

**PH.D. DISSERTATION**

**INTRASTATE CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS:  
U.S.-GUAM AND DENMARK-GREENLAND  
ISLAND-CONTINENT AFFAIRS**

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**Island-Continent Affairs**

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## **Introduction**

August 26th, 2019, Arkansas Republican Senator Tom Cotton penned an opinion piece published in the *New York Times* that reminisced a collection of purchases by the United States during different eras from President Woodrow Wilson in 1917's acquisition of the Danish West Indies, known today as the U.S. Virgin Islands, to more recently in 1946 when the Truman administration attempted to acquire Greenland for \$100 million dollars<sup>1</sup>, in an attempt to acquiesce President Trump's intentions of acquiring Greenland. However, a major caveat exists in Senator Cotton's op-ed piece and logic in altering center periphery relations in a time outside of a vast global-war that appears out of touch not only with modern international affairs, but also with the center periphery relationship in its entirety. Consideration for the special institutional arrangement made by the Danish realm or any legal-body towards their respective peripheries must first be understood as an established relationship between center peripheries and cannot be outright disregarded without engaging in the literature and framework to intrastate center periphery relations. Otherwise, there will be consequences that occur such as the difference of opinions between the leaders of Denmark and Greenland in terms of, for instance, how the Greenlandic natural resources or Greenland in general is to be used and invested by an outside third-party (i.e. China); despite Greenlandic wishes, Greenlandic power does not supersede the security of the Danish realm which the island-periphery is a part of. In the Asia-Pacific, grassroots protests erupted from the mismanagement of another center-periphery relationship, Washington and Guam, in which the Department of Defense's premature intentions to acquire additional land, Pagat, in order to relocate marine training

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<sup>1</sup> Tom Cotton, "Tom Cotton: We Should Buy Greenland," *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/opinion/politics/greenland-trump.html>

onto a recognized cultural burial site of the Chamorro locale, heavily backfired. In both instances, where Guam and Greenland are case studies to this dissertation, center periphery relations differ from those of that of the federal government and prefectures/states given that the former possesses legal-arrangements that, though sourced from Congress or the Danish realm, also gives the island-peripheries the right to current self-determination, whereas prefectures/states do have rights and representation that their counterparts do not though are at the same time far more integrated into the sovereign nation than Guam and Greenland; ironic at-times.

In the current state of our world, from a rising China to a protectionist United States, the nature of center-periphery relations is plunging into a great deal more of uncertainty and existential crises facing changing times in opposition to familiar status quos. Understandings of international norms on sovereignty, power, security, and subsequently dimensions that make-up an analytical framework with which to examine center-periphery relations therefore must be given greater thought as times shift and center-periphery issues arise. Where there was only sovereignty on a Westphalian state-to-state basis, there now exists a more mainstream understanding of shared self-governance, autonomy, and power in the domestic hierarchical structure. Where there was power based on quantitative and qualitative military focused analysis now must be re-traced to the root and source of power, be it legal, constitutional, by decree, or even referendum. And where there was a concentration on singular perspectives such as the economy, defense-security, and so forth there must be a fresh analytical framework that embodies five main dimensions that create a holistic approach to understanding center-

periphery relations itself and vis-à-vis security in order for an analysis that illustrates issues based on more comprehensive and sound logic.

Over the years, the Trump administration has shown us that even the most outer edges of sovereign territories are relevant and do matter in international affairs amongst rhetoric and reality. In particular, the relevance and influence of the periphery to the center within the domestic hierarchy. As such, what are the powers of the periphery, with which framework do we understand this power, and in said framework does security supersede the other dimensions of the framework to become the single most-influencing factor in center-periphery relations. With the transfer of power from the Obama presidency to the Trump administration, the attention on center peripheral relations has also shifted though nevertheless important. Case in point, the U.S. pacific island territory of Guam was once well known for the major announced military build-up on the island as part of Obama's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy.

A year into the Trump presidency, the island of Guam is now becoming more infamous as a possible target for North Korea to be "tamed with fire"<sup>2</sup> as opposed to softer rhetoric in the previous decade; a new normal for the periphery as a result of being caught up in a war of words between two grandiloquent leaders Kim Jong-un of North Korea and Donald J. Trump of the United States, rather than former norms such as the original rebalancing strategy of the Obama administration. A strategy that has become

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<sup>2</sup> Will Ripley, "North Korea revives Guam threat ahead of US-South Korea drills," *CNN*, October 15, 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/13/asia/north-korea-guam-threat/index.html>. Accessed on November 2017.

more or less dismantled in comparison with its original form back when then Secretary of State Clinton first announced the plan in *Foreign Policy*.<sup>3</sup>

Likewise, with climate change leading to more possibilities in natural resource expeditions due to warming temperatures, meaning melting ice, on the rise and technological advances, such as advancements in ice-breakers and abilities to retrieve natural resources from shale, for instance, as well as sovereign states, such as Russia or Japan, seeking more participation in northern Europe and the Arctic. Significant changes in the Danish realm and the region as a whole may occur as a result of said technological advances and climate change by surpassing natural barriers such as in the Northern Sea Route, once thought of as inaccessible without ice-breakers, in order to access more viable economic trade routes.

If these natural barriers become easier to traverse, the trade-centric Northern Sea Route would translate to greater commercial viability, visibility, and therefore power in Arctic matters, especially amongst Arctic powers within the region. Thereby increasing the strategic significance and security of an island periphery such as Greenland, though whether or not this translates into power within the domestic hierarchy remains closely linked to how the center itself interacts with the periphery. Nonetheless, massive natural resources such as "hydrocarbons...found in Greenland's subsoil...[and] iron mines to the north of Nuuk, molybdenum in the north-eastern part of the island, and uranium, gold, diamonds, coal, lead, zinc, silver, platinum, and nickel in the south"<sup>4</sup> and related industries such as industrial and resource related development on an Arctic periphery

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<sup>3</sup> Hillary Clinton. "America's Pacific Century." ForeignPolicy.com <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/> (accessed October, 15, 2011)

<sup>4</sup> Mark Auchet. "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66 No. 4, (2011): 964.

such as Greenland creates more potential to influencing power as climate change continues to occur and technology further develops.

These shifting changes in the region are of particular interest to a sovereign state and center such as the Kingdom of Denmark whose main claim to the Arctic lies in its autonomous country of Greenland within the realm, the latter holding a seat in the intergovernmental Arctic Council<sup>5</sup> given its influence and nature within the Arctic geopolitical region. Additionally, in the future if Greenland does move towards even further autonomy and possibly even independence, the delicate balance between center and periphery can be analyzed further beyond sheer size, population, strategic location, or natural resources, though these are important influencing factors to mention.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to realize the importance of the center periphery relationship in domestic affairs and the domestic hierarchy versus sovereign state-to-state analysis in seeking greater understanding of island peripheries that should have been a priority from the very beginning. As such, my main research question seeks to answer; does the notion of security supersede the powers of the periphery to become the single-most defining and therefore most-influencing dimension to center-periphery relations? Further areas to examine include, how do we define history/culture/government/industry

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<sup>5</sup> Established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, the Arctic Council is the preeminent intergovernmental forum for addressing issues related to the Arctic Region. The members of the Arctic Council include the eight countries with territory above the Arctic Circle (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Federation, and the United States) plus six Permanent Participants (PP) groups representing the indigenous people of the Arctic, which include Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council. The Council focuses its work on matters related to sustainable development, the environment, and scientific cooperation; its mandate explicitly excludes military security. Traditionally, the Council is chaired by the foreign minister of the country holding the chairmanship. (U.S. State Dept. <https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/>)



and natural resources (the other dimensions) in relations to the framework and to the center-periphery relationship? As we understand the role of each dimension, what then can be explained regarding the powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center? And lastly, how does the periphery then operate in this type of environment to achieve maximum leverage for its own concerns?

Under a multi-dimensional analytical framework researchers will be able to understand center periphery relations in a more comprehensive manner. Therefore, the framework aims to a) establish better understandings into the complex power system in center periphery relations using a multi-dimensional analysis that identifies features such as the historical, cultural, governance, natural resources or industries, and most critically security within the domestic hierarchy and how much power and influence this gives the periphery over the center and b) determine if certain center periphery policy faux pas or issues could have been better dealt with using said framework, and c) create a systemic method for future reference in managing center periphery policies and center periphery relations as a whole in both academia and policy.

Returning to the northwestern euro-hemisphere, Greenland is an island peripheral power with the real possibility of achieving independence in the near-to-mid future from her center, Denmark, unlike Catalonia from Spain nor Crimea from the Russian Federation, or even in comparison to Guam with the United States as the other main case studies in this dissertation, as Greenland the island-periphery already maintains various forms of acknowledgments to a path of self-determination and independence from the Kingdom of Denmark; though, the highly autonomous country ironically shares a fate exceedingly similar to that of another island-periphery, the U.S. territory of Guam in the

Asia-Pacific, that is when security issues of the center are involved the periphery loses legal-sourced power over internal affairs; this will be explained further in the following dissertation chapters.

In a logical sense, one would imagine that a periphery the size of Greenland with an abundance in minerals and resources, political will, political capital in the Folketing<sup>6</sup>, as well as representation in the Arctic Council for Denmark, amongst a plethora of other power influencing features, should be able to comfortably engage with its center, Denmark, if and when needed on a multitude of policy matters. While vice versa, that Guam, a periphery so far and so tiny in the Pacific Ocean, with much more substantial economic dependence on the U.S. Federal Government and the U.S. military, as well as inadequate unity in political will in conjunction with a strategic location but barely any strategic voice/representation, would easily be dismissed by her center with so many features disfavorably and disadvantageously stacked against the similar yet more occupied island-periphery of Guam.

Yet, in the Greenlandic matter of economic investments from outside, in particular sovereign-related funds or companies, i.e. Chinese investments, to the misintentions of a military build-up on an ancient Chamorro<sup>7</sup> burial ground on Guam, the

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<sup>6</sup> The Danish-Parliament. Represents the legislative assembly in Denmark passing Acts that apply in Denmark. The Folketing is also responsible for the adoption of the state's budgets, approving the state's accounts, exercising control of the Government as well as taking part in international cooperation. <https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/about-the-danish-parliament> Accessed on January 2019.

<sup>7</sup> People arriving from islands off Southeast Asia, most likely Taiwan, settled Guam and the Marianas more than 4,000 years ago. Archaeological evidence indicates rice cultivation and pottery making prior to European arrival in the 16th century. By then, the Chamorros had developed a complex, class-based matrilineal society based on fishing and agriculture, supplemented by occasional trade visits from Caroline Islanders. (<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/brief-500-year-history-guam-180964508/>) Access Nov. 1st 2018.

former being a loss for the greater authoritative periphery and the latter being a win for the lesser authoritative periphery, it is clear that the influencing power and decision-making process surrounding center periphery relations are far deeper and more complex than meets the eye. How the periphery functions within the domestic hierarchy influences the power the periphery may have versus the center. Otherwise, one would expect that each and every time, without fail, the far larger and more advantaged periphery would easily acquire what it wants while the far smaller and much more disadvantaged periphery would in the end constantly and consistently lose out.

Why do we see such similar discord and dependency of the periphery to the center with regards to security issues that involve center and periphery in specific policy matters such as the natural resource/labor visa issue between Greenland and Denmark, as we see between Guam and the United States in reference to the military buildup, if the former peripheral power is on a logical note in the higher ends of a power spectrum while the latter periphery is on the lower ends, as calculated by political will, natural resources, legislative and legal powers, and more concretely the status of the periphery granted by the center. In the case of Guam, the island periphery is governed by the Organic Act<sup>8</sup> passed by Congress of the United States, while Greenland is governed by the Home-Rule<sup>9</sup> and Self-Rule Acts<sup>10</sup> that engaged the Greenlandic people in a referendum, which was twice confirmed with an overwhelmingly majority political turnout and affirmation

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<sup>8</sup> "Organic Act of Guam" is the Act of August 1, 1950, 64 Stat. 384, codified as 48 U.S.C. 1421-1425, as amended.

<sup>9</sup> Statsministeriet. "The Greenland Home Rule Act." Accessed October 2013.  
[http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_12712.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html)

<sup>10</sup> Statsministeriet. "The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement." Accessed October 2013.  
[http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_13090.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html)

of the island periphery's status.<sup>11</sup> All of the above-mentioned are different forms of formal-legal power sourced from the federal structure originally and eventually by the center.

Therefore, there must be such examinations as to does power originate solely from being bestowed upon by a legislative, judicial, or even executive body such as Congress, the Courts, and the Presidency? Or, is power more fluid and within reach of the local indigenous population via various forms such as grassroots organizations or protests? Either way, where does the periphery stand vis-à-vis the center? What influences center periphery relations the most? Moreover, how does the position of each periphery within the domestic hierarchy influence each respective party alongside the analytical framework?

This work seeks to engage in as well as answer most if not all of these underlying questions behind the main contrast in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific case studies. The case studies are specifically chosen for the contrast in their logical degree of power in terms of their relative power in addition to diversifying the dialogue and analysis from one region to two in their respective domestic hierarchical structures. Limitations may be that both peripheries stem from democratic or semi-democratic (constitutional monarchy) sovereignties, but nonetheless provide useful insight into the workings of center periphery relations as well as in power relations. This work also uses a more expansive analytical framework derived from or at least inspired by previous center peripheral systems that engage in various dimensions and features to a peripheral relationship be it economic, sovereign, or geographical.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

The dissertation argues that the research indicates, regardless of positioning on a logical power spectrum, certain dimensions such as security or governance/constitutional law are so prevailing and absolute in power-giving to the center that they may simply supersede center periphery relations, particularly since both parties are not on an equal and balanced footing to begin with in the domestic hierarchical system; a useful method to understanding center periphery relations when sovereignty is not applicable in domestic affairs as much as state-to-state affairs. Therefore, the hypothesis of this dissertation is if security is not the peripheries main concern, perhaps culture or the environment may be, yet is the main concern for the center, presenting an at odds situation, and the center is able to act accordingly, then, it is apparent that the powers of the periphery are limited versus the center on a security-basis. There is an exception to the rule, however, which is that in the periphery, if there is an alternative, and the center can logically resituate itself, where it still fulfills its security needs while saving face, it will respect the periphery as the issue escalates.

Most of the time, power is given to the periphery from the center, rarely has it been the case that the periphery achieved power from the center without some form of drastic measures, such as a major territorial-legislative walk-out<sup>12</sup>, as is the case in the island of Guam, or major cohesion in political unity, political voice, and political willpower in achieving more self-determination as is the case in the island of Greenland<sup>13</sup>. To put into perspective, power relations, particularly inter-state relations

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<sup>12</sup> Doloris Coulter Cogan. *We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam's Quest for Democracy*. University of Hawai'i Press, 2008. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wr07b>.

<sup>13</sup> Statsministeriet. "The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement." Accessed October 2013. [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_13090.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html)

between sovereignties, have been written about, investigated, and discussed in-depth from many different angles and to many different degrees over decades if not centuries.

Center periphery relations in an intra-state perspective, however, much less so. Nonetheless, power relations within center periphery relations remains highly intriguing to explore as in most cases the former allows for the theoretical to be applied in a more practical or realistic manner; a point not forgotten in future chapters. It is often the case that center periphery relations are neglected or mostly relegated to an economic or solitary cultural/security perspective, i.e. Immanuel Wallerstein<sup>14</sup> or Carlos Escude<sup>15</sup> amongst others, while a more comprehensive look that takes into consideration of what is actually happening in the sovereign state's own internal periphery becomes very much sidelined as internal affairs; though the understanding of David A. Lake's hierarchical structure<sup>16</sup> allows internal affairs to be examined through a different power lens.

While in-depth focus of previous literature into single dimensions of center periphery relations are significant in understanding meaningfully how that dimension may function (i.e. in the economic-industry, defense-security, etc.), to fully understand the entirety of center periphery relations or the nature of peripheral relations, as well as to prevent future policy or security faux pas—a major purpose and aim of this dissertation—a more comprehensive framework analysis is required in order to fill the research gap that currently exists and in turn adds-on to contemporary existing literature. As such, while center periphery relations has been discussed in international relations, it has not

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<sup>14</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> Carlos Escude, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

<sup>16</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2009).

been talked about to the fullest extent with the proper approach befitting the context of world relations or center periphery relations as one would understand them today.

Center periphery analysis in this dissertation itself is highly intriguing, not only because of the first-person empirical data that this dissertation was able to source, but also due to the fact that in a world where the mainstream media is constantly speaking or listening to the next major players on the world stage, yet often times is disturbed by smaller players such as Guam or Puerto Rico, and so forth to a point that causes vast public relations crises, then it certainly becomes a focal point worth taking another look at and examining how these smaller players or peripheral powers may or may not influence their greater counterparts or centers.

Their interactions, counteractions, reactions, amongst other forms of actions to each other should be highly fascinating to anyone interested or invested in center periphery relations, be it scholars, students, or state members and so forth, not to mention significant and impactful to contemporary literature and research on a purely academic sense.

Throughout this paper, the academic approach that will be taken is mostly inductive as we clarify each of the different dimensions to the natural relationship between the center and periphery, before determining peripheral powers, followed by an ample amount of empirical analysis to verify the differing arguments or claims that the analytical framework may make based on various matters such as the nature of peripheral relations, differing power of dimensions in the framework to the military buildup of the Guam case-study or the land-resource management of the Greenland case.

There is both a theoretical and practical component to this dissertation's academic contributions in addition to the originality that this work provides, which should benefit future works on the center and periphery or possibly even in power relations in the domestic hierarchal structure.

Speaking of power, as to why the periphery is so limited in power vis-à-vis the center. There are simple explanations such as poor negotiation skills, dialogue and communication, or even the lack of transparency creating misunderstandings and mayhem, but it is far more likely that because the center has such centralized power be it in legislative powers or the presidency which is so concentrated in one or two of the dimensions, such as defense-security, and used as such or called forth so often, that those are the true reasons behind why the periphery in reality has such little say vis-à-vis the center despite the significance in the strategic location of the periphery; the attitude the center takes on the periphery is also another reason for how the periphery is positioned in the domestic hierarchy and thus affects the powers and influence of the periphery.

Observations of certain international affairs, ranging from the Asia-Pacific rebalance during the Obama administration as well as the Trump presidency's surprising role with reference to North Korea to the United States assuming the Arctic Council chairmanship, as well as, on tangent, the recent U.S. Supreme Court hearing on Puerto Rico have all indicated that current understandings of center periphery relations are insufficient to comprehend or even recognize the periphery's role and, by nature, power in influencing international and domestic affairs in and around the center and periphery.

It remains that current observations and studies are inadequate with the focus being too narrowly placed on one specific dimension or feature, i.e. aid, militarization,



sovereignty, or economic development etc., while ignoring other possible features that could influence the relationship or policy concerns at hand. As such and in affirmation, there is a need to work towards a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional analytical framework that is inclusive rather than exclusive while working towards a solution for many of the issues plaguing and limiting center periphery relations.

In the Guam case study, if it holds true that the argument of using an analytical framework as mentioned above prevents unnecessary miscalculations, then matters such as the military build up (i.e. contentions of live-fire training fields locations) would have a different outcome to the one that it did have; a failed calculation on the part of the Department of Defense and an uprising of a sense of justice for the Chamorro people and the peripheral government. Likewise, in the Greenland case study, if the argument holds true, then matters such as visa control or land access power (particularly towards foreign-funds) could also have other possible more preferable outcomes rather than being declined visa and labor access by the center to influence the peripheries power over the island's natural resources vis-à-vis the Danish realm's defense security. As it stands, the resulting outcomes between the center and periphery in the aforementioned issues could most definitely be thought of as bad public relations or bad press in addition to poor judgment in actual detail and policy.

In addition, the framework seeks to situate and clarify each dimension in their respective concerns, of particular significance, to examiners and fellow researchers, as well as the greater audience-at-large, followed by an assessment of overall center periphery relations given the analysis above. That said, the framework is, in a chronological sense, applied in the following order: Stage one consists of evaluating

power in intrastate center periphery relations via the multi-dimensional framework. Stage two determines the importance of each dimension to center periphery relations based on immediate existential/policy concerns. And lastly, stage three summarizes the analysis of these dimensions on center periphery relations for this dissertation's individual cases, i.e., U.S.-Guam and Copenhagen-Greenland.

As part of the research design, this dissertation intends to create an analytical framework that logically explains underlying intrastate relations between the center and periphery. The dissertation then seeks to provide constructive analysis based on the empirical evidence alongside theoretical components of the framework for center periphery analysis. Specific to this dissertation's case studies, the work therefore develops and uses a framework analysis that broadens the understanding of scope and dynamics between the Guam-Washington and Greenland-Copenhagen center periphery relations while concurrently examines the application of said framework on case-specific policy issues such as the military buildup on Guam or resource management in Greenland.

There are, however, a few caveats to the dissertation's analytical framework. a) The framework is perhaps limited in the ability to provide conventional in-depth analysis, though balances this limitation by providing wider-breadth and therefore more inclusion in a holistic approach, b) the framework is meant to be progressively suggestive in nature rather than exhaustive as the analysis examines different dimensions moving forward, some may criticize this as being unfinished or less well-thought of in structure or planning though it is purposefully done to be adaptable and evolutionary as a framework for now and the future, c) not all periphery's matter in the same way as the selected case studies of Greenland or Guam does to Copenhagen and Washington, respectively, though

the framework does still technically apply to any center periphery relationship, there are certain special center periphery relationships that may hold more weight in the international state of affairs; an ebb and flow that changes over time for practical reasons, i.e. the Azores to Portugal.<sup>17</sup>

As this dissertation has noted, both the Guam and Greenland case studies reflect another theoretical and paradigm subset within center-periphery studies or center periphery discourse that should be mentioned in this dissertation, the island-continent relationship. Okinawa, for instance, though not a case selected for this dissertation, would also be reflective of the island-continent notion though may be slightly different in that it is more accurately to portray as an island-island relationship. In particular, there are cases where the center and periphery are not necessarily an island continent situation, i.e. landlocked nations, the fact that both case studies *are* does add to the scope and depth of such a framework in both utility and diversity amongst current discourse and literature.

It is also noteworthy to mention that, for island-continent relations, in the past, it has been "argued that...island bases [as Guam and Greenland are] are administratively, operationally as well as politically distinguishable from continental overseas bases."<sup>18</sup>

In both Guam<sup>19</sup> and Greenland<sup>20</sup>, particularly Greenland historically, these are islands that host and have hosted significant (United States) military bases for an

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<sup>17</sup> During the Second World War in 1943, Azores became a critical periphery to Portugal as a result of Great Britain's leasing of the air and naval bases. From '44-'45 the United States has also maintained significant American military presence in the now-autonomous region of Portugal. In spite of the historical connection, the Azores islands has become less of a military focal-point with the United States, seeing major military reductions implemented in 2014 and therefore a decrease of power to the periphery in the current relationship between Portugal and the Azores, center and periphery respectively, in a defense-security military sense.

<sup>18</sup> Paul Claesson, "Continental Hegemony and the Geopolitics of Island Basing: A Preliminary Approach to Ethnic Identification and Political Mobilization in Militarized Island Communities," *Scandia* Vol. 54, no. 1 (1988): 89.

extended period of time; a shared history or component in their relationship with their centers, though not necessarily a defining one in Greenland's scenario. In addition, "continental access to island areas does not mean insular access to continental areas"<sup>21</sup> which means that while it is very possible for people from the center to relocate to the periphery it is often a much larger sacrifice for movement in the opposite direction. And, as explained earlier, a reflection of the power disparity between the center and periphery early on, if one is to read continental areas as the center and island areas as insular.

Furthermore, as globalization enables travel or communication to rise to a level as never seen before, the center periphery relationship is still very much largely one-sided with the periphery having much more to sacrifice or to catch up on than to receive or deliver. However, many will argue that for instance security or funding is often provided to the periphery as an act of reciprocity, though this is not always necessarily the case, as for instance in Greenland the natural resources the periphery holds far outweighs that of the center, and the security of Guam provided to the periphery by Washington—also turns the island-periphery into a target by threats such as North Korea.

Be it the case study on Guam or Greenland, island-continent center peripheral relations often share two important truths separating them from their core: the "geographic (the separation by water of the insular community and its continental metropole) and [the] ethnic (the emergence of an island identity distinct from that of the metropole)."<sup>22</sup> Both of these factors exists in the Washington-Guam and Copenhagen-

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<sup>19</sup> Anderson Air Force Base and U.S. Naval Base

<sup>20</sup> Thule Air Base

<sup>21</sup> Paul Claesson, "Continental Hegemony and the Geopolitics of Island Basing: A Preliminary Approach to Ethnic Identification and Political Mobilization in Militarized Island Communities," *Scandia* Vol. 54, no. 1 (1988): 99.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

Greenland case studies and deserve to be noted for contextual accuracy vis-à-vis the framework analysis. Such a brief but important mention of the island continent subset is useful to the overarching center periphery relationship by generating much needed perspective into certain historical usage or power disparity between the island (periphery) and continent (center), however, it is not one of the main aims of this paper but rather serves as a prelude or supplement for the framework and further analysis.

To reiterate, this work aims to present a credible multi-dimensional analytical framework that allows for a more in-depth understanding of the features of intra-state center periphery relations in which the center has institutionalized particular legal arrangements to the periphery, i.e. vis-à-vis the Organic Act for Guam or the Home-Rule and Self-Rule Acts for Greenland, though the periphery may manage and hold certain powers vis-à-vis the center.

Specifically, the research questions that this dissertation posits are:

a) What kind of and which dimensions are significant and decisive in analyzing center periphery relations? With the notions that *history, culture, governance, natural resources and industries*, as well as *security* are supposedly the significant dimensions that compose of the aforementioned in the analytical framework.

b) Identifying how each dimension plays a role in center periphery relations, with an analysis into each dimensions in terms of significance to the other dimensions, to the center periphery relationship itself, and why?

c) Does the notion of security supersede the powers of the periphery to become the single-most defining and therefore most-influencing dimension to center-periphery relations?

Sub-themes include consideration for the Guam and Greenland case studies with the work attempting to highlight differences and similarities between the two dichotomous peripheries in a compare and contrast analysis.

As for the dissertation blueprint, first is a foreword on the themes or subjects of this dissertation. This paper focuses on the matters of power or more importantly security in the overarching center periphery relations, as well as where the dissertation fits into the current literature and modern day international affairs. It also elaborates into each of the various chapters and briefs of what is to come in the longer versions explained in detail within each chapter.

Chapter one is the literature review and research design where the focus is on which pieces/studies or authors of the vast amounts of literature has been selected for review and critiqued in light of this paper's own creation and analytical framework to be used in the Guam and Greenland case studies. Chapter one provides a much-needed segment on terminology and usage that defines research limits and boundaries to an otherwise limitless dissertation, which could go on indefinitely. The overall research design of the dissertation and the analytical framework is explained in detail before the case studies so that the following chapters makes sense to readers in the understanding of what is going on critically with each case study, policy, question, and in overall center periphery relations and so forth, as per the analytical framework. Chapter two does also highlight where the literatures in power and center periphery relations have been

insufficient in answering the needs of center periphery relations as seen in issues or matters of today.

Chapter two explains the nature of peripheral relations between the center and the periphery. This chapter explains which aspects or dimensions have been selected as part of the analytical framework to investigate center periphery relations as well as why, and to provide a fuller understanding as to how each of these different dimensions work as a component separately and how they work together as part of the analysis in its entirety as part of the whole.

Chapters three and four are the main case study chapters split into the Arctic case study chapter of Copenhagen-Greenland followed by the Asia-Pacific case study chapter of Washington-Guam. Both are outlined systemically and similarly as to appear cleaner, simpler, and not confuse readers with their purpose. However, they both tackle differing yet similar questions or concerns, not the same issues but issues that are prevalent to their own respective relationships, and both undergo the framework analysis as explained in chapter three.

Lastly, the conclusion provides a closing overview of what this dissertation has managed to achieve in discussing power, security, and center periphery relations in intrastate relations and the domestic hierarchy as is relevant to current international relations, where all of this fits in the existing literature, how the analytical framework is created and intended to be used, and finally how the framework has been tested through real case studies and real issues with concluding remarks and analyses on both policy matters and the analytical framework itself, as well as center periphery relations for the future.

## **Chapter 1:**

### **Literature Review, Hierarchy, and Insights from Inter-State Center Periphery**

#### **Relations**

##### **1.1 Wallerstein, Escude, and O' Tuathail**

Immanuel Wallerstein, Carlos Escude, and Gearóid O' Tuathail are three of the most significant individuals whose research impact the theoretical direction of this dissertation's own analytical framework in examining center periphery relations.<sup>23/24/25</sup> In examining center periphery relations it is impossible to understand the dissertation's work without evaluating previous major literature that covers center periphery literature, albeit in an interstate manner. Therefore, there is a need to understand interstate center periphery literature to analyze applicability, similarity, and differences to intrastate center periphery relations. All three have written extensively on center periphery relations, though in vastly different contexts, and are authorities in center periphery literature as well as influencing this dissertation's own boundaries and limitations in important ways by furthering the understanding of already touched upon subjects such as the World System, the affect of great powers on their nearby state peripheries, and the geographic meaning to the framework and security behind center periphery relations.

Separately, each researcher's single perspective (i.e. economy-based, geography-based, and state-based)<sup>26</sup> contributions enables precedent for this dissertation's framework with which to build upon, with regards to what has been already understood,

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<sup>23</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

<sup>24</sup> Carlos Escude, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

<sup>25</sup> Gearóid O' Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.



and therefore excluded, and what has yet to be explored, and therefore requires additional research and analysis beyond what is currently available in existing works and literature.

Together, the different vantage points by each researcher in previous literature create a multidisciplinary foundation for this dissertation's framework to present a more encompassing approach in examining center periphery relations. One that refers to and respects previous contributions while developing further breadth as well as originality in the form of a single analytical framework that touches upon the geopolitical, the economic, as well as the state-based vis-à-vis multiple dimensions across center periphery relations. Simultaneously, the dissertation itself holds a unique compare and contrast setting with the Guam and Greenland case studies that illustrates the framework's utility in actual situations versus theoretical concepts.

In an inter-state perspective, Wallerstein's economic model in the world systems analysis heavily focuses on the aspects of labor, the distribution of materials, the movement of trade and economy, coupled with the capitalist associations between the core, the periphery, and semi-peripheral nations. Each of these, the core, the periphery, and semi-periphery are evaluated and examined based on their respective positions and functions in a world system part of the capitalist structure while the dissertation's aim and focus lies in a more intra-state perspective.<sup>27</sup> Wallerstein's economic explanation of the world-at-large functions in a global manner where the division of labor as well as where each state or region was situated within the world economy. Where the resources were obtained, how they were obtained, where they were then processed and re-processed, all represented Wallerstein's understanding of the core, the periphery, the semi-periphery,

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<sup>27</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

and the external in a heavily economy-based world-system. This previous literature in center periphery relations provides a basic understanding into how the world at present may function as a center periphery system in it of itself while reflecting on a more feudal to medieval even colonist past.<sup>28</sup> Wallerstein's understanding to center periphery relations is highly regarded in the economic sense in that it provides the basis to how major powers such as Great Britain at the time or France pursues semi-peripheries and peripheries to benefit itself economically, while in this dissertation Guam is at a disadvantage as the Jones Act<sup>29</sup> limits the economic prosperity of the island, Greenland however hold vast resources to which Denmark is certain to negotiate into some form of agreement should Greenland move towards sovereign independence as Denmark currently subsidizes the island-periphery.<sup>30</sup>

In order for the world system to engage properly there has to be different distinctions amongst the unit components such as the commonly understood developed core (center) or the underdeveloped periphery as well as the semi-periphery, which serves as an in-between. There is also an understanding in this dissertation of what constitutes as the periphery vis-à-vis the center, but most importantly how the case study peripheries differ greatly with other peripheries in the domestic scene. California or Texas for instance are two states within the United States that are constantly and consistently referred to as being different from the rest of the United States, in particular Texas which

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Transportation Institute, "The Jones Act", accessed on December 2014, <https://transportationinstitute.org/jones-act/>.

<sup>30</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

has in multiple situations threatened secession from the United States.<sup>31</sup> Though, even as both states constitute as peripheries under this dissertation's terminology, the difference is that both are fully incorporated into the federal system of the United States, while Guam and Greenland are not in their respective domestic scenarios. California and Texas not only have immense power in congressional representation to the Senate and the House, both states also have real voting rights to elect the commander-in-chief or president of the United States while Guam does not. Therefore, the power balance is already clearly divided amongst these peripheries, this dissertation seeks to examine the powers of the periphery for peripheries that are particular in that they are not fully incorporated into the system or that they hold special titles and positions distinguishing themselves from the usual periphery.

While Wallerstein's work provides insight into the existing world system and of center peripheral relations, particularly trade and economy-wise, the analytical framework of this dissertation seeks to differentiate itself by concentrating not on just the economic model (though includes certain aspects of the economy through a dimension which examines natural resources/industries) but instead presents a more comprehensive nature of peripheral relations, particularly touching upon instances that account for defense affairs, security, and power influences as is relevant to more well-known and outspoken current affairs suggestively symbolic of the importance of certain peripheries to the center and the world at large in modern times.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Appomattox Court House, Va, "Should Texas secede? Why breaking up is hard to do", PBS News Hour, accessed May 2017, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/texas-secede-breaking-hard>.

<sup>32</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

Where Wallerstein focuses on the world at large, rising above nation states as the individual units (a central theme in more realist leaning paradigms) though still remaining in the inter-state discourse, this dissertation focuses on more internal and domestic hierarchic understandings of the center and periphery via a more constructivist-leaning approach with the incorporation of the concept of hierarchy focusing on explaining the powers of the periphery, where it originates, and how power shapes policy and security issues.

Likewise, just as Wallerstein's model is multidisciplinary in nature, the dissertation's framework analysis is also multi-faceted, highly inclusive of a range of dimensions, aspects, and standards that examine the main case studies of Washington-Guam and Copenhagen-Greenland's center periphery relations.

In comparison, Escude is much closer to this dissertation's own analytical framework, though still in an inter-state perspective, with a general direction and contribution that is more relevant to the realm of foreign policy, the logic of power, and the structural hierarchies of a defense security agenda. This aligns his intentions much closer with the motives of the framework and can be seen as an inspirational building block to the framework analysis suggested.<sup>33</sup> With the case of Greenland, it is critical to note the importance of the American Thule Air Base<sup>34</sup> located on the island-periphery that provides the eyes and ear for the United States to watch over the region, in particular Russia, in the case of any military action that may be threatening to the United States. Of course, the Thule Air Base while built during war-time has been a long-time agreement

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<sup>33</sup> Carlos Escude, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

<sup>34</sup> Talal Husseini, "Thule Air Base: inside the US's northernmost military base of Greenland", Air Force Technology, accessed 2019, <https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/thule-military-base-in-greenland/>.

between Denmark and the United States, which is then reflected in negotiations between Denmark and Greenland itself regarding how the military base may affect the island-periphery's economy, environment, and further security.

Though Escude speaks mostly on Argentina and Latin American affairs, as he himself was a special advisor to the Argentinean Foreign Minister Guido di Tella<sup>35</sup>, the perspective that his work takes on is a very state to state centric point of view that follows an age old concept of one large singular hegemon such as the United States or the then Soviet Union (or the U.S.S.R.) and the influence these hegemons have as core actors vis-à-vis peripheral states such as Argentina and so forth in the Latin American sphere of influence.<sup>36</sup> This is different in that the evaluation of state-to-state hierarchical center periphery relations involves the sovereignty of said state, in a sense the struggle between powers, while the domestic hierarchical intrastate center periphery relations examines the struggle for power within a limited sovereignty or limited power based upon a formal-legal construct that may have been erected during a different time and space scenario. And while Greenland has moved forward in the Home-Rule and Self-Rule Acts, Guam has yet to achieve cohesive political will with the only chance of gaining more power (becoming a commonwealth) has formally passed.<sup>37</sup>

This basic yet fundamental difference separates Escude's work from the framework analysis provided here forth, albeit not the only difference. The analysis here offers more encompassing details regarding the context of current times with reference to

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<sup>35</sup> Eugenio D. Matibag, "Carlos Escude", 2012, *World Languages and Cultures Publications*, p. 77. [https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/language\\_pubs/77](https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/language_pubs/77)

<sup>36</sup> Carlos Escude, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

<sup>37</sup> Frank Quimby, "Guam Commonwealth Act", Guampedia, accessed 2019, <https://www.guampedia.com/guam-commonwealth-act/>.

original sources, which add on to the significant lack in literature in both the Guam and Greenland case studies, in particular the Guam case study.<sup>38</sup>

This dissertation's work seeks to go beyond this state-to-state norm by opting for an intra-state hierarchical perspective that largely examines sidelined perspectives in unique territories or peripheries that are a possession of the center itself. Most of the time, these territories or peripheries possess unique qualities or powers that separates themselves to either a more advantageous or disadvantageous position that can influence the trajectory of the center, policy issues, and further power concerns.

A major distinction between Wallerstein and Escude and this work's own research is in the analysis of center periphery relations through an inter-state v. intra-state (or legally-domestic) perspective. While there are certain advantageous and disadvantageous to each perspective, the inter-state discussion of center periphery relations has been far more readily available and common in discussing power, defense-security, and so forth. As such, there is a need to discuss further and explore the domestic hierarchy and powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center mainly from the periphery's perspective, as this is dissertation's work is an analysis of the powers of the periphery and may allude to the center's power though is focused on the periphery's power vis-à-vis the center.

Without this dissertation's work on intra-state domestic analysis, specific issues such as the political status of the periphery vis-à-vis the center, the military build-up in the periphery, as well as the resource-management of Greenland vis-à-vis Copenhagen disappear almost entirely from the discussion itself being deemed as internal affairs or insignificant to the center periphery conversation. Thus, the importance of the analytical

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<sup>38</sup> Carlos Escude, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

framework being intra-state focused, though it is by all accounts applicable in the inter-state sense as well, for the purposes of this dissertation, intra-state is not only more suitable but also more practical in dealing with these particular type of center periphery relations and center periphery issues this dissertation chooses to examine.

Rising beyond purist concepts of state and sovereignty, or in other words rising above inter-state and intra-state relations, O' Tuathail's work on critical geopolitics is geography-based research with strong notions of geopolitics even further removed from the orderly structures provided in both the previous works of Wallerstein and Escude (the economic model and the similar yet more political/foreign policy inclined state to state stance, respectively).<sup>39</sup>

O' Tuathail's work on critical geopolitics argues that in contrast to classical geopolitics the ideas of boundaries or spheres of influence and the identities or visions that carry forth political statecraft are many times created to serve a particular purpose.<sup>40</sup> O' Tuathail's work suggests that Guam and Greenland serve a particular purpose, that of being either a strategically located island-periphery or one that holds vast future resources, and therefore carries forth the political statecraft the center continues to mold upon said peripheries. As the United States militarizes Guam further, the island creates a military based culture that is unique amongst the territories, while Denmark's softer approach towards Greenland suggests the eagerness to seek out negotiations and options to Greenland's resources in the event of full-sovereign independence. Clear illustrations

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Gearóid O' Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

of both statements are in the continuing military build-up on the island of Guam and the continuing subsidization of Greenland's economy by the Danish government.<sup>41</sup>

This notion is interesting in that the multi-directional analysis takes into account how the relationship of a center and periphery may be formed, geopolitically speaking, where that relationship is being taken politically, and whether or not the periphery is able to influence the direction of its own future, or in other words a reference to the power aspect of the periphery in influencing and shaping center periphery relations.

