Deliberation against Manipulation:
Can Deliberative Democracy Propose Solutions to William Riker's Criticisms of Political Manipulation in Democracy?

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1. Introduction

Deliberative democrats maintain that a stable and desirable democracy can be achieved through deliberative reforms in democracy (Bohman 1996; Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010). After the deliberative turn around 1990, democracy is "not just about the making of decisions through the aggregation of preferences. Instead, it is also about processes of judgment and preference formation and transformation within informed, respectful, and competent dialogue" (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p.3).

However, critics of deliberative democracy have argued that deliberation may invite political manipulation (Van Mill 1996). William Riker (1986, 1988) takes a pessimistic view of democracy, claiming that it fails to avoid manipulation and cycles of the outcome of voting. Based on the literature of social choice theory and his own case studies, Riker proposes that there are three major forms of political manipulation: strategic voting, agenda control, and the introduction of new issue dimensions. The findings of social choice theory such as Arrow's (1997) and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's (1973; 1975) theorems support Riker's pessimistic conclusions.

The question of whether deliberation accelerates or prevents political manipulation—one of the central problems in political theory

and policy design—remains unanswered. If we can solve this problem, then we can judge whether or not deliberation actually stabilizes democracy. We may even predict whether recent deliberative reforms in democracy will be successful.

This essay will address Riker's three types of manipulation, which are used to sway voters. The essay will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of deliberative democracy for solving the problems posed by the three types of manipulation. After reviewing recent research on deliberative contributions to the prevention of vote manipulation, this essay will argue that deliberative solutions for both preference structurization and incentive formation are indispensable. When these two factors are combined, deliberative procedure makes vote manipulation substantially difficult.

In section two, the essay will discuss the three types of vote manipulation proposed by Riker. In section three, as a feasible solution to strategic voting, I will argue that the deliberative process contributes to generate single-peaked preferences and agreement on issue dimensions. However, in section four, I will argue that structurization of preferences is not enough to prevent strategic voting. In section five, I will contend that deliberative democrats can deter strategic voting by demanding deliberative accountability of manipulators. In section six, I will discuss deliberative solutions to agenda control. In section seven, I will argue that the process of deliberation prevents

dimension manipulation by sorting out tangled issue dimensions into a single dimension if preferences and issues are separable. Finally, I will conclude that both preference structurization and incentive formation through deliberative process are indispensable to solve the problem of strategic manipulation in voting.

2. Riker's three types of manipulation

William Riker (1988) proposed that there are three types of vote manipulation: (1) strategic voting, (2) agenda control, and (3) the introduction of new issue dimensions. This section introduces and briefly explains these types of manipulation.

2.1. Strategic voting

Strategic voting is a method of manipulating voting results when "some voters can achieve a desired outcome by voting contrary to their true preferences" (Riker 1988, p.141). Any voters can secretly commit strategic voting if the discrepancy between their true preferences and expressed choices is undetected (Riker 1988). Gibbard notes that "any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation" (Gibbard 1973, p.587). Here, *manipulation* refers to strategic voting. Thus, Riker concludes that the possibility of strategic voting is universal and inescapable in any ordinal method of voting, voters rank alternatives in accordance with their preferences (first, second, third, etc.) (1988, p.143).

2.2. Agenda control

Agenda control is a method of manipulation which changes the final results by selecting alternatives and voters, or by arranging the order in which they are presented (Riker 1988). Leaders of decision-making bodies can manipulate

voting through the selection of alternatives, voters and voting procedure. Even worse, ordinary members can also manipulate voting by introducing new alternatives (Riker 1988).

2.3. Introduction of new issue dimensions

By the strategic introduction of new dimensions of concern, participants can overturn the Condorcet winner, an alternative that gains the most support by the process of comparing alternatives in pairs (Riker 1986; Riker 1988; Hinich & Munger 1997). Under majority rule, a median voter can become the Condorcet winner if people have single-peaked preferences along one dimension of concern (Black 1948; Hinich & Munger 1997; Moulin 1980). However, even if there exists a Condorcet winner in one dimension, the introduction of new dimensions breaks the existing Condorcet winner "since there is generally no median position when the number of issues is greater than one" (Hinich & Munger 1997, p.70). Thus, Riker argues that such "manipulation is frequent but unidentified, again all outcomes of voting are rendered meaningless and uninterpretable" (Riker 1988, p.238).

3. To avoid strategic voting

Deliberative democrats have sought to alleviate issues reflecting Riker's concerns about manipulation. A voting method is said to be strategy-proof when, "after careful scrutiny of all opportunities, all agents would always conclude that their best action is to be truthful" (Barberà 2001, p.620). How, though, can the process of deliberation make subsequent voting strategy-proof?

3.1. Two reasons why unanimous consensus-building is unpopular

A solution to the problems of effective

consensus-building is that if all participants unanimously support the same alternative, by definition there is no room for cycles and manipulation. Joshua Cohen argues that "ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus" (Cohen 1997, p.75). Jürgen Habermas, a deliberative democrat who supports this claim, sees "the principle of democracy" as the ideal type of lawmaking in modern society, and characterizes it by saying "only those statues may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent [*Zustimmung*] of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted" (Habermas 1996, p.110). Habermas values unanimous consensus based on the same reasons over mere compromise (1996, p.339) because reasoned consensus enhances stable social coordination.

