

## Origins and Consequences of One-Party Dominance: Comparative Analysis of Ex-Yugoslav Countries <sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

Since the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), ex-Yugoslav countries have followed divergent paths. For example, while Slovenia successfully joined the EU in 2004, Bosnia-Herzegovina still remains under the international administration and the future status of Kosovo remains unclear at the time of writing. Despite a large amount of academic and journalistic works devoted to this region, much remains to be done to analyse and explain commonalities and differences among ex-Yugoslav countries, because much less effort has been made for the systematic comparative analysis of ex-Yugoslav countries based on a single and coherent framework.

This article thus attempts to conduct a comparative analysis of ex-Yugoslav countries to explain commonalities and differences from a perspective of the dominant party and democracy. These countries followed divergent paths in this regard: Slovenia and Macedonia have not had a

dominant party while Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro had or still have a dominant party. This article attempts to address following questions: What are the origins of one-party dominance in this region? What are the factors that contributed to the maintenance of one-party dominance? What are its consequences? Ex-Yugoslav countries have not been analysed from this theoretical perspective, and this article aims to add some empirical findings to the existing literature and to contribute to the further understanding of the phenomenon that attracts increasing scholarly attention.

This article consists of four parts. The first part presents the definition of dominant party and applies this definition to ex-Yugoslav cases. Secondly, this paper analyses the factors that contributed to the emergence of dominant party. It will be argued that the two-ballot majority system (TBMS) played a significant role in consolidating the parliamentary dominance in Croatia and Serbia. Another factor, however, played an important role as well, namely the presence or absence of the issue that divides the ethnic majority group. The third section analyses the maintenance of one-party dominance, examining the strategies used by dominant parties and the

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behaviour of opposition parties. This section also attempts to explain why one-party dominance collapsed in Croatia and Serbia in 2000. Finally, the consequences of one-party dominance will be discussed. It will be argued that the one-party dominance has had some negative effects on the quality of democracy, such as the exclusion of ethnic minority, the erosion of fundamental human rights and corruption. The issue of the exclusion of ethnic minorities will be discussed separately since there is an interesting difference between Croatia and Serbia on the one hand and Montenegro on the other.

## 1. One-Party Dominance and Ex-Yugoslav Countries

### 1.1. Definition of One-Party Dominance

The definition of “dominance” is not a straightforward issue, as Bogaards (2004) shows. This article takes a three-dimensional definition following Boucek (1998), namely electoral, parliamentary, and executive. In other words, a party must achieve “dominance” in all of these aspects in order to be judged “dominant”. In each dimension, “dominance” is defined as follows:

(1) **Electoral dominance:** largest share of the votes received (not necessarily an absolute majority of votes)

(2) **Parliamentary dominance:** largest share of the seats in the parliament. This could be either: (a) an absolute majority in the parliament, or (b) a relative majority (less than 50 % but the largest among all parties) that could allow the party to dominate the government formation and policy making.

(3) **Executive dominance:** control of the executive power. Here, “control” is defined by the party’s ability to impose and realize its policy preferences as government policies. This is achieved either by: (a) the formation of single-party government, enabled by an absolute majority in the parliament or by a relative majority with the acceptance of opposition parties (i.e. single-party minority government), or by (b) the formation of coalition government in which smaller coalition partners are not powerful enough to negotiate with the dominant party over government policies in key policy areas. Note that the definition in the latter case is still somewhat vague and requires some qualitative judgment on the power of the “dominant” party and other coalition partners. This vagueness suggests that we should be cautious if the party forms a coalition government, but on the other hand we should not exclude the possibility that a party that forms a coalition government becomes “dominant” (for a similar argument, see Pempel 1990, p.3). For example, the Social Democrats in Sweden ruled either alone as a minority government or in alliance with other parties such as Agrarians and Communists, but it is often regarded as a dominant party (Pempel 1990). In the case of presidential or semi-presidential system, both the president and the government should be under control of the same party, because “ [d]ivided government signals the absence of dominance” (Bogaards 2004, p.175). The “policy preferences of the dominant party” could be those of just one faction in the party when there are many factions that compete with each other within the party over the con-

tent of policies. This means that the presence of multiple factions within the dominant party does *not* lead to the disqualification of that party as dominant (see Bogaards 2004, p.183).

In addition, temporal dimension is also important, because winning elections just once and forming a single-party government after elections is not enough to be regarded as “dominant” party. As Pempel has argued, a party that is to be regarded as dominant “must be at the core of a nation’s government over a substantial period of time, not simply for a few years” (Pempel 1990, pp.3-4). Therefore, this article includes the temporal dimension of dominance: following Bogaards, this article will speak of a dominant party only when one party achieves dominance in the three dimensions discussed above through three consecutive multi-party elections (Bogaards 2004, p.175).

In the context of ex-Yugoslav cases, a distinction between dominant party and dominant *authoritarian* party is important. According to Bogaards, the dominant authoritarian party system is a system in which one-party dominance is maintained by extra-democratic means. This means that the authoritarian dominant party “does not allow for competition on an equal basis” (Bogaards 2004, p.178) and therefore, by construction, alternation in power becomes “only a theoretical possibility” (Bogaards 2004, p.178). Among our cases, the case of Serbia indeed shows that opposition parties faced difficulties in achieving the alternation in power even when they received enough votes to do so (see below). Concerning the dominant authoritarian party, therefore, it is neces-

sary to ask why the alternation in power was possible. The analysis of the Serbian case will show that some additional factors were necessary for opposition parties to achieve the alternation in power, even though election results certainly triggered the collapse of one-party dominance.

For the operationalization of dominant authoritarian party, this article follows Bogaards (2004). In other words, the Freedom House scores for political and civil liberties are used to see whether a country is “free”, “partially free”, or “not free”. A dominant party that is found either in “free” countries or in electoral democracies of “partially free” countries would be judged as a dominant party. A dominant party found in “partially free” or “not free” countries that are *not* electoral democracies would be judged as a dominant authoritarian party.

## 1.2. Ex-Yugoslav Cases: Divergence after the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Which countries among ex-Yugoslav countries have had or still have a dominant/dominant authoritarian party? This article examines five countries, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Bosnia-Herzegovina is excluded from the present analysis not only because it experienced a full-blown civil war (1992–1995) which obviously disrupted regular elections in this country but also because it is still under the auspices of the international community (almost an international protectorate) and has not recovered full sovereignty at the time of writing. This article will treat Serbia and Montenegro as separate cases even though they composed the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2002 and composed a state-union "Serbia and Montenegro" from 2002 to 2006. It is because there is no party system of its own at the federal level and because these two republics have had completely different party systems: the collapse of one-party dominance in Serbia in 2000, for example, did not lead to the collapse of one-party dominance in Montenegro. In addition, Montenegro has already achieved a quasi-independence (though not recognized internationally) since 1998: for example, it now has a different currency (EURO is the only official currency in this country while Serbia has its own currency DINAR) and has established a different system of customs.

The election results for the president and the parliament and the successive governments since the first multi-party elections until 2006 are presented in the Appendix. These results show that ex-Yugoslav countries diverge in terms of party dominance: Slovenia and Macedonia have not had a dominant party while three republics, namely Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, have had one.

In Slovenia, the LDS has managed to gain the largest share of votes and seats in the parliament for three consecutive elections (1992, 1996, 2000) and indeed has occupied the office of prime minister for most of the period from 1992 until 2004. Its government, however, collapsed after the vote of non-confidence in 2000, after which the government led by Bajuk of the SLS+SKD was installed. In addition, the office of president was held by Milan Kučan, who is not from the LDS, from 1990 to 2002. Therefore, one can conclude

that Slovenia has not had a dominant party system.

Macedonia is a clear-cut case of the absence of a dominant party, because there is simply no party that has managed to secure the largest share of seats in the parliament and the office of prime minister through three consecutive elections. The alternation in power has occurred three times during the period from 1990 until 2006 (in 1998, 2002 and 2006). Macedonia has managed to maintain the inter-ethnic power sharing (between Macedonians and Albanians) in the government despite several alternations in power.

In Croatia, the HDZ managed to secure the largest share of votes and an absolute majority of seats in the parliament for three consecutive elections in 1990, 1992, 1995. The office of president was held by Franjo Tudjman, the founder of the HDZ, for the same period (including two presidential elections in 1992 and 1997). The office of prime minister was also occupied by the HDZ politicians for the entire period until the fourth parliamentary elections in 2000. The HDZ has kept its monopoly on ministerial posts for the entire period as well, except for the national unity government from 1991 to 1992 (due to the Serb uprising in Krajna region in summer 1991, which lasted until early 1992). The influence and power of other parties was limited in this national unity government and this would not disqualify the HDZ as a dominant party. Therefore, one can conclude that the HDZ was a dominant party in Croatia from 1990 to 2000, and its dominance collapsed after the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections, both of which the HDZ

lost.

