

LIVING AMONG OTHERS:
Divergent Religious Practices among Indonesian Muslim Migrants in
Japan

他者のなかで生きる
—日本におけるインドネシア出身のイスラム教徒における多様な宗教実践—

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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January 2022

ABSTRACT

Key words: Muslim, migration, culture, Japan, Indonesia

In international migration literature, researchers have questioned whether Muslim migrants' arriving to non-Muslim countries can integrate into the hosting society. This question seemingly departs from the assumption that Islam is a cultural group recorded historically in adversity with non-Muslim Western civilizations. Taking the case of Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan, this thesis examines a similar perception.

Using mixed methods of ethnography and survey approaches, the author performed field works in Greater Tokyo Area, especially in Tokyo metropolitan and Chiba, between 2015 and 2018. Data is collected from observations, interviews with around a hundred Indonesian Muslim migrants from different backgrounds, including students, *kenshusei-jishusei* (trainees), corporate employees, Japanese spouses, nurses, and others. Utilizing Swidlers' (1986) theory of "culture in action," the author examines Muslims' religious expressions and practices such as halal diets, reactions toward different religious practices (such as Christmas), views on non-Muslim political leadership, etc. The author finds both moderate-inclusive and conservative-exclusive Islamic practices.

The inclusive practices present Muslims' "flexible" attitudes (religiosity) that can integrate and fit with the local expressions. This research shows cultural repertoire and ideologies have influenced Indonesian Muslims' practices in Japan in different ways. International migration causes an "unsettled" period where a migrant encounters a new society and unfamiliar social and cultural circumstances. This transitional period is when someone tries out new traditions, skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles. During the settled period, a migrant's cultural repertoire influences their religious practices. In this framework, Indonesians from moderate, inclusive, and cosmopolitan cultures develop similar inclusive religious practices in Japan. In contrast, those whose cultural repertoire is founded on conservative, exclusive, or fundamentalist backgrounds adopt conservative-exclusive strategies. During an unsettled period, an Indonesian migrant could be easily influenced by those around them.

The conservative-exclusive Islamic practices in Japan represent the rise of Islamist culture and ideologies among university students, especially science and engineering students in Indonesia. After arriving in Japan, the students and alumni continue their habitus of Islamism. All the structural and cultural repertoire of Islam in Indonesia, the contemporary phenomenon

among the youth, directs their exclusive strategies of religious practices in Japan. Having “advantageous” social status among other Indonesians, many students and alumni have mobilized Islamic activities attracting public participation and seeded “social capital” among the others. Being in Tokyo, through their organization, eventually, they make their presence in Japan as an essential node connecting their transnational networks in Indonesia and beyond.

Although exclusivism among immigrants is growing, a serious threat from the Muslim minority toward Japanese society is hardly found in the short term. Conflicts often occur within internal Indonesian and Muslim groups. In the long term, however, if the migration policy has changed (relaxing policy for unskilled and refugees), which is unlikely, and the Muslim population reaches a significant quantity, there could be room for extra precautions, or a new analysis, and additional conversations would be required. Moreover, this growing conservatism-exclusivism phenomenon among Indonesian immigrants in Japan implies that minority immigrants’ incorporation is dependent not only on the Muslim’s migration, social, economic, and cultural preparedness but also on the welcome attitudes of the hosting society.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This dissertation project on the “divergent religious practices among Indonesian Muslims in Japan” would never come into a reality without dedication, help, advice, and support from some great people and organizations. I would like to take this opportunity to thank to all of them.

First of all, I am grateful to the chair of my dissertation committee Prof Gracia Liu-Farrer who had patiently guided, evaluated, and encouraged me to accomplish this final project. As my academic advisor, between 2014 and 2022, Prof. Farrer has inspired me and enriched my perspectives with various different themes and methods of research. Through her weekly *zemi* and regular discussions, I learned a lot how to do and develop my own research. Under her guidance, I am glad that I finally come to this stage.

I also want to express my gratitude to Prof. Ken Miichi, Prof. Keiko Sakurai (Waseda University) and Prof. Mark Woodward (Arizona State University), serving as deputy chair and members of the committee, who, in spite of their busy time, have enthusiastically read my manuscript, providing me with corrections and insightful ideas of how to improve the quality to this final draft.

Secondly, I would like to express my immense gratitude to Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan (LPDP) (Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education) Ministry of Finance which provides me a full scholarship to pursue my Ph. D program at Waseda University located in one of the most expensive cities on earth. Without this scholarship support, it is impossible for me to experience studying and doing research in this stunning lovely city.

Third, I would thank to all of my friends at GSAPS Waseda especially my cohorts and members of sensei Farrer’s Zemi, especially Jotaro Kato, Helena Hof, Jocelyn Celero, Tricia Okada, Gulin Kayhan, Yao Dacheng, Mira and others who have constantly provided me with helps and insightful ideas about improving my research quality.

Also, to all Indonesian friends at Waseda who very kindly supported me during my time in Japan. My special thanks go to Mas Puji Eddi Nugroho, Mba Aprilia Suandi,,mas Pratama, mas Raden Adit, Mas Sholahuddin, mas Sigit and all friends at Indonesian Student Union (PPI).

Special thanks also go to all of my wonderful friends at many Indonesian organizations in Japan which provide me opportunities to know deeply and better about the internal dynamics

of Indonesian Muslims in Japan. They are especially Nahdlatul Ulama special chapter of Japan, KMII of Tokyo, Bhinneka, JMS, ect; To all of the respondents who willingly talk to me in spite of their busy time. For their convenience I would not be able mention their names, and residence location. Thanks for your time and participation in this research project as my respondents and friends. You are all in my minds.

My thanks also go to State Institute of Islamic Studies IAIN Manado that supports me to succeed this Ph. D opportunity. Specially I would thank to Prof. Rukmina Gonibala and Dr. Delmus P. Salim, the previous and current rectors, and to some very helpful colleagues at FUAD, AQLAM, LP2M and PS3M including Ahmad Rajavi, Edi Gunawan, Rahman Mantu, Faradilla Hasan, Rusdiyanto, Arhanuddin Salim and Sulaiman Mapiasse.

I am also indebted time and opportunity to accompany my mother who died a few days before my dissertation exam was conducted and my father who has been paralyzed since two years ago and I had less opportunity to accompany both of them during their medical treatment at hospital or at home. “Thanks for your understanding to let me go finishing my Ph.D. contract.” To my mother, in heaven, I hope that you could see that I finally finish my study program.”

Finally, I would like to thank Nurza Auliya Rahmi, Zayaan Prasasti Ramadhan, Bening Noura Narasya and Binar Majdaa Harumi my lovely wife and cute kids who endlessly and lovingly accompanied, motivated and entertained me during this long period of research and writing time. To them I am indebted much time and opportunities to play, travel, exercise, read books and to learn many new things together because of the obligation to accomplish my final work as a graduate student.

To these people and the others who worked anonymously with me in this project and my PhD program at Waseda University, I am very grateful.

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(tell your life experiences in Japan by selecting "very disagree, disagree, I do not know, agree and very agree") 14

Q15 Gambarkan sikap anda di sekolah, kampus, tempat kerja, dan tempat umum (describe you position to the following statement) lainnya di Jepang terkait dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut. Pilihlah salah satu respon berikut: sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, tidak tahu, setuju, sangat setuju 15

Q16 by selecting either Wajib (obliged) Sunnah (preferred), mubah (permitted) Makruh (disliked) adn haram (prohibited) 16

Q17 Pilihlah sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, tidak tahu, setuju, dan sangat setuju untuk pernyataan-pernyataan berikut ini. 18

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ABBREVIATION

3Ds (Dangerous, dirty, and demanding)

ACT Aksi Cepat Tanggap (fast and responsive act)

APSJI Asosiasi Program Studi Jepang Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Japanese Study Programs)

BNP2TKI Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (The National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrants Workers, currently is BP2MI)

BP2MI Badan Perlindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia (Agency for Indonesian Migrant Workers Protection)

BUMN Badan Usaha Milik Negara (State- owned Enterprises)

DDII Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic Propagation Council)

DI Daarul Islam (Islamic Abode)

EPA Economic Partnership Agreement

FORKITA Forkita Forum Kajian Islam Tokyo dan Sekitarnya (Tokyo (and beyond) Forum of Islamic Studies)

FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)

GII Gereja Interdenominasi Injili Indonesia, GII (Indonesian Biblical Inter-Denomination Church)

GISI Gereja Injil Seutuh Indonesia, (Biblical Church of Indonesia)

GMIM Gereja Masehi Injili Minahasa (Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa)

Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group (Party)

GRIPS Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS),

HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Student Association)

HTI Hizbuttahrir Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic Party)
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute of Islamic Studies
ICJ Islamic Center Japan

ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)

ICOJ Islamic Circle of Japan IFGF International Full Gospel Fellowship

IIFSO International Islamic Federation of Student organization

IJC Indonesian Japan community
IM Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood)
IMM Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association)
IPB Institut Pertanian Bogor, (Bogor Agricultural University)
IPMI Ikatan Perawat Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Nurses)
IPTIJ Ikatan Persaudaraan Trainee Indonesia di Jepang (Association of Indonesian Muslim Trainees of Japan)
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
ITS Institut Teknologi Surabaya (Surabaya Institute of Technology)

JAKIM Jabatan Keagamaan Islam Malaysia (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia)
JASSO Japan Student Services Association

JEC Japan Evangelical Church

JIT Japan Islamic Trust

JLPT Japanese Language Proficiency

JMA Japan Muslim Association

JMS Jemaah Masjid SRIT (Congregation of Indonesian Mosque)

KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Action Union of Indonesian Muslim Students)

KMII Keluarga Masyarakat Islam Indonesia (Family of Indonesian Islamic Community in Japan)

KMKI Keluarga Masyarakat Kristen Indonesia (Family of Indonesian Christian Community)

LDK Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Dakwah Institute)

LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies)

LPDP Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan (Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education)

MA Madrasah Aliyah (Islamic Upper Secondary School)

MASYUMI Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)

MEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MIDORI Islamic Culture Circle

Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)

MIT Masjid Indonesia Tokyo (Indonesian Mosque of Tokyo)

MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council)

MUIS Majelis Ugama Islam Singapore (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore)

MUDAI Muslim Waseda Indonesia

NII Negara Islam Indonesia, Islamic State of Indonesia

NKK/BKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/ badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan
(Normalization of Campus Life programs)

NU Nahdlatul Ulama (The Revival of Islamic Scholars)

OSIS Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah (Student Council)

PBNU Pengurus Besar nahdlatul Ulama (Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama)

PCINU Pengurus Cabang Istimewa Nahdlatul Ulama, Board of Nahdlatul Ulama Special
Chapter

PERSADA Perhimpunan Alumni Dari Jepang (Japan Alumni Association)

PERSIS Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)

PII Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student)

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesia Communist Party)

PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party)

PMII Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Movement)

PMR Palang Merah Remaja (Youth Red Cross)

PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)

PPI Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia (overseas Indonesian Student Association)

PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity and Development Party)

PRAMUKA Praja Muda Karana (Scout Organization)

ROHIS Rohani Islam (Islamic Spiritual club)

S1 Strata 1 (undergraduate program); also, for S2 (Master program) and S3 (Doctoral program)

SMA Sekolah Menengah Atas (Upper Secondary School)

SMK Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (Vocational School)

SNMPTN Seleksi Nasional Masuk Perguruan Tinggi Negeri (National Selection of Public Universities Entrance)

SRIT Sekolah Republik Indonesia Tokyo (Indonesian School of Tokyo)

STAIN Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State College of Islamic Studies)

TITP Technical Intern Training Program

UGM Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)

UI Universitas Indonesia

UIN Universitas Negeri Islam (State Islamic University)

TIT Tokyo Institute of Technology

WAMY World Assembly of Muslim Youth

WES, World Education Service

WIBJ Wanita Indonesia Berkarya (Indonesian forum of working Women in Japan)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

1.1.1. Islam and Muslim as minority in Japan

Islam in Japan is believed to have grown at its fastest rate in the last decade (2010-2019) since the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the earlier period (e.g. Anis, 1998; Kojima, 2006b), when Japan's economic prosperity was at its peak, Islam in Japan had a population of over 100,000 people, the majority of whom were foreigners. Recently according to some media estimation, the number of Muslim in Japan could reach as many as 230 thousands (Hajis, 2021; Hisanaga, 2020). Looking at the earlier period, however, the Muslim demography in Japan has witnessed a change in their composition. Indonesians now have become the largest Muslim population by nationality. Previously, “old” Muslim migrant communities in Japan were dominated by South and Central Asian migrants including Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indians and Iranians (Kojima, 2006). One thing that both periods have in common is that, despite its growth, the Muslim population in Japan remains a super minority group, accounting for less than one percent of the total population. This minority status of Indonesian (as well as other) Muslim migrants challenges them from performing certain religious practices and rituals which were everyday habits, customs, and lifestyle in their home country (Nakhleh et al., 2008).

This dissertation is about Indonesian Muslim migrants’ diverse religious practices in Japan and the cultural influences behind those practices. This study’s point of departure is the conception that culture where human grew with has consequences or impacts on human actions including their practices of religiosity. Relating to the minority status of Indonesian Muslims in Japan, this dissertation will describe the relationship between the developing Islamic practices of Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan and the social or cultural resources which impact those practices. I believe their cultural resources in Indonesia as well as their new experiences in Japan have many Indonesians made their practices transformed or modified. Exploring Indonesian migrants’ inter-cultural relation with the Japanese society, the dissertation investigates why many Indonesian immigrants develop exclusive Islamic practices strategies and why others choose the opposite path.

Reflecting the similar phenomena in Indonesia, contemporary Indonesian community in Japan has witnessed the growing tendency of Islamic fundamentalism.¹ The term denotes an aspiration to implement Islam in its most “original” forms, not impured with non-Islamic cultural elements (Roy, 2017; Saeed, 2020; Tibi, 2002). Promoting purification ideological perspectives, the fundamentalist supporters idealize the most authentic Muslim community attributed to the first, the second, and the third Muslim generation (7,8,9 CE). They were early Muslim communities whose faith and practices were believed to be freed from other cultural stains. Therefore, a good Muslim in the current time, according to the holders of this principles is anyone who follows the path of those early Muslim generation who lived in the same period

¹ Throughout this thesis I inter-changeably use the terms of fundamentalism Islamism and post-Islamism related to Muslims political and social action (practices). These are unavoidable terms used in the study of contemporary Muslim societies and world affairs. Although the concepts origin from different historical contexts, they share many common things in the contemporary Islamic ideologies aspiring the changes in the world order by application of Islamic principles (Syaria). Fundamentalism gains it popularity in the heyday of the post-colonial era where Muslim internal communities were conflicting each other between the nationalists and “religious” on the nation-state building issues whether to adopt “secular democracy’ or Islamic system. While Islamism, having established in France in the 1980a in response to the growing aspiration of political Islam, it gains more popularity post 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Referring to Basam Tibi (2002), I define Fundamentalism as an aspiration and ideological movement aiming to change the secular political system and culture with Islamic system according to its “original” tradition and the “authentic” teaching during the Prophet Muhammad and his companion in the 7th and 8th centuries. Tibi includes all ideas and people or groups along with their soft or violence practices from Hasan Al Banna, Maududi, Seyid Qutb, to Osama bin Laden. Challenging other experts’ criticism Tibi says fundamentalism does not equally mean the ideology of “*ushuliyuun*” or the earlier devoted Muslims rather it is a political aspiration using Islam for their interests.

Some experts disagreed with term because it sounds a generalization and it comes from the Western Christian discourses. Edward Said and Esposito view that the terms of fundamentalism is Outsiders’ (Western) project against Muslim’s world influenced by the colonial perspectives. Besides the term came from the Protestant Church discourse on the purification movement or Christianity in its origin forms. Esposito for example proposes others such as Islamic revivalism, Islamic activism, and Islamic extremism. In spite of the term debates, and for its popularity both in popular and academic media, usage of fundamentalism does not mean exclude what other scholars’ proposal for others such as that of Said and Esposito when labelling Muslim who appeal Islam as the source of authority for all political and social action (religious practices). Other scholars including Hasan Hanafi also support Edward Said and Esposito, yet admitting the term of fundamentalism as correct and must be accepted to the phenomena among Muslim communities (Kramer, 2003). This thesis does mean specifically to contribute to the etymological debates, rather it focuses on a phenomenon among Muslim by using the available terms already. Because both terms are dominantly still in use, I therefore, could not use only one term to describe varieties in this conception

In addition to the fundamentalism concept, Islamism appearing later specifically focuses on the political aspiration of Muslim society in the context of religion and the state. Both share the same ideas in Islam as a way of life of Muslim in their whole life aspect including the politics. Yet some fundamentalists do not care about politics (such as some of Salafi (Wahabi) and Tablighi movement) to which Oliver Roy name as post-Islamism. The post-Islamist more want to change the culture without interfering the politics. In this framework, Islamism and post-Islamism (in Roy definition) are variants of Islamic fundamentalism (in Tibi’s framework).

of the prophet Muhammad and his companion or the “*Salaf*” community (Arabic : Ancestors).² Attempting to revive the ideas and custom of pre-modern Islamic society in the current modern civilization and their active propaganda in the non-Muslim society, the fundamentalist Muslims often encounter social and cultural challenges not only from the non-Muslim but also from their fellow Muslims (Roy, 2004). There are some of their Islamic beliefs and practices which contradict not only the established tradition of Japanese society but also their Indonesian co-Muslims.