O' Tuathail's work loosens the more finite structure of economics or the state to state politics found in the literature combined with David Lake's perspective on hierarchy forms a particular framework that, with the work of the two previous individuals, reaches into deeper notions of political space, identity, vision, and most considerably geography.<sup>42</sup>

This dissertation's own framework can be seen as containing essential parts of all these different ideals and aspects in one form or another, yet possesses newly defined limitations, boundaries, and more importantly perspective that goes beyond the geographic, the world system, or nation-states, though it is limited in examining center peripheral relations between the core nation and mainly the perspective and powers of the periphery in an intrastate periphery to center manner for this work's purposes.<sup>43</sup>

In addition, the analytical framework further elaborates and seeks to establish better solid groundings into center periphery relations by having certain dimensions such

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<sup>41</sup> "North America:Greenland", CIA, accessed 2019, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print\\_gl.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_gl.html).

<sup>42</sup> Gearóid O' Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

<sup>43</sup> Gearóid O' Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).



as a historical or cultural dimension, natural resources/industry, defense security, as well as governance in the attempt to examine the nature of peripheral relations via more holistic lenses. Overall, this provides for a far more comprehensive blueprint to center periphery relations while looking at the ideas of power and influence in regards to the issues relevant to each main case study with more breadth rather than depth in contrast to the works of previous authors. This dissertation seeks to assert itself as a more unified look into the nature of center periphery relations and aims at an analysis that in examination proves to be useful in creating workable solutions to current center periphery issues, in particular to those of a security nature.

## **1.2 Michael Hechter's Work**

Interestingly enough, in the literature review, parts of well-respected researcher Michael Hechter's work on internal colonialism, notably written before the Welsh and Scottish parliamentary devolutions (1997), paint a strikingly accurate picture that can be applied to the Washington-Guam peripheral relationship as well, turning into a reference and supplement for greater understanding and perspective into center periphery relations.

Hechter states that, "the obstacle to...development suggested by the internal colonial model analogy...relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core but to a malintegration [sic] established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate."<sup>44</sup> Moreover, "the dominated society is condemned to an instrumental role by the metropolis."<sup>45</sup> Why are these particular phrases of critical importance?

First, it creates context using another existing example in previous literature, the United Kingdom in dealing with its peripheries. Second, it establishes that in many

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<sup>44</sup> Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

instances the periphery is unable to remove itself from the role allotted to it by the central government, not to mention in increasingly unfair or disempowering methods to the periphery. Third, it states clearly that often times the dominated society or the periphery in this instance is assigned a particular role by the center, again very similar to the Washington-Guam case study and should be referred to when considering this dissertation's own research and analysis.

For instance, on Guam this would refer to the island's designated defense security role as a strategic possession of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, and the disproportionately heavy military infrastructure and installments on island (a third of the island)<sup>46</sup>, as opposed to adjusting for developmental integration on par with the center or the U.S. mainland/Washington. With reference to powers of autonomy, defense security, the rebalance, and political status issue are frequent reminders for Guam to her questionable status and role as a United States possession or better-termed unincorporated territory today.

Hechter's understanding of colonialism is incredibly close to the nature of peripheral relations between many centers and peripheries, as many of these peripheries either started out as colonies or possessions *originally* before being integrated into the state at large and many have gone through the conditions described above, though there are still peripheries that exist as possessions (i.e. Guam). Therefore, his understanding of the core and integration are quite insightful in understanding our own analytical framework that examines power in center periphery relations. That being said, not all

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<sup>46</sup> "Bureau of Statistics and Plans," *Office of the Governor*, accessed Dec. 2019, <https://bsp.guam.gov>

center periphery relations has a strong colonialist factor, (i.e. the Falklands), though that remains in the minority.

One of the main reasons for noting Hechter's work is to touch upon the idea of inner colonialism or internal colonialism in terms of the U.S.-Guam and Denmark-Greenland center periphery relation. Both Guam and Greenland have been more subjugated rather than integrated into the United States and the Danish-realm, respectively, in a similar colonial manner. However, on this count Denmark has done well to integrate Greenland on a far-higher scale in contrast to the United States vis-à-vis Guam. Not only has Greenland achieved a considerable amount of actual voting-representation in Danish-affairs, Greenland is well on its way to becoming more than just a periphery but rather a periphery that influences or at least sways the center more so than the accepted 'center influencing periphery' notions mentioned in inter-state relations above. Therefore, the need to understand and differentiate between the colonizer and the colony, in particular the distinct differences that play out between the metropolis and dominated society as Hechter asserts.

Outside of Wallerstein, Escude, and O' Tuathail, as well as Hechter's work, other significant notions surrounding center periphery relations that influences the analytical framework includes the geographic differences or similarities between the center and periphery, respectively, as well as how power is understood in this dissertation's context including in what form center periphery relations is understood and defined in this research—amongst which constructivism plays an important role to the multi-dimensional aspect of the framework.

### **1.3 Notions of Geography, Power, and Security**

By a more constructivist account, authority in the field Alexander Wendt describes "variables of interest to scholars—e.g. military power, trade relations, international institutions, or domestic preferences—[as] not important because they are objective facts about the world, but rather because they have certain social meanings."<sup>47</sup> What sort of insinuation does this powerful statement from existing literature have in terms of this dissertation's own framework analysis and theoretical direction? In research such as this dissertation, the importance of agreement and understanding, mutual understanding, between two parties, the center and periphery, are at the center of an intersubjective analysis that then transforms and integrates as a multi-dimensional analytical framework.

These previous assertions clarify to readers that singular valued items such as those listed above are not relevant in it of themselves but rather as part of the entire theoretical construct. Assertions like the one Wendt notes, in which certain objective facts, such as military power, trade relations, and in this case international *and* domestic institutions hold value and meaning to center periphery relations because of who and what they affect rather than simply how the affect has taken over. The same logic applies to both inter-state and intra-state relations and is a two-way street, center-periphery or periphery-center. Therefore, referenced. For example, the geographical distance in the island-continent relationship in center periphery relations is a major reason for vast differences in dimensions such as culture or history, however, the failure to properly integrate the periphery as part of the whole can be either by accident, unlikely, and much more rationale is part of an agenda to separate and distinguish the center from the

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<sup>47</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). page number

periphery for certain security and strategic purposes. Another case in point, from the periphery's perspective, natural resources inherent to Greenland are of value but not because of their empirical meaning but rather how the periphery perceives these resources as crucial in their path to economic independence from the center or in this situation Copenhagen.

Likewise, another easily understood example illustrating a constructivist understanding is the Anderson Air Force Base and U.S. Naval Base located on the island of Guam. These physical military installations, while significant on their own, possess far greater meaning by being deterrents to those that threaten the defense security and strategy of Washington in the Asia-Pacific. Only by understanding each individual dimension as part of the analytical framework can greater meaning be attached to the nature of peripheral relations and further down the road for center periphery relations.

In terms of norms and power, Alexander Wendt further states that, "meaning is constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs, which scholars must understand if they are to explain State behavior"<sup>48</sup>, precisely what this dissertation's framework analysis is seeking to argue. That a single perspective understanding of center periphery relations cannot suffice to explain the entirety of center periphery relations or the nature of peripheral relations for that matter. It must be a combination of various critical dimensions that account for a comprehensive and well-rounded analysis that then gives meaning to center periphery relations and in turn to power, policy, and issues.

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<sup>48</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* Vol. 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81.

Wendt notably states that, "Constructivists argue that the nuclear arsenals of [sovereign states such as] the United Kingdom and China, though comparably destructive, have very different meanings to the United States that translate into very different patterns of interaction."<sup>49</sup> Similarly, the intrastate relationship hosting U.S. military bases in the island periphery of Guam mean very different things to the periphery than the center. In parallel, Greenland's natural resources in oil, mineral, as well as strategic positioning hold very different meanings to the periphery as opposed to the center.

While inter-state and intra-state relations are rather different in ideology and structure, there are similarities that can be brought forth from their differences, in particular to the notions of international v. domestic hierarchy. As such center periphery relations can be dealt with on a semi-independent level, in particular alluding to center periphery relations where the periphery is uniquely positioned either above or below what constitutes as inter-state or intra-state. And, as this dissertation refers, "While some Constructivists would accept that States are self-interested, rational actors, they would stress that varying identities and beliefs belie the simplistic notions of rationality under which states pursue simply survival, power, or wealth."<sup>50</sup> Though not going as far as to label the views presented in this dissertation in any set paradigm, certainly the theoretical basis are closer to accepting constructivist-leaning statements than purely realist or liberalism. Though the concept of hierarchy is incorporated into the dissertation, in particular domestic hierarchical structures. While center periphery relations may be bound to self-interests as rational actors, other dimensions must be taken into

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Relations, Principal Theories," *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Wolfrum, R. ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011).

consideration beyond the need for survival, power, and wealth. Otherwise, dimensions such as history or culture should not play the influencing role that they do have in determining power and the nature of peripheral relations, subsequently in policy matters and related issues.

In a more physical sense, a leading researcher in the field of geopolitics, Alison Mountz states that, "Islands have been geopolitically strategic sites in theatres of war where states set up naval bases to station and launch troops."<sup>51</sup> Moreover, these islands tend to "have pasts checkered with patterns of colonization, occupation, liberation, displacement, dispossession, and militarization."<sup>52</sup> In addition, "Islands become sites of territorial control and conflict of all kinds, where imperial, colonial, military might are expressed and resisted, and state sovereignty undertakes projects less likely to happen on mainland territory."<sup>53</sup> Her own research in existing literature is essential to understanding the powers and purpose of Guam and Greenland vis-à-vis their centers as both case studies happen to be islands, strategic in form, checkered with patterns of colonization, and that reflect a reality which is much more common in the periphery than in the center. That and the fact that both island peripheries hold defense-based installations akin to the ones described previously compel readers to take Mountz's research and examine how a framework analysis as the one provided here would hold in supplementing existing literature.

So far, the discussion above has mentioned a constructivist notion of social meaning to objective facts in the 'real world' or better termed–reality–and how these

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<sup>51</sup> Alison Mountz, "Political geography I: Reconfiguring geographies of sovereignty," *Progress in Human Geography* Vol. 37, no. 6 (2013): 835.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 835.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 836.

references can be and are applicable to the analytical framework used in this dissertation be it from the center's standpoint or peripheries'. Furthermore, Mountz adds a component of geopolitical sense that distinguishes island-peripheries, such as Guam and Greenland, as regularly subjugated to militarization, war, and different sorts of colonization, occupation, integration or liberation, and so forth. Thus, the need to build upon the previous works in discussing more unique cases that are either highly lacking in literature or have not been brought together in a comparison and contrast form as this dissertation has done.

One other notion to be discussed in this literature review is power, particularly what power means in a constructivist-leaning dissertation, as the following framework and chapters will illustrate. Power, in particular how we choose to define it, the role it plays in the dissertation and the analytical framework, and how power has already been discussed is a not so small notion that has been researched upon over and over again by many leading researchers amongst International Relations. At times, power as one would understand is intrinsically hierarchical, thus center periphery relations is eventually an analysis into the domestic hierarchy and subsequently security between the center and periphery as well as much of center periphery relations.

First, there are the many great scholars that have considered defining power as "one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations"<sup>54</sup>, with "proper definition remain[ing] a matter of controversy."<sup>55</sup> In this dissertation, rather than relying on a quantitative weighted numerical or statistical scale to measure power, the main bases

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<sup>54</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13.

<sup>55</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 322-45.



for judgment and analysis lies with the qualitative framework to sift through each individual dimension in order to look at how the center and periphery perceives said dimensions. Figuring out which dimensions play what parts in the nature of peripheral relations, what subsequent effects or influences (powers) this may have on center periphery relations and policy issues, and in what priority the analysis frames dimensions in light of these issues is central to the framework's process.

As mentioned above, it is highly unreasonable and perhaps disadvantageous to use numerical measurements for the notions of power in dimensions and center periphery relations as the empirical value and meaning to the center, periphery, the natural relationship, and onwards differ tremendously depending on the issues at hand. Each analysis, however, is brought forth after empirical evidence and is made in reference to particular subjects. That said, Hans Morgenthau is another leading figure that provides a reminder that, "the concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political science."<sup>56</sup>

Despite so, Jack Nagel has attempted a more specific and logical depiction stating that, "Anyone who employs a causal concept of power must specify domain and scope. To say 'X has power' may seem sensible, but to say 'X causes' or 'X can cause' is nonsense. Causation implies an X and a Y - a cause and an effect."<sup>57</sup>

In this instance, the particular domain is the natural relationship between center and periphery while the scope is limited by the dimensions themselves as well as specified via the particular policy matters or issues to be examined. Nagel further clarifies

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<sup>56</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd edn. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, [1948] 1960), p. 27.

<sup>57</sup> Jack H. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 14.

that "If power is causation, one must state the outcome caused. Stipulating domain and scope answers the question 'Power over what?'"<sup>58</sup> Here, we interpret the literature as allowing us, once domain and scope is defined, to clarify where the power lies (in which dimensions), what that power means to the center and periphery, and ultimately in what influencing or non-influencing manner that power provides to individual issues and certain subject matters such as the military buildup. Others have set forth defining what counts as power, Baldwin states that, "the importance of military force has been exaggerated; the role of nonmilitary forms of power has been underestimated; and the field of IR has been impoverished by its insulation from studies of power in other realms."<sup>59</sup>

In this dissertation, we are adding on to the literature in the sense that the framework analysis is careful not to overweigh the significance of dimensions such as defense security in lieu of the other dimensions and is constructed in a manner that respects other fields such as history and culture to create a well-rounded comprehensive analysis of power and influence vis-à-vis the center and periphery.

In addition, other researchers such as Lasswell and Kaplan "cite[s] respect, rectitude, affection and enlightenment as base values of power and influence"<sup>60</sup>, while Robert Dahl "included values, attitudes, expectations, decision-making rules, structures

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, (London: Sage Press, 2013), 285.

<sup>60</sup> Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 87.

and constitutions."<sup>61</sup> Alexander Wendt lists "brute material forces"<sup>62</sup> as bases of power and power to be "constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts."<sup>63</sup>

Each of these items listed by various scholars again point to the importance of, which is well respected in this paper, understanding how values, structures, expectations, are in defining and understanding power and influence, particularly vis-à-vis the center, the periphery, and the analytical framework. While the dissertation may not utilize all aspects referenced above, certainly the relevant and overarching nature and argument is built into the framework analysis.

On the other hand, security, often intertwined with defense affairs, is a notion that grows out of power. With great powers security becomes vital to securing the hegemony that great powers have. Middle powers such as Denmark also prioritizes security although in a different manner that seeks to combine cooperation between other middle powers or often choosing a major power to side with; in a sense, the 'balance of power' bandwagon scenario. Often times middle powers will seek to align itself or securitize itself with a major power that suits the ideology of itself, such as Denmark with the European Union or the United States as opposed to the more authoritarian Russia close by. Thereby allowing the United States continuation after the construction of the American Thule Air Base on the island periphery of Greenland. Or, Denmark may seek to join NATO and other institutions to legitimize its own security in another form of self-protection. "Security relations can take a variety of forms and can vary by dyad. The dyadic nature of these relations is particularly important. Each state has many potential

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<sup>61</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "Power," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* Vol. 12 (New York: Free Press, 1968).

<sup>62</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 97.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

partners, and there are many degrees of hierarchy within each possible relationship...Accordingly, relations can differ across dyads, taking one form with one partner and another with its neighbor, depending on circumstances. In the early postwar period, for example, the United States entered into an alliance with Australia and New Zealand, but in the same general region, expanded its imperial outpost in Guam to include all of Micronesia."<sup>64</sup>

"Sovereignty is a type of authority relationship. And despite the volumes written about it, authority is one of those terms—like power—that political scientists, and especially those in international relations, define only with difficulty."<sup>65</sup> Understanding security outside of "the norm of Westphalian sovereignty and other norms of human, political, and civil rights [will] sometimes [result] in conflict. Juridical sovereignty is but one of several competing principles in world politics. By lifting this mask, the pursuit of other norms might well be enhanced."<sup>66</sup> "Scholars of international relations typically rely on a formal-legal conception of authority. In this view, authority is conferred on rulers by prior lawful institutions"<sup>67</sup>, as illustrated by the joining of nations in the League of Nations, United Nations, European Union or NATO.

In intrastate distribution, "Those that share common values, political ideologies, cultural histories, and more are likely to share preferences over the substance of

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<sup>64</sup> David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations", *International Organization* Vol. 50, No. 1, (Winter 1996): 6.

<sup>65</sup> David A. Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations", *International Studies Review* Vol. 50, No. 4, (Sep., 2003): 304.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 321.

<sup>67</sup> David A. Lake, "Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order", *Review of International Studies* Vol. 35, (Feb. 2009): 37.

international order, especially over rules regarding the appropriate relationship between states and markets, government regulation, religion and the rule of law, and so forth."<sup>68</sup>

As such and in summary, in the notions of geography, power, and security, one realizes the significance of the geopolitical set-up of both Guam and Greenland in island-continent affairs. Where both island-peripheries are not only inclusive within the Danish realm or the American empire, each has multiple or at least one singular and significant military base located within the periphery itself. The island-continent description serves to further highlight the divide between the domestic center and periphery. In terms of power, as noted above, the term itself is highly difficult to analyze from soft power to hard power to everything in-between. However, the dimensions provided in the framework of this dissertation serves to clarify where the power is institutionally sourced and moreover how each dimension plays a role in each of the hypothetical and the realistic situations that are further covered in the case study chapters. Power is first situated based on their institutional and legal framework, giving weight to each dimension based on such arrangements, followed by the adjustment of the powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center as the significance of each dimension to said policy, decision, or case is concretely or readily available, i.e. in the form of local protests/activities, lawsuits, or further dimensional (such as cultural or historical outreach or legal actions within the federal or constitutional system) dialogue taken by the periphery. Lastly, defense-security affairs are often relegated to the state as a symbol of sovereignty or absolute power, however, in the more intricate center periphery relationship, the periphery has more often than not had to forfeit or leverage as much as

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<sup>68</sup> David A. Lake, "Legitimizing Power, The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy", *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 2, (Fall 2013): 89.

possible given the nature of laws pertaining to sovereign-security or the military-at-large. Nonetheless, the clarifications of geopolitics, geography, power, and defense-security as discussed above lay down foundations for a more impactful and purposeful dissertation to follow given the limitations, boundaries, understandings, and logistic of geography, power, and security vis-à-vis the center and periphery relationship.

#### **1.4 Incorporating Hierarchy into Center-Periphery Analysis**

Hierarchy is a concept that has in the past decade gained momentum in understanding international relations. Center periphery relations as examined in this dissertation focuses on the political science/international relations dynamic, it is an important concept to incorporate beyond common understandings of the anarchic nature in international relations. "Following [Thomas] Hobbes, nearly all scholars presume that world politics is anarchic, or lacking in any authority superior to that of states."<sup>69</sup> However, as the literature deepens and philosophical thought expands, other understandings have emerged to illustrate that there is an innate hierarchical nature to any two relationships. Perhaps most prominently, David A. Lake has written extensively on hierarchy and the effects of hierarchy in international relations and in state-to-state relations. Where Lake does not discuss, though has alluded to and mentioned, is the understanding and incorporation of hierarchy in the domestic sphere. In the current world system there exists particular peripheries that hold special status or positions that distinguish and differentiates such peripheries from most peripheries in a nation-state. Guam, for instance is a periphery that is a territory or protectorate of the United States that holds neither the rights of California, Texas, Alaska, or other peripheries that

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<sup>69</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 1.

influence Washington. The island is far weaker and far lower in the domestic hierarchical system than the other peripheries yet may be more significant in terms of strategic location and military interests. Greenland, on the other hand, is on the other side of the dichotomy where it is also a special periphery in that it is an autonomous country moving closer to independence from the Danish realm. As such, a compare and contrast analysis of the two peripheries through a domestic hierarchic lens establishes meaning and understanding to the situation from inside the system rather than state-to-state. Similar to the idea that anarchy has been presumed as the norm for international relations, the domestic sphere has been long ignored and under analyzed as part of the state though understanding the special peripheries and how center-periphery relations affects national policy is actually quite important.

As Lake explains on hierarchy in international relations, "Some subordinate states acknowledge the authority of another in...limited areas, recognizing as legitimate perhaps just the right of a dominant state to regulate their interactions with third parties, traditionally known as a sphere of influence, in military affairs, or an economic zone, in trade and financial relations."<sup>70</sup> This holds true for the domestic hierarchic system as well. In particular, Greenland is able to manage affairs aside from foreign policy, defense, though regulates most other areas of concern. He further explains that, "Other subordinates grant a dominant state deeper and more extensive authority, ceding the right to make security policy in a protectorate or economic policy in a dependency."<sup>71</sup> Guam is exactly the type of periphery where, perhaps not granted willingly, the United States holds extensive power on the island's affairs in almost all fields sans environmental and

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 2.

cultural concerns, though even those concerns may be superseded at times due to security concerns.

Legitimacy of rule is another area of concern where one has to understand how exactly the center periphery relationship formed and under which circumstances legitimated the center periphery relationship. "In a relational approach, the right to rule rests on a social contract in which the ruler provides a political order of value to the ruled, who in turn grant legitimacy to the ruler and comply with the restraints on their behavior necessary for the production of that order."<sup>72</sup> With Guam the legitimacy for the United States comes under the Organic Act, while for Greenland the legitimacy most recently has been established through the Home-rule and Self-rule Acts.

While a state may discuss sovereignty, a periphery may discuss the extent of rule by its center. Power is just as divisible and apparent in the periphery as it is in the state, Greenland has been granted such powers that Guam does not have. As Lake explains, "a state might retain authority over its general diplomacy but confer authority over its defense policy to some other state...Treating sovereignty as divisible allows authority between states to vary along [a] continua of lesser or greater hierarchy."<sup>73</sup> Therefore, in the domestic hierarchical system, Greenland is a periphery higher up on the hierarchical system while Guam is not, in particular because of the power granted to Greenland by Denmark versus Guam by the United States. Furthermore, as "authority is a type of power over others"<sup>74</sup>, where the power lies and how it is legitimated transforms our understanding of how much power the periphery has vis-à-vis the center in the domestic hierarchical system. As such, incorporating hierarchy into the analysis and understanding

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 8.



of center periphery relations is tantamount to understanding power, center periphery policies, and center periphery decision-making.

Lake describes "Legitimacy [as] a political construct that derives from many sources: tradition, divine revelation, charisma, formal-legal rules. In modern international relations...legitimacy is rooted in a social contract in which the dominant state provides a political order to the collection of individuals who compose the subordinate"<sup>75</sup>. In both Guam and Greenland there is legitimacy that exists in the formal-legal sense, in the Organic, Home-rule, and Self-rule Acts, though the roots of which may have started as a new political order that Denmark and the United States provided for after major confrontation(s) or war.

Lake further states that while "useful for analyzing established domestic hierarchies, a formal-legal conception of authority is of dubious utility for the study of international relations."<sup>76</sup> As this dissertation focuses on domestic hierarchies, the formal-legal concept of power is incredibly important to the understanding of where power is derived, whether that power is legitimate, and with which power the center has over the periphery and as a result which powers or institutions the periphery may legitimately use to overcome the domestic hierarchical structure.

Michael Doyle directly "offers a widely cited consensus definition of empire as a 'system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate periphery.'"<sup>77</sup> Doyle accurately describes the current situation faced by Greenland and Guam vis-à-vis Denmark and Washington

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 57.

clearly. Though the extent of power or subordination the periphery allows the center is a struggle rooted in the dimensional framework analysis this dissertation provides and clarifies upon.

Ian Clark offers a consensual definition of hierarchy as:

'a political arrangement characterized by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of power and glory and society is classified in successively subordinate grades. This *hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-strategic power*, yielding the traditional groupings of Great Powers, medium powers, and small powers. It may equally be described in economic terms, yielding the stratification into first, third and fourth worlds. Outside a statist perspective, it may be analysed in terms of centres or cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries.'<sup>78</sup>

In understanding power or security and even the dissertation's framework, "Theoretical constructs can never be measured directly; analysts compile indicators of GDP, military personnel, population, major power status, and others that we believe capture more or less accurately the underlying construct of coercive capabilities."<sup>79</sup>

Lake directly refers to Micronesia and Guam arguing for the necessity of the island periphery and the political stability or order it has provided. "In the case of Micronesia, where the war (World War II) had demonstrated the necessity of controlling the islands surrounding its vulnerable naval base on Guam, the Navy argued vigorously to keep the islands under American rule."<sup>80</sup> The United States though at time fails to

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<sup>78</sup> David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 60.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 64-65.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 130.

remember that, "To govern others, in whole or part, the dominant state must accept a degree of governance over itself as well."<sup>81</sup>

In terms of hierarchy, in center periphery relations, "status cannot be reduced to identity. On the contrary, the concept of status would be incomplete without hierarchy. Relations among status groups are inherently hierarchical."<sup>82</sup> As such, "states can be divided into a high-status core and a low-status periphery"<sup>83</sup>, for instance in the case of Guam vis-à-vis Washington. Moreover, Galtung asserts that not only does the center periphery relationship exist and matter, "in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions; *and* the resistance of this inequality to change. The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery,"<sup>84</sup> thereby highlighting not only the significance of center periphery inter-state relations but intra-state relations as well. Galtung further "stress[es] as the 'basic structural differences' between 'center' and 'periphery' — *apart* from the differences included in the definition — the degree of social participation...of knowledge...and of opinion-holding"<sup>85</sup> And that in the concept of center and periphery, Langholm discusses the "rank, similarity with center, and accessibility from (access to) center [that] are partly different dimensions, partly different standards for conceiving and measuring social position"<sup>86</sup>

## 1.5 Case Selection and Research Design

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 131.

<sup>82</sup> Marina Duque, "Core-Periphery Structure in the International Status Hierarchy", (Harvard Kennedy School, 2017), 4.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>84</sup> Nicholas Onuf, "Center-Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does It Matter?", *All Azimuth* Vol. 6, N1, (January 2017): 7.

<sup>85</sup> Sivert Langholm, "On the Concepts of Center and Periphery", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 3/4 (1971): 274.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 277.

In terms of the case studies, the rationale for selecting Guam in the Asia-Pacific and Greenland in the Arctic is that they represent two very similar island periphery situations on opposite ends of the power spectrum in distinctly different regions; one in the Asia-Pacific and the other in the Arctic. Moreover, both case studies represent institutionally distinct peripheries that have been given special status by their respective centers. In Greenland, the Danish realm has conferred via referendum the Home-Rule and Self-Rule acts accordingly in 1979 and 2009, respectively. While on Guam, the Organic Act of 1950 enacted by Congress allows for Guam to have a form of 'mini-constitution' that reflects further autonomy in an unincorporated territorial title. The institutional relationships that Greenland and Guam have with Denmark and Washington offers even more validity to pursuing both case studies in the Asia-Pacific and the Arctic as strong and significant representations of institutionally special island-periphery and center relationships to analyze. In both case studies, much of the powers of the purse (treasury), local judiciary, and local executive branch are allotted to the island-peripheries with the island-peripheries holding much autonomy aside from those of a defense-security, foreign affairs, and laws pertaining to a the federal or 'Danish realm' level.

To further elaborate, on the center periphery spectrum Guam has become increasingly dependent on the United States for her well-being, while Greenland is becoming increasingly independent of Denmark going exactly in the opposite direction which poses an interesting dichotomy of sorts to see whether or not the differing powers in the periphery allow for a different outcome in fate and policy. This, however, does not suggest that either island-peripheries are independent sovereign states in line with international norms. It does suggest that the two island-peripheries are special in their

strategic position be it for security or natural resources and thus structured differently in the domestic hierarchical structure, with Guam leaning towards being increasingly dependent and thus weaker while Denmark leaning towards being increasingly autonomous and thus stronger when compared and contrasted.

While the two case studies may have areas of distinction, certain common ground that Guam and Greenland both share include the fact both Guam and Greenland have an original indigenous population that must come to terms with a cultural displacement between the center and periphery, that reasoning adds to the decision behind this selection as a uniquely qualified one in examining center periphery relations.

With the ongoing public relations fiascos or lawsuits of Washington or Denmark vis-à-vis their peripheries, one could not help but think that had Washington been more carefully concerned with the local government and their analysis, i.e. when choosing which properties (areas) to turn into military training centers, or had Denmark been more transparent in dialogue with the Greenlandic government instead of waiting for the Greenlandic authorities to find out via media reports, center periphery relations would be much better off for both parties.

While it is technically possible to explore other peripheries vis-à-vis their center, it is perhaps not as meaningful nor is it as substantial or noticeable to center periphery relations and the studies of power and influence in the periphery as the central case studies of Guam and Greenland provides with their dichotomous nature to each other and distinctively comparable and contrastable components.

If a periphery is so easily overwhelmed by the center that it holds neither particular meaning nor value, strategic or otherwise, then the case is simply and easily

dismissed. There would be very little purpose in examining a center periphery relationship, where the can-dos and cannot-dos of the center and the periphery are so straightforward. The paper therefore has selected the above case studies to focus on peripheries that have more to contribute in terms of sheer substance and perhaps power or more interesting dynamics with their center than other possible counterparts.

Case in point, the Lajes Field or air base in the autonomous region of the Azores (of Portugal) was once a major focal point during the Second World War to various differing parties, consisting of but not limited to a United States Air Force detachment unit. However immediately after the Post-War Era to as recent as a few years ago, the Azores has increasingly lost its strategic value it once held in the past. As a result, while the Azores, as an autonomous region or periphery to Portugal, may have been an interesting case to examine center periphery relations and subsequent powers during that particular period, the case would serve as an interesting one to examine the gradual loss of power in the periphery and consequences not the powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center as defined and up for reinterpretation and analysis as in this paper. Indeed, in future research an Azores case would be relevant to the loss of power in center periphery relations, but as this dissertation is examining the powers of the periphery not the rise and fall of said power, the case selection of Guam and Greenland are most contrasting and evident in providing for an explanation of the powers of the periphery and whether or not that power then affects how the center handles issues and scenarios regarding both island peripheries, in particular that of a defense security nature.

In case selection, this is not tautological in the sense that all dimensions were considered as an end all be all with the end result being predictable. Rather, the

framework creates more transparency and understanding in order to minimize possible misjudgments than without said framework. The only difference with the inclusion of said framework is that framework analysis is time consuming and therefore difficult, as all analysis are, in the beginning though gradually becomes easier as systemized to a database-from and at least familiarized in those with the need and expertise.

Lastly, research derived from paper analyses and policy details, inclusive of research from already interviewed figures, will further refine the originality and literary contribution by offering a separate distinctive outlook into center-periphery relations.<sup>87</sup> Using Guam and Greenland as the case studies, the paper asserts the nature of the peripheral relationship, subject/intent, and the resulting roles/powers to be the independent, intervening, and dependent variables, respectively, in its aim of better understanding the roles/powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center.

## **1.6 Research Approach and Methodology**

The dissertation uses qualitative interview methods on Guam with the island-leadership, the in-betweens, and grassroots to draw out first-hand insights on the rebalance, political status, and identity, etc. as related to the questions of roles and powers in the periphery. Interviews were conducted from the periphery in a semi-structured fashion with each interview lasting from thirty-minutes to a little above an hour depending on individual schedules.

Roughly half of the interviews were conducted during August-2014 while the other half done in July-2015. Interviewees were composed of nearly a dozen influential individuals, from the University of Guam President, former Guam Chief Justice, various-

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<sup>87</sup> On author's intent in center-periphery relations, see works by Immanuel Wallerstein (world-systems), Carlos Escude (peripheral sovereignties), and Gearóid O' Tuathail (geopolitical influence).

Senators to the Legislative Speaker, Lieutenant Governor, as well as the lead attorney in rebalance-related lawsuits.

Note, however, that unlike the U.S. Congress or Japanese Diet, the Guam Legislature is appointed to only fifteen-senators, including the speaker, making the interviews of particular value and representative of island voices.

Units of analysis do not fall into the state-to-state paradigm, but rather similar to the World System framework where the World is the entire system at large and the units are labeled as the core, periphery, and semi-periphery as related to their economic purpose and economic status. The dissertation's system would then be the Center in place of the World and respective peripheries including the center itself.

In terms of case selection, research design, research approach, and methodology, this dissertation, in summary, examines the established institutional center periphery relationship between Guam/Greenland and Washington/Denmark as indicated by Congress and the Danish realm. Through original interviews, sourced-material, and the dissertation's framework, the case studies further examine how the framework is applied to certain decisions and provides not only an evaluation of past cases but in the present and future as well. All said and done, the dissertation works towards a better understanding of where peripheral power arises and how that is leveraged in center peripheral relations.



## **Chapter 2:**

### **The 'Peripheral' Relationship and the Analytical Framework**

#### **2.1 Defining Terms**

Prior to deeper analyses, careful wording alongside clearly defined boundaries to the central concepts of the periphery, the center, and the 'peripheral relationship' itself is essential to more substantive readings into this paper; a paper which will use Guam in the Asia-Pacific and Greenland in the Arctic as central case studies in the attempt to reinterpret as well as expand upon the center periphery relationship in intrastate center periphery discourse.

First, periphery in the context of this paper is used to describe the internal entities (i.e. territories, autonomous country in the Realm) on the outer edges (hence 'periphery') of fully sovereign independent states. However, there is a difference in a periphery that is fully integrated into either the Danish realm or the United States. Neither Greenland nor Guam can be considered as such. Both are uniquely positioned in terms of security, strategy, and in Greenland's case—natural resources. Guam is a possession of the United States, a territory or protectorate, while Greenland is an autonomous country within the Danish realm with limited sovereignty.

For the case studies in question, the peripheries that are deemed as significantly strategic to the center and distinctively comparable to each other would be Guam for the United States in the Asia-Pacific and Greenland for the Kingdom of Denmark in the Arctic Circle. Second, the center, although commonly referred to as the capital or core, i.e. Washington, represents the ruling government at-large. And third, the peripheral

relationships mentioned in this paper are relations, be it cultural, historical, or further, between the center and the periphery.

For the purposes of this dissertation, the center represents not only the capital (i.e. Washington or Copenhagen) but also the branches of power that represents the central government at large. This may vary between cases or countries but for the most part is a reference to the executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers representing the federal or sovereign government, for instance Congress or the Danish Parliament, the Supreme Court of the United States, and so forth. Despite most peripheries holding similar structural outlooks, with territorial legislatures, local court systems and so forth, it is more likely and more often that locally elected leaders represent the periphery as a representation or the will of the local populace.

In terms of power disparity, the concept is rather logic-based rather than established through concrete quantitative data, or through tables that chart each individual item in a concrete power spectrum. This paper does present graphs, however hypothetical and provisional at this point, that illustrates the source of power for the periphery as well as a flowchart as to how that influences the center and security/policy issue. Examination of and clarifications into the multi-dimensional framework via this dissertation's case studies should further illustrate the point above. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the multi-dimensional framework vis-à-vis the legal and institutional arrangements with the center, which in turn translates to peripheral power. While figure 2 provides a similar illustration with security more heavily weighted; though figures 1 and 2 are indicatively notional not quantitative and as granted by the center. Figure 3 provides a detailed description of center periphery relations through the multi-dimensional framework.




Figure 1 - Notional Analytical Framework




Figure 2 - Notional Analytical Framework (w/ Security as superseding dimension)

# Center-Periphery Relations: Analytical Framework

<p><b>History:</b> Denotes the historical relationship between the center and periphery, including but not limited to important historical events, moments, and memories. A basic fundamental foundation in understanding center periphery relations.</p>	<p><b>Culture:</b> Further clarifies the center periphery relationship by illustrating cultural similarities and differences, as well as distinguishing cultural ideals that may be distinct to either center or periphery. Allows for the analytical understanding of how center periphery relations started as well as matured over time given the historical dimension.</p>	<p><b>Governance:</b> In the analytical framework, governance demonstrates to what extent peripheral powers and roles have developed as acquired vis-a-vis the center by the periphery. Demonstrates what the periphery can or cannot do legally, however also outlines the influence the periphery may have on center periphery relations.</p>	<p><b>Natural Resources and Industries:</b> As a dimension, natural resources and industries outlines the potential or significance of the periphery to the center for purposes-at-large. An indicator of the willingness of the center to negotiate or initiate dialogue with the periphery given the periphery's abilities in areas such as economic independence or dependence as well as security needs and so forth.</p>	<p><b>Defense-Security:</b> This dimension highlights the significance of the periphery to the center's overall security strategy. In the analytical framework as well as in center periphery relations, defense-security, both in ideology and actual deployment further clarifies center periphery relations, particularly how important the periphery is to the center in terms of power balance, necessity, and leverage.</p>
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Figure 3 - Clarification of Dimensions to Framework

Most on the list of to be considered, including the five dimensions of *history*, *culture*, *governance*, *natural resources/industry*, and *defense-security* can be easily understood in their respective natures which then reflects an overall judgment of peripheral power in relation to and in contrast with separate differing peripheries, in this case Guam v. Greenland. Power disparity means that one is assumed to have more or less power than the other, as calculated through the analytical framework, and the greater the disparity the more apparent the dimensional advantages or disadvantages may be, though that will be determined in the research analysis that follows.

The source of power of each island-periphery comes in many forms. First, there is the formal-legal hierarchic form of power in which the island peripheries have either been granted by the center or popularly voted on via a referendum in the periphery itself. For Guam, this means that the Organic Act bestows the majority of the periphery's source of power, and while it may not be fully integrated into the United States and remains a protectorate, the island may still utilize the federal system and structure thereby challenging the center in an event of policy disagreement. This has happened on several occasions when either the island itself or grassroots organizations or the Guamanian people have sued the federal government or the department of defense for cultural, environmental, or even matters related to the military buildup under the federal judicial system. While the formal-legal structure of Greenland has been established that the Danish realm recognizes Greenlandic power over the island, in particular natural resources, with the exceptions of foreign policy, defense, and security affairs; hence why the latter is considered to possess more power than the former when being compared and contrasted as island-peripheries. Second, the source of power for the island-periphery

may come from the island itself. With Greenland, the vast amount of resources that will one day inevitably be of use to the Greenlandic government and people as well as the strategic location of the island, being the eyes and ears of the United States and Denmark, grants it special and specific purposes that other peripheries may not have. On the other hand, while Guam may not possess these natural resources, the strategic location of the island is far more apparent than Greenland and to the United States as evident by a third of the island being occupied by the U.S. military<sup>88</sup> with further military buildup as the still existent threats of North Korea or the rise of China influencing the United States role in the region. A third source of power, though much more difficult to measure, is the power of the people and the media's role in the portrayal of the United States and Denmark as they treat the Guamanian and Greenlandic people and each island periphery respectively. As Dr. Natividad of the University of Guam has said, "the United States hates to be humiliated"<sup>89</sup> and particularly for democratic states, the power of the people, the media, and international attention may or may not be a source of power depending on the administration. For instance, in the Trump Administration, in spite of the media, the Trump Administration has been able to govern in a manner that President Trump has chosen for the United States and thus Washington itself.

