belong to the unacceptable poetry in the polis.

Socrates criticizes Homer severely, but Socrates orients his attention not toward Homer's literary skill, but toward Homer's governing skill. This is expressed in the imaginary question that Socrates poses to Homer.

> *Politeia* 599 d-e
>
> ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα γιγνώσκειν ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλους πολλοὺς πολλαὶ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί; σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα: σὲ δὲ τίς;
>
> Dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth about virtue, a craftsman of a phantom, just the one we defined as an imitator, but are also second and able to recognize what sorts of practices make human beings better or worse in private and in public, tell us

> which of the poleis was better governed thanks to you, as Sparta was thanks to Lycurgus, and many others, both great and small, were thanks to many others? What polis gives you credit for having proved a good lawgiver and benefited them? Italy and Sicily do so for Charondas, and we for Solon; now who does it for you?

This imaginary question includes three striking points. First, the question posed to Homer concerns governance. Although Homer is recognized as a poet in modern times, what matters to Socrates is not his literary skill such as polished expressions. Rather, the point is whether Homer can engage in polis governance well. This point indicates that the decisive criterion of good and beneficial poets is whether they engage in the good governance of the polis. Their literary skill is, at least in this context, of secondary importance. The second point is that Socrates compares the achievement of Homer with that of Lycurgus and Solon, both of whom are generally regarded as lawgivers. It is, therefore, obvious that the second sentence, "which of the poleis was better governed thanks to you?" concerns legislation. Here Socrates expresses the view that the comparison of Homer with historical lawgivers is appropriate and that poets can be lawgivers. It is natural to think that the "governance" mentioned in the previous sentence is connected to the "lawgiver," since one needs good laws and its makers, lawgivers, in order to govern a polis well. By introducing the comparison of Homer with historical lawgivers, poetry is now determined as a means of beneficial governing. This is the third point. Although it is included in the second sentence, the phrase "to have benefitted (ὠφεληκέναι) them" should be understood to be independent from the second point. Generally speaking, the "benefit" which poets bring to the polis can include anything from victorious battles to agricultural profit, as the passages immediately following the citation shows. However, the benefit mentioned here seems to have a broader sense; benefitting people is equal to "making people better." In other words, the poets have to benefit the individual in the polis.

Precisely speaking, the quotation above does not directly concern the necessity of poetry. It argues that the poets who are seen as the educators of people should play the role which is similar to that of lawgivers. This does not mean the disappearance of making poetry. In other words, they must not become lawgivers and establish laws; poets are not lawgivers.[126] The imaginary question indicates rather that the effect on the audience or people that poets, especially the greatest poet Homer, have had is almost equal to that of lawgivers who have given the people the basis of their lives both in public and in private. As Solon's legislation have benefitted the Athenians, poets including Homer who are criticized severely can actually benefit people with their poetry. If their works are "not only pleasant but also beneficial to regimes and human life (οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον)," then such poetry should be accepted in the ideal polis (607d-e). The pleasant *and* beneficial poetry is in actuality required in the ideal polis, because the education for the guardians has to be conducted through poetry. Because Socrates has already discussed the beneficial poetry, he does not repeat it in Book 10. The repetition of the discussion on poetry in the last book can be seen as Socrates' emphasis that the beneficial poetry is different from the poetry (especially Homer's one) which is widely accepted and praised in his time.[127] In order to have beneficial poetry in the ideal polis, the criteria judging whether it is beneficial or harmful to people is required. Now let us turn back to the discussion on the education through poetry.

[126] For further examination, see Oki-Suga, "Where Are the Poets in Plato's Political Philosophy?"

[127] It is contested why the different views on poetry are shown in Book 2 and 3 and Book 10. See Penelope Murray, *Plato on Poetry*.

3. 3. Poetry in Education

The main question Socrates addresses in the examination of poetry in the education is, which kind of poetry is worth being heard by the children, and "the finest told tales for them to hear" (378e). The important point here is that Socrates does not compose an ideal poetry by himself, which is found in the *Symposion* or in the *Phaedrus*.[128] He does not become a poet who is able to compose the ideal poetry, but he scrutinizes poetry from the viewpoint of "founders of a polis (οἰκισταὶ πόλεως)" (379a). This point indicates also the existence of poets, who are different from "founders" or lawgivers of a polis.