In Serbia, the SPS managed to secure the largest share of votes and seats in the parliament for four consecutive elections in 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1997. The office of president was held by Slobodan Milošević, the founder of the SPS, for two consecutive presidential elections in 1990 and 1992, and held by Milutinović from SPS after 1997 presidential elections. The office of prime minister was occupied by politicians from the SPS for the entire period from 1990 to October 2000. The SPS failed to secure an absolute majority of seats in the parliament three times (1992, 1993 and 1997) and sometimes entered into coalition with other parties (mainly JUL and ND, but sometimes with SRS as well). However, the influence and power of other parties was limited and the policy preferences of the SPS prevailed in politics during the Milošević era. Therefore, one can judge the SPS as a dominant party from 1990 to 2000 in Serbia. Its dominance virtually collapsed after the 2000 federal presidential elections when Milošević was defeated by opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica and the collapse was confirmed by the parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2000, when the DOS coalition won an absolute majority in the parliament.

In Montenegro, the DPS has managed to secure the largest share of votes and seats in the parliament for seven consecutive elections in 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2006 (i.e. *all* elections held since the transition to multi-party system). The office of president has also been held by the DPS leaders: Momir Bulatović from 1990 to 1998, Milo Djukanović from 1998

to 2002, and Filip Vujanović since 2002. The office of prime minister has also been held by the DPS politicians since 1990. The nature of dominance has changed, however, because of the split of the DPS in 1997. Until 1997, the DPS was clearly a dominant party and no opposition party could exercise any influence whatsoever. However, the split within the DPS started to emerge after 1996 between pro-Milošević (and pro-status quo) faction led by Momir Bulatović and pro-reform, pro-Western and anti-Milošević faction led by Milo Djukanović. The 1997 presidential elections were fought by these two leaders and the latter won. As a result, the former faction broke away from the DPS and created a new party SNP. It marked the emergence of salient political issue that divided the entire nation and the emergence of stronger opposition against the ruling party. Since 1997, therefore, the DPS has formed a coalition with similar policy preferences (mainly SDPCG and LSCG but also sometimes an ethnic minority party such as DUA) to maintain its dominance. The DPS prevails in Montenegrin politics, however, and one can judge the DPS as a dominant party in Montenegro from 1990 up to 2006.

Are they dominant parties or dominant authoritarian parties? Croatia was classified as “partly free” but an “electoral democracy” by the Freedom House during the Tudjman era (1992-1999) despite the electoral flaws (see e.g. FH 1998). Therefore, this article (somewhat hesitantly) classifies the HDZ as a dominant party. As for Serbia and Montenegro, unfortunately, there is no separate Freedom House score for these two republics, which makes the

precise judgment difficult. Yugoslavia was judged as “not free” from 1993 to 1998 and “partly free” from 1999 to 2001. Furthermore, Yugoslavia is *not* included in the list of electoral democracies in the Freedom House report during the Milošević era (see e.g. FH 2000). If one applies this information to both Serbia and Montenegro, one should judge the SPS and the DPS (until 2000) as dominant authoritarian parties. This application, however, becomes problematic for the DPS, because Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is judged as “free” in 2002 and 2003, and Yugoslavia is included in the list of electoral democracies in the Freedom House report already in 2001 (FH 2001). Given this fact, the DPS (2001-2006) must be judged as a dominant party and not dominant authoritarian. The problem is that this distinction does not reflect any aspect of reality in Montenegro: the Freedom House score is heavily informed by political developments in Serbia (including Kosovo), and the improvement in the freedom scores is simply due to the improvements in Serbia. Since the nature of governance by the DPS has not changed very much and there has been genuine electoral competition between two forces in Montenegro since 1998, one may probably judge the DPS as a dominant party (but not authoritarian) at least since 1998<sup>2</sup>. In any case, it is difficult to solve this issue without separate judgment on the situation of political rights and civil liberties in Serbia and Montenegro. Since there is no such data available at this moment, this article regards the DPS as a dominant authoritarian party until 1997 or later but then a dominant party from sometime

between 1997 and 2000 up to 2006.

## **2. Origins of One-Party Dominance**

### **2.1. Effects of the Electoral System**

In the case of Croatia and Serbia, the majoritarian electoral system was an important factor that contributed to the emergence of a dominant party. Both in Croatia and Serbia, the two-ballot majority system (TBMS) was used for the first parliamentary elections held in 1990. In both countries, this electoral system gave a big “bonus” to a party that would become dominant (Cohen 1993; Goati 2001). As for the Croatian case, the HDZ secured only slightly above 40 % in both rounds while it secured 67.5 % of the seats in the parliament (see table 1), leading to the advantage ratio of about 1.6 which is much higher than the mean of the 3 dominant parties in non-PR systems in the West (Japan’s LDP, UK’s Conservatives and France’s RPR, 1.31, 1.16, 1.26 respectively, see Boucek 1998, p.121). As for the case of Serbia, the advantage ratio was even higher: in the first parliamentary elections in 1990, the SPS secured only 46.1 % of the votes but secured 77.6 % of the seats in the parliament (see table 2), leading to the advantage ratio of about 1.68. In the first round, the SPS received only 46 % of the votes cast but secured 91 % of the 96 seats decided in the first contest (Cohen 1993, p.158). If the PR system was used in these countries, probably it would have been difficult for these two parties to secure an absolute majority of seats in the parliament, which in turn could have weakened the power of these parties



**Table 1.** Votes and Distribution of Seats for the Sociopolitical Chamber of the Sabor, 1990

Parties	First Round		Second Round		In Parliament	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Seats	%
HDZ	1,200,691	41.8	708,007	42.2	54	67.5
SKH-SDP and smaller left parties	994,060	34.5	627,345	37.3	19	23.7
SDS	46,418	1.6	34,682	2.0	1	1.2
Centrist Coalition and all others	633,892	22.0	308,378	18.3	6	7.5
Total	2,875,061	100.0	1,678,412	100.0	80	100.0
Voter Turnout	84.50 %	—	74.80 %	—	—	—

Source : Cohen 1993, p. 100.

**Table 2.** Votes and Seats of Leading Parties in Serbia, 1990

Parties	Votes	%	Seats	%
SPS	2,320,587	46.1	194	77.6
SPO	794,786	15.8	19	7.6
Independents	456,318	9.1	8	3.2
DS	374,887	7.4	7	2.8
DZVM	132,726	2.6	8	3.2
Total	5,034,613	100.0	250	100.0

Source : Goati 2001, p. 209.

after the elections. It seems clear that the majoritarian electoral system used in these two countries did indeed contribute to the establishment of dominance of HDZ and SPS.

There is one interesting difference between these two cases, namely the intention of the rule-setter. In Croatia, it was actually Communists who insisted to use TBMS for the elections while opposition parties (including the HDZ) argued for the adoption of the PR system when the round table between Communists and opposition parties was held in January 1990 (Woodward 1995, pp.117-119). Communists miscalculated that they would win the elections and they were indeed punished by the electoral system they argued

for. Therefore, while the electoral system contributed to the dominance of the HDZ after elections, it was not a result of the intention of the HDZ.

The story is different in Serbia. The SPS was founded by a former Communist leader Slobodan Milošević in July 1990 and practically a successor party of the League of Communists of Serbia. In Serbia, it was the SPS who decided to use the TBMS in the first parliamentary elections and benefited from the electoral system. Therefore, it is highly probable that the bonus given to the strongest party was an intentional, rather than unintentional, effects of the rule-setter. Note that there was a time-lag between Croatian and Serbian elections: the first multiparty elec-

tions were held in April-May 1990 in Croatia and in December 1990 in Serbia. Therefore, Milošević might have learned from the Croatian case that the TBMS works well for the strongest party.

In any case, the relations between the electoral system and the emergence/absence of dominant party are not straightforward. Firstly, even among ex-Yusoglav countries, the same electoral system did not lead to the emergence of dominant party: in Macedonia, TBMS was also used for the first parliamentary elections but no dominant party emerged (see Appendix)<sup>3</sup>. Secondly, dominant parties could emerge under the PR system as well, as the cases of Sweden and Ireland show (see Boucek 1998). Among our cases, the case of Montenegro also confirms it: while the PR system has been used since the first parliamentary elections, the DPS still remains dominant. In order to fully explain the variance among ex-Yugoslav countries, therefore, the electoral system alone is not sufficient. This article points out another factor, namely the presence or absence of the issue that divides the ethnic majority group.

## **2.2. Issues and Cleavages**

The second important factor that affected the emergence or absence of a dominant party in ex-Yugoslav countries is the presence or absence of salient issues/cleavages that divide the ethnic majority. In a country where the ethnic composition is characterized by the presence of a clear ethnic majority and ethnic minorities, the voting behaviour of the ethnic majority is of vital importance for the emergence or absence of a dominant party. If no salient


issue or cleavage divides the majority ethnic group, there is more likelihood for an overwhelming majority *within* the ethnic group to vote for one party, which could lead to the emergence of a dominant party. Here, the dominance of the party and that of the ethnic group come together and inter-related to each other. Recall, for example, the argument made by Horowitz (1985, pp.628-632) that it is important to divide the votes among the majority ethnic group into several parties in order to prevent the permanent dominance of the majority ethnic group under the democratic system, if an ethnic structure of the country is characterized by majority-minority. The prevention of permanent dominance *by one party* becomes synonymous with the prevention of permanent dominance *by one ethnic group*. In this sense, the issue of one-party dominance is directly relevant to the issue of political and democratic stability in multi-ethnic societies.