## **2.2 The Peripheral Relationship and Analytical Framework**

With terms defined and proper rationale given on case study selections, it is time to move towards examining the peripheral relationship and the nature of peripheral relations itself.

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<sup>88</sup> Chloe Babauta, "Guam's strategic importance: From coaling station to tip of the spear", *Guam Pacific Daily News*, September 2, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/09/02/guams-strategic-importance-coaling-station-tip-spear/1048589002/> (accessed 2019)

<sup>89</sup> Dr. Lisalinda Natividad in one-on-one interview with author, 2015.

Given the recent developments in peripheral territories from the 21st century forward to just a few days ago, results from U.S.-North Korean relations (vis-à-vis Guam)<sup>90</sup>, Sino-Russian interests in the Arctic (vis-à-vis Greenland)<sup>91</sup>, and possible rotation of military as between South Korea-Japan and the U.S. (vis-à-vis Okinawa)<sup>92</sup> have indicated that there is significant reason and need to develop an analytical framework that seeks to understand and explain the powers of the periphery as a player that is both *a part* of the conversation though many times set *apart* from the discourse entirely.

The existence of peripheral territories such as Guam in the Asia-Pacific has somewhat allowed for North Korea to ramp up rhetoric against the United States, with recent defense-security advancements that have allowed for nuclear weapons to reach the U.S. territory.<sup>93</sup> After a flurry of exchanges between the U.S. President and the North Korean Supreme Leader, much of which was covered extensively in the media, further developments such as permanent staging of the THAAD whether on Guam or in South Korea eventually led to the possible outcome of a U.S.-NK Summit in Singapore in June 2018.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Bruce W. Bennet, "How Trump Reset U.S.-North Korea Relations", Rand Corporation, July 2, 2019, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/07/how-trump-reset-us-north-korea-relations.html>.

<sup>91</sup> Yacqub Ismail, "The Limits of the Alliance Between China and Russia", The National Interest, July 10, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/limits-alliance-between-china-and-russia-66406>.

<sup>92</sup> H. Andrew Schwartz, "The Importance of U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Defense Cooperation", Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 28, 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/importance-us-japan-korea-trilateral-defense-cooperation>.

<sup>93</sup> Robert Delaney, "North Korea considers missile attack on Guam, after Trump vows 'fire and fury' over nuke report", *South China Morning Post*, 9 Aug, 2017, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2106007/trump-vows-meet-north-korea-with-fire-and-fury-if> (accessed 2019).

<sup>94</sup> Gerry Doyle, "If Missiles Are Headed To Guam, Here Is What Could Stop Them", *The New York Times*, Aug. 11, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/asia/guam-north-korea-missile-defense.html> (accessed 2019).

The effects of the U.S. Presidency on the island of Guam is no doubt felt by the periphery despite its own wishes, however, the power with which Guam has to deal with said issue or Washington is not as clear nor one-sided. Therefore, we have the need to improve the analytical framework to understand where the power of the periphery comes from and how that power may actually come to influence policy, issues, and other relevant matters. Without a clear analytical framework that examines the origins of power for the periphery and subsequently analyses of the periphery on the center etc., it is highly possible for misunderstandings to rise between the periphery and center, create disharmony within the periphery itself, and become costly as well as ineffective to the administration, such as in the Pagat-scenario of the Guam case study.

The multidisciplinary approach in this dissertation examines power, where it originates from in the peripheral case studies, and how it comes to influence or implicate further issues. Complementary approaches include examining center-periphery relations, power relations, with a more hierarchical perspective, as defined by the literature above.

Regardless of perspective, the likely role designation by the center of the periphery remains a powerful indicator of center-periphery relations. While, the periphery is able to perceive its own role within center periphery relations, it is, however quite limited, as most governing powers to the periphery are conferred by the center, whether by decree from a legislative body or the constitution, i.e. the Organic Act vis-à-vis Guam, those powers are again likely to be very limited or temporary rather than a reflection of the true realities of the periphery. There are also other hidden legislations that may weaken peripheral powers such as the previously mentioned Jones Act/Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which states that maritime commerce into U.S. ports must be by U.S. flagged



vessels, hindering possible trade from more nearby countries even if partially exempt in the case of Guam.

Laws aside, most likely the type of role and relationship the periphery takes on will depend on one or more factors including but not limited to the type of resources the periphery holds, the type of government and legislation that bestows power upon the periphery, as well as various other factors that may be either beneficial or detrimental to the relationship at large such as the popular vote in our institutionally democratic case studies. Unfolding the layers or dimensions to the center periphery relationship is one of the key aspects to this framework that the paper is built upon and uses in examining the Guam and Greenland case studies.

With that said, it is critical to understand that the possible dynamics stemming from center periphery relations have to be looked at through a different, deeper, and more sophisticated structure--as this dissertation presents. Without looking at the different parts of the peripheral relationship, one could easily be misguided into focusing, for instance, too much on the details to a single dimension such as security-defense or historical animosities between the center and periphery without proper reference to how or why they may relate to a present situation, such as base relocation, or even to each other, thus hindering or creating obstacles to real solutions.

The analytical framework being presented in this dissertation fills that gap of knowledge and understanding by expanding more broadly on the more specific details. This allows for a relatively more inclusive and comprehensive system that looks at key segments or parts that influence and affect center periphery relations, most notably through the angles of history, governance, and security as these form the basis for

evaluating the powers and significance of the periphery and peripheral relationship in terms of existentialist ideals and existentialist threats.

Moreover, after establishing the different parts to a center-periphery relation, the framework is then taken to a higher assessment of analysis by situating each part of the analysis as either a short-term or mid-to-long term concern in terms of existential significance--on both sides. Finally, the analysis, as a result, will then become a much more refined and useful tool that is ready to assess individual situations affecting the peripheral relationship such as the marine relocations or military buildup on Guam or the resource management issues or labor issues of Greenland and come up with more tangible results, solutions, or at least dialogue at more mutually beneficial levels.

### **2.3 Explaining Dimensions - Significance and Meaning**

In order to seek justification and answer the question of whether or not security as a notion supersedes the other dimensions, it must be clear what the dimensions to this work's analytical framework are, what they signify, and what they mean. As mentioned previously, the dimensions that this paper focuses on are *history, culture, governance, natural resource and industry, and security*. Each of these dimensions are significant in that these are the foundations which make up the analytical framework that can then be used as to examine further specific issues such as the military buildup on Guam or the resource management issue on Greenland. A dimension is one piece of the puzzle that makes up the whole in regards to the analytical framework. Separately, each dimension examines one aspect of the center periphery relationship. Without understanding history, one cannot understand culture, without culture and history; one cannot understand how the logical and legal source of governance came along, without governance, one cannot

understand how the utilization of natural resources or industries are developed, and lastly without the four previous dimensions, one cannot understand the defense-security of a periphery vis-à-vis the center. While there are times that these dimensions may overlap in terms of meaning or significance, each dimension exists on its own while co-existing together to make up a holistic approach to a comprehensive framework in understanding issues of center periphery relations. For instance, in a more scientific manner, oxygen and carbon dioxide are both in the 'air' that we breathe; however, both are made up of separate molecules and serve different purposes, but together the co-existence of both (albeit not limited to the two, as dimensions are not limited to the five), largely make up our understanding of the 'air' that we breathe and what is necessary for existence. Likewise, each dimension signifies and holds different meanings, though together, the dimensions make up the pillars to the understanding of the analytical framework used to examine center periphery relations. In short, dimensions are but one part of the center periphery relationship, and the five dimensions presented in this paper are the most significant in terms of bringing originality and comprehensive depth to examining center periphery relations.

#### **2.4 The Nature of Peripheral Relations - Purpose and Framework Rationale**

With this paper, the research on center periphery relations, as derived from analyses into the Guam and Greenland Asia-Pacific and Arctic case studies, respectively, will reveal even further empirical and qualitative data that contributes to the current literature while the originality, by offering a separate distinctive outlook into center-periphery relations, will serve as a blueprint to this and future frameworks on center periphery dynamics.

As to the question of role(s) and powers of a periphery, in particular the powers of the periphery as with power it is common for role to then be assumed, the answer remains highly dependent on various factors, but can be narrowed most notably, into the a) *nature of the periphery's relationship to the center in center periphery relations*, b) *the subject matters at hand (i.e. the strategy, policy, or matter in correspondence)*, and c) *the placement of said periphery within the domestic hierarchical structure*.

To better understand power in center periphery relations, it is necessary that several, namely five, distinct yet, as detailed later, encompassing aspects or dimensions be vigorously examined and evaluated for the Guam and Greenland case studies; dimensions which include the areas of *history, culture, governance, natural resources or industry*, and last but not least *security* (both the physical, i.e. quantifiable items such as the number of bases or military numbers, and conceptual, i.e. qualitative such as strategic blueprint or importance of said territory).

That being said, the illustrations above present visuals that lay out the main structure of this dissertation in a more easily understandable graphic. In order to evaluate the nature of peripheral relations, one must start by examining each individual dimension in its own right then as part of the whole (the analytical framework), followed by to the left, whether or not the dimension constitutes as important or significant to the particular issue, i.e. political status, which can then be understood in a chronological manner, in the form of short or mid-long term concerns, to the right are misunderstanding minimizers which fall outside of the direct analytical framework though examines the positioning of the periphery in the domestic hierarchy in the respective parties (center and periphery) and with regards to respective issues.

## **2.5 Analytical Framework for the Nature of Center Periphery Relations**

That said, first and foremost, the analytical framework (or how the framework should be carried out or utilized in analysis) is not meant to be a terminal one. Rather, it is evolutionary and can be built upon and improved depending on the situation or the circumstances.

Therefore, while the current framework may have five distinct aspects deemed to be comprehensively significant in analyzing center periphery relations, future frameworks may see the number of angles expand to seven or perhaps even more areas or subareas depending on the aforementioned shifts to situation or circumstance.

But, at a very basic and fundamental level, it is very unlikely and difficult not to take into account these five dimensions in the analysis of center periphery relations, as they are the pillars of where power is derived from vis-à-vis the center and periphery, how it is manifested in reality, and to what purpose it serves.

Second, the framework presents each aspect or dimension as either a short-term or mid-to-long term concern for policymakers, powerful individuals that both dictate or influence the movement and utility of power in either the center or periphery, but can be read upon and is applicable to the general public for greater usage and other purposes. Here, the idea is that, depending on which center periphery case at hand, i.e. Washington-Guam or Greenland-Denmark, which amongst the five aspects is more pertinent or more urgent for policymakers to deal with in order to achieve the highest mutual collaboration to a particular subject. For instance, if we were to discuss the future of Greenland's autonomy vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Denmark, perhaps certain aspects such as natural resources/industry, governance, and security may become more important than the

historical or cultural ones which are less contentious although no less important. This means that as the Greenlandic people move forward in their cohesive political will, the economy and welfare of the Greenlandic people and the island periphery will force more realistic aspects of life, such as the way the island is governed (governance)—moving towards more autonomy—as well as more power over how their vast natural resources are managed. While historical and cultural subjects are still important to the periphery without managing the resources/industry and governance and to a further extent the security of the island periphery, the wellbeing of the people will come first and therefore more important.

Likewise, if we were to discuss the situation of indigenous rights with the Inuit people, perhaps the more proper balance of analysis would be to give the historical and cultural dimensions more weight or value in order to understand the possible requests between Greenland and Denmark on the matter. The decision on which dimensions hold how much power or weight in the conversation depends on these situation that is currently being discussed. But, the overall direction of the powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center suggests that ultimately it is the economic welfare of the island that then moves the periphery to utilize historical and cultural aspects of their periphery to leverage the center into more autonomy. As such each scenario within the case studies may have different weights of each dimension given the situation, the evidence is in how the periphery and government have reacted in accordance to the situation, therefore allowing examiners to give weight to each dimension. Overall, however, this dissertation would still focus on the powers of the periphery vis-à-vis the center and how in the overarching picture each dimension plays its role. This is a true given the words of previous U.S.

Delegate to Congress Dr. Underwood and most interviewees, however once security is involved and as the analysis turns into a securitized issue, security as a dimension overtakes the other concerns as evidenced by the military buildup on Guam. The difference that this framework asserts is that regardless of where the emphasis may be, that an encompassing understanding via the current framework will still have more realistic benefits both in theory and use no matter the individuals, parties, or whomever involved as opposed to a singular more narrow and focused perspective.

As mentioned before, the framework is a very flexible and evolutionary one. It has the capability to shift to fit the circumstances or situation while staying true to the original formula (keeping the base dimensions used for analysis) that reveals the core authenticity behind the relationship between the center and periphery.

Third, there is a particular way in which this structure should be applied to make the most logical sense. Stage 1 consists of evaluating the nature of the peripheral relationship (dimensions). Stage 2 is to determine the importance of each aspect based on immediate existential concerns or to the urgency of the particular subject at hand. And, lastly, stage 3 is to conclude certain inferences on the peripheral relationship, as applied via the framework to individual cases and subjects giving it relevancy and significance in policy and affairs, i.e. in Guam or Greenland over militarization/de-militarization or resource permits/labor distribution, respectively.

## **2.6 Understanding Center Periphery Power through Framework Dimensions**

In the following segments, the dissertation describes in detail the purpose of and weight each individual dimension holds, clarifying what exactly that dimension entails in its own right and as a component of the overarching framework.

### **2.6.1 History<sup>95</sup>**

First thoughts may be that history is simply something that happened in the past and that it involves plenty of events, dates, occurrences, and is more often than not relegated to the backburner if not controversial or relevant to modern times. It is often times a dimension which is included or introduced as a bullet point or listing type of information that can be easily skimmed or absorbed as a matter of fact. Sometimes this provides a very quick and accurate direct reading into current center periphery relations. Other times however this kind of reading or understanding can be a very misleading and misguiding notion if not taken into consideration as part of the entirety in center periphery relations.

History though is much more than just a set of dates and occurrences. It is a dimension that provides solid foundations into the analysis of any center periphery relations. It gives understanding, perspective, and basically builds a story around how the periphery and the center came to be, how their relations were built, and does a lot to explain their relations in the present by showing when certain laws were introduced, how long the current relationship has been, and important points of reference for either cooperation or confrontation. As such, it is a very important part of the nature of peripheral relations.

When taken into the dynamics of center periphery relations, one must be careful to understand the historical aspect not just at face value but to place the history in perspective and in relation to the center, the periphery, or center periphery relations as a whole. Or, depending on the weight of either party in the specific issue, i.e. when

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<sup>95</sup> See for instance Peter N. Stearns (1988), American Historical Association, "Why Study History?", [https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/why-study-history-\(1998\)](https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/why-study-history-(1998)), (accessed 2019).



speaking of the military buildup on Guam, the historical understanding of Guam's background would outweigh the historical understanding of the U.S.'s overseas military installations for a number of reasons, such as the location being on the periphery or the policy affecting the periphery the most, and so forth. So, there is a certain amount of weighing or weight distribution going on that puts the particular emphasis of the dimension on the party (center or periphery or both) that is most likely to be affected.

Further interpretations of how the history dimension may be understood as part of the nature of peripheral relations include whether or not the periphery and her people hold historical animosities or certain complications towards the center could result in particular policy impasses, i.e. military base agreements, and vice-versa. Alternatively, affirmative shared history would bring relatively more positive influences to the periphery that likely ease the central administration's development in negotiations and policy, such as in the values of certain shared institutions such as the military or economic modernizations on Guam as a result of American colonialism to the territory).

Moreover, there are a number of concerns that should be taken into consideration when understanding a dimensions relevance to the center or periphery or center periphery relations. Certain historical memories, such as the 'liberation' of Guam by the United States from Imperial Japan during World War II, play a significant role in relations between the center and periphery. However, to what extent and in what manner center periphery relations are affected depends on the interpretation by the center or periphery. (With regards to accuracy, one method to better and more accurately frame history in future research as a dimension could be to include polls or data that can gauge the accuracy of the sentiments surrounding the history between center and periphery.)

Put shortly, this aspect looks at the past for answers to the present and future. Particularly in situations such as Okinawa, though not a case study that this paper investigates nonetheless provides certain context into the framework. Okinawa is a peripheral entity that in almost any instance of analysis, there will be a reference to or discussion of the historical memory aspect, without such an inclusion the dialogue would end up being incomplete as the weight of historical events, repeated somewhat in modern days, still lingers very strongly and plays an important role in the island people's own memories.

Due to the unforgiving atrocities that occurred throughout Okinawa's historical memory<sup>96</sup> as well as the unfortunate events that have happened as a result of the U.S. military installations on Okinawa, citizens of Okinawa are much less likely to embrace militarization in the prefecture. This is a direct reading and analysis into Okinawa (the periphery)'s attitude towards military installments or normalization policies by Tokyo (the center) based on the historical memories or historical events that have occurred on the island that in turn make an impact on the overall center periphery relationship.

On the other hand, the central government in Tokyo that has not experienced a historical memory or happenings to the likes of Okinawa creates a possible explanation for the much less severe confrontations or dilemma to Japan's defense-security normalization. Also a reading into the center and center periphery relations but in the absence of as opposed to what has happened. With regards to the nature of peripheral relations, a controversial past versus a relatively shared and peaceful history can be concluded as making or breaking the peripheral relationship. It is, as we commonly

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<sup>96</sup> Saburo Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931-1945* (New York: Random House, 1978), 185.

understand the term, a dimension that reflects how the past was as we then interpret that understanding as part of how things are.

This dimension is rather interesting in that not only is history based on what we have commonly been known to associate the dimension with, that is factual evidence and events that have occurred in the past, but history is also simultaneously a notion that exists in the memory of the people living today in both the periphery and the center. And while the events and dates themselves matter greatly, how the history of a particular event in either periphery or center has evolved, been told, or interpreted also greatly changes the impact or influence this dimension may have on the nature of peripheral relations.

In the periphery, an analysis of the historical dimension would focus on not only what is known in the empirical or understood past, but also what the people or government of the periphery deem to be as being significant or important to their collective memory as well.

Guam, for instance, considers liberation day held every year in the form of a festival and parade as a remembrance of the deliverance of the island and the Chamorro people from the Japanese during the Second World War. This genre of commemoration, brought on by a member of the leadership in the local community<sup>97</sup> during that era, cements a historical moment of the past with a strong-lasting bond in the present as a modern day event or living memory that exists in the island people 'till this day.

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<sup>97</sup> Agueda Iglesias Johnston, founding member of Guam Women's Club, the Guam Fine Arts and Historical Society, amongst others; educator and civic leader.

In this instance, significant historical moments turned modern day memories, such as Guam's liberation day, do have a powerful impact on the historical dimension that in turn affects the peripheral relationship in a largely positive and reinforcing manner.

Not all historical moments can be or is made into annual parades or holidays and so forth. That is one example. Alternatively, if the periphery does choose to grant meaning or meanings to certain historical aspects of the periphery, then it is highly likely that it carries certain weight in influencing the nature of the peripheral relationship.

Whether or not this is a negative or positive influence depends on the nature of the historical event in question as well as how it is remembered in modern day. Either way, these are stepping stones of empirical evidence that can be collected relatively easily and used to gauge the historical foundations to the peripheral relationship that in turn gives a clearer view into the relationship dynamics itself.

In the center, such an analysis of history would be much harder to carry out without narrowing down, being specific and particular to the historical interactions between the periphery and the center alone.

It is also possible to look at both the historical dimensions of the center and periphery at the same time, certain notions that come into mind range from how the center and the periphery were introduced to one another, what the circumstances were in the initial stages, how have the developments in their relationship been as time passed, and where has that historical link taken the two parties to today, are all worthy of analysis as part of the historical dimension when looking into both parties in the center periphery relation.

Interestingly enough, there is a historical component that is related to the center and periphery yet not *of* the center and periphery. Particularly from the periphery's point of view, one would often take into consideration how the center has treated other peripheral entities in their history and from that perspective make a conclusion on how the periphery itself is being treated. For instance, Guam is not the only territory belonging to the United States; the United States is also in possession of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as well as other territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands. From the periphery's point of view, one could gauge the nature of center periphery relation's historical dimension by comparing how the center has treated other peripheries in the past with how the periphery is being treated in the present. Of course, this type of analysis is much more on tangent and indirect in contrast to the direct readings into center periphery relations alone but can prove to be useful in elaborating the dynamics to a center periphery's historical dimension.

History therefore, while complex with a lot of empirical depth and data, as a dimension is usually pretty straightforward in that it is what it is for the most part. While attitudes and perspectives may be different based on where you sit and where you stand, polls and interviews provide ample information to gauge different subjects and sentiments that are relevant in understanding the nature of peripheral relations by way of the historical dimension. Bringing together the center and periphery is not the only reason for this framework or this paper. At times, the ambition can be to highlight the differences that the center and periphery have, or where the peripheral relations are in the moment. That kind of analysis and understanding alone may be beneficial in processing or progressing other types of policy or plans. For instance, if it is well known that this

particular area in the periphery is extremely controversial for the center's perhaps military expansions, then if possible the most reasonable solution would be to find an alternative that is less controversial and at the same time remaining effective to the center's needs. In that situation, while there is no bridging of the two parties, at least highlighting the differences allows for impasse to be lifted and schedules to move forward.

Where does this historical dimension fit into the analytical framework? History should be considered as the foundations to understanding how the nature of peripheral relations came to be. It is a dimension that can be seen as very basic or an introduction into what is to come. And as such, is a very fundamental aspect of the peripheral relations and while it may not always be controversial or relevant it is important to know as a background knowledge to other dimensions that make up the nature of peripheral relations. And how does one put together this piece of the framework puzzle? Again, this is a dimension based on heavy empirical facts, literally following a timeline of events, dates, and occurrences will build a database for the framework to sit on and refine to based on other dimensions. Of course, if there were particular time frames or subjects, it would become easier and more targeted by looking at that particular date and perhaps forward and backwards enough to look at the entire picture.

### ***2.6.2 Culture***

Consciously separate from history, *culture*, as an aspect, is perhaps a bit more complex to evaluate in terms of the periphery and center. Different to the historical dimension, culture is often times considered to be a way of life or lifestyle that has evolved or developed based on a number of factors including but not limited to the local people, the surrounding environment, as well as the interactions between the center and

periphery. Culture is also often a matter of identity. It includes the languages that is spoken or shared, religious beliefs or shared spiritual practices, as well as a number of other identity markers that can prove to be either bonding or excruciating with regards to the center and periphery.

There are two instances that immediately come into mind when speaking of cultural differences becoming cultural clashes between two separate parties that remain part of a whole. For instance, the acts of reformation proclaimed by Henry VIII in 16th century England led to severe cultural clashes between Catholics and Protestants in the following centuries to come. That is an instance that shows differing cultural values could produce extremely difficult times for the weaker party involved. Another instance is a more modern example of Puerto Rico. The island is a periphery to the United States as a commonwealth yet removed enough in location and culture that for the most part Spanish is the most well-known and spoken language and English the lingua franca despite both languages being set as official languages. This kind of cultural distinction and separation can often times create more controversy than reconciliation. Namely that, while the Hispanic or Spanish-speaking community at large (i.e. Florida) may think very fondly of Puerto Rico, the center or Washington and the government at large may not have the same connection or fondness based on such a degree of difference. (There is ample evidence of discriminatory feelings based on the language that one speaks, in particular if it differs with the language that is spoken at large).

To narrow down and be more specific, what exactly is culture to center periphery relations and the nature of peripheral relations? If the historical dimension was the backbone to the center and periphery, then culture is the meat that holds everything

together. If the periphery and center share similar cultural values, such as religious or social norms, then it would be easier to operate dialogue and communication between the two. So, while history may serve to be the foundations to understandings of peripheral relations, culture serves to smooth or solidify engagements involving one another, such as dialogue and communication. Humans tend to be more bonding with each other when they do share common values or culture in this instance, and for instance the majority of Guamanians being Catholic and speaking English works well with Washington's military installations which can then share a common dialogue and traditions during say Christmas or Easter, and that kind of bond lessens the type of tensions or affairs that arises from say a U.S. military installation held to Tokyo (the center) then applied to Okinawa.

To the periphery, culture is often times the last thing that the local people can hold on to. It is quite often remembered of fondly before the attempts of the center to either assimilate or disregard of in favor of the center's own traditions and culture. It is simply closer to fact that more often than not the relationship between the center and the periphery is unbalanced. The center usually has far greater sway and influence over the periphery as the larger party with more of everything, but mostly in funds and in army. It is not always true, but for the most part holds. (For instance Catalonia should be considered as a periphery to the far northeast of Spain that has the notion of overfunding the central government as a fundamental reason for independence). More often than not, the center does have more control and influence over the periphery, which is why the periphery's original cultural values are often times at stake and are often times in need of protection and understanding. The periphery often times fears the removal of their own



cultural values in place of the center's in order to sustain a reasonable living or be accepted into the greater society or to move into positions of power.

Looking at the peripheries of this paper, Guam is such a periphery that it has always been affected strongly by the center. For the three hundred years that it served as a colony of Spain, the lasting effects were that the Chamorro language, its people, and cultural traditions have largely become in-tune with the Spanish. Catholicism, blood lineage, and way of life come to mind. Following the Japanese occupation and the current American influence over the unincorporated territory, the most spoken language is now English and the way of life has largely been built around the U.S. military if not tourism. So, Guam is a periphery that has to have her island's culture protected vis-à-vis the United States. On the other hand, Greenland is a periphery that is many times larger than the Kingdom of Denmark, likewise her raw resources far outweighs the Danish central government. Separate from Catalonia, however, Greenland's massive sizes is largely covered in ice and is far from inhabitable, and the local population is miniscule compared to the Danish population, thus also creating an uneven balance in center periphery relations and subsequently the culture and the nature of peripheral relations.

To the center, culture in the past was used to bring the periphery to order, usually by forcefully imposing the center's culture on the periphery and hopefully uniting the center and periphery as a unified entity. Or, a more mercantilist idea would be to disregard the periphery altogether and use the periphery's resources and people or location for its worth rather than understanding the periphery in any purposeful meaning. In modern days, however, this is less common as any subterfuge of the periphery by the center would face tremendous backlash in the international community at large. And with

most of the world discovered and globalizing at an incredible pace, the idea of keeping peripheries is much stronger than before. If the center can bring along cultural values that the periphery can appreciate and slowly through incentives or time allow the periphery to match up with the center, then the center would have less trouble in policy or plans. Hypothetically speaking, if the periphery is largely Buddhist and the center is largely Christian, then the idea of constructing a monumental cathedral on the island would be quite heinous and almost very surely to fail. However, if the periphery over time aligned herself with Christianity or even Catholicism, then plans of constructing the aforementioned monument or cathedral would seem much more likely to pass if not even welcomed by the local people. That is a great example of how culture, when sharing similar values, can bring together the center and periphery. Though, the nature of peripheral relations has to be determined in the beginning first before anything else can be considered.

Though interlinked with history, no doubt, culture often times may be confused with the historical dimension, as such where does culture fit into the framework? Culture serves as a more refined point of understanding into the analysis of the nature of peripheral relations. It allows for readers an understanding into what has happened between the center and periphery after certain dates, events, or occurrences. At the same time, culture provides a deeper understanding into the periphery by showing what sorts of lasting impacts and influences the center may or may not have on the periphery's people, the periphery's culture, and the periphery itself. It can also be used to understand how much power the center has over the periphery, but at the same time shows how much resisting power or assimilating power the periphery has vis-à-vis the center. There are

cases where the periphery has taken an aspect of the center, integrated itself for the most part with that aspect, and then commands a certain level of importance and respect based on that which did not exist before. Point in case, the island of Guam did not have military bases to the degree that the United States now has on the island (an air force, a naval base, and soon enough a command of marines). As time progressed, more and more Guamanian locals have decided to join the US military, be it for the incentives or for the cultural integration. As generational values pass on or simply as time progresses and the military becomes a much more cemented value and factor into island's culture and its people, the defense-security undertones of the island periphery, or the self-awareness of its strategic importance and self-sacrifice to the center at large creates more power to the periphery than it would have otherwise. Culture not only depends on the historical legacies left behind by colonizers of the periphery, but also in the willingness to continue cultural soft power from the center to the island-peripheries. As such, the difference of culture as originating from the periphery, however being transformed by the center, and therefore differing from history in the impact the dimension has in current and modern affairs of center periphery relations.

There are certain questions that must be asked in order to create transparency and clarity to the analytical framework, in particular dimensions that are closely intertwined as culture and history often can be. How do we understand culture as part of the nature of peripheral relations? How do we understand this dimension in the overall puzzle? We look to the cultural commonalities and differences that exist in the current relationship between the center and periphery. We then think of why these differences or similarities exist and to what extent do they exist. Subsequently, and as it pertains to the subject or

policy/plan at hand, how much of an influence or importance does such a dimension play into center periphery relations? These are all different ways to incorporate culture as a dimension into the nature of peripheral relations.

Culture is at times thought of as a subject that brings into mind the controversial ideas of cultural assimilation or appropriation usually by or from the center. However, if the modern day culture in the periphery has been assimilated to a certain point where reconciliation at-large has taken place and no longer affects short and long term affairs, then culture can be regarded as a redeeming factor beneficial to the overarching peripheral relationship.

As mentioned before, Guam is an exemplary case study to examine center periphery relations. Despite the island territory being a largely Spanish overseas colony for hundreds of years<sup>98</sup>, as well as suffering through immense tragedy in World War II<sup>99</sup>, the incorporation of a Guam Guard (U.S. military)<sup>100</sup> and subsequent American-culturalization has ebbed the flow of animosity and created a largely patriotic and harmonious local-society in tune with the center.<sup>101</sup> That in it of itself has allowed for a much smoother transition in the push for security initiatives; feelings of belonging largely ride deeper with the Guamanian or Chamorro people than say with the Okinawans to the Japanese. Culture, in areas where history remains difficult, is an answer and alternative solution in relationship building that allows future and present generations that vital sense of identity despite troubled pasts. However, culture is not created instantaneously, it may

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<sup>98</sup> Patricia L.G. Taimanglo, "The Chamorro People of Guam," *American Psychological Association (Communiqué)*, August 2010.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Capt. Ken Ola, "Guam Guard's First Adjutant General Dies," *National Guard*, January 23, 2012.

<sup>101</sup> Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, "Guam's Future Political Status," *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* Vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 138, 147.

take several years at minimum before a real impact to the center periphery relationship may be felt on either end. That said, over a period of decades, which is relatively short in the grand scheme of things, noticeable changes in attitude towards each other can be empirically seen. For instance, as a very sizable number of younger next generation Guamanians or Chamorros enlist in the United States military, the influence of military culture or even perhaps American culture will grow stronger comparatively to a population that does not have that exposure or militarization.

### **2.6.3 Governance**

One of the most critical dimensions to the center periphery relationship, *governance* or the type of government that the peripheral entity holds is key to what type of relationship and with what powers she can function on. What does governance actually mean? Governance implies a way of governing or a form of government. And why is it such a critical factor in understanding the natural relationship between the center and periphery? This is because governance is one dimension that is very close to being an absolute aspect in peripheral relations.

To understand governance is to understand autonomy in the legal sense. "Autonomy is understood to refer to independence of action on the internal or domestic level, as foreign affairs and defense normally are in the hands of the central or national government, but occasionally power to conclude international agreements concerning cultural or economic matters also may reside with the autonomous entity."<sup>102</sup>

In addition, "'typical' arrangement probably could be represented by a locally selected chief executive, responsible politically to the local electorate or legislature rather

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<sup>102</sup> Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 74, no. 4 (Oct., 1980): p. 860.

than to the central authorities, with separate national or concurrent local/national administration of national laws applicable to the autonomous territory. This description would apply, for example, to the U.S. territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Cook Islands and Niue, and the former International Settlement of Shanghai (although late in its history Shanghai did begin to enforce certain Chinese tax laws applicable to Chinese residents of the settlement)."<sup>103</sup>

In terms of power,

"(1) residual powers: is the local legislature one of general powers, restricted only by specific grants of authority to the principal entity, or does it enjoy limited, enumerated authority subject to the reserved or residual powers of the principal or sovereign state?

(2) veto powers: does the central or sovereign government retain either a legislative or executive veto over local enactments?

(3) constitutional amendment: may the local entity independently amend its own constitution or basic constituent laws or is the amending process subject to the approval of the ultimate sovereign?"<sup>104</sup>

Returning to autonomy, "It must be remembered that autonomy is not a term of art or a concept that has a generally accepted definition in international law. While the degree of autonomy or self-government enjoyed by a territory often has been utilized by international legal scholars to determine in which category of special sovereignty or dependency-protectorate, vassal state, dependent state, colony, associated state, or other category-a territory should be placed, these categories often are overlapping and frequently subject to scholarly disagreement. Thus, autonomy is a relative term that describes the extent or degree of independence of a particular entity rather than defining a

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 863.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 866.

particular minimum level of independence that can be designated as the status of 'autonomy.'<sup>105</sup>

Largely, the center is already long established in the way it governs so the emphasis here will be placed on the periphery. What is meant by absolute aspect is that there has to be legal documents or acts and laws that were passed and enacted to create a government or a form of governing. As such, it is easier to identify, understand, and verify as well as being quite traceable and transparent. (The only scenarios where this may not be the case are peripheries that are written in ways where the governance of the periphery is only on paper when in fact the real law of the land may be in some other shape or form. South East Asia, for example, comes into mind as countries such as Indonesia or the Philippines have a center that must deal with so many outlying islands that it may be hard to implement laws or acts that have been agreed on in far reach lands without martial law or the presence of the military.)

In the application of autonomy to the dimension of governance, in center periphery relations the notion usually signifies a form of legal mandate or establishment of rule of law in the periphery by the center. Or, it may be the case that the periphery has fought for or negotiated from the central government. Thus, in the nature of peripheral relations if the historical dimension acts as a backbone and culture as the embodiment of those relations, then governance is the attire that dictates how the periphery may or may not behave (or appear) and in what manner or in what capacity it may hold on to vis-à-vis the central government at large. If it is handed a uniform that implies being a butler than that is usually what the periphery is limited to. If, on the other hand, the periphery is handed free reign over itself and allowed to choose its own powers or relationship to the

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 885.

center, then the periphery has more options and more range in the way it wants to appear to itself and to the center.

In the United States, "the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions collectively known as the Insular Cases—that interceded to settle the protracted political feud. What is most striking about this episode in constitutional history is that the Court's intervention brought closure to a volatile national debate implicating international affairs and foreign treaties--matters in which courts were expected not to meddle--without provoking significant public backlash or damaging the Court's institutional credibility."<sup>106</sup>

In the periphery, the governance dimension is the legal settings or legal powers it has to form a government and ability to function for the local people, the local environment, and the local lands. In the Guam case study this dimension appears as the Organic Act passed by the Congress of the United States (or center) and essentially establishes a government of the people. However, subsequent powers or details to the democratic institution were achieved by the peripheral powers own methods. Here, the reference is to the legislatures' en masse walkout initiated by the then Guam Assembly which eventually led to greater powers that manifested in a form of self-government, the United States citizenship, and other forms of self-power that was not freely available during the island's jurisdiction under the United States' Navy and Department of Interior. In the Greenland case study, this dimension appears in multiple stages from the Home Rule Act of 1979 that gave the periphery limited powers to the Self-Rule Act of 2009 that gave even more powers including assuming responsibility for her own judicial affairs, natural resources, and policing powers.

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<sup>106</sup> Krishanti Vignarajah, "The Political Roots of Judicial Legitimacy: Explaining the Enduring Validity of the Insular Cases," *The University of Chicago Law Review* Vol. 77, no. 2 (Spring 2010): p. 781.



In the center, governance as a dimension can be seen as how much power the center is willing to hand-off to the periphery. Most of the time, the periphery starts out as a colony in various forms where direct rule was applied vis-à-vis the center. Only in modern times has the idea of governance been more profound and more applicable to the center periphery relationship. Whether it is in Denmark or the United States, the way the laws or acts are written usually reserves some form of power to the center in cases of emergency or in cases of extreme manner. As such, while the center may be allowing the periphery various forms of self-governance, this is usually done in the belief that there is a need to have a different form of governance from the direct rule that was once applicable to colonies. This belief may be rooted in the fact that the periphery has slowly become self-aware or self-capable of its own abilities, strategy, or resources, and thus in the long-term having a mutually respectable and mutually beneficial center periphery relationship may be the motive for change. Other times, the belief may be that without certain incentives or certain change, the periphery becomes too difficult to manage without creating international condemnation or hurting the center (backfiring) in the perhaps immediate to long run.

In the framework analysis, governance allows the reader to understand not only the natural relationship but to understand how it actually functions as a system. How does the periphery maintain itself as an entity and how does it act in relations with the center. All of these understandings are essential to forming a correct analysis or diagnoses to which policies or plans may or may not be applied to the periphery by the center, assuming the center has particular plans or functions for the periphery in the future. Governance gives a clear picture to the rule of law, to what is plausible in and around the

relationship and what options there are for enforcing certain actions or what the consequences of inactions may be.

Essentially, it can be seen as the hand that you're dealt with (in terms of cards). From an autonomous country in a Kingdom (i.e. Greenland) to an unincorporated territory (i.e. Guam), the various types of governance spells out the different types of leverage that a periphery has when in talks with the center regarding the management of her political or security situation.

Again, being mindful that while it may seem that the type of governance or governing relationship between the center and periphery is set in stone (as changes are usually minor with the basic structure being intact for relatively long periods of time), the type of governance can change if there is enough political will by the people in the periphery or alternatively by a high-level judicial body; the Greenland Home Rule Act of 2009 that provided an immense amount of governing powers is one example with the Insular Cases in the United States being another in the opposite direction.

Most of the time, a legislative body or legislative piece such as the United States Congress or Organic Act, in the case of Guam, decides the type of governance the periphery will have vis-à-vis the center. At times, governance may overlap with the historical aspect to a peripheral relationship as many of these peripheral powers are often intertwined with complex wartime histories, bounded by certain treaties or the negotiations of then.

One has to understand, that while the various aspects of center periphery relations may or may not be similar, overlap, or even contradict one another, this framework works by allowing the analyzer, reader, or audience the opportunity to connect the dots/see the

larger picture for themselves by actively distinguishing and focusing on one aspect over another *after* taking a look at the whole or at least a larger whole than would have been otherwise. Only then will this framework serve to be useful and with purpose if not it will seem like a whole lot of work that is tremendous in itself but for nothing without aim.

The framework is meant to be built upon, to be more progressive and inclusive all at the same time, in a way not so different from an encyclopedia or dictionary, where you have tremendous amounts of information but only call upon that which you need in the right time and place. With this framework, it is similar except that the range can be limited to the subject or case study, thereby narrowing the scope, without losing the vital expertise for each segment or aspect, as the data will be highly specialized to the particular subject/intent/case study in question.

Going back, while a peripheral relationship is largely based on the type of governance that it currently has. Equally important, however, is the possibility of movement within the types of governance.

For instance, whilst entities such as the territory of Guam may remain in political status quo due to current deadlocks between statehood, free association, or independence, or simply the indecision of the United States Congress to act, i.e. Puerto Rico, others such as Greenland are making progress towards a self-sustainable economic and security-defense situation that may eventually lead to full-independence. As such, the future prospects of governance within the periphery impact the well being of the peripheral relationship as well. By and large, the influence of governing powers associated with or entrusted to the periphery can heavily sway the direction, weight, and even worth of a peripheral relationship.