Keeping a distance from the standpoint of poets, Socrates tries to propose "models" or "patterns" (τύποι)[129] of poetry which is acceptable in his polis. In Book 2 and 3, Socrates shows some abstract patterns of poetry by examining existing poetical works, such as Homer's *Iliad* and *Odysseey*. The main task here is not criticizing each verse; rather, he tries to find out a theme that is shared among works that cannot be accepted in the ideal polis, so that he can find criteria for differentiating beneficial contents from harmful ones. When these criteria are put into practice in the polis, they function as the "models" that all poets have to refer to. If a poet represents something deviating from the models in the verse, this verse must be refused. Note that Socrates refuses only the representations or depictions that would bring harmful effect on the recipients, not the poets themselves.[130]

Then, what kind of criteria does Socrates establish? The greatest principle of poetry is that "the god must surely always be described such as he is" (379a). This principle corresponds to the definition of imitation in Book 10. The description in poetry cannot be the nature or the

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[128] In the *Symposion*, Socrates tells the story of Eros (198a-212c), and in the *Phaedrus*, he tells two different stories—one is the story which corresponds to that of Lysias (237a-241d), the other is the palinode (243e-257b).
[129] Murray translates it "models."
[130] This point should be emphasized, because the banishment of poetry does not necessarily mean the banishment of poets.

form of gods, but poetry can represent an imitation which is removed from the form only once, just as a couch which a craftsman produces. “Being described such as he is” indicates that the description in poetry should not be drawing of a couch which represents only one side of it. Although Socrates here refers only to gods, this can be applied also to humans, especially heroes. Gods and heroes are the main figures that appear in poetical works, therefore “the models” or the norms of beneficial poetry concerns also mainly the descriptions of gods and heroes.

Concerning the description of gods, three points are set as norms. First, gods are only “the cause of good things (αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν)” (379b; 380b-c). The verses that describe as if gods are also the origin of bad things would give the children an impression that even gods sometimes do bad things and injure others. Because such images could promote children’s bad behavior and impiety, they must be forbidden. The second norm concerning gods is that gods, as long as they belong to something “in every way in the best condition,” do not “transform and alter” themselves (μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦν)” (381b). They are neither “wizards (γοητής)” nor do they “mislead us by lies (ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν)” (383a). In accordance with this norm, some verses where gods are depicted to “deceive and bewitch (ἐξαπατάω καὶ γοητεύω)” people by transforming their appearances should not be heard by children (381e). The third norm is that gods should not be depicted to “lament (ὀδύρεσθαι)” (388b). Such depiction is “an imitation made in unlike way (ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι),” especially it is inappropriate for “the greatest of gods” (388c).

These three norms are intended to have two effects. First, as is obvious, they are intended to fulfill the greatest principle above. The description of gods who are the cause of good things and do not deceive humans by transformation is the exact depiction of gods “such as they are.” This is actually the proposition of the ideal forms of gods that are to be admired in the polis. The gods so depicted are assumedly the addressees of “the hymns to gods (ὕμνοι θεοῖς)” (607a). Especially the first two norms offer the reasons why gods in the polis are worth being admired.

Besides, they offer also the models of being good. The depiction of gods being the cause of good things and not deceiving others is prepared to be imitated by people in the polis. This is the second intended effect, and the third norm has this aspect stronger than the rest. Here, one further aspect is added to the concept of imitation. The imitation assumed here is the action that the audience or the recipients of poetry do when they listen to the works of poets.

Now, we have to consider the question of why the "patterns" or "models" above are beneficial and are to be imitated. At the concluding part of the examination on the poetry, Socrates argues as follows: "we ourselves would use a more austere and less pleasing (αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ) poet and teller of tales for the sake of benefit (ὠφελίας ἕνεκα), one who would imitate the style of the decent man [&]" (398a-b). In these words, Socrates mentions the imitation of "the style of the decent man" as the typical example of the beneficial poetry. In other words, poetry would bring benefit to the polis, as long as they handle "the style of the decent man." Then, how can this model be beneficial? According to Socrates, it is because one would "imitate (μιμέομαι)" such a man. The audience imitate this model not only through speech (*logos*), but also through their attitude, voice, accent and gesture. In the moment of imitating, three different means of education—harmony, rhythm and speech—appear as the means of imitation. These means that should be used at the first stage of the ideal education are equivalent to the means that children use in the process of their growth. Then, how can such an imitation be beneficial for the people in educating them?

Firstly, we must pay attention to the point that the imitator, the subject or actor of the imitation, is poets and tellers of poetry. As the examination heretofore has shown, there are two kinds under the concept of the imitation: one is the work in which poets and story tellers are engaged, and the other is, the so-called continual reaction of the audience—especially children and young people—through body, voice and thought. Because the latter depends necessarily on the former, if one wants a reformation in the latter imitation, the reformation of the former is firstly required. It is almost impossible to change the way of the imitation which the people

have learned in their childhood, because the continual practice of imitation would take root deeply in one's character and natural disposition, especially when their souls are "soft and tender." Halliwell interprets this point by using the concept of "character formation." He understands the reason of the argument of Socrates that the audience should imitate certain characters as "character formation through habituation."[131] This understanding grasps, on one hand, the core of the benefit of poetry and myth, which is discussed throughout in Book 2 and 3. If one imitates the voice, behavior and thought of a brave hero, it will help make one's real character. On the other hand, however, his interpretation seems to consider little about the danger of the "identification," because he connects easily the habituation through the identification to the character formation. As we shall see below, while Plato sees listening to poetry and imitating the voice or behavior of the characters there as beneficial, he sees identifying oneself with the characters in the poetical works as dangerous.