A weaker version of unanimous consensus is Rawls' idea of "overlapping consensus"—a consensus among people supported by different reasons (Rawls 1995). Rawls argues that democratic stability is possible if political experts propose desirable alternatives or basic laws and then the general public, with diverse value standards and comprehensive doctrines, support the alternatives for each reason endorsed (1995).

However desirable it may be, assuming unanimous consensus in democratic decision-making is unpopular with a number of theorists for two reasons. First, the assumption of unanimous consensus may be impractical and idealistic in a liberal democratic society where people have different value judgments. As Cohen notes, "Even under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule" (Cohen 1997, p.75).[1] Moreover, unanimous consensus is not desirable in those cases where preservation of difference enhances group rights of minorities (Young 1989) or

agonistic respect among citizens (Connolly 1991). On the other hand, if like-minded people join further deliberation, it may generate excessive group polarization (Sunstein 2002). Therefore, deliberation for unanimous consensus-building is uncertain and may be undesirable.

Second, unanimous consensus is mathematically unnecessary to have acyclical and strategy-proof social decisions (Arrow 1977). For instance, Knight and Johnson criticize the unanimous consensus approach because the transformation of preferences into unanimous consensus is "too strong" and "beside the point" in arriving at consistent and manipulation-free majority decisions (1994, p.283).

Knight and Johnson argue that a more moderate claim is to seek common understanding on the issue dimension that people seek to vote on while preserving differences over their ideal points (1994). They argue that, if people agree on dimensions of political controversy such as the Left-Right spectrum of political parties, majority decision leads determinate results and thus solves the problem of cycles and manipulation. Therefore, they conclude, although unanimous consensus is ideally desirable, it is in reality both too strong and unnecessary for the prevention of cycles and manipulation.

3.2. A plausible solution: Consensus on issue dimensions and single-peaked preferences

Knight and Johnson's argument is based on Duncan Black's well-known assumption of single-peaked preferences of voters. This assumption is one of the common ways to obtain a Condorcet winner and thus prevent strategic manipulation (Arrow 1977; Moulin 1980). An intuitive definition of single-peaked preferences is that some alternative is not chosen as last by all voters (Craven 1991). Such condition is met if alternatives can be linearly ordered, according to some unanimously agreed criterion such as left to right or small to large (along one issue

dimension), and each agent have the most preferred alternative (e.g., "J") and his or her degree of preference declines monotonically as alternatives are farther from the ideal point "J" (Barberà 2001; Hinich & Munger 1997).

The assumption is common because it (1) yields a Condorcet winner; (2) preserves all desirable conditions of democracy, and (3) is most probable to assume that all people have single-peaked preferences (Black 1948; Arrow 1977).

(1) Importantly, a Condorcet winner exists if the preferences of the agents are all single-peaked along one issue dimension (Dummett & Farquharson 1961; Moulin 1980). Here, the transformation of preferences into unanimous consensus is not a theoretical prerequisite for a Condorcet winner, since "single-peakedness implies transitivity and hence ensures the existence of a Condorcet winner" (Riker 1988, p.126).[2] If a Condorcet winner exists, cycles and manipulation are not possible. In addition, Moulin shows that this unique Condorcet winner is the median peak of the individual orderings (1988).[3]

However, the argument that unanimous agreement on issue dimensions is unlikely raises legitimate concerns. Still, Niemi proves that a Condorcet winner exists if the preferences of around 70% of participants are structured along the line of one dimension. Niemi concludes that, "depending on the size of the group, the paradox [non-existence of Condorcet winner] will infrequently occur if only 75% or 70% or even fewer of the individuals adopt a common standard [dimension] of judgment" (1969, p.494). Thus, the assumption of single-peakedness allows room for people to disagree on issue dimensions. The above-mentioned research suggests that if the assumption of single-peaked preferences holds, majority decision rules yield a Condorcet winner and avoid manipulation even given modest disagreement and a plurality of values in society.

(2) Moreover, the assumption is common because it preserves all fundamental conditions of democracy, as proposed by Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. In order to avoid the Condorcet paradox and strategic manipulation, one has to relax one of the democratic conditions. However, under single-peakedness assumption, one can avoid cycles and manipulation without relaxation of democratic conditions, since given preferences of individuals ensures acyclicity in social preference.

Indeed, the assumption of single-peaked preferences is one kind of possible value restriction that ensures acyclicity in social preferences (Sen & Pattanaik 1969; Arrow 1977; Craven 1991). Yet, such an assumption "is a constraint on the structure of preference orderings, not on the content of preferences" (Knight & Johnson 1994, p.282). This is the theoretical advantage of the single-peaked preference assumption—it does not require the relaxation of unrestricted domain conditions to avoid cycles and manipulation while preserving a plurality of opinion.

(3) In addition, this assumption is most probable because people tend to prefer alternatives that are closer to their most preferred alternatives. Single-peakedness of preferences derives from the tendencies of rational agents. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that people's preference distribution exhibits single-peakedness when the issue dimension is single and alternatives are linearly ordered.

To sum up, the assumption of single-peaked preferences avoids cycles and manipulation without relying on a complex transformation mechanism of preferences and unanimous consensus on alternatives. The research suggests that the assumption of single-peakedness is robust enough to answer charges of strategic manipulation and is suitable for society with plural values and modest disagreement.

