

On the Dialogue on the Invariable Concomitance in **Vijñānakāya*

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The objectives of this paper are two: one is to elucidate the question whether or not the invariable concomitance (i.e., what is observed is always concomitant with what is existent; namely, what is observed is always existent) utilized by the proponent (the *Sarvāstivādin*) in the proof of existence in the past, [at present,] and in the future (i.e., the past and future source of evil, the greed, is existent because it is observed) in **Vijñānakāya* (『阿毘達磨識身足論』) without his opponent's consent is acceptable to his opponent, and the other objective is to elucidate the question how the proponent can persuade his opponent into accepting the invariable concomitance, provided that his opponent does not own the invariable concomitance.

The method is to analyze and examine the only counterargument by the opponent and the confutation by the proponent against it in **Vijñānakāya* in order to clarify the following circumstances in this dialogue.

First of all, in demonstrating what is existent in the past, [at present,] and in the future, the proponent tacitly utilizes the invariable concomitance that what is observed is always existent.

Secondly, however, the opponent rejects the invariable concomitance itself. Because the opponent, who asserts that things in the past and the future are not existent, supposes that things in the past and the future are observed but are not existent, he rejects the reason (“because it is observed”) adduced by the proponent as uncertain (which later Buddhist logicians called *anaikāntikahetu*) because the reason does not always deduce the conclusion (“[it] is existent”). Therefore, indicating this reasoning error to the proponent, the opponent claims “[the consciousness of the things in the past and the future does not possess the objects because the things that should be the objects of the consciousness are not existent. Hence, some] consciousness does not possess the object.”

Then, thirdly, in order to confute this opponent's counterargument, the proponent introduces the relationship between agent (*kartr*) and object of action (*karman*) into his discussion. Namely, the proponent suggests his opponent a traditional doctrine (*āgama*), which denotes that the agent of perception (consciousness) always possesses the object of perception (the object of consciousness), which the opponent accepts. As a result, the opponent faces with the dilemma: insofar as he claims that [some] consciousness does not the object, he cannot accept this traditional doctrine, while insofar as he accepts this traditional doctrine, he cannot claim so.

Fourthly, however, the opponent again claims that the consciousness possessing the object in the past and the future does not possess the object, which is apparently harmonic to the traditional doctrine.

However, his interpretation has a slightly revised connotation that the consciousness possessing the [actually non-existent] object in the past and the future does not possess the [actually existent] object.

Finally, in confutation against this interpretation, the proponent suggests his opponent the relationship between cause and effect concealed in the relationship between the object of consciousness and consciousness. Namely, the [actually existent] cause, i.e., the object of consciousness, engenders the result, i.e., the consciousness. Therefore, when the result (i.e., consciousness) is existent, the [actually existent] cause, (i.e., the object of consciousness) is always existent. In other words, consciousness always possesses the [actually existent] object. As a result, the opponent cannot persist in his interpretation of the traditional doctrine by slightly revising his claim.

About the Definition of *ālambana* in *Ālambanaparīkṣā*

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As well known, Dignāga (ca. 480-540) discusses the thesis of the cognized objects (*ālambana*) in *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. In this work he specifies two conditions which the cognizable objects should fulfill.

The cognizable objects for certain knowledge must fulfill conditions that they consist of the source of the knowledge and have the same images (*ākāra*) as the knowledge.

These conditions are reasonably supported by the theory of *sākāravāda*, which states that knowledge is endowed with the image of its object and position. However Dignāga proves the statement scrupulously and thereby develops the argument leading to the conclusion that the theory of "cognition-only" (*vijñaptimātravāda*) is drawn inevitably.

This paper aims to interpret the text in detail based on notes, add logical analysis and consideration in terms of the above contents and thereby clarify the definition of cognized objects (*ālambana*) bibliographically.

Dharmottara's Understandings of Mental Perception (*mānasa*)

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Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmakīrti's works, is the first scholar that shows a special attitude toward mental perception. He says that the existence of mental perception is allowed only from