Although poetry is used as an important part of the first stage of the education, Plato's attitude toward poetry, or imitation in general, is quite complicated. The main reason for this complexity is based on Socrates' banishment of poetry from the ideal polis in Book 10 of the *Politeia*, *although* he lists its benefits in Book 2 and 3. Our last task concerns this point.

4. Banishment of Poetry and *Mimêsis*

4. 1. Banishment of Poetry

By defining the useful verbal falsehood, Socrates shows the importance of the supervision of the storytellers in the polis (ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς) (377c). There are two reasons for this supervision. First, as stated in Chapter I, the period when the children listen to the stories is "the most decisive" period for humans, because at this time "each individual thing can be most easily molded and receive whatever mark [one wants] to impress upon it" (377c). Second,

[131] Stephen Halliwell, "The 'Republic's Two Critiques of Poetry," p. 254; Stephen Halliwell, *The Aesthetics of Mimesis*, Chapter 2.

as shown in the last section, only the rulers are allowed to tell the verbal falsehood. However, since educating children is the task of storytellers and mothers, it is necessary to "supervise" them whether they tell only the stories that is allowable in the polis.

Here arises the problem as to what kind of stories they should tell concretely, because the criteria which were brought into light in the previous section are only the models for poets in making poetry, but they do not determine which poetical works are to be listened to. Socrates addresses this problem through rejecting (ἐκβάλλω) some works which are widely cited. The works that Socrates gives as the target of his rejection are "the great stories (οἱ μείζονες μῦθοι)," i.e., "the ones Hesiod and Homer told us, and the other poets too (οἱ Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί)" (377d). Socrates' use of the dual form of the verb "told (ἐλεγέτην)" denotes "the joint importance" or "the joint responsibility" of Hesiod and Homer "in forming the canon of Greek mythology."[132] In spite of adding "the other poets," the objects Socrates examines and criticizes in the following discussions are mainly the texts from the works of these two representative poets who had educated the entire Greeks (cf. 606e).[133]

Therefore, when Socrates mentions "the many parts of the stories that they tell at the moment," the parts which are rejected in the ideal polis indicate the verses Homer's and Hesiod's works. Then, what is the problem of their works and why are they rejected? Note that Socrates does *not* try to reject all of their works. In other words, he does not banish their entire works such as the *Iliad* or the *Theogony*; rather, he attempts to find out "smaller stories (ἐλάττονες [μῦθοι])" which are included in their works and are depicted in an inappropriate way (377c). There are two perspectives in the criteria through which the useful verbal falsehoods are distinguished from the hateful ones. The first criterion is whether the falsehoods

[132] Penelope Murray, *Plato on Poetry*, p. 137.
[133] Interestingly, the texts Socrates quotes from Hesiod's works, *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, are much fewer than the citation from Homer's *Iliad* and *Odysseey*. The poets who are included in "the other poets" are presumably Aeschylus (cf. 381d, 391e, et al.), Euripides (cf. 395e, 568b), Sophocles and Pindar.

are depicted “fine (καλῶς)” or not (377d). Socrates explains it in a more concrete way as follows.

> *Politeia* 377e
>
> ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.
>
> When a man in speech makes a bad representation of what gods and heroes are like, just as a painter who paints something that doesn’t resemble the things whose likeness he wished to paint.

The word “badly (κακῶς)” is the opposite concept to “fine (καλῶς).” These words of Socrates contain two points to which we should pay attention. First, the difference which makes the stories “fine” or “bad” is the depiction of “gods and heroes.” This difference would not be effected by the polarity between truth and false. Even if a story is true, it should not be told to “those who are thoughtless and young people (ἄφρονές τε καὶ νέοι),” when it is not “fine.”[134] This view is based on the idea that young people are not able to “distinguish hidden sense (ὑπόνοια) from what is not (ὃ μή)” (378d). Second, it is noteworthy that the analogy is between the stories told “by words (τῷ λόγῳ)” and the paintings. This point seems to contradict the first point, because the reason why a painter draws badly is his incompetence of drawing resemblance. This point reveals that there is a presupposition that the truth, namely the object of paintings, is always “fine.” In order to understand this point further, we have to examine the concept of mimesis.

[134] Although Socrates excludes thoughtless and young people from the object of the stories which are true but inferior depiction, he also admits that only a few people are allowed to hear such stories, when these stories have to be told (378a).

4. 2. Problem of *Mimêsis*

When Socrates mentions "a painter (γραφεύς)" in the quotation above, it suggests the relationship between truth or form and its imitation (μίμησις), because painters play an important role in the discussion on the banishment of poetry in the last book of the *Politeia*.

Let us jump back again to Book 10. After he discussed different themes in six books, Socrates turns back to the theme of poetry at the last part of the entire dialogue. At the beginning of Book 10, he argues that the foundation of the polis is "rightly" done, especially from the viewpoint of "not admitting at all any part of it that is imitative" (595a). This beginning is itself controversial, because it seems to contradict not only the statement expressed in Book 2 and 3, but also that in the later discussion in Book 10 (607a) on the usefulness of poetry as the verbal falsehood.[135] Let us read the original text.