3.3. Agreement on issue dimensions and tentative triumph of deliberative democrats

Single-peaked preferences require shared adoption of issue dimensions among people. Various factors contribute to form this common adoption of issue dimensions. Niemi argues that, within the "two-party system, … socialization processes, discussion and other forms of interaction often structure the situation by formulating or clarifying the principal issue involved in a dispute" (1969, p.494). Since the deliberative turn, researchers have often argued that deliberation helps us obtain single-peaked preferences by forming agreement about issue dimensions (Miller 1992; Knight & Johnson 1994; Dryzek & List 2003; Mackie 2003).

Dryzek and List describe how the deliberative processes that request generalizable interest, reasons that are acceptable to all, induce single-peaked preferences on a shared dimension (2003). Their argument can be summarized as follows. First, reflective and social aspects of deliberation encourage people to "re-frame" a given decision problem in terms of generalizable interests (Dryzek & List 2003, p.16). This process helps people to discover, create, and identify relevant issue dimensions (e.g., open/closed, equality/inequality) (Dryzek & List 2003). Deliberation also disaggregates a profile of each agent into separate dimension-specific profiles (Dryzek & List 2003). Second, "the informational … and argumentative … aspects of deliberation resolve factual disagreements on how alternatives are aligned on the shared dimension" (Dryzek & List 2003, p.16). Finally, people's rationality allows them to find their ideal points and form single-peaked preferences on the single issue dimension (Dryzek & List 2003).

Since generalizable values and interest are agreeable or at least understandable for many people, people's concerns are connected to widely shared issue dimensions.[4] Thus, many people would agree about which lines of issue they contest (agreement on issue dimensions). However, this agreement is not a substantive agreement, but a meta-level agreement (Dryzek & List 2003). Niemi's research (1969), mentioned above, suggests that it is sufficient if 70% or fewer people agree. With such meta-level agreement, there is still wide room for disagreement.[5] Therefore, it is more plausible to assume that people can reach agreement on issue dimensions than unanimous consensus on substantive conclusion.

If people agree on an issue's dimension, then the rational agent would place his or her ideal point on the spectrum of the shared issue dimension. Eventually, single-peaked preferences on the issue dimension are formed among people. List and Pettit argue that "deliberation may transform individual attitudes so as to make them more cohesive and bring about a pattern like unidimensional alignment" (2011, p.52). If this is the case, one can avoid cycles and manipulation. Therefore, as Knight and Johnson conclude, the instability of democracy caused by cycles is not "quite so dire a threat to democracy as Riker supposes" (1994, p. 280).

Riker acknowledges that "agreement about dimensions probably renders uncontrived cyclical outcomes quite rare" (1988, p.128). After citing Peter Fishburn's analysis of the transitivity of collective decision, Riker admits that "quite a wide variety of rather mild agreement about the issue dimension guarantees a Condorcet winner" (1988, p.128). Hence, he concludes that, "because of agreement on an issue dimension, intransitivity only occasionally renders decisions by majoritarian methods meaningless, at least for somewhat homogeneous groups and at least when the subjects for decision are *not* politically important" (1988, p.128).

4. In support of Riker's concerns

It is attractive to adopt the assumption of single-peaked preferences and meta-level agreement on the single issue dimension through public deliberation. Nevertheless, Riker (1998) argues that such a solution to the problem of strategic manipulation will only work in the case of minor political issues. He explains that, if issues "are politically important enough to justify the energy and expense of contriving cycles," manipulators have incentive for manipulation whenever possible (1988, p.128). Thus, Riker holds that, "on the very most important subjects, cycles may render social outcomes meaningless" (1988, p.128).

Riker's concern about the ineradicability of strategic voting is legitimate for three reasons: (1) Vote trading (logrolling) allows manipulation even when there exists a unique Condorcet winner (Riker 1988); (2) the incentive for strategic voting survives even under value restriction, including single-peaked preferences, in special situations (Craven 1991); and (3) if political issues are not separable into a set of single dimensions, then Chaos Theorem suggests that multi-dimensional political issue opens the unlimited possibilities of strategic manipulations (Riker 1988).

4.1. Vote trading as a dynamic system of strategic voting

Riker argues that vote trading dramatically accelerates the likelihood of strategic voting even in the presence of a unique Condorcet winner (1988, p.157). Even when single-peaked preferences are formed through deliberation, manipulators still obtain intended outcomes by vote trading (logrolling) or coordinating strategic voting with other participants who are bribed with future benefits or support on other occasions of voting. Vote trading is especially frequent when the collective decision-making is repeated and serial: in legislatures, committees, and local community meetings, for instance.[6] This concern may not be relevant to a voting body that is randomly sampled from the public, such as the members of a public jury and Deliberative Poll, small group discussion among randomly selected members of citizen.

The dissatisfaction of the losers can also accelerate the dynamics of vote trading. According to Riker, an absolute majority of first-place votes minimizes the number of dissatisfied persons (Riker 1988). However, Riker suggests that, "Even in equilibrium, substantial though minority dissatisfaction is to be expected" (Riker 1988, p.207). For instance, having a Condorcet winner effectively reduces the number of dissatisfied persons. Yet, a Condorcet winner makes individuals who do not get their first choice make a social decision. In such a case, Riker argues, "the various members of the majority of dissatisfied losers … have a compelling motive to upset the current outcome" (Riker 1988, p.208). Thus, even if a Condorcet winner is given, people may have an incentive to manipulate a vote. Therefore, vote trading may undermine the equilibrium of collective decision-making, which is formed by structured preferences through deliberation.