#### ***2.6.4 Natural Resources and Industries***

In the periphery, natural resources and industries, including minerals, gas, oil, tourism, the military and so forth (listed in-detail in earlier chapters as well as in future chapters) are all critical factors that influence the amount of leverage a peripheral entity has in negotiations between the center and periphery.

What we commonly understand as natural resources are resources that are available in or around the periphery's immediate natural environment. For example, raw resources such as minerals, gas, and oil are extremely valuable and viable natural resources that would catapult a periphery's standings with the center. Other natural resources may include anything from the available fishing opportunities to the amount of forestry or timber around the periphery. All of which provide a different source of livelihood and lifestyle to parties concerned. Industries are a bit trickier to understand in that certain industries are only viable after a tremendous amount of development and active pursuit is initiated. Following the Second World War it would seem quite delusional to outright state that the US territory of Guam be named a top tourist location for members of the Far East. However, after progressive development in the local territory, the tourism industry has now grown into the alternative mainstream industry aside from the US military. Other areas such as Hong Kong were also invisible to certain industries until active development and engagement by their centers. If it were not for the initial spread of English as lingua franca and the pursuit of the ports of Hong Kong as a global hub by the United Kingdom, the following industries in banking, trade, and economic development would perhaps have not materialized in the manner that it did between the mid-1950s to the 1990s. Thus, industry is the possibility of a viable source of

revenue or livelihood that is actively pursued or engaged upon by the center in the periphery for specific purposes.

Greenland's source of power is rooted in referendums based on natural resource utilization and freedoms, which follow precedence, and many experts have asserted that with time and technological advances the natural resources will allow Greenland to be able to move towards independence with a form of agreement with Denmark as the center appears to not disagree with such a move (as apparent in the approval of the first two referendums, and popular vote/political will/majority moving towards more autonomy) very similar to Palau and the United States.<sup>107</sup> While the dependence of the periphery to the center remains in being heavily subsidized both economically and in security, by the center, if the strategic value or even the natural resource value of Greenland were not massive, Denmark would not be giving way in as we have seen, Portugal and the Azores is a clear situation where the periphery has lost power due to the American bases removal from the island and the island going nowhere in terms of autonomy instead transforming itself into a tourism-based periphery.<sup>108</sup>

In terms of the center periphery relations or more specifically the nature of peripheral relations as defined in this dissertation, natural resources or industries as dimensions can be understood as another more refined stage above the historical (backbone), the cultural (the body), and the governance (the attire) being closer to the accessories that the periphery possesses to decorate itself with. Whether or not the periphery has these natural resources (or even strategic value) or certain viable industries

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<sup>107</sup> "U.S. Relations With Palau", U.S. Department of State, August 14, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-palau/>.

<sup>108</sup> Matt Meltzer, "The European Island Paradise That American Tourists Have Yet To Discover", Thrillist, October 15, 2018, <https://www.thrillist.com/travel/nation/visiting-the-azores-islands>, (accessed 2019).

is almost equivalent to how able the periphery is able to provide itself beyond just the clothes on its back. Again, just an analogy but an analogy that provides context in case the content appears to be difficult to understand. To the nature of peripheral relations it provides a certain attractiveness aspect to the periphery that the center may or may not consider valuable to its own agenda and liking. The higher the number of available natural resources or possible industries the higher the attractiveness a periphery becomes for the center. Likewise, as the attractiveness aspect is raised the ability of the periphery to negotiate for its own agenda increases as well. Though this is not a dimension on attractiveness, rather the availability of natural resources or industries signify how attractive the periphery or how important the periphery may be vis-à-vis the center and thus the ability of the periphery to utilize as a source of power in its natural relationship.

While the understandings of this dimension in the periphery is quite similar to the understandings of what natural resources or industries are as explained above, when examined vis-à-vis the center becomes an entirely different picture. For the periphery, the center's available industries play a much larger role than natural resources would. For example, if the people of Greenland were educated under the Danish system and seek to find livelihood in government agencies or the private sector, these mature industries may be more readily available in Copenhagen as opposed to on Greenland itself. Similarly, in the vast lands that constitute the United States, to the people of Guam it is a land of opportunity for sectors or industries that would not be viable or readily available on the island itself. Thus, the center's attractiveness to the periphery may be in this instance strongly different than in previous dimensions where the emphasis is usually placed on the periphery or the center's notions on the periphery. Here, we have a situation where the

periphery and the center may share an equal notion of power and opportunity for each other, although it is mostly the case that it is far more difficult for those in the periphery to attain equal opportunities in the center rather than vice versa given the basic costs to transportation, environment, and so forth.

As part of the framework, natural resources or industries can be seen as an entry point into what possible contentions or frictions may arise between the center and periphery. Usually, it is differing opinions on how natural resources should be used or how certain industries may be developed that lead to fractures between the center and periphery. As such, it is a good measure for analysts to consider the possible resources and industries that pertain to the center and periphery and whether or not this compiled list plays a role in center periphery relations that would otherwise not have created issues in policy or plans. Once we understand how the center and periphery were established to each other (in history), and we understand how the center and periphery interact (by culture), and to what extent the interaction may evolve or devolve (in governance), we can then determine whether or not there would be areas of contention or differing opinions as natural resources and industries come into play.

Ultimately, the evaluation of this dimension can be seen as a judgment on whether the peripheral entity can be self-sustaining<sup>109</sup> in the present or could become self-sustainable in the future. If either possibility exists, then the peripheral relationship could be greatly influenced or broken (from the center). If not, then dependency on the center for survival becomes an inherent addiction forcing the periphery to adapt to the needs of the center rather than the other way around.

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<sup>109</sup> Here, self-sustaining refers to the ability of a peripheral entity in running a stand-alone economy based on available natural resources, aforementioned, rather than monetary subsidies from the center.

### **2.6.5 Defense-Security**

Arguably the most vital of all five dimensions<sup>110</sup> is similarly the most complex. Under the pretense of security, sometimes, the center is allowed incredible freedoms and powers in achieving its aims through rather creative or intelligent manners<sup>111</sup>—which is why security to be understood can be rather complex.

How does defense security pertain to the center periphery relationship/the nature of peripheral relations? Defense security as commonly understood is the safety of a particular area, a particular people, or even particular values, institutions, and even strategies and designs. Usually, security is provided by the central government because it is legally mandated to the center. Such as in the United States, the ability to have a military or force that implements the rule of law is vested in the federal government and any such application of the rule of law is passed by the federal government to the state and lower levels of government. In our Greenland case study, the ability or jurisdiction of policing was only handed off to the periphery by the center when the Self Rule Act of 2009 passed into law. Likewise, in the Guam case study, the US military presence in the form of THAAD or the Anderson Air Force Base or Apra Naval Base is a sole jurisdiction of the US Department of Defense that serves the greater strategic or security needs of the United States (the center) and by extension Guam (or the periphery). Thus, the notion of security is the ideational versus material application of armed forces in protecting the island, the people on the island, and what the island may represent to the central government at large.

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<sup>110</sup> As natural resources and industries are highly interlinked, the two are unless otherwise noted seen as one dimension for the purposes of this paper.

<sup>111</sup> National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress; Chapter 343, 1st Session; S. 758; Catherine Lutz, "US Military Bases on Guam in Global Perspective," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 30 (2010): 3-10.



Now, where does security fit into the entire center periphery picture? What role does it take on in the nature of peripheral relations? Be it Greenland's seat in the Arctic Council or Guam's strategic location for the United States in the Asia-Pacific, security is a justification for a jurisdiction implementing a strategy of defense and military arms to protect the interests of the center at large. So it provides reasoning to protect the periphery or the center by extension.

In the periphery, the notion of security is very much a necessity if there are other larger players that may be capable of causing harm to the periphery. For instance, in recent rhetoric from North Korea to Guam, the words spoken by the North Korean leader causes alarm for the island's government and people as to what the center can do to protect the periphery in situations that are perhaps beyond its own control and powers. However, the flip side to this security situation is that there are many advocates whom suggest that without the center's undue attention and grand strategies that the periphery itself would not become a physical or even theoretical target for other larger players. In other words, there are those who argue that it is quite the opposite that the more the center's strategies or plans fall into policy and planning, only then does the security risk appear.

To the center, the idea of security is usually for the larger nation-state as a whole. Point in case, Guam is part of the line of defense for the United States proper as well as a way for the United States to gauge the Asia-Pacific in terms of aiding allies or commanding a presence in the region. In addition, the ability to have the periphery being part of the greater nation at large means that there is usually very little need to negotiate with host nations in contrast to a situation like the Philippines where after Manila was

able to achieve independence they became able to negotiate with the United States on whether or not they wanted the US military presence at all. With a situation such as Greenland or Guam, the physical securities of both peripheries lie in the defense and foreign affairs of the center rather than in the periphery, in legal jurisdiction and in reality.

"During the Cold War, island bases in Okinawa, post-independence Philippines (the Clark air base and Subic Bay naval base), and Guam anchored a Washington centered security architecture designed to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansionism."<sup>112</sup>

While, "island bases on non-sovereign US territories (US colonies) have proved to be much more secure in political terms than those dependent upon the consent of a foreign government."<sup>113</sup>

Whereas in the beginning we started with basic understandings of the center and periphery, further refined by how the center and periphery interact, to the various forms of governance and resources that the periphery has, security provides a logical reasoning behind why the center and periphery relationship exists or why the nature of peripheral relations may be the way they are. Security creates purpose for the center to the periphery, and to opponents of the center's security risks a reason for why the periphery is being highlighted as a target while for proponents a justification for the center's protection of the periphery from the surrounding environment at large. In the Greenland case study, securitizing Greenland's natural resources or the different trade routes as well as the Arctic Council seat signifies a vested interest by the Kingdom of Denmark in

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<sup>112</sup> Peter Harris, "Environmental Protection as International Security: Conserving the Pentagon's Island Bases in the Asia-Pacific," *International Journal* Vol. 69, no. 3 (September 2014): 382.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 384.

securing those assets as well as the well being of Greenland and her people at the same time. Likewise, in the Guam case study securitizing the strategic location of the island symbolizes the United States' necessities in being a commanding presence as a hegemon and global player by having nuclear or defense-security presence in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, for the center (the US Department of Defense) a commanding presence in the periphery could reassure nearby allies of the United States as a serious and reliable player for strategic and economic dialogue as there are many cases where in South Korea or in the South China Sea the United States has sent military forces to showcase its commitments towards allied players in the region and vice versa to parties it disagrees with the ability to be a deterrent to any possible intrusion on the center's grand strategies.

While it is a coincidence that both case studies happen to be island peripheries, it is no coincidence that "off-shore islands historically have been of greater strategic than economic interest to continental powers."<sup>114</sup> Even in the case of Greenland, while it can be argued that the vast amounts of natural resources it possesses may appear to be of more value economically rather than strategically. If Denmark were to lose her periphery, then she would also arguably lose a seat at the Arctic Council as well as becoming secluded from the Arctic region entirely perhaps.

In both Greenland and Guam we have seen instances where the idea that "the heartland of an ethnic minority is expropriated in the name of national security"<sup>115</sup> could not be closer to the truth. In the name of national security, how much land should be taken and for what purpose has always been a decision largely made one-sidedly by the

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<sup>114</sup> Paul Claesson, "Continental Hegemony and the Geopolitics of Island Basing: A Preliminary Approach to Ethnic Identification and Political Mobilization in Militarized Island Communities," *Scandia* Vol. 54, no. 1 (1988): 88.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

center and for the center with little regard to those it affects. The same is true with Okinawa and Japan, particularly as it deals with toxic waste issues. Interestingly enough, the environmental, cultural, or heritage component to the subjects of interest (military buildup or resource allocations) may currently be the strongest legal power for the periphery in preventing the center from imposing its will on the peripheral government. Though, I digress for now.

Security, from the center's perspective (although frequently in cohesion with the periphery), will be split into two distinguishable segments. Security that focuses on the psychological concerns in strategy and power, and security that is embodied in the physical realizations of the military, such as bases or artillery, which serve from the periphery in question. Greenland, for instance, may be important geopolitically to the Arctic Circle, particularly to Denmark; however, the amount of foreign and domestic military stationed on the landmass itself is not equivalent to what it should be based on geographical size and strategic value (for instance, to Denmark or the U.S.)—as in a strong conceptualized security that may pale in comparison in actuality.

However unlikely or perhaps likely in light of recent events, certain hypotheticals such as Russia or China acting assertively or aggressively in their respective regions, would, for instance, compel the United States or Japan to significantly alter the peripheral relationship so that the probable first points of contact can meet state (center) security needs. Quite frequently, the *raison d'être* of a periphery in a strategically significant location *is* to provide for the theoretical and actual security of the center and state at-large. As a result, in the decision-making process vis-à-vis the periphery, security concerns *are* sometimes the end-all be-all.

Although situational and varying case-by-case, the distinct aspects presented above illustrate the basics to the complexity behind understanding the natural peripheral relationship—an understanding that will subsequently shape the strategic blueprints to follow.

## **2.7 Summary**

To summarize, this chapter has provided readers with a fundamental understanding into what constitutes as intrastate center periphery relations at large. It has also suggested that the five areas, namely *history*, *culture*, *governance*, *natural resources and industries*, and *security* as dimensions are indicative and suggestive of where power originates from (though stops just short of asserting a direct causal link) that form the analytical framework with which to take apart or put together different issues.

With the aforementioned in mind, the dissertation is able to test out specific areas of concern relevant to both the center and peripheral cases, in Greenland the resource management issue and on Guam the issue of the military buildup, using the laid out framework to examine whether or not the original framework or the purpose and aim of this dissertation--that the framework is mutually beneficial to the center and periphery and fosters better understanding and movement in policy matters in center periphery relations than would otherwise if worked out without this framework.

If this framework was taken apart, it would not make the same sense as it would in cohesion and create that analytical impact as it does when put together.

First, the individual processes then analyzes certain empirical data through the multiple aspects of the peripheral relationship into qualitative research, then the specialization of that research is then subject to further analysis into useful and

meaningful interpretations vis-à-vis issue and intent, and finally putting it all together into a workable timetable in terms of urgency for short-mid-long term attention bringing together an intensive yet workable framework to find solutions to the issues between the center and periphery; one that works well between the center periphery because it is custom made to the unique concerns and background that surrounds center periphery relations.

## **Chapter 3. Arctic Case Study - Greenland**

### **3.1 The 'Peripheral' Relationship - Overview**

For the purposes of this dissertation, "the Arctic" shall be defined using the structure provided by the Arctic Council, stating the Arctic as,

[...] the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66 degrees 32'N), and north of 62 degrees N in Asia and 60 degrees N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea.<sup>116</sup>

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Considered an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland, or Kalaallit Nunaat in the Greenlandic language, is the periphery of Denmark in the High North<sup>117</sup> with which Copenhagen, the Danish capital, lays claim to the Arctic.

Via Greenland, Denmark is attributed a seat in the high-level inter-governmental institution that is the Arctic Council. However, "it should be noted that traditionally neither the Danish public nor its politicians have ever seen Greenland as a priority."<sup>118</sup>

As one of the only multi-lateral institutions for those concerned with the Arctic, the Arctic Council, established in 1996, is perhaps the most significant forum for parties interested in the Arctic outside of direct bilateral relations with Arctic members.

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<sup>116</sup> Ronald O' Rourke, "Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service* CRS Report for Congress (2017): 3.

<sup>117</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 10.

<sup>118</sup> Mark Auchet. "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66 No. 4, (2011): 959.

It is this special center periphery relationship with Greenland, which Copenhagen has, that allows Denmark's involvement in the High North despite being geographically located in continental Europe.

Geographically, the island country is 2,166,086 km<sup>2</sup> in size, a periphery nearly half of the European Union or roughly a fourth of the United States.<sup>119</sup> Though, it is important to note that while Greenland is the largest island in the world, as only Australia is considered an island-continent by most, only 19% is ice-free.<sup>120</sup> With "Greenland's geographic distance from the rest of Denmark and the history of their relations are of course important elements in this story. However, the interest shown in the Arctic by such great powers as the United States, Russia, and China, as well as by the European Union, combined with the new Greenlandic government's increased activity, is putting pressure on Denmark to come up with a more forceful strategy in the area."<sup>121</sup>

In addition, the local population is noticeably low at approximately 56,000 people, with 88% constituting those of Greenlandic-ancestry with the remainder composed of Danish or other Europeans and so forth.<sup>122</sup>

Therefore it is astonishing, in terms of world affairs, that Greenland was capable of attaining home-rule autonomy in 1979<sup>123</sup> and further expanded self-rule in 2009<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 10.

<sup>120</sup> "Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic", Government of Greenland, <https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Departments/Udenrigsanliggende/Kongerigets-Arktiske-Strategi>

<sup>121</sup> Mark Auchet. "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66 No. 4, (2011): 959.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Prime Minister's Office, *The Greenland Home Rule Act*, Christiansborg: (Publisher?) November 1978, [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_12712.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html)

<sup>124</sup> Danish Parliament, *Act on Greenland Self-Government*, Amalienborg: (Publisher?) June 2009, <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Engelske-tekster/Act%20on%20Greenland.pdf>



from her center, despite the population numbers or viable land to be had; Copenhagen, though, remains largely responsible for foreign, defense, and security affairs of the island.

In terms of the more important sea routes and lanes, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) "covers all routes across the Russian Arctic coastal seas from Kara Gates (Novaya Zemlya) to the Bering Strait"<sup>125</sup>, while a second route is "the Northwest Passage (NWP)...referring to the maritime routes that span the straits and sounds of the Canadian Arctic archipelago along the Northern coast of North America between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans."<sup>126</sup> As climate change influences the Arctic, ice coverage no doubt will continue to decrease during the warmest of seasons. As a result, "an alternative route could be the 'trans-polar route' that runs straight across the Arctic Ocean, without involving passage in either Canadian or Russian territorial waters (though entry and exit to the Arctic Ocean would still be through the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the U.S./Russia in the Bering Strait or Canada/Greenland/Norway on the Atlantic side."<sup>127</sup> Considering that the region relies heavily on sea routes and lanes, it is important early on to identify and distinguish between currently viable routes as well as future possible routes in further analysis. As mentioned above, these would be the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the alternative 'trans-polar' route.

If all is seemingly on a certain well known, though a bit optimistic, trajectory towards full autonomy or independence, why then the sudden intense interest in Greenland's peripheral relationship?

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<sup>125</sup> Henrik Ringbom, "The European Union and Arctic Shipping," *The European Union and the Arctic* (Brill, 2017), 247.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

Clearly, observed phenomena such as climate change has been increasingly creating an impact in the Arctic, or at least fueling substantial public discourse. As well as Russia's activities in Crimea and the Eastern European region has sparked defense security concerns in Northern Europe, particularly Sweden and Norway, though the Danish realm is commonly associated with Northern Europe as a whole.

Nonetheless, misunderstandings between the center and periphery on more particular and recent subjects such as industrial, mining, and resource licenses by Greenland to foreign parties, or labor visa issues between the Danish government and the Greenlandic government are specific concerns that have been brought forth to the immediate spotlight, the denial of labor visas are in part associated with defense security issues.

Likewise, Greenland's future in terms of self-determination or itself as a political entity has also been a long-term and immediate concern, indicating that while Greenland may be a high-ranking periphery in the peripheral power spectrum, due to the periphery's position in the domestic hierarchy and legal-power granted by the vote on referendums, it may not be able to achieve what it wants or receive concessions in her favor on the counts of constitutional legal boundaries or due to certain defense-security matters superseding concerns on development, the environment, or culture.

As a case study, this particular peripheral relationship is highly valuable to this work in consideration and in contrast to the Asia-Pacific Guam case as each periphery is a case on opposite ends of the analytical framework discussed previously in chapter three.

Greenland, or the former, is a substantially more powerful periphery than the latter on almost all counts, particularly in natural resources, sheer size, legitimacy in governance, political will, and direct representation.

Similarly, the Greenland case study does examine particular subjects of interest, i.e. licensing and labor, with the intent to argue whether Greenland does or does not have more leeway with the central government given its peripheral status and strategic location, or whether none of this matters as the framework may illustrate restrictions that certain dimensions have in binding Greenland's powers despite being markedly high as a peripheral power vis-à-vis the central government examined through the dissertation's framework.

As a result, there is an absolute need to look into the nature of Greenland's peripheral relationship, Copenhagen and Greenland's perspectives on the subjects of licensing and labor, as well as the inferences of such matters to power and policy in order to understand more fully the analytical framework in application and to the nature of peripheral relations itself.

## **3.2 Center-Periphery Relations**

The nature of peripheral relations between Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, as observed vis-à-vis the aforesaid dimensions, is as follows:

### ***3.2.1 History***

Amongst the expeditions early on, Eric the Red, a Norwegian Viking, is perhaps most notable given that he named the island Greenland back in 982 CE (Common Era). Norway did consider Greenland a crown dependency by 1261; however, during the 1600s the last Norwegian settlements were gone, leaving only the local Inuit population. By

1721, the first Danish settlements appeared and as a Danish monopoly of the island grew Norway relinquished her rights with the Treaty of Kiel (1814).<sup>128</sup>

Fast-forward to the mid-1900s, Denmark becomes occupied by Nazi Germany in the Second World War while Greenland is cut off from her center, leaving the United States assuming power and control; as "Denmark lost contact with Greenland due to the German occupation, the US [began] show[ing] interest in placing military bases around the island."<sup>129</sup>

Under the occupation of Germany, "the US government considered that the government of Denmark was 'not in a position to exercise sovereign power over Greenland'...allow[ing] Washington to deal with Kauffmann [then Danish ambassador to the United States] and the governors of Greenland without going through Copenhagen"<sup>130</sup> or the Realm, as the Kingdom of Denmark likes to refer to itself, directly.

While almost entirely *sui generis*, it is important to note that, in the signing of a treaty regarding Greenland's defense in 1941, "the US respected the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland and...Kauffman was designated as 'acting on behalf of His Majesty the King of Denmark in His capacity as Sovereign of Greenland [whose authorities in Greenland have concurred therein].'"<sup>131</sup>

This may seem confusing and contrary at first, but if one separates the statements into two specific parts, everything becomes much more transparent and far more

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<sup>128</sup> "The Peace Treaty of Kiel", The Royal House of Norway, <https://www.royalcourt.no/artikkel.html?tid=30100> (accessed 2019)

<sup>129</sup> Maria Ackren and Uffe Jakobsen, "Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives," *Polar Record* Vol. 51, no. 259 (2015): 405.

<sup>130</sup> Clive Archer, "Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence: New Two-Level Negotiations?," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 38, no. 2 (2003): 129.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

transparent on the United States' intent and the power Greenland had at that time in relations with Denmark. With the first statement, the United States' consideration over Copenhagen not being in the position to exercise sovereign power over Greenland is mostly a reference to the occupation of Denmark by then Nazi Germany, but ties in fairly well with the United States' wishes to set-up a military capacity in the Greenlandic territory.

Then, in the second statement, being in wartime and wanting to receive more legitimacy in Greenland, the United States' recognition of Ambassador Kauffmann diplomatic status serves strictly for the purposes of signing the defense treaty regarding Greenland. As a result, there were many unilateral decisions and movements by the United States in Denmark's periphery, despite the Danish government repudiating such a decision, with the US seeing Kauffmann as with credentials yet without full authorizing powers by His Majesty the King.<sup>132</sup>

In other words, the United States can almost be considered an intervening or at least influencing player to center periphery relations at this point.

As the central government's repudiation came, the Danish ambassador Kauffmann (to the United States) declared the central government in Copenhagen no longer with power to order decisions as it was being held under Nazi Germany. Therefore, subsequent legal matters or rather complications grew exponentially, the Danish government in Copenhagen decided that Kauffmann (though with local Greenlandic approval and agreement, the periphery's consent) acted out of line and was therefore stripped of rank and considered for high treason. It was not until the Liberation of

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<sup>132</sup> Christian Wenande, "In the name of the king or traitor to the crown?", *CHP Post*, March 5th, 2018, <http://cphpost.dk/history/in-the-name-of-the-king-or-traitor-to-the-crown.html> (accessed 2019).

Denmark in 1945 that Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann's charge was revoked and the ambassador appointed a Minister without Portfolio in the future Cabinet.<sup>133</sup>

Now, where exactly do these preliminary to precise moments in historical occurrences fit into the history dimension to guide the framework and understanding of the nature of peripheral relations?

While this is an extremely well-known, fascinating, and distinct historical moment in the U.S.-Greenland-Denmark relationship, it is otherwise unsuitable as a specific sub-subject case study since there were simply too many different confounding factors, special circumstances, and outside parties that would deviate from a representational center periphery situation as presented in modern international affairs.

And, while deviating for details unrelated to the framework's analysis of center periphery relations, the incident certainly is a defining moment in center periphery relations between Greenland and Denmark and definitely a part of the historical dimension; the historical moments set precedent where none had existed before in Greenland as a periphery.

Prior to the Second World War, "The Arctic [really] was more or less a military vacuum"<sup>134</sup>, not that military engagements are the only significant aspects to the historical dimension, but rather the historical dimension often provides much depth and clarity into the nature of peripheral relations.

After the Second World War, the United States returned Greenland to Denmark with the condition of island base operations for the US and NATO, otherwise known as

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Maria Ackren and Uffe Jakobsen, "Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives," *Polar Record* Vol. 51, no. 259 (2015): 404.

the legal basis for Thule Air Base today. Statistically, "by the end of the war (1941-1945) the US had established 13 army bases or 'bluies' and 4 navy bases in Greenland."<sup>135</sup>

In addition, the United States considered "Greenland [to be] within the area embraced by the Monroe Doctrine"<sup>136</sup> otherwise meaning that the actions taken by the United States were not at all to influence Europe or partake in European matters but rather remains within a larger North American strategy and understanding. "The American presence during the war (Second World War to Cold War) had positive economic repercussions for Greenland, which grew accustomed to a certain freedom of decision-making. The situation fostered the growth of historical claims that made Greenland part of the postwar decolonization movement."<sup>137</sup>

Moreover, following the Second World War, Greenland's significance as a periphery became notable as she "had a substantial strategic meaning for Denmark during the Cold War, but especially also for the USA"<sup>138</sup> during and after those periods.

With the end of both WWII and the Cold War, strategic military interest in Greenland as a periphery did begin to wither down as most military bases began to shut down. Thule Air Base, though, was the exception; not only was the air base still running, the U.S. military air base has since been upgraded with advance missile defense standards, in part due to the importance of the Thule Air Base to American understandings of Russian defense security activities within the region. Once again, does the notion of security supersede other dimensions to influence not only how the center

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<sup>135</sup> Clive Archer, "Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence: New Two-Level Negotiations?," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 38, no. 2 (2003): 129.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>137</sup> Mark Auchet, "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66 No. 4, (2011): 960.

<sup>138</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 176.

makes decision but also outside influencing powers which do affect but should not be conflated with the center periphery relations between Greenland and Denmark.

In terms of military means, more than two decades ago, in 1995, the Danish forces in Greenland were collectively known as the Greenland Command, a force subordinate to the Danish Defense Command yet possessed the same ultimatum to defend and protect the Realm in her entirety; Subtle but striking similarities to the Guam case study where there is a Guam Guard under the US Command, though both peripheral commands are subordinate to the center's main defense security protocol; the point and purpose of which is made only to clarify in reference to the framework and analysis.

In the modern era, "Greenland still appear[s] to be important in Danish-US relations under the umbrella of NATO...[and is] sought after by the US notably as a base for missile defense-related installations."<sup>139</sup>

Backtrack a few decades, chronologically, by 1953, Greenland achieves integration into the Kingdom of Denmark, and obtains representation in the Danish parliament. More than twenty years later, in 1979, Greenland attains *home-rule*, a tremendous breakthrough for the indigenous Greenlandic movement that allows for self-government and the creation of the Home Rule Government. Here, the periphery obtained powers and administration over matters related to its own domestic order.<sup>140</sup> In 1985, Greenland leaves the European Economic Community, which later evolved into the

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<sup>139</sup> Maria Ackren and Uffe Jakobsen, "Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives," *Polar Record* Vol. 51, no. 259 (2015): 404.

<sup>140</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 177.



modern day European Union, then further votes for greater autonomy in 2008<sup>141</sup> achieving *self-rule* in 2009<sup>142</sup> with the latter further expanded as the "responsibility for judicial affairs, policing and its natural resources."<sup>143</sup> Even so, it would be a not so gentle reminder that Denmark maintains vast powers vis-à-vis Greenland by retaining the authority over foreign affairs and defense security.<sup>144</sup> In the nature of peripheral relations, this is where Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark are in terms of the historical dimension.

If we were to follow the framework's method of analysis, then the answer would be that the historical dimension does not in fact come into play for much of the existing Greenland-Copenhagen relationship.

Certainly, there are instances in Greenland's history where there were an intense amount of speculation towards powers and placement during World War II. Or, if taking a step back even further there may have been contentious historical moments when Greenland was a colony between Norway and Denmark and subsequent notions of colonization. It does not appear so that there are specific moments in the historical dimension where tremendous controversy or contentious points of order are strong enough or apparent enough to derail center periphery relations. With that being understood, the nature of peripheral relations between Greenland and Denmark on the count of history can be, for the most part, be taken as a matter of fact rather than anything deeper or more influencing in modern affairs.

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<sup>141</sup> "The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement," *Statsministeriet*, accessed Dec. 2019, [http://www.stm.dk/\\_p\\_13090.html](http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html)

<sup>142</sup> Do note that while home-rule and self-rule may sound similar, they are indeed two separate and distinct words that hold very different meanings.

<sup>143</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 177.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

To the center, the historical dimension, particularly of the sudden diplomatic crisis during the Second World War is very much a precedent or learning moment for Copenhagen. This alludes to the fact that to Copenhagen Greenland as a periphery was able to make specific decisions that usually would only be granted to the central government at large. While there existed some form of representation by the center, the movement of policy or major decisions was still very much in the direction of the periphery or Greenland much more so than in the direction of Copenhagen. And, subsequently, charges of treason were passed down by the center.

It is crucial to be mindful however, that as opposed to other center peripheral relationships, this was during a time of war where the Kingdom of Denmark was massively overwhelmed by other major players in the region and thus had very little actual influence or impact over how the periphery would conduct itself in a time of emergency vis-à-vis the United States. In addition, after the Second World War and further historical events, the charges of treason were exonerated and much of the then controversial issues brought to a conclusion.

Within the nature of peripheral relations, most of these historical issues were settled in a manner that was decisive and absolute rather than remaining as points of concern and does not extend to the modern day historical memory of the Danish or Greenlandic people. Therefore, while informative to how the Copenhagen-Greenland relation is established, it should be read as nothing further and nothing less.

For the periphery, this historical dimension is more powerful in the nature of peripheral relations than it is to the center.

Due to the fact that Greenland, even by Danish proxy, was able to make specific precedence over jurisdiction, or the taste of power and ability, so to speak and in light of the aforementioned history, has created in the Greenlandic people a truer sense of where the periphery stands in relations to the center. Many peripheral relations do not have a scenario where the center is itself at an existential risk or crisis and as a result would not go through this moment of empowerment or trial. Though the occupied Tokyo and current Okinawa may be exceptions to be examined in future works.

The historical dimension to the periphery, though still a more foundational dimension than anything else, allows the periphery to view itself almost as a momentary equal that no doubt led the tiny-population into more grandeur political ambitions and policy-play when it comes to center periphery relations.

As such, the historical dimension in the periphery has given Greenland a taste of what is possible, plausible, and perhaps tenable in its own future and in the nature of peripheral relations.

As part of the framework analysis, the examination of the historical dimension between Greenland and Copenhagen has shown that while very complex with a number of critical moments, such as the crisis of World War II, the dimension serves more as an informative aspect to defining the establishment of relations between a center and periphery. Unless specifically brought to attention, this dimension should not turn into a point of contention or controversy as much of what has occurred in the past has been resolved to satisfaction or to absolution for the most part. Unlike the manner in which the United States has prolonged the War-Bill in Congress to the Chamorro people of Guam

for their suffering during wartime, Greenland has settled most of the controversial historical issues in the Danish realm.<sup>145</sup>

Both Greenlandic and the larger Danish state and society may reference the historical dimension periodically, but as part of the framework it should not be a major influencing factor or determinant to more specific policy matters such as the land resource management or labor visa issues further explained in this chapter. (It remains possible, however, to be brought up by a legislative member or other prominent members of either society, though the real lasting impact or influence is very likely to be minimal.)

In the end, history as a dimension, while important to understand to seeing the nature of center periphery relations, should not be as much of an impact or influence on the specific policy matters concerning this paper or in fact for future center periphery relations. In the overarching framework, this is a dimension that will most likely be a non-concern for policy makers due to the fact that the subject itself does not appear controversial or have the ability to create impasse in policy. Though sets-up a reference for the unusually high position of Greenland in the domestic hierarchical structure of the Danish realm, in particular compared to the Faroe Islands, another island periphery of Denmark.

### **3.2.2 Culture**

Of the current Greenlandic population, the Thule people or proto-Inuit are considered to be the ancestors of the current Greenlandic Inuit people, or the majority

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<sup>145</sup> Haidee Eugenio Gilbert, "San Nicolas to senators: \$7.5M local war claims payment risks \$30M-plus payment for all", *Guam Pacific Daily News*, August 21, 2019, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2019/08/21/senators-hold-off-action-local-war-claims-bill/2068331001/> (accessed 2019).

population of Greenland. To Greenlanders, "88% of whom are Inuit"<sup>146</sup> most "understand Kalaallit Nunaat as an Inuit nation."<sup>147</sup> More accurately though, Greenland is a blend of Inuit and Scandinavian culture, particularly as we see the influence of Scandinavia, be it Norway or Denmark, throughout Greenland's historical memory and cultural immersions.

Inuit or Greenlandic culture, however, is at the forefront and of utmost importance with regards to the Greenlandic people and their own identity. The "indigenous people can exercise a kind of double pressure on their respective states through regional and national institutions and through their international associations."<sup>148</sup> This is a statement of power that the indigenous people have over the peripheral and central governments, i.e. influence in the domestic hierarchy, one that Guam shares though is weakened by powerful ties the military has on Guamanian culture and the island culture itself.

Notable individuals often take considerable pride in being Inuit, with local indigenous populations preferring to be "loyal citizens of the United States, Canada, and Greenland, but...are Inuit, or Eskimo"<sup>149</sup>, first and foremost."<sup>150</sup> In terms of the Greenlandic Inuit, a "special role is assigned to the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to protect their cultural identity and way of life" with a "special steering committee...consisting of high-ranking government representatives of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands."<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 178.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Antoine Dubreuil, "The Arctic of the regions: Between indigenous people and subnational entities—Which perspectives?", *International Journal* Vol. 66, No. 4 (2011): 938.

<sup>149</sup> Although the term Eskimo, while still popular in a few regions, is a term that (at least in North America) does carry over negative connotations in a pejorative manner, which had developed over time.

<sup>150</sup> Jessica Shadian, "From states to polities: Reconceptualizing sovereignty through Inuit governance," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 16, no. 3 (2010): 496.

<sup>151</sup> R.M. Czarny, *The High North* (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015): 124.

In the nature of peripheral relations, the cultural dimension is much more difficult to manage and respond to as compared to the historical dimension above, as one is fluid and evolutionary as the other may be presented in differing manners but more concrete in historical documentation. Modern day Greenland has more or less conformed and integrated with the Scandinavian cultures of say Norway, Denmark, and so forth. Greenlanders consider themselves almost entirely to be a separate people and culture that should be more asserted than Copenhagen would perhaps like. Even just a few years back, "Greenlanders were recognized as an independent people under international law and Greenlandic became the sole official language."<sup>152</sup> This indicates that the periphery has become much more aware of themselves culturally and as such sets a higher agenda that could prove to be problematic if not managed properly in center periphery relations.

While on a tangent, the following example should provide a better contextual understanding of how the cultural dimension may impact center periphery relations and subsequently the nature of peripheral relations.

Internationally, even just a decade ago, it may have been extremely difficult to (and perhaps still is today) to assert the idea of renewable energy versus fossil fuels for many industrial and developed nations. Slowly however, with the progression of technology and the proper introduction of what solar energy or renewable sources of energy were as well as the pros and cons in contrast to what is available now, many central governments and societies are large are beginning to embrace the idea of renewable energy sources as viable and plausible to simply fossil fuels.

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<sup>152</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 177.

What this seemingly removed illustration demonstrates is that with proper introduction and management, it is entirely fathomable that the Greenlandic culture and identity that the people of the periphery are increasingly assertive over can be a reconciliatory factor in the nature of peripheral relations.

Point in case, decades ago Greenlandic people, as part of integration, had to learn the Danish language and fit into the Danish society and culture in order to obtain specific jobs or positions or opportunities that the center provided where the periphery could not.

Vice versa, there was a not so small amount of discrimination towards having Greenlandic individuals in positions of power even in the periphery itself. Quite a number of times, the Danish central government would have Danish people and those more aligned with the Kingdom at government capacities.

While a lot of this has changed for the better as society has matured in both center and periphery, it can still prove to be a difficult situation if either the center decides to either reintegrate on reasons such as security or foreign concerns or if the periphery decides to move closer to independence and reassert their cultural heritage over their Danish assumed nature.

To the center, this is particularly thorny issue with empirical evidence that in the historical past Copenhagen did have partiality towards those who could speak, for instance, the Danish language, as well as having people from Denmark be the shakers and movers of society.

Why this is a concern to the cultural dimension rather than the historical aspect is that while occurring in the historical past, these concerns are actually rooted in the differences of culture, one that affects the power of the periphery and distinguishing and

thereby separating the cultural and indigenous of the Greenlandic people vis-à-vis the center in the domestic hierarchy. Greenlanders as explained above consider themselves to be Inuit and distinctly different in terms of being a separate people, possessing a separate language, and perhaps seeing themselves as part of the Kingdom but in a very distinct manner.

Issues that could arise or stem from cultural differences are many times realistic and influential enough that matters of environmental or economic policies may be regarded as not being culturally sensitive enough to the needs of the periphery. For the center, the cultural dimension is an aspect to center periphery relations that has to be carefully managed and proceeded with.

To the periphery, the same sentiments occur. Though, the difference is that the majority of the Greenlandic people and the Greenlandic government have time and time again, through for instance the passing of the Home Rule Act and Self Rule Act, shown that they are far more interested and concerned in the well-being of the Greenlandic perspective. Many may beg to differ given the current political climate, but as a matter of fact, these sentiments on culture are far stronger and have subsequently been included into legislative matters for the periphery.

As the periphery is able to "themselves...more and more, discover the island's economic and political potential<sup>153</sup>, the cultural card becomes a much more viable and potent influencer in engaging with political or economic matters. Even further down the current trajectory, "An independent Greenlandic state would be the first and sole

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.



sovereign state with a majority native Arctic population and thus what some have called 'the first truly Arctic state'.<sup>154</sup>

In the framework analysis, it becomes quite clear that while there is much less to say or point out than in the historical dimension. The understood movement of the Greenlandic people's words and actions signifies that for the Greenland case study and to the nature of peripheral relations between Greenland and Copenhagen, the cultural dimension is one that could cause possible tensions between the two parties.

Even if the policy or matter associated may not be directly related to cultural concerns, cultural concerns must be taken into consideration to prevent a mishap in center periphery relations. For instance, even if the center does decide certain trade, industrial, or economic developments to the benefit of the periphery, Copenhagen must understand that there will be consequences if the Greenlandic population, particularly the pro-Inuit pro-independence parties are not satisfactorily given space and forum for dialogue.