Politeia 595a-b

καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω.

τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική: παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη.

[135] Otfried Hˆffe, "Einführung in Platons Politeia," pp. 16-17; Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Part I, p.393; Julia Annas, *Introduction to Plato's Republic*, p. 342.

> And indeed, I said, I also recognize in many other aspects of this polis that we were entirely right in the way we founded it, but I say this particularly when reflecting on poetry.
>
> "What about it?" he said.
>
> In not admitting at all any part of it that is imitative. For that the imitative, more than anything, must not be admitted looks, in my opinion, even more manifest now that the soul's forms have each been separated out.

The important point here is, as mentioned, the reason why the founding of the ideal polis by Socrates and his interlocutors is done "entirely right." They did not "accept any part of it that is imitative." One should not misunderstand this sentence. Socrates does not refuse all kind of poetry, but he refuses poetry as far as it is imitative (ὅση μιμητική). Then, how is imitation (*mimêsis*) defined here?

At first, Socrates explains imitation by giving examples of couches and tables. On the ground of the discussion developed in Book 6,[136] each of them is supposed to have one "form (ἰδέα)" (596b). Some craftsmen make couches, some make tables. What craftsmen (δημιουργός / δημιουργοῖ) make is couches and tables that we use in our daily life, but when they make these products, they "look at (βλέπειν)" the form of couch or that of table. Such craftsmen can be called carpenters. In addition to such craftsmen, there are people who produce couches and tables that look like them but represent only their "appearances (φαινόμενα)" (596e). People producing the mere appearances are called "imitator (μιμητής)," whose best example is "painter (ζωγράφος)" (*ibid*). Couches or tables that painters draw are only their appearances and what they look at in drawing is not "the form" of couches or tables, but couches and tables in sight, namely productions.

[136] Especially 490b.

In the same way, Socrates counts also the writers of tragedies (τραγῳδοποιός) as one of the imitators, because, just as painters, the object of tragedies is not "the form" but the appearance. Nevertheless, we can also see that the work of imitators and that of craftsmen fall in the same category, if we see them from the perspective of imitation. The former imitates productions, but the latter the forms. Then, what is the difference between these two types of craftsmen? Let me take an example of a couch, just as Socrates does. A couch, which we use in daily life, appears differently depending on the angles from which we look at it. Although the difference of its appearances does not come from the difference of its shape, but from its angles, painters draw different appearances as if it is not the same couch. There is a gap between the drawn pictures and the existing couch that craftsmen produce. The same thing happens also in tragedies. When the tragedy-writers depict mistakes, faults or guilt the gods and heroes make, their works give audience an impression that this is the entire life or the lifestyle of gods and heroes, although the expressions of the gods or heroes who make mistakes are only a small part of their entire lifestyles. Such expressions are just like a drawn couch. The tragedy-writers do not grasp the nature of gods and heroes, but they tell only a small part of their natures.

Therefore, the imitators who produce only the appearances are called "the man at the third generation from nature (ὁ τοῦ τρίτοῦ ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητής)" (597e). Note that, even if these words sound negative, Socrates does not directly criticize its distance from the nature. In other words, the fact that the appearances as productions of the imitators—couches or tables on canvas, for example—are distant three times from their forms or natures is *not* the reason for "not admitting" poetry. These words are only descriptive. Then, why should the poetry "as far as it is imitative" be banished from the polis?

Interpreters have seen that the problem of imitation lies in its closing the way to inquire the truth or the Good. H. Gadamer, who sees politics as equal to philosophy, understands that

paideia, education, aims at the inquiry of the truth from fake ones.[137] Fujisawa finds the reason of limitation of literatures in the difficulty that they handle only specific cases, so that the imitation in such specific cases, which he calls "speculative *mimesis*," should be reformed into imitation of truth or the *epistêmê* itself, which he calls "inquiring *mimesis*," so as to make use of imitation as the means in the education.[138] Fujisawa's point of view is shared also by Ogino who finds the problem of imitation in its interruption of people from questioning "what is F?" and in its power to make them stay in the speculation.[139] Kablitz's emphasis lies on the difference between representation (Ab-bildung) and replication (Nach-bildung).[140] If the imitation of the poetical works is not simply a "representation" but a "replication," it will interrupt people from inquiring the truth. Even worse is that the replica, i.e., the production or the result of imitation, will replace the place occupied by the true one. Ogino refers to this point too. The replacement of the replica is much worse in the case of poetry than in the case of drawing, because no one is able to "verify" through the comparison whether the figure of Achilles in Homer's *Iliad* is rightly and truly depicted.[141] As long as the figure of Achilles in the *Iliad* is inherited, it occupies the place of "the form" or "the nature" of Achilles. This power of imitation, which can be called the *mimêsis* as replication, would be dangerous, when it has an audience or the recipients who are not able to "verify" its authenticity.