4.2. Manipulability with restricted preferences

Single-peaked preferences ensure the acyclicity of social preferences and strategy-proofness. However, Craven (1991) shows that, in some cases, strategic voting occurs even under value restrictions such as single-peaked preferences. According to Craven, group members have an incentive to express false preferences when certain groups can improve their welfare and have a sufficient number of members to overturn the existing Condorcet winner (1991). They would conceal their sincere single-peaked preferences and express false

intransitive preferences so that they yield cycles and indeterminacies of result, which would allow further manipulation.

Craven provides the following example (Craven 1991, p.97):

Table 1. Potentially manipulable single-peaked preferences (Craven 1991, p.97)

Set of individual	Number of individual	True preference
E	n_1	aP_ibP_ic
F	n_2	bP_iaP_ic
G	n_3	bP_icP_ia
H	n_4	cP_ibP_ia

From preferences with a single-peaked structure shown above, alternative b is chosen in the following cases:

If $n_2 + n_3 + n_4 > n_1$, then bPa gets the most votes and alternative b is chosen.

If $n_1 + n_2 + n_3 > n_4$, then bPc gets the most votes and alternative b is chosen.

If alternative b is chosen, then groups E and H are not absolutely better off, since their first choices (a and c) are not chosen. If groups E and H express false preferences by putting b last, then they can get their most-preferred consequences or yield cycles, which allows further manipulation. Thus, groups E and H have an incentive to express false preferences.

Such cases depend largely on contingent factors: the number of each faction, the chosen Condorcet winner, and the preference patterns of factions. Yet, Niemi's research (1969) implies that if more than 25% of people's preferences violate the single-peaked pattern, they also increase the possibility of cycles and thus of strategic manipulation. These examples show that single-peaked preferences cannot guarantee the elimination of the possibility of strategic voting in some special cases.

4.3. Separability of preferences and issues

Riker refers to McKelvey and Schofield's Chaos Theorem and conclude that democracy results in disequilibrium if a decision is made on multidimensional issues (1988). The Chaos Theorem asserts that, "regardless of other voters' preferences, any one voter with complete information about the other voters' preferences, control of the agenda, and the ability to cast his own vote as he chooses can always construct majority paths to get anywhere in the [policy] space" (McKelvey 1979).

In order to avoid such multidimensional chaos, deliberative democrats argue that deliberation can "sort out, and hopefully reduce, the dimension over which they disagree" (Knight & Johnson 1994, p.282). However, the problem is not as simple as deliberative democrats maintain. Hinich and Munger describe the nature of this problem as follows: "Voting on each issue separately can solve the problem of multidimensional instability of majority rule. However, separating the issues in the agenda works only if preferences are also separable" (1997, p.166). Riker argues that "survey researchers repeatedly find that voters appear to judge candidates and issues by one or more dimensions of concern" (1988, p.182). He explains:

Continuity in a world of several dimensions is of utmost importance for strategic manipulation. It is this feature that allows for the easy multiplication of alternatives, that generates a wide variety of individual orderings, and that thereby creates situations of disequilibrium in which the chance of the existence of a Condorcet winner is reduced to practically zero. (Riker 1988, p.182)

Thus, as Riker concludes, "in the absence of an equilibrium, anything can happen" (1988, p.187).

However, Mackie refutes this argument. He argues that the Chaos Theorem depends on

unrealistic premises (2003, p.175). According to Mackie, "the multidimensional disequilibrium version of spatial theory does not, so far, survive experimental testing" (2003, p.181). The assumption "that the distribution of preferences is multidimensional rather than unidimensional is not established" (Mackie 2003, p.181). Mackie asserts that the Condorcet winner and equilibrium exist regardless of the separability of preferences. He argues that:

> If preferences are separable, and if voters are either sincere or strategic, then dimension by dimension voting will select the intersection of medians as the equilibrium choice. If preferences are nonseparable, then dimension by dimension voting will necessarily select that equilibrium, unless voters are sophisticated (Mackie 2003, p.177).

Mackie concludes that, "dimension-by-dimension voting is an exemplar of structure-induced equilibrium ... to force stability upon chaos" (2003, p.178). If Mackie is correct, then dimension-by-dimension voting yields equilibrium, even in multidimensional issue spaces, by reducing a multidimensional choice to "an unrelated series of unidimensional choices" (Hinich & Munger 1997, p.166). Researchers seek strategy-proof conditions in multidimensional cases (Moulin 1980; Barberà 2001). However, the question has not been fully settled and it deserves further formal and empirical investigation.

To summarize, researchers have argued for the introduction of the assumption of single-peaked preferences and agreement on issue dimensions through deliberation as a viable solution to the problem of strategic voting in a liberal democratic society. However, the possibility of vote trading, manipulability under value restriction, and the problem of multidimensional chaos suggest that deliberative effects on the structurization of preferences

such as single-peaked preferences are not sufficient to avoid strategic voting in some cases. This leads us to regard the importance of the incentive formation of participants through the deliberative process, discussed in the next section.