What does or does not count as tradition and culture to the Inuit Greenlandic people is not for the central government to say; rather a method to bridge differences would be to bring in those who feel isolated or those that are concerned that the central government is intent on understanding those perspectives even if that may be at odds with the central government at large's own agenda.

Culture as a dimension is undoubtedly more critical to understand and carries more weight than the previous historical dimension. Not only does culture change with the ebb and flow of society and the times, in Greenland's particular case, the self-awareness and further movement in a progressive independence direction has elevated the cultural concern whereas previously it would not have been as so.

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 178.

This is a dimension that should be more carefully watched throughout the mid-long term, as culture is something evolves very slowly and whether it is integration or an awareness of oneself, it is an aspect that does have the potential to be a point of concern for both parties much more so in the mid-long term.

### **3.2.3 Governance**

The governance of Greenland can be split into two main parts; a) being Greenland's governance vis-à-vis Denmark or the Realm while b) denotes Greenland's governance vis-à-vis the Arctic or the High North as a whole. Both should be considered to be crucially important in terms of center periphery relations. Broadly speaking, Arctic governance "is fragmented and highly politicized, consisting of states, market parties, and several formal and informal institutions, such as the legal framework of UNCLOS<sup>155</sup> and the intergovernmental Arctic Council."<sup>156</sup> "UNCLOS came into force in 1994 [and] has been ratified by all Arctic states except for the USA."<sup>157</sup> It is further broken down into five Arctic coastal states that have "made it clear to the rest of the World that they are the (only) legitimate actors, based on their sovereignty, to deal with issues concerning the Arctic Ocean."<sup>158</sup>

"In the arctic council, it is Denmark who officially has a seat at the table, but in practice it is Greenland who is most active in the council."<sup>159</sup> In addition, in "issues

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<sup>155</sup> United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

<sup>156</sup> Coco C. A. Smits, Jan P.M. van Tatenhove, and Judith van Leeuwen, "Authority in Arctic Governance: changing spheres of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments," *Int. Environ. Agreements* Vol. 14, (2014): 331.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 338.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 337.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 341.

specifically addressing the Greenlandic Arctic, Denmark more or less follows Greenland's perspective and advice in its position taking."<sup>160</sup>

The Arctic Council issue is simple but at the same time complex. In a geopolitical sense Greenland is specifically located in the region that within the Arctic Circle, as such it is provided a seat and equal footing in the intergovernmental agency alongside other such members such as Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway and so forth. By proxy, Denmark is as the overarching central government able to voice concerns and interests via this special forum. On the other hand, the more complex aspect is that any future movement of Greenland away from Danish realm basically means that Denmark must take more care of its treatment to the peripheries if it wants to remain part of the circle and part of the conversation.

In the Danish realm, there is another proxy by way of the Faroe Islands, however given the fact that Iceland was once also a part of the Danish realm but eventually led itself towards independence, the likelihood that this precedent and history carries over is strong and not within reach or means.

As a governance issue, this means that Copenhagen must tread carefully with how it manages current center periphery relations if it is to establish greater bonds and interests in the mid-long term. Denmark must create incentive that to be part of the Danish realm carries more weight for the Greenlandic people and Greenland itself in one form or another as opposed to all out independence in the manner that Iceland has carried itself.

To the nature of peripheral relations, this is also another point of concern that is on equal footing with the cultural dimension.

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

As Greenland has progressively and consistently spoken on and voted to gain more powers via referendum and as a periphery from Copenhagen, the specific wordings of certain legislations and acts are crucial to understanding where this fits into the overall dynamics. As mentioned previously, in terms of rights and responsibilities, "political domains, including defense, foreign policy, and security, remain shared between both countries"<sup>161</sup> though more left to Denmark than Greenland. Moreover, "Denmark is only responsible for common matters defined as foreign, security, and defence policies, as well as the common currency. Greenland is responsible for all matters that have internal consequences, such as police, justice, coastguard, fishing, education, health, culture, infrastructure, and economic development, including natural resources exploration and exploitation."<sup>162</sup>

Regarding the 2009 law on self-government "Greenland must respect the interests of the Danish realm as a whole and obtain the assent of the Danish government. It is not a sovereign nation."<sup>163</sup> These are strong and clear words that set boundaries to the governance dimension stating what exactly the periphery is, what it is legally able to do, and perhaps how much space for maneuver there is in the future. While this is true, "The new legislation stipulates that the Greenland government may participate in negotiations for agreements that concern it and may conclude agreements with foreign states and international organizations that exclusively concern Greenland."<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Antoine Dubreuil, "The Arctic of the regions: Between indigenous people and subnational entities—Which perspectives?", *International Journal* Vol. 66, No. 4 (2011): 933.

<sup>163</sup> Marc Auchet, "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66, (2010-2011): 962.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

Bear in mind, in the periphery, "The inhabitants of Greenland are recognized as a people pursuant to international law with the right to self-determination."<sup>165</sup> Though, "as a sub-national territory within the realm of Denmark, Greenland lacks the ultimate decision-making power within foreign and security policy...even though it has full decision-making power regarding its own natural resources."<sup>166</sup> Again, this references another point of contention that will be discussed further down. But the specific wording that it has full decision-making powers over natural resources yet lacks the powers to foreign and security policy is a very tricky legal matter that may have to be settled in the legal courts or by referendum or even more serious methods of contention if the concern ever arises; the concern does arise and is explained further.

To the periphery, "It is not out of the question that in the future Greenland may strive for full sovereignty and only keep the Danish monarch as head of state. It would also mean assuming full control over the Arctic matter."<sup>167</sup> What this means that while Greenland has accepted the current situation or role it plays as an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark or the 'seat-provider' so to speak in the Arctic Council. It considers the ability of political movement to be within reasonable powers to the periphery that is perhaps quite at odds with how the Danish government may see itself, thus the wording of legislation and acts are very important at this stage.

For its part, the center will point out that even as Greenland has achieved certain stages in the governance dimension, namely the Home Rule and Self Rule Acts, statistically, "In 2010, financial transfers from Copenhagen accounted for about one-third

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<sup>165</sup> Maria Ackren and Uffe Jakobsen, "Greenland as a self-governing sub-national territory in international relations: past, current and future perspectives," *Polar Record* Vol. 51, no. 259 (2015): 404.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> R.M. Czarny, *The High North* (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015): 121.

of the Greenlandic budget, around DKK 3.5 billion (approximately EUR 470 million)."<sup>168</sup>

"The turnout was unusually high (72 percent), and an overwhelming majority of voters (75.5 percent) supported the new arrangement, which came into effect on 21 June 2009, the 30th anniversary of the home-rule proclamation. The preamble of the act on Greenland self-government states that Greenlanders form a separate people under international law with the right to self-determination."<sup>169</sup>

With the vast amount of natural resources available to Greenland and the increasing movement in the climate change situation, the ability of financial independence based on certain industries may prove to be a much more lucrative and viable path for Greenland in achieving what the autonomous country seems to be seeking. It almost seems as a matter of time rather than anything else at this point. If technology is to advance in the decades to come coupled with climate change that opens up even further opportunities, there is a real possibility, even with additional environmental protection (which in itself may become even more sustainable and advanced as again technology advances), then the center must be concerned with how much weight these current governance aspects will carry in the mid-to-long term future.

If the periphery is able to create revenue that lessens the financial transfers to a minimum, then the movement towards independence and the powers of the periphery are greatly increased while the center's abilities to use financial funding as leverage weakens. Carefully worded documents, legislation, and acts may prove to be binding now, but

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<sup>168</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 177.

<sup>169</sup> Mark Auchet. "Greenland at the crossroads: What strategy for the Arctic?" *International Journal* Vol. 66 No. 4, (2011): 961.

when the situation evolves and the governance no longer applies, that is when the center must take into consideration how to understand the new nature of peripheral relations.

Peripheral relations are almost always difficult to change simply because the center possesses such a massive amount of power as compared to the periphery. Usually, this is in the form of financial ability, economics, industries, and natural resources as well as societal movement as a whole. However, in Greenland's case, which is why it serves as an excellent example in contrast to Guam, is that Greenland as a periphery in comparison to Denmark is massive. While the population of the periphery may remain low, the natural resources available to the periphery are incomparable. Likewise, the geopolitical positioning of the periphery in the Arctic is precisely why the Kingdom of Denmark has a position in the Arctic Council at all.

As a reminder to how difficult the governance dimension may be to center periphery relations, between Greenland and Denmark, Greenland's licensing issue has specifically "tested the relation[s] with Denmark as the authority to grant visa to foreign labor lies with the Danish authorities."<sup>170</sup> This is an immediate short-term concern that will progressively become much harder to ignore as the mid-long term stages arise. Due to the technological advances being made today as well as what Greenland has achieved in recent memory as well as may be made possibly even more aware of with climate change and industrial developments, if governance in the short-term is not given more thought, then in the mid-long term it could possibly become a winner takes all movement.

Again, in the analytical framework, governance as a dimension plays a very significant role in that not only does it establish current natural relations, but it could also

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<sup>170</sup> Coco C. A. Smits, Jan P.M. van Tatenhove, and Judith van Leeuwen, "Authority in Arctic Governance: changing spheres of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments," *Int. Environ. Agreements* Vol. 14, (2014): 340.

allude to future possible relations between the center and periphery. With the way Greenland has been representing itself and voicing in its own interests and concerns through legitimate legal progressions symbolizes the likelihood of future movement hindered only by economic developments, basically the access to and development of natural resources as a monetary viability for the Greenlandic people and periphery.

Even without considering more special cases of Monaco or the Bahamas where low-population but a vibrant society and industries exist, Iceland itself a former part of the Danish realm has only three hundred some thousand people. Therefore, a low population may not be such a crippling factor if natural resources and industries or even a welcome economic tax system creates incentives for more people to immigrate as technology and climate change progresses.

### ***3.2.4 Natural Resources and Industry***

Prior to engaging in analysis of the natural resources that remain obvious to Greenland, such as the minerals, oil, and gas, one aspect that may be overlooked is the defense-security agreement the United States has with the Danish realm on Thule Air Base located within the periphery. It is important to note that, "Greenland has been an essential 'card' in Denmark's economic and strategic relationship with the United States"<sup>171</sup> most likely due to the U.S.'s military positioning, again specifically Thule air base.

In addition, "Greenland and the Arctic has also been a 'card' for Denmark to develop closer ties with powers like China."<sup>172</sup> Here, the defense-security undertone is less transparent and more closely related to natural resources, but US-China security

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<sup>171</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 42.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.



concerns within the Arctic are not to be dismissed so easily. While Beijing's "*turn toward sea power*...emphasizing positions on sovereignty issues on [state] actor's authorities at the AC [Arctic Council], shows, a clear intention to re-interpret and re-design, the conceptual international public order of UNCLOS"<sup>173</sup>, this remains to be seen as actual heightened threats to the regions natural resources or industries. Though in one particular case, and as of late, a Chinese government-owned firm "announced a 3.6 billion Danish krone (U.S. \$560 million) contract to build a new airport"<sup>174</sup>, a decision that after careful consideration between Washington (Thule consideration) and Copenhagen was ultimately rejected despite possible Greenlandic economic interests in favor of security interests. Therefore returning to US-China security, despite the possible economic or industrial interests previously aforementioned.

Further on natural resources, as one expert notes, "Greenland is neither Greece nor Iceland: it has an enormous potential of strategic natural resources."<sup>175</sup> The Igaliku agreement in 2004 allows 'the government of Greenland [to] appoint a representative with whom the US commanding officer at Thule Air base will consult on local affairs'<sup>176</sup>, showing that there is enough weight in the matter and certain respect and power that Greenland is given an ability to perhaps not oversee but certainly engage in the military

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<sup>173</sup> Sandra Cassotta, Kamrul Hossain, Jingzheng Ren, and Michael Evan Goodsite, "Climate Change and China as a Global Emerging Regulatory Sea Power in the Arctic Ocean: Is China a Threat for Arctic Ocean Security?" *Beijing Law Review*, Vol. 6, (2015): 202.

<sup>174</sup> Aaron Mehta and Valerie Insinna, "Greenland's note for sale, but it is strategically important," *DefenseNews*, Aug. 16, 2019, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/08/16/greenlands-not-for-sale-but-it-is-strategically-important/>

<sup>175</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 50.

<sup>176</sup> 2. Rasmus Bertelsen, "Devolution and Withdrawal: Denmark and the North Atlantic, 1800-2100", in *Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic*, ed. L. Heininen, (Palgrave Macmillan UK: 2014): 18.

installation within the Greenlandic isle. This is very much akin to other sovereign nations where the US may need to negotiate or have dialogue with the hosting partner in order to secure what it views are necessities in American strategy. These types of agreements that Greenland has with other sovereign nations, despite being authorized by Copenhagen, are ground breaking in slowly moving away responsibility and powers that the center usually has to the periphery. In the defense-security 'industry' this certainly holds true with the Igaliku agreement.

Where exactly does natural resources and industry fit in as a dimension to center periphery relations between Greenland and Denmark? Thinking of it in this manner may be more beneficial. Governance is the realization of ambitions and agendas or motivations so to speak. The tremendous amount of natural resources that Greenland possesses is precisely why the periphery is able to have such a powerful role in center periphery relations. Without the fundamental understanding that Greenland has the potential (not yet performance) to the natural resources gifted to her in the natural environment, one would fail to see why this dimension is incredibly important.

On the surface, it is very easy to state that the natural resources are the end all for a successful nation state and the founding of sovereignty. However, it is a bit more complex than that.

Natural resources and industry wise, while Greenland's "best prospect[s] for rising revenues is offered by the natural resource sector including mineral resources, fish and marine mammals, hydropower and possibly oil and gas."<sup>177</sup> Denmark does not show

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<sup>177</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 177.

impressive numbers for either oil or gas reserves and production for both is below 1% of the world total.

Greenland has no oil or gas development and no related industry, and there has been hardly any exploration-taking place. In the current short-term, the center or Copenhagen does not need to be as concerned of how natural resources may be utilized, and while the evolving industry may turn into or manifest itself as a real path towards independence or a change of the nature of peripheral relations. That is at least decades down the road. Rather, while "Arctic oil and gas are...important for Greenland on a rather mid-to-long term basis...it will be of tremendous importance for Greenlanders in the sense of gaining independence from Denmark"<sup>178</sup>. The sentiments and notion of viability or plausibility for the natural resources and industries itself is a greater common uniting factor for the Greenlandic people much more so than the current state of minerals, oil, and gas.

This dimension, therefore, takes on a much more populist tone in that it serves as a reminder to the Greenlandic people of what they still have on their own lands, what may be possible to them for the future, and where the world of globalization and climate change and technological advances may bring for their long-term future. This is definitely a dimension that while briefly comes to mind in the short-term will almost always be displaced into the long-term as the technology is just not there yet. It is not realistic at the moment to turn the natural resources that the periphery possesses into financial means to sustain the periphery.

Moreover, in the fishing industry, also another point of interest and natural resource/industry, a 2005 Danish legislative authorization act allows Greenland to have

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid.,178

bilateral agreements with other states such as Iceland, Norway and Russia and with the EU.

Powers stated include the right to "negotiate and conclude agreements under international law with foreign states and international organizations, including administrative agreements, which relate entirely to subject matters where legislative and administrative powers have been transferred to the Authorities of Greenland."<sup>179</sup> This is incredibly important, not only to the governance dimension in which Greenland has been allowed to form bilateral agreements with other sovereigns (though authorized by Denmark thus included in the natural resources segment and not the governing segment), this type of legislation and natural resource/industrial development proves that Greenland is not only capable of managing its own natural resources and developing familiar industries, but that other regional powers are able to work with the periphery enough that Denmark is not necessarily involved to the extent say the United States or Tokyo is with Guam and Okinawa on marine relocations.

Although this may be a difference of national security or defense versus natural resource and economic means, the symbolism remains and shows the ability of Greenland to be a periphery powerful and capable enough of understanding its own natural resources and eventually developing them. For both the center and the periphery, natural resources are an important asset and critical to consider in nearly all aspects, from an economic perspective, a political status perspective (in particular to self-determination for the periphery), and an incredibly influencing dimension in the center periphery relation as a whole.

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<sup>179</sup> Refer to the Home-Rule and Self-Rule Acts of the Kingdom of Denmark

What comes across as different and unique in the Copenhagen-Greenland case study is that rather than placing limitations on Greenland's natural resources or related-industries, Copenhagen has granted more powers to the periphery than most centers have traditionally in the past, for instance in comparison with the island of Guam which is a not an autonomous country instead a territory. While there are various reasons that have led to this decision, the most likely one being the political unity or voice in the Greenlandic community as well as the level of democracy, democratic system, and adherence to rule of law, the opportunity that Copenhagen has given itself for future center periphery relations is tremendous considering legal foundations between the two parties (i.e. in the Home Rule and Self Rule Acts).

As the previous Greenlandic government has stated; Greenland welcomes focus on environmental issues but does not welcome environmental concerns without a future in industrial development. The above clearly shows that while natural resource and industries may not be a short-term concern, it definitely is a long-term consideration on both parties.

### ***3.2.5 Defense-Security***

Greenland, as an island-country in the Arctic surrounded by valuable marine resources such as the fishing industry or important marine trade routes such as the Northern Sea Route, must also consider another dimension that significantly impacts its relations with the center--security.

Maritime security, though often under the jurisdiction of multilateral institutions or even bilateral agreements, necessitates a certain amount of mutual trust and cohesion between the center and periphery in order to consolidate power, diplomatic, economic, or

even military-based, whether alone for the periphery or together as a state, that translates to defense-security amidst other influencers that may possess different agendas and intentions than the ones the center or periphery may have in mind, in particular from foreign-funds or other nearby Arctic powers.

For further understanding, maritime security may be...

"...understood in a matrix of its relation to other concepts, such as marine safety, sea power, blue economy and resilience. Second, the securitization framework, allows the study of how maritime threats are made and which divergent political claims these entail in order to uncover political interests and divergent ideologies. Third, security practice theory enables the study of what actors actually do when they claim to enhance maritime security."<sup>180</sup>

Of maritime security specific to Greenland and the region, this area of security is "mostly peaceful in name of scientific research, application of international maritime law, bilateral negotiations in the 2008 Illulissat Declaration, in the 2009 Tromso Declaration, all signatories agreed that the rule of law should be basis for regional development and international relations."<sup>181</sup> In spite of this, there are "announcements -- particularly from Russia and Canada -- which "exhibit assertive rhetoric intended for a domestic audience and are often more related to prestige policy than *realpolitik*".<sup>182</sup> Though, "under the 1996 Ottawa declaration, the arctic council is not allowed to discuss military and security issues."<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> For more on security frameworks see, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) and Christian Bueger, "What is Maritime Security?" (*Marine Policy*, 2015), p. 1.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

With reference to defense-security that is a result of sovereignty-related matters in the region, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) actually governs, with clarity and jurisdiction over marine-related matters. In particular, UNCLOS states, "Sovereignty refers to a nation's right to exclusively govern a particular area without any outside interference. Under UNCLOS, sovereignty is restricted to a state's territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coastal baseline). (24 nautical miles, limited sovereign action)." In addition, the "right of utilization under UNCLOS, exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles), right of utilization does not equal sovereignty. Anything beyond 200 is high seas, or international waters, *terra nullius*."

Likewise, with rights of utilization, there is also the international seabed authority that is an international agency which oversees these matters. Not unexpectedly, as the Arctic is not the South China Sea, where the "2008 Illulissat declaration does not exist in the east and South China Sea. The South China Sea has overlapping exclusive economic zones. By contrast, exclusive economic zones established in the Arctic Ocean are neither overlapping nor disputed, almost all existing and purported resources in the Arctic are located firmly within a single exclusive economic zone."<sup>184</sup>

For Greenland, there are instances of a double-edged sword, in which Copenhagen has previously in the past indirectly denied Greenland power over herself in the name of national security, more often than not, Copenhagen and Greenland is better served when providing a united front protecting their respective interests in the region. Copenhagen categorically touts the Danish-realm, inclusive of Greenland, in remarks on defense-security and recognizes the importance of Greenland to the center. And, to a certain extent, Greenland understands that even in its position as a periphery the island is

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

better served under the defense-security capabilities of the center alongside its own. As such, this dimension creates a particularly meaningful union almost of the center and periphery unlike that of the one on Guam, though these are two differing situation and circumstances (Greenland does not have a third of its land in possession by the military nor does it have an air force, naval, and soon to be marine base permanently located on the island-periphery; An American station, Thule Air Base, does exist however.)

That being said, where does security come in vis-à-vis the other dimensions in the nature of peripheral relations? Security as a dimension in the Greenland-Copenhagen relationship is not as contentious, while remaining important, as say the United States has in security issues with Guam. For the most part, the Arctic Council is explicitly stated many times over as not the forum to discuss these defense security issues. (Although, that does not mean that members involved in the Arctic Council is provided another platform for dialogue for matters such as economic or environmental that may preclude more serious discussion of security issues involving such matters).

As the Self-Rule Act of 2009 indicates, the foreign affairs and defense security aspect of Greenland still remains the responsibility of Denmark, that is to say that the center still holds on to tremendous powers of a sovereign nation or center particularly over its periphery by withholding these crucial powers of center periphery relations.

While Greenland is allowed jurisdiction over policing matters within its own boundaries, there is an important difference between policing and actual security defense in the form of a naval force, air force, and so forth. As such, for the center periphery relations, this is not as contentious of a point in the relationship as opposed to the previous dimensions of culture or governance.



To the center, being able to accurately gauge the threats that other regional powers may present, although usually Denmark is aligned with Sweden, Norway, and other Scandinavian countries, and therefore act on the security defense aspect is crucial to how it sees its own center periphery relationship.

Without very noticeable threats to the region, which so far may only consist of rhetoric from Russia, the security risks that have been discussed have so far not been as apparent as a few have assumed given the detriment of climate change and subsequent increase in Arctic Council involvement by other parties and the usages of the Northern Sea Route.

To be more specific, any disputable areas of natural resources or industries do not currently pose a security threat as can be seen in the South China Sea where you have overlapping economic zones and where a peripheral entities presence may be the key to international recognition over particular claims.

Here, as pertaining to the center, Copenhagen and beyond, most if not all of the natural resources fall within boundaries that are not controversial. Rhetoric and the role of the media may be more to blame than anything else. Again, "none of the coastal states excludes the *possibility* of interstate conflict in the Arctic, for instance over access to natural resources located in areas under their jurisdiction or strategic shipping lanes transiting through their coastal waters."<sup>185</sup>

To the center though, "Denmark has the Arctic politically high on its agenda"<sup>186</sup>  
Historically, "Denmark did have something of value for US defence: Greenland. What

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<sup>185</sup> Kristian Atland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?," *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 33, (2014): 146.

<sup>186</sup> Kathrin Keil, "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 49, no. 2 (2014): 176.

has been described as the 'Greenland card' 'played a role for both Danish and American policy-makers' throughout the main part of the Cold War."<sup>187</sup> With "the Thule Radar, located North-West of Greenland, [being] seen by some as the 'eyes and ears' of U.S. defense"<sup>188</sup>

Specifically, the "Danish Navy's six ice-capable surface vessels will probably remain the country's main military asset in the region...the Danish Navy's three new multi-role frigates of the *Iver Huitfeldt* class, built in 2008-2013, may also carry out national defense tasks in the northern waters."<sup>189</sup>

To the periphery, Greenland's population itself does present a situation where it may not be plausible to have such a massive amount of defense security capabilities. Though, as time and technology progresses, the actual number of people involved versus the weapons of capabilities involved may shift in relations.

For instance, during "peacetime the role of warships is mainly seen in protecting the core sea lines of communication in order to facilitate trade and economic prosperity by means of deterrence as well as surveillance and interdiction."<sup>190</sup> Not indicative of any true security risk such as the ones that are being advocated by regional Southeast Asian nations vis-à-vis China or North Korea to Japan and the United States. "Geography

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<sup>187</sup> Clive Archer, "Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence: New Two-Level Negotiations?," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 38, no. 2 (2003): 133.

<sup>188</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 44.

<sup>189</sup> Kristian Atland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?," *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 33, (2014): 156.

<sup>190</sup> Christian Bueger, "What is Maritime Security?" (Forthcoming *Marine Policy*, 2015), 3.

[however] *does* matter, and so does the regional level, even in an increasingly globalized world."<sup>191</sup>

Likewise, there is always the question for the periphery of "whether the Thule Air Base may play a larger role in regard to the tasks performed in and around Greenland by the Danish Armed Forces in cooperation with other partner countries."<sup>192</sup> Both parties agree that the current "Danish Armed Forces...continued presence on the island is the best safeguard of its sovereignty"<sup>193</sup>

On the other hand, there are other key players such as "influential member of the Landsting (Greenland parliament), Hans-Pavia Rosing...insist[ing] that 'we can no longer simply dismiss the problem only because defence matters...are under the jurisdiction of the Danish government'"<sup>194</sup>

In the context of center periphery relations, "By 2001, relations between Greenland and Denmark were institutionalized so that there was an understanding over security matters. [Greenland] formally had no decision-making power in security policy, it was established that Greenlandic opinion would be consulted on foreign and security matters directly affecting Greenland".<sup>195</sup> Moreover, and as mentioned earlier, the "Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security" (Ottawa Declaration)

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<sup>191</sup> Kristian Atlad, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?," *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 33, (2014): 150.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>193</sup> R.M. Czarny, *The High North* (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015): 123.

<sup>194</sup> Clive Archer, "Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defence: New Two-Level Negotiations?," *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 38, no. 2 (2003): 137.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 140.

IMO/UNCLOS, IMO created UNCLOS, both relatively similar in international maritime laws and regulations though independent."<sup>196</sup>

As such, in terms of security, or the possibility of independence which in itself may be seen as a security issue for the center and the periphery, "Full national sovereignty for Greenland is one option, but not *necessarily* the option that will serve Greenland best in the future"<sup>197</sup> As an aside, in 2012, the arctic command replaced the Greenland command. The Danish realm however reasserts that the "[purpose of the Danish defense in and around Greenland is primarily to enforce Danish sovereignty by virtue of presence and surveillance"<sup>198</sup>, which is a noticeable nod to the purposes of protecting the overarching Danish sovereignty.

### **3.3 Political Status: Greenland**

In an attempt to understanding peripheral relations between Greenland and Copenhagen, it would be a wise and fair decision to examine the fairly complex and intertwined sovereign issue that is the political status of Greenland within the Danish realm. A brief into the political status of Greenland allows readers to better understand where the framework analysis above fits into the larger center periphery relation, that is Denmark-Greenland, as well as creates a segue of perspective into the resource management matter to come.

As the framework analysis above already examines the majority of the nature to center peripheral relations, this section will instead focus more on the history and

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<sup>196</sup> Jessica Shadian, "From states to polities: Reconceptualizing sovereignty through Inuit governance," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 16, no. 3 (2010): 490.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

understanding of Greenland's political status and the intent of both parties as this also affects the analysis of the resource management issue mentioned above.

As it stands, Greenland is a moderately autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark, attaining home-rule in 1979 and self-rule in 2009<sup>199</sup> by large margins on both counts. However, the subject of political status surrounding Greenland has remained a bit contentious, though not to the point of controversial, usually rising and falling in attention according to the election cycles as can be expected.

While perhaps obvious, it is still meaningful to point out that usually political status issues are intensely controversial on both ends, as this would mean a loss of land, resources, people, and representation and so forth for the center and vice versa in the opposite direction for the periphery. As a result, political status matters are usually not settled easily or must be aligned in both the center and peripheries interests in order to be peaceful and mutually acceptable.

As a matter of legislation, the "Act of 2009 allows the government of Greenland to assume legislative, executive and judicial powers, which Danish authorities had until then. By virtue of the Act, Denmark keeps its power regarding foreign affairs, defence and economic policy. However, the importance of being an 'Arctic State' is clear to Denmark. For this reason, its Arctic strategy, which was presented in 2011, focuses on cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland in a win-win approach to Arctic issues."<sup>200</sup> Moreover, "the people of Greenland" and acknowledges their capacity as 'a people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination.' Consistent with

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<sup>199</sup> Minor difference in date, to be precise, voted-in 2008 while taking-effect 2009.

<sup>200</sup> Mar Campins Eritja, "Strengthening the European Union—Greenland's Relationship for Enhanced Governance of the Arctic," *The European Union and the Arctic* (Brill, 2017), 67.

this provision, the Act contains a specific regulation on the access of Greenland to independence."<sup>201</sup>

In addition, "the Danish government and the Greenlandic government (Naalakkersuisut), so as to adopt an agreement that regulates Greenland are way out of Denmark's territory. This agreement, which must be submitted again to referendum, must have the consent of the Danish Parliament, as established in Section 19 of the Danish Constitution."<sup>202</sup>

Here, there is an interesting note to the political status of Greenland that should be taken into consideration.

Precedent in the form of Iceland's sovereignty or independence exists, where Denmark eventually gave Iceland independence in 1918 then Iceland itself voting to become a republic when Denmark was occupied by Germany in 1944. As such, the subject matter itself is not a vague unknown grey area unfamiliar to either party.

However, the situations surrounding Greenland today are much more difficult and complex than during the Icelandic Independence movement. One, Greenland possesses far more natural resources than Iceland does. Two, losing Greenland would mean perhaps losing representation in the Arctic Council if the Faroe Islands are not taken into consideration. And three, these are times of peace where Denmark is not being occupied by Nazi Germany and could possibly end a Greenlandic Independence movement given the distance and center's resources.

Despite so, the three points indicated above can be resolved with enough dialogue and if the interests of both parties as explained below in intent align. As a democratic

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<sup>201</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>202</sup> *ibid.*, 68.

institution, Denmark must respect the vote of the people. As Spain is beginning to understand with the Catalonia re-vote at the end of 2017. Copenhagen understands the independence leaning ambitions of the Greenlandic government. Given the history Denmark has had with its other colonies and the granting of various powers to the Greenlandic self-government in 79 and 09, it would appear unlikely that the subject matter issue becomes controversial. Rather than a matter of if, political status perhaps seems more like a when and in what form that is acceptable and agreeable to both Greenland and Copenhagen.

### **3.4 Center's Perspective: Copenhagen**

In terms of resource management, the nature of peripheral relations that Copenhagen has with Greenland is what sets it apart from most other cases.

Given the extensive historical dimension between Copenhagen and Greenland, it is not a surprise that Denmark is willing to allow Greenland a right to independence let alone the management of her own resources. Copenhagen's major issue, however, is not in fear of Greenland's independence, rather there are specific rules and policy that may affect Danish policies today that may hold both parties back in terms of resource management issues. Here, the reference is to a zero-tolerance policy on extracting radioactive elements in Greenland that was introduced in the 1980s, which still applies as of 2012.<sup>203</sup>

Whether or not Greenland is able to develop her vast mineral resources, or indeed any other natural resource, in a way that is not only beneficial to the domain but without too much outside interference or reliance, that is a key security issue that Denmark is

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<sup>203</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 6.

increasingly focused on as the center. Copenhagen's perspective is not in the 'why' or in the 'what' but rather in the 'how' and in the 'whom'. The Danish concern is not that Greenland wants to industrialize or capitalize on her natural resources for domestic and economic reasons, but rather with whom will Greenland partner, as most of the partnerships will be Greenland state partnerships, and in what way will their partnership take form. Again, experts have suggested "the best option for the defence of an independent Greenland clearly remains a defence agreement with Denmark."<sup>204</sup>

### ***3.4.1 Resource Management***

One of the most critical issues to resource management is labor. No matter in which country or with which partners, natural resources, be it mineral, oil, or gas, must be accessed via technology as well as human labor forces.

In terms of peripheral powers, "the Greenlandic authorities have assumed full powers over mineral resources in the subsoil. In so doing, the system of joint management between Greenland and Denmark and Denmark's power of veto, which had been in force since 1979, has come to an end. It is the government of Greenland, which now grants drilling, and exploitation licenses, directly and it is entitled to all the revenue derived from mining and hydro-carbon exploitation."<sup>205</sup>

There is no way around this fact, resources that are just sitting in the ocean or deep in the land do not hold real value unless it is accessible, it is retrievable, and viable in end form be it rare earth elements or liquid natural gas. There is one truth about Greenland that Copenhagen has, however. In terms of leverage, negotiations, or powers,

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>205</sup> Mar Campins Eritja, "Strengthening the European Union—Greenland's Relationship for Enhanced Governance of the Arctic," *The European Union and the Arctic* (Brill, 2017), 85.



"foreign manpower will be needed in the development of projects as the Greenlandic work force is not enough."<sup>206</sup>

While Greenland is indeed responsible for managing her own natural resources, the Kingdom of Denmark is still very much concerned and responsible for foreign and security affairs. That said Australia in the Asia-Pacific is often times a pointed example for the Danish to look at in terms of balancing or managing resources with foreign and security affairs. Back in 2009, Australia, a country similar to Greenland rich with natural resources, was able to refuse an attempted majority stake takeover by the Chinese on a leading Australian rare earth firm named Lynas Corp. Despite such a setback for the Chinese, Australia was still able to manage international relations with China on friendly terms, this is the challenge Denmark must face moving forward in both relations with Greenland and outside investors. When it is in the national interest of Denmark to say 'no'.

#### ***3.4.1.1 Labor (Visa) Permissions***

In terms of the historical dimension, labor manpower throughout time has always been a significant issue for Greenland as the local population is only roughly around 55,000. That in it of itself is an insufficient number for any major industrial development. Likewise, historically, the Greenlandic population who are capable of speaking Danish have generally been filling the administrative positions across both center and periphery leaving another gap between those willing to work in blue collar type jobs versus white collar type jobs. These however, while not minor issues by any means, are not significant

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<sup>206</sup> Damien Degeorges, "The Role of Greenland in the Arctic" (PhD Dissertation, IRSEM, 2012), 7.

enough to be considered as historical obstructions to the resource management issue with regards to labor permissions.

Therefore, this dimension in this particular subject is most definitely not a short-term immediate priority nor does it seem to turn into a mid-long term issue either. It is simply background information to understanding the situation but neither hinders nor hurts any progress on the subject.

Culture, depending on whose perspective can either be played down or played up. In Copenhagen's perspective, however, they will most likely believe that for the greater good of the entire Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland should be more concerned about issues such as outside economic investments or influences or overall defense security concerns for the both of Greenland and Denmark. This dimension is a rather tricky one, as the Greenlandic population has been colonized for an extensive period of time before being integrated into the Danish kingdom.

Moreover, the home-rule and self-rule attained in 1979 and 2009 as well as the recognition of the Greenlandic people and language as a unique and separate identity from the Danish are all possible issues for Denmark to be playing the culture card.

While this may be the case for a subject such as the political status issues of Greenland, this is not the subject at hand. The subject at hand is Greenland's resource management and Denmark's ability to control labor immigration into Greenland for project developments.

In this particular situation, the cultural dimension seems to be not an immediate short-term priority necessary to resolve in order for the two parties, center and periphery, to engage in dialogue and come to resolution.

It is, however, a possible obstruction to future details be it infrastructure, energy policy, and the like so should therefore be considered a mid-long term priority that needs to be looked at and considered for a possible peaceful resolution between the two different identities or growing identities shall we say as Greenlanders, while prideful in their language and identity, are not unaware of the importance of being able to speak Danish and the Kingdom at large.

Governance is where the center holds tremendous power over the center. Every piece of legislation, be it home-rule or self-rule, has given more and more autonomy and jurisdiction rights to the Greenland, the periphery. Yet despite so, it is clearly written in black and white that the center, or Denmark, in this case has clear powers over foreign and security affairs. As such, the very real and not hypothetical question of a Chinese investment signed and cleared by Greenland for a development project yet considered to be too close to national interests for Denmark's liking can and will be rejected upon accordingly.

Since Greenland has the rights to her own natural resources, Greenland can give the green light for investments into her territory, however, as the legal documents state clearly Denmark also has the right to consider this a security issue and therefore not release the necessary labor visas for workers to enter Greenland and actually begin the work of construction or labor.

Even if both parties are well within each of their respective legal boundaries to do what they are doing, Denmark in the end may become the subject of controversy and dispute for obstructing economic development as Greenland puts it. As a dimension to the resource management issue, governance or the types of powers that are given to each

party is very high on the priority list. No doubt a short-term priority that must be given dialogue and attention if this dispute is to come to an end or a result that is amicable for both parties. Since at this point, Denmark may be able to achieve what it wants by using legal powers, it will lose far more in terms of center periphery relations and the political favor or like-factor from the Greenlandic people.

For Copenhagen, if governance were a dimension that helps Denmark in her center periphery relations, natural resources and industry would be a dimension that hurts. Simply put, the massive amounts of natural resources, be it oil, gas, or minerals that are found in and around Greenland are nowhere to be found in Denmark proper, at least not in any way remotely similar.

Therefore, this is a dimension that should also rank very highly on the list of priorities and issues to be dealt with if dialogue were to occur over a specific issue, such as the resource management issue. No doubt the minerals in question are located on Greenland proper, and even further the self-rule act allows Greenland full rights and responsibility to do whatever they may please with those natural resources.

Be it to simply keep it green to keep environmentalists at bay, as there are reports that the oil and gas found in Greenland are as of current technology not significant, or to create bidding wars for outside investment such as the Chinese in mining projects.

The only caveat, and the one that plays to Copenhagen's favor, is that regardless of what Greenland may or may not want to do. Copenhagen still has to keep in mind that if there is a possibility, even remotely, that the Kingdom of Denmark considers the action to not be in the national interest, this could be hypothetically even if the United States considered it unsafe for Thule Air Base and relayed the message to Denmark, that

Denmark will have the rights to shut it down, either directly, or more realistically in an indirect way such as with the labor visa situation by not providing what is absolutely necessary to jump start a massive project such as a mining project or other economic developments.

Without the support of Denmark, it seems highly improbable for Greenland, even with the proper agreements, to do much developing. In essence, these legal documents or signed papers may become nothing more than tiger papers at the end of the day if Copenhagen sees fit.

Admittedly, there exists some crossover between this dimension and governance as they are at times intertwined. All said and done, this is a dimension that is also very important to dialogue and should be considered amongst the priority list for short-term priorities.

Security here plays an important part in center periphery relations. Perhaps this is not the most optimal way to look at things, but if Denmark is not able to protect Denmark proper, how will she be able to look at Greenland, or the Faroe Islands, or whatever constitutes as the Kingdom of Denmark?

Therefore, there is a direct relation with resource management the labor visa accessibility issue and the national defense security interests of the Danish Kingdom. Amongst all of the dimensions, this is perhaps the single most important one.

Without the fear of an existential crisis, or interference or influence to the Kingdom, for that matter, than other issues such as which powers or what roles from which legal documents, a reference to governance as a dimension, or even which raw materials are available, a reference to natural resources as a dimension, is not necessarily

such a significant issue alone. Only when there is a real threat or serious concern that for instance the natural resources may be misappropriated or mishandled would there then be a need or cause to examine center periphery relations or power and roles, other dimensions such as history or culture only come to play if it helps or hinders significantly, and perhaps a bit with culture, but for the most part those two dimensions can be left alone.

