

# The Less Favored Foreigners: Public Attitudes toward Chinese and South Korean Residents in Japan

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This quantitative study aims to investigate the predictors of Japanese sentiments regarding the acceptance of foreign residents in Japan, particularly individuals from China and South Korea. This paper analyzes data from the 2013 “Public Survey on Political Participation of Citizens and Internationalization”, to examine and compare the level of acceptance among Japanese citizens toward Chinese and South Korean residents. Analysis models are established by examining demographic factors and socio-cultural adaptation factors. The results demonstrate that Japanese citizens are more likely to accept an increase of South Korean rather than Chinese residents. Gender, age, and education significantly affect attitudes toward foreign residents of both nationalities. However, relative household income and marital status proved insignificant. Thus, Japanese citizens who showed higher satisfaction with their lives tend to accept foreign residents more.

**Key Words:** Attitude, foreign residents, Japan, group threat theory


## Introduction

Even though it has been widely discussed by local governments over the last two decades, Japan is still far from realizing its aspirations of creating a “multicultural” society. Previous studies (Burgess, 2004; Tai, 2007) argue that while multiculturalism is generally favored by the public, many “who demand cultural homogeneity within a nation approve of multiculturalism but are unwilling to grant equal rights” (Nagayoshi, 2011). A large number of Japanese citizens consider foreign residents as a threat to labor market competition. Moreover, Japan’s ideology of ethnic homogeneity is a further obstacle to achieving multiculturalism (Nagayoshi, 2009). It was reported in 2017, approximately 1.9 percent of the registered population were non-Japanese.<sup>1</sup> Even if naturalized citizens of non-Japanese ethnicity are counted, the figure would rise only slightly to about 2 percent. In 2009, Hays reported that Japanese people recognize Japan as “one of the world’s most insular countries.” Meanwhile law enforcement officials and scholars sometimes explain Japan’s low crime rates by referring to its “monoracial society” (Hays, 2009) even though evidence supporting a link between diversity and crime is baseless.

Despite these perceptions, the labor force shortage pressured the Japanese government to consider how to attract foreign workers. For instance, members of the Liberal Democratic Party presented a

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**Figure 1.** Statistics of the Foreigners Registered in Japan (1972–2014)


Sources: 1972–2009 在留外国人統計 (*Statistics of the Foreigners Registered in Japan*), Ministry of Justice: <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/02-12.xls>; 2010–2014 在留外国人統計 (*Statistics of the Foreigners Registered in Japan*), Ministry of Justice: [http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichi-ran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichi-ran_touroku.html). (May 10, 2015)

proposal to accept 10 million foreigners by 2050 (Ito and Kamiya, 2008). In May 2012, to promote their entry, a point-based system that provides highly skilled foreign professionals with preferential treatment was introduced by the Immigration Bureau of Japan.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, the number of residents from China and South Korea, the largest migrant groups in Japan, are likely to increase. Since the official normalization of Sino–Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, the Chinese population in Japan jumped from 48,089 in 1972 to 654,777 in 2014. This rapid increase has resulted in ethnic Chinese emerging as the largest foreign resident group in Japan.<sup>3</sup> The number of Korean residents in Japan declined to 501,230 in 2014. Despite this drop, Chinese and Korean nationals combined still comprised over 70 percent of the total number of foreign residents in Japan (see Figure 1).

These foreign residents enter Japan on various visas. Regardless if they stay in Japan as students, dependents, or skilled professionals, all of them are actively involved in the Japanese labor market. Some are even striving to make Japan a second home. In 2014, a total of 215,155 Chinese and 65,711 Korean nationals were registered as permanent residents in Japan with an additional 354,503 Koreans registered as special permanent residents. On average some 9,000 non-Japanese gain permanent residency each year. Further 3,060 Chinese and 4,744 Koreans were naturalized in 2014 making up a majority of the total number of 9,277.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, despite these numbers Japanese society has only achieved a degree of heterogeneity and multiculturalism in certain large urban areas, such as Tokyo’s Shinjuku and Toshima wards. Foreign residents, especially those from China and South Korea, experience social alienation while living in Japan. Due to the strong identity of being “Japanese” among Japanese people, many foreign residents perceived discrimination in Japan, therefore their cognitive and affective evaluations of personal life rarely climb up to the same level as Japanese, and are often lower than people in their origin countries.