Following in the footsteps of their Indonesian counterparts, many Indonesian Muslims in Japan advocated for controversial practices including their aspiration and practices of; extremely restricted halal dining; not sharing dining tables with non-Muslims, and not accepting their dining invitations; prohibition of Bank interest, equally considered as usury practices; prohibition of women to emigrate their countries without company of their guardians; limitation of women access to the professional careers; instruction of wearing *burqa* (full head cover) for female Muslims); avoidance of visiting others’ religious shrines; prohibition to join swimming, music and singing class for girls; prohibition of uttering “Christmas greetings”; their political aspiration of holding Islam as a political identity against secular political identity (theocracy vs democracy).³

Through this case of Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan, I want to study sociologically the significant relationship between culture and practice (action, human behaviors) in an international migration setting. International, or transnational mobility provide periods of transition and transformation where immigrants select strategies of their practices based either on certain ideologies or their available cultural resources (repertoire). This chapter

² Ahl salaf (Salafi) (the followers of Salafism) is a contested and normative identity claimed by everyone of Sunni Muslim who follow the path of the prophet and his companion (Esposito 2005). Therefore, Sunni Muslim followers around the world including members of Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia, Doebandi and Tablghi in India, Ikhwan in Egypt and Pakistan as well as Wahabi in Saudi Arabia. Normatively associate themselves to be the ahl Salaf. In the twentieth century, however, Salafism has been a strong rhetoric of the Wahhabis. They exclusively attribute the Salafi to their group (the Wahabis). It is the outsiders’ term associated to the followers of Wahab, the last name of Muhammad bin Abd Wahab, the man behind the current Saudi Arabia Islamic ideology. As I would discuss this topic broadly in chapter three, for this introductory section, I only want to emphasize their spread among different Muslim groups and individuals from the purist one who do not involve in the political discourse and to those the Islamists seeking the establishment of Islamic political authority; from the pacifist to the most radical one. They are different in politics and social strategy but they are in consensus about the purification issues. See (Roy, 2004; Tibi, 2002).

³ From field works data in Japan 2015-2018

provides background information, establishes a scope, posits research questions, and discusses previous literature related to this study.

1.1.2. Acculturation: contemporary discourses on Islam and migration

The relationship between Islam and international migration has attracted public and scholarly discussion for at least two reasons. First, as with all social groups embedded with shared symbols, a Muslim community requires its members to perform or demonstrate a certain symbolic act of commitment to the group. Secondly, international migration presumably entails inter-cultural encounters that enhance acculturation (e.g J. Berry et al., 2006; J. W. Berry, 2001; John W. Berry, 2013; U. Kim et al., 1994) which is “another kind of commitment” with larger plural social group. Acculturation is often described as cultural adaptation including changes in immigrants’ perception and attitudes toward other groups. Acculturation, as I understand it, in international migration settings is a membership (commitment) overture toward commonly shared habits, customs, and traditions of other groups in the host society.⁴ Interestingly, in the context of international migration, Muslims often migrate to non-Muslim countries whose dominant cultural practices typically contrast with conservative Muslim tradition. Throughout Europe, some of the largest Muslim populations can be found in France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Russia where the dominant culture and customs differ significantly from that of Muslims. This phenomenon prompts questions about how Muslim Immigrants reconcile their Islamic practices with their shared commitment to the local multicultural society. Studies of International migration to the US, for instance, find immigrants often face “Americanization” (assimilation-integration) a convergence of US culture and their original cultural and religious identities (e.g Barrett, 1992; Eck, 2007; Foner & Alba, 2008). In contrast, many investigations in Europe discuss Muslims’ alienation from the host society and culture (e.g Bowen, 2004, 2010; Cesari, 2004, 2007b; Connor, 2016; Ebaugh, 2010; Haddad, 2011; Riva Kastoryano, 2004; McLoughlin & Cesari, 2016; Modood, 2015). This study is inspired by whether and how Muslim migrants can maintain their religious commitment as well as a commitment to the other social groups; nationalities, and global citizenship.

Many academic studies on Islamic migration to Europe and America post 9/11 question “What happens to Muslims’ religion, religiosity, or religious practices (I use the terms inter-

⁴ This what I meant by cosmopolitan identity refers to understanding one’s identity; bridging category between nationality and internationality, local and global, universal and particular. See (e.g Appadurai & Breckenridge, 1988b; Beck & Grande, 2014; Parekh, 2003; Turner, 2002).

changeably) when they leave their home and reside in the non-Muslim or secular society”(Modood, 2015; Roy, 2017; Shaheen, 2003). There have been at least two approaches responding this question, namely integrative and conflict approaches. Integrative approaches imply Muslims’ strategies of practicing Islam accommodate the customs and expressions of the local (host) culture therefore seemingly inconsistent (to their “home” culture). In contrast, those who favor conflict approaches are not willing to accommodate and are even resistant to the local culture, hence looks highly consistent to their culture (Rognes & Schei, 2010).

Regarding the first approach, there are many studies about the ways Muslims strategize their religious practices by accommodating elements of local culture (inclusivism). For instance, inspired by Western music culture, some young Muslims created hip-hop musical group drawn from Islamic songs and performances, even though certain Islamic groups had prohibited such music (e.g Khabeer, 2016). In another instance, because basketball is very popular among American youth, a few Muslim youth activists used basketball to strengthen Muslim community organizations in the US (e.g Thangaraj, 2015). In Europe some religious leaders including Oxford Professor, Tariq Ramadhan have initiated discourse around “European Islam” which is Islam that is compatible with European values. They encourage Muslim communities in Europe to actively participate in public discourse around European society and government policy. Certain Muslim communities and individuals also draw controversy by contravening Islamic tradition by promoting Muslim LGBTQ groups (Wilson & Baggs, 2019) or supporting female imams (Kasraoui, 2020) for equality reasons. These cases are controversial among the majority of Muslims (see for example Kinoshita, 2020), but are produced in the context of Islam and international migration.

Secondly, within the conflict framework, many scholars point to the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism (and or radicalism) especially among second generation European Muslims. The growth of Salafism and Islamism ideology as a counter against secularist regimes in Muslim countries strengthens a general impression in the West about Muslims’ inability to co-exist harmoniously within multicultural European societies (exclusivism). This is in part because many Muslim countries are not accustomed to separate religion and the state, which may provide a cultural shock for Muslim immigrants when they arrive in European countries (e.g. Bowen, 2010; Cesari, 2007a; Ramadan, 2009; Roy, 2017). As a result, while many Muslims are accepted as European citizens, they reject some European values and principles such as promoting sex positivity and gender equality, democracy, religious freedom,

and human rights and also differentiating between private and public spaces. Some Muslims, especially the transnational Salafi (Wahabi) faction⁵ consider those values human interferences against God's law. In recent decades, Europe also has witnessed several terrorist attacks carried out by immigrant Muslims. As a result, Islamophobia and opposition against Islam and Muslims has increased in Europe. There is also circulating public opinion about the risk of European values of being eroded by the arrival of millions of Muslim migrants in Europe (Murray, 2017). These phenomena in Europe have in part inspired this research in terms of possible similar phenomena nowadays or in the future in non-Muslim countries outside of Europe and the US.

Outside of Europe, (before the Covid-19 pandemic) Muslims steadily moved to and settled in non-Muslim countries including Japan and other East Asian countries—especially Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. While there have been a tremendous number of scholarly works about their emergence in Western countries, there is limited research about their presence in East Asia, particularly Japan (Nakhleh et al., 2008; Onishi & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2003). There are insufficient studies about the different models of religious practices developed by minority Muslims in those regions. Therefore, this study explores Indonesian Muslim migrant communities in Japan and attempts to contribute to the discussion about these migrants varied religious practices.

Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japan has become a destination for international migration (Castles, 2014; Douglass & Roberts, 2000; Liu-Farrer, 2011b) including emigrants from Muslim regions such as the Middle East (mainly Iran), South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India), Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia), and Central Asia (Turkey and Uzbekistan)(Kojima, 2006; Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2007). The country's impressive modernization, economic prosperity, and labor opportunities within manufacturing industries have drawn Asian migrants—including Indonesians—to Japan. A new migration policy launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which allowed “unskilled” workers to enter Japan with an internship visa, prompted many young Indonesians to migrate to Japan under this program (Kartikasari, 2013; Maemura et al., 2009; Ohno, 2012).⁶ There were other migration

⁵ The Salafi refers to idea and movement attribute themselves as the followers of correct Islam according to the early Muslim generation during the prophet Muhammad in the sixth century. They called for the idea of purification of Islam from the other non-Islamic cultural elements producing different faction of Salafi (pure salafi to jihadis salafi, the most extreme one). It is called Wahabi or the followers of Muhammad bin Abd Wahab by the outsiders referring to their 19th century charismatic leader, the ideologist behind the establishment of Saudi Arabia Kingdom. See (Esposito, 1999) .

⁶ The Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) is a work training program provided by the Japanese government with the initial goal of assisting in the transfer of "technical skills" from Japan industries to

policies that provided opportunities for many Indonesians (as well others) to reside in Japan, such as academic study abroad programs, language schools known as *Nihongo gakko*, jobs for health care workers, and regulations that encouraged “*nikkeijin*”⁷ (Japanese descendants) and those who have Japanese spouses to enter. Currently there are probably around 150,000⁸ Muslim foreigners in Japan, with Indonesians making up the largest percentage. But despite the increasing number of Muslim foreigners, their ratio remains very small compared to the total population of Japanese society. If the total number of Muslims in Japan comprising around 150.000 including local Japanese Muslims, the number remains less than one percent of the total Japanese population.

The population size affects Muslims’ ability to organize communal and religious practices that they used to perform in their home countries. Many Islamic practices including beliefs and rituals which are performed on a daily or weekly basis are socially supported by the states and society which forms their religious identity. For example, in their home countries, Muslim find it easy to perform communal prayers because mosques and prayer rooms are built everywhere including at schools, malls, train stations, and sport stadiums. In Indonesia, the national government also provides financial support for various religious activities such as Islamic festivals, and schools. As a consequence, when they encounter a different society or culture that is less centered around Islamic practices, Muslims often need to adjust to certain local cultural elements. Exposure to cultural differences might prompt immigrants to reconsider their beliefs or philosophies because of what they encounter in the new society. This exposure can have a variety of consequences, and in some cases might influence someone toward a certain cultural or religious direction. Many become more cosmopolitan or inclusive and adopt different religious practices (B. S. Turner, 2002), while others even convert to new religions such as Christianity or Buddhism. Other become more conservative or fundamentalist and adopt exclusive and radical practices. However, these two polarized approaches that Muslim minorities use to develop their religious practices in non-Muslim societies do not provide

developing countries. Through these programs, Japanese companies can hire young people from other countries, allowing them to stay in Japan under internship visa for one to three years. Motivated by a desire to meet the demand for labor forces in Japanese companies, the program has drawn public criticism for its low pay in spite of actual working hours (not training).

⁷ There are some thousands of Japan descendants in some parts of Indonesian regions such as (mainly) Medan (North Sumatera) and North Sulawesi.

⁸ This is my estimation from different sources such as (Kojima, 2006) around 70 000, (T. Sakurai, 2007) less than 100000 and more updated resources =around 130.000. See (Tanada, 2017). Another resource claim around 230.000 Muslims in Japan. See the Economist (Hajjis, 2021).

enough information about the reasons why Muslims might choose one strategy over the other. This dissertation focuses on Muslims' different religious practices in non-Muslim societies and the cultural factors behind those differences. While different everyday practices seem plausible everywhere, the explanation of what influences these different practices often comes with theological perspectives of different Muslim. Providing Muslims' theological differences as a mere factor of their different practices would not capture comprehensively the complex reality behind Muslims' behaviors.

1.1.3. Exclusivism and inclusivism: a discourse among Muslim today

How Muslims must behave toward non-Muslims has been an essential discussion of Islamic theology influencing general Muslim societies. However, most contemporary Muslim society has been developed in the exclusive Islamic theologies that are very challenging to the inclusive values of the 21st-century global human civilization. Some classic theological interpretations of Muslims toward the others, including creeds of "no salvation for non-Muslims, no prophet after Muhammad, Islam is the only religion, no religions other than Islam" have been fundamental principles firmly rooted in the Muslim society (Saeed, 2020; Mun'im Sirry, 2017). Therefore, many attempts of Muslim theologians and leaders to revise such interpretations remain resisted and marginalized. This exclusivism phenomenon is because today's Islamic theology is rooted in a creed structured in the second and third of the Islamic century, where Muslims and Christians historically were in constant conflicts (Mun'im Sirry, 2017; Yusuf, 2010a).

In fact, according to Abdullah Saeed (2020) Quran, the holy book, has provided foundations instructing Muslims to look at and treat others equally. Yet because today's Islamic authority regime has "inherited" the previous exclusive framework, any current attempt to make alternative theological interpretations remains unproductive. Reflecting the thoughts and social movements led by some Muslim theologians and leaders,⁹ Abdullah Saeed proposes what he called Islamic inclusivism within the social dimension instead of a theological one. Within this framework where Muslims can produce inclusive attitudes toward others. Muslims worldwide could participate but pioneered common global human values and movements such as

⁹ Saeed refers his arguments to several Muslim scholars and theologians including Fazlurrahman (Pakistan), Mahmoud Ayoub (US), Imityaz Yusuf (Malaysia), Qordhawi (Jordan), Nurcholis Majid (Indonesia), Abdulaziz Sachedina (US), Tariq Ramadhan (UK), Abdolkarim Soroush (Iran), Farid Essack (South Africa), Ashgar Ali (India). I would add Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia), Abdullah Annaim (Sudan), Nasr Hamid Abou Zayd (Egypt) among others

democracy, freedom, human right, and justice. Within this inclusivism framework of Abdullah Saeed, this thesis attempts to examine the social dimension of exclusive and inclusive attitudes in the everyday practices of Indonesian Muslims in Japan.

1.2. Research focus and questions

This study discusses cultural strategies that Indonesian Muslims employ in Japan and their impact to the Muslims' integration with the "host" culture and society. As a majority non-Muslim country, Japan like several other Western countries is rich in very different cultural expression from that of Muslims'. In that situation conflict often occurs because of guests 'hesitance to adjust with their "host" culture. Theoretically, based on some concepts of social interaction or communication such as those described by G.H Mead (e.g. Mulyana, 2012), it could be assumed that immigrants' international engagement and exposure to cultural differences might influence and transform their perception and religious behaviour to be more inclusive or secular. For example, Mead's symbolic interaction theory says that social interaction in the form of verbal communication between two or more persons produces and reproduces an exchanged meaning/interpretation or perception toward each other (e.g. Aksan et al., 2009; Mead, 1934; Mulyana, 2012). The more they interact, the more they understand about each other, and the less they misinterpret (e.g. Njoku, 2006b; Olagbaju & Awosusi, 2019) (Njoku, 2006b; Olagbaju, Oladotun Opeoluwa, 2009). Following this theory, many social institutions (family, tribe, sport club, local government etc.) suggest their members intensify their social interaction between individuals to prevent social conflict or prejudice. Related to the theories of the communication importance, however, there are also some inconsistent facts and practices found among Muslim immigrants. Many of Muslim migrants, in spite of their living in a non-Muslim country, and interacting with its non-Muslim citizens, remain holding their exclusive views and do not make their conservative religious views toward the others transformed into more inclusive ones. In many cases, emigrants become more religiously exclusive after living in other countries (Connor, 2009). To analyze these inconsistencies (expected integration) of Muslim practices in Japan (as well as other countries), in the contemporary global migration phenomena, there is a need more complementary theoretical explanation.