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[137] Hans Gadamaer, "Plato und die Dichter," pp. 193-7, 200.

[138] 藤澤令夫「プラトンにおける論争の論理」p. 165; 「文芸批判の基準としての『カリス』、『オルトテース』、『オーペリアー』」pp. 330-332.

[139] 荻野弘之「詩人の場所—『国家』第十巻の「詩人追放論」(1)—」pp. 14-17.

[140] "Wären die Spiegelbilder nämlich bloße Abbilder, so wären sie vermutlich weniger gefährlich. Denn sie würden sich als bloße Substitute von etwas, das sie selbst erkennbar nicht sind und auf das sie eben deshalb hindeuten, präsentieren. Nachbilder aber versuchen eben diesen Unterschied zum Verschwinden zu bringen. Sie versuchen sich an die Stelle dessen zu setzten, was sie nicht sind und was sie zu sein doch vorgeben." (Andreas Kablize, "Mimesis versus Repräsentation," p. 219.)

[141] 荻野弘之「詩人のいない国—「詩人追放論」その問題の再定位のための試論」pp. 13-15.

4. 3. Mimesis and its Audience

When imitators, for example painters, represent some objects on a canvas in order to satisfy themselves, it would not be problematic. However, when they represent something in order to show their works to "us (ἡμῖν)," the character of imitation that it is far away from the truth or the nature appear as a difficult problem (598b). This "us" Socrates mentions denotes the general audience, who do not know the form of the drawn objects. This audience includes also "children and thoughtless people (παῖδές τε καὶ ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι)" (598c). Since the audience do not know as much about the object as the painter, it is easy especially for a "good (ἀγαθός)" painter to "deceive (ἐξαπατάω)" its recipients and to make them believe that the drawings are the real ones (598c). The function of imitation which is described as "deceit" is, of course, found not only in paintings but also in poetical works. Interestingly, however, Socrates does not lay its responsibility on the poets. Rather, he seems to criticize the audience who are deceived by the imitation because of their lack of ability to "distinguish knowledge from ignorance and imitation (τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷός τ᾽ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι)" (598d). In this context, Socrates does not assume the difference among the audience of poetry, for example, whether they are children or adults. This is because the effect poetry has is not different in accordance with who the audience are. However, it is obvious that such effect of poetry on children is stronger than adults.

When Socrates describes the recipients of imitation in this way, what is in his mind is no more the relationship between painters and observers of their paintings, but that between poets, especially tragedy-writers, and the audience who watch their plays. The audience cannot "distinguish" the true form from the imitative one. Specifically, they are not able to distinguish the inferior portraits of gods and heroes in the tragedies from their natures which are composed of courage or self-control. In addition, the poets are doing imitation even in representing "the greatest and finest of things (περὶ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων)," i.e., that of "war, military

command, the founding of poleis (διοικήσεων πόλεων), a man's education (παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου)," of which the audience do not know what is imitation and what is not (599c-d). This incapability of the audience is surely far from the attitude required in the inquiry of the form or the Good, but the problem that Socrates sees seriously dangerous is not such incapability. Rather, when the audience as the recipients of imitation react collectively against imitation, or more specifically, poetry, this incapability appears as the greatest problem.

Although they are not able to compare between the portraits in poetical works and the form of gods and heroes because of their lack of ability to distinguish among them, the audience believe that some poets write "pleasurable (ἡδύς)" poetical works and tragedies "well (εὖ λέγειν)" (599a; 60a1; 607d). As a result of it, they applaud the poets. The applause by the audience induces a further reaction of poets. The poetry which is to play the educative role in the polis, seeks more applause from its audience, and produces works that please, not educate, the audience. Then, the question is why the audience see some works as "pleasurable." The greatest part which should take its responsibility is, according to Socrates, "the element in us which is far removed from intelligence (πόρρω δ᾽αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν)" that enjoys and abandons oneself to the pleasure provided by poetry (603b). This part of the soul is called "irrational (ἀλόγιστον)" and is ruled not by "reason (λόγος)" or "law (νόμος)," but by "suffering (πάθος)" (604a). When poetry works upon this irrational part of the soul, the audience feel "pleasure." As far as the audience do not have a soul with the rational part controlling the irrational, they cannot distinguish those bringing only pleasure from those educating their souls. The audience who follow the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod, are reflected in the image of people who are not educated under Plato's new educational program. Here emerges the circular structure between the poets and the audience of poetry, and Socrates sees Homer as the best example.

Finally, it should be questioned how poetry works on the audience and why such effect is criticized, because it is, on one hand, a criticism on the poetry, and on the other hand, it

reflects the power of poetry. The passion that most strongly works on the irrational part of soul is "grief (λύπη)" (604b). The following shall examine how poetry works on souls of the audience, using the strongest passion, grief, as a beachhead.