## The Less Favored Foreigners



**Figure 2.** Major difficulties faced in Japan (Nikkei Brazilians and Chinese, 2006)

Previous studies have showed how Chinese have been successful in different industrial areas after settling in Japan. Newcomers, however, still encounter many adaptation difficulties arising from cultural and social barriers in the host society (Ying, Samaratunge and Hartel, 2011). The 2006 Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) survey demonstrated that Chinese low-skilled workers experienced a much greater degree of communication problems with Japanese than their Nikkei Brazilian counterparts. Furthermore, Japanese attitudes toward foreigners were ranked the second most difficult obstacle among respondents (see Figure 2). These difficulties that newcomer Chinese residents face may result in conflicts and inappropriate administration policies in the host society.

Other minority groups encounter marginalization. Since the late 20th century, Korean residents also experienced systematic discrimination. They were paid lower wages than their Japanese co-workers, and faced the racist contempt of many individual Japanese (Fukuoka, 2000). Feelings of contempt towards ethnic Koreans are still deeply ingrained in Japanese society leading to much discrimination. Over the course of their personal development, many ethnic Koreans internalize Japanese negative images of themselves. The complexity surrounding the ways in which they imagine themselves results in an intricate and contradictory mixture of aspirations to assimilate while retaining an ethnic Korean identity (Fukuoka, 2000).

Anti-foreigner sentiments are closely linked to regional politics and relations between China, South Korea and Japan. The diplomatic relations between the three nation-states have fallen into a turbulent state in recent decades. A recent survey revealed that nine out of ten Japanese citizens view Sino-Japanese relations negatively. Some political issues like the Diaoyu Islands and Liancourt Rocks dispute, often gain the attention of the Japanese public and impact attitudes towards China and South Korea.

Thus, in some densely populated districts with foreigners in Japan such as Ikebukuro and Shinokubo, it is not uncommon to see anti-Chinese or South Korean demonstrations organized by Japanese ultra-nationalists.

The Japanese government has implemented policies to attract skilled labor from other countries, however it has yet to address the important issue of how to help foster the acceptance of these foreign residents. Japan is under much pressure to create a multicultural society. Nevertheless, the adaptation difficulties of foreign residents are seen as an obstacle for themselves, rather than that of the Japanese population. Only when Japanese natives are willing to accept foreigners, will foreign resident groups be able to integrate into Japanese society. Then the Japanese government can further strive for social stability and economic development.

Therefore, to improve foreign residents' incorporation into the host society, it is necessary to understand the reason Japanese citizens hold negative perceptions of foreign residents, especially toward those from China and South Korea. Some researchers believe xenophobia is due to Japanese people's fear of foreign cultures' effect on the national identity (Befu, 2001; Ishiwata, 2011). Others argue that Japanese people fear losing jobs to foreigners in the labor market (Fetzer, 2000; Nukaga, 2006). There are a number of questions the existing literature does not address. What particular political environments cause anti-foreigner sentiments among Japanese people? Which particular migrant groups do they dislike? Lastly, what other factors contribute to negative perceptions of foreign residents? Considering the significance of minority groups and specific diplomatic relations (Zhang, 2015), this study focuses on Chinese and South Korean residents to explore the prevalence of xenophobia in Japan.

Using quantitative methods, this study presents a data analysis of the 2013 "Public Survey on Political Participation of Citizens and Internationalization" to examine Japanese attitudes toward foreign resident groups. The key questions addressed in this study are as follows. Do Chinese residents face a greater degree of xenophobia than South Korean residents in Japan? What are the determinants of Japanese perceptions of Chinese and South Korean residents? This study makes a significant contribution in a couple of ways. By investigating the attitudes of Japanese citizens towards foreign residents, it urges the Japanese government to consider how to both attract a foreign labor force and realize "multiculturalism." At the same time, this study examines the predictors of Japanese people's acceptance of Chinese and South Korean residents. These findings may be useful for organizations developing effective programs to assist foreign residents in adapting to Japanese society.