Normatively, according to the Islamic theology, a Muslim must obey the law of Allah (*sharia*) to be regarded a good or pious Muslim; otherwise, they deserve the torment of hell. Therefore, according to strictly exclusive religious interpretation, only those who carry out

religious practices according to certain ideologies can be regarded as “good Muslims” (Yusuf, 2010a). However, for many immigrants, the Muslim ideal is related to the standard of everyday Muslim practices in their home country. For many of them, including among Indonesians, living overseas in non-Muslim countries significantly hinders their ability to practice Islam. It is no surprise, therefore, that many conservative Muslim parents do not allow their daughters to study abroad because of their religious doctrine. These parents are hesitant because non-Muslim countries are not typically prepared with Muslim facilities, such as mosques, Islamic schools, or halal foods. They are also concerned with un-Islamic cultural influences that their children might encounter. Within this normative exclusive Islamic framework (e.g. Saeed, 2020), being in non-Muslim regions might put Muslims into personal or cultural conflict. On one hand, they must be good Muslims, avoiding any "un-Islamic" practices or cultural elements that, according to them, might tarnish or spoil their faith and religious tradition. On the other hand, they are in a predominantly non-Muslim society (in this case, Japan) whose customs and traditions are far different from Islamic society.

In practice however, Muslims in international migration settings employ at least three strategies of practicing Islam.¹⁰ First, regarding their response to the cultural differences, some Muslims—such as the Salafi activists—are very engrossed with their conservative-exclusive ideologies based on literal textual interpretation of Islamic sources. The conservative group’s cultural repertoire and available resources become their primary reference in their Islamic practices. The second group of Muslims, in contrast, navigate cultural differences inclusively because of their contextually historical, philosophical, and sociological reading of Islamic texts. This group’s cultural resources also become their primary reference for religious practices. Third, the final group, encompassing most Muslims, is those who select their strategies of religious practices interchangeably depending on their available set of their skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle, which all influence their so-called cultural toolkits or repertoire. This study explores how Indonesian Muslims’ diverse religious practices in Japan are influenced by their cultural repertoire.

The term cultural repertoire or tool kits, in brief, refers to Swidler's (1986) metaphor to explain culture’s influence on action. Opposing previous theorists including Talcott Parson and Max Weber, Swidler argues that cultural values (ideologies) do not orient people’s social action

¹⁰ The first two strategies I equalize them to the concepts proposed by Imtiyaz Yusuf, among other Muslim scholars see (Yusuf, 2010b).

in an unwavering way. In other word, one's action does not necessarily correspond with one's cultural values. Instead, there are sets of skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles that influence individuals' actions. In the case of the Muslims in non-Muslim countries, a wide range of cultural tools influence their behaviour (See Chapter Three). This notion of cultural tool kits or repertoires is demonstrated by how people perform/practice their religion/religiosity. Commonly people do good deeds for others not because of their religious ideologies about believing in God, the promise of heaven and paradise, or a fear of torment in hell, but rather because of their available set of skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle. Thus, people's different cultural tool kits determine their different reactions toward others' attitudes and behaviours. Believing an ideology would not necessarily produce an action except in certain situations where someone is being in the "unsettled" time or undergoing some type of life transition, which will be discussed in Chapter Three. For instance, many churchgoers and *haji* travellers to Mecca demonstrate strong faith and piety within the context of their religious journeys, but revert to doing so-called "sinful" deeds when they return home. This is a normal behaviour in all religious communities.

International migration provides a similar period of transformation from settled to unsettled lives. Immigrants often experienced periods of cultural shock or barriers, which can lead to new cultural ideologies (John W. Berry, 2013) In such transitional situations, international immigrants, regardless of their faith, are prone to change their religious practices and ideologies depending on how "settled" their migration lives are. This thesis will focus on the different strategies Muslim immigrants use in the new society and culture and their varied influencing cultural repertoires.

Although Muslims worldwide have some similarities in certain central tenets and rituals, Muslims daily practices vary depending on individual socio-cultural background. For example, Marshall Hodgson coined the phenomenon *Islamicate* to describe the practices of Islam in India, which are influenced by the Hindu culture including Indian caste system (Hodgson, 1974). Likewise, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, attributes "Nusantara before Islam" to describe the typical characteristics of Islam practiced on the Nusantara/Malay archipelagos (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, and Singapore). Additionally, every individual or social group always has different determining social factors that influence their perspective: economic, professional status, political orientation, lifestyle,

profession, social and cultural background all formulate their cultural repertoire that characterizes their ways of practicing Islam or strategy of action.

Related to the immigrants' "strategy" of religious practices, issues of how Muslims maintain their religiosity in new places, while at the same time facing expectations to adjust to other cultures is a common dilemma for Muslim immigrants (and their relatives). After Malaysia, Middle Eastern countries are the most common destination for Indonesian immigrant labour because they share similarly Muslim culture with that of Indonesia. For example, Indonesian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia—who are mostly women—do not worry about being influenced by "un-Islamic" tradition, and even get opportunities to explore their religion further and attain the respected title of "Hajj."

Since the 1980s nearly every family in many rural areas in West and Central Java has had at least one member who worked in the Middle East and acted as a breadwinner for their family by sending money home to assist with finances (Silvey, 2006). They are stereotyped as "better Muslims" than those who go to non-Muslim countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. They could easily continue performing their Islamic piety practices, learn the "correct" Middle Eastern Islam, and perform the Hajj (pilgrimage). On the other hand, those who go to East Asia or non-Muslim countries are exposed to "non-Islamic culture," which impacts their relationship with Islamic practices. A common stereotype attributed to the Hong Kong or Taiwan "alumni" in rural villages is related to their un-Islamic style outfits. For instance, those returnees from Hong Kong or Taiwan often wear less conservative clothes that do not conform to the local villagers' contemporary habits.

The negative social labelling for those going to non-Muslim countries was so strong and influential that I once met an Indonesian maid fleeing from Singapore because she was asked to take care of a puppy. She believed that as a Muslim, she should not touch the dog, which would taint her faith. Indeed, living with a dog as a pet in Western societies and Japan is a serious taboo in some Muslim-majority communities—especially on Java Island. The maid said, "I would better flee from my host, rather did what they ordered" (washing the dog).

In Japan, some of my interviewees, especially *kenshusei* (technical interns) and workers do not want to accept their *shacho's* (supervisor) dinner invitation as they believe sharing a table with those who drink liquor will deteriorate their religious faith. Also, most Muslim families I encountered in Japan complain about the school curriculum, which teaches their

children evolution-based theories which contradict their belief in God's original creation/Creationism.

Despite these adversities, Indonesian Muslim immigrants continue migrating to Japan (as well as in other non-Muslim countries). They develop different strategies, practices, or behaviors that are accepted both in their new culture and in Muslim circles. This dissertation focuses on these different religious practices and strategies which result from their intercultural experiences with the host society as well as their preserved traditions. As conservatism-exclusivism has become a growing phenomenon among Indonesian migrants in Japan, it also become substantial emphasis of my investigation. In other words, this dissertation address questions why people develop different attitudes or practices toward others, and become more tolerant, intolerant, conservative, progressive, exclusive, or inclusive regarding new or different cultures. Because these attitudes and practices relate to their cultural repertoire at their home country and at the host country, current period of life, this thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

1. Which cultural repertoires and migration life circumstances influence Indonesian Muslim immigrants' strategy of Islamic practices in Japan most?
2. What is the relationship between the inclusive or exclusive Islamic practices of Indonesian Muslim immigrants in Japan, their cultural repertoire as Indonesians, and their life circumstance in Japan?
3. How is Indonesians' divergent religious practices affect their integration/incorporation to the Japanese society?

1.3. Literature review

1.3.1. Muslim and international migration

"God moves as human move" (Levitt, 2003) is a short but meaningful statement on how religion intersects with human migration. The history of human migration is strongly related to the history of religions. Levitt says Abraham was the first immigrant when he left his son and wife in the desert. Levitt might have forgotten that according to the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim beliefs, it was Adam and Eve who were first expelled from the paradise known as the Garden of Eden and forcibly migrated to earth. Aside from Adam, Eve, and Abraham; Moses and Muhammad also experienced influential migration stories as told in the written history of world religions. With growing attention in the press around immigrants and their religious involvement, the intersection of religions—including Islam and immigration—has become an

essential topic within public discourse and academia (e.g. Cesari, 2007c; Connor, 2009; Kivisto, 2018).

Studies about Islam and migration were rarely conducted until the 1980s. This period of the 1980s marks a new wave of Islamic globalization (from Saudi Arabia) to non-Muslim destination countries, especially in Europe and North America (Cesari, 2007a, 2007b), which greatly influenced the Muslim world. When rapidly-growing Muslim populations reached up to 10 percent in some European countries, demographers' realized the potential impact on European demographic composition. Since then, Islam and Muslims have become the most popular research topic within the field of European identity politics (Cesari, 2004). In the US, having the largest international immigrants, interests in the study of religion and migration were overshadowed by topics relating to how migration intersects with racial and ethnic identity issues (Alekseevskaja, 2015; Buenker, 2017). It was only after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that the US began to seriously study Islam and Muslim immigration (Schmid, 2016). The interest in the Muslim immigrant community only increased after Harvard launched its "Pluralism Project," (1996) which explores the changing faces of American religious pluralism, including Islam, as an integrated part of American identity (Eck, 2007). According to Schmid (2016), the current largest scholarly published and unpublished corpus in the US is about Islam, radicalism, and the Muslim community in the US. In addition to the growing quantity of Muslim migration projects, after almost forty years, the discussion topics have also varied and evolved. Despite this variety, within the literature about Islam and migration, there are at least three overarching, shared themes.

First, regarding the broader subject of how religion functions for immigrants, studies on Islam and migration reflect scholars' interest in the practicalities of practicing Islam in non-Muslim societies. Secondly, this research often covers the transformation of immigrants' religions, including Islam, and portrays changes in religious symbolic expression, practices, and individual and social identity. The third theme is specific to Islam and Muslim immigrants that discuss how a state and society cope with transnational Muslim immigrants and global security (P. Mandaville, 2010). Undoubtedly, this latest concern is influenced by the fact that Islam and Muslims have been associated with religious radicalism and also with rapidly increasing Muslim demographics in immigrant countries.

The first theme under the heading of 'the function and role of religion for immigrants' has been mainly explored through two perspectives, first discussing the immigrants'

experiences and secondly concerning the host society's attitudes toward the immigrants. Coping with the first theme, the function and role of religion for immigrants, according to (Connor, 2009), religion plays very importantly as "medicine pills" for the patients. Most of the experts on international immigration agree that immigrants are a vulnerable group that often face increased stress and marginalization (e.g. J. Berry et al., 2006; Buenker, 2017; Connor, 2012; Kivisto, 2016; Silvey, 2004; Van Oudenhoven & Hofstra, 2006; Vertovec, 1999). They are often marginalized from the host society because of differences in ethnicity, religious traditions, having minority status, occupation, and class. Immigrants frequently report homesickness and loneliness and also often shoulder heavy debt burdens because of relocation costs. Within this context, religion can function as something of a "balm," decreasing their pain overseas by connecting people to their home culture at churches, temples, or mosques (Connor, 2009). The ritual and social activities organized by these religious organizations provide relief for the immigrants. Members of Indonesian Catholic church in Chicago, for example, feel united in one family because they often meet and do activities together (Padawangi, 2005). Similar experiences are also shared among immigrants from different nationalities in the US. Many consider religious institutions such as church and mosque as a surrogate family in the new environment.

The other issue relating to the function of immigrants' religion is whether religion acts as a barrier or bridge for immigrants' integration into the host society. In this context, integration is defined as the immigrants' cultural adjustments through which they can access equal opportunities and resources as the natives (John W. Berry, 2013). This includes discussion on Muslim assimilation or integration issues in Europe, the US, and Canada (Cesari, 2007c; Foner & Alba, 2008; Kymlicka, 2018; Modood, 2015).

The standard argument about such discussion is that religious participation has become a bridge for Muslims in the US and barrier in Europe (Connor, 2016; Eck, 2007; Foner & Alba, 2008). Religious group or institutional participation provides extensive opportunities for leadership, settlement and employment prospects, and social capital as well as direct assistance for their members in the new countries (Connor, 2009). Most old immigrants rely on their co-ethnic or religious community members when they arrive to a host country to help them get integrated into the new society (Modood, 2006; Vertovec, 2001).

Like other immigrants' religions in Europe, Islam is considered a barrier that prevents its followers from integrating into European culture (Cesari, 2004, 2007a; Foner & Alba, 2008;

Merry, 2009). Scholars share notions that separation of state and religion as the essence of Western European secularism has made some countries in Europe more hostile toward religion than the US. This is rooted in Europe's political culture, having successfully separated religion from the public and governmental spheres. Many Europeans view immigrants' religion, especially Islam, as a threat to their values of separating the "church and state" (private and public spheres) (e.g. Bowen, 2010; Cesari, 2004; Kastoryano, 1991). Another contributing factor to this barrier is that, unlike Muslim immigrants in the US, most Muslim immigrants in Europe are from "unsettled" backgrounds and are regarded as lower class (e.g. Connor & Koenig, 2013b; Foner & Alba, 2008; Levitt, 2009). They are often from poor countries, are less educated, and don't have fully developed European language skills. Another contributing factor is the historical context of conflict between Muslims and Christians within Europe, which remains strong among Europeans and Muslims memories.

The history of conflict between Muslims and other cultural and religious groups in the West has been extensively documented in Muslim and European history. Three centuries of Crusades (Polk, 2018), European colonization over Muslim countries in Asia and Africa, and repeated tension between religious groups over Jerusalem have perpetuated the conflict and instilled prejudice in both groups (Mansour, 2018). Many influential and controversial scholars, including British historian Bernard Lewis and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, have generalized how passionate Muslims are in resisting Westernization. For instance, many Muslim countries adopt political rhetoric centered around rejecting the interests of the US and its allies (Hasan, 2019a).

Related to this subject of acculturation, there is another feature representing Muslims' integration into American society. While religion (Islam) in Europe is considered a barrier for immigrants' integration into the host society, religions in the US, including Islam, have become bridges and tools which allow immigrants to integrate with the host society (Foner & Alba, 2008). American religious institutions encourage immigrants to invest in social capital through which they can gain more opportunities, such as settlement and employment. For example, participating in community groups at Mosques has become a point of entry for immigrants to gain more significant opportunities for leadership and service that bring them prestige (Foner & Alba, 2008). Likewise, participation in social or religious organizations like NGOs and missionaries allow immigrants to engage in local civic groups. Studies reveal, that social interaction through faith-based organizations helps many immigrants to overcome integration

problems and stress (Bulut & Ebaugh, 2014; H. R. Ebaugh & Chafetz, 1999; Fong & Lee, 2006). In a study about South Asian migrants in the US, Levitt found that religious activities at mosques have become an intermediary for its followers to expand their economic opportunities (Levitt, 2007). Connor and Levitt, however, also note that Muslims' integration trends within American culture and society are influenced by some factors such as the immigrants' social backgrounds and the pluralist culture and society of the US (also see Cesari, 2007a, 2007b).

Most Muslim immigrants who arrived in the US from South Asia and the Middle East are originally from middle or upper class in their home countries. They have above-average economic resources and education which influence their lives within their new countries. This also allows the second generation to attain high education and secure good employment in the US (Connor & Koenig, 2013; Diehl et al., 2009; Levitt, 2009; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Voicu & Şerban, 2012). Many of their second generation become professional lawyers, medical doctors, bankers, investors, IT experts, and top managers and CEOs at American companies (Levitt, 2009). Another factor to why Muslims can easily integrate into the larger American society is the notion of American-friendly culture for religious pluralism. America's pluralistic culture is rooted in American Christianity, which is the largest civic movement in the US (Putnam et al., 2012).

The second theme of religion and migration literature, where this research is situated, addresses religious transformation, reflecting the acculturation of immigrants' religion into the dominant culture. To participate in a broader community, immigrants might employ various strategies of assimilation or integration. While the first implies taking a new identity shaped from the host society, the latter merges old and new cultures (e.g. Barkan, 1995; J. W. Berry, 1992, 2001). The early history of religious missionaries, including Christianity and Islam in Southeast Asia, was preceded by the acculturation of religion or practices with the local culture. According to scholars, the arrival of Islam on Java islands in its early period would not have been successful without acculturating some Islamic elements into the Javanese tradition (e.g. Geertz, 1957; Hefner, 1987; Hitchcock & Woodward, 1991; Woodward, 2011). Early Muslim scholars changed the language of prayers and services, incorporating Javanese expressions in many Islamic rituals or vice versa. Within today's global migration era, Muslim immigrants also adjust some Islamic elements into American culture or vice versa. This is reflected clearly, for example, in how Islamic community organizations in the US structurally mirror US

protestant congregational organizations (Yang & Ebaugh, 2001). According to Yang & Ebaugh (2001), congregational structure of Islamic communities does not present in most Muslim countries, however in Western countries, they need to assemble formal structural bodies to represent Muslim society. More examples can be found in the Muslim immigrant communities utilizing local cultural elements in their Islamic practices, such as accommodating American culture in Islamic organizations (Woodward, 2019). Unlike traditional mosques in Muslim countries, which serve only for religious activities such as prayers and Islamic tutorials, mosques in US and the UK function as community centers that also facilitate social activities, health care, sports, language education, weddings, even political mobilization (Metcalf, Barbara Daly, 1996). There are several studies into hybrid American-Islamic expressions, such as *hijabi* hip hop discussing a veil-wearing Muslim girl band that performs hip hop concert (Eltantawy, Nahed, 2019) and Muslim basketball clubs that demonstrate Muslim youth using American sports as means of social integration (Thangaraj, 2015). Through that American cultural genre, second generation Muslims are able to feel more included and integrate easier in the broader American society (Karam, 2020).