In the end, the framework as observed shows us that security is the major dimension that then leads to investigating governance, and natural resources as also significant dimensions, before taking in the cultural and historical aspects to complete a picture or a whole. That is how this framework plays out in center periphery relations, it shows a logical and sensible blueprint of why we have an issue, what is the issue, and what we should do with said issue, though the latter is much later on in further analyses. But properly focused on, this perhaps cumbersome and tiring exercise does serve a purpose and brings more detail and clarity than otherwise.

#### ***3.4.1.2 Summary***

This exposes a serious sign of possible miscommunication, misunderstanding, or at worst mistrust between the two governments on what can be discussed, what is being discussed, and what should be discussed. Ultimately, the power and leverage seems to lie nowhere near the periphery but rather in the center or even possibly in outside forces, such as Beijing, seeing as how the details of the matter were not extensively provided. The Danish intelligence service seems to worry that "Chinese companies will become so

economically important for Greenland that they would be able to manipulate a Self-Rule Authority that is smaller and has fewer financial resources."<sup>207</sup>

However, in the process of the Danish government's actions and inactions, it is further isolating a unit within the Kingdom itself. Greenland already has a substantially tangible path to independence with strong support throughout most of its history, isolating the island-periphery now may cause future problems in the center-periphery relations when more dialogue rather than less would seem appropriate in handling matters such as this. It seems far less coherent to remain a hermit in security decision-making particularly as the partner, Greenland, is as close as it is to Denmark both figuratively and literally. On a twisted side-note, the U.S. military were the ones who built the place in the first place back in 1942, during World War II.

### **3.5 Periphery's Perspective: Greenland**

Greenland's perspective in the entire matter is that it wants exactly what the Greenlandic people have voted for.

Both in 1979 and 2009, the political will of the population spoke out increasingly for greater autonomy and rights over their own territory. It is therefore Greenland's perspective that the natural resources found in Greenland proper, and around Greenland for that matter, is a concern for the Greenlandic people and in the interests of Greenland itself. While Copenhagen may be concerned that there exists other outside parties who may or may not have different intentions for the Greenlandic people or more correctly the Greenlandic territory and her natural resources, Greenland feels that this again is an example of the center pushing their power onto the periphery when in fact there may be none.

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

What is lacking, though, is dialogue and trust between the center and periphery with regards to how the natural resources should be developed and basically the details have not been as specific or well thought of than it should have been.

### ***3.5.1 Resource Management***

One of the major issues that Greenland has with Copenhagen is that in resource management, while Denmark has already agreed to release the rights to natural resources to Greenland following a majority popular vote resulting in the self-rule act of 2009, Greenland has been unable to fully exercise her rights in reality.

What this means is that while Greenland has the power to sign development agreements with outside parties, be it the Chinese or whomever, the legal document seems to have little holding with the Danish government at large.

For Greenland, while the issue of resource management may seem like one and the same, Copenhagen differs by adding a lens of other variables such as national security or foreign affairs that is in real legal terms under Danish jurisdiction.

Herein lie the major difference and the major issue of contention. One of the determinants to the issue of resource management is the changing Danish-Greenlandic relationship, "in which the development of a Greenlandic oil and gas sector is seen as a tool to become financially independent."<sup>208</sup> In particular, with "Greenland, 14 exploration wells have been drilled up until 2012, five have been drilled in the 1970s, one in 2000, and another eight in 2010 and 2011."<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Coco C. A. Smits, Jan P.M. van Tatenhove, and Judith van Leeuwen, "Authority in Arctic Governance: changing spheres of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments," *Int. Environ. Agreements* Vol. 14, (2014): 329.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 334.



Though with regards to the Arctic states, "The Arctic 5 made it clear to the rest of the World that they are the (only) legitimate actors, based on their sovereignty, to deal with issues concerning the Arctic Ocean."<sup>210</sup> Therefore, be it the Arctic Council or an autonomous periphery such as Greenland, only the sovereign states have final say in the decision making process, though the periphery may influence the matter greatly. Though that in it of itself is a bit controversial with critics, such as Iceland, stating that it bypasses arctic council limited to state actors.<sup>211</sup> As part of understanding the resource management issue, in the island periphery the Mineral License and Safety Authority is the central governmental actor in Greenland, Mineral Resources Act (MRA, 2009), still the single set of rules of the game concerning oil and gas development in Greenland.<sup>212</sup>

Internally, "within the Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut), the extractive industries are also subject to debate. Even though the two large political parties, Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA), are in favor of developing oil and gas activities in Greenland, they have different opinions as to *how* these activities should be developed."<sup>213</sup>

"Moreover, it also tested the relation with Denmark as the authority to grant visa to foreign labor lies with the Danish authorities."<sup>214</sup> According to the Queen of Denmark, whom most likely only has press releases that represent how the central government at large proofreads states that "political domains, including defense, foreign policy, and security, remain shared between both countries Queen 2009."<sup>215</sup> That is an optimistic

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid., 337.

<sup>211</sup> Coco C. A. Smits, Jan P.M. van Tatenhove, and Judith van Leeuwen, "Authority in Arctic Governance: changing spheres of authority in Greenlandic offshore oil and gas developments," *Int. Environ. Agreements* Vol. 14, (2014).

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., 339.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid., 340.

<sup>215</sup> Queen's Address, The Danish Monarchy, <http://kongehuset.dk>

view of cooperation and dialogue that is not impossible given the nature of peripheral relations. Though in Greenland's perspective, "most activities on an Arctic level should be executed in cooperation or via Denmark. at the arctic council, it is Denmark who officially has a seat at the table, but in practice it is Greenland who is most active in the council."<sup>216</sup> On the other hand, opposing views by the center state that "Denmark is following Greenland's perspective and advice in its position taking (Gov. of Greenland, personal)."<sup>217</sup> Internally, "Within the governance arrangement of Denmark and Greenland, the tendency is that the Greenlandic state gains more authority step by step."<sup>218</sup>

### ***3.5.1.1 Mineral, Oil, & Gas Licensing***

#### ***History***

Mineral, oil, and gas licensing is an issue that is less than a decade old if one takes into serious consideration the self-rule act of 2009. Prior to this point, natural resources, while part of Greenland proper, did not strictly fall under the responsibility of the Greenlandic government. Therefore, while there may be issues regarding how to develop the natural resources on Greenland, and that type of dialogue may have occurred numerous times over different periods. Strictly speaking, any sort of tension or fall out is perhaps best understood as to be after the self-rule act.

While it is entirely possible that Greenland considers the mineral, oil, and gases in and around its territories to be a historical heritage of sorts to the Greenlandic people, which is not untrue, the notion of this dimension being brought up in historical references may not be the wisest way the periphery can operate vis-à-vis the center. Particularly

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.

after the self-rule act, Greenland sees the viability of serious dialogue with Copenhagen rather than to numbingly reference history in way that seems to divulge more powers from the center. That method would be far too obvious for the center to accept and as such possibly rejected if not already addressed previously. Again, after the self-rule act, Greenland by the rule of law has oversight over its own natural resources; however, the implementation of such is what is controversial today. More than a historical concern, as both parties have already agreed to terms and the self-rule act announced, the specific workings or practicalities later explored in the governance dimension is perhaps more suitable and thus more substantial to the peripheral relations than this concerns.

Does this dimension seem like a serious threat to dialogue or cooperation between the center and periphery? Highly unlikely, as history here is a dimension that seems as a low-priority possibly even a non-concern at this point. However, it is important to understand the historical undertones of how the self-rule act came to be and why perhaps the governance dimension is an issue and why the Greenlandic government and people may be upset given that they consider the licensing to be perhaps a return to their own historical heritage over these natural resources. This dimension on those notes does provide clarity and understanding that would otherwise often be easily overlooked.

### ***Culture***

When removed from the nature of peripheral relations and specifically on the subject of licensing, this dimension does not seem to make a significant difference when it comes to the particular issue of natural resource licensing.

Greenland has been part of the Arctic or rather High North community for an extensive period of time. And while Scandinavian culture is not unfamiliar to the

Greenlandic Inuit, it is true that of the Greenlandic local population a majority are Inuit, recognized as a separate and independent people. Why this is important to understand is that if the center decides to cede certain powers over to the periphery, yet actively obstruct the periphery from the newly and legally attained powers, then the situation may result in a misunderstanding that Copenhagen has different attitudes, such as a cultural discrimination, into what the Greenlandic people are capable of doing. Rather than simply stating that this is a security concern for the Danish realm, which is how the licensing issue is being framed but could be misunderstood or misread if not stated explicitly and implicitly, particularly amongst the populace cultural issues may once again be a barrier rather than a diverse non-factor, improperly managed.

As a result, akin to the historical dimension, culture is another low-priority and non-concern to the center periphery dialogue at this moment as it pertains to the licensing issue. Given the extensive period of time Greenland has been in the Danish realm, and because of such a cultural bond (whether of free will out of necessity) between the two, the Greenlandic people and Denmark should be able to communicate or understand each other more than if they were completely foreign entities or hostile to each other in both pragmatic and cultural terms.

### ***Governance***

Governance is a key dimension that the Greenlandic government can put forward on the negotiating table. It is one of the more legitimate and rare cases where the periphery has an actual legal standing, in this case the rights and responsibilities to her natural resources, and is able to use such standing against the central government for other reasons leading to the obstruction of full resource development.

This is a situation where the center and periphery may either sit down at a negotiating table or pursue arbitration between the two parties, or Greenland and Denmark may choose to pursue a legal battle where each party argues their case before the judiciary.

### ***Natural Resources and Industry***

In Greenland's domestic hierarchy under the Danish realm, the natural resources and industry is more significant than either the historical or cultural dimensions, however falls short of the security or governance dimensions.

It is without a doubt that the natural resources and subsequent industrial development is at the heart of the center periphery debate. However, it is not an active help or hinder rather it is simply a fact, more of a passive nature.

Yes, it is a fact that Greenland has vast amounts of mineral resources, and yes perhaps as technological advances are made in the future, oil and gas may become more accessible and likely resources for development as well. But all of these facts are not active reasons in which the center and periphery are engaged in negotiations or dialogue, therefore it is not enough reason to be a force or motivation behind an issue or policy such as licensing or labor permissions. The onus falls under the legality or governance as well as the main reason or motivation such as security behind the actions. Thus, natural resources and industry as a dimension is important in that it is the existing reason for everything to follow, but only in so much as it is a passive reason; a low-priority dimension.

Though it is not to dismiss the area of natural resources as "trade in natural gas shapes political relationships more strongly than trade in oil does, because gas development and trade tend to require large-scale investment and long-term contracts."<sup>219</sup>

"Oil is priced on world markets...Natural gas (outside North America) is not priced on markets"<sup>220</sup> with "estimated 30 percent of the world's undiscovered reserves of natural gas and 13 percent of the undiscovered reserves of oil."<sup>221</sup>

### ***Defense-Security***

Security, on the other hand, is a slightly more significant dimension than natural resources/industry. While it is not at the same degree of concern for Greenland as it is for Copenhagen, security should be considered a mid-level concern or priority for the periphery. Who has access to Greenland and in what manner is the crux of the security dimension, regardless of center or periphery. However, as the Kingdom of Denmark is legally responsible for foreign and security affairs, that may be one of the reasons Greenland is less likely to and less able to treat security as a dimension that would be highly ranked on the priority spectrum.

"Oil has consequences for national security not only through its effects on the states that consume it, but through its effects on the states that produce it, too."<sup>222</sup> It has the "potential to reorder political relationships around the world."<sup>223</sup> This is absolutely true in Greenland's case where both center and periphery present relative power positions,

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<sup>219</sup> Michael A. Levi, "Energy Security: An Agenda for Research," *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): 11.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Kristian Atland, "Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?," *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 33, (2014): 145.

<sup>222</sup> Michael A. Levi, "Energy Security: An Agenda for Research," *Council on Foreign Relations* (2010): 4.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

as the security of the Realm is at stake, Copenhagen has decided against providing visa and labor to Greenland for natural resource developments despite the island-periphery already signing off on the natural resources licensing them to foreign entities for development.

### **Industrial v. Environmental**

As explained previously, Greenland is an instance in which Copenhagen does have significant power evidenced by the control of Greenland's defense, security, and foreign affairs on top of economic subsidies to the island-periphery. However, Greenland is also a high-power periphery, as the island periphery has not only twice voted in referendums with high-turn out and high-majority that confirms the Home-Rule and Self-Rule Acts in addition to direct representation in Copenhagen and much autonomy in self-governance over itself and natural resources. Therefore, on environmental issues related to Greenland, such as the industrial development versus environmental protection, Copenhagen has many times given way to the island-periphery, most notably in the protection of Greenland's industrial rights versus environmental concerns.<sup>224</sup>

### **3.6 Summary**

One of the most important excerpts from the Greenland Self-Rule Act:

#### Self-Rule Act 2009

Recognizing that the people of Greenland is a people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination, the Act is based on a wish to foster equality and mutual respect in the partnership between Denmark and Greenland. Accordingly, the Act is based on an agreement between Naalakkersuisut [Greenland Government] and the Danish Government as equal partners.

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<sup>224</sup> Refer to Greenland on Common Fisheries Policy and the joining then subsequent leaving of Greenland from the European Community as opposed to Denmark

(2) The Government and Naalakkersuisut shall cooperate in international affairs as laid down in this Chapter with a view to safeguarding the interests of Greenland as well as the general interests of the Kingdom of Denmark.

(3) The powers granted to Naalakkersuisut in this Chapter shall not limit the Danish authorities' constitutional responsibility and powers in international affairs, as foreign and security policy matters are affairs of the Realm.

#### GREENLAND'S ACCESS TO INDEPENDENCE

21. (1) Decision regarding Greenland's independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland. (2) If decision is taken pursuant to subsection (1), negotiations shall commence between the Government and Naalakkersuisut with a view to the introduction of independence for Greenland. (3) An agreement between Naalakkersuisut and the Government regarding the introduction of independence for Greenland shall be concluded with the consent of Inatsisartut and shall be endorsed by a referendum in Greenland. The agreement shall, furthermore, be concluded with the consent of the Folketing [Danish parliament].

(4) Independence for Greenland shall imply that Greenland assumes sovereignty over the Greenland territory.

(2) Section 8 of the Greenland Home Rule Act shall remain in force until the mineral resource area is taken over by the Greenland Self-Government authorities.<sup>225</sup>

Many see "the Arctic simultaneously as a viable future source of valuable mineral supplies and as a fragile space to be protected and preserved."<sup>226</sup> And, as the above clearly states and to further supplement, in the future "the diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes--the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage."<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Danish Parliament, *Act on Greenland Self-Government*, Amalienborg, June 2009, <http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Engelske-tekster/Act%20on%20Greenland.pdf>

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ronald O' Rourke, "Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service* CRS Report for Congress (2017), Summary.



To the nature of peripheral relations, Greenland and Copenhagen possesses uniquely cooperative and mutually respectful center periphery relations as evidenced by the passings of the Home Rule Act and the Self Rule Act (Governance), though the implementation of parts of these legislations is worrisome for peripheral relations. While the historical and cultural dimensions reflect differently with respect to the center and periphery, for the most part both aspects are not strongly detrimental to center periphery relations as the misgivings in the past are largely resolved with more consideration and tensions in the future of the periphery (Greenland). In reference to the natural resources/security dimensions, these aspects are areas of most serious concern as Greenland seeks to diversify and develop its natural resources which in turn causes concern for Copenhagen's security defense (particularly if investments are from foreign state-related firms). Overall, the natural relationship though is intact, stable, and much stronger than in most center periphery relations.

Governance, natural resources, and security may be seen as immediate short term concerns to the issue of resource management, (not the peripheral relationship itself, as policy specific analysis is and should be separate from center periphery relations in general), as these three are most influential in affecting the aforementioned. While historical and cultural matters, while important, should be considered more mid-long term if not less influential concerns to the resource management issue.

In terms of Greenland's unique positioning above abundant yet not quite reachable resources, political status aside (as this has existed and been discussed thoroughly already), resource management is a problematic issue in that for Greenland it is about development and the economy while for Copenhagen it is more related to security.

Natural resources itself has already been vested in Greenland's power, the implementation or the intents of center and periphery in interests and direction, however, is the main source of misunderstandings and tension. If that can be resolved via dialogue, public or private, this issue should be workable. Again, the subject matter itself is more or less decided, per Self Rule, however the center and periphery's miscommunication of interests and purpose has to be clarified and realigned for the policy issue to be dealt with.

For the future, as the nature of peripheral relations between Greenland-Copenhagen are incredibly stable and strong, using the framework analysis to underline issues with particular policy matters, supplemented with matters of subject and intent, could very well prevent future misunderstandings and public relations crises from occurring. Without consideration for one another, the center peripheral relationship is bound to have issues, however, issues are not insolvable and a lot of details can be overcome if the framework above is taken seriously into consideration prior to major policy decisions.

## **Chapter 4. Asia-Pacific Case Study - Guam (Guahan)**<sup>228</sup>

### **4.1 The 'Peripheral' Relationship - Overview**

At the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Guam was ceded to the United States as part of the Treaty of Paris.<sup>229</sup> In the modern-era, the island is an unincorporated territory of the latter by way of the Guam Organic Act of 1950<sup>230</sup>, with a brief yet brutal stint from 1941-1944 by the Japanese in WWII before being recaptured by the United States.<sup>231</sup>

Roughly three times the size of Washington D.C., the island has a population of nearly 170,000<sup>232</sup>, of which the majority ethnic group remains with the native indigenous Chamorros<sup>233</sup>, as well as two strategically critical military bases (Anderson Air Force Base to the north and Apra Naval Base in the south)<sup>234</sup>, refer to figure-3.

In its purpose, Guam serves as a significant hub for the defense and security affairs of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Previously, in chapter three of this dissertation the reasoning and logic behind Guam and Greenland's case study selection had been made fairly clear. The rationale, however, was more in line with how the case studies fit the analytical framework, fit the peripheral power spectrum, and how the case studies served in a compare and contrast capacity to each other and therefore made good as selections in examining the nature of peripheral relations.

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<sup>228</sup> Guahan is the proper-title for Guam in the Chamorro-language.

<sup>229</sup> Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, U.S. Congress, 55th Cong. 3d sess., Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 5-11.

<sup>230</sup> Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 384, codified as 48 U.S.C. 1421, et seq.

<sup>231</sup> Taimanglo, *Communiqué*.

<sup>232</sup> Shirley A Kan, "Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments," *Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress* (2014): 1.

<sup>233</sup> Taimanglo, *Communiqué*.

<sup>234</sup> Kan, 1.




Figure 4 - Clarification of Guam (U.S. Navy Map)<sup>235</sup>

Why Guam in this instance is not referring to those aspects already covered.

Rather, it seeks to detail, as the Greenland chapter did as well, why Guam became such a

<sup>235</sup> Jeffrey Marchesseault, "From BRAC to OBRACC: base closures deemed necessary," *PNC-Guam*, Nov. 30, 2018, <https://pncguam.com/from-brac-to-obracc-base-closures-deemed-necessary/>

sudden area of interest to the center (the United States) and had become enveloped in the media spotlight in its own right.

There are two specific explanations that justify the increased attention to center periphery relations between Washington and Guam.

First, during the Obama administration, Guam had been brought to the forefront in sorts due to former Secretary of State Clinton's announcements of a rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Years later, in the Trump administration, it was the rhetoric between North Korea and the United States that once again led to massive international media coverage of Washington, her periphery Guam, and the complicated nature of peripheral relations between the two. While previous administrations understandably considered the island of strategic importance and value to the United States, it was only in the Obama and Trump administrations where the island periphery really saw itself garner global attention in the mass media. Either by being included, in detail, as part of a grand strategy of security to the United States or, as demonstrated early in the Trump administration, by being caught in the crossfire of two presidential characters. As a result, and in addition to the reasoning provided in chapter three, where the nature of peripheral relations stand between Washington and Guam, how this center periphery relationship interacts, and which powers as well as where the relationship is going are all of great importance to observe as part of the case study's 'why'.

In particular, the understanding of issues such as the military buildup or the island periphery's political status in the case study will provide readers with a much needed and better grasp of how specific policies or matters can and are being influencing by what and how the periphery says or does and vice versa.

Whether or not these issues can become more amicable or at least resolved through the analytical framework remains to be tested in the upcoming sections, although there are clear lessons to be learned apart from the fact that everything in hindsight may be twenty-twenty (20/20).

## **4.2 Guam's (Guahan) Center-Periphery Relations**

The nature of peripheral relations between Guam and the United States, as observed vis-à-vis the aforesaid dimensions, is as follows:

### **4.2.1 History**

Historically, the island-territory has been a Spanish colony for over three hundred years since Ferdinand Magellan's first discovery in 1521. Before that the island had remained largely in the hands of the ancient Chamorro society.

After relinquishing the islands to the United States following the loss of the Spanish-American War in 1898, thus becoming a U.S. peripheral-colony and after the infamous invasion of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii by the Japanese during World War II, Guam also suffered an invasion by the Japanese the following day on December 8, 1941. Following the Battle of Guam from July 21 to August 10, 1944, the United States returned and was able to recapture the island from Japanese occupation. The island became a U.S. possession until the Guam Organic Act (GOA) of 1950 established the island as an unincorporated territory, concurrently granting U.S. citizenship to her people henceforth.

A critical point to note, however, is that as the civilian-structured rule of law was established through the GOA (U.S. Congress) instead of the U.S. Constitution, the island's U.S. citizens are not only unable to vote for the U.S. President, island citizens

also do not have proper and full voting representation in Congress, and theoretically-speaking citizenship may be revoked by the powers of Congress though it has never acted on such powers.<sup>236</sup>

Whilst the Organic Act did provide civilian government to the Guamanian people in the post-war era, prior the island was under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy, the Governor of Guam was federally appointed until 1968 where the Elective Governor Act then allowed the periphery's semi-autonomous self-government to be popularly elected rather than appointed.<sup>237</sup>

In center periphery relations, the historical dimension between the island of Guam and Washington is albeit shorter than that of the previous Greenland case study.

While Guam had remained a Spanish colony for nearly three hundred years, to be detailed in the following pages under historically significant memory, it was under the American influence that the island would experience expansive military restructuring as well as rather tumultuous times under the aforementioned jurisdiction of the U.S. Naval Department. Likewise, the years of occupation by the Japanese during the mid 1940s and the subsequent recapturing of the island by the American military is still imprinted into the historical memory of the local older populace as well as youth or adults whom have gone through the historical education or oral historical traditions.

Nevertheless, this could be considered a double-edged sword for the historical dimension vis-à-vis the center and periphery.

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<sup>236</sup> Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "The (Un)exceptional Life of a Non-Voting Delegate: Guam and the Production of American Sovereignty," *Pacific Asia Inquiry* 3:1 (2012).

<sup>237</sup> "Elective Governor Act," Sept. 18, 1968, Accessed Dec 2019, <http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/90/497.pdf>.

The original animosities or historical misgivings towards the United States after becoming a U.S. possession may have been alleviated somewhat by the deliverance of the Guamanian people by the American troops in 1944, celebrated annually on the island as Liberation Day. However, on the flip side, there are those whom advocate that if the island had not been a United States possession at the time then the Japanese would not have invaded the island to begin with.

As the United States has now granted relative powers and associations such as being an unincorporated territory and the U.S. citizenship to the island of Guam, as well as the island becoming more integrated with the United States and the U.S. military, the Japanese occupation has for the most part become a historical incident that allows to the United States to say that they are the liberators of the island and of the people, hence Liberation Day, though ironically it is a liberation from the Japanese into their own American sovereignty rather than returning the island to the indigenous Chamorro people; a fact in logic more than a political statement.

Seeing as how relatively recent these occurrences in history were, mostly within the century, and the fact that there is a still an annual Liberation Day parade celebrating the United States' recapturing of the island from the Japanese, now in its 74th year, as well as the very much alive and real sentiments of the local indigenous Chamorro survivors, the historical dimension does in fact play a role in the Guam-Washington relationship and does affect the nature of peripheral relations to a moderate degree.

From the center's perspective, historical moments in the nature of peripheral relations work in favor of Washington for the most part.



In 1898, the island of Guam being ceded to the United States serves as a legitimate method of handover from the Kingdom of Spain to the United States. Moreover, the United States Navy only sent a single cruiser, the USS Charleston, to capture the island of Guam as the Spanish largely neglected the island, becoming a bloodless event without resistance.<sup>238</sup>

Subsequently, the United States' recapture or deliverance of the island from its Japanese occupiers in 1944 again works in favor of the United States as a reminder to the locale of the lesser of two evils in contrast to the brutality the island of Guam experienced under the Japanese. In short, the most significant moments in the historical dimension not only serve as a legitimizing factor for Washington's possession of the periphery under international rules and norms but also as a 'celebratory' reminder to the periphery of much harder times under the Japanese.

For the periphery, the historical dimension is very similar to one that perhaps Okinawa shares with Tokyo, although Okinawa is a different story as there are significant differences in language, culture, and sovereignty between the U.S. on Okinawa and the U.S. on Guam.

To the island of Guam, being part of the Spanish empire for nearly three hundred years is incredible amounts of time to have very little actually occur between the Spanish and the Guamanian locale in comparison or contrast with the Americans or the Japanese. And, while the 1898 ceding of Guam was a peaceful event, the subsequent invasion of Guam in 1941 than the recapturing in 1944 was not.

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<sup>238</sup> Becky Little, "How the United States Ended Up With Guam", History, Aug 9, 2017, <http://www.history.com/news/how-the-united-states-ended-up-with-guam> (accessed 2017).

Depending on the age group spoken to, the importance of the historical dimension could vary greatly.

To the older populations who still have historical memories from the tumultuous times, the larger consensus may be that as the Japanese occupation was incredibly brutal the American's recapturing is a relief as mentioned before.

To the younger populations, without proper historical education or empathy through cultural or more personal means, many have integrated with a largely American society inclusive of the U.S. military on island, serving in one capacity or another, that may remove them from the intense sentiments felt by older populations, especially with the integration of Guamanian society to an American one running quite deep, though that will be explored in the cultural dimension.<sup>239</sup>

In a purely historical sense, the historical moments or occurrences above leave the periphery with fonder and perhaps even stronger ties to the United States, for the most part.

If one goes entirely by the end results vis-à-vis the historical facts and structural timeline, the periphery and the center by virtue of the history dimension are actually strengthened in their peripheral relationship rather than weakened by bringing together a shared sense of historical authenticity and 'going through difficult times together'.

Where does this dimension fit in the overall framework analysis and therefore the understanding of security within the set of dimensions? Again, the more significant events between the center and periphery seem to reinforce the relationship rather than disengage the two. However, while the historical dimension may not incur the wrath of

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<sup>239</sup> Speaker Judi Won Pat, Lt. Governor Tenorio, Dr. Natividad in one-on-one interviews with author, 2015.

the periphery, to a severe degree, and may even at times boost the position of the center's legitimacy and position, it remains to be seen if historical shared memories are enough to reconcile with the modern day challenges faced by the periphery, be it in the economy, the culture, security, and so forth.

As a dimension, a little over a century's worth of historical influence and continued governance under the United States has vastly increased as well as consolidated the affinity between the island and the mainland; overcoming issues such as distance. Moreover, the dimension is more stabilizing to the peripheral relationship rather than destabilizing; although, the occasional question of war reparations<sup>240</sup> still affects the relationship detrimentally.

Overall, the nature of the peripheral relationship is held intact rather than hurt by historical understandings. Therefore, the dimension can be considered as a long-term concern as it does not appear to immediately affect policy or interests in the way the historical memory of Okinawans would affect policy there.

### ***Decolonization, Power, and the Kissinger Files: the Originality and Relevancy***

As part of the investigation into the historical dimension in the nature of peripheral relations, there is an interesting aside, recently declassified, in the form of telecom notes between Henry Kissinger and Ambassador to the United Nations Ambassador Scali. It provides a sense of how, twenty some years into the Organic Act, the center or Washington carried out matters concerning the periphery with very little regard for the island's opinions or role in international matters.

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<sup>240</sup> Staff Reports, "The Fight for War Reparations," *Stars and Stripes (Micronesia Area Research Center)*.

As a historical note, it provides reference for the center periphery relation and context to how the Spanish could have largely neglected the island for nearly three hundred years, how the GOA could have come to be following the Guam Assembly's struggles, and how much has actually changed in the current era. It also allows readers to form their own opinions of how much power and influence peripheries had over their own matters, let alone the centers, and how much this has also changed in modern times.

To put even more perspective into the matter, the UN was invited by the Guam political status commission in an attempt to obtain commonwealth status from the United States.

A periphery that holds a rather similar fate to Guam in the Pacific is the Commonwealth of the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean. Beginning in 1954, Washington has been called upon by the United Nations to "take the appropriate steps in giving the islands' population the opportunity to express its wishes regarding the political status without any external interference," exactly what the Guam political status commission had been trying to attain for the pacific-island itself.<sup>241</sup>

### ***Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Scali***<sup>242</sup>

Another point of historical reference, recently declassified original telecom notes between Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Scali depicts an incredible tête-à-tête between the two diplomats vis-à-vis the United Nation's role in listing or delisting either Puerto Rico and/or Guam on the non self-governing territories (colonies) list. Held at 9:45 a.m. on August 22, 1973 and 10:22 p.m. of the same day, the diplomats discuss briefly yet

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<sup>241</sup> Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers, *Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in a Comparative Perspective*, (Amsterdam University Press: 2003), p. 55.

<sup>242</sup> Declassified files on Kissinger & Guam UN Visit, declassified original documents (E.O. 12958) on file w/ author.

assertively on whether or not to allow the UN to send a mission to either island to assess their respective situations. (Differentiate in timeline and argue for relevancy even post Guam-doctrine)

Kissinger states bluntly of his "oppos[ition] to their (UN) going to either island" (referencing the UN's intent to visit either Puerto Rico and/or Guam as part of their duties to non self-governing territories (colonies)).<sup>243</sup> Ambassador Scali on the other hand rebriefs or reminds Kissinger that the United States has "accept[ed] the obligation under Article 73 of the UN Charter to report to the UN on non-self governing territories...inform[ing] the UN in the 1940s that Guam, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were non self-governing."<sup>244</sup> Moreover, the United States has "also accepted the principle of the UN sending missions to non self-governing territories but we have so far never issued an invitation. In 1953 after Puerto Rico achieved commonwealth status, the UN General Assembly voted to remove Puerto Rico from this list. That decision is still in effect."<sup>245</sup>

Most telling of the control Washington had over the periphery is in Kissinger's response in which his "instinct is [that he doesn't] know why we should lump Guam and Puerto Rico...making a concession on something else" that his "instinct would be to hold tight on Puerto Rico and tell them (UN) on Guam at some later point...But, without committing ourselves"<sup>246</sup>, the latter significantly telling of the strategies Washington had in my mind of the true purpose and reality between it's assertions to the UN and actions in private. Ambassador Scali and Kissinger even go as far as discussing what may happen

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

if the UN does make their visits and possible responses or conclusions they think may be reached. For instance, Scali points out that a visit will "put PR back on the list of non self-governing territories", while Kissinger responds that "then we'll get very tough with them and tell them we don't have anything further to do with this Committee" almost disregarding the United Nations in favor of a realpolitik stance. Beyond Puerto Rico the idea of a visit Guam is also mentioned, "This is one alternative. I don't want to give a nickel on this, but if we can get them to go to Guam under conditions that we can control..."<sup>247</sup> though is quickly shot down "The only problem is that once they have been in Guam they will go into the Trust Territories."<sup>248</sup> Either way, neither Ambassador Scali nor Secretary Kissinger had trust in the United Nations nor were they intending on following through on any of their agreements to the non self-governing list.

Though Kissinger being the diplomat that he is admits at the very end, "that would be my instinct. But, I may well be wrong."<sup>249</sup>

Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Scali's exchange through declassified original sources have demonstrated the blatant disregard of the times for the welfare of and the people of the island-periphery of Guam. With that said, the dynamics in which the two have convened in a tête-à-tête are incredible in illustrating how high-level Washington figures considered the center periphery relationship and the decisions that were made which ultimately led to current center periphery affairs. An interesting point to note as the dissertation works to detangle and demystify intrastate center periphery relations.

#### ***4.2.2 Culture***

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

With the historical dimension being less contentious, but perhaps more so than in the case of Greenland, sustaining a stable, intact, and well-maintained foundation between the island and the United States may come down to the cultural dimension instead, as the two are often interlinked yet distinctly different in terms of content and context.

In terms of *culture*, the island and her people do retain deeply rooted Spanish traditions as a result of centuries of Spanish colonialism.

Be it by lineage, as many do have Spanish blood, or by tradition, in the form of fiestas, language, etc., or even faith (overwhelmingly Catholic<sup>250</sup>), the Chamorros and Guamanians are to this day still immensely though passively influenced by their once Spanish colonizers.

However, this is not to say that the psychological or political affiliations and identification with the United States through years of education, military means, citizenship, and the general passing of time under possession by the United States are any less weakened in the conscious cultural connections between the people of Guam and her center as a result of the previous Spanish influences.

As mentioned above, culture plays a stronger role in the overall relationship than a dimension such as history, and how it is maintained or played out by either party will determine how much influence culture can have.

For instance, since the military buildup is a major issue to both Guam and Washington, it would be in the interests of both parties that no cultural faux pas are made ahead of time (see the Pagat issue further below).

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<sup>250</sup> Congressional Record, V. 148, PT. 1, January 23, 2002 to February 13, 2002.

In terms of center periphery relations, as the Guamanian locale has a majority ethnic group that also happens to be an indigenous group, the Chamorros, who these people are, how they perceive themselves to be (both in relations to themselves and the center), and how they understand their culture in their future will be incredibly important to understand by Washington if the nature of peripheral relations is to maintain balance, mutual respect, and proficiency.

The Pagat issue is a recent reference to the U.S. military's original intents of a live-fire training installation to be built in that particular area without proper regard for the cultural and historical value of the village. As of 1974, the US National Park Service registered Pagat as an archaeological site with the Guam National Register of Historic Places designating historical significance. Furthermore, in 2010 the National Trust for Historic Preservation had labeled Pagat as "one of the eleven most endangered historic places" citing cultural, architectural, and natural importance"<sup>251</sup>

To the center, Washington's sovereign culture after the subjugations then integration of Native Americans, on every level, is one that is built upon the ideals and values of immigrants, though the thirteen original colonies were technically British themselves to begin with. As such, the culture of another ethnic group in the periphery, particularly an indigenous and majority group should be highly regarded and understood in order to advance Washington's own agenda or even on common mutual interests.

Here, Washington already has an advantage in the periphery as over the years due to certain incentives a large portion of the Guamanian locale have become part of the U.S. military in one form or another.

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<sup>251</sup> Tiara R. Na'puti and Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "Militarization and Resistance from Guahan: Protecting and Defending Pagat," *American Quarterly* Vol. 67, no. 3 (September 2015): 846.



Not only does this affect those who enlist or those who serve, but inevitably it affects the military culture on island and the families or people related to those who are a part of the military. Second, the local language is being overtaken by English, which is spoken in the United States proper, unlike in Puerto Rico where the majority speaks Spanish. This helps to integrate or subside the cultural differences that may occur between the center and periphery. Third, the Spanish traditions left behind are not conflicting with many of the American institutions or values that Washington already has, i.e. Western institutions, the Catholic faith, and so forth.

Thus, if the United States is careful to respect and understand the periphery's culture and work with the periphery in areas that may cause concern, culture should not become an issue, much like the historical dimension. Only blatant disregard for the cultural dimension would incur popular protests or demonstrations that would create tensions in center periphery relations.

To the periphery, culture is incredibly essential in the identities of those who see themselves as either Chamorro or Guamanian.

Just as how Native Americans in the United States are treated, or a much better example of how the Maoris and their culture is preserved and respected in New Zealand, the Guamanian people see their culture in the same light. On the other hand, as reality has it, Guam has become further and further integrated with the United States as opposed to in the beginning when the self-government was just settling down after the Organic Act. Everyday cultural traditions and experiences are not major issues to the center periphery relations.

Burial grounds and the respect of the Guamanian identity and people, or their way of life, however, may be an intense area of disagreement in the nature of peripheral relations. And, to not consider the consequences of disturbing sacred cultural sites to the Guamanian people in favor of policy is perhaps one of the most irksome issues for the periphery to deal with simply because it is not that hard or difficult of a matter to study and understand ahead of time before an entire project is laid out.

Culture in this aspect will only cause issues to the center periphery relations if ignored and overlooked as the periphery is only so large and areas of cultural sensitivities should not be that hard to manage.

Which leads two possible conclusions, that either the center or Washington understands the cultural dimension yet chooses to ignore it or there has been insufficient caring and understanding in the cultural sensitivities or concerns of the Guamanian people and the island itself. Either way, it is not a pretty picture for the center when things go wrong.

Subsequently, where does the cultural dimension fit into the larger framework analysis? In the Guam and Washington case, it is becoming clear that the issue of culture is a very important matter that could envelope other matters as cultural areas of concern can be vast and multi-layered.

It is also proving to be more significant to center periphery relations as compared to the previous dimension, history, and should be considered as an immediate concern that has long lasting impact for the short-mid-long term. Though once understood, should not be too hard to work with in terms of the framework or policies.

Cultural preservation and integration, which sounds almost contradictory and confrontational but is not, in conjunction with considerations for the island and her indigenous Chamorro culture is a beneficial method to this dimension and to negotiations that at the same time creates a mutual sense of identity, belonging, and purpose.

A dual political identity between the island and the United States would not jeopardize a hypothetical situation just as having pride in being from the East Coast<sup>252</sup> or the Deep South<sup>253</sup> would not hurt negotiations as fellow Americans, theoretically. As such, perspectives may change, but core values do not.

#### **4.2.3 Governance**

Governance, as previously touched upon in the historical dimension, is one of the most critical dimensions in the island's case study. Current Governor of Guam Eddie B. Calvo during his inaugural address has already indicated that "any status is better than unincorporated territory"<sup>254</sup> of the United States.

In other words, the current status appropriated by the U.S. Congress to Guam is one that is minimal to say the least, behind the full powers of a state and even that of a commonwealth such as Puerto Rico.

As a mirror for the Guam case study, the U.S. Virgin Islands experienced a similar process in which "local dissension with the authoritarian administration and

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<sup>252</sup> Stereotypical Understandings of the East Coast is that it encompasses the Eastern Bloc of the United States geographically located next to the Atlantic Ocean, in particular Upper East Coast tends to vote liberal and Democrat. For the purposes of this dissertation the East Coast is used to illustrate that while differing domestic blocs tend to have different mindsets the citizens are nonetheless still Americans regardless of value-intricacies.

<sup>253</sup> Whereas stereotypical understandings of the South encompass largely the Southern States from Texas to Florida, in particular the Deep South tend to vote conservative and Republican. For the purposes of this dissertation the South is used to illustrate differing domestic blocs are still Americans regardless of value-intricacies.