## **Literature Review**

Immigration research on "multiculturalism" focuses on how various cultures within the same society are treated. The public's discomfort with multiculturalism is not surprising. Throughout the years, numerous researchers examined predictors of the attitudes of the host society toward foreign groups (Nagayoshi, 2011). In 2010, Pettigrew and Tropp argued there is a higher correlation between contact and prejudice reduction in cases with a high level of intergroup hostility (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2010).

Interracial friendships have also been found to be a strong predictor of positive racial attitudes (Powers and Ellison, 1995). Thus, learning about the culture of a group can improve intergroup relations (Gardiner, 1972).

During recent years, the issue of multiculturalism has received a lot of attention in Japan with many scholars attempting to explain anti-foreigner sentiments (Nagayoshi, 2011; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006). Existing literature argues that the strong ethnic identity of the Japanese people is one of the significant reasons why multiculturalism has not yet taken a foothold in Japanese society (Nagayoshi, 2011). Japanese people believe in and wish to maintain the myth of the nation's ethnic homogeneity (Nagayoshi, 2011; Befu, 2001). In an analysis of anti-minority sentiments, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky (2006) argued that negative attitudes toward out-group populations are shaped by the relative size of the group and economic changes. Likewise, comparative studies that combined individual and country level variables to examine cross-national variation in anti-minority sentiments relied mostly on two indicators of group level threat as sources for prejudice: group size and economic conditions (Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers *et al.*, 2002; Nagayoshi, 2011).

Previous studies employed *group threat theory* to explain the attitudes of the majority towards minorities. This theory assumes that individuals identify with one or more groups, and the diverse interests of different groups generate conflicts and negative attitudes (Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2012). Two lines of argumentation emerged from this theory: the 'realistic group threat theory' school argues that anti-foreigner attitudes are a result of real experiences and interests (Bobo, 1983); while the 'perceived threat' school claims that what matters is if the threats are perceived as real (Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2012). In other words, according to the 'realistic group threat theory' argument, anti-foreigner sentiments can be examined by considering objective indicators, whereas the 'perceived threat' school argues that subjective indicators are more significant.

It is still difficult to identify what subjective indicators influence the perception of threat. Objective indicators, on the other hand, are frequently examined by researchers. For instance, age, and education have been claimed to significantly affect prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2010). Moreover, Blalock (1967) argues that the majority group could feel threatened by the relative size of a minority group, since larger numbers of foreign residents could be thought to have more potential in collectively advancing their cultural or economic status.

The effect of economic threats on anti-foreigner sentiments has been examined through the lens of labor market competition theory. In economically advanced countries, foreign residents from developing countries are more willing to work for lower wages and under poor conditions. As such, in certain industries there are more opportunities for foreign residents than the majority population, since the latter are unwilling to work these jobs (Boswell, 1986). Thus, those with lower socioeconomic status in the majority group tend to demonstrate a higher degree of xenophobia (Esses *et al.*, 2001). However, Van der Brug *et al.* (2000) found that economic and social variables were mostly insignificant in explaining support for anti-foreigner attitudes in European countries (Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2012).

Due to the mixed results of this approach, contact theory has been employed by scholars (Nukaga, 2006). Linguistic differences have been found to be a predictor of xenophobia, whereas contact with foreign residents results in more positive perceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2010). Previous research mainly focused on majority groups in European countries and the U.S. Furthermore, the economic status and size of the minority group have been found to have various effects. These factors, however, are rarely examined in Japan.

Previous studies on multiculturalism in Japan have demonstrated that Japanese generally express negative sentiments towards foreign residents (Tanabe, 2011; Nagayoshi, 2011; Zhang, 2015). Yet, in regards to the adaptation process of Chinese and South Korean residents, it is first necessary to clarify how Japanese perceptions of foreigners vary depending on their nationality. The willingness of Japanese locals to accept the increasing number of individuals from China and South Korea reflect the way they think of multiculturalism. Therefore, this study investigates Japanese perceptions—and their determinants—of Chinese and South Korean residents to better understand sentiments regarding multiculturalism. Building on Kunovich (2004), I argue in addition to economic and social capital, human capital such as age, gender, and education may potentially also be significant indicators of perceptions of foreign residents.