All ex-Yugoslav countries that are analysed here indeed have an ethnic group that constitutes a clear majority in the country (see Appendix for the ethnic composition of these countries in 1991). If one analyzes the issues and cleavages that divide the ethnic majority group, one can conclude that some issues or cleavages divided the majority ethnic group in Slovenia and Macedonia, while it was not the case in Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro.

In Slovenia, it seems that two cleavages have defined the party system since the first elections, namely a value cleavage (secular libertarians - Religious traditionalists) and an economic left - right cleav-



**Figure 1:** Ideal-typical configuration of the party system: “national communism, negotiated transition and cultural conflict”.



Source: Kitschelt 1995, p. 466.

age. The Slovenian party system that emerged after the first elections in 1990 fits what Kitschelt called “national communism, negotiated transition and cultural conflict” ideal typical configuration (see figure 1) that are characterized by three main electoral forces: right libertarians, left libertarians and cultural traditionalists. In the Slovenian case, the LDS represents right libertarians, ZLSD and DeSUS represent left libertarians, while Christian Democrats (SKD and NSi) and other parties (SLS, SNS) represent cultural traditionalists. Given the relatively stable electoral support these parties enjoy across a series of elections, it seems that the cleavages that define the party system became consolidated soon after the first elections. These cleavages prevented the

emergence of a dominant party in Slovenia.

In Macedonia, what prevailed in the first elections in 1990 among Macedonians was the issue of statehood. The VMRO-DPMNE, a newly-established nationalist party, campaigned for the sovereignty of Macedonia and the transformation of Yugoslavia into “confederation” of sovereign republics, while non-nationalist left parties (old regime party SKM and reformist Communists SRSM) campaigned against such a course and argued for the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation. Macedonian voters were divided on this issue, which led to the relatively equal strength of these two forces in the parliament. This division among Macedonian voters was a critical factor that prevented

the emergence of a dominant party in Macedonia. The subsequent electoral results show that a significant number of Macedonian voters switch their support from one party to another, and neither party has won so overwhelmingly that it could form a single-party government without making a coalition with Albanian parties. This balance between two electoral forces *within ethnic Macedonians* has prevented the emergence of a dominant party in Macedonia (note that Albanians consistently voted for ethnic Albanian parties and almost no ethnic cross-voting has occurred in the parliamentary elections, even though it occurred in the second round of presidential elections).

In Croatia, the HDZ campaigned for the ethno-centric platform and drew its support exclusively from ethnic Croat voters. On the contrary, other parties drew their support from minorities such as Serbs and Yugoslavs as well as Croats. The former Communist party, for example, gained a significant support from Serbs, who constituted almost one-third of its supporters (Siber 1992). Indeed, the HDZ seems to have been successful in acquiring a majority of votes among ethnic Croats: from table 1, one can see that the share of votes the HDZ got was about 42 % which means about 54 % of the ethnic Croats if one assumes that 100 % of its supporters were ethnic Croats. The lack of salient issues within ethnic Croats led to the divided support for non-HDZ Croatian parties (mainly post-Communist party and Centrist Coalition) among the rest of ethnic Croat voters. Assisted by the electoral system discussed above and this fragmented support for non-HDZ Croatian parties,

the HDZ succeeded in securing an absolute majority of seats in the parliament while drawing its support exclusively from ethnic Croat voters.

In Serbia, nationalism that had risen since the Milošević's ascent to power played an important role in unifying ethnic Serb voters. Pribičević argues that the discovery of "force of nationalism" was the most important factor for the electoral success of the SPS: Milošević won over a large segment of people by promising to stop the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo and re-unify Serbia (Pribičević 1997, p. 110). With the general radicalization of the Serb electorate that started much earlier than the first elections, non-SPS parties could not find an issue that they could raise to differentiate themselves from the SPS. The SPO, the main opposition party against the SPS in the 1990 elections, was even *more nationalistic* than Milošević and the SPS (Cohen 1993, pp.152-154). With the nationalist position having been already "occupied" by the ruling SPS, opposition parties could not gain much support (Goati 2001, pp.30). Another factor that helped the emergence of a dominant party was an extreme fragmentation of opposition parties. Miller even suggests that the inundation of opposition parties was deliberately created by the SPS: the SPS deliberately lowered the criteria for party registration and made it easier to create new parties, which led to the mushroom increase of opposition parties (Miller 1997, p.164). Helped by these factors, the SPS secured an overwhelming majority in the parliament after the first elections.

In Montenegro, there was an overwhelm-

ing consensus among ethnic Montenegrins on the support for the Serb cause (for the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation, re-unification of Serbia and Kosovo, etcetera). Again in Montenegro, the ruling SKCG had already taken a “nationalist position” before the transition to a multiparty system, which made it difficult for the opposition parties to use the “nationalist card” as an effective tool for anti-ruling party campaign, unlike Croatia, Bosnia or to some extent Macedonia (Goati 2001, pp.32-37). With the absence of the salient issue that divides ethnic Montenegrins, the DPS won an absolute majority even without the assistance of the majoritarian electoral system.

As discussed above, the emergence of a dominant party in the ex-Yugoslav countries coincides with the lack of salient *intra-ethnic* issues/cleavages within the ethnic majority. Thus the emergence of a dominant party in the ex-Yugoslav region was partly a result of the concentration of votes from ethnic majority voters. This means that one-party dominance was at the same time the dominance by the ethnic majority over minorities. In multi-ethnic societies, such a situation often has serious consequences for inter-ethnic relations, and ex-Yugoslav countries were no exception in this regard. This issue will be discussed in the section 4.

### **3. Maintenance (and Collapse) of One-Party Dominance**

In this section, factors that contributed to the maintenance of one-party dominance are analysed. It will discuss (1) the strategies used by ruling parties and (2)

behaviour of opposition parties. Finally, some factors that contributed to the collapse of one-party dominance in Croatia and Serbia as well as some features that characterise the aftermath of collapse are examined.

#### **3.1. Strategies of Ruling Parties**

In order to maintain their dominance, ruling parties adopted some strategies. This section discusses two particularly remarkable ones, namely (1) institutional manipulation and (2) control of the media.

Firstly, dominant parties in ex-Yugoslav countries, particularly the HDZ and the SPS, had recourse to the manipulation of electoral system. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, for example, Serbia was divided into 9 electoral districts and this enabled the SPS to win 123 seats (49.2 %) with only 38 % of the votes despite the apparent “proportional” system, because the SPS could win as many as 38 seats in two Kosovo districts with tiny Serb votes for SPS (due to the boycott of Albanians who constitute almost 90 % of the Kosovo population). For example, the SPS won 21 seats with only 60,000 votes in the Priština district, while this number of votes in Belgrade would give a party only 4 seats (Pribičević 1997, p.119). The HDZ also manipulated the electoral system for its advantage. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, for example, a special non-geographic district was allocated to the “diaspora” (ethnic Croats living outside Croatia, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who consistently support the HDZ), giving them the right to choose twelve representatives for the parliament, which is a disproportionate level of repre-

sentation compared to other voters (HRW 1999; Kasapović 2001, pp.28-29)<sup>4</sup>. The HDZ also used other means such as gerrymandering. For example, it succeeded in redistributing the city of Zagreb, where the opposition enjoyed more support, so that its voters were redistributed among four mainly rural districts that were supportive of the HDZ (HRW 1999).

Especially in Croatia, the HDZ also manipulated the timing of elections for its advantage. Firstly, it capitalized on its security policies to garner the electoral support. In 1993, for example, Croatia launched an offensive only two weeks before the upper house elections. In 1995, the government decided to call early elections for the lower chamber of the parliament two months after the successful completion of the "Operation Storm" to "liberate" the Serb-occupied territory of Krajina. As some Croatian scholars pointed out, the intention of the ruling party was obviously to organize elections while national euphoria that emerged after the liberation of the Croatian territory was felt (Cvrtila 2001, p.55; Zakošek 2002, p. 46). Secondly, the HDZ chose the date of elections that would make monitoring more difficult and would affect the voter turnout negatively. For example, the HDZ first has chosen December 22 for the 1999 elections, which invited criticism from domestic and international observers, and the new date for the elections, January 3, 2000, has elicited similar concerns from the European Union and opposition parties in Croatia (HRW 1999).