5. Incentive-formation through deliberation as another solution to the problem of strategic voting

In the previous section, I showed that strategic voting is still possible even under structured preferences such as single-peaked preferences. Deliberative democrats can address such drawbacks by offering other solutions. They argue that deliberation deters the incentive for strategic voting because it increases (1) the equal distribution of information about people's preference orderings, (2) the cost of manipulation and (3) non-self-centered incentives. All of these factors make strategic manipulation difficult.

5.1. Equal distribution of information about people's preference orderings

Deliberation may reveal the preference orderings of participants. This may enhance strategy-proofness in voting, despite the fact that perfect information is an important factor in strategic voting and other kinds of manipulation.

Deliberative democracy asks participants to give reasons for their choices. This increases the likelihood that people will reveal their preference orderings. This may be true, especially in repetitive or face-to-face small group deliberations. Yet, critics of deliberative democrats worry that deliberation itself may increase the potential for manipulation, because perfect information about people's preferences is the major source of strategic manipulation (Van Mill 1996). As Mackie says, "The manipulator needs confident knowledge of the distribution of preference rankings in the population"

(2003, p.160). Thus, according to Van Mill, "too much information distributed to all members about the other participants' beliefs is more democratic, but can make it easier to manipulate the agenda" (1996, p.749). Similarly, information about the others' beliefs is indispensable for strategic voting and dimension manipulation.

However, Van Mill's concern is not legitimate. Given information about the preference orderings of all participants, other participants can detect traits of manipulation and then counter manipulation by strategic voting. A disproportionate distribution of information may help manipulators, but commonly shared information does not, because it prevents the manipulator from gaining an informational advantage. In short, deliberation enhances the distribution of information about participants' preference orderings. This increases the likelihood of detecting secret manipulations and counter threats against manipulators, and thus weakens the incentive for strategic manipulation.

5.1.1. Dispute on observation of preferences: Riker versus Mackie

Riker argues that "to identify strategic voting requires that we know both the voter's true values and the voter's actual expression of the value in a vote" (1988, p.167). However, he argues, "from direct observation we can know only the latter. We must infer the former from other and softer evidence" (Riker 1988, p.167). Mackie asserts that Riker assumes that manipulation is unknowable, and that the prospect of manipulation therefore exists in every voting scenario (Mackie 2003, p.38). This leads Riker to the unsustainable conclusion that the possibility of manipulation necessarily exists in every voting scenario. Mackie criticizes Riker's argument because, he says, it contains a paradox: "Manipulation is possible only if preferences are known; but if manipulation is possible, then preferences are unknown"

(2003, p.160). The crux of Riker's argument is that he insists that manipulation is ubiquitous precisely because of our inability to observe these manipulations and assess either their frequency or level of severity. Mackie argues that "manipulation is not possible, however, without knowledge of others' preferences" (2003, p.160). Therefore, Mackie refutes Riker's argument by proposing that voters' "underlying preferences are knowable," and this would lead us to conclude that manipulation is, in fact, assessable (2003, p.39).

Mackie's argument seems plausible because Riker's argument does seem to contain the paradox Mackie says it does. Moreover, Riker's assumption is derived from aggregative account of democracy, which overlooks the effect of deliberation before voting. Since the deliberation process encourages communication among people and their being accountable for their opinion, it can enhance the distribution of information about people's preference orderings. If manipulation is knowable by others, then manipulation is crippled and democracy is free from strategic voting.

5.2. Credible threat increases cost of manipulation

If proof of manipulation is revealed to public, then people can counter manipulators. If the cost of manipulation is high, manipulators would withdraw actual manipulation even if they potentially have incentive to do so. Hence, credible counter threats would deter strategic incentive of manipulators (Kelly 1993).

Riker himself admits that the majority can counter a manipulator's strategic voting by likewise committing strategic voting and forming a coalition (Riker 1988). In such cases, strategic voting may cancel each other out. When this occurs, strategic voting does not actually lead to a harmful outcome (Mackie 2003).

In repeated deliberation settings such as a

legislature or a committee, tit-for-tat strategies would work. Moreover, even in one-off settings, "if all voters vote strategically, … then the outcome is just the same as if all voters vote sincerely …, sophisticated votes cancel each other out in a manner of speaking, and our true and fair outcome is thus restored" (Mackie 2003, p.161). Indeed, the expectation to vote strategically is enough to deter strategic incentive (Mackie 2003, p.161). Austen-Smith (1987) shows that sincere voting and strategic voting generate identical results under the full knowledge of others' preferences and the freedom of offering amendments.

5.3. Preference filtering for public debate avoids self-centered incentive

Not only counter threats but also personal reputation in the public forum serves as an obstacle to manipulation. In repetitive deliberative settings, false representations of preferences become a risk in that, "nobody will believe you next time" if one's deception comes to light (Dryzek & List 2003, p.10). In the long run, people avoid damaging their personal reputation as it would damage their ability to persuade others. To Habermas, participants in deliberation must maintain their truthfulness in order that their claims to be perceived as valid. Therefore, deliberative democrats argue that requirements of accountability or reason-giving in public discourse induce non-self-centered incentive (Goodin 1986).