## Data and Method

Employing quantitative analysis, this study looks at data from the 2013 “Public Survey on Political Participation of Citizens and Internationalization” to examine the degree of acceptance among Japanese of Chinese and South Korean residents. In 2013, 4,133 individuals participated in this national survey. In terms of gender, 47.3 percent of respondents were men while women accounted for 52.7 percent. The average age of respondents was 53.9. Thus, the proportion of young people in this survey was very low. To elucidate Japanese attitudes toward foreigners, the survey asked: “Do you agree or disagree the number of foreigners in your community should increase?” The survey inquired into the acceptance of foreign residents of specific nationalities: Chinese, South Korean, Filipino, Japanese-Brazilian, German, and American. Thus, this survey data allows for a comparative analysis of the degrees of acceptance of foreigners from China and South Korea.

To determine what factors affect participants’ attitudes, I assess two sets of independent variables: 1.) human and economic capital and 2.) social capital and subjective factors. Model 1 examines predictors of Japanese attitudes toward Chinese and South Korean residents (human and economic capital). Human capital includes gender, age, marital status, number of children, level of education, occupational status and relative household income. Previous research has shown that demographic and economic status significantly affect natives’ attitudes toward foreign residents (Semynov *et al.*, 2006; Hjerm, 2001). Other studies examined the impact of gender and marital status (Hello *et al.*, 2004; Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2011). Likewise, this study also addresses the role of gender and marital status. Moreover, since research has demonstrated a frequent correlation between education and anti-foreigner attitudes




(Hjerm, 2001; Nukaga, 2006), this study also considers respondents' level of education. Occupational status verified different types of work in Japan, while unskilled workers may encounter strong competition when the size of minority is significant, therefore, this indicator also been included to examine Japanese attitudes toward foreigners. Model 2 examines human, economic, and social capital together. As mentioned above, scholars have argued that intergroup social contact can reduce prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2010), and that interracial friendships are a strong predictor of positive racial attitudes (Powers and Ellison, 1995). This model, then, also looks at the impact of social contact between Japanese and non-Japanese via traveling abroad or encountering foreigners living nearby. Finally, the relationship between life satisfaction and favorable impressions of foreigners will be tested in this model.


### Findings

To explore which foreign groups Japanese tend to accept, Figure 3 first examines the acceptance of Chinese, South Korean, Filipino, Brazilian, German and US foreign residents. The survey asked: "Do you agree or disagree to the increasing number of foreigners in your community?" Results show that nearly 70 percent of respondents demonstrated a willingness to welcome foreign residents from the US (3,112) and Germany (2,849). However, respectively only 21 percent (876) 30 percent (1,240) were open to accepting Chinese and South Korean residents. This suggests that Chinese and South Korean residents are the least welcomed minority groups in Japan.

To examine if Japanese sentiments toward foreign groups correlate with attitudes regarding the respective home countries, this study then tested the favorability rating of nine countries: China, South Korea, Russia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. (see Figure 4). Respondents were asked: "Do you like or dislike these countries?" They gave answers on a 7 point scale showing a higher favorability toward the U.S., Sweden, and Germany. Likewise, reflecting their sentiments toward Chinese and South Korean residents, participants held negative impressions of China and



**Figure 3.** Acceptance Attitude of Japanese toward Increasing of Foreign Residents (2013)



**Figure 4.** Favorability Rating among Japanese toward Other Countries (2013)

South Korea.

To examine the determinants of acceptance attitudes toward Chinese and South Korean residents, binary logit model was employed in this study (Table 1). As dependent variable, the answers to question “Do you agree or disagree to the increasing number of foreigners in your community?” were unified into two categories: 0=disagree, and 1=agree. Thus, considering the necessity to examine factors including human, economic and social capital, the binary logit model can be used to model dichotomous outcome variables, in the logit model the log odds of the outcome is modeled as a linear combination of the predictor variables.

Models 1 and 2 show that these determinants have shaped Japanese degrees of acceptance of Chinese and South Korean residents. In Model 1, human and economic capital are employed as independent variables. Japanese women are more likely than men to accept South Korean residents. In addition to gender, age also impacts Japanese attitudes. Older respondents tended to have more negative perceptions of foreigners. Model 1 further demonstrates that those with higher levels of education are significantly more accepting of foreigners. Occupational status, however, had a weaker impact. Although unemployed respondents were more likely to have negative perceptions of South Koreans, there was no significant impact on their views of Chinese. Marital and parental status as well as income were not significant factors. Thus the results indicate that while age, gender, and education significantly shape Japanese attitudes toward Chinese and South Korean residents, income and employment status are largely insignificant factors.