Another important element of the strategies of dominant parties in ex-Yugoslav countries was media control. In all coun-

tries, ruling parties tightly controlled state media and this gave an enormous advantage to dominant parties. In Serbia, for example, the coverage of the SPS was much more extensive and longer than opposition parties (e.g. see Pribičević 1997, pp.118-119; Goati 2001, pp.38-39). In addition, when opposition parties were covered, they were often presented in a negative manner. For example, during the electoral campaign in 1993, RTS (Radio Televizija Srbije) broadcast several special programs on opposition parties, referring to them as "non-patriotic and dependent on the Western financial help" (Pribičević 1997, p.119). As for Croatia, the lack of independence of HRT (Hrvatska Radio-Televizija) was a major concern for the Western countries and observers (HRW 1999). For example, during the election campaigns in 1997, the media coverage was extremely skewed, and the HDZ was given much longer airtime than all other parties combined (Banjeglav 1999). The situation is not so different in Montenegro since the ruling party controls the state media. OSCE/ODIHR, for example, concluded that the "coverage of the political campaign by the main sources of information, Montenegrin and Serbian Television, as well as the print media was not well balanced and the prejudicial effect this can have is of concern" (ODIHR 1997). In 1998, ODIHR states that "the degree of balance of coverage and equal access for all political parties decreases when discussing news programs on state television, since the majority of time (50.6 %) during the prime time news at 19:30 is given to President Djukanović and the Montenegrin government, with most of

this time classified as positive coverage” (ODIHR 1998), even though the “Izbori 98 program” (coverage related to election campaign) succeeded in providing equal access on state television to all political parties during the election campaign.

In Croatia and Serbia, ruling dominant parties repressed the independent media which tends to be critical of the regime. In both countries, this was done through administrative and technical means to control media. In Croatia, for example, Criminal Statutes revised and expanded in 1996 prescribed the punishment for insulting and libelling President, Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament and other high functionaries (Banjeglav 2003, pp.161-168; Malović & Selnow 2001). These laws were used to repress the independent media such as Feral Tribune, Novi List and Radio 101 (Banjeglav 2003, pp.161-168). In Serbia, the notorious Public Information Act of 1998 prohibited the publication of information “damaging the reputation or interest of a legal or physical person” and “offending honour or integrity of a person,” and it envisaged the punishment of the founder and the publisher by a fine of up to 800,000 dinars (HCHRS 1999, pp.73-107). This law thus became “a highly efficient tool” for the Serbian authorities to “settle their political accounts with unruly media” (HCHRS 1999, p.95) and provided a legal basis for repressing the independent media.

Dominant parties in Croatia and Serbia even showed a tendency to reject the election results when they turn out to be inconvenient for them. In Croatia, for example, an opposition candidate won the mayorship of the capital, Zagreb, but Tudjman

vetoed the installation of an opposition mayor. While the opposition-dominated City Assembly elected one mayor after another, Tudjman kept vetoing and this led to an eighteen-month standoff during which Zagreb was essentially without a mayor (Kasapović 1998; HRW 1997; HRW 1998). Finally in April 1997 when the local elections were held, the HDZ won enough seats in the Zagreb assembly to elect a mayor from the HDZ, helped by the new electoral system which favored larger parties (Kasapović 1998, pp.133-134). In Serbia, the opposition coalition “Zajedno” (meaning “together”) won in fourteen of Serbia’s 19 largest cities in the municipal elections of November 1996, but the government attempted to declare the victory of the ruling party or to annul the results citing unspecified irregularities. This incited huge demonstrations against the regime, which the government could not stop even though they used violence and arrests. Finally the government was forced to recognize the results in February 1997.

The discussion above on the strategies used by dominant parties shows that, especially in Croatia and Serbia, elections were seriously flawed. This, however, is not the sole factor that explains the maintenance of one-party dominance. The behavior of opposition parties was also important.

### **3.2. Behavior of Opposition Parties**

The capability of opposition parties to reach political accords and to form a coalition is often cited as one factor that explains the presence or absence of a dominant party (see e.g. Pempel 1990, pp.19-20). This was also an important factor in ex-Yugoslav countries. In Croatia and

Serbia in particular, opposition parties helped the maintenance of one-party dominance by failing to coalesce and cooperate with each other against the dominant party.

In Serbia, opposition parties often fought against each other, which weakened the strength of opposition against the regime. For example, when an anti-regime opposition coalition (DEPOS, or Democratic Movement of Serbia) was formed in 1992, the DS leadership did not show any enthusiasm for the formation of a new opposition alliance and criticized their opposition rivals (Thomas 1999, pp. 112-113). In addition, this led to the further fragmentation of opposition parties, namely the emergence of pro-DEPOS factions within the DS, who broke with DS and created a new party, DSS. Even within DEPOS, serious divisions had arisen by mid-April 1993 on future opposition strategy (Thomas 1999, p.149) and in autumn this year again on the Geneva peace plan (Thomas 1999, p.189). When the anti-regime opposition coalition "Zajedno" was formed in September 1996 (mainly by SPO and DS), the DSS was antagonistic to such coalition (Thomas 1999, p.278). In early 1997, massive demonstrations against the regime (originally triggered by the regime's rejection to accept the 1996 municipal election results) began to wane as opposition parties started infighting over who would run to replace Milošević as Serbian President: Djindjić (the leader of DS) sharply criticized the candidacy of Drašković, the leader of SPO (FH 1998). When the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 1997, Drašković and his party SPO contested the elections while

the DS decided to boycott the elections (Thomas 1999, pp.342-357). While the Zajedno alliance could have seriously damaged the Milošević regime, they "proved too internally weak and incohesive to be able to capitalize on its success" and it was ultra-nationalist SRS that "took the opportunity to exploit the damage which Zajedno had done to the credibility of the Milošević regime" (Thomas 1999 p.349).

In Croatia, opposition parties were also fragmented. This fragmentation was partly caused by the introduction of a mixed electoral system under which some seats were allocated according to the proportional representation system. According to Bartlett, the introduction of a PR system that increased the fragmentation of parties was a political tactic of the ruling party HDZ (Bartlett 2003, p.42). While the popularity of President Tudjman started to diminish gradually as a variety of scandals hit the regime, "the opposition failed to capitalize on the diminishing popularity of the government since it remained divided and proved incapable of seizing its opportunities" (Bartlett 2003, p.51).

While dominant parties in Serbia and Croatia used some strategies to maintain their dominance, therefore, the failure of opposition parties to cooperate and coalesce against the dominant party also helped the maintenance of dominance. This point leads us to the analysis of the collapse of one-party dominance in Croatia and Serbia. It will be shown below that the change in the behavior of opposition parties was a critical factor for the collapse of one-party dominance.



### 3.3. Collapse of One-Party Dominance in Serbia and Croatia

Among our cases, one-party dominance in two countries, namely in Croatia and Serbia, collapsed in 2000. This section briefly discusses some factors that contributed to the collapse of one-party dominance in these countries.

The most important factor for the collapse of one-party dominance was a growing unpopularity of dominant parties. This was largely a result of the policies of dominant parties. In Croatia, the most important reason for the loss of popularity was the economic crisis which erupted in 1998, triggered by the collapse of a number of regional banks (Bartlett 2003, p.55; Zakošek 2001, p.102). The unpopularity was also fuelled by various corruption charges and scandals of HDZ members and their fellows: in the privatization process, the ownership of a large part of the Croatian economy was transferred to individuals who were either members or associates of the HDZ and the economy had become dominated by so-called “tycoon capitalists” who had little interest in productive accumulation but more interested in asset stripping and getting rich quickly (Bartlett 2003, p.55-56). The consequences of the government policies were even more disastrous in Serbia: the decade of the rule by the SPS was marked by a series of economic crisis, including hyperinflation, a decreasing living standard and a growing international isolation of Serbia, which increasingly undermined the popularity of Milošević and the SPS. Goati (2000) shows that, by the year 2000, the Serbian electorate was dominated by pro-European orientation despite the isolation-

ist government. Numerous empirical researches conducted between September 1999 and March 2000 indicated that the Serbian electorate gave more support to democratic opposition parties *as a group* than to the ruling parties, i.e. SPS, JUL and SRS (CeSID 2000, p.12, emphasis added by the author).

This was not sufficient, however, for the collapse of one-party dominance. The change in the behavior of opposition parties was also of critical importance. Both in Croatia and Serbia, opposition parties managed to make a large coalition against the incumbent regime which could present a clear alternative to the dominant party. In Croatia, a six-party coalition known as Šestorka (meaning “the Six”) was formed for the 2000 parliamentary elections. This coalition was composed of two main groups: the main group was a partnership of the two centre-left parties, SDP and HSL, and another was a group of four smaller parties, HSS, IDS, LS and HNS, known as the “Group of Four”. As Bartlett points out, “for the first time in ten years the opposition remained united throughout the election campaign” (Bartlett 2003, p.57), and it contributed significantly to the collapse of one-party dominance. In Serbia, a large opposition coalition called “DOS” (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) was formed by 18 parties, led by DS and DSS. While one important opposition party, namely the SPO, decided to run independently in the elections of 2000, this large coalition also provided a clear alternative to the dominant party in Serbia.

Indeed, this is where Milošević seems to have made a miscalculation. In Serbia, the

event that triggered the collapse of one-party dominance was the federal presidential elections. The federal president was to be elected by the federal parliament under the constitution and actually it was Milošević himself who decided to amend the constitution so that the federal president would be directly elected. With the opposition parties that had always been fighting against each other and unable to cooperate, it seems that Milošević calculated that he could easily win the elections that would give him another 5-year term with “democratic” legitimacy. Against his expectations, however, opposition parties were able to form a large coalition. In addition, the selection of candidate was also critical. The presidential candidate of DOS was Koštunica, who had kept a relatively clean image among voters, unlike Djindjić who had been marked by the history of political infighting with other politicians (notably Drašković of SPO) and who could have not appealed to the Serbian masses as broadly as Koštunica.