Indeed, influential deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas argue that understanding among people is achieved when the listener accepts the "validity" of the claims made by the speaker (1996). Validity is composed of three criteria: rightness, truth and truthfulness (Habermas 1986). Rightness is affirmed in relation to norms and normative contexts. Truth is stated for correct existential presuppositions. Truthfulness is claimed based on the expression of subjective experience. Thus, Habermas argues

that, "an agreement of this sort is achieved simultaneously at three levels" (1986, p.307).

This threefold validity check may deter the incentive of strategic manipulation. For the manipulator, a truthfulness check seems to be the most difficult to achieve because maintaining consistency between speech and actions is difficult. As Habermas notes, "Addressees who have accepted a claim to sincerity can expect a consistency of behavior in certain respects" (Habermas 1986, p.303). If the manipulator has to obey this deliberative accountability, then he or she cannot achieve the hidden intentions because they cannot be openly implemented. Habermas argues that even "concealing publicly indefensible interests behind pretended moral or ethical reasons necessitates self-bindings that either on the next occasion expose a proponent as inconsistent or, in the interest of maintaining his credibility, lead to the inclusion of others' interests" (Habermas 1996, p.340). Thus, the manipulator is discouraged from venturing strategic action in communicative action.

If this is the case, "the structural constraints of an intersubjectively shared language impel the actors – in sense of weak transcendental necessity – to step out of the egocentricity of a purposive rational orientation toward their own respective success and to surrender themselves to the public criteria of communicative rationality" (Habermas 1998, p.233). Habermas explains that the requirement of validity plays as a filter, which "screen [s] the topics and contributions, information and reasons in such a way that, ideally, only the 'valid' inputs pass through the filter of fair bargaining and rational discourses" (1996, p.341).

In line with Habermas, if one takes the theoretical standpoint that people are not only motivated by private interests but also by public ones, then Goodin's proposal on "laundering preference" becomes an attractive solution to strategic manipulation (Goodin 1986). Goodin argues that, "in the context of collective

decision-making, people will launder their own preferences. They will express only their public-oriented, ethical preferences, while suppressing their private-oriented, egoistic ones" (Goodin 1986, p.88). Laundering preferences also means that social authorities respond selectively to people's preferences so that undesirable preferences are not represented (Goodin 1986). Under such considerations, people may undertake an internal deliberative reflection called "deliberation within" (Goodin 2003, p.183). Consequently, people act *qua* good citizens apart from personal cost and benefit concerns. Therefore, deliberative democrats argue that the deliberative requirement to keep one's truthfulness may deter strategic incentive of manipulation.

We can see that the deliberation process deters the incentive of strategic voting because it enhances equal distribution of information about people's preference orderings, cost of manipulation, and non-self-centered incentive. The combination of all of these factors makes strategic voting substantively difficult.

To summarize, deliberative responses to strategic voting consist of two major solutions: establishing agreement on issue dimensions for single-peaked preferences and preventing incentives for strategic voting through deliberation. However, the structurization of preferences, commonly acknowledged as the solution for strategic voting, is not enough. Both the structurization of preferences and the formation of incentive through deliberative process are indispensable for the prevention of strategic voting.

6. To avoid agenda control

Incentive formation through deliberation reduces another kind of manipulation: agenda control. Agenda control is prevented if a strong equilibrium such as a Condorcet winner exists. Riker argues that, "if voters have enough information to know that such an outcome could be arrived at, then it is probably difficult to manipulate an agenda" (1988, p.170). For example, if all voters know alternative X wins the majority, the proposal of a new alternative or a new procedure by leaders is regarded as illegitimate by other participants. Thus, a strong equilibrium of people's opinion may inhibit agenda control. Yet, Riker claims that, "since the conditions for a strong equilibrium are difficult to fulfill, manipulation of the agenda is not usually precluded because of the distortion of tastes" (1988, p.171). Riker refers to McKelvey and Schofield's Chaos Theorem regarding "the extraordinary fragility of equilibria" when a political issue involve two or more dimensions (Riker 1988, p.192). Chaos Theorem shows that a multidimensional decision potentially opens the endless possibilities of agenda control.

6.1. Democratic solutions against agenda control

As solutions to agenda control, deliberative democrats offer (1) a democratic filtering of voting procedure, (2) new proposals through the requirement of democratic accountability and (3) information-sharing mechanisms which enable counter-threats against agenda control by strategic voting. Accordingly, deliberation may avoid agenda control through incentive formation even within multidimensional cases.

In democratic settings, agenda control has to be approved by other participants. Even leaders of a voting body are constrained by procedural regulation and approval of ordinary participants (Riker 1988). Moreover, apparent agenda control can be challenged by other participants in democratic decision-making bodies (Riker 1988).

Riker claims that, "despite these restrictions, however, leaders' control of agenda is ordinarily not challenged," since leaders are customarily regarded as legitimate and satisfy the regulation

of fairness in voting bodies (1988, p.170). Leaders are typically not challenged except in cases of extreme arbitrariness because challenging agenda control signifies challenging leadership itself; thus, it is costly (Riker 1988). This implies that there exists wide room for unchallenged agenda control.