In Book 10, Socrates assumes two parts in the soul of the audience. One is called "rational (λογιστικός)" (602e), which plays the role of "measuring, counting and weighing (μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι)" in order to resist being deceived by the appearances (602d). The part "which puts its trust in measurement and calculation (τὸ μέτρῳ καὶ λογισμῷ πιετεῦον)" is considered as "the best part of the soul (βέλτιστον τῆς ψυχῆς)" (603a). The other is the irrational part that is "far removed from intelligence." The part with which the imitative art (ἡ μιμητική) associates is this irrational part, because, unlike the rational part, this part does not measure or count but accepts (willingly) something "neither true nor healthy (οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ᾽ἀληθεῖ)," namely what the imitative art creates (603b). The representative thing that is "neither true nor healthy" is "the suffering" that drags one to the grief (604a). Note that only the irrational part feels the grief. The rational part receives it too, but the way how they receive it is different. As the explanation of the rational part shows, the irrational one receives it and is dragged, since this part does not have "reason and law" that enables one's soul to resist against the dragging by the grief. This image recalls the metaphor of the marionette in the *Nomoi*. The irrational part wants actually to be dragged to the grief, because the nature (φύσις) of this part tells us to weep and to lament, in order to become satisfied (δακρῦσαὶ τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθηαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι). The irrational part receives and feels "pleasure" when its natural desire is fulfilled. Therefore, the picture of weeping and lamenting is seen as a sign that the rational part is beaten by the irrational part of the soul. This is also an evident that the weak soul seeks pleasure, but not its just state.

The grief is not the only passion that associates with the irrational part; "fear of death (τὸν θάνατον δεδιέναι)," "laughing (τὸ γέλοιον)," "sex (τὸ ἀφροδίσιον)" and "spiritedness (θυμός)" are also counted as the passions that bring pleasure (368a; 606c-d). Since these

passions have a "fretful element" or an "irritable disposition" (τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν), they appeal easily to the irrational part (604e). It is important to keep in mind that Socrates does not criticize or try to banish these passions; it is impossible. The target he is attacking to is the soul in which the rational part cannot control the irrational part and the soul that is overwhelmed by them. In other words, Socrates' reproach is directed toward the souls of the recipients of imitative works, namely the audience. Then, what is happening within the soul of the audience, if the rational part cannot resist the grief against the pulling of the irrational?

In order to address this question, let us read the following passage which explains why the poets tend to depict the "irritable disposition" in their works.

> *Politeia* 604e
>
> οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις: ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται.
>
> Now then, the irritable disposition affords much and varied imitation, while the prudent and quiet character, which is always nearly equal to itself, is neither easily imitated nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a festive assembly where all sorts of human beings are gathered in a theater. For the imitation is of a condition that is surely alien to them.

Here Socrates explains why poets compose poetry appealing to the irrational part from two viewpoints. The first one concerns the lack of poets' ability. The poet who engages in imitation (ὁ μιμητικὸς ποιητής) is not able to compose poetry which depicts "the prudent and quiet character" (605a). It must be noted that Socrates points out only that such character is "not easy

(οὔτε ῥᾴδιον)" to be represented in poetical works. Even if it is difficult for the poets, it is possible. The second viewpoint concerns the audience. That is, the recipients of imitation, especially the audience gathering to see the plays of tragedies, do not possess the ability to "understand (μανθάνειν)" the prudent and quiet character. Because such character is "alien to them," they are not able to understand what is imitated on the stage. This point corresponds to the discussion on the relationship between pleasure and familiarity, as observed before. According to Socrates, one feels pleasure toward something, when it is the thing which one is familiar with. If people does not get used to the character of the "prudent and quiet" person during childhood, they do not feel pleasure at all in seeing the imitation of such character. As a result, they cannot enjoy the plays where the prudent and quiet character is represented.

As the last important point concerning the reception of poetry, we have to pay attention to the presuppositions of Plato: in watching the plays of poetry, the audience forget themselves and sympathize with the figures in poetry. This situation is depicted by Socrates as follows:

> *Politeia* 605c-d
>
> οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.
>
> When even the best of us hear Homer or any other of the tragic poets imitating one of the heroes in mourning and making quite an extended speech with lamentation, or, if you like, singing and beating his breast, you know that we enjoy it and that we give ourselves over to following the imitation; suffering along with the hero in all seriousness, we praise as a good poet the man who most puts us in this state.