Both in Croatia and Serbia, there were some additional factors. In Croatia, the death of the authoritarian leader was also important. President Tudjman died from cancer at the end of 1999 aged 77 just before the election. Given Tudjman’s authoritarian tendencies to reject election results inconvenient for the HDZ, Tudjman’s death surely contributed to the smooth transfer of power from the HDZ to opposition parties. After the elections in 2000, the HDZ recognized their defeat and accepted the electoral results.

The situation in Serbia was different. The authoritarian leader was still there and attempted to reject the election results.

After the first round of the federal presidential elections, the regime (or more precisely the Federal Electoral Commission, FEC, acting as an agent of the regime rather than an independent organ) first announced that Koštunica had gained 49.9 % of the votes cast and attempted to hold a second round vote (Goati 2001, p.245), while it was apparent that Koštunica had indeed gained more than 50 % of votes in the first round vote. In such a situation, the realization of alternation in power required some additional factors.

The first factor was a successful mobilization of citizens by the opposition side. When the complaints of DOS against the decision were rejected by FEC, Koštunica decided to contest it and started mobilizing citizens against the regime, calling for the “civic disobedience” until the recognition of the electoral results. The demonstrations reached the peak on 5<sup>th</sup> October when more than 700,000 citizens from all over Serbia gathered in the streets of Belgrade and occupied the Federal Parliament and the buildings of RTS (Goati 2001, p.246). This successful mobilization by the opposition created an enormous pressure against the incumbent regime, which finally forced Milošević to accept the results and step down. The momentum gained by DOS in the federal presidential elections was confirmed by the landslide victory of DOS in the Serbian parliamentary elections at the end of 2000 which marked the end of dominance by the SPS in Serbia.

The second factor was the availability of alternative and independent information on the actual electoral results. In order to invalidate the official electoral results forged by the authorities, there must be some

reliable information that shows that the official electoral results were indeed forged. If international election observers are present, they can play an important role in this regard. In Serbia, however, they could not play this role since they were not allowed to enter the country (ODIHR 2000). Under such circumstances, the domestic well-organized NGO played a crucial role. The local NGO called "Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID)" deployed more than 6,000 activists to monitor the elections throughout Serbia on the Election Day despite the blackmailing and harassment by the police, and quickly published their own version of the election results, being the first organization to declare the victory of Koštunica in the first round vote (CeSID 2003). The findings by the CeSID and Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies made a significant contribution to the composition of complaints submitted by the DOS to the Constitutional Court (CeSID 2003), which made a decision on 5<sup>th</sup> October, after the turnout of hundreds of thousands of citizens in the street, to revoke the FEC decision to reject Koštunica's complaint and to abolish the FEC decision on the election results.

This section finally points out one common feature in Croatia and Serbia in the aftermath of the collapse of one-party dominance, namely the start of infighting within the new coalition government. As discussed above, a successful coalition formation of opposition parties was a critical factor for the collapse of one-party dominance. This, however, often has a serious consequence for the post-election policy coordination among ruling parties: precise-

ly because the alternation in power became possible by coalescing parties of different ideological orientations, policy coordination between ruling parties became difficult in both countries once they achieved the alternation in power<sup>5</sup>. In Croatia, the IDS left the government in disagreement over economic policies and in dispute over the IDS proposal to make Italian an official language in Istria (Bartlett 2003, p.60). In addition, the issue of cooperation with the Hague tribunal led to the dispute between the HSLs and other ruling parties: the four ministers from the HSLs threatened to resign in protest at the government's decision to hand over General Ante Gotovina (Bartlett 2003, p.60). In July 2002, the HSLs finally left the government. In Serbia, the infighting erupted between Djindjić (DS) and Koštunica (DSS) over the issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, with the former supporting and the latter opposing it. When the Serbian government led by Djindjić handed over Milošević to the Hague Tribunal, Federal President Koštunica harshly criticized the Serbian government. The DSS left the government in August 2001 and was formally expelled from the DOS coalition in July 2002.

Such infighting between ruling parties tends to weaken the government's capacity to formulate and implement coherent policies. This could lead to the disillusionment among voters who had voted for opposition parties with the (often unreasonably) high expectations on changes that the alternation in power could bring about. This disillusionment could, in turn, lead to the revival of former dominant parties. Indeed, the HDZ again gained power after

the 2003 elections. Serbia saw a dramatic rise in support for the ultra-nationalistic party SRS in the 2003 elections even though the SPS remained quite weak. While the (at least relatively) pro-Western and pro-market parties such as the DSS managed to make a ruling coalition that excluded the SRS after the 2003 elections, this coalition could only establish minority government which was fragile and unstable. Such situation could pose a serious challenge to the democratic prospect in Serbia even after the collapse of one-party dominance.

#### **4. Consequences of One-Party Dominance**

This final section briefly discusses the consequences of one-party dominance for emergent democracies in ex-Yugoslav countries. The first part of this section focuses on the issue of exclusion of ethnic minorities, not only because it was of critical importance in this region but also because there is an interesting difference between the cases. The second part then discusses the quality of democracy in general. All of our cases of dominant parties (HDZ, SPS and DPS) are similar in this regard and this has an important implication for emergent democracies.

##### **4.1. Exclusion of Ethnic Minorities**

When dominant parties drew their support exclusively from the ethnic majority, their dominance led to the exclusion of minorities. Both in Croatia and Serbia, dominant parties (HDZ and SPS) campaigned for nationalistic programs and they implemented a series of ethno-

centric policies once they gained power. This exacerbated inter-ethnic relations in these countries, causing a serious internal instability.

In Croatia, ethno-centric election campaigns of the HDZ started to exacerbate inter-ethnic relations between Croats and Serbs even during the campaign period of first multi-party elections in 1990 (Bugajski 1994, p.47). The ethno-centric policies implemented by the Croatian government after the elections further alienated Serbs in Croatia, who started to take centrifugal (and later secessionist) actions against the Croatian government. Such policies include the introduction of the historical red and white chessboard emblem to the official flag and the uniform of police force (which Serb policemen refused to wear), the adoption of a new constitution that stipulates that the official language and script are "Croatian" and Latin script, and the dismissal of Serb policemen who were replaced by newly recruited ethnic Croats in the name of the "correction of the disproportion between Croats and Serbs of the Communist era" (Silber & Little 1996, pp.98-99). The Serbs were excluded from the policy-making process in Croatia after the elections. While radical actions taken by Serbs are not solely caused by the government policies but also by the outside support from the Republic of Serbia, it is certain that the HDZ government policies are also responsible for the exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations in Croatia.

In Serbia, the Serbian government led by Milošević started anti-Albanian policies even before the first multi-party elections, such as the abolition of Kosovo autonomy and of public education in Albanian lan-

guage, “legal” purge of Albanian workers from major factories as well as in the other fields (doctors, police, journalists, teachers, etc.), and the closure of media in the Albanian language (Judah 2000, pp.62–63). Albanians started centrifugal actions against such policies by establishing the “parallel society” such as their own education system, financed by the contributions of Albanians both within and outside Kosovo (Judah 2000; Kostovičová 1996). While the violent rebellion by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) did not start until 1997, inter-ethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians seriously deteriorated much earlier due to the policies of the SPS government. The ethno-centric policies implemented by the Serbian government also led to increasing frustrations and grievances among other ethnic minorities, such as Hungarians in Vojvodina and Muslims in the Sandžak region. Various Hungarian parties demanded an autonomy for Hungarians, either political (territorial) or cultural (Samardžić 1999). Sandžak Muslims have also taken some centrifugal actions, such as the establishment of “Sandžak Muslim National Council (SMNC)” in May 1991 and the organization of a referendum on “political and regional autonomy of Sandžak” by SMNC in October 1991. The exclusion of ethnic minorities in Serbia after the elections thus led to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Serbia.

The case of Montenegro is quite unique in this regard because the DPS transformed itself in 1997 from a dominant party supported mainly by the ethnic majority group (Montenegrins) to the one supported by both majority ethnic group and eth-

nic minorities. In Montenegro, ethnic minorities such as Albanians or Muslims (Bošnjaks) have been strongly against Milošević and the government of Serbia. Due to this position, they supported Djukanović when he campaigned for the pro-reform and anti-Milošević program in the 1997 presidential elections. Indeed, he won the presidential elections thanks to the support from these minorities in the second round vote, without which he could not have won (Bulatović, pro-Serbia and pro-Milošević candidate, was winning in the first round of vote, when most of the minorities voted for their own presidential candidates). Since then, the DPS has taken more liberal policies that have positive impacts on ethnic minorities, including the recruitment of politicians from ethnic minorities to the ministerial posts (Šistek & Dimitrovová 2003, pp.160–173). Even though there are some ethnic parties for minorities such as Albanians and Muslims, they do not enjoy full support within their respective ethnic constituencies because a significant number of voters among these minorities vote for the DPS rather than their ethnic parties (Šistek & Dimitrovová 2003). While the DPS has maintained its dominance since 1997, therefore, this dominance remains partly dependent on the support of ethnic minorities and thus has *not* led to the exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations. The case of Montenegro suggests that the emergence of dominant party may not necessarily be harmful for domestic inter-ethnic relations if it enjoys the support across different ethnic communities and does not draw its support exclusively from the ethnic majority.



