

## The Refutation of Externalists' *pramāṇa* Theory in Logico-epistemological School of Buddhism with a Central Focus on the Contact of Senses and Objects (*indriyārthasamnikarṣa*)

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This paper looks at how the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is regarded in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Dharmakīrti, who completed the basic theory of this tradition, says that *pramāṇa* is the most influential for determining which object cognition perceives, while asserting the nonduality among *pramāṇa* and its consequence (*pramāṇaphala*). Naturally the externalists such as *Naiyāyika* and *Vaiśeṣika* take objection to this assumption.

This paper consist of two parts. The first is general representation of Dharmakīrti's theory of nonduality between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*. I offer a synopsis of the section of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin) dealing with this problem, and give a brief explanation for it. This part doesn't include any new academic find, but is written for readers new to the material.

The second part deals with an argument over the contact of senses and objects (*indriyārthasamnikarṣa*). The opponents argue that *pramāṇa* is senses (*indriya*), a presentation of objects (*arthālocana*), a contact of sense and objects, or cognition of a qualifier (*viśeṣanajñāna*), in contrast to Dharmakīrti's view that *pramāṇa* is cognition holding the image of object (*arthasārūpya*). Of the opponents' views, I take up in particular the problem on the contact of sense and objects, and examine how Dharmakīrti refuted it. For this purpose, first I peruse the statements in PV and PVin, and then look closely into a passage from the section on the examination of the *Vaiśeṣika* theory in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, and its commentary, Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, in which we can see a more detailed explanation.

Dharmakīrti's main argument against his opponents' view that *pramāṇa* is the contact of senses and objects is a kind of reduction ad absurdum: the contact is in full, so if the contact is *pramāṇa*, the cognition (= *pramāṇaphala*) would be in full. However, the cognition is not in full. Consequently, the contact is not *pramāṇa*. This argument depends on the externalists' characteristic view of perception, such as *Vaiśeṣika*'s. They assume that the universal (ex. whiteness) really exist in objects (ex. cow). It follows that judgmental cognition of all properties in the object occur in the moment of contact as a perception, because all the properties, which exist in the object as the universal, come into contact with senses.