

the traditional and dogmatic standpoint. However he comments on Dharmakīrti's its definition because he finds no vital reason to deny its existence.

He analyses its definition in the way no other scholar has ever treated. He says its definition can be considered in three ways as follows:

- (1) uniqueness of its cause
- (2) uniqueness of its object
- (3) uniqueness of itself (=mental perception)

Using this analysis, he judges the cause of mental perception as continuous one (*samanāntara-pratyaya*) and its object as cooperating factor with sense perception. Taking his own standpoint about mental perception, he refutes the interpretation made by an another commentator Vinītadeva.

The Two Meanings of the Word *pramāṇa* and Their Relationship

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The word *pramāṇa*, which is widely used as a key term of epistemology in Indian philosophy, seems to have two meanings in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Namely, it means valid cognition (*samyagjñāna*) in the context of explaining that *pramāṇa* falls into two categories, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). In the context of explaining what is called the theory of non-distinction between *pramāṇa* and its result (*pramāṇaphala*), *pramāṇa* is the fact that cognition has the image of the object (*meyarūptā*), or the form of the grasper (*grāhakākāra*), which means that it is the direct factor for determining which object cognition perceives.

In this article, I begin by focusing on how we can understand the two meanings of the word *pramāṇa* in a consistent manner, and I find that according to Dignāga it is used metaphorically (*upacārāt*) in the sense of valid cognition. That is to say, when *pramāṇa* as valid cognition, corresponding to perception and inference, is analyzed through the opposing concepts of means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and result of cognition (*pramāṇaphala*), it ought to be equated with the result of cognition. In this case, the word *pramāṇa* is used in the sense of the result of cognition, that is, the result of *pramāṇa*.

Secondly, I attempt to compare this usage of the word *pramāṇa* with that in the Nyāya school. In the case of the Nyāya school, the *Nyāyasūtra* defined some *pramāṇas* as cognition, and at the stage of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārttika* there coexisted two definitions of *pramāṇa*, one as valid cognition

and the other as means of cognition, but ultimately the means of cognition came to be referred to as *pramāṇa* and the result of cognition as the result of *pramāṇa*. However, the result of *pramāṇa* is always established separately from *pramāṇa*, and so the result of *pramāṇa* is consciousness of what is to be abandoned and so on (*hānādibuddhi*) when *pramāṇa* is cognition of an object. Therefore, it is not specific to the Buddhist logico-epistemological school to use the word *pramāṇa* in the meaning of cognition, but we can acknowledge its distinctiveness in that, while regarding *pramāṇa* as cognition, they avoided establishing the result of *pramāṇa* separately from cognition through the metaphorical usage of the word *pramāṇa*.

Dharmakīrti's Interpretation of *nigrahasthāna* (1): On *asāadhanāṅgavacana*

SASAKI Ryo

It is well known that Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660) explains "the condition of defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*), which is the traditional concept of debate, in detail in the *Vādanyāya*. However, it had not been sufficiently clarified by preceding studies that the definition of "the condition of defeat" in the *Vādanyāya* is original and differs from that of the *Nyāya* school. Dharmakīrti divides "the condition of defeat" between the *asāadhanāṅgavacana*, which is the "the condition of defeat" for a disputant, and the *adoṣodbhāvana*, which is the "the condition of defeat" for an opponent. The purpose of this study was to analyze the *asāadhanāṅgavacana*.

On analysis, it becomes clear that Dharmakīrti interprets *asāadhanāṅgavacana* as having five meanings according to the following criteria: (i) a case relation between *sādhana* and *aṅga*, (ii) the meaning of the word *sādhana*, (iii) the meaning of the word *aṅga*, and (iv) the method of adding the prefix *a-*. To be specific, the findings are as follows. In the case of (i), in the first, second, third and fourth interpretations *sāadhanāṅga* is interpreted as a case-determined compound (*tatpuruṣa*) and in the fifth interpretation it is interpreted as a possessive compound (*bahuvrīhi*). (ii) In the first, fourth and fifth interpretations *sādhana* is interpreted as *siddhi* and in the second and third interpretations *sādhana* is interpreted as *karaṇasādhana*. (iii) In the first and fourth interpretations *aṅga* is interpreted as *kāraṇa* and in the second and third interpretations *aṅga* is interpreted as *avayava* and in the fifth interpretation *aṅga* is interpreted as *dharma*. (iv) In the first and second interpretations the prefix *a-* is added to *vacana* and in the third, fourth and fifth interpretations the prefix *a-* is added to *sāadhanāṅga*.

On the basis of these four sets of criteria, Dharmakīrti interprets *asāadhanāṅgavacana* as the