## 4.2. Quality of Democracy

Secondly, the establishment of one-party dominance negatively affected the quality of democracy in ex-Yugoslav countries, causing erosion of the fundamental civil rights and serious corruptions. In addition to the severe restriction of the fundamental rights of ethnic minorities, such as Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Serbia, one-party dominance has led to the increasing restriction of political freedom (such as freedom of expression and speech) even for the citizens of ethnic majority, because dominant parties attempted to maintain their dominance through undemocratic means such as media control. Both in Croatia and Serbia, the government control over state enterprises and privatization process has led to the serious level of corruption during the era of dominance by the HDZ and the SPS. According to the survey on the level of corruption conducted by Transparency International in 1999, for example, Croatia was ranked 74<sup>th</sup> and Yugoslavia was ranked 90<sup>th</sup> among total 99 countries. The 1999 CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) score, which ranges from 0.0 (highly corrupt) to 10.0 (highly clean), was 2.7 for Croatia and 2.0 for Yugoslavia (TI 1999).

Montenegro is no exception in this regard. Indeed, war and international sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia presented great opportunities for enrichment to well-connected individuals, including the ruling elite, through a variety of semi-legal or criminal practices, including large-scale smuggling. For example, in an interview in the Italian press in January 2001, the Italian Finance Minister Ottaviano del Turco accused Djukanović of involvement

in cigarette smuggling and of being closely connected with the Italian Mafia, while Montenegrin officials have denied it (ICG 2001). As for the political freedom, the fact that Duško Jovanović, editor-in-chief of the Montenegrin daily *Dan* and a critic of leading officials in Montenegro, was killed in May 2004 seems to show the precarious nature of the political freedom in Montenegro. Montenegrin researchers who studied the state of democracy from various angles found that the existence of corruption leads to a non-professional and ineffective judicial system and that the non-existence of control and legality in the power functioning, caused by the existence of corruptions and criminals in certain structures of the power, hinders the advancement of democracy in the area of political processes (Bešić et al 2006).

The cases of ex-Yugoslav countries suggest that the emergence of a dominant party could be detrimental for the quality of democracy. While it could be the case even for established democracies, the potential danger is much more serious in emergent democracies because of the weakness of judiciary. The fact that the country is newly democratized often (if not always) means that the judiciary has been highly politicized and not independent. If the judiciary has not established its strength and independence, in turn, dominant parties that emerge after elections could dominate the judiciary as well, either by covert political pressure and influence or by direct control through the appointment process. This is critical for the quality of democracy, since the domination of judiciary by dominant parties almost necessarily leads to the complete lack of insti-



tutional check and balance. The emergence of a dominant party by definition means that there would not be much check and balance between executive and legislature. If there is no independent judiciary, therefore, the dominant party could easily degenerate into a dominant *authoritarian* party since the human rights violations by the incumbent regime cannot be properly checked and restrained by the judiciary.

### In Lieu of Conclusion

This article has discussed origins, maintenance and consequences of the one-party dominance in ex-Yugoslav countries. This part, in lieu of conclusion, discusses some points that deserve particular attention, related to consequences of one-party dominance.

Firstly, experiences of ex-Yugoslav countries show indeed that the one-party dominance could be detrimental to the quality of democracy in newly democratized countries. This, however, does not mean that the effect of one-party dominance is always negative. The ex-Yugoslav cases suggest more nuanced conclusions in this regard.

As for the effect of one-party dominance on inter-ethnic relations, the nature of the support base of the dominant party seems crucial. If a dominant party draws its support exclusively from the majority ethnic group, its dominance would be viewed by minorities as a dominance of the majority ethnic group. This will be detrimental to the legitimacy of democratic institutions since minorities may “equate democracy not with freedom or participation but with

the structured dominance of adversarial majority groups” (Sisk 1996, p.31). If a dominant party draws its support across different ethnic groups, however, its dominance is not necessarily detrimental to inter-ethnic relations. The case of Montenegro shows that the dominant party could change its nature over time: the DPS transformed itself from an ethnic Montenegrin party to a more multi-ethnic party, which contributed indeed to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations between Montenegrins and ethnic minorities such as Albanians and Muslims. If the change happens in the opposite direction, however, such change might be harmful for inter-ethnic relations in the country.

As for the negative effects of one-party dominance on the quality of democracy in general, it is important to take into account one intervening variable, namely the strength of judiciary. The one-party dominance would not be so harmful for the quality of democracy in Sweden, for example, but would be much more so in newly democratized countries where the judiciary tends to be weaker and not sufficiently independent. In order to see whether this conclusion is valid or not, it is necessary to compare various cases of dominant parties in old democracies and newly democratized countries. If such a conclusion is indeed valid, one could argue that what is harmful for the quality of democracy is not the one-party dominance *per se* but rather the one-party dominance which functions under the weak judiciary.

Secondly, these problematic consequences of one-party dominance imply the presence of dynamics that is opposite to what Pempel called the “virtuous cycles of

dominance” (Pempel 1990). According to Pempel, a dominant party is able to implement the “historical program” and policies that reinforce its own power base, and the implementation of such programs or policies in turn enables the party to enjoy more support and to become even more dominant. The experiences of ex-Yugoslav countries, particularly Croatia and Serbia, suggest a dynamics in the opposite direction: the one-party dominance leads to problematic consequences such as the erosion of fundamental rights and serious corruptions, and precisely due to these consequences, the continuation of one-party dominance itself becomes a paramount issue among voters. When maladies of dominance become increasingly visible, voters might vote against the dominant party simply in order to reject the continuation of dominance, even regardless of their preferences in specific policy areas. This desire among voters to “kick the rascals out” may be a critical factor for the end of one-party dominance and the opening of new era of increased political competition.

#### Notes

1 This article is a revised version of the paper presented at Workshop 24 (Dominant Parties and Democracy) of the 33rd Joint Sessions of Workshops, *European Consortium for Political Research*, held at University of Granada in April 2005. The author would like to thank directors of the workshop, Dr. Matthijs Bogaards and Dr. Françoise Boucek, as well as other participants of the workshop, for their comments. Of course, the author is solely responsible for the contents of this article.

2 For example, OSCE/ODIHR concluded that the parliamentary election in 1998 was

“generally well conducted” and represents “a significant improvement over the previous elections held in the Republic of Montenegro.” See ODIHR 1998.

3 What emerged in Macedonia after the first elections is what could be called “2 \* 2 party system”: two major Macedonian parties (SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE) competing for the support of Macedonian voters and two major Albanian parties competing for the support of Albanian voters. In this sense, Macedonia is an interesting example that supports the argument made by Duverger that the majoritarian system tends to lead to the two-party system, even though this effect is observed only *within* ethnic groups rather than at the national level.

4 The European countries put a pressure on Croatia to revise its election law as a condition for its admission to the Council of Europe in November 1996. As a result, this disproportionate representation of diaspora was corrected by the 1999 election law, which stipulates that the number of representatives chosen by the diaspora will be proportionate to the number of diaspora voters who participate in the election, according to a formula derived from the number of voters per seat in the electoral districts inside Croatia. The text of the 1999 electoral law is available at <http://www.croatiaemb.org/politics/vote2000/zakon1.htm> (accessed on 2002/04/16).

5 For the analysis of similar difficulties faced by the coalition government after the collapse of LDP dominance in Japan, for example, see Laver *et al* 1996.