Another religious transformation might not be influenced by the host culture, but by the power of the transnational religious institution. Transnationalism as another theme of Islam and migration is an alternative strategy (action) of dealing with the host society has also been a growing study. Transnationalism relates to "a new phenomenon" of cross-national border migration, which not only engages activities in the new society but also in their home countries and beyond (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Schiller et al., 1992; Vertovec, 2007). This perspective is unlike the assimilationists' paradigm which only examines migrant's activities in their new location, describing migrants who were cut off from the customs of their home, and who were totally assimilated into new languages, habits, and customs of the new society. Instead, transnationalism explains how two or more places and cultures are bridged, modified, and transformed by migrants' activities (Levitt, 2001). The advances in transportation and information technology have allowed transnational immigrants to easily maintain traditions from their homeland, including religious practices. The emerging phenomenon of transnational migration also influences Muslim migrants to reflect their religiosity in transnational contexts. Since the 1980s, despite small numbers, there have been growing works on immigrant Muslims in non-Muslim societies exercising their religious faith, religious practices, and institutional or activist affiliation to their home countries or beyond, which is the primary tenet of transnational Islam. There are, however, many forms of transnational Muslim immigrants being studied.

Varied conceptions of transnational Islam have been mapped out by Ralph Grillo (2004) in his introductory article for the special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration entitled *Islam, Transnationalism, and Public Sphere in Europe* (2004). This is probably the most comprehensive guide to the concept of transnational Islam. The article contains Grillo's commentary on selected papers discussing the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe who maintain their ties with their origin countries or beyond in many different social and cultural contexts. Grillo characterizes three categories of transnational Islam.

The first, is Islam within a transnational circuit of immigration that moves back and forth between two countries, while the immigrants are anchored in the home countries. Promoting Riccio and Soares's papers, Grillo explains how this first category works in explaining a certain kind of transnational migration among Muslims. The paper studies West African migrants in France and Italy who are mainly male circulatory migrants with families in villages or towns in Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal (Grillo & Soares, 2005). Each year they work temporarily in France and Italy, but they seek a final return to their home origins where they maintain multiple economic, social, and religious ties (p.865). Both Riccio and Soares describe the communities as Sufi (Islamic spiritualist group) followers of Maurid and Tijaniyya groups, with strong ties in both their home and host countries (p. 865).

Grillo's second category is transnational Islam within a bi-national or pluri-national framework. This category covers those living abroad, while their orientation is bound in two or more countries, especially their origins. In this framework, there are French immigrants in Algeria, Pakistani in Britain, Turkish in Germany, and Moroccan in Italy. Unlike the first type of transnational Islam whose orientation is the origin country, the second is associated with both the sending and receiving countries. The Turkish and Pakistani in Germany and Britain care about matters such as identity and politics in Germany or Britain, in their home countries Turkey and Pakistan, and other countries where Turkish and Pakistani immigrants disperse (p. 866).

The third transnational Islam, *ummah*, is a kind of a super tribal or trans-ethnic global community which crosses borders of race, ethnicity, and national identity. This view is founded from their orientation of one faith, one Islam and one community guided by the holy book. It is a community formed under the premise that there is a mass of people united under a single heading of Islamic ideology. Quoting (Antoun, 1994), Grillo exemplifies an account of a Jordanian student at Leeds University who gains prominence for his experiences of religious

studies in Cairo among Pakistani Muslims. In this case, Islam first signals a common identity marker. Islamic scriptures have many expressions defining Muslims all over the world are one united community of faith, beliefs, and practices irrespective of their origins. Some transnational Islamic movements and organizations have used the vocabularies to claim their political goals.

Existing literature on transnational Islam as *ummah* identifies different Islamic ideologies and institutions that were originally local movements, which then became transnational and trans-ethnic such as Islamic Brotherhood (Salafism), Wahhabism, Tabligh, Jamaat, and Ahmadiya. Related to their existence in Western countries, most literature concerns the nature of borderless ideological organizations and the national security threats that might occur from those who share ideologies with violent groups such as Al Qaeda and Hamas. However, most literature departs from their existing networks in Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, some Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian countries. Many works also deal with the existence of underground movements in Western countries, most famous of which is Oliver Roy's works on globalized Islamic networks among second-generation Muslims in Europe. The following works have taken Roy's works as a point of departure on Muslim immigrants in Europe.

As Olivier Roy (2004) has conceptualized, globalized Islam is the post-failed 1980s Islamic political movement that sought to change the secular state into an Islamic one. After the failed exercise of political aspiration in many Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, a new type of movement claimed to be non-political. Having gained popularity in the 1980s, the movement has since shifted its direction. Instead of establishing an Islamic state, it prioritizes creating a just, Islamic version of society. In other words, it is an *Islamization* project through its customs, laws, and lifestyle. It is about practicing Islam without interfering with the state's political forms. The Islamists in South and Southeast Asia are no longer motivated to establish an independent state, but seek to re-Islamize Muslims according to their standard of correct Islam (Roy, 2004). Political Islam's failure provides insights into how the neo-fundamentalism fragments Muslim society because of theological differences. The recent conflict in Muslim countries, including Indonesia, is not between Muslims and non-Muslims, but internal strife among Muslims because of conflicting religious interpretation. Muslims hate or dislike other Muslim groups because they support to what neo-fundamentalists are against, and vice versa.

Relating to transnational immigrants, there is a large body of studies about how "globalized" Islamists in non-Muslim countries are transformed by the internal dynamics of Muslim society as well as social perception of their host society (Bodziany & Saleh, 2017; Bowen, 2004; Grillo, 2004; Nielsen, 2007). In addition, some authors of Muslim migrants in the non-Muslim societies within the European context have highlighted the tension within Muslim communities regarding Muslims attitude responding cultural difference they encountered in the host society (Cesari, 2005; Croucher, 2008; Haddad, 2002; Hoffmann et al., 2006; Nielsen, 2007).

In general, the majority works on Muslim migration talk about externals' cultural influence on Muslim attitudes toward the host society. This implies an emphasis on Muslims' integration strategies that is seemingly dependent on others' social acceptance—which is true—but, on the other hand, this perspective neglects and does not explain the existing inconsistencies among Muslim individuals or groups. For example, the works on transnationalism which indirectly describe external influence on Muslim individuals and groups do not explain why Muslims accept or resist the transnational Islamist ideas and movements. Although they are in the same geographical or cultural group setting, they respond differently toward transnational Islamic ideas. In other words, through this study, I intend to fill the gap regarding inconsistencies in Muslim responses within host societies and examine why this question has yet to be sufficiently answered.

After exploring the existing literature on the issues of religion, Islam, and migration, I have found two trends in the literature. First, there is insufficient explanation about why Muslims strategize differently their religious practices in their context of minority groups. Questions of why one Muslim group behave exclusively toward the others and why the other Muslims behave inclusively toward non-Muslims (and Muslim others) remain insufficiently answered. Secondly related to area studies, although the topics have attracted discussion in academia and public discourse within Western society such as European countries, the US, Canada, and Australia, little consideration has been given to Muslim immigrants in non-Muslim and non-Western societies such as Japan. As the case of Islam or Muslims in Japan provides both feature of minority groups' strategies in the new culture and alternative study of the non-Western societies, this study is expected to fill the existing gap in both focused studies. Another reason for its importance is that abundant studies cover Muslim immigrants settling the plural or multicultural societies. Very few studies have been conducted in a "homogenous" society

such as Japan. Thus, I believe this project in Japan could contribute to the field of Muslim migration studies.

1.3.2. Islam in Japan

Islam and Muslims in Japan, in the context of international migration is a relatively new subject of study. The study has not yet started until the late of 1970s and early 1980s, when international immigrants from the Middle East, Central, South, and Southeast Asia arrived Japan. The popular topic of Islam in Japan before and during that period centralizes over the history of Islam in Japan, and the very minority “local” Japanese Muslims. Keiko Abuse (Obuse, 2015) for example, writing “Oxford Bibliography” on Islam in Japan, does not list any scholarly work on Migrants in Japan before the 1980s except some personal accounts, or diaries of Japanese converts, and Japanese travellers to the Muslim countries. Similarly, from my search using Google scholar searching machine, within 1970- 1990 period, there are only few scholarly relevant papers.

The literature on Islam in Japan grew following the 2001 9/11 attacks in the United States, indicating an increased interest in the Muslim communities and their religions by Japanese scholars—largely driven by an awareness of potential security threats due to the global war on terrorism (Nakhleh et al., 2008). In more recent years, influenced by the effort to attract more international tourists from Muslim countries, there is a growing discussion about providing halal food options in Japan, to accommodate Muslim food and cuisine requirements. The thriving Japan halal tourism industry has contributed to the increase in academic research on Muslims in Japan as well. From the available literature (mostly in English), the contemporary study of Islam and Muslims in Japan has centralized on several topics, namely; history, demography, minority issues, and the halal industry. I will sketch the themes as follows:

On the history, the works of Abdul Karim Saito (Saitoh, 1979), Komura Fujio, Kuroda Hisyam (Kuroda, 1986) and Al Sammarai (Morimoto, A. B., & Chowdhury, 1980) have contributed to the popular discussion on the chronology of Muslim arrival and their community institutional formation and development in Japan. However, most available studies of the initial arrival of Islam in Japan refer to the insiders’ Muslims ‘documents, which I think need more updating from multi-disciplinary perspectives to avoid certain possible information biases.

On the early arrival of Muslim in Japan from his perspectives of early Muslims traveling through the North (land) and South (sea) Saito argues that Muslim contacts with Japan was a

part of Muslims' Southern journey through the sea (Saitoh, 1979). Meanwhile (Esenbel, 2011) provides a historical overview of contact between Japanese and the Muslim world and introduction to the Muslim world. His work also includes early Japanese converts to Islam, Turkish Pan-Islamists figures and researches relating to the Japan's Islam policy. In addition, Kuroda Hisham (1986) wrote about the preliminary report on the Japanese Muslim minority in Japan, focusing on their strategy for acceptance in Japan and how to modify attitudes in Islamic Japan, as well as how to blend it with mainstream Japanese culture (Kuroda, 1986).

Based on the previous papers and some other documents Salih Mahdi Al-Samarrai (2009), the chairman of the Islamic Center Japan wrote a piece on the history and development of Islam in Japan in the chronological order from the 19th century to the 2000s. As several other documents corroborate, he finds the first contact between Japan and the Islamic world date back in the 19th century during the Meiji Era. In that period, because Japan and Turkey were the only Asian independent countries that enjoyed freedom from the Western colonial pressure. Because of this shared status, they established diplomatic contact by visiting each other.

According to Al Sammarai (Al-Samarrai, 2009), the first visit was conducted by the Turkish envoys in 1890, consisting of around six hundred officers and soldiers. Completing their diplomatic mission, on their way back to Ottoman empire (now Turkey), while still in Japanese water, their ship was smashed by a hurricane, killing most of the passengers, leaving only a few alive. After the disaster unfolded in Japan's coastal waters, Japan's local authority, along with their two ships, assisted the survivors back to Istanbul, which impressed the Turkish authority. The tragedy moved both sides, opening doors for Muslim visitors to Japan and vice versa. This was the beginning of close ties between the two countries. Since then, there have been many visits recorded from both sides. Al Sammarai says two of the delegation members from the ship converted to Islam and are recorded as the first and second Japanese Muslims. Al Sammarai also described the development Muslim community in several phases and most importantly which is important part of his piece is about the positive role of Saudi Arabia kingdom in the late of the 1970s in helping the Muslim community in Japan such as building mosques and the financial support for Islamic Center Japan to which he affiliated with.

The following issues in the available literature of Islam in Japan is about their demography. Depending on their perspectives, authors have far gaps in total number of Muslim populations in Japan. Samarai has shown that there is a controversy concerning the number of Muslims in Japan. He affirms that the total number of Muslim in Japan could be as many as

more than 400 thousand including around 100 thousand Japanese, and 300 thousand foreigners. The demographic issues of Muslim in Japan are indeed a matter of debate in the study of Islam and Muslims in Japan. All the literature notes that there is no official data about the number of Muslims in Japan because the Japanese administration does not include religion in their state register. This has led to some discrepancies in Muslim population statistics in Japan depending on the source.

Based on government estimates, the number of Muslims is below 50,000, including native Japanese Muslims, which is too small (Kojima, 2006). Contrastingly, internal Muslim records claim there are between 300,000–500,000 Muslims in Japan (Al-Samarrai, 2009). Using Kojima's method, I would predict the contemporary total number is between 100 and 150 thousand. Referring to Kojima, this statistic is calculated from the number of immigrants' nationality settling in Japan (X) and the Muslims' percentage in their countries of origin (Y). In other words, the number can be found from this formula $X \times Y = \text{Muslim population in Japan}$. This number makes up less than 1 percent of the 127 million Japan population (Kojima, 2006). In terms of location, currently, Muslims inhabit Japan's prefectures of Tokyo. Great Tokyo areas (Kanto) accumulate the largest one. The growing number of mosques around the country also indicates the growing Muslim population on Japan's archipelagos. Compared to their number in Europe, the current Muslim population in Japan, which is 90 percent foreigner, is much smaller even than pre-World War II number in Europe (Kojima, 2006; Nakhleh et al., 2008). This composition, I believe, suggests that the current studies on Muslims in Japan should be approached mainly from minority group perspectives as several academic works have been dealing with.

The population size determines Muslim's ability to organize several communal rituals that they used to perform in their home countries such as daily prayer at mosques, a weekly prayer, Islamic education for children, halal feasts, weddings, and even funeral and burial ceremonies. Most existing studies about Muslims in Japan reveal that it is difficult for them to practice these rituals in Japan (e.g. Anis, 1998; Kwak, 2009; Safdar et al., n.d.; Vestre, 2011). This case of cultural hurdles becomes a vital issue in most current studies of Islam and Muslims in Japan.

Several studies have noted cultural hardship many Muslim migrants face when transitioning to Japan. There are many Japanese cultural expressions including languages and customs that are unusual to or even conflicting with their origin culture. Historically, unlike

most European and US cultures, which are influenced by the Judeo-Christian tradition, which shares some similar traditions and knowledge to that of Islam, Japan had not much contact history with Islam and Muslim rulers. As a result, Islam and Muslim practices are often seen as alien to the average Japanese citizens (Kenji, 2013; Kwak, 2009; Miura, 2006; Yamagata, 2019). Several controversial practices, behaviors, or even taboo in Muslim countries have become a popular cultural style in Japan such as non-halal cuisines; polytheism or atheism; local religious and cultural festivals; and legal, normalized adult entertainment industries.

In addition to those contradicting popular custom in Japan, as several works has mentioned as minority group what makes a minority feel distressed about their status is their inability to integrate themselves in the dominant culture caused mostly by their shortage in Japanese language. Many studies indicate that many foreigners minority groups in Japan cannot compete in the social life and jobs market because of their poor skills in the Japanese (Djafri, 2019).

For instance, a study on Indonesian professional employees finds, although some graduated from Japanese universities, many lag behind their Japanese co-workers in their language skills (Djafri, 2019). For instance, most Indonesian nurses, despite their long-term stay in Japan, remain uncomfortable speaking Japanese with their Japanese co-workers (Ford & Kawashima, 2016; Ohno, 2012) and many receive complaints about their writing ability. Most Pakistani men married to Japanese women cannot read and write in Japanese Kanji, making them very dependent on their Japanese wives for paper work (Kudo, 2009). Likewise, most Indonesian women married to Japanese men have problems reading and writing in Japanese. Once they get older, they often regret their inability to transfer their Islamic or Indonesian values to their children because of their lack of Japanese skills (see chapter Two and Five). Although first-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe or the US might experience issues related to language skills, I believe they do not face a similar level of language difficulties that their fellows in Japan face. English/Euro language share a common alphabet to Bahasa Indonesia, while Kanji is entirely different

While there are abundant descriptions about the hurdles minority groups face in Japan (e.g. Asakura & Murata, 2006; Kanno, 2008; Murphy-Shigematsu & Willis, 2008; Vestre, 2011) unfortunately, there is a little discussion about different strategies utilized by Muslims who live in Japan, especially regarding their adaptation choices and strategy decisions. What makes some choose one strategy while others choose another? When Muslims settle in Japan,

they strategize their religious practices depending on their available cultural resources such as habits, customs, and lifestyles. This is the novel question I explore through this research which I will discuss in Chapters Five and Six.