<sup>254</sup> Gov. Eddie B. Calvo, "State of the Island Address," *Office of the Governor of Guam*, February 16, 2015.

economic malaise would make way for the 1936 Organic Act, granting the islands universal suffrage and a measure of self-government."<sup>255</sup>

To understand governance in the context of Guam, it is essential to have a firm grasp on how delegates from the territories work in the U.S. Congress and subsequently what powers they may or may not have to influence center periphery relations, most particularly access to committee leadership positions and access to conference committees. "Starting in 1973, the political parties in the House have recognized that these representatives not only have full voting rights in committees, but also seniority rights. The latter was crucial, because as mere 'additional members' of standing committees from 1871 to 1971, the statutory representatives had been excluded from the seniority system on committees."<sup>256</sup>

With this "the House (of Representatives) has extended to them still another privilege, one that greatly enhances their power as well as their potential for influence within the committee system and with regard to decisions taken both on the House floor and in the Senate-participation in conference committees."<sup>257</sup>

With neither the ability to vote for President nor the capacity to have full representation in Congress, the island is immediately relegated to 'second-class' status by default. U.S. citizenship, although internationally recognized, is no substitute to real political currency and sway that, for instance, swing states in the United States often have.

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<sup>255</sup> Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers, "The Comparative Context: Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, Deadlocks in American Geopolitics," *Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in a Comparative Perspective* (Amsterdam University Press: 2003), 53.

<sup>256</sup> Abraham Holtzman, "Empire and Representation: The U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* Vol. 11, no. 2 (May 1986): 261.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

The lack of political currency that the island leadership has because of the appropriated governing structure translates to inefficient if not incapacitated talks between Hagatna<sup>258</sup> and Washington.

As Swedish anthropologist Ronald Stade writes in his ethnography *Pacific Passages*, the author recognizes the divide between how Washington sees the island periphery and how Hagatna differs. Published in 1998, the author specifically tries to understand world society as culture, in particular using Guam as a case study for the differences of a long-colonized peripheral island's inner perception and how the center perceives one of the last remaining colonies in the world. Of particular significance, Stade was able to interview the United States Air Force's International Political-Military Affairs Office on July 29, 1994, leading to an astonishing view of Washington on the island periphery. In an "interview with the U.S. Air Force's strategic analysts in Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas and Captain Gilles Van Nederveen:

Douglas went on to say that the local people sometimes seem to forget that they are an American territory, which means that 'they are a possession, and not an equal partner.' Douglas gave an example: 'If California says that they want to do this or that, it is like my wife saying that she wants to move here or there: I'll have to respect her wish and at least discuss it with her. If Guam says they want to do this or that, it is as if this cup here [he pointed at his coffee mug] expresses a wish: the answer will be, you belong to me and I can do with you as best I please.'"<sup>259</sup>

Oblivious to the eventual repercussions of such words and such an interview, eventually led to an apology from the U.S. President after scathing dissent and opposition

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<sup>258</sup> Formal-title for the island's capital.

<sup>259</sup> Ronald Stade, *Pacific Passages: World Culture and Local Politics in Guam* (Gotab, Stockholm, 1998), 192-193.

from various local groups. Similarly, regardless of the cultural value, environmental urgency, or issues of human rights/decolonization surrounding certain negotiations such as the rebalance or political status, the heavily weakened or nonexistent power is not only clearly visible but would require drastic measures over time to correct.

Often times, the current mode of operations in the Guam-Washington relationship "reinforce(s) the dependent connections of the territory to the United States, the island's military importance, and also the spatial dimensions of the island as both at the edge of and periphery to the United States."<sup>260</sup> For center periphery relations, the governance dimension is incredibly crucial to understand as a fundamental understanding into the nature of peripheral relations. Much of the current self-government that the Government of Guam has is authorized by the GOA, which itself is an authorization by Congress. Via the GOA, one would understand what type of powers and the overall relationship the island has with Washington.

However, how the governance dimension is taken in the future, definitely not a short-mid term concern but rather a long-term concern will eventually become a matter of great concern for both the periphery and the center.

Similar to the Greenland case, there is a precedent in the nearby area where the current sovereign nation of Palau was formerly under the United States, passing from being Trust Territories of the United Nations, to the US. And, although Palau has achieved independence in 1994, there are two major areas that should be noted.

First, Palau is a state that has signed off on free association with the United States, which not only means closely linked ties and decisions between the two sovereigns, the

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<sup>260</sup> Tiara R. Na'puti and Michael Lujan Bevacqua, "Militarization and Resistance from Guahan: Protecting and Defending Pagat," *American Quarterly* Vol. 67, no. 3 (September 2015): 844.

United States also has a fifty-year military access to the country. Second, Guam has two major military bases, Anderson Air Force Base and the US Naval Base in Apra Harbor, and a soon to be expanded marine relocation on the island.

These areas of difference, particularly the latter, could mean that governance in the future of center periphery relations be either incredibly closely worded to what Palau may have (or perhaps even more US leaning given the current amount of military on the island), or move entirely to integration if the political will of the island's people are sufficient.

Only in either case, where there is a real move towards independence or integration with the US proper, will governance become an issue for center periphery relations. While it is immensely important to understand as part of the nature of peripheral relations, this is definitely not an item that would be a concern in the foreseeable future for the above reasons, not to mention the other rules such as a Guam plebiscite rendering the movement of governance difficult.

To the center, for the most part the island of Guam has been a relatively calm periphery that has not been difficult to maintain. While suffering a brief stint by the Japanese from 1941-1944, Washington has provided the island with its own self-government in the form of the Organic Act, and moreover has created an industry, the US military, for the island's economic survival.

As mentioned above, only when there is real political will from the island's people does the United States need to take serious concern of how the periphery may or may not act in relations with the center.

Guam does not have a voting delegate or proper representation to Congress and therefore poses little threat in terms of affecting how Washington may treat it. (Although, Guam may still lobby for many other items if they are not deemed to be influencing matters of Washington's own existential concerns or grand strategies). And the Guam legislature can pass as many resolutions as it wants, though this will have very little effect in the actual center periphery relationship.

Only if there is real movement in either independence or integration does the governance dimension cause concern for Washington, otherwise the current political standings of the periphery (as many have indicated) is most suitable for Washington's agenda in the Asia-Pacific and as a hegemon in the region.

To the periphery, the Organic Act is indeed a very difficult legislation on the island of Guam. While Washington has provided for Guamanians to be US citizens, the way the Organic Act has been structured, alongside the requirements of the Guam plebiscite makes it incredibly difficult if not outright impossible for the island-periphery to seek other roles and powers or movement in the governance dimension.

However, the longer the island-periphery relationship in this case the more it appears that integration rather than independence is becoming a much more plausible choice (and commonwealth was rejected earlier by the periphery). To the periphery, the issue of governance (or political status almost) is one that is constantly brought to attention, as unlike Greenland there is no proper representation for the Guamanian people in Washington.

Governance as a dimension is perhaps one of the more important aspects to focus on in the framework analysis.



How the island periphery acts or may act is entirely written into the legal framework provided in the GOA. While there may be instances where the island periphery diverges from the written law, but that is far and few between.

As stated, governance should be considered more important than history, on equal footing with culture or even more important in the long run, and should be one of the very first details understood in the nature of peripheral relations.

On the other hand, one should be very careful not to take the aspect one-dimensionally and build a mindset surrounding just the governance powers of the periphery. That is exactly the reason for many misgivings between the center and periphery in many cases that should not occur if other dimensions are taken into consideration.

As such, the understanding of governance should be essential but in complementation to the other parts of the framework analysis, that is how the framework differs from previous researchers and where the analysis could provide real change and real understanding into the differences in center periphery relations.

Overall, the governance dimension as discussed above should be considered a long-term concern as the actual movement from the periphery into either independence or integration vis-à-vis Washington is currently at a glacial pace and into the foreseeable future.

The Kissinger files, under the analytical framework of this dissertation, demonstrates how center periphery relations may operate behind closed doors. Certainly, it is a historical document between then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Ambassador Scali of the United States to the U.N., however these declassified files

illustrate how Washington, almost fifty-years ago, discussed island-peripheries such as Puerto Rico and Guam and the differences between agreement in principle and acting upon said agreements. Five decades later, as transparency and responsible governance, as well as technological advances allowing for accountability and accessibility, become more crucial in center periphery relations examining these files not only allows for a comparison into the change that has occurred in Washington-Guam relations over the years, but also what has not changed in terms of leverage and perspective, as reflected in Stade's 1998 research *Pacific Passages* including interviews with high-ranked military officials<sup>261</sup> on Washington's, in particular the Department of Defense's view, of the island-periphery. Even here, the difference is obvious, transparency and accountability thirty-years from the Kissinger files led to a different environment that eventually had the interviewees held accountable with an apology from the U.S. President. Another twenty-years from that interview, or currently in 2018, an even more aggressive call for transparency and accountability in center periphery relations, may shift Washington-Guam center periphery relations, despite the overall power structure or leverage still favoring Washington over Guam. Therefore, the need for the Kissinger files and Stade's research and interview to demonstrate in a chronological manner the evolution of center periphery relations from behind closed door, to accountability despite traditional views, and finally, in this dissertation the balance in leverage and roles and powers between Washington-Guam in the modern-day era.

For further illustration on this shift in Washington-Guam center periphery relations, the following Supreme Court case of *Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle*, argued and

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<sup>261</sup> U.S. Air Force's strategic analysts in Guam; Lieutenant Colonel Douglas and Captain Gilles Van Nederveen

decided on two years ago in 2016, will further highlight what the insular cases means in terms of Washington-Guam center periphery relations, to what extent territorial/commonwealth status affects center periphery relations, and the reality of Washington-Guam center periphery relations as overseen by Washington (the Federal Government), the periphery (Puerto Rico, yet applicable at large to Guam), and the Supreme Court's analysis and clarification for Washington-Guam center periphery relations in recent times.

***The Supreme Court Case of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, Et Al.***

While only related to the island of Guam on tangent yet still critically important, the current Supreme Court case of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Luis M. Sanchez Valle, Et Al. argued early January 2016 does touch upon what the third branch of the federal government--the judiciary--feel regarding the rule of law and its effects on territorial governance and powers, including Guam; a case potentially influential enough that the United States is amicus curiae in the matter.

While the main objective of the court case is to determine the power of prosecution in a double-jeopardy situation, the Supreme Court justices in the hearing go extensively into what the law does or does not say on territories, directly and indirectly.

For instance, in Justice Ginsburg's point of question to 48 U.S.C. 1704<sup>262</sup>, the counsel responds and reasserts that while there is "a measure of self-government [delegated] to...particular territories...each of them, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and

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<sup>262</sup> U.S.C. 1704 (48), "Concurrent jurisdiction; exceptions for national defense purposes," Accessed Dec. 2019, <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title48-section1704&num=0&edition=prelim#sourcecredit>

American Samoa are still governed by [different] Organic Acts of Congress, as was Puerto Rico prior to 1952."<sup>263</sup>

While counsel was making an attempt for his argument, he indirectly has reminded the court that the powers that Guam has to govern with are sourced directly from Congress vis-à-vis an organic act that is delegated and could be modified according to the will of the federal government.

In a separate segment further into the case, counsel even goes as far as describing that the "government of the Virgin Islands is itself a creature of Congress" which as Guam is in an identical situation connotes that the Guamanian government is similarly a creature of Congress.

Being rather aware of the delicacies to the *Commonwealth v. Valle* case, Justice Breyer has mentioned, "If we simply write an opinion and it says, Puerto Rico is sovereign, that has enormous implications. The insular cases<sup>264</sup> are totally changed in their applications. On the other hand, if we write an opinion that says it's just a territory, that has tremendous implications."<sup>265</sup>

Either way, the impact of this case on governance, not only for Puerto Rico but including Guam, may be significant if not already important to the clarity of judicial interpretations of law and congressional acts from the United States' highest-court perspective.

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<sup>263</sup> *Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle Et Al*, 579 U.S. 1, (2015).

<sup>264</sup> Juan R. Torruella, *Ruling America's Colonies: The Insular Cases*, 32 *Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.* (2013).

<sup>265</sup> *Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle Et Al*, 579 U.S. 1 (2015).

It is interesting to observe, that, counsel for the commonwealth is interpreting that "Congress has plenary authority over the territories under the Territorial Clause"<sup>266</sup> and further argues that "Congress is not the prisoner of its plenary authority; it is the master of plenary authority."<sup>267</sup> The Territorial Clause is highly significant in that it is legally sourced power for Washington's judiciary as well as Guam's government in understanding how the United States currently has set precedent and sees the island-periphery. It is important to note that matters regarding power may come from the United States Congress, however the manner in which the island periphery of Guam has to move within the federal structure or the domestic hierarchy is alternatively, outside of Congress, through the judicial branch in which the Territorial Clause has been imprinted in the rule of law.

Here, the statement speaks volumes regarding the degree of powers the Guamanian government may have as well as the ability for modification to this governing arrangements in the future; the former being close to none as all power sits with Congress, the latter being rather hopeful as Congress may alter the peripheral relationship as the counsel for the commonwealth insists has happened in 1950 with Puerto Rico in the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950.<sup>268</sup>

Moving away from the counsel for the commonwealth to the counsel for the United States, Ms. Saharsky states that the opinion of the executive branch is that "territories derive their ultimate power from Congress [sic]. That's [sic] true by virtue of

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<sup>266</sup> Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle Et Al, 579 U.S. 1 (2015).

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

<sup>268</sup> Public Law 81-600, Date Accessed Dec. 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/81st-congress/session-2/c81s2ch446.pdf>

the Territory Clause."<sup>269</sup>--An explicit assertion of the federal executive government in the judicial setting. And, while touching upon history, there is another instance of enlightening into the governance aspect of the peripheral relationship when Justice Sotomayor (herself a Puerto Rican), reminds counsel that "the Court pointed to the fact that, when these islands pass laws, they could be vetoed by Congress or -- or were -- that was the Organic Act. Congress was appointing their legislature, in part, or they were appointing colonial governors...that made them classic territories."<sup>270</sup>

Here, Justice Sotomayor reminds us that the Organic Act passed by Congress is historically intentionally different from the way it is assumed in modern day. As the organic act was in the historical past, the federal government often had non-indigenous individuals take on significant roles in their respective territories. Today, that relationship has shifted. In the future, that shift could evolve into something larger.

With reference to the Territory Clause, Chief Justice Taney's ruling on the power of Congress, the purpose and scope of the provision, require further explanation and clarity. In *Scott v. Sanford*, a landmark decision on constitutional law (though widely criticized), "made clear that the Constitution does not grant Congress the power to indefinitely administer territorial acquisitions under its 'plenary powers,' creating in effect a colonial regime."<sup>271</sup> Though the Spanish way of colonialism, Guam's previous imperial power, itself towards their islands and further inhabitants "has become a permanent modus operandi"<sup>272</sup> should not be regarded as such in the United States. Moreover, critics from law observers assert that "The Constitution does not authorize the United States to

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<sup>269</sup> *Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle Et Al*, 579 U.S. 1 (2015).

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer joined by Justice Sotomayor.

<sup>271</sup> Juan R. Torruella, "Ruling America's Colonies: The 'Insular Cases'," *Yale Law & Policy Review* Vol. 32, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 67.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*

hold territory or its citizens in such a condition; the *Insular Cases* and *Balzac* validated this colonial status in direct contravention of the words and values of the Constitution. These cases were wrongly decided ab initial."<sup>273</sup>

These cases themselves and the arguments that follow carry substantively more depth and insight than what has been selectively taken for the arguments of this dissertation. Nonetheless, quite a few points in the governance dimension has been explained or at least enlightened by a convincingly raw primary source less than a year old explaining the judiciary and the executive's interpretations on said peripheral relationships.

Coming back to governance as a dimension, it is ironically one of the strongest weakening dimension to the peripheral relationship from Hagatna's point of view. A *primary-concern* that would be increasingly difficult to resolve without a finished plebiscite, strong-leadership, and political will of the islanders in subjects such as the island's political status or rebalance build-up.

#### ***4.2.4 Natural Resources and Industry***

Economically speaking, beyond tourism and military installments, Guam holds very little in terms of *natural resources* such as minerals, oil, or gas. Even if the ocean is abundant in resource, there are environmental concerns as well. However, a lack of resources is not indicative of future roles or powers in terms of the peripheral relationship for the Guam Washington case.

While there would be major sway had vast amounts of natural resources been well-hidden, discovered, and utilized for major industries, other nation-states or former colonies, *despite not being in a peripheral relationship per se but existed very much in*

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<sup>273</sup> Ibid., 94.

*the periphery*, such as Hong Kong<sup>274</sup> or Singapore<sup>275</sup> were able to adapt, in spite of their circumstances, to create major political, economic, and industrial hubs regardless of their lack of resources.

It is the agenda or the incentives of the center that often can transform the periphery within a short span of time. How that actually may occur again depends on the nature of the peripheral relationship, and the understanding of issues through a framework as the thesis suggests in reaching optimal heights between the two parties.

To be pragmatic, however, is to acknowledge that there are no readily available natural resources in the near to far future. Instead, focusing on developing current major industries, regardless of political positions, would be more practical as a tool in future inter-state negotiations of role and powers vis-à-vis Washington.

Regarding the natural habitat of the island, advocates for protecting the island-periphery come from the original landowners themselves, with Lou Flores Bejado<sup>276</sup> stating "We're here because we want to protect our sacred lands, We're tired of the effort to destroy our lands and create this militarization."<sup>277</sup>

Adding, "There's so much culture that is a part of this land, and if you see the beauty of this land, it brings me sadness to see the destruction that will occur, We're here to say enough is enough. As they continue to move forward with their plans to destroy our property, we say shame on them. In Chamorro, we call it 'tai respetu' have some

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<sup>274</sup> John Page, and E. Campos, "The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy," *World Bank, Washington DC* (1993).

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Granddaughter of Ritidian's original landowners Benigno Leon Guerro Flores and Dolores Martinez Flores

<sup>277</sup> Chloe B. Babauta, "Residents hold candlelit vigil for Ritidian," *Guam Pacific Daily News*, Published Jan. 15, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/01/15/residents-hold-candlelight-vigil-ritidian/1032350001/>



respect for our people and our island, because they are just strangers here"<sup>278</sup>, noting an obvious divide between the indigenous populace and the United States military's perspective on natural resources and in particular the island-periphery as a whole.

Guam's single delegate to Congress, Madeleine Bordallo in open support asserts "that the military should own less, not more, land on Guam" stating that her role in Congress is "to hold the Defense Department accountable for the 'net negative' pledge, whereby the military will have a smaller footprint on Guam and more military land is transferred to GovGuam and, ultimately, the people of Guam."<sup>279</sup>

Crossing-over to the Security dimension, yet still a part of the natural resources and industry dimension as detailed below. Officially-speaking, Guam is a significantly strategic territory in the Asia-Pacific that allows the United States access to the nearby routes and waters, serves as a refueling station, hosts various military exercises, and a variety of other purposes that forwards the U.S. agenda. From thought to practice, the idea is very much true in reality as well. With two major military installments, Anderson Air Force Base and Apra Naval Base, nuclear-attack submarines, anti-missile defense, amongst others, the evidence points to a security and strategy effort that is not only being realized but is continually advancing with joint-government efforts, for instance, by the United States and Japan in terms of marine-deployments and costs associated with the rebalance strategy. Most recently, in "April 2014, President Obama issued a U.S.-Japan

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<sup>278</sup> Ibid.

<sup>279</sup> Kasmira Engichy, "Bordallo Responds to Prutehi Litekyan group," *Guam Pacific Daily News*, Published Dec. 16, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/12/16/bordallo-responds-detail-prutehi-litekyan-groups-october-letter/957743001/>

Joint Statement, reaffirming that ‘the United States and Japan are...making sustained progress towards...the development of Guam as a strategic hub.’”<sup>280</sup>

In regards to center periphery relations, natural resources and industries will instead focus on the lack of such a dimension and how that affects the nature of peripheral relations. Guam currently has two major industries on the island that have developed over the past century, the military industry and the tourism industry. Neither of these industries is due to the actualization of natural resources on or around the island. One could possibly argue that the tourism industry is based off of the oceans, beaches, and Hawaii-like piece of America mentality that has tourists flocking from East Asian countries, however that is still more industry than procurement of raw resources in the sense that Greenland has with minerals, oil, gas, and so forth. As such, the lack of a similar dimension in the periphery creates even more transparency and importance to how other dimensions play a role in center periphery relation.

With regards to the center, the apparent lack of natural resources or industries (as the military industry is a result of security concerns not of the periphery itself in a strict 'nature' term), provides Washington with quite a bit of leverage in terms of what it can do in the relationship, how it will go about doing so, and primarily serves as an economic leverage over the island periphery.

The lack of natural resources or industries likewise means that if the center has strong ambitions and certain agenda, it can create incentives for the periphery to follow if the resources are available. Usually the idea of carrot and stick is played out between two nation states on a bilateral level, however the notion works here as well. Washington may very well deal a carrot/stick play with Guam in order to achieve what its interests and due

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<sup>280</sup> Kan, Summary.

to the lack of such a dimension, the island periphery may become very restricted in terms of viable economic options.

A bit darker but along the same lines, once Washington has its island periphery 'addicted' per se to what the center provides for the island, then it would be very hard to become 'clean' of these influences, particularly the longer the relationship lasts and the more inclusive yet still exclusive (think US citizens yet no representation) that the military industry becomes.

On Guam's side, this is a very real concern or an existential crisis to the island periphery. Without substantial natural resources or viable industries to survive on, the island periphery may have very little say in the direction it wants its own future to be, particularly if the island becomes more and more reliant on the US military and federal government for subsidies or as an economic factor. It really depends on which position the island periphery takes in terms of how to view such an issue.

If the island periphery has a more independence or Guam centric position, than the tourism industry should be a larger more primal focus, and Washington's encroachment with the marine relocation becomes a concern to the periphery's abilities in managing island affairs.

On the other hand, if integration with the United States is the position, than such an expansion by the Washington, if done properly, will greatly boost the island's significance and perhaps future role and power if the infrastructures, investments, and military means are well thought of.

This is a two way street, although much more so for the United States proper, that both the center and periphery may consider in the long term to see where the relationship may eventually carry itself towards.

Obviously, there will be other factors to consider including the political will of the Guamanian people, the administration that is sitting in the central government at large, as well as even further factors of how North Korea may develop itself and how Japan may seek to normalize itself, and so forth.

For the most part, the periphery must understand where it sees itself in terms of major positioning before being able to form a proper analysis and opinion on where this dimension or lack thereof may affect the nature of peripheral relations moving forward.

In the overall framework, this dimension is very interesting for the fact that in both case studies this is the only instance where the dimension is more of a non-existing aspect. As such, the apparent lack thereof of such a dimension in the relationship gives more weight to other dimensions but as well poses as either a tremendous weakness or strength for the center more than the periphery to work with in terms of center periphery relations. Unlike the previous dimensions which all supplemented the analysis by enhancing upon the understandings between the center and periphery, this dimension removes itself and as a result creates more attention to the other dimensions and how they may play out in the overall analysis.

As a dimension, this is more than likely a mid-long term concern for policy matters as the lack of natural resources or viable multiple industries has been an area that is ongoing for an extended period of time. Therefore, only with either tremendous political will towards one particular position on the part of the periphery or grand strategy

changes on the part of the center will this dimension or lack thereof show itself to be either an opportunity or a disadvantage towards the relationship.

#### ***4.2.5 Defense-Security***

Without a doubt, the *other* principal concern amongst the dimensions, *security*, both conceptual and in reality, has 'secured' the island's near future so-to-speak as any shifts in the region, independently, and so forth would translate as drastic breaches to U.S. power, public-image, and the internal-workings of the region. In the long-term, however, security may have indirectly doomed the island—or, as former Guam-Congressman Robert Underwood declares as the island's "birthmark curse"<sup>281</sup>—relegating her to a minor status without full powers for an extended period of time; until a point where a decision in political status by the islanders would not hinder nor hurt the original intentions and blueprint of the United States.

So far, in assessing the *nature* of the island's peripheral relationship, *security* and *governance* has been evaluated as critical concerns that affects Guam's (or keep Hagatna? Guam's capital is referred to as such...) role and powers in inter-state negotiations with Washington *strategically, permanently, and to a great-extent*, whilst *history, culture, and natural resources* are less significant although they do influence the overall nature of peripheral relations without the intensity as the aforementioned.

In terms of the nature of peripheral relations, security is certainly the majority if not entirely the dimension that influences how this center peripheral duo interacts.

As mentioned very early in this thesis, as soon as the strategic significance of the Azores Islands of Portugal began to diminish following more permanent peaceful times,

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<sup>281</sup> Robert Underwood in one-on-one author interview, Aug-2014.

the periphery saw a decline in many areas and could not diversify quick enough to prevent its relationship from drastically changing, perhaps not for the better.

Here, the same ideology applies where the strategic security value of Guam's positioning and identity as a U.S. territory in the Asia-Pacific plays a great deal into the foundation and future of center periphery relations.

Unlike the Azores island periphery of Portugal, however, the likelihood of Guam's strategic value diminishing due to peacetime or a cool down of defense security issues in the region is highly unlikely given the current state of international affairs in the region and America's overall hegemony.

Without a major shift in international relations in the area, security will remain the single most influencing factor that shapes the nature of peripheral relations between Guam and Washington, though of course not the only dimension.

It is incredibly important to stress that while security plays an incredible role into the dynamics between Guam and Washington, without understanding the roles of the governance dimension or culture dimension is akin to not understanding the balance of powers in the American governmental system.

In a way, these dimensions, while not checks and balances, to influence one another and that in turn influences how the peripheral relationship takes form.

To the center, the island of Guam really seems like a hidden gem from God that at the time of the Spanish American War was not as apparent, even Spain herself neglected the island for much of its three hundred year rule.

With the advancement of technology and progression of international affairs, the island periphery has become an essential part of Washington's grand strategy or

maintaining hegemony over the region. Without the island periphery, Washington is not able to support its allies, such as South Korea or Japan, with the air or naval force located on the island.<sup>282</sup> Likewise, without Guam, Washington is unable to alleviate the pressures of US military installations in the region.

In addition, the reality that the island periphery is a US possession allows the US military or Washington to, in the name of security or defense matters, have considerable freedom in what it wants to do with its own agenda vis-à-vis the periphery and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Asia at large. For Washington, the significance of Guam in terms of strategy at the same time being a US possession, these two must be considered simultaneous to be aware of the potential to the center, cannot be understated and is a considerable perspective with which the center views center periphery relations.<sup>283</sup>

On the other side, the periphery is also very much aware of her growing significance as a strategic periphery in the region. Likewise, it understands the limitations to roles and powers given the governance factor and lack of natural resources or industries. Though, the opposite may have begun to occur in which statehood has become more actively pursued by the island periphery, particularly under current Governor Eddie Calvo's administration.

As the political will of the Guamanian people becomes clear over the next decades, perhaps through polling or elections, than this dimension may prove to be extremely beneficial for the island's interests.

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<sup>282</sup> Shirley A Kan, "Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments," *Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress* (2014).

<sup>283</sup> Julianne Smith, Erik Brattberg, and Rachel Rizzo, "Transatlantic Security Cooperation In the Asia-Pacific", Center for a New American Security, October 2016,

Either way, the status quo simply does not work for the periphery and as such Guam should be actively pursuing a path to either closer or further ties from the US.

As it stands, while Guam may be aware of its own strategic significance or the role that it could possibly play in the region or in center periphery relations, due to the other dimensions these are but understandings that have very little translation into leverage or power for interactions between the center and periphery. Rather than sheer size or population, though that is considerable to note, the available natural resources, economic resources ultimately leads to either more autonomy or self-governance and financial independence that in turn leads to leverage, leading to negotiations, and therefore power negotiations.

There are even open suggestions that Washington or more precisely the US military simply comes to the island, informs or disregards the island, and then leaves the periphery with little regard for the voice of Guamanian people and the periphery. There is no incentive to do so and no real cause to do so other than perhaps moral obligation. Only if the periphery is able to have a united voice in a large enough and consistent enough manner, such as Catalonia with Spain, will there be even a little bit of change to the nature of peripheral relations. Meaning political will and cohesiveness is far more important, evidence of such is in the inability to hold referendum, or rejection of commonwealth status.<sup>284</sup>

As it stands, while the island periphery is aware of the situation it may not be able to do very much without representation, perhaps the only options (that are certainly worth considering) are to use Washington's own established federal laws in protecting the

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<sup>284</sup> Speaker Judi Won Pat, Lt. Governor Tenorio, Dr. Natividad in one-on-one interviews with author, 2015.



island's interests or using the judicial process in order to achieve more power and means that will influence how dimensions such as security and governance play out.

While security may influence all peripheries or all states, there is a difference in the ability to influence Washington, California has representation in both the Senate and the House of representatives, and together with meaningful unification of party be it the Democrats or Republicans, concerns met with enough unity translates into legal change from within the system, something that a territory would have a much more difficult time to do as the delegate's vote is powerless, though in the committee vote, there is some influence.

As a concern, while it is incredibly important, any shifts to the security dimension and influences to the nature of peripheral relation are moderate at best. However, to policy matters this dimension may perhaps be a very immediate concern and deemed a short-term concern. It would really have to depend on what the subject at hand is. For instance, if it is the political future of the island, then this would be a mid-long term concern, whereas the natural resources or industries may become more pressing, while if an issue like the buildup is brought up, then of course as expected the security dimension would be a more pressing short term area of concern.

To the framework, this dimension is really an example of how a single dimension (i.e. security) could be so expansive that readers often times lose sight of the other dimensions and the roles and influences other dimensions play in the analysis. Similar to the natural resources dimension in the Greenland case, this is a highly determining aspect for center periphery relations and only with proper care in conjunction with the other dimensions can a true analysis via the framework be realized.

What this means is that while it is an important part of the framework, because it is so important it is often thought of as the only issue. Obviously, this is not the case, so care and thought and much consideration should be put into understanding this dimension, particularly how it relates to the whole of the peripheral relationship and to the other dimensions. Instead of purely definite answers to *which roles* and *what powers*, at the end of the investigative process, it becomes apparent as to the key influencers that structure the inter-state negotiations and narratives.

In the Guahan case study, to discover the proper roles/powers to the island, the subjects of security and governance must lead before the other dimensions can be addressed. Otherwise, it is an inefficient alternative that is moving away from the end-goal rather than towards it. Therefore, understanding the nature of peripheral relations thus serves to better clarify the underlying reasons behind which roles and what powers the island serves vis-à-vis the United States.

Alternatively, *however*, the investigation does allow separate takes on the relationship by opening possibilities, for instance, using secondary concerns as motion to pressure primary concerns. Though judgment would lie in the interpretation of the dimensions and the strategy being implemented.

### **4.3 Political Status: Guam**

Understanding the nature of the peripheral relationship subsequently allows for the analysis or question of intent and purpose to begin.

A case within the case, in reference to the political status issue, in 1982 the first self-determination plebiscite was held on Guam regarding her political status vis-à-vis the United States with the following five political options: Statehood, Commonwealth, Status

Quo, Independence, and Free Association; in the end Commonwealth and Statehood were the top-two with Commonwealth prevailing but eventually collapsed at the executive branch.<sup>285</sup> In 1997, the Guam Decolonization Commission was established and revised the original plebiscite to one with three terminal options based on a mandate by the United Nations, namely: Statehood, Independence, and Free Association.<sup>286</sup>

Whilst many definitions exist for what a colony represents, none is more eloquent than the following, "A colony is 'a territory, subordinate in various ways—political, cultural, or economic—to a more developed country. Supreme legislative power and much of the administration rest[s] with the controlling country, which [is] usually of a different ethnic group from the colony.'"<sup>287</sup>

As a reminder, while the Organic Act serves as a local constitution for Guam, the island does not retain the same powers that are reserved to American states, as the US Congress "retains plenary power (that is, authority) to amend the act or to enact any legislation it wishes for Guam without the consent of Guamanian US citizens"<sup>288</sup>; including political status. Due to insufficient funding, low voter-registration as required by law, etc., the political status of Guam has remained in question without too much advancement in any one direction.

We need to note that if Washington and Hagatna had a near identical understanding on the island's political status, whether in total concurrence or dissent, then the island would have already attained, for instance, the status of commonwealth,

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<sup>285</sup> LisaLinda Natividad, "U.N. Decolonization Statement - Statement by Representative of Guam," *United Nations*, PRS/2012/CRP.9 May 30 - June 1, 2012.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Juan R. Torruella, "Ruling America's Colonies: The 'Insular Cases'," *Yale Law & Policy Review* Vol. 32, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 58.

<sup>288</sup> E. Robert Statham Jr., "Reformation of the Guam Legislature," *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 3:4 (1997): 127.

etc. However, since there *is a difference in intent* on the subject matter, therefore plebiscites *were held* and *negotiations* did occur. To what extent did the role or powers of the periphery influence said negotiations is what is to be explored and assessed.

With that said, referring to the nature of the relationship to explain the periphery vis-à-vis the center, governance and security has already been established previously as *key natural dimensions* that influence the circumstances. Unfortunately for the island-periphery, the assessment of both dimensions translates to a removal of powers and an already designated or delegated role for the island.

To illustrate, the act of the U.S. Congress in the GOA determined the political status years before, likewise the decision of the executive branch resulted in failed negotiations (*Washington's intent*) that the island leadership had to accept despite the conclusive vote of a desired Commonwealth status (*Guam's intent*). And, as the rationale below insinuates, the island's role as a territory is seen as *precisely* the logic for why the *center's* interests is to dissolve the political status issue. Unless Hagatna can reassure Washington that any shift in her political status is a beneficial move for Washington, then save a whirlwind combination of outstanding leadership, political will, plebiscites, and copious lawsuits, the case is perhaps closed for the foreseen future.

In reality, political status as an issue should show mutual benefits to both the island and the United States if there is a desire to achieve concrete outcomes. Though, at the current stage of complacency on-island, it appears difficult to use human rights, political will, etc. to push the agenda.

As a former Congressman from Guam and President of the University of Guam, Robert "Underwood...[states] 'the desire for political fulfillment will always be a feature

of Guam's ongoing relationship with the US. At times, this desire will appear dormant and then it will spring to life as it did in the 1930s and 1940s and again in the 1970s and 1980s."<sup>289</sup> Moreover, only by understanding the "surge of indigenous agitation"<sup>290</sup> can primary concerns be resolved. As a subject, however, it is an almost dead-issue at the moment; ironic as the role and powers are *in part* defined precisely because of a lack in political will for role and powers.

#### ***4.3.1 Purpose and Intent Specific to the Island of Guam Case Study***

Taking a closer-look into the political status issue, as legal-expert Hannah M.T. Gutierrez notes, "Guam has its own experience and historical relationship with the United States...[and] Indeed, U.S. citizenship—and the fifty-year quest to obtain that status [sic]—has been an integral part of Guam's history and experience. [As such, it] can and should be a significant part of any future relationship with the United States."<sup>291</sup> In reference to the U.S. citizenship, as a part of the political status issue, Gutierrez echoes the intents of a vast-majority of Chamorros and Guamanians living on the island. Regardless of how the situation is resolved, U.S. citizenship is seen as an irrefutable component of the historical struggle in roles and powers.

While status has been and still is fought through political and legislative channels—[with the] United States thwarting attempts through inaction or amnesia<sup>292</sup>—a majority of local leaders strongly affirm their U.S. affiliation/citizenship while

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<sup>289</sup> Quimby, 377.

<sup>290</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Crisostomo, "Strategic Guam," USAWC Strategy Research Project (2013), 24.

<sup>291</sup> Hannah M.T. Gutierrez, "Guam's Future Political Status," *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 4:1 (Winter 2003): 148.

<sup>292</sup> Valerie Solar Woodward, "Reading American Empire in Guam," *The Contemporary Pacific* 25:1 (2013): 72.

simultaneously seeking greater political autonomy, limits to federal power, and primacy for the island's indigenous.<sup>293</sup>

Regardless of the political-spectrum, island leaders such as Speaker Judi Won Pat (*Democrat*) and Governor Calvo (*Republican*) have common concerns and intents as related to Guam's political status.

The Speaker has "pondered the possibility of gathering women who represent local children's and women's shelters, decolonization activist groups, law firms, nonprofit organizations, private businesses, public health programs, and university departments to discuss U.S. militarization and indigenous sovereignty as one, unified group."<sup>294</sup> While the Governor, has said that, "For far too long the native people of Guam have been dealing with inequality of government. We have been dealing with taxation without full representation, with quasi-citizenship and partial belonging...it is time for us to realize our full political destiny, so we can take control and lead and live the way that is best for our people...to support our human rights as citizens of this world...[to support] our place in this world."<sup>295</sup>

On Washington's end, however, Congressional think-tank expert Shirley Kan asserts that the rationale for the military build-up (rebalance) on Guam is precisely due to the territory's status. As it stands, "the United States is not required to negotiate with sovereign countries on force deployments or face the risks of losing bases or access"<sup>296</sup>—vis-à-vis the territorial-island.

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<sup>293</sup> Frank Quimby, "Fortress Guahan," *The Journal of Pacific History* 46:3 (December 2011): 357.

<sup>294</sup> Keith L. Camacho, "After 9/11," *American Quarterly* 64:4 (December 2012): 701.

<sup>295</sup> Quimby, 378.

<sup>296</sup> Kan, 10.

In the end, *proper alignments of intent* within agreeable-terms would be a win-win of moral, ethical, and even *realpolitik* grounds, particularly in preventing an adverse power-struggle rising from differing end-points.

#### **4.4 Center's Perspective: Washington**

Washington's perspective of Guam, the island-periphery's strategic value, military matters, and so forth as aforementioned:

Following the issue of political status, a subsequent-case examining intent/subject, originally initiated during the Bush administration back in 2003,<sup>297</sup> the road to a rebalance in the Asia-Pacific was cemented by the Obama administration as an official state-policy or strategy that started with then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's op-ed in *Foreign Policy* (2011). Again, looking at the dimensions deemed principal in concern, the appropriated governance and subsequent security significance has forced the island to little or no say on this subject.

Already "home to six military installations and about 15,000 military personnel and their dependents. Almost one-third of the island is off-limits to its native population because of these military installations."<sup>298</sup> Higher-level negotiations, such as "In 2006, [as] US and Japanese officials, without consulting Chamorro leaders, agreed to relocate substantial American forces from Okinawa to Guam in conjunction with other realignments"<sup>299</sup> that do occur *hurt peripheral relations* in both scenarios. As an aside, it

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<sup>297</sup> Mark E. Manyin, et al., "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's 'Rebalancing' Toward Asia," *Congressional Research Service* CRS Report for Congress (2012): Summary.

<sup>298</sup> Woodward, 69.

<sup>299</sup> Quimby, 370.

is noted quite frequently that the "rise of the Asia-Pacific region may well prove to be the single most transformative geopolitical shift of the 21st century."<sup>300</sup>

Speaking as part of the Department of Defense, "US 7th Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, emphasized how 'Guam is a hub. Guam has geography and that will be enduring . . . it is now becoming very important to us again. Guam will always be strategically important because of its geography alone."<sup>301</sup> In addition, well-respected think-tank CSIS indicates that "Congress should be prepared to fund the fairly modest costs of modernizing U.S. facilities in Guam and elsewhere in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility. This would be an early indication to U.S. allies that the Congress and administration are prepared to work together to sustain momentum in our engagement of the region."<sup>302</sup>

Our own congresswoman has mentioned that despite the intentions of those on island, "We can [only] negotiate to a point, but if we overstretch we risk the entire program."<sup>303</sup> And that, the "setbacks and challenges that we have faced with the realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam are, to a certain extent, the result of a not clearly understood strategy that describes what the rebalance effort is truly about."<sup>304</sup>

*Clearly*, despite differences, Washington and Hagatna *intends* to move forward with rebalancing-related subjects, as indicated by the final SEIS w/ the record of decision following in late August 2015—at least in the negotiating sectors.