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## Appendix: Ex-Yugoslav Countries, 1990-2006

### 1. Slovenia

**Ethnic Composition (1991):** Slovenes 87.6 %, Others 12.4 % (Croats 2.7 %, Serbs 2.4 %, etc)

**Presidents** (Directly Elected through TBMS, 5-year):

1990/04 Milan Kučan (ZKS-SDP)

1992/12 Milan Kučan (independent, supported by ZLSD)

1997/11 Milan Kučan (independent, supported by ZLSD)

2002/12 Janez Drnovšek (LDS)

**Governments:** Period, Prime Minister (Affiliated Party), Ruling Parties

1990/05-1992/04 Lozje Peterle (SKD) DEMOS (SKD+SKZ+SDZ+ZS+SDZS+SOS)

1992/05-1992/12 Janez Drnovsek (LDS) LDS+SDS+ZL+ZS+DS

1993/01-1996/10 Janez Drnovsek (LDS) LDS+ZS+SKD+SDS (left 94/03) +ZLSD (left 96/01)

1997/02-2000/04 Janez Drnovsek (LDS) LDS+SLS+DeSUS

2000/05-2000/10 Andrej Bajuk (SKD+SLS) SLS+SKD+SDS

2000/12-2002/12 Janez Drnovsek (LDS) LDS+ZLSD+DeSUS

2002/12-2004/11 Anton Rop (LDS) LDS+ZLSD+DeSUS+SLS (left 2004/04)

2004/12- Janez Jansa (SDS) SDS+SLS+NSi+DeSUS

### List of Parties in Slovenia:

DeSUS: Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia

DS: Demokratska stranka Slovenije Democratic Party of Slovenia

LDS (1): Liberalno demokratske stranke Liberal Democratic Party

LDS (2): Liberalna demokracija Slovenije Liberal Democracy of Slovenia

NSi: Nova Slovenija - Krščanska ljudska stranka New Slovenia - Christian People's Party

SDS: Slovenska demokratska stranka Slovenian Democratic Party

SDSS: Socialdemokratska stranka Slovenije Socialdemocratic Party of Slovenia

SDZ: Slovenska demokratična zveza Slovenian Democratic Alliance

SDZS: Socialdemokratska zveza Slovenije Socialdemocratic Alliance of Slovenia

SKD: Slovenski krščanski demokrati Slovenian Christian Democrats

SKZ: Slovenska kmečka zveza	Slovenian Farmers' Alliance
SLS + SKD: SLS + SKD Slovenska ljudska stranka	SLS+SKD Slovenian People's Party
SLS: Slovenska ljudska stranka	Slovenian People's Party
SMS: Stranka mladih Slovenije	Slovenian Youth Party
SNS: Slovenska nacionalna stranka	Slovenian National Party
SOS: Slovenska obrtniška stranka	Slovenian Craftsmen's Party
SZS-SZDL: Socialistična zveza Slovenije	Socialist Party of Slovenia
ZKS-SDP: Zveza komunistov Slovenije-Stranka demokratične prenovе	League of Kommunists of Slovenia - Party of Democratic Reform
ZLSD: Združena lista socialnih demokratov	United List of Social Democrats
ZL: Združena lista	United List
ZS: Zeleni Slovenije	The Green Party of Slovenia
ZSMS-LS: Zveza socialistične mladine Slovenije-Liberalna Stranka	League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia-Liberal Party

**Parliament (one chamber)**

Election Year/Month	1990/04	1992/12	1996/11	2000/10	2004/10
Electoral System	PR				
Parties	Number of Seats				
ZKS-SDP > ZL	14	14	—	—	—
» ZLSD	—	—	9	11	10
» DeSUS	—	—	5	4	4
SZS—SZDL	5	—	—	—	—
SDZS > SDSS > SDS	6	4	16	14	29
SDZ > DS »	8	6	—	—	—
ZS »	8	5	—	—	—
ZSMS-LS > LDS(1) »	12	22	—	—	—
» LDS(2)	—	—	25	34	23
SKZ > SLS > SLS + SKD	11	10	19	9	7
SKD	11	15	10		—
» NSi	—	—	—	8	9
SNS	—	12	4	4	6
SOS	3	—	—	—	—
SMS	—	—	—	4	—
National Minorities	2	2	2	2	2
Total	80	90	90	90	90

Sources: All election results are available at the homepage of the statistical office of the Republic of Slovenia. See <http://www.stat.si/> (accessed on March 16, 2005).



## Keiichi Kubo: Origins and Consequences of One-Party Dominance

### 2. Croatia

**Ethnic Composition (1991):** Croats 78.1 %, Serbs 12.2 %, Others 9.7 % (Yugoslavs 2.2 %, etc)

**Presidents** (Directly Elected through TBMS, 5-year):

- 1990/05 Franjo Tuđman (HDZ) elected by Parliament based on the old constitution
- 1992/08 Franjo Tuđman (HDZ)
- 1997/06 Franjo Tuđman (HDZ)
- 2000/02 Stjepan Mesić (HNS)
- 2005/02 Stjepan Mesić (HNS)

**Parliament** (3 chambers in 1990, 2 chambers in 1991–2001, Upper Chamber was abolished in Mar. 2001)

**Lower Chamber of the Parliament**

Election Year/Month	1990/05 <sup>1</sup>	1992/08	1995/10	2000/01	2003/12
Electoral System	TBMS	Mixed <sup>2</sup>	Mixed <sup>3</sup>	PR	PR
Parties	Number of Seats				
HDZ	209	85	75	46	66
» DC	—	—	—	—	3
HSLs	101	14	12	70	
SKH-SDP > SDP	—	6	10		25
LS	—	—	—		
IDS	—	6	18		
HSS	—	3		10	
HNS	—	6		11	
SBHS	—	—	—	1	11
HSP	—	5	4	4	8
SDS	5	—	—	—	—
SNS	—	3	2	1	—
SDSS	—	—	—	—	3
Ethnic Minority Seats	—	9	5	3	4
Others	36	1	1	1	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>152</b>

Notes : 1 Total of the three chambers.

2 TBMS(60) & PR(60) & minorities(18)

3 TBMS(28) & PR(80) & minorities(7) & 12 (overseas)

Sources: Results until 2000 are taken from Zakošek 2002. The 2003 results are taken from the website of the election commission of the republic of Croatia, <http://www.izbori.hr/> (accessed on March 5, 2005).

**Governments:** Period, Prime Minister (Affiliated Party), Ruling Parties

- 1990/05–1990/08 Stjepan Mesić (HDZ) HDZ
- 1990/08–1991/07 Josip Manolić (HDZ) HDZ
- 1991/07–1992/08 Franjo Gregurić (HDZ) “Democratic Unity” government: HDZ+SDP+HNS+HSLs+SSH+SDSH
- 1992/09–1993/04 Hrvoje Šarinić (HDZ) HDZ
- 1993/04–1995/10 Nikica Valentić (HDZ) HDZ
- 1995/11–2000/01 Zlatko Matesa (HDZ) HDZ
- 2000/01–2002/07 Ivica Račan (SDP) SDP+HSLs+HNS+LS+IDS+HSS
- 2002/07–2003/12 Ivica Račan (SDP) SDP+HNS+LS+HSS+Libra
- 2003/12– Ivo Sanader (HDZ) HDZ+DC

### List of Parties in Croatia:

DC: Demokratski centar	Democratic Center
HDZ: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica	Croatian Democratic Union
HNS: Hrvatska narodna stranka	Croatian National Party
HSL: Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka	Croatian Social-Liberal Party
HSP: Hrvatska stranka prava	Croatian Party of Rights
HSS: Hrvatska seljačka stranka	Croatian Peasants' Party
IDS: Istarski demokratski sabor	Istrian Democratic Alliance
LS: Liberalna stranka	Liberal Party
SBHS: Slavonско-baranjska Hrvatska stranka	Slavonia-Baranja Croatian Party
SDP: Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske	Social-democratic Party of Croatia
SDS: Srpska demokratska stranka	Serbian Democratic Party
SDSS: Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka	Independent Democratic Serbian Party
SKH-SDP: Savez komunista Hrvatske-Stranka demokratskih promjena	League of Communists of Croatia - Party of Democratic Change
SNS: Srpska narodna stranka	Serbian National Party

### 3. Serbia

**Ethnic Composition (1991):** Serbs 65.8 %, Albanians 17.2 %, Others 17 % (Yugoslavs 3.2 %, Muslims 2.4 % etc)

**Presidents** (Directly Elected through TBMS, 5-year):

1990/12	Slobodan Milošević (SPS)
1992/12	Slobodan Milošević (SPS)
1997/12	Milan Milutinović (SPS)
2003/01	Nataša Mičić (Acting President due to the failure of presidential elections in 2002)
2004/07	Boris Tadić (DS)

**Governments:** Period, Prime Minister (Affiliated Party), Ruling Parties

1991/02-12	Dragutin Zelenović (SPS)	SPS
1991/12-1993/02	Radoman Božović (SPS)	SPS
1993/02-1994/03	Nikola Šainović (SPS)	SPS
1994/03-1998/02	Mirko Marjanović (SPS)	SPS + ND
1998/02-03	Mirko Marjanović (SPS)	SPS + JUL + ND
1998/03-2000/10	Mirko Marjanović (SPS)	SPS + JUL + SRS
2000/10-2001/01	Milomir Minić (SPS)	SPS + DOS + SPO
2001/01-2003/03	Zoran Djindjić (DS/DOS)	DOS + G 17 Plus
2003/03-2004/03	Zoran Živković (DS/DOS)	DOS
2004/03-	Vojislav Koštunica (DSS)	DSS + G 17 Plus + SPO + NS

### List of Parties in Serbia

DEPOS: Demokratski Pokret	Democratic Movement
DOS: Demokratska Opozicija Srbije	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS: Demokratska stranka	Democratic Party
DSS: Demokratska stranka Srbije	Democratic Party of Serbia
DZVM: Demokratska zajednica Vojvodanskih Madara	Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
JUL: Jugoslovenska levica	Jugoslav Left
ND: Nova demokratija	New Democracy
NS: Nova Srbija	New Serbia

## Keiichi Kubo: Origins and Consequences of One-Party Dominance

SPO: Srpski pokret obnove  
 SPS: Socijalistička partija Srbije  
 SRS: Srpska radikalna stranka  
 SSJ: Stranka srpskog jedinstva

Serbian Movement of Renewal  
 Socialist Party of Serbia  
 Serbian Radical Party  
 Party of Serbian Unity

### Parliament (one chamber)

Election Year/Month	1990/12	1992/12	1993/12	1997/09	2000/12	2003/12
Electoral System	TBMS	PR				
Parties	Number of Seats					
SPS	194	101	123	110	37	21
JUL	—	—	—		—	—
ND »	—	—	—		—	—
SPO »	19	—	—	45	—	23
» DEPOS	—	50	45	—	—	—
DS »	7	6	29	—	—	37
» DSS »	—	—	7	—	—	53
» DOS	—	—	—	—	176	—
G 17 Plus	—	—	—	—	—	34
SSJ	—	—	—	—	14	—
DZVM	8	9	5	—	—	—
SRS	—	73	39	82	23	82
Others	22	11	2	13	—	—
Total	250	250	250	250	250	250

Sources: Results from 1990 to 2000 are taken from Goati 2001. The 2003 results are taken from the website of the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, <http://www.cesid.org/> (accessed on March 6, 2005).