Another developing contemporary issue on Islam in Japan is related to the halal industry. As Japan currently has become a destination for tourists from Muslim countries, scholars are investigating various cultural conflicts. Marketing and management issues of halal products in or from Japan seems to be becoming a major focal point (see for example (e.g. Alhabshi, 2016; Henderson, 2016; Yusof & Shutto, 2014). Scholars from Malaysia and Indonesia, consider halal options a critical issue in Japan. Yet none of them discuss the halal from the cultural factors influencing Muslims' strategies of action, including halal topics, which is my point of departure. To sum up, finally, it is essential to note that although Indonesia supplies the largest Muslim immigrant population in Japan, there are fewer studies on Indonesian migrants than studies on Muslim from other ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, there are not many (potentially no) studies that portray how Indonesian different cultural backgrounds affect their actions. In this case, studying Indonesians, the largest foreign Muslim population in Japan, having a varied cultural background is very important.

1.3. Chapters organization

The dissertation report contains eight chapters which are structured in the following organization: Chapter one introduces the background of this study, research focus, research questions, and previous literature related to the study subject. The chapter provides the rationale of the research assumptions and questions accumulated from observed phenomena of Muslim migrants and the available body of literature in this field. More importantly from this chapter, the readers are expected to easily grasp what is the significance of this dissertation in the existing discussion of study field.

Chapter Two introduces the setting of this research subject which is the Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan. It discusses in the history of the arrival, the development of Indonesian community in Japan, as well as their social and religious lives and organizations. It aims to give the readers understanding the profile of the Indonesian community in Japan, the causes of their migration, the migrants' life condition, the different socialization among the Indonesian immigrants.

Chapter Three describes theoretical frameworks on which this research bases its analysis. The chapter has two sections; first is about theoretical conception which introduces conceptions

of culture, cultural repertoire, strategy of action, settled and unsettled lives, religiosity conception. Secondly, is about the cultural repertoire of Indonesian Muslim society related to their skills, habits, custom and lifestyle of their family, ethnic, religious groups, and other social and religious organizations. The theoretical frameworks provide perspectives how the research questions are established and guiding tools for key conceptions used in the whole thesis discussion

Chapter Four describes the ethnographic methods and procedures of data gathering which utilizes observation, interviews. Ethnographic study conception is provided as well as varied technics of observations and interviews. The procedures, the informants, the locations, and Qualitative survey was conducted to get general data about Indonesian Muslims' religious practices. Most importantly the chapters describe how practical steps of data collection were accomplished by the researcher and which form of data is available.

Chapter Five is about the survey and its result. It describes the social and cultural background of the respondents and their opinion in various issues. It also describes the popular circulating Islamic practices among Indonesian and measures how exclusive and inclusive Indonesian Muslims are.

Chapter Six is description of the exclusive strategy of religious practices and the cultural repertoire behind them. This analytical chapter describes the conservative practices of Indonesian Muslim related to their exclusive or conservative cultural repertoire. The consequences of the exclusive practices on their integration into the Japanese society. The chapter also provides discussion on why Indonesians select exclusive strategy of religious practices as the consequences of exclusive cultural repertoire of the trending conservatism in Indonesia and the influences of fundamentalist ideologies among their new groups in Japan.

Chapter Seven provides “control” variables of the previous chapter. It also functions to strengthen the previous finding about the exclusive practices of Chapter Five. Contrasting Chapter Five, it is about Indonesian migrants who select strategies of inclusive religious practices. The inclusive cultural repertoire explains the cultural factors behind their inclusive practices.

Chapter Eight as a concluding part provides the closing statement which includes the importance of the research, the contributions, and the recommendations for further future research possibilities. Wrapping the whole chapters of the dissertation, this chapter also provide discussion of the implication of this study for Japan and for Indonesia.

CHAPTER 2

INDONESIAN IMMIGRANTS IN JAPAN

SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS LIFE: AN OVERVIEW

2.1. Early history

Indonesians traveling and settling in Japan is a relatively new phenomenon compared to traveling to other neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia (Kaur, 2004; Mulyana, 2012). Most available literature reveals these Indonesians started arriving in Japan around the 1930s, a period of Indonesia's revolutionary movements (Post, 2009; See Gotō, 1997). It is a new movement era, which emphasized a shared awareness of Indonesian nationality and of the struggle against the Dutch. The very early arrival of Indonesians in Japan refers to the information recorded by a Waseda historian Ken' Ichi Goto—translated into Indonesian language as "*Jepang dan Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia*" (Japan and the Indonesian National Movement). According to Goto, several Indonesian students had arrived in Japan in the 1930s. He recalls some historical names from West Sumatra, Central and East Java, and Madura who went to Japan to pursue their higher academic programs. Goto describes the first two Indonesians studying in Japan were Madjid Usman and Mahjuddin Gaus from Minangkabau (now West Sumatra province). Gaus studied medicine at JIKEI University, becoming the first young East Indies who achieved a doctoral degree in Japan before World War II. At the same time, Usman studied Law at Meiji University.

In Japan, besides studying at universities, with support from the Japanese empire, they established a student association called *Serikat Indonesia* (Indonesian United) through which students participated in the political propaganda supported by the Japanese government. This activity was closely related to Japan's political agenda to gain more public support and sympathy against the Dutch. The students were invited to talk on behalf of their country to Japanese and international audiences (Post, 2009). Several factors influenced the interest of Indonesian students in Japan; First is Japan's growing popularity as the only Asian advanced country that rivalled the Western countries, especially after its triumph defeating the Russian Navy force in the Japanese sea (1904-1905), its internal economic, and military development. During the period, Japanese goods and companies flooded the East Indies markets (Post, 2009).

Many Indonesians perceived Japan as an alternative place to study as equally as the Netherlands.

Secondly, despite the educational quality issues, the growing interest is caused by the shorter travel distance to Japanese land and cheaper expenses of studying there than in European universities. Japan (at that time) was also considered very welcoming for Asians—calling themselves “the brother” for the Asians—as they maintained motivation to get more sympathy from the international public to strengthen their influence in Asian countries (Post, 2009). Rivaling Western countries, Japan established serious campaigns or propaganda for other Asian countries against Western colonialism, including allowing and supporting cheap educational programs for Asians. It was said that the monthly living expenses in Japan were only 3-5 Yen, which is three or four times less expensive than the Netherlands' costs. Sudjono, an Indonesian alumnus of Leiden University, according to Goto, wrote an article in an Indonesian newspaper suggesting that Indonesian should look at Japan as an alternative place for further study programs where he had done (See Gotō, 1997). Besides having good programs, the Japanese government provided supporting facilities and even financial assistance for the Indonesian students. This situation stimulated many more Indonesian students to be attracted to pursue their degree programs in Japan. According to the Association of Japan Alumni (PERSADA), the total number of Indonesian students in Japan around the period of WWII was 94 (Persada, 2021). "The total could be more," according to Hasan Shadzily, the author of Indonesia-English best seller dictionary graduating from Kyoto University during WWII.¹¹ Indonesian students' active participation with their revolutionary political activities were shown in several events.¹²

Firstly, Japan had been keen to attract support from Muslim communities, especially Indonesians. The Muslim students arriving in Japan became a point of contact for both Indonesia and Japan during the Japanese colonial era. The historian, H.J. Benda, describes the preparation of the Japanese government to dominate their neighbouring countries in Asia, such as Indonesia. This preparation also included their warm and friendly attitude toward Muslim groups in Indonesia. He states that in mid-1930s, the Japanese Islamic Association was established in Tokyo. A handful of Japanese students were dispatched to the Middle East to familiarize themselves with Islam and the Muslim world. In 1938, this association organized

¹¹ As quoted by (“Historia,” 2018)

¹² Fajar Raidy, *Pelajar Indonesia berjuang di Jepang* (Riadi, 2018)

Islamic World Conference in Tokyo attended by Indonesian delegations (Benda, 1955). The conference also marked the opening of new mosques in Kobe and Tokyo.

Secondly, while attending the conference, Mohammad Hatta, Sukarno's co-declarator of the nation's independence, made a meeting with Indonesian Students associated with the “Serikat Indonesia” on a campaign for the country's self-determination. There was some pictured evidence of Indonesians joining a march for independence in Japan during the 1940s (Riadi, 2018).

After Independence was declared, the students' group also made political moves such as initiating personal approaches (lobbies) with the Japanese officers who supported independence. Under Mr. Umarjadi's leadership (died 2012), for instance, in 1947 and 1949, along with around 300 Indonesian, Japanese, and foreigner participants, the students condemned aggression exercised by the Dutch and the allied forces. The Indonesian embassy headquarter was established in 1958, recording more Indonesians who come to Japan under student permit.

After World War II, in which Japan was defeated by the alliance, as a war compensation, the Japanese government invited Indonesian students to further their study in Japan under the “*Pampasan Perang*” scholarship program (*Baisyo Ryugakusei*). According to Ginanjar Kartasasmita, ex-chairman of the House of Representatives, there were around a hundred Indonesian students who received the scholarship, including himself between 1943 and 1965.¹³ Additionally, due to the Japanese companies' expansion in surrounding countries, since 1954, the Japanese government established a worker training program to promote international cooperation and offer assistance to newly developing countries. According to Romdiati, thousands of workers from Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia went to Japan under this program between the 1950s and 1960s (Romdiati, 2003). Although this was considered a short-term training, it could be a precedent for a new technical intern and training policy that would have been released in the 1980s.

In the 1970s, Mr. Umarjadi, early Japan alumni becoming Indonesia's first UN ambassador, along with several early Indonesian students in Japan (Japan Alumni Association) established a higher education institution in Jakarta named Persada University, the only

¹³ Ginanjar official speech on the 60th anniversary Indonesia-Japan relation (*Penyerahan Penghargaan Menteri Luar Negeri Jepang 2004 Kepada PERSADA (23 Juli)*, 2004). Also see (Riadi, 2018)

university established by the international Japan alumni union (Persada, 2021). The university plays an important role in non-government Indonesia-Japan relationship programs, including sending and receiving exchange students to and from both countries. Except for students and diplomat families, according to my oldest informant, Mr. Ahmad (73), a veteran Japan media reporter, there were not many records of Indonesian settlers in Japan prior to the 1970s. He reveals that his coming to Japan was an extraordinary case related to a national political event in Indonesia.

2.2. New migration era

Other than students having arrived earlier, the influx of Indonesian immigrants in Japan started its way in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to a new migration policy in Japan amending Immigration Control Act restricting foreign workers. This amendment allows the presence of a new resident category called “Technical intern and training program (TITP) (Oishi, 1995; Roberts, 2000; Yamanaka, 1993). 1993 marked the beginning of the deployment of Indonesian trainees to Japan.¹⁴ Previously at the beginning of the 1980s, under the scheme of entertainment visa, following the Philippines, Vietnamese, and the Thais, a number of Indonesian women arrived in Japan working as entertainers (e.g. Sellek, 1996, 2001). The currently available data on the Indonesians in Japan describes one percent of them were entertainment visa holders (figure 1). However, it is difficult to find them now as these entertainers do not disclose their identities to co-nationalists. Many of these women have now returned to Indonesia, and several others have married Japanese men and live with their families in Japan (Interview 2016). For example, Ahmad, an informant who has been living for more than forty years in Japan, relayed that he had met many Indonesian women working as entertainers—a few of them had married with Japanese locals. It was he himself, who led the Islamic conversion and wedding ceremonies. While there is limited non-Japanese data on older Indonesian immigrants, there are several works both in Japanese and English discussing the emergence of new Indonesian immigrants in Japan.

Several authors have mentioned that the policy of Industrial Training Program ITP and TTP Technical Training Program starting in 1993 has opened a new phase of Indonesian migration to Japan (Kartikasari, 2013; Maemura et al., 2009; Riskianingrum & Gusnelly, 2018; Tirtosudarmo, 2005). Many of the ITTP program participants could send money to their family

¹⁴ Also See (IM Japan, 2018).

during their internship period and could build a house or buy land after returning from the program.¹⁵ Since then, affected by the success stories of the trainees, hundreds to thousands of young Indonesians depart every year to Japan. Trainees then surpass the numbers of student visa holders. According to the 2018 's Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, the current registered number of Indonesian populations in Japan is 51811 (*Japan-Indonesia Relations (Basic Data)*, 2019) excluding the irregulars which could be as many as 3000.¹⁶ From varied sources the current (as 2018) composition of Indonesian residents in Japan accounts around 19.000 Kenshusei (BNPTKI 2018), 6500 students (JASSO survey 2018), 2300 Japanese spouses (Ministry of Justice report). The rest were nurses and caregivers, engineers, entertainers, skilled workers, dependents, and Japanese descendants.

Most of them live mainly in Tokyo-to, Aichi-ken, Ibaraki-ken, Shizuoka-ken, Chiba, and Kanagawa-ken (Figure 01/2). Many Indonesian ex trainees settled in Japan because they are married to Japanese women after completing the training program or rehired for the second time through individual channels. Others work permanently in Japan after they graduated from Japanese universities. The following is a description of the migration background, demographic profiles, and living conditions of Indonesian students, corporate employees, trainees, nurses, and Japanese spouses that form an Indonesian community in Japan.

¹⁵ Field works in Klaten, Central Java August 2017

¹⁶ Interview with embassy staff 2017.




Figure 1/2 Distribution of Indonesians in Japan by prefectures: Source: Ministry of Justice¹⁷

2.3. Indonesian migrants in Japan: background, profiles and living conditions

2.3.1. Students and corporate employees

According to data provided by WES, World Education Service (New York) in the last few decades, Japan has always ranked interchangeably as the fourth or fifth most favorite overseas destination for Indonesian students to pursue their higher education following the US, UK, Australia, and Malaysia. Since the 1990s, hundreds of Indonesians have enrolled at Japanese campuses for varied graduate, undergraduate, vocational, and language programs each year. In Japan, according to the Japan Student Service Organization or JASSO recent survey (2016-2017) (Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2018). Indonesian students are among the sixth-largest international student population (5,500 of 267,000) following Chinese, Vietnamese, Nepalese, South Korean, Taiwanese, and Sri Lankans or the second largest from Southeast Asia (in the previous years, the third after Thailand, see figure 3).¹⁸

¹⁷ Number of Indonesian in each prefecture can be seen from (Nbakki, 2014).

¹⁸ According to the 2020's report Indonesian students have reached as many as 6000.

As international students concentrate in Tokyo universities and schools (61%), likewise, most of the Indonesian students also reside in the Greater Tokyo area, especially metropolitan Tokyo, Chiba, Yokohama, Saitama. Without mentioning their number, according to Indonesia's Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) chapter of Japan and Indonesian Student Association (PPI) Facebook account, Indonesian students are registered in almost all famous high educational institutions around Tokyo, especially Tokyo University (TU), Tokyo Institute of Technology (TIT), Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology (TUAT), Waseda University, Keio University, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Chiba and Tsukuba University, and Asia Pacific Japan University.

According to the JASSO report (Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2018), most international students go to schools on their private funds.¹⁹ However, JASSO does not mention the countries of international students by sources of funds. Therefore, it makes it difficult to estimate how many Indonesian students' study on public scholarships or their own support. However, the report describes less than 40,000 of 267,000 international students used Japan's, or foreign government and institutional funds. Most of my graduate student interlocutors went to those universities through a competitive scholarship program both from Indonesia and Japan governments or organizations (see also Djafri, 2019). I also found that almost all Indonesian Ministerial Departments send a few of their employees to Japan with various scholarship schemes either as a student or researcher or exchange student to upgrade their professional skills. Likewise, every year, around twenty young Indonesians receive Monbukagakusho/MEXT scholarships to pursue their bachelor's and master's degree programs in Japan.²⁰ Through very competitive selection in Indonesia, some students also receive scholarship awards from non-government Japanese corporations such as YKS, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, and SMBC. On the contrary, almost none of the Japanese language and vocational schools' students (around 2000 of them) receive government scholarship (Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), 2018). They pay their expenses either from their part-time job (*baito*) or from their family support in Indonesia. The widespread of unverified information

¹⁹ This true as majority of international students are from Chinese and most of them went on private fund (see (Liu-Farrer, 2011a)

²⁰ See Q and A, Monbusho scholarship (*Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Japanese Studies*, 2018).

about abundant job positions available in Japan with a very high salary increases the interest in coming to Japan under a language student visa. Some are successful, but others fail.²¹

While the scholarship grantees might enjoy focusing more on how to complete their studies as soon as possible, except for those from the wealthy families, the self-sufficiently-funded language students are more often disturbed by financial issues (Djafri, 2019). Living in one of the most expensive cities on earth, many Indonesian language students must strategize on how to survive. From my fieldwork in Tokyo, I encountered many language schools (*Nihongo gakko*) students sleeping less than five hours a day, spending most of their time on part-time jobs (*baito*) to pay their unpaid tuition and living expenses. Many live in an unhealthy shared room or reduce their spending on food for financial reasons. Many were burdened by massive unpaid loans.