In Model 2, social capital and subjective indicators are considered. Except for gender, the results parallel those of Model 1, in the sense that, except for gender, the significance of human capital persists even after other indicators are controlled. There is no significant difference between the attitudes of Japanese men and women toward South Korean residents when social capital and subjective indicators are controlled. Younger, well-educated Japanese are more likely to accept foreigners from both China



**Table 1.** Determinants of Japanese Attitudes toward Foreign Residents from China and South Korea (2013)

	Model 1				Model 2			
	China		South Korea		China		South Korea	
	Coef	S.E.	Coef	S.E.	Coef	S.E.	Coef	S.E.
Gender ( <i>ref</i> =male)	.056	.092	.037***	.083	.025	.108	.082	.099
Age	-.121***	.035	-.147***	.031	-.158***	.040	-.120***	.038
Marital status ( <i>ref</i> =single)	-.083	.114	.054	.102	.025	.134	.099	.122
Children ( <i>ref</i> =none)	.118	.121	.116	.109	.246+	.143	.104	.129
Education ( <i>ref</i> =junior high school)								
High school	.060	.153	.123	.137	.108	.186	.279+	.164
Professional school	.160	.181	.261	.161	.282	.219	.458**	.194
University	.465**	.165	.451**	.149	.500*	.202	.766***	.181
Occupational status ( <i>ref</i> =regular employee)								
Part-time employee	.087	.118	.007	.106	.077	.138	.007	.126
Self-employed	-.243	.186	-.039	.159	-.272	.218	-.053	.187
Family worker	.331	.232	-.064	.221	.282	.276	.059	.255
Management	.080	.221	.169	.198	-.165	.268	.173	.238
Student	.325	.349	.202	.342	-.091	.411	.192	.428
Unemployed	-.081	.122	-.213+	.109	-.046	.142	-.007	.130
Subjective relative Household income	-.054	.047	-.058	.042	-.107*	.060	-.133**	.055
Experience abroad ( <i>ref</i> =none)					.102	.110	-.019	.100
Number of foreigners living in one's vicinity					-.124	.115	-.059	.106
Frequency of encountering foreigners					.139**	.068	.142**	.063
Life satisfaction					.118**	.067	.126**	.061
Favorable impression of foreign residents					.848***	.034	.851***	.033
_cons	-.802**	.248	-.423*	.223	-.112**	.378	-.882**	.345
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.017		.024		.234		.251	

Note: N=3,703, Model 1=Demographic Status & Socioeconomic Status, Model 2=Social Capital & Subjective Factors.  
*p*<.1 +, *p*<.05 \*, *p*<.01\*\*, *p*<.001\*\*\*.

and South Korea. Even though occupational status did not affect Japanese attitudes, subjective relative household income demonstrated strong anti-foreigner attitudes in Model 2. Japanese with higher incomes hold stronger anti-foreigner sentiments. Thus, social capital barely affected degrees of acceptance. Frequency of encountering foreigners significantly impacted attitudes toward both Chinese and South Korean residents. The results suggest the more often Japanese meet foreign nationals, the more likely they are to accept foreigners as neighbors or colleagues. Moreover, subjective indicators proved significant. Japanese respondents who are satisfied with their lives are more likely to accept foreigners from both China and South Korea. Also, not surprisingly, favorable impression of foreigners positively correlated, to a significant degree, with respondents' acceptance.

## Conclusion

This study addresses how Japanese natives view foreign residents from different countries. Like other foreign groups, Chinese and South Koreans generally enter Japan with ambitions of upward socio-economic mobility. Further they wish to achieve personal life satisfaction, which requires them to adapt to the host society. Since the foreigners' means of adapting to a host society depends significantly on the resources that they bring from their countries of origin and the social environment in the destination country (Portes *et al.*, 2005; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; cited in Takenoshita, 2015, p. 49), social environment in Japan represented significantly effect on foreign residents' perceptions. Employing quantitative data analysis, this study found that Japanese people are more likely to accept the numerical growth of foreigners from Europe and North America than those from other Asian countries. It then further explored Japanese attitudes towards South Korean and Chinese residents.