## 4. Montenegro

**Ethnic Composition (1991):** Montenegrins 61.8 %, Muslims 14.6 %, Serbs 9.3 %, Albanians 6.6 %, Others 7.7 %

**Presidents** (Directly Elected through TBMS, 5-year):

1990/12 Momir Bulatović (SKCG)

1992/12 Momir Bulatović (DPS)

1998/01 Milo Djukanović (DPS)

2002/11 Filip Vujanović (DPS) - Acting President, due to the failures of presidential elections in Dec 2002 and Feb 2003.

2003/05 Filip Vujanović (DPS)

**Governments:** Period, Prime Minister (Affiliated Party), Ruling Parties

1991/01-1993/03 Milo Djukanović (SKCG>DPS) SKCG>DPS

1993/03-1998/01 Milo Djukanović (DPS) DPS

1998/02-2001/07 Filip Vujanović (DPS) DPS+SDPCG

2001/07-2002/11 Filip Vujanović (DPS) DPS+SDPCG+DUA+LSCG

2002/12-2006/11 Milo Djukanović (DPS) DPS+SDPCG

2006/11- Željko Šturanović (DPS) DPS+SDPCG+DUA

**Parliament (one chamber)**

Election Year/Month	1990/12	1992/12	1996/11	1998/05	2001/04	2002/10	2006/09
Electoral system	PR						
Parties	Number of Seats						
SDPCG	—	—	—	42	36	39	41
SKCG > DPS	83	46	45				
NS >	13	14	—		29	33	30
SNP	—	—	—				
SNS	—	—	—	—		—	—
LSCG >	—	13	—	5	6	4	—
» LPCG*	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
» "National Unity"	—	—	19	—	—	—	—
SRSJ CG	17	—	—	—	—	—	—
SP CG	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
SDA	—	—	3	—	—	—	—
DUA	—	—	2	1	1	2	1
DS CG	—	—	2	1	1		1
DK	12	—	—	—	—	—	—
SRS	—	8	—	—	—	—	—
PzP	—	—	—	—	—	—	11
Others	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total	125	85	71	78	77	75	81

\* with Bošnjak Party in 2006.

Sources: All election results until 2002 are available in Bieber 2003. The 2006 election results are taken from the website of the election committee of Montenegro, <http://www.rik.cg.yu/> (accessed on September 26, 2006).

**List of Parties in Montenegro:**

DK: Demokratska koalicija	Democratic Coalition
DPS: Demokratska partija socijalista	Democratic Party of Socialists
DS CG: Demokratski savez Crne Gore	Democratic Alliance of Montenegro
DUA: Demokratska unija Albanaca	Democratic Union of Albanians
LP CG: Liberalna partija Crne Gore	Liberal Party of Montenegro
LS CG: Liberalni savez Crne Gore	Liberal Alliance of Montenegro
NS (NSCG): Narodna stranka Crne Gore	National Party of Montenegro
PzP: Pokret za promjene	Movement for Change
SDA: Stranka demokratske akcije	Party of Democratic Action (Muslim Party)
SDPCG: Socijaldemokratska partija Crne Gore	Socialdemocratic Party of Montenegro
SKCG: Savez komunista Crne Gore	League of Communists of Montenegro
SNP: Socijalistička narodna partija	Socialist National Party
SNS: Srpska narodna stranka	Serbian National Party
SP CG: Socijalistička partija Crne Gore	Socialist Party of Montenegro
SRS: Srpska radikalna stranka	Serbian Radical Party
SRSJ CG: Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije za Crne Gore	League of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia for Montenegro

## 5. Macedonia

**Ethnic Composition (1991):** Macedonians 64.6 %, Albanians 21.0 %, Others 14.4 % (Serbs 2.2 %, etc)

**Presidents** (Directly Elected through TBMS, 5-year):

- 1991/01 Kiro Gligorov, elected by Parliament based on the old constitution
- 1994/10 Kiro Gligorov
- 1999/10 Boris Trajkovski (VMRO-DPMNE)
- 2004/05 Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM)

**Parliament (one chamber)**

Election Year/Month	1990/11	1994/10	1998/11	2002/09	2006/07
Electoral System	TBMS		TBMS(85) & PR(35)	PR	PR
Parties	Number of Seats				
LDP	—	—	4	60	32
SKM-PDP > SDSM	31	95	27		
» NSDP	—		—	7	
SPM	5		1	1	45
SRSM > LPM	17		—	33	
VMRO—DPMNE	38	49			
» VMRO—NP	—	—	—	—	6
DA	—	—	13	—	—
DUI	—	—	—	16	17
PDP	22	10	14	2	
» PDPA > DPA	—	—	11	7	11
NDP	1	4		—	—
Others	6	11	1	1	2
Total	120	120	120	120	120

Sources: Results of 1990 are taken from RZS 1990. Results of 1994 are taken from RIK 1994. Results of 1998 and 2002 are taken from the website of the election commission of Macedonia, <http://www.dik.mk/> (accessed on March 16, 2005 and December 11, 2002). Results of 2006 are taken from the website of the election commission of Macedonia, <http://www.sec.mk/> (accessed on January 5, 2007).

**Governments:** Period, Prime Minister (Affiliated Party), Ruling Parties

1991/01–1992/07	Nikola Kljusev (Non-Party)	No party - “Specialist Cabinet”
1992/09–1994/10	Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM)	SDSM + PDP + NDP + LPM + SPM
1994/11–1996/02	Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM)	SDSM + PDP + LPM + SPM
1996/02–1998/11	Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM)	SDSM + PDP + SPM
1998/11–2000/11	Ljubco Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE)	VMRO-DPMNE + DA + PDA
2000/11–2001/05	Ljubco Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE)	VMRO-DPMNE + PDA + LPM
2001/05–2002/10	Ljubco Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE)	“National Unity” government: VMRO-DPMNE + DPA + SDSM + LPM + PDP + LDP
2002/11–2004/05	Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM)	SDSM + LDP + DUI
2004/06–2004/11	Hari Kostov (SDSM)	SDSM + LDP + DUI
2004/12–2006/08	Vlado Buckovski (SDSM)	SDSM + LDP + DUI
2006/08–	Nikola Gruevski (VMRO-DPMNE)	VMRO-DPMNE + DPA + LPM + NSDP + SPM + PDTM

**List of Parties in Macedonia:**

DA: Demokratska alternativa	Democratic Alternative
DPA: Demokratska partija na Albancite	Democratic Party of Albanians
DUI: Demokratska unija za integracija/Bashkimit Demokratik per integrim	Democratic Union for Integration (Albanian Party)
LDP: Liberalno-demokratska partija	Liberal-Democratic Party
LPM: Liberalna partija na Makedonije	Liberal Party of Macedonia
NDP: Nacionalna demokratska partija	National Democratic Party (Albanian Party)
NSDP: Nova social-demokratska partija	New Social Democratic Party
PDP: Partija za demokratski prosperitet/Partia e prosperiteti demokratike	Party for Democratic Prosperity (Albanian Party)
PDPA: Partija za demokratski prosperitet na Albancite	Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians
SDSM: Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija	Socialdemocratic Alliance of Macedonia
SKM-PDP: Sojuz na komunisti na Makedonija - Partija za demokratska preobrazba	League of Communists of Macedonia - Party for Democratic Change
SPM: Socijalisticka partija na Makedonija	Socialist Party of Macedonia
SRSM: Sojuz na reformistički sili na Makedonija	League of Reformist Forces of Macedonia
VMRO-DPMNE: Vnatrešna Makedonska revolucionerna organizacija-Demokratska partija za Makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
VMRO-NP: Vnatrešna Makedonska revolucionerna organizacija-Narodna partija	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – National Party

**Legend:**  $A > B$  denotes “party A is renamed or reorganized into party B”

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$\begin{matrix} A \\ \gg B \end{matrix}$  denotes “party B broke away from party A”

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$\begin{matrix} A \\ \gg \\ \gg B \end{matrix}$  denotes “party A merged into (or entered into coalition of) B”

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