The majority of my undergraduate interlocutors who pay their own tuition come from upper-class families by Indonesian standards. They took a preparatory program (including a Japanese course) before enrolling, without being bothered by living expenses or part-time. On the other hand, except for those very motivated, many of the language school's students are "trapped" into a tuition fee loan both from the school and from their relatives at home. Therefore, many of them also took overtime work hours, rarely succeeded in their academic program, and failed in the language exam or *senmon gakko* admission.²² A few of them, in the end, become overstayers and irregulars. Those who succeed, gain excellent Japanese skills, or continue their *senmon gakko*, are able to enter the Japanese labor market, work in better workplaces, and have more opportunities (e.g. Djafri, 2019).

My interlocutors receiving a scholarship such as Monbukagakusho/Mext or other Indonesian awards usually can focus on their study program and enjoy their time in Japan (Djafri, 2019). During their free time, many of them socialize in various interests or hobbies such as traveling, sport, art, ethnic, and religious activities. Almost every campus in Japan has the Indonesian Student Association that runs multiple cultural and leisure activities such as *enjoying Hanami, Momiji, Hanabi*²³, skiing, or hiking. Most of their board members are

²¹ Discussion on the language students see (Djafri, 2019)

²² There is a report Indonesian student being exploited by the language school (Kyodo, 2017)

²³ *Hanami* is Japanese custom of enjoying flower (especially cherry) blooming session (spring) usually between March and May. The most common activities are visiting spots where cherry blossoms are blooming; *Momiji*, like *hanami* is Japanese custom of enjoying the fall session when the leaves become colorfully yellow

recipients of public scholarships. In addition to other Indonesian ethnic and religious organizations, the student organization also helps a lot of their newcomer fellows during their first days' settlement. Several big campuses also have Indonesian Muslim students' groups that help organize Islamic rituals and events. Through these Muslim organizations, students can expand their roles and networks out of campus, actively participate, and organize various Islamic events held by the Indonesian embassy or communities in Japan. Many of these students who receive Japanese government and private institutions scholarships, and self-funded students will likely find a job in Japan after completing their programs. The majority of Indonesian *salarymen* I encountered were alumni of Japan higher educational institutions.

Little quantitative data about Indonesian corporate employees (“*salarymen/women*”) and professionals from the previous studies provide difficulties in estimating their number and job position or fields (e.g. Ford & Kawashima, 2016). However, referring to the listed participants in some Indonesian professional regular meetings and their online Facebook group membership, I found them having quite diverse professional positions. They possess different job titles such as professors, researchers, medical doctors, language teachers, marketing managers, sales representatives, or supervisors, and business owners. A fairly large number of them also work in the IT sectors and computer-related industries. There is also an online Facebook group for Indonesian career women (*Wanita Indonesia Berkarya*) in Japan. Although its group members are also from diverse backgrounds, many have Japanese university degrees or experiences working as Indonesian language teachers. Most of those belonging to the latest group have excellent skills in Japanese (N2 and N1). Unlike the other groups of Indonesians, these "professional groups" of males or females are likely to include people who are best able to incorporate or integrate into the Japanese lifestyle.

By incorporation or integration, I mean the ability of immigrants to access and afford welfare and social resources in the same way that natives do (J. W. Berry, 1992). Referring to Portes, (1981), I define integration equally as social incorporation, an equal opportunity of the migrants in their social, economic and cultural attainment as the natives. In this framework, incorporation requires welcome acceptance and policy of the host society either.

and red between October and November. *Hanabi* is fireworks feast, a Japanese custom of marking the arrival of summer

Following the concept above, I observed that the majority of the members in this Tokyo professional group are more economically and socially incorporated than other Indonesian residents. Those who have been on their careers for a long time (i.e. more than ten years) have usually lived just as the same as other Japanese salarymen do and make in terms of their work hours, incomes, and expenditures. Most of them live with family members, including children, in spacious 3LDK (Living, Dining, and Kitchen areas) apartments outside of Tokyo (such as in Saitama, Chiba, and Yokohama), with monthly rents exceeding 100 thousand Yen. Many of those residing in the hearts of Tokyo pay rent as much as 200 thousand Yen a month, paid partially by their offices. Many of them have permanent resident status, planned to buy, or have bought their own house. In terms of Muslim salarymen's religious practices, this group probably enjoys most of their religious "freedom." Many of them have their personal prayer spaces at the office and have Japanese co-workers or employers who understand a Muslim's needs such as halal food, Friday prayers, and "days off" during great Islamic holidays. One of my informants who had made a pilgrimage to Mecca within summer season also told a story of how good his employer's treatment for him was. The company gave him a total three months leave, two months of which 100% without salary deduction.

One of the dominant concerns among my salarymen and professional informants is related to the passion deficit in what they call "inner satisfaction". This is especially for those who have been living in Japan for so long, more than five teen years excluding their school time. Many (if not most of my informants) feel that their jobs are not their true passion. While most of them have an engineering or science educational background, they found their jobs rarely related to their expertise. While their training was engineering, physics, computer, or other natural sciences, many worked in marketing and administration departments. Many feel overqualified for the simple and repetitive tasks in their companies without a challenge like what they experienced when they were still a graduate student. Three of my informants have a Ph.D. degree, but they feel trapped in static work habits at their companies. As Ph.D. degree holders, they wish more to be academicians than practicing engineers. They wanted to return to Indonesia for a teaching career. They realized, however, that it would be counterproductive to their career (they are in the late 40s and early 50s). Other challenges are mostly related to their Islamic identity. This is further discussed in another section of this chapter.

2.3.2. Trainee and technical interns

In Japan, there are residents called trainees (*kenshusei*) and technical interns (*ginōjisshusei*) who hold their visas for work training or interns in duration between one and three years. They are the participants of the Technical Intern Training programs (TITP), which has been launched since the early 1990s. In its handbook program, it is stated that the program aims to transfer the Japanese technical and industrial skills to the participants, which hopefully can transfer their new knowledge and skills to their home countries (also see Kartikasari, 2013). In addition to China, there are five other Southeast Asian participating countries, including Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Currently, Vietnam sends the largest number of Kenshusei groups (Ministry of Justice 2017). Lately, Indonesia contributes the fourth largest trainee population after Vietnam, China, and Thailand. They are working with physical jobs that are not preferred by young Japanese, and often called by Japanese as three "Ds" or dangerous, dirty, and demanding (Roberts & Wilkinson, 1996). Indonesian technical intern participants work mainly in manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, and construction companies. Their status as trainees, however, affects their salary much lower than the minimum standard for the local workers from 50-80 thousand Yen (for *kenshusei*, 1st year) and 80-100 thousand Yen (for the *jesshusei* 2nd-3rd year) (Kartikasari 2013, interview 2015-2017). Therefore, many media commentators view this program as human exploitation (S. Scott, 2010). Even a UN assembly in September 2017 sees this program as a camouflage to the cheap labor exploitation (*Japan Migrant Workers*, 2017).

Every year the number of Indonesian *kenshusei* increases, especially between 1998 and 2000 during the Asia financial crisis, and in 2008 when the financial crisis hit the world. There was a decline in their number within 2010-2011 after a big earthquake hit Japan (Fukushima) and obviously within 2020 for global COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Ministry of Manpower of the Republic of Indonesia, until the period of 2018 Indonesia has sent more than 68.450 participants, of which around 48.398 have returned. Therefore, the ministry states about 20.000 Indonesian trainees remain in Japan every year.²⁴ The 1997 monetary crisis in Indonesia caused job cuts, resulting in a rising unemployment number. This situation pushes the increasing flows of Indonesian transnational migrants, including those heading to Japan (Tirtosudarmo, 2005;Hugo, 2012). Many ex-trainees having a good relationship with their previous employers were rehired and guaranteed menial job positions for the second time or

²⁴ See (*Pemerintah Dorong Peningkatan Pekerja Magangke Jepang*, 2017).

further. A small number of them got extended time and permanent resident status after marriage to Japanese women.

Referring to my fieldwork notes of visiting some Indonesian trainees' areas in Tokyo, Chiba, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, I found the current critical voice on their miserable life and work condition is partially correct. The Indonesian trainees' shared opinion is that their status of trainees makes their salary not correspond to their heavy work equally to their Japanese co-workers. With the same tasks, the trainees only receive 900 Yen (in Tokyo) or 700-800 (out of Tokyo), while their Japanese co-workers receive 1200-1500 Yen hourly (also see Kartikasari, 2013). This condition is the common reason behind why some Indonesian trainees I met have violated their contract, leaving the company, becoming undocumented or irregular immigrants, seeking other jobs. The majority of trainees I encountered also express their disappointment of living in Japan as their experiences of Japan working style is beyond their imagination. A shared opinion is common among them that their works are far harder than they had ever imagined. Many of them also work in very remote areas, which are even quieter than their villages in Indonesia.

One trainee working at a small steel factory in Sano Tochigi states;

"My imagination before coming to Japan was, I can enjoy living in Japan as I usually did in Indonesia. There is a lot of leisure time to spend with friends, going together, visiting some interesting places, trying new experiences, watching shows, sightseeing in the heart of Tokyo but actually not. We are thrown in this very remote area that I never encountered in Indonesia. No lives, no entertainment. The Japanese people do not care about you except for your work. We work hard from morning until dark. Very tired, then we sleep. At the workplace, we were very stressed out. Every time the Japanese co-workers and Sacho got angry and without any hesitation said "Baka Baka" to us. Ya..that word (baka-baka) is a quite regular insult that we received and cannot resist." (Translated by author)

Another trainee of car accessories in Chiba states;

"I thought the training in Indonesia before departure to Japan was the hardest. The fact is, living in Japan is much harder. You have to work literally continuously without interruption except on the designated time, such as 10-minute coffee break at 10.00 and 15.00, lunchtime at 12.30 pm. If you are spending time for private purposes, including going to restroom out of those working hours, your salary will be deducted. Indeed, it is a training that

we have never imagined. It is real work. More than a real labor job in Indonesia. You remember "Slavery". Basically, they are doing that now" (in the 21st century) (Translated by author)

I asked several *kenshusei* in Sano whether they will recommend this training program to their brother or sisters and friends. In consensus, they said, "No. *Too many sacrifices and risks to work in Japan. It is always better to work in your own country!*" These *kenshusei* in Sano also talked more about they degrading religious faith.

Their poor language skill causes the commonly shared experiences about working in Japan. Many trainees are bullied by their co-workers because they cannot comprehend the Japanese commands. At a certain time, they may understand the instructions, but when a problem occurs, they cannot express their opinion correctly. This experience is widespread, especially among those whose pre-departure training works under the supervision of non-government programs (individual recruitment). Some non-government programs usually shorten the language training from six months to three months only.²⁵

Despite this difficult living condition, some trainees realize that the income they receive in Japan is still better than if they were in their hometowns having scarce jobs. One *kenshusei* said, "*Unlike in Japan, in Indonesia, I have little certainty about making a living. There is no job there (in Indonesia). Therefore, I withstand these hardships.*"

2.3.3. Nurse and care workers

Due to the need for nurses and care workers, the Japanese government has cooperated with the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines to allow Indonesian and Filipino nurses to work in Japan (Hirano et al., 2012). The Japan-Indonesia EPA was signed in 2007 and approved by the Japanese DIET in May 2008. In August of the same year, the first batch of Indonesian care workers arrived. Since then, every year, the Indonesian government has sent around 500 nurses to Japan except between 2011 and 2013 (BNP2TKI 2017) due to the earthquake impacts.²⁶ From 2008 to 2018, Indonesia has sent 11 batches comprising 2445 *kangoshi* (nurse) and *kaigofukushishi* (care workers) (Humas BP2MI, 2019).

The agreement allows the Indonesian nurses to make their career in Japan after they pass the professional exam. Before passing the exam, they work for two years under "training" status. The position requires them some qualification before departure; a certified degree from

²⁵ From interview notes with some *Kenshusei*

²⁶ A report on Indonesian nurse and care workers in Japan (Parsaulian, 2017).

Indonesian colleges, two years of work experience for the nurse position, and no experience needed for the caregiver, and basic Japanese (Hirano et al., 2012) Upon their arrival, they learn Japanese for six months before they are distributed to the hospital and healthcare facilities throughout Japan. The cost of migration, including fees for recruitment, matching, airfare, and the Japanese language training, which costs approximately 3.6 million Yen per person, is shouldered by the Japanese government and the receiving hospitals/care facilities. Within the EPA scheme, they are allowed to work for two years and extended for one another year (since 2015) before passing the exam. When they pass the exam, they deserve equal rights and obligation to those of Japanese nurses.

According to many reports, the exam is too difficult to pass for Indonesians who have difficulty with the *kanji* characters. Therefore, every year only a few candidates pass the test. The success rate, only 2% for the first batch in 2010, rose to 14.3% in 2011, and 29.6% in 2012 (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), 2015). In February 2015, the Japanese government announced a 1-year visa extension for Indonesian and Filipino candidates who had failed the national qualification examination to allow them to make a second attempt (Ford & Kawashima, 2016).

Nurses, as skilled workers, have better living conditions, particularly those who have passed the exam and become professional nurses. Yunus and Ardi, my two interlocutors among the small number of the Indonesian nurses, expressed their pride and confidence in their careers. They live with family along with their children just as an ordinary young professional middle-class family in Indonesia. They both told me their respected role as a nurse.

“After passing the exam, my life got changed. My hospital respects me equally to those of the Japanese. My professional advice is taken into account. They provided me with some assistants, some were from Japan and some others were from Indonesia I can also give them instructions. The doctors also respect me, and I am confident to express my opinion before the hospital staff. What I like most is I now have independence. Every year, I evaluate my job position, whether the hospital should raise my salary or facilities, and look around if there is a better vacancy. Last year I decided to move to another hospital because of salary issues. Besides, I was preparing for my wife's maternity. I want to move to an area where there is a large Indonesian community. I am sure this will be a massive help for my wife. Therefore, I move (Ardi).

After two years, he told me he wanted to move again because a new hospital has offered him better benefits, including a free spacious apartment.

In the Indonesian community in Japan, professional nurses also enjoy a social reputation among new nurse candidates. Everyone takes them as examples of how to be successful in

exams and as people who can give guidance in everyday life. The young newcomers call Yunus and Ardi big brothers whose words are taken seriously. Yunus and Ardi now become the board of IPMI association of Indonesian Muslim Nurse in Japan. Their social position is recognized by Indonesian people in Japan or nurse schools and colleges in Indonesia. Besides becoming representative of the Indonesian nurse community in the Indonesian Muslim Community KMII, Yunus is also often invited to give talks about the nurse career in Japan or Indonesia institutions.

Unlike professional nurses who work in medical facilities, many Indonesian caregivers who graduated from Indonesian nursing schools express their dissatisfaction. A few I met said they did not realize at the beginning of their work as caregivers for permanence. One of them said;

"Having a nurse certificate, I did not imagine working like this, taking care of the adult people every day. I thought it was only temporary that I am working as a caregiver and I can be promoted as a professional nurse in Japan. In Indonesia, this kind of work is conducted not by those who have a nurse diploma. In the early days, I felt regretful. I could not accept myself taking care of others in this way of full care while I 'abandoned' my parents, who also need my treatment in this tender way. But, after a while, I've come to accept it; I can adapt to my workplaces. I like talking with my clients, helping them But I do not want to continue my job for the rest of my life. I will probably stop working in the next three years and return to Indonesia to start a small business." (Joko)

When I asked them whether they had reviewed their job description as an adult care worker before departure to Japan, my informants said, "No." They were just too excited, finding themselves having a chance to go abroad to Japan. *"Like everyone else in the village got an offer to go abroad,"* he said.