These reactions of the audience in observing the poetical works is not caused by their thoughtlessness. Even for "the best [people] of us," it is difficult to escape from such reaction of their souls. What Plato depicts here with the words "give oneself" and "suffer along with the hero" are the audience who fear the Hades or the Afterlife and lament the death of their friends as if they were themselves Achilles or other figures. They cannot dissociate their own experiences from the incidents that happen to the figures in the poetry. The disappearance of the distance or difference between the audience and the figures in tragedies is also shown by the Greek words. The audience forget themselves, because they "give themselves" or "surrender themselves" to the figures. They "suffer along with the hero" not from the standpoint of the observers, but as the actors or agents; they "experience (πάσχω)" the incident "together (σύν)." Through the plays on the stage, the audience give themselves to others, namely the figures. They enjoy plays without an objective perspective. Rather, they experience all of the incidents together with the figures who are frightened of death and lament the death of their friends, and as a result, they "identify" with the figures.[142]

The first sentence at the beginning of Book 10 has to be understood from this perspective. What Socrates has in mind when he argues the banishment of poetry from his ideal polis, is the imitative art that is removed from its nature or its authentic form *and* makes the audience feel pleasure, forget themselves and suffer along with the figures in plays. It also indicates that Socrates in the *Politeia* does *not* try to banish entire poetry. By defining the poetry that brings bad effects on the audience, he attempts to save the poetry that is acceptable in the polis.

[142] Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, p. 45.

5. Summary

This chapter inquired the content of education through *mousikê*. As observed in Chapter I and II, education and *mousikê* are two decisive elements that constitute the ideal just polis as well as the luxurious polis. Because the ancient Greek concept of "*mousikê*" entails various aspects of performances, such as instrumental music, song, dance and poetry, the ideal education which makes use of *mousikê* has to concern these various aspects.

Plato's educational program defined in the *Politeia* consists of three main stages. The first stage includes two parts: upbringing and education through *mousikê* and physical training (*gymnastikê*). The second stage is called the "prelude" for the main learning and people are supposed to learn mathematics including arithmetic and astronomy at this stage. At the third and last stage, people are finally able to be engaged in the "dialectic." Unlike the second and third stages of the program, the upbringing and education through *mousikê* targets at all children, especially infants and small children, in the polis.

The important precondition is the relation between the means for educating children and the *conditio humana* that we observed in Chapter II. *Mousikê* is divided up into two elements: one is musical elements, i.e., harmony and rhythm, and the other is its verbal part which is called "speech (*logos*)." The *conditio humana* and the upbringing through *mousikê* converge at the musical elements. The musical elements, harmony and rhythm, are useful for upbringing infants and very small children who are not yet able to understand speech or language. Note that the upbringing through harmony and rhythm is not a kind of teaching. Just like the breeze blowing in the healthy place examined in Chapter II, this stage of education aims at creating inclination to the "beautiful *logos*" in children's soul, so that children will feel pleasure and familiarity to the works accompanied by "beautiful *logos*" when they understand speech and language. In other words, the task of the upbringing through harmony and rhythm is to make habit.

In the education through *mousikê*, “harmony” and “rhythm” are used to represent the attitude, life and character of the figures in plays. Socrates emphasizes that these harmony and rhythm should represent voice, accent or pitch and gesture or posture. In other words, it does not matter which kind of harmonic modes and metric are employed. Because harmony and rhythm are able to appeal to the auditory and visual perceptions of children who do not understand *logos* yet, these musical elements have to show them how a courageous or a moderate person behaves.

When children grow up and become able to understand *logos*, the verbal part of *mousikê* plays the main role. This part is the content of the stories or poetic works and it is consisted of the verbal falsehood (*pseudos*). Socrates pays special attention to the verbal falsehood, because it should be used only by the rulers of the polis. On this ground, the content of poetry needs to be carefully examined. As the imaginary question, which Socrates casts to Homer, suggested that the task of poetry is to make the people in the polis better. Thus, some verses that could promote children’s bad behavior or impiety will be deleted, because, if children repeatedly listen to the scene where gods or heroes do wrong, they will tend to imitate such character. According to Plato, these unacceptable passages are frequently found in Homer’s and Hesiod’s works.

The last part examined the reason for such a severe criticism against the two greatest poets. The observation revealed that Plato’s reproach is directed at the circular structure which is constructed by poets and its audience. When the poets compose poetical works, having Homer’s or Hesiod’s works as their models, the audience applaud them because the audience are used to such stories. In order to break this circular structure, Plato criticizes some poetical works which are widely accepted quite severely, but it does not mean that he wants to completely banish poetry from the polis. The point is rather that he has to attack only the unacceptable passages in order to make use of poetry for educating children.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis attempted to explain the political art developed in Plato's philosophy from the perspective of education, observing mainly his *Politeia*. As stated in the preface, it was an attempt to re-politicize the *Politeia*. The thesis showed how strongly "the political" plays the central role in this dialogue, even though the political dimension does not seem to fit to the understanding of "the political" in our time. In the following, first I shall look back on the entire argument, and then, refer to some points with which this thesis could contribute to a series of the study of Plato's philosophy and the study of the history of political thought and political philosophy.

Chapter I was engaged in the question of where the political dimension appears in the *Politeia*. It demonstrated that, whereas although Socrates speaks of a polis first in the analogy between polis and soul, the political dimension can be already found in the discussion where two main interlocutors of Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimatus, quote the verses from famous poets, especially the greatest poets, Homer and Hesiod. The inquiry into "the political" has already begun at the same time with the question of justice in the individual, because the views of justice which every citizen in the polis possesses reflects necessarily what one learned or heard in one's childhood. Their "fathers," whether it is in a biological sense or in a metaphorical sense, tell stories of what happens to people who have lived justly in the Afterlife. The portraits of gods, heroes and the Hades that the fathers narrate to the children originate from poetical works. These images are inherited from fathers to children, because the fathers believe the images in such stories are useful in educating their children. The old host of the house in Piraeus, Cephalus, represents a person who had lived in this tradition.