Still, deliberative democrats do challenge Riker's assumption. Under deliberative settings, both leaders and participants have to justify their proposals publicly. For leaders, the challenge and threat of reelection from other participants would deter the incentive of agenda control. Although settled issues such as leadership draw few challenges while political issues are contentious, under deliberative democracy, authority in politics becomes "a limited suspension of judgment enabled by a context of democratic challenge and public accountability" (Warren 1996, p.46). While Riker does not investigate enough whether proposals from ordinary participants will be challenged, it is highly plausible to think that ordinary participants who attempt to influence agenda control unduly will likewise be challenged by other participants. Accordingly, by deliberative accountability and counter threat, deliberative democrats can offer solutions to agenda control as discussed below.

6.1.1. Democratic filtering of voting procedure

Deliberation directly deters the attempt of agenda manipulation such as arbitrary procedures, restriction of alternatives and the introduction of new voters. Deliberative democracy potentially asks all participants justify their claims and situations by publicly giving reasons. Thus, deliberation would dramatically accelerate the probability of being challenged about agenda control, since the deliberative forum is equally open to anyone with equal participatory power, even including non-participants (Cohen 1986). Sunstein mentions that, "in deliberative politics, even the most

vernal or self-interested participants in politics must invoke public justifications in their support" (1993, p.244). Thus, if deliberative democracy does not let a procedural matter go unchallenged, agenda manipulation becomes substantially more difficult.

6.1.2. Democratic filtering of new proposals

Deliberation also deters more a subtle attempt of agenda manipulation: the introduction of new alternatives. Deliberative democracy requires equal proposal and participatory power to all (Cohen 1986). Thus, equal participatory power accelerates the chance of agenda control by means of introducing new alternatives.

Deliberative democrats respond to this problem by explaining that "deliberation can be used to decide on a procedure for distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant alternatives" (Dryzek & List 2003, p.23).[7] In a deliberative democracy, manipulators have to justify their proposals; thus, irrelevant alternatives would be rejected (Dryzek & List 2003). However, as it is difficult to distinguish desirable proposals from strategic proposals, it is also unlikely that manipulators commit strategic manipulations, since manipulators have to be accountable for giving reasons about their proposals and choices not only at the moment of discourse but also after the discourse (Habermas 1996). Basically, manipulators have to keep deceiving others for long time. This laborious task would weaken the incentive for strategic manipulation.

6.1.3. Information-sharing mechanisms and counter-threats by strategic voting

Deliberation enhances information sharing about others' preference orderings and the possibilities of counter-threats by strategic voting. Agenda control is countered by strategic voting: "'Manipulation' [i.e., strategic voting] may be the mechanism that gives voters countervailing power over agenda

setters" (Hinich & Munger 1997, p.166). If other participants know the influence of an agenda setter on voting results, other participants can vote against agenda control by strategic voting (Hinich & Munger 1997). Moreover, shared information about preference orderings of participants helps people detect traits of agenda control and fight against it.

We have seen that deliberation process functions as a democratic filtering mechanism against agenda control. By requesting justification and accountability, deliberative procedure inhibits such agenda controls as arbitrary procedure, restriction of alternatives and the introduction of new voters. Deliberation successfully deters incentives for manipulation even in subtle cases like the introduction of new alternatives. Moreover, the information-sharing function of deliberation helps people fight against agenda control through counter-strategic voting. These findings suggest that the incentive formation and information-sharing functions of deliberative democracy play significant role in preventing agenda control.

7. To avoid dimension manipulation

Collective decisions are susceptible to manipulation when they contain more than one issue dimension. The more issue dimensions are attached to the decision, the more difficult it is to gain an alternative to satisfy the n-dimensional median of all issue dimensions. Hence, deliberation and open discussion may have controversial effects on dimension manipulation.

7.1. Open discussion and multidimensional chaos

Niemi warns that new issues and ad hoc groups contribute to unstructured situations leading to cycles and manipulation, since "Intransitivities are most likely to occur in unstructured situations, where there are no common guidelines for judging the alternatives or in situations involving multiple dimensions" (Niemi 1969, p.494). Here, manipulators exploit unstructured situations by manipulating issue dimensions.

The problem of multidimensional issues may occur more often in the wildness of the general public sphere rather than in that of arranged publics (Habermas 1996). This applies not only to skillful politicians who exercise heresthetic (Riker 1986) but also to ordinary participants and all citizens who can/should introduce new dimensions to public decision making, since openness is an crucial function of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1996). However, this desirable feature of open democracy may render collective decisions highly manipulable. By the strategic introduction of new issue dimensions, participants can break the existing median and change results of collective decision to their desirable consequences. Therefore, Riker concludes that, "manipulation is almost always possible" and the equilibrium of democracy is destabilized (1988, p.141).

7.2. Bridging rhetoric and multidimensional chaos

Dryzek's recent argument about "bridging rhetoric" is a good example of deliberation-led multidimensional chaos. According to Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010), "bridging rhetoric" is a type of rhetoric which appeals to a wide range of people who have different socioeconomic backgrounds by selectively invoking their interests and concerns. Thus, bridging rhetoric helps "securing wide public attention" (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p.74). Dryzek and Niemeyer suggest that not only reason but also "non-logos aspects" such as rhetoric play important role in deliberation (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, pp.69-70).

Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) raise the concern about distinguishing between good and bad rhetoric in support of rhetorical communication in deliberation. They differentiate "bonding" and "bridging" rhetoric for this reason: "Bonding is associating with people who are similar in social background, bridging is associating with people with different social characteristics" (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p.76). They conclude that, "tests are necessary to distinguish between desirable and undesirable rhetorical invocation and suppression of particular discourses" (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p.67).

However, the problem of bridging rhetoric involves the absence of a Condorcet winner and manipulability, although Dryzek and Niemeyer pay little attention to this. If bridging rhetoric amalgamates different expectations and concerns, it makes it difficult to have a Condorcet winner and strategy-proof voting results. Fundamentally, different dimensions of issues brought by people accelerate multidimensional chaos and prevent single-peaked preferences.

Although the idea of bridging rhetoric works well for the inclusion of diverse participants, it does not work well for yielding the Condorcet winner and avoiding strategic manipulation. Therefore, further deliberation processes for agreeing on issue dimensions and deliberative accountability are indispensable after invoking wide public awareness of issues by bridging rhetoric.

7.3. Sorting issue dimensions through deliberation

When multiple issues are packaged together such that they appear to be single issue, proposed issue dimension and issue dimension in people's mind do not match, and even reasonable people have preferences with more than one peak along single issue dimension (Dryzek & List 2003). In order to avoid such complications, it is important to sort out entangled issue dimensions into separate issue dimensions (Miller 1992).

The deliberative process is expected to prevent situations in which multiple dimensions and multiple peaks are mixed up. Thus, by distinguishing and sorting complex problems into each single issue dimension, people can achieve a collective decision by voting; in other words, to "induce a shared understanding regarding the dimensions of conflict" (Knight & Johnson 1994, p.282). If relevant voters "can agree about what is at stake in a particular political conflict – majority rule need not generate cyclical social orderings" (Knight & Johnson 1994, p.282). Therefore, the deliberative process is a prerequisite for dimension-by-dimension voting, which presents cycles and manipulation.

According to Dryzek and List (2003), the deliberative process addresses the problem of multidimension in four ways: subdividing decision problems into dimension-specific sub-dimensions, making hierarchies of dimensions for decision procedure, revealing agents' subjective priority on issue-dimensions by vote trading or logrolling, and proposing more appropriate alternatives (Dryzek & List 2003). Empirical data from Deliberative Poll show that, "ordinal rankings of policy options approach single-peakedness" after deliberation (Farrar et al. 2010, p.333), an effect, as Fishkin argues, significant for those who have not formed their opinion (2009). In short, the deliberative process contributes to division and sorting of issue dimensions and agreement on the issue that most concern people.

To sum up, dimension manipulation is common in real politics. However, deliberation may prevent dimension manipulation if it sorts out dimensions via open discussion. Consequently, openness is a fundamental feature of deliberative democracy. Yet, given this openness and participation, everyone can add new interpretations or dimensions of

issues, potentially causing multidimensional chaos. Dryzek and Niemeyer argument on bridging rhetoric, for instance, may make political issues multidimensional by packing different perspectives into one catch-all political issue. Hence, open deliberation needs further deliberation to sort mixed dimensions. Therefore, stable and desirable democracy needs not only deliberation for openness and inclusion of various opinions, but also deliberation for sorting issue dimensions. Then, dimension-by-dimension voting procedures, with agreement on issue dimensions and single-peaked preferences, can avoid cycles and strategic manipulation.

8. Conclusion

Deliberative democrats maintain that the deliberative process helps us avoid the problem of vote manipulation described by Riker. First, deliberation enhances the structurization of preferences such as single-peaked preferences by inducing agreement on issue dimensions. Thus, deliberation helps to yield a Condorcet winner and makes the voting process strategy-proof. However, this is not sufficient to preclude the possibility of manipulation. Therefore, the second solution requires deterring incentives for manipulation through deliberative accountability requirements. If these two solutions are combined, deliberative democrats successfully refute from Riker's criticisms of political manipulation in democracy.

Manipulation cannot be a serious problem as long as the possibility of strategic manipulation remains a logical possibility and does not affect outcomes in the real world. Deliberative democrats have shown that this escape route is a plausible solution to the problem of vote manipulation. Given that sustainable and fair democracy is enhanced by deliberative procedures before voting, deliberative

democracy not only overcomes Riker's criticism on manipulation, but can even save democracy from the problem of meaninglessness.

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[Notes]

1　Since substantive agreement and voting are less promising, meta-agreement becomes a plausible solution (Dryzek & List 2003).

2　Knight and Johnson do not exclude the possibilities of transformation of preferences.

3　It implies that an alternative which has a median peak on a spectrum wins more votes than any other alternatives because the median preference is supported most by both voters who have left- and right-sided preferences.

4　In line with Habermas, I argue that even crude opinions and religious claims can be articulated into generalizable interest by other competent participants, since informal political sphere is sensitive to problem statements, and articulates them, and forms them into public opinion through discourse (Habermas 1996, p.359).

5　For meta-level agreement over incommensurable values, see note 67 in List 2003.

6　One may refute Riker, for future issues are unforeseeable. Yet, the expectations of unspecified future support may be enough for participants to have an incentive to cooperate with manipulators.

7　The deliberation process may satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition without imposing voting rules on it; thus, "positional methods such as Borda rule may be attractive aggregation mechanisms" (Dryzek & List 2003, p.23).

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