2.3.4. Japanese spouses or children

Human mobility and migration, historically and contemporarily, have been the channels for inter-cultural or transnational marriages (Jones & Shen, 2008; V. Kim, 2021). Outgoing migrants and the incoming ones equally can open opportunities for international marriages. As an international migration destination in the Asia Pacific, Japan is not an exception. Thousands of Japanese citizens are married to foreigners annually. According to the statistics from the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare in 2019, there are 21,130 marriages between Japanese and foreigners in Japan (V. Kim, 2021) . The report also states that Chinese, the Philippines, Korean, and Thai are among the most common registered foreign wives. At the same time, Korean, American, Chinese, and Brazilian are the most common registered foreign husbands for the Japanese (Figure. 5) (Jiji, 2015). Another statistic about Indonesian-Japan married

population refers to the Bureau of Statistics, 1995/2000 Census of Population, as quoted by (Kojima, 2012). He writes that among the male Muslim foreign residents married to the Japanese, Indonesians rank the third-highest percentage following Pakistan and Iran. Of the Indonesian married man workers in this period, 37% are married to the Japanese. The number increased after 2000, reaching up to 43%. The case is even much higher for Indonesian females whose proportion is more than 50%, the second-highest percentage following Malaysians (figure 6). This seems real because like Malaysians, many Indonesian females are from Chinese ethnic background. This means that 50% of married Indonesian female stocks in Japan are spouses of Japanese. What is the actual number of Indonesian-Japanese spouses then? Referring to data of the Ministry of Justice, around 11% of Indonesian immigrants are spouses and children of the Japanese. Therefore, the moderate number of Indonesian-Japanese marriages stocks would be around at least 2000 cases. As the size of the Indonesian population in Japan keeps increasing, the actual number of Japanese spouses would also be more than what is recorded. As December 2020 report by ministry of Justice, there are 2142 registered Indonesians as a spouse of Japanese.²⁷

Indonesian-Japanese marriage has not been a new phenomenon. During the Dutch colonial era and Japan occupation in WWII, thousands of Japanese lived in Indonesia. Many of them were married to the locals, producing a generation of *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants)(Okushima, 2005). The studies on their contemporary issues remain limited except those among Balinese-Japanese and Minahasan-Japanese couples.²⁸ This fact seems because the two are non-Muslim ethnic groups having less constraints with the Japanese culture and vice versa. Indeed, intercultural or international marriage, in many ways, signs one's integration to another culture. Therefore, a Muslim married a Japanese seems an extraordinary case. The Japanese should convert first in order they can marry their Indonesian mate.

There are many Javanese and Sundanese men and women (Muslim ethnics) who are also married to Japanese, yet so far, almost no existing studies have focused on them. On Balinese-Japanese couples, Suzuki Kazuyo (Suzuki, 2015) argues that it is the consequence of the popularity of Bali among the Japanese tourists and sojourners. Quoting the Japan consulate data in Denpasar, Suzuki states (p.46) there are at least 2000 Japanese who live in Bali, and Japanese short-term visitors are recorded as Bali's third-largest foreign visitors. Unlike Muslim

²⁷ Japan Ministry of Justice Report 2020

²⁸ Minahasan is the largest ethnic group in North Sulawesi. Majority of them are Christian adherents.

ethnic groups in Indonesia, Balinese is considered to have fewer cultural blocks for Japanese, such as consuming pork and liquor that is a constraint for Muslims. Besides following their social media groups, from my interviews with the Balinese ethnic group leader in Tokyo, although he was not sure of the valid quantity of all Balinese in Japan, I believe there are more men than women in their group. The majority of them work in "*gamba*" (construction labor) sectors or laborers in manufacturer industries.

Likewise, the Christian Minahasans in Oarai Ibaraki share some similarly less cultural (dietary) constraints as the Japanese making them easily integrate into the local community. Liquor and pork are some of the essential items in their feasts and gatherings of their origin hometown in North Sulawesi. In Oarai Ibaraki, four Christian churches belong to around 800 Minahasan people (4% of the Oarai population). They are mostly Japanese descendants (*nikeijin*) and their families are working in the fishing industry. Many Minahasan men and women among them are married to the locals. In addition to their existence in Oarai, Minahasans in Japan affiliate themselves to the "Kawanua" community organization in Japan, one of the most organized Indonesian diaspora ethnic communities. They have hundreds of their members married to Japanese men, and a few to Japanese women. Whenever I visited churches in Tokyo, I met bands of Minahasan females who are married to the Japanese. Besides their Christian religious background, according to many hearsays, they are favored East Asian people due to the facts that Minahasan women (and men) have lighter skin color than other Indonesian ethnic groups (Okushima, 2005). Regarding this issue (Kojima, 2012), also said there are more Malaysian and Indonesian women who are married to the Japanese than other residents from Muslim countries because majority of them are from Chinese ethnic backgrounds.

Unfortunately, the statistic does not differentiate the percentage of the spouses and their children. I believe the Japanese spouses are more than their children in quantity, besides the latter commonly are still teenagers. This is the reason why the data on the last group is minimal and is not my intention to contribute to this gap. The existing literature on Japan-Indonesian spouses also does not provide information about the number of these children (Ministry of Justice). However, all the available sources admit that the inter-cultural spouses in Japan are increasing, including I believe the number of Indonesian children of Japanese spouses (e.g. V. Kim, 2021). The following paragraphs describe the channels enabling Japanese and Indonesian marriage and their problems.

Many Indonesians married their Japanese wives or husbands after their long-term contact or relationship with the Japanese when they were either in Japan or Indonesia. Many Balinese men dated their spouses when they were surfing trainer or being tourist guides (possibly other job titles) in Bali. Many ex-trainees, spouses of Japanese, dated their girlfriends after they maintained a good relationship with their matches when they were in Japan. Some ex-trainees have proposed to the women before they return to Indonesia and get married in Indonesia. The others go back to Japan on a tourist visa and get married to their girlfriends in Japan. A few others even get married to Japanese to save their status as illegal workers or overstayers. Their Japanese spouses used to be their co-workers or friends at the workplaces, neighborhoods, or elsewhere unpredicted. An ex-trainee told; he first saw his Japanese wife when he was hospitalized for several days due to a work accident. His wife was a nurse assistant who treated him at the hospital. From that moment, he developed the relationship, getting married in Indonesia. The case is very different among Indonesian salarymen who met and dated Japanese men or women at school or workplaces either in Indonesia or Japan. A lady informs me she dated her current husband in Jakarta at their office, getting married in Jakarta (Niti). A few years later, they live in Japan. Another informant said he first encountered her Japanese wife at a national university in Jakarta when she participated in an exchange program, making friendships and developing contact with her and marrying her (Bakhtiar). He moved to Japan when he was doing his Master and Ph.D. in Japan. Likewise, a nurse is married to a Japanese co-worker at the same hospital in Tokyo. A salaryman informs he is married to a Japanese woman whom he met at the same university during undergraduate program.

Cultural integration seems to be a common issue among mixed Indonesian-Japan marriages (V. Kim, 2021), especially when they have children. Two points they share in common are, namely, the problem of the Japanese language and Islamic (other religious as well) practices. The Japanese language proficiency among ex-trainees, ex Bali tourist guide, or housewives is so low that they are incapable of transforming Islamic and Indonesian values unto their Japanese speaking Children. Many feel they could not act as an “ideal” Indonesian father who can teach their children Indonesian language, accompany them when they do their homework, or correct their inappropriate Japanese language expression. As the children grew, the Indonesian fathers got a weakened role upon their children. They feel a total difference of being a father in Indonesia whose capacity to shape their children's attitudes is “so obvious.”

On the other hand, many Indonesian wives, because they are the ones who take care of the households, especially their children's needs, they have full access to teaching their children. They can drill their children with Indonesian words and expressions. Yet when the child grows up and learns more Japanese, the mother cannot catch up with their kids. Moreover, the problem occurs when they have two or more children. Their second or third children go to Japanese school and use the Japanese language most of the time, both at school with their friends and at home with their siblings. They no longer practice the Indonesian language, making their Indonesian skill faded away. In consequence, the mother cannot express her words fully both in Japanese and Indonesians. Likewise, the children would not fully understand their mother's Japanese and Indonesian utterances. In another section, I will describe how Indonesians strategize themselves from this situation.

In terms of religious beliefs, many Indonesian wives and husbands express their hurdles of nurturing Islamic faith and identity unto their children. Japanese school does not provide religious education and the parents do not have substantial knowledge to teach Islam except from their past experiences (Ishomuddi et al., 2015). Many Indonesian wives and husbands, for example, complain about the evolution theory subject, which is the standard curriculum taught in Japanese schools. "It is indeed difficult for Muslims to understand that humans once were apes, which is against our beliefs," they say. "But in Japan, they call it scientific theory and mainstream understanding of the origin of the universe." In an interview, a father states: "In Japan, school and their teachers are the ones who shape our children's minds." He adds. "I do not want my kid to continue her junior high school in Japan," He says. Another fieldwork I conducted in the summer of 2016 documented an example of how serious they believe the problem of becoming a Muslim in Japan is.

Once in Yamanashi Islamic graveyard, during a voluntary public cleaning program, I talked to an Indonesian lady in her sixties with a daughter in her early 20s, visiting her father's tomb (the lady's Japanese husband). After offering the prayer, the woman told me in tears. She felt sorry she could not teach her grown daughter in Islamic ways. Her daughter, she states rarely prays, cannot read the holy Qur'an, and does not understand (she thought) about the Islamic concept of hereafter (when the mother took to silence and chanted prayers, the daughter played with her smartphone and looked unfamiliar with how to behave at her father's graveyard). *"As a Muslim mother, I feel I have failed,"* she states in the Indonesian language while her daughter sits next to her. However, many other Muslim parents have different

strategies coping with a challenging situation in Japan, witnessing different experiences from that of the other Indonesians.

2.3.5. Irregulars

Irregulars are those whose residence status in Japan is not supported by immigrants' legal documents (Rahman & Lian, 2011). Therefore, they are often called undocumented immigrants. They are mostly overstayers who may have been tourists, language students, or *kenshusei*. The majority of them are tourists who overstay with the intention of finding work through illegal brokers in some remote areas (Mika, 2005)(Okushima, 2005). Likewise, there are also students (mostly language students) who are unwilling to return to Indonesia after their visa expired and *kenshusei* who are running away from their employer ending up in unregistered jobs. Many of them are also trapped in multiple debts both in Indonesia and in Japan. They live difficult lives, moving from one place to another to cover their status. According to data from the Indonesian embassy, there has been an increase in the number of Indonesian irregulars among asylum seekers ("nanin") since 2017. Many young Indonesians were scammed by brokers to work in Japan under this scheme. They went to Japan as tourists, and they applied for refugee status which will never be approved. The broker plays with the interval period between the refugee application submission period and the date the decision is made which takes a few months. During the waiting period, refugee applicants can work to supply their accommodation and tickets to return to Indonesia. As their number gets increasing, the *nanmin* visa issues attract discussion among Indonesian policymakers debating between those refugee applicants as nationalism betrayers and victims of illegal migration brokers exercising with Japanese policy of migration.

2.4. Muslim communities

2.4.1. Social and religious organization:

Existing studies about Muslim immigrants in Japan estimate Indonesia has the largest Muslim population comprising around 25000 residents, 85% of the total Indonesian population in Japan (Kojima, 2006; K. Sakurai, 2008). Some of them, especially students and professionals are active participants of Indonesian Islamic groups existing in every big city, running communal religious activities such as daily and weekly prayers, Islamic lectures and gathering. KMII (established in 1980s), Keluarga Masyarakat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Family Association, is an important community organization, informally coordinates diverse Indonesian Muslim groups affiliated to their city, campus, or professional association. There

are Indonesian Muslim communities in Gyotoku (Ichikawa-shi), Nishi-Chiba, Meguro, Fuchu, Sano forming their community groups. There are also Muslim students, nurse, and trainees' associations such as MUDAI (Waseda), MIDORI (Tokyo Tech. Institute), and TODAI Muslim (Tokyo University). Several prefectures and towns also have Indonesian Muslim associations. Below is the list of Indonesian Muslim organizations as collected from various sources.


Figure 02/2: List of Indonesian Muslim organization

NAME	DESCRIPTION	ACTIVITIES
Forum Kajian Islam Tokyo dan sekitarnya (Forkita, 2018)	Islamic studies circle of Tokyo (Public group)	Bi-Weekly Islamic classes
Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT) (ACT, 2018) Jepang	A chapter of Indonesian organization	Fundraising
Keluarga Masyarakat Islam Indonesia Jepang (KMII) (KMII, 2018) TOKYO KMI - Kansai KMI- Fukuoka KMI-Gifu KMI- Hamamatsu KMI- Hiroshima KMI- Ishikawa (KMI Ishikawa, 2018) KMI- Kagawa KMI- Kitakyushu (KAMIKITA) KMI- Nagano KMI- Nagoya KMI-Okayama KMI-Sendai (KMI Sendai, 2018) KMI-Toyohashi Forum Keluarga Muslim Indonesia Tsukuba (FKMIT) Ikatan Majelis Muslimin Muslimah (IM3) Gunma Muslim Fuchu Koganei INDO-GYOTOKU	<i>Keluarga</i> means Family. Indonesian Muslim Communities in Japan living in respective prefectures and towns. All are under coordination of or in cooperation with the KMII in Tokyo. Majority of their members are students, trainees (<i>kenshusei</i>), nurses, Japanese spouses, and professional	Coordinating all Islamic activities in each region Daily, weekly, monthly and annual gathering Also organize wedding and death ceremonies.
Dompot Dhuafa Jepang	Representative of an Indonesian organization	Charity and Fundraising
Fattah Generation Alliance (FGA)	Limited forum for Palestine issues	Online discussion
Forum Silaturahmi Muslimah (Fahima)	Female Muslim Forum	Weekly tutorial
Ikatan Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia Jepang (Isamu)	Indonesian Muslim Student Association	Coordinating all Indonesian Muslim students in Japan
Ikatan Perawat Muslim Indonesia (IPMI)Jepang Ikatan Persaudaraan Trainee Indonesia di Jepang (IPTIJ) Professional Muslim Indonesia di jepang (Promia, 2018).	Association of Indonesian Muslim Nurses Association of Indonesian Muslim trainees Association of Indonesian Muslim Professionals	Coordinating Muslim members of the profession's group
Masjid Indonesia Tokyo JMS (Jamaah Masjid SRIT	Indonesian Mosque in Meguro Congregation of Indonesian Mosque	Religious service; including prayers, dead burial
MUDAI MIDORI TODAI MUSLIM	Waseda, Tokyo tech Institute and Tokyo university Muslim student group	Weekly and Monthly gathering
Persatuan Muslim Indonesia Jepang (PMIJ)	Muslim student group, awardee and alumni of MEXT scholarship	Monthly and Annual gathering

Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah (PCIM) Jepang Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Nahdlatul Ulama (PCINU) Jepang	Special chapters of the Indonesian organizations Muhammadiyah and NU	Worship Service, gathering, charity and fundraising
AZZAHRA RAHIMA	Special interest and limited groups such as Spouse of Japanese (Azzahra). Family care and children education (RAHIMA)	Islamic tutorial, female and family activities
Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS)	Islamic party special branch of Japan	Cadre recruitment,
KAMMI	KAMMI branch of JAPAN	Ideology Socialization

Businesspersons and corporate employees graduating from Japanese higher educational institutions enjoy prestige of middle-class status and social honor among Indonesian communities for their employment status and language skills. They are the leading groups that have leadership influences on the other junior groups such as students, nurse, workers and trainees. Likewise, women of career are the reference for other Indonesian women who hold dependent or working visa status. There are significant number of female nurses, but very small numbers of trainees. Besides actively participating in “mixed” male and female organizations, women also have some exclusive interest forums that is separated from the male activities. Significant numbers of the organizations and forums’ members are spouses of Japanese or Japanese descendants. Many of those who have lived in Japan for more than ten years have secured permanent resident status, while very small numbers of them get citizenship status.²⁹

²⁹ But I was not able to meet any of them except from online media discussion.



Source is "Muslim Population in the World and Japan, 2011", Hirofumi Tanada, 2013

dspace.wul.waseda.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2065/39421/1/NingenKagakuKenkyu_26_1_Tanada.pdf

Figure 03/2: Muslim population in Japan

2.4.2. Indonesian Muslims and the International Communities

Indonesians are always mingling with their Indonesian groups (e.g. Okushima, 2005). Almost all my Indonesian informants including the salarymen have limited Japanese friends or contacts. I visited some Indonesian compounds such as those in Meguro, Gyotoku, Sano, and Yokohama, joining their group events, visiting their apartments, staying overnight, talking to those people and found similar phenomena. They only have Indonesian close friends. On the free time, they hang out with their co-ethnic friends. An informant from a professional group, for example, states “Japanese do not talk a lot; they cannot be an intimate friend for an Indonesian like me.” I would rather hangout with fellow Indonesians.”