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<sup>300</sup> Majority Staff Report, Re-Balancing the Rebalance, 113th Congress, 2nd Session, S. Prt. 13.

<sup>301</sup> David Scott, "US Strategy in the Pacific," *Geopolitics* 17:3 (2012): 620.

<sup>302</sup> Michael J. Green, with Zack Cooper and Mira Rapp Hooper, "Defense," CSIS (Pivot 2.0), (January 2015), 6-7.

<sup>303</sup> Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Remarks Before the GUASA Conference, Office of Congresswoman Bordallo (Oct 2014), 1-6.

<sup>304</sup> Bordallo, 4.



*Secretary of the US Navy: Response to Congresswoman Bordallo*<sup>305</sup>

Dear Representative Bordallo:

Historic sites that cannot be avoided and will be directly affected by construction are subject to data recovery and recordation, in accordance with the 2011 PA. Once all known affected historic sites have undergone recovery, MEC clearance that is part of site preparation will proceed. In all cases, if previously unknown cultural sites are discovered, the 2011 PA requires that they be isolated from construction work in order to allow further investigation in consultation with the Guam SHPO. Careful coordination with MEC clearance is required to ensure work is done in accordance with explosive safety requirements. Archaeologists are in charge of carrying out investigation and protection of such sites with the support of a MEC team.

Existing public access to recreational resources not directly affected by the LFTRC surface danger zone is an important and ongoing consideration in the DoD effort to develop an agreement with the Guam National Wildlife Refuge relative to the Congressionally authorized establishment of safety buffers on Department of Interior controlled lands at Ritidian.

Importantly, no cultural sites in the surface danger zone will be directly harmed by the construction or operation of the Live Fire Training Range Complex. As documented in detail in the Training Ranges Review and Analysis (TRRA) study, the range complex will be situated at an elevation of some 600 feet above the culturally sensitive locations in the Ritidian Unit.

Under the analytical framework, center periphery relations as described in this dissertation illustrates the balance that the Secretary of the U.S. Navy has taken in order to assure or rather re-assure the periphery of specific cultural and defense-security matters, in particular the expansion of the U.S. military on peripheral-territory as well as whether or not this infringes upon peripheral power under Washington's federal structure. Not only does the Secretary take specific precautions in highlighting issues that Guam's sole Congresswoman and delegate has risen, mainly as rhetoric to grassroots constituents,

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<sup>305</sup> "Secretary of the U.S. Navy: Response to Congresswoman Bordallo," *Secretary of the U.S. Navy*.

the Secretary takes additional steps to calm the periphery in matters such as culturally significant Ritidian as well as the periphery's environment-at-large.

Here, the Secretary's letter indicates a mid-high level response to the Congresswoman by addressing the historical, cultural, and defense-security dimensions while at the same time alluding to Washington's overarching powers above the periphery by using terms such as 'controlled lands'. The letter indicates attention to detail by pinpointing exactly which laws or departments affect which specific concerns raised by the Guam-delegate. Moreover, while there has been response by the grassroots organization mentioned by Congresswoman Bordallo, there has not been the same amount of media coverage, protests, or attention as there was previously when the Department of Defense acted upon the Pagat-case. This can be seen and used as support and reasoning for the analytical framework's execution involving specific matters related to center periphery relations after a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the periphery. As the letter illustrates, not only has three of the five dimensions been detailed upon, but a fourth dimension of Governance has also been tucked in between fine lines. As a result, the Ritidian issue or the Congresswoman's letter has become subtler rather than bombastic, as the Pagat-case has since turned infamous for.

In terms of purpose and intent, it seems clear that the Delegate and the Secretary have an understanding between each other through their letters that the grassroots organization has since rejected yet failed to achieved lasting effect. As the Delegate intends on balancing center periphery relations in Guam's favor and the Secretary obligated to the Congresswoman under Washington's federal structure, the purpose and intents of both parties in clarifying rather than smoke-mirroring the peripheral-audience

is apparent in the structured manner of the questions and answers as indicated above. In the short-term, both the Delegate and the Secretary appear to have fulfilled their respective duties to each other, to their audience, and to the balance in center periphery relations. However, in the mid-long term there is still much to be seen on whether or not Washington will carry through with the rather detailed yet rhetorical response written above.

### **Summary**

Beginning with the Secretary of the U.S. Navy's letter, Washington's perspective on Guam has been clear that the United States understands the Congresswoman's difficult position vis-à-vis her constituents. But, the Secretary also indicated that regardless of the situation, Washington will continue to operate strategic expansions as necessary though paying attention to the dimensions of concern or at least the majority of dimensions in order to balance center periphery relations, as an integrated periphery becomes far more powerful than it is now while an independent periphery may cooperate but no longer becomes an intrastate matter. Furthermore, the correspondence between the Delegate and the Secretary is thus highlighted with such significance is due to the fact that not only is there only one Delegate representing the periphery's voice and that the Secretary is fairly high in the chain of command save the Secretary of Defense, correspondence between the two have been far and few over the years, especially when concerns of Washington's strategic expansion is involved or environmental laws under the federal structure come into play.

That said, and as Shirley Kan of the Congressional think-tank aforementioned reminds us that the Washington has no obligation to negotiate with the intrastate

periphery but rather the obligation arises from the Secretary's respect or orchestration vis-à-vis a member of Congress, a partial member at that, to the island-periphery. Sasakwa Foundation researcher, Dr. Hornung, in his 2017 publication has recognized that, "Opponents often argued that the people of Guam did not have a chance to shape negotiations over their future that were essentially conducted by Washington and Tokyo."<sup>306</sup> And, that despite the overtly positive polling results in his piece, the consensus of concern from this dissertation's interviews echo a deeper concern within the community of voices gone unheard of in the often one-sided center periphery relationship.

#### 4.5 Periphery's Perspective: Guam

##### [Military Buildup (The Interviews)<sup>307</sup>]

As a collection of original sources, interviews regarding the paper's aforementioned aims were conducted with the intent to illuminate further insight into the paper's questions. Interview excerpts from selected individuals, as well as the data reflected in Tables 1-4, serve to highlight the prominence of roles/powers in peripheral discussions. Likewise, the excerpts showcase the respective voices of influential figures representing the leadership or grassroots etc. on key-matters such as the rebalance or political status for a more diverse and encompassing outlook.

*Table 1 Identity Composition*

<b>Identity</b>	<i>Chamorro</i>	<i>Guamanian</i>	<i>Amer./Guam.</i>	<i>Other.</i>
Interview-Members	81% (9)	0% (0)	9% (1)	9% (1)

<sup>306</sup> Jeffrey Hornung, "The U.S. Military Laydown on Guam: Progress Amid Challenges," *Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA*, (2017), p. 55.

<sup>307</sup> Each-interview part of a collection originally sourced by the author; individual profiles available on request; all quotes taken from interviews-directly.

<b>Total</b>	99% (11) <sup>308</sup>
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Source: Author's Compilation

Table 2 Member Associations

<b>Association</b>	<i>Leadership</i>	<i>In-Betweens</i>	<i>Grassroots</i>
Interview-Members	63% (7)	18% (2)	18% (2)
<b>Total</b>	99% (11)		

Source: Author's Compilation

Table 3 Views of the Political Status Issue

<b>Political Status Issue</b>	<i>Free</i>			
	<i>Association</i>	<i>Independence</i>	<i>Statehood</i>	<i>N/A</i>
Interview-Members	63% (7)	9% (1)	9% (1)	18% (2)
<b>Total</b>	99% (11)			

Source: Author's Calculation

Table 4 Views on Guam's Role in the Peripheral Relationship (w/ Washington)

<b>Chess-Concept (Role of Periphery)</b>	<i>Potential</i>		
	<i>Pawn</i>	<i>Castle/Bishop</i>	<i>Queen/Etc.</i>
Interview-Members	72% (8)	27% (3)	[27% - 3]
<b>Total</b>	99% (11) & [27% - 3]		

Source: Author's Calculation

On the outlook of Guam's role and powers vis-à-vis the rebalance, *Speaker Won Pat* of the leadership states that, "Because we are a colony, because we are so small, there is really very little impact that we could have in terms of the relationship with the United States, being a powerful country." In addition, the U.S. uses the "Jones Act (*merchant marine act of 1920*), restrictions, etc. to keep us where they can control us, to become dependent to the United States and dollar." Furthermore, while "Japan is at the table, [the] US is at the table, we're not at the table at all, Okinawa is not at the table, they're overburdened too" in reference to negotiations and security affairs vis-à-vis the military buildup. While the Speaker cites the Jones Act as well as 'not sitting at the table' in arguing Guam's particular reality in roles/powers vis-à-vis the United States. Her words

<sup>308</sup> Number in parenthesis represents total number of individuals interviewed, w/ selections (votes) tallied into percentages.

are strikingly strong in resonating a sense of powerlessness at dealing with the central government-at-large from the periphery's perspective.

Offering institutional insight, a frequent guest to Guam and an in-between in this paper, former Minister of State for External Affairs (U.S. Virgin Islands) *Dr. Corbin* explains that, for instance, "[We're] not members of the United Nations. At a disadvantage, we could not negotiate. Just provided information. But, [we] did belong to other bodies (international)." As such, you could get "something tabled and adopted to move policy forward (at a higher level)" to "influence the process." Therefore, according to *Dr. Corbin*, as petitioners at the U.N. during the decolonization (political status) hearings, Guam may have been simply subjects being discussed, however, membership or participation in other forms and forums did allow the island to create its own role/power to influence subsequent actions; a different outlook globally versus the earlier domestic one.

Guam-academic and president of the Guahan Coalition for Peace & Justice, *Dr. Natividad* believes that while, "[Guam] do[esn't] sit at the table [being] absolutely a pawn. A piece of [inexpensive] real estate. [With the] lack of political power [in part] because of the political status issues", the "US absolutely hates to be shamed" internationally. Thus, despite a "One-sided and abusive relationship driven by what America needs and wants", *Dr. Natividad* asserts that Guam's roles/powers can be expanded and achieved through generating greater political will via global activism and awareness of the issues such as colonization or military buildup.

On a calmer-note, slightly differing from earlier critics, *President Underwood* states that "Guam's role and America's ability to project power into this environment, is

not as a policeman but rather a stabilizing force" and that "the issues of Guam are not of intellectual stance but rather political will." As a former congressman as well, President Underwood presents a more diplomatic tone in discussing the aforesaid issues, asserting that in the right-time and right-place, negotiating roles/powers is not impossible nor improbable, but patience and readiness are key rather than "political theatre."

Our last influential excerpt, lawsuit lead attorney *Leevin Camacho* emphasizes that while "Change in numbers, or force posture, permanent to rotations, was between the politics of the governments and funding, something like live fire range areas or site, [he is] extremely confident was affected by lawsuit." Camacho asserts that the "power of the people and the power of the law was what prevailed." Moreover, in addressing fears of apathy to Guam-related issues such as decolonization or the military buildup, Camacho said "Hawaii is an example of resurgence in identity so we shouldn't be looking at it in a linear fashion." That, "it is not about the majority vs. the minority. [Rather], it is about rights (*mentions interracial marriage*)."

Separately, on ways the periphery may influence the process, Camacho considers "political capital that you create with lawsuits is what you need" as a power of the periphery. Claiming the most-recent victorious lawsuit against the Department of Defense as "symbolically, a water-shed moment" providing a practical/legal perspective outside of institutional/global awareness initiatives. All in all, the interviews signify and illustrate in detail, from institutional insight to political and legal perspectives, the voice and outlook from the periphery *adding to* center-periphery discourse.

***Guam Delegate Madeleine Bordallo:***

## ***Response to Grassroots Prutehi Litekyan<sup>309</sup> (Save Ritidian)***

Your letter cites concerns regarding impacts...on Litekyan (Ritidian) and Tailalo' (Northwest Field). The proposed LFTRC will be constructed entirely inside the fence at Andersen Air Force Base...There will be no range construction below the cliff line or elsewhere within Litekyan (Ritidian).

Not acquiring any new land is one of the military's commitments made to the people of Guam under the "Four Pillars" of the buildup.

I am committed to ensuring that the military lives up to the letter and the spirit of the federal National Historic Preservation Act and their commitments regarding historic and cultural preservation on Guam.

Finally, as part of the Marine relocation, the military is making substantial investments in civilian infrastructure and cultural preservation programs on Guam. Recently, the Defense Department awarded GovGuam \$12 million in federal funding to plan, design, and build a Guam Cultural Repository. When completed, this will be a state-of-the-art facility dedicated to the preservation of Guam's Chamorro cultural artifacts: a first for our island. Without this Cultural Repository and dedicated Chamorro preservationists on staff, I am concerned that some of Guam's most unique artifacts and cultural heritage may be lost forever to time, the elements, and an ever-changing world.

As a senior Democratic member of the House Armed Services Committee, which provides oversight for the Defense Department, I fought hard against conservative Republicans in Congress to secure the necessary federal authorization and funding for this Cultural Repository.

Federal law—the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.)—require that the military protect public drinking water supplies, including northern Guam's aquifer. Under federal law, the Defense Department is obligated to safeguard our aquifer from any/all potential sources of contamination from the proposed LFTRC or any

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<sup>309</sup> Description as follows: "We, the Guam-based group Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, are a direct action group dedicated to the protection of natural and cultural resources in all sites identified for DOD live-fire firing training on Guam."



other military-related activity on Guam. It is also important to note that the military has a direct, vested interest in protecting the aquifer: that is where their drinking water supply comes from too.<sup>310</sup>

In Congresswoman Bordallo's response to the grassroots organization Prutehi Litekyan, the Delegate has offered the same type of assurance offered to her by the Secretary of the Navy. Again, this is a structured and detailed letter that not only holds details that refer to at least three of the five dimensions, the historical, the cultural, and defense-security, the Congresswoman also indicates her rank and positioning within Washington's structure in order to achieve the highest priority for the periphery in the intrastate center periphery relation.

### **Analysis of Selected Interview Material<sup>311</sup>**

#### **Attorney Camacho**

As per the 'We Are Guahan' v. the Department of Defense (DoD) lawsuit, Attorney General of Guam, Leevin Camacho has stated that as "a lawyer, [he] was lead for We Are Guahan in [the] participation for the lawsuit." And that with respect to the Department of Defense, Washington was "trying to control the narrative, but there weren't any alternatives that DoD was considering, [so] to say that they changed their mind voluntarily...[DoD] w[as] sued precisely to include alternatives, Northwest Field, Ritidian [as an] option" in which the attorney general further insisted that the lawsuit had "Absolutely, affected [the] outcome" of DoD's [final] decision." This is a strong and concrete example of utilizing peripheral legal powers within the federal judicial system

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<sup>310</sup> Kasmira Engichy, "Bordallo Responds to Prutehi Litekyan group," *Guam Pacific Daily News*, Published Dec. 16, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2017/12/16/bordallo-responds-detail-prutehi-litekyan-groups-october-letter/957743001/>

<sup>311</sup> Interviews with Attorney Camacho, Speaker Barnes, Speaker Won-Pat, and Vice Speaker Cruz all held in separate one-on-one discussions with author (2014-2015).

with the outcome being seen as a periphery-leaning victory or result for the people and island of Guam.

While the rotations of the military and subsequent effects on the island military buildup is more between the government of Japan and the United States, Camacho asserts that the removal of the ancient Chamorro burial/cultural site of Pagat as a live training ground as being "extremely confident because of [the] lawsuit." The attorney general further asserts that the "power of [the] people and [the] power of law was on the side of Hagatna" for the Pagat case, while the "ability to govern ourselves [is] rooted in congress in which we have no direct representation", moreover "military contracts have been awarded to outside of Guam contracts, such as in Hawaii or California." In particular, the "department of defense has historically been a lobbyist against additional rights" for the Guamanian/Chamorro people. As such, there is a distinction that Attorney General Camacho makes between winning in the federal judicial system over the Pagat lawsuit/case versus the self-determination and peripheral power of the island of Guam. One being to undergo and utilize the current federal legal-system for the periphery, while the other as much more difficult situation that sans political willpower and grassroots upheavals, there are more obstacles in obtaining additional leverage or rights for the island vis-à-vis the department of defense or congress in terms of center periphery relations or center periphery power, in particular as it relates to the security aspect of the periphery and center as Pagat was able to be relocated to another viable location that the department of defense is satisfied with.

**Speaker Barnes**

Speaker of the Guam Legislature, Speaker Barnes has many times affiliated herself as indigenous leadership seeking to find the balance between Guam and the United States and that between the center and periphery her best interests will align with her constituents, the people of Guam, and the island-first. She states that while, "I'm a Chamorro at heart, my bloodline," the speaker also acknowledges "that Uncle Sam is [aware] that Guam is a prime jewel for them."

As to the periphery, Barnes "believe[s] that Guam should have some kind of self-governance" as "Uncle Sam knows the viability and sustainability of Guam to" Washington. In addition, in talks of peripheral power and political status, Speaker Barnes believes that "We have what it takes to protect and defend the island in its entirety" though from a "personal perspective - Uncle Sam has treated Guam as a second class citizen." And that, "the United States has not done enough to recognize who we are as a people. We need to decide as a people." The island, in particular the people, "have fallen into complacency, our island has fallen into complacency" that without education, the most direct influence to raise political cohesiveness and strength, the island will continue to be in status quo. "Education is key to younger generation realize to determine their destiny."

On talks with the department of defense, "On more than several occasion, panels were one-way, presentations were" dictated. "Why can't I speak," the speaker once mentioned, because they were not allowed to despite the numerous occasions and presentations on-island. And, "When we did get to speak, there was never a response." Only duly noted. So you have to deal with this "very delicately" as even Barnes has family in military, though "a piece of [her] says why can't you take care of your own."

Historically, "they left, they came back, they forgot." "We respect the united states, but give us something that we can call ours and our own, let us have some kind of self-governance, let us choose" were the speaker's exact words.

### **Speaker Won Pat**

Former Speaker is also critical of the relationship between Guam and Washington, as she mentions, "We were brought up to think that because we are a colony and so small that there is very little we have very little impact with the United States" that "Guam is definitely a possession of the United States." In terms of political status, "the problem is that we have waited so long to exercise the right to self-determination, [the wait] will affect the result of the plebiscite." In particular, "We're limited in what we can do, in order to pursue a better life [many] have joined the military." However, this type of military loyalty "affects our perception of our relationship with the United States." Even though self-determination is "guaranteed under the United Nations, those [rights] feel threatened." Historically, "we weren't U.S. citizens at the time but we were attacked because" we had the U.S. flag. "If the united states wanted us to become more self-sustaining" then the imposition of the Jones act prohibits further independence and growth. Instead this move forces the periphery "so that we can become dependent to the U.S. dollar." In talks with the military, "we don't even sit at the table, we have no power." And similar to current Speaker Barnes, there is an echo of "complacency" and "long-time ingrained thought" which "has taken away our drive, our initiative" with "Education" being key to political cohesiveness and peripheral power. Lastly, Won Pat asserts, "a resurgence a reawakening [is key to] who we are."

### **Vice-Speaker Cruz**

Former Judge and Vice-Speaker of the legislature Cruz "recognize[s] the geopolitical issues by Washington, [and] that [the U.S.] should be aware of" a situation in which "you've been married to this tourism man for fifty years, provide well for you, for the most part it's been good life, now some keen young marine comes, do you want the chance of this young man, or leave us, they've been known to just up and leave", a hint towards the diversification of the economy. Unfortunately, "Washington has us over the barrel, and we have leaders who acquiesce to that." While "the central government is more generous with them, provid[ing] quite a bit of money" because of the military placement with "a lot of our most outspoken activists are former military, but...if things change do we lose our military status", "people are afraid [sometimes] if they lose" this status. As an island, "We're more Americanized than some American states, fortunately or unfortunately." In terms of the island's political status "I don't think Statehood is possible, I'm realistic enough, they won't allow two members for state and a vote in the house." "We'll always be second-class citizens until the constitution is amended, but the [flipside] is people come to" Guam they lose the voting rights they originally had. With regards to possible hierarchical change, "the United States just isn't going to even consider changing the status of Guam" as it is too vital as a chess piece, another mention towards Puerto Rico and the commonwealth's own political status.

#### **4.6 Asia-Pacific Affairs Summary**

To the nature of peripheral relations, Guam and Washington possess a defense-security though still mostly colonialist type relationship, which affects center periphery relations at large, given that almost a third of the island is occupied by the U.S. military in the form of Anderson Air Force Base to the north and the U.S. Navy to the south with

future arrangements for the marine relocation. Historical memory, though contentious to some, is largely a reinforcing dimension to relations (see Guam Liberation Parade). Likewise, the cultural aspect has more or less integrated with the United States (in terms of the English language, the U.S. military), even if still heavily protective in terms of heritage by the Guamanian people. With respect to the Governance aspect, the Organic Act is still the foundation to Washington-Guam relations with the positioning of the island in the Asia-Pacific serving as key to U.S. strategy in the region. Lastly, the lack thereof of natural resources instead highlights other dimensions, their roles in center periphery relations, and could be another key area to look at in terms of incentives or concessions. Overall, the natural relationship is intact, stable, though not as strong in equal opportunity in comparison with Greenland, as one is an unincorporated territory the other being an autonomous country within the Danish realm. This contrast in powers between the peripheries does strike a difference, which if interests diverge may be extremely difficult for Guam as opposed to Greenland with regards to options and abilities.

Here, culture is an all around concern that should be noted in the short-mid-long term. Natural resources a mid-long term concern depending on whether incentives or concessions are to be made. And governance and history to be long term concerns for the future, in terms of how the current form of government in the island periphery may or may not change and as a result how the historical memory may work to either hinder or help the future relationship. Lastly, security is the major concern that must be taken into consideration in the short-run given the marine relocation and subsequent military buildup taking place in the near future.

In terms of subject matters, political status cannot be an aside as it is to Greenland as quite a bit of powers have already been ceded to the island periphery in that scenario, so while status may not change in the near future, it definitely could become a contentious issue in the far future. Even with the exchanges between the Guam delegate and the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, it is clear that the military buildup issue is not going to go away or resolve itself anytime soon. However, the intent could be held to a higher regard in terms of care for the island's culture, the island's people, and the island's voice. In particular, the response provided by Washington, while thorough, is still quite far removed from the understandings by the local public and the island-periphery itself. Many in the Guam legislature find the treatment belittling and nothing short of being complacent to what the center is already being accused of. For better center periphery relations and the military buildup, Washington must have more sincerity in treating the issues related to the island periphery rather than simply directing, redirecting, and acting in a supreme leader type of mentality. Mutual understanding and trust cannot be built in one day and the treatment of the island periphery by Washington does not help the situation and can be done far better for the interests of both parties, particularly Washington's reputation and the military's role.

For the future, as center-periphery relations is understandably tense due to lack of powers for the periphery and increasingly close anticipation for the marine transfers, the framework analysis serves as a reminder to Washington of which ways and in what areas center periphery relations may need to be addressed. Likewise, consideration and acknowledgment, particularly to be felt by the local Guamanian populace has to be taken to heart by Washington if progress and mutual agreement is of mutual interest in the

peripheral relationship. Dialogue, transparency, and sincerity are absolutely a must for policy decisions onwards if trust and respect are to be felt in this center peripheral relationship.



## **Conclusion**

In summary, the aim of this dissertation to present a credible multi-dimensional analytical framework that allows for a more in-depth understanding of intra-state center periphery relations has largely-been fulfilled. More specifically, answers to the introduced research questions include a) that *history, culture, governance, natural resources and industries*, and *security* are the significant dimensions that compose the multi-dimensional aspect of the analytical framework, b) that each dimension has been assessed and identified as to their respective roles in center periphery relations and in the structure of the analytical framework, in particular vis-à-vis the center periphery itself, and c) that security does supersede the powers of the periphery to become the single-most defining and therefore most-influencing dimension in center periphery relations as illustrated in the Guam and Greenland case studies above.

This dissertation further demonstrates that in the two island-periphery case studies, Guam and Greenland, regardless of the island-periphery's power in a relative power spectrum, security as a dimension is *non-negotiable* when considering how history, culture, governance, and natural resources/industry as dimensions *are negotiable* and leveraged in center periphery relations. In the framework and illustration aforementioned, the center may at times give leeway towards the other dimensions yet remains adamant in defense-security affairs. Therefore, leading to the conclusion that security does supersede the powers of the periphery to become the single-most defining and therefore most-influencing dimension to center-periphery relations. As to the extent of power the periphery leverages in terms of autonomy or other decisions, that conclusion is highly-dependant on the type of dimensions involved and ultimately the decision that

has been made by the center. If the decision is not directly related to security-issues, then as the case studies in this dissertation has shown, the extent of power ranges from significant decisions in favor of the periphery, to minor decisions that still impact the periphery though remains balanced; unlike defense-security affairs, where the center is a one-way street. Beyond the dissertation's main research question, this dissertation has also developed originality in defining and developing an analytical framework useful to understanding center periphery relations from a multi-dimensional perspective; one that allows the reader or researchers implications into power, autonomy, security, and issues vis-à-vis the center periphery relationship.

As the dissertation illustrates, the peripheral relationship is a complex two-sided relationship that requires a multi-dimensional analytical framework to fully understand as a whole. Starting with the framework introduced in this work, it is clear that dimensions such as *history*, *culture*, *governance*, *natural resource/industry*, and *security* are but a few critical components that allows for a deeper understanding to what constitutes the nature of peripheral relations, followed by notions of purpose and intent in certain situations to sift relevant from irrelevant information particular to each case in question and context, as demonstrated in the Guam case study.

In the Asia-Pacific case, the previous chapters has indicated that with a lack of natural resources to emphasize on (besides an environmental perspective), the *raison d'être* to the relationship lies in the strategic security value that has become the intrinsic value of the island-periphery over time. Though it is noteworthy to mention the insert of the 'Kissinger' piece in illustrating the center periphery relationship as depicted historically as opposed to only conceptually or 'for future reference' besides what has

been illustrated in the Guam and Greenland case studies. During the days of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, Washington had considerable sway over the periphery in terms of exactly what strategic value meant to the center. Even as the island-periphery was listed on the United Nation's list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, otherwise known as the colonies list, Kissinger strictly relayed to then Ambassador to the U.N. Scali forbidding a mission from the U.N. to visit the island-periphery. Such is the act of *realpolitik* in play, where on one end the United States sits on the U.N. committee to decolonization while in reality obstructs the U.N. missions from actually playing their role by sending missions to Puerto Rico or Guam as opposed to by Secretary Kissinger early-on in fear of the resulting consequences that may have occurred.

Besides strategic or intrinsic value to the island-periphery, other dimensions to the framework such as history or culture also plays a significant role to understanding the periphery's wants and needs, though the true power of the periphery lies in the governance dimension as cemented by the Organic Act of 1950. In the most legitimate legal sense, this piece of law grants the island a semi-autonomous structural governing framework that then allows the island to work within the system to negotiate and find balance between what the government-at-large can give and is willing to give to her periphery. Though the original sense of power for the periphery may be most legitimate in legal frameworks, such as by the Organic Act, or indirectly by U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as well as other Congressional or Presidential decrees, indirectly the power of the people is also well worth referencing in future works. For instance, the grassroots organizations such as We Are Guahan have enabled the local populace to engage in local protests, community gathering, and voicing of their opinions against what they deem as

an encroachment on their cultural heritage, land, and way of life. Discussing the U.S. Supreme Court in tangent, in recent years (2016) court case *Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, Et Al.* illustrates how the Court or judiciary branch of the government-at-large is highly hesitant to restructure the current center periphery relationship. Not only is the ruling extremely narrow and limited to the double jeopardy issue in question, the questions of sovereignty are not directly dealt with but rather relegated back to the insular cases, a previous ruling.

In the original interviews and sources obtained by this work, the vast majority of those in leadership positions on Guam have indicated that the periphery feels like a pawn bent to the center's will, and if given the choice would desire free association over any other option. Current Governor Eddie Baza Calvo has repeatedly mentioned that any status is better than unincorporated territory, indicating a strong unity from the elites and leadership that the island does want self-determination in one form or another. Unfortunately, as former President of the University of Guam and former delegate to Congress mentions, the political willpower and unity from the island is not at the point where such a move or referendum is viable. Moreover, the restrictions to a plebiscite as well as the stringent requirements as to who may or may not have a vote towards the island's future has all hindered the island-periphery in re-establishing its relationship with the center.

In the legitimate framework, lawsuits filed from the island against the Department of Defense have also worked well (Pagat-case) illustrating the powers of the rule of law within the legal and legitimate system. Our congresswoman no doubt tirelessly and relentlessly works for the representation of Guam, despite the limited capacity, through

being a ranking member and member in committee and subcommittees vis-à-vis issues that pertain directly to Guam's political status, defense-security positioning, as well as marine relocation/military buildup. Thus, there are at least a few routes to power for the periphery within the legal legitimate framework and the powers of the periphery as part of the populace at large.

In the Arctic case study of Greenland, the situation is very much different from its counterpart Guam. Greenland, unlike Guam, possesses vast quantities of natural resources, albeit still in difficult to acquire conditions or statuses, such as underneath vast quantities of ice-covered land, or in far-reaching oceans without clear indications of success from oil-seeking companies. These vast resources, however, has written a clear path to eventual independence or at least some form of autonomy that Guam can only dream of at this given point in time. Yet, despite the natural resource dimension being an extreme positive for Greenland's peripheral power, it is also the power of the people who have spoken up in referendums and voting (in the democratic to semi-democratic systems) that have allowed for the island-periphery to achieve home-rule in 1979 and self-rule in 2009 towards more autonomy and powers in regards to her own natural resources, minerals, and many other local powers such as policing, the judiciary, and licensing rights. Even the title of each case study is a clear give away on just how much power the periphery has vis-à-vis the center.

Guam is an unincorporated organized territory of the United States, while Greenland is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland has full and direct representation in parliament, as well as its own legal and legitimate systems (of parliament, and so forth), while Guam merely has a delegate to Congress with limited

voting rights and the people of Guam cannot vote for the U.S. presidency despite sacrificing so much in terms of per capita enlistments by Guamanians to the American military. Moreover, Greenland also plays a significant role in the Arctic region by being a natural Arctic player holding a seat in the Arctic Council, as well as being the eyes for America in Northern Europe through the Thule Air Base. More importantly, Greenland allows Denmark and subsequent allies to keep an eye out for the critical Northern Sea Route and other trade-related routes surrounding the region. Similar to Guam, Greenland is also majority indigenously populated, meaning that the cultural and historical dimensions play or will eventually play a significant role in any negotiations or communications between the center and periphery.

One of the major illustrations of Copenhagen's intent on keeping the Danish realm safe, and by extension Greenland safeguarded, is during late 2016 when Prime Minister Lars Rasmussen "personally intervened to prevent a Chinese company from acquiring a disused naval base in Greenland."<sup>312</sup> Not only is this an indication that there are serious breakdowns in the dialogue or communication between the center and periphery, it also means that a certain level of mutual distrust exists besides the two quite autonomous powers.

As an autonomous country within the Danish realm, Greenland is relegated far more power than Guam is in her relationship with the United States, even so, the greater the power Greenland possesses in the relationship may actually have clouded the relationship by forcing Copenhagen to act in the name of security to override what Greenland has already deemed appropriate via other means. In particular, although

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<sup>312</sup> Martin Breum, "China syndrome," *The Arctic Journal*, December 21, 2016, <http://arcticjournal.com/politics/2784/china-syndrome>. Last Accessed On January 2017.

Greenland has given the rights and licensing over resources to foreign sovereign-funds, without the access to labor visas as controlled and supplied by Copenhagen, these are but empty contracts unable to be fulfilled in the long run. Thus, power can be relative if the purpose and intents of the center and periphery are not closer aligned and communication has broken down at a more basic level. According to the mass media, leadership from Greenland only learnt of the decision moments before it was announced by Copenhagen, meaning that the island-periphery was kept out of the loop despite the majority political will and unity overwhelmingly voting for Home-Rule and Self-Rule. Here, the concern may not lie in just the analytical framework or the dimensions per se, but rather may need to focus on the intent and purpose, again situational, behind center and periphery to create a conducive environment for actual tangible results that would prevent unnecessary showdowns or faux pas, such as having Greenland go through overseas visits, signing agreements, etc. only to be shut-down by the government-at-large, Copenhagen.

On the analytical framework, this work has shown that it is critical and even essential for a more holistic view on center periphery relations by bringing in dimensions that are not only valuable to peripheral relations but pillars to understanding individual sub-cases within the cases themselves. For instance, in the political status issues of both Greenland and Guam, a thorough understanding of the how the periphery has attained the status it has today (the historical) to how the periphery maintains its way of life within the current legitimate legal framework (or culture and context) conveys much to how an issue such as political status should be perceived.

There are times though in which the defense-security of the center, Copenhagen and Washington, often times supersedes these important values but therein lays the

misunderstanding and misjudgment of power on both sides. While security and natural resources may be top-priority for the center or the state, underneath it all the subtext of the situation at the heart of it all are the people who feel that there lack of voice and input into further sub-cases such as natural resource or mineral licensing to the marine relocation or military buildup is the main reason for feelings of injustice and lack of respect. As such, the dialogue should surround the not only the dimensions as previously noted in the analytical framework, but also in the purpose and intent of each respective party and seeing whether or not there remains space and movement for compromise between the center and periphery. Otherwise, the periphery will, regardless of the center's hold on power, seek to move within and outside of the legitimate legal framework to achieve what it deems as power to sway these issues that affect their everyday livelihood.

With that said, it is equally important to make concluding remarks on the analytical framework used in this dissertation specifically on the Guam and Greenland cases as well as sub-cases. As introduced, the multi-dimensional framework is composed of the historical, cultural, governance, natural resources/industry, and security dimensions. Each of these dimensions serves as stand-alone assessments to the center periphery relationship. However, when brought together as one single analytical framework, the result is much more substantial in content and context.

Without the proper historical and cultural context, Washington made err in deciding where the next live training fire center should be built (on ancient burial grounds no less). Without divulging into the natural resource/industry of Greenland, one would not be able to comprehend how an island-periphery such as Greenland is able to time and time again reach sizable negotiations with Copenhagen; agreements that may one day



lead to eventual self-determination or independence in one form or another for the periphery from the center. Likewise, the security and governance dimensions surrounding both Guam and Greenland give readers an understanding to how power truly works in both scenarios, where it is derived from (mostly by legislative powers such as the Organic Act, the Home Rule Act, and the Self-Rule Act). Moreover, understanding the logistics to the governance dimension illustrates how even in limited fashion the Guam delegate is able to move within the system to voice an opinion for the populace.

At the end of such an analysis from said multi-dimensional framework, specific issues such as the political status issue, the military relocation issue, and oil and mineral licensing issues become easier to navigate, particularly defusing areas of misunderstanding and creating more possibilities to co-exist and co-create the mutual trust and benefits necessary to move policy forward. Furthermore, the ideas of purpose and intent allows for further clarification of the aforementioned analysis by touching upon the center and periphery directly beyond the established relationship or status quo. Purpose and intent fulfills a need in direction that compels each party to look at not only where the relationship is but also how this relationship may or may not affect the question at hand. Obtaining such knowledge may be difficult but not impossible, and once known, how to align respective intents with end goals would allow both the center and periphery to come closer in agreement particular to intra-state relations versus inter-state relations. In the Guam case study, and very extensively explored at the end of chapter five, we see how Congresswoman Bordallo, Guam's single delegate to Washington's Congress, is able to not only receive criticism or the voice of the people from a significant local grassroots organization, Congresswoman Bordallo writes to the

Undersecretary now Secretary of the Navy on behalf of her constituents line-by-line in a question and answer communication seeking answers to the concerns of the island-people. Certainly, a few of these answers may border on rhetorical, but there are a few that are genuine and sincere in providing the periphery with assurances from the center that may not have been acquired if not for the proper channels, the communicative dialogue, and the center periphery relationship that has been established throughout the years.

This paper has demonstrated that one is able to conclude that while peripheral power in the domestic hierarchy does influence issues that are cultural or environmental, if the issue is security related, then the periphery has incredible difficulties against the center in achieving leverage or results that are periphery-leaning rather than center-leaning. And, while the hypothesis is if security is not the peripheries main concern, (perhaps culture or the environment may be), yet is the main concern for the center, (at odds), and the center is able to act accordingly, then, it is apparent that the powers of the periphery are limited versus the center on a security-basis. The paper illustrates conclusively that security is the most-influencing dimension, and most defining of center periphery relations though not the end all be all it is no doubt a major influencer as evidenced by the Guam and Greenland case studies and the multi-dimensional framework presented. However, (the exception to the rule), in the periphery, if there is an alternative, and the center can logically resituate itself, where it still fulfills its security needs while saving face, it will respect the periphery as the issue escalates. (i.e. the Pagat issue in the Guam case study).

In the end, when it comes to the powers of the periphery, it is certainly true that the center holds the vast majority of power. However, despite so, there are instances as indicated above where the periphery is able to take control of its own future either by voting (as is the case for Greenland in the overwhelming majority votes for Home Rule and Self Rule) or in local opposition, lawsuits, and within the system (as is the case in Guam for the Pagat-case, and as Congresswoman Bordallo's communications indicate). Whether or not the origins of peripheral power come from a legitimate legal source, i.e. Congress or Parliament, the periphery does have power to influence the center given the right momentum, the right situations, and the proper channels. In and out of the system, this dissertation has indicated that knowledge of the established center periphery relationship vis-à-vis said multi-dimensional framework gives the party in the center periphery relationship concerned and cautious enough to listen the final upper hand in negotiations and/or agreements.

Individuals Interviewed (Addendum)

**Vice Speaker B.J. Cruz**

*(Vice-Speaker of the Guam Legislature & Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Guam)*

**Dr. Carlyle Corbin**

*(former Minister of State for External Affairs of the U.S. Virgin Islands & former United Nations Delegate)*

**Hope Alvarez Cristobal**

*(former Guam Legislature Senator & former United Nations Delegate, subject of film *The Insular Empire*)*

**Speaker Judith T. Won Pat**

*(Speaker of the Guam Legislature)*

**Attorney Leevin T. Camacho**

*(Lead Lawyer in representing *We Are Guahan* & the Guam Preservation Trust in lawsuits against the United States Department of Defense)*

**Dr. Lisa Natividad**

*(President of the Guahan Coalition for Peace & Justice, University of Guam Professor, Member of the Guam Commission on Decolonization)*

**Senator Nerissa Bretania Underwood**

*(Senator of the Guam Legislature)*

**Lt. Gov. Ray Tenorio**

*(Lieutenant Governor of Guam)*

**President Robert Underwood**

*(President of the University of Guam, former U.S. Congressman)*

**Senator Rory J. Respicio**

*(Majority Leader of the Guam Legislature)*

**Senator Tina Muna Barnes**

*(Legislative Secretary of the Guam Legislature)*

*\*Interview lengths vary from 30 minutes to 1 hour.*

Individuals Interviewed (Updated-Addendum)

**Vice Speaker B.J. Cruz**  
(Currently, Public Auditor of Guam)

**Speaker Judith T. Won Pat**  
(Guahan Academy Charter School)

**Attorney Leevin T. Camacho**  
(Currently, Attorney General of Guam)

**Senator Tina Muna Barnes**  
(Currently, Speaker of the Guam Legislature)

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