After the political dimension appeared clearly in the discussion, Socrates begins establishing an ideal polis in speech in order to investigate the origin of justice and injustice. The need for establishing not only the true and healthy polis but also the luxurious and swollen polis proves that justice (and injustice) can exist only in the latter polis. The examination in the

latter part of Chapter I showed that the key to establish a just polis is education and imitation which do not exist in the healthy polis at all. Thus, the combination of education and imitation, especially imitation in *mousikê*, appears as the central theme in Plato's political philosophy.

As Chapter 2 showed, the combination of education and *mousikê* reflects Plato's understanding of the *conditio humana* that distinguishes human beings from other animals. In the *Nomoi*, which describes the *conditio humana* more clearly, it is defined as the perception of orders and disorders in motions, i.e., rhythm and harmony. While other animals are also able to sense sounds or motions, they are unable to observe orders and disorders in them and feel pleasure. Unlike other animals, human beings are able to dance with others, because they feel pleasure when they sense rhythm and harmony and they share the sense of rhythm and harmony. In this way, we can see a connection between the understanding of the *conditio humana* and the concept of *mousikê* which emerged as the main theme in Chapter I.

The *conditio humana* as the perception of rhythm and harmony relates furthermore to education. The examination of the latter in Chapter II showed that the appropriate environment for education is primarily directed at the auditory and visual perceptions. The ideal education environment is likened to "the healthy place," where the breeze brings health from good regions. In this place, children's eyes and ears are required to be always exposed to beautiful works, so that they get used to beautiful things within themselves. The examination in Chapter II demonstrated also that the healthy place is prepared for all children in the polis regardless of which kind of *physis*, natural disposition, they have. The education or upbringing at the first stage targeting at the *conditio humana* is open to every child in the polis, while the higher programs, mathematics and dialectics, are prepared only for the selected children.

Chapter III inquired how the education through *mousikê* is established. In other words, the question there was what is the content of this education. The education through *mousikê* can be divided into two stages in accordance with the age of the children who are to be educated. First, the musical elements of *mousikê*, harmony and rhythm, are used to bring up infants or

small children who do not understand *logos* yet. These elements, however, do not designate certain harmonic modes or metric, but rather voices, accents and gesturer of the figures in plays. The important point here is that harmony and rhythm represent the attitude of courageous or moderate persons. When children grow up and come to understand *logos*, the content, i.e. the verbal part, of *mousikê* plays the primary role in the education. In setting the criteria of the appropriate content of poetry, Plato pays attention to the representations of gods and heroes.

When Plato sets the criteria of good poetry, he criticizes the prevailing poetical works severely at the same time. As the last section of Chapter III showed, his severe reproach against poetry finds its ground in the power that poetry can have for its audience. Poetry functions as the means of education, because the audience somehow imitates the figures in plays and Plato also tries to make use of it. On the other hand, however, if one listens to a poetical work repeatedly, the character of its figure can become one's own character through imitation. Besides, there is a circular structure between poets and their audience and poets; poets keep on creating inappropriate works as long as their audience applauds them based on the pleasure whose origin lies in their familiarity to such works. Plato's reproach against the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod, aims at breaking this circular structure between the poets and the audience. Plato's apparent contradictory attitude towards poetry in Book 2 to 3 and Book 10 is based on this understanding of poetry.

The arguments from Chapter I to Chapter III of this thesis may have implications that could go beyond a study on Plato's political philosophy. First, this thesis shows the possibility to understand "the political" from a perspective that is different from the modern one. When we try to consider the political aspect of something, we tend to seek something political in our sense; for example, a decision to dispatch the military in the Diet is political, whereas an apology of a boy who broke a toy of his friend is not political. The inquiry into the emergence of "the political" in Plato's philosophy can make us reconsider what "the political" is. Second, if we understand that the political art should primarily concern souls, as Plato depicts in the

Politeia and in the *Nomoi*, we should not underestimate the study on the psychic dimension of the members of the political community than that on the exterior political system. The component of the political community is human beings, which is an animal spices with a soul.

If we follow the categorization by Plato, we live in the "luxurious and swollen" society. It is impossible for us to regain the "true and healthy" one, just like it was impossible for Socrates and Glaucon. However, we can "purify" our society by educating children. "The one greatest thing (ἕν μέγα)" in establishing the ideal political community is to educate the next generation (423e). Socrates knows, when he tells the Phoenician story, that education or leading the citizens is not to be completed in several years; it takes several generations. Plato suggests the long but certain way to acquire the "purified" political community, while he himself tries to lead his readers to philosophy.

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