

[C] needs one more interpretation in order to dissolve the contradiction with the first old doctrine [A], the other old doctrine [B] shows nothing as to the relationship between Matter, Name, and Speech except that Matter and Name can indirectly generate their common result, Speech; namely, as to the relationship between Matter and Name, the two have no relationship. Hence, there is no dissolving the contradiction between the unrelated two. Fortunately, the latter doctrine [B] presents this relationship from the viewpoint of those who listen to a speech, which shows that Speech can affect Name, and thereby Name can manifest Matter.

Therefore, the discussion about “the basis of Speech” is primarily about the relationship between cause and effect from the viewpoint of those who make Speech; however, in order to dissolve contradiction, the relationship between what is based and what is the base (affecting and affected, or manifesting and manifested) from the viewpoint of those who listen to Speech is applicable to the discussion about “the basis of Speech,” and eventually the interpretation and explanation from the viewpoint of the listeners of the teachings came to be the mainstream.

Dharmottara's Theory of Cognition of the Object: Between the Conceptual and the Non-conceptual

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The Buddhist logico-epistemological school accepts two kinds of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), and direct perception as cognition free from conceptual construction. Therefore, direct perception is supposed to operate as valid cognition without any conceptual construction. However, Dharmottara, in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's opuses, defines valid cognition as the cognition that causes a person to make an act, and he is of the opinion that making an act presupposes judgment of some kind or another. Then, the question is how direct perception without conceptual cognition could be considered as valid cognition, if the judgment is conceptualistic.

In this article, I would like to examine how Dharmottara resolved this question referring to his *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* and *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, with previous studies by Dr. Oki Kazufumi and Dr. Helmut Krasser. I focus especially on cognition of the object (*arthādhigati*), which is presented as the result of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) in the case of direct perception, and deal with the problems of the relation between cognition of the object and the judgment and whether the cognition of the object is conceptual or non-conceptual.

At first, I confirm Dharmottara's definition of valid cognition and its result. According to him,

pramāṇa as valid cognition (*samyagjñāna*) is cognition causing a person to make an act (*pravartaka*) on the object, namely cognition causing a person to attain (*prāpaka*) the object, which is equated with cognition showing the object of the act and with cognition discriminating the object. On the other hand, a result of valid cognition is the function (*vyāpāra*) of such cognition for causing a person to attain the object, which is equated with the fact of showing the object of the act (*pravṛttiviśayapradarśana*) and with cognition of the object (*arthādhigati*).

Secondly, I inquire into the object of the act and the discrimination in view of two kinds of objects of direct perception, that is, the object that is directly grasped (*grāhya*), existing momentarily, and the object of judgment (*adhyavaseya*), having a temporal span. This view is typical of Dharmottara. The result shows that the object of both act and discrimination is the object of judgment, which is closely related with an achievement of a purpose (*arthakriyā*).

Finally, I attempt to demonstrate the position of cognition of the object in the process of direct perception, applying the same kind of relation as these two object to that between cognition of the object and judgment. In the process of direct perception, non-conceptual direct perception having the form of the object matter (ex. the blue) arises at first, and then conceptual cognition arises, which judges the precedent direct perception. The fact that the precedent direct perception is of a certain object (ex. the blue) is ascertained only if the later conceptual cognition judges it. Therefore, The cognition of the object itself exists as non-conceptual, but it is all but conceptual because it is cognition of a certain object is ascertained by conceptual cognition.

What is *abhāvapramā* in the demonstration of *svaparakāśa* in the Advaitavedānta school?: In contrast to *viparyaya*

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I previously contributed an article about the demonstration of *vijñāna svaparakāśatā* seen in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (Kh), which was written to Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) of the Advaitavedānta school. In that case, evidence is found in the Kh for the conception of the right cognition of negation (*vyatirekapramā*), which is hardly found in other texts of the Advaitavedānta school, so I contributed the article about this conception. In that article, it becomes clear that this conception is the right cognition of nonexistence of cognition (*abhāvapramā*) and possesses the problem of whether it is *svaparakāśa* or not. But I could not examine the similarities and differences between *abhāvapramā* with an error (*viparyaya*) and *abhāvapramā*, so I consider the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* in this article.