This study's findings demonstrated that generally Japanese are more accepting of South Korean than they are of Chinese residents. By investigating predictors of attitudes, this study's findings suggest that gender significantly impacts attitudes toward foreigners with Japanese women being more likely to accept foreigners from South Korea rather than those from China. This suggests Japanese women may be more accepting of international marriage. According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare,<sup>5</sup> in 2003, the number of Chinese wives in Japan was 6,253. They outranked women of other nationalities married to Japanese nationals. The number of Chinese husbands was 718, ranking third after Filipino and Korean men. Yet, the divorce rate for Chinese-Japanese marriages has climbed to over 45 percent (Qu, 2009). Even though there might be some economic stability, cultural and linguistic barriers may eventually lead to failed marriages.

Additionally, age, education, and subjective relative household income all strongly affected Japanese attitudes toward foreign residents. Younger, well-educated participants were more likely to accept individuals from China and South Korea. In contrast elderly respondents demonstrated stronger anti-foreigner attitudes. Moreover, the significant impact of human capital on acceptance attitudes remained after controlling for social capital and subjective predictors. Unemployed Japanese expressed strong negative sentiments toward foreign residents. This result partly confirms the findings from previous studies, which found that employers show weaker anti-foreigner attitudes than unskilled employees do (Nagayoshi, 2009; Iyotani, 1992). Thus, as shown in Model 2, subjective relative household income positively impacted Japanese acceptance of foreign residents, yet higher economic status remained largely insignificant. This finding contrasts with previous studies on anti-foreigner sentiments (Semyonov, Rajiman and Gorodzeisky, 2006). Moreover, subjective factors were examined in this study including life satisfaction and favorable impression. Japanese are more likely to accept Chinese and South Korean residents when they are satisfied with their own lives. Meanwhile, higher levels of favorable impression can allow Japanese natives to be more accepting of out-groups, and, in turn, the increasing number of foreigners.

Precarious Sino-Japanese relations may also effect Japanese attitudes toward China and Chinese res-

idents in Japan (Zhang, 2015). Socio-historical issues, especially the island dispute in the East China Sea, should be considered. It has inflamed Sino-Japanese relations in recent years, with real threats of conflict that could be difficult to reconcile (Vogel, 2013). Meanwhile, as previous studies point out, Japanese people support the idea of multiculturalism while simultaneously embracing the notion of a homogenous Japanese nation (Nagayoshi, 2011; Burgess, 2004; Tai, 2007). As the most unwelcome foreign groups in Japan, Chinese and South Koreans face greater difficulties than others in adapting to the host society. Negative image by host country constitutes a powerful magnetic field around which contradictory self-images of assimilation and differentiation co-exist, creating an intricate mixture of assimilatory and differential aspirations (Fukuoka, 2000). Without a supportive social environment, resources from both the home and host countries are crucial to their well-being. Policies are in place to attract foreign laborers. Yet the local government also needs to consider how to keep these migrant workers and help them to adapt to the host society. By discussing the predictors of Japanese attitudes toward foreigners from China and South Korea, this study highlighted anti-foreigner attitudes toward specific groups, through the lens of supported group threat theory. Thus, the promotion of communication and understanding between Japanese natives and foreigners, for the purpose of realizing multiculturalism deserves further attention.

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Japanese foreign statistics, from the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. [http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichiran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html). (November 30, 2017)
- <sup>2</sup> Points-based System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals, Immigration Bureau of Japan: [http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact\\_3/en/system/index.html](http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_3/en/system/index.html). (April 9, 2015)
- <sup>3</sup> Japanese foreign statistics, from the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. [http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichiran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html). (November 30, 2017)
- <sup>4</sup> Statistics of Naturalization in Japan, (帰化許可申請者数等の推移), The Ministry of Justice: [http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei\\_t\\_minj03.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei_t_minj03.html).
- <sup>5</sup> Statistic sources from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 国籍(出身地)別在留資格(在留目的)別外国人登録者の「日本人の配偶者等」の在留資格を持つ外国人数: <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001074828>. (April 10, 2015)

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