Those living in Indonesia “neighborhoods” interact more intimately with Indonesians. Those who do not have Japanese skills are very much dependent on those who are fluent in Japanese. The age of internet and digital communication make them remain intimate with the co-nationalists and very updated with the Indonesian situation. When “Google translate” Apps does not give a clear translation they scan the characters and send to their Indonesian close

friends who will reply with an interpretation. Each of those groups has an online forum (Facebook, Line, WhatsApp, Instagram) through which they share information related to the groups' interests including religious issues. Although Indonesians are the largest international Muslim population, yet their role in the international Muslim immigrants in Japan used to be marginalized until their current successful establishment of Indonesian mosques.

While Indonesians are the largest international Muslim community by population, only recently, the community has established their first own mosques. Located in Meguro Tokyo and Sano (Tochigi), the mosques become the centers of Indonesian Muslim communities. The former, built on the Indonesian school ground, is commissioned by Indonesian embassy whose congregation mostly are students and families living in Meguro, and the latter belongs to an Indonesian community group whose congregation are trainees living in Sano and surrounding areas. Recently, two other mosques and a mushalla have been rented in Kabukicho Shinjuku, and Akihabara by Nahdlatul Ulama special chapter of Japan (PCINU). The recent establishment of the mosques have moved up the "social status" of Indonesia community in the international Muslim communities in Japan, from the "users" only to the "provider" of the mosques. In that situation, Indonesian Muslim community in Japan represented by KMII or other Islamic organization can participate equally with other international Muslim communities in Japan.

For a long time, even until now, to my observation of South Asian migrants (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) have outstanding role in the global Muslim diasporic communities including that in Japan (e.g. Werbner, 2004). They always possess formal or informal communal leadership in the International Muslim community's forum in Japan even though Indonesian Muslims have exceeded their number. This is logically true for some reasons. First, historically, South Asian arrived earlier (Okushima, 2005) and are more experienced in being a Muslim minority group in Japan than the Indonesian Muslims. Many South Asian first generation had passed away or they have become senior citizens of the group (aged after 50s) whose words and contributions are honored by their community (compared to Indonesian who are majority young people aged between 30s and 40s(e.g. Okushima, 2005). From my field works note, in Yamanashi Muslim Memorial Park, there are more South Asian names buried than any other Muslim ethnic background's names.

Secondly, there are different perspectives of immigrants' relationship with their homelands. The majority of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi I met in Japan possess an "old" migration perspective; intending to settle permanently in Japan and do not intend to go back to

their country (from interviews). They sought to have “naturalized” Japanese citizen status through different ways including marriage with the locals (Okushima, 2005). Therefore, it is very easy to find Pakistani and Bangladeshi men married to Japanese women (e.g. Kudo, 2009) and have their nationality status changed.³⁰ In contrast, most Indonesians do not intend to be Japanese citizens (interviews), even though they married a Japanese. In consequence, psychologically, many South Asian Muslims immigrants are seemingly more anticipating permanent citizenship consequences in Japan among which is about community development and children education. In that sense, many South Asian Muslim community—especially Pakistani—used to be very enthusiastic to build a mosque as a place of worship and a community center. Many mosques in Japan are commissioned or supported by ICOJ Islamic Circle of Japan, whose members mostly are from Pakistan, India, or Bangladeshi ethnics. With the recent successful establishment of mosques in Tokyo and Tochigi, Indonesians are seemingly considered as having their confidence and an equal role in their interaction, including in shared Islamic mission and its development in Japan.

2.4.3. Muslim religious practices

Being a Muslim in non-Muslim society, most of my interlocutors express their concerns on several obstacles such as halal diet, the lack of prayer spaces, lack of Islamic education for kids, rare halal restaurants, and some Japanese adult entertainment industries. Most of the apparently circulating discourses among Muslims centralize around how to strategize themselves toward un-Islamic customs which they have never encountered before (e.g. Ishomuddi et al., 2015). In the next analytical chapters (chapter Five and Six), I divided two different strategies they have developed; the exclusive and inclusive strategies.

However, in brief, here are some of their strategies; cooking and dining at home, establishing their own halal market (online or direct selling system), avoiding some Japanese parties (i.e., *nomikai* and Friday night hang out). Many parents allow their children to go only for primary schools in Japan (grade 6), sending them to Indonesia for the secondary years to minimize the Japanese cultural influence. Some parents send (and also plan for) their children to go to Islamic schools in Indonesia. A few female Muslims avoid visiting male medical

³⁰ Related to this, therefore, the number of Bangladeshi or Pakistan (male) who are married to the Japanese female is much higher than any other Muslim nationalities. In contrast, more Malaysian and Indonesian Muslim women are married to Japanese men (Kojima). Since both in SEA and JAPAN, a wife traditionally follows their husbands

doctors. Few conservative Muslims restrict their daughters from swimming class, and attending friends' residences, avoiding the non-halal eateries.

However, most Muslims have positive views about some Japanese habits and customs such as cleanliness, neatness, health system, time regularity, work culture including time punctuality, personal discipline, honesty, social trust, respecting others, and passion in science and modern innovation. All of these, they said, correspond with Islamic teachings. Their “negative and positive” views on Japanese culture is, however, very dependent on their different social backgrounds or cultural repertoire (the next two chapters describe more about those cultural repertoire).

2.5. Social and religious organization: Christian and other religious communities

The religious diversity of Indonesian society is also reflected in their different religious affiliations and organizations in Japan. The Indonesian communities in Japan have established and developed their religious institutions which represent their existences among Indonesian communities in Japan. From my field works data, similar to the Muslim communities, the Christians including Catholic and partially Hinduism (Balinese) people also actively present their communal religious activities. Hardly, however, I found Indonesian Buddhist communal activities in Japan, although I also met few individuals who associate themselves with Buddhism in Indonesia. This seemingly is because majority Buddhism adherents (Mahayana) in Indonesia are those from Chinese ethnic backgrounds and they very rarely meet the typical cultural backgrounds of Indonesian immigrants in Japan. Majority of the Indonesian immigrants are Javanese by ethnic background, kenshusei and student by job title, and are Muslims by religious tradition. Within those characteristics, Chinese and Buddhist background would be the smallest minority part of Indonesian community in Japan. Most Indonesian Chinese I encountered have either Christian or Catholic religious background. Their migration channel would be much selectively possible from academic study, marriage, professional, and cultural positions.

Likewise, in terms of cultural differences from Japan, as Japan is also a “home” for Buddhism (Mahayana)(Ellwood, 2016), the Indonesian Buddhism adherents would rarely meet cultural obstacles as those experienced especially by Muslims, and partially by Christians in Japan. Another important characteristic of Buddhism is, as many experts say, its strong emphasis on the individual's aspect of consciousness and spirituality. Therefore, Buddhist commoners do not have to go to the religious shrine and practice certain ritual communion as

a Muslim or Christian does. As a Buddhist, my informant, an IT man, states he only maintains his everyday practice to be in line with Buddhism ethics and does not necessarily go to the temples or associate with certain religious groups. If they want, they might easily join an international Buddhist community in Japan.

While Muslim community has KMII, the Indonesian Christian communities, since 1989 has established *Kerukunan Masyarakat Kristen Indonesia (KMKI)* or Harmony of Indonesian Christian Community, which organizes several shared activities among different Christian denominations in Tokyo and other cities in Japan. KMKI, like KMII functions as a coordinating board among different Indonesian churches in Japan including Catholic and a few Protestant churches (KMKI, 2018). The Catholic community has started its early communion since the 1970s at the embassy house which was also participated by non-Catholic members. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Christian (Protestant) communities, namely *Gereja Interdenominasi Injili Indonesia*, GII or Indonesian Biblical Inter-Denomination Church and IFGF International Full Gospel Fellowship have also established their communions. The former belongs to the independent and mixed denominational or non-affiliated groups in Tokyo³¹, the latter affiliated to its central church in Jakarta named GISI (Gereja Injil Seutuh Indonesia, Biblical Church of Indonesia).³² Another very active Indonesian church is Minahasan ethnic (protestant) church which has its representative churches in Oarai, Ibaraki. Currently those churches communities work independently organizing their activities and developing their membership but share some programs especially for Christmas and Easter celebrations.

Except GII and Minahasan churches in Oarai having their own church building and organizing their worship ceremonies at their church buildings, the other denominations, in cooperation with local Japanese churches organize the Indonesian worship mass at their affiliated mother churches. They make permanent slots for Indonesian service. In Tokyo for example, Indonesian Catholics community held their mass at St. Anselmo Meguro every Saturday evening 17.00-19.00. Likewise, the GII, affiliated to the Japan Evangelical Church (JEC), organizes their worship mass at their central organization church at certain times. GII held their activities including communion and Sunday school at JEC's headquarters at a hotel in Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo. GII also held their worship communions in several cities in Japan such

³¹ GII official website; (*GII Japan*, 2018)

³² IFGF official website; (*IFGF*, 2018).

as Takashi Gunma, Suzuka, Okaya Nagano, Nishio Aichi, Mitsukaido Ibaraki, Hamamatsu Shizuoka, and Oarai.³³

Meanwhile, IFGF International Full Gospel Fellowship has representatives in some cities in Japan especially in Tokyo, Ota Gunma, Hamamatsu Shizuoka, Suzuka Mie, and Osaka. Similar to GII, IFGF also joined with its mother organization in Japan as a division of Indonesian language church. GMIM or Minahasan churches have at least three churches in Oarai Ibaraki serving around 1000 Minahasans. In some other cities where their affiliated churches are not available, communion is held at their board or member's houses.

Historically, the establishment of those churches seem supported not only by their internal group members, but also by external groups or individuals. A Japanese priest, Yuo Atsumi returning to Japan after 17 years of service in Indonesia, has helped the establishment of GII in Tokyo in 1989, then becoming the advisor of the church board. Likewise, a German pastor working at a Catholic university has helped a lot unto the early development of Indonesian Catholic worship service. Because of the pastor's help the Indonesian congregation could make their communion at a room of a university building at a university in Tokyo.

Not every Indonesian Christian goes to the Indonesian communion or churches for different reasons such as different church affiliation, location distance, unmatched schedules, experiencing international communion. Many Indonesians also have changed their habit of going to churches after a long time of living in Japan. A woman (a Japanese spouse) states she and her family has very long time not visited church because they are very busy with their jobs. While Indonesian church services are conducted on the weekends which are busy days for their kids' who are doing extracurricular activities. A Japanese church she attended, however, looks not friendly for foreigners, so she opts not going to the church any more. However, the Indonesian church community remains meaningful for their members. This is because the Indonesian communion, according to some members, provide Indonesian nuance, and nostalgic atmosphere which they would not encounter at Japanese and International churches.

Those organizations play an important role in supporting the social religious life of Indonesian Christian in Japan. Each church has responsible divisions which take care of religious activities and public education among the Indonesian families, students, and workers. Many Indonesians coming to Japan experienced heavy cultural shocks for the different culture

³³ Official website of GII (*GII Japan*, 2018).

and lifestyle in Japan. The church's people and their activities, for many people, make them feel connected to the tradition which they were familiarized with in Indonesia. For example, the church congregational group have very important support for what Turner called “rite of passage”,³⁴ including one’s birth, baptism, marriages, and death ceremonies or anniversaries. The presence of Church communities and the social interaction among their members have helped their members be relieved from the hardship of international migration (Padawangi, 2005). For newcomers, when they need assistance, they will be easily supported by the co-church members. For some immigrants, churches become like surrogate parents to whom they can share their life problems, heavy burdens, abandon their sense of insignificant marginal social class, and get help from other members (Cao, 2005).

In the case of the Oarai Indonesian community for example, according to Kim, Church membership has provided significant meaning to the lives of Minahasan who works in 3Ds (dirty, danger, and demanding) sector of fishery works which is the lowest working class in the Japan society (Roberts & Wilkinson, 1996). Participating in the church activities has enabled them to meaningfully signify themselves in terms of wearing good dress, wearing perfume, grooming for good looking performance before the congregation far different from their daily look at the *kaisha* (company, workplace), wearing white plastic suites with gloves and head cover, within the dirty, wet, and smelly workplaces. The moment at the church becomes the “liminal” phase where the status of the *kaisha* workers is abandoned, embracing a new status as a God’s servant. By becoming active members of the choirs, church managers and program volunteers enable them to forget their suffering of their lives at *kaisha*.

Likewise, because of the church members’ active participation in Tokyo, not only they become an “ordinary” Indonesian in Japan, but they also become active participants in the social dynamic of Indonesian society in Japan. It is a common phenomenon that immigrants who work closely with the embassy, or Indonesian representatives in Japan are those who are active in religious organizations such as in mosques and churches. The religious group membership provides opportunity where people feel not distanced between those working as employer and employee, upper and middle class. The social hierarchy at many religious groups such as church and mosque is bridged by how active someone is in the group and not dependent on their social class outside of the religious groups. This framework enables someone at the lowest social hierarchy at their workplace to have a high social stratification in the religious groups. Similar

³⁴ See (T. Turner, 1977)

roles of religions on the immigrants also seem effective on other religious members such as Balinese Hindus.

Besides Islam and Christianity, Indonesian Hinduism has also existed in Japan and represented the Balinese culture. It is commonly known that 85% of Balinese ethnic population are Hindus while minority of them are Muslims and Christians. In Japan, there are a number of *kenshusei*, students, professionals, expatriates, and Japanese spouses whose ethnic background is Balinese. Many Japanese women are married to Balinese guide men and surfers after their repeated visits to Bali. Some Balinese *ex-kenshusei* also married their Japanese partner after dating them during their internship period. As for the majority Balinese, religious ritual is very important to their life. Therefore, they often meet together to offer *puja* (worship) including especially on their annually important event such as Nyepi and Galungan. During these days, they meet together observing worship and Balinese performances such as Kecak or Pendet dances accompanied with live Balinese music. From my fieldwork notes, the Balinese people from different backgrounds including *kenshusei* and Japanese spouses often meet together during long holidays such as new year, golden week, and some selected weekends. There they often make an outdoor “*puja*” (worship) and a party afterwards.

As Bali is a very popular tourist destination among the Japanese, the Balinese in Japan are also very actively participating in cultural events held by the Indonesian embassy or local administration for cultural and tourism inter-cultural promotion. They also actively participate in local cultural performances. They have art and cultural groups in Tokyo and are often invited by the embassy or other private enterprise for public performance. There is also a Balinese restaurant in Tokyo which routinely provides Balinese shows. The cultural and art groups also function as a place where they practice Balinese dances such as Kecak (for males), and Balinese musical instruments which are an unseparated aspect of Balinese religious tradition. Indeed, wherever we go to Bali, we will find *pura* (Balinese temple) unseparated from the art performance and materials. Thus, it is not a surprise that many Balinese in Japan aspire for the establishment of *Balai Banjar* (public hall, often with *pura* structure) to maintain their Balinese spirituality, while being away from home. They planned to buy land outside of Tokyo on which these *Balai Banjar* and *pura* will be established. Since 2017, they have made public fundraising to build their own *pura* and multi-purpose hall (*Banjar*). This aspiration, if it comes true, seemingly will mark the next step of Indonesian religious diversity’s representation not only at home but also at overseas hosting countries.

2.6. Chapter summary

This chapter has overviewed the history and contemporary development of Indonesian migrants in Japan, immigrants' different profiles and their living condition, as well as social and religious lives in Japan. In a brief, Indonesians are new comers among other foreign population including those from other Muslim countries such as Pakistanis, Iranians and Bangladeshi in Japan. Indonesian had used to arrive in Japan previously as students, now they are coming to Japan with varied visa status holders; namely students, *kenshusei-jesshusei* (trainees), corporate employee, dependents, a spouse of Japanese, Japan descendants, and permanent residents.

Partially this chapter also provides information about Indonesians as well other foreigners from developing countries experiencing cultural shock in the early period of their residency in Japan. The chapter also describes the “transitional” life of the minority group in the contemporary migration context implying the vulnerability of the immigrants from other cultural sources' influences.

To sum up, this chapter on Indonesian migrant group finds religious organizations play an important role in immigrants' social and career support. This is in line with several previous research findings such as that of Ebaugh among others stating religious institutions have a pivotal role in the immigrants' stressful life (e.g. Ebaugh, 2010; Kivisto, 2014; Levitt, 2007). The Indonesian religious institution such as mosque, church, mushalla, study groups play as a remedy to ease the burden and a painful life of the immigrants.

CHAPTER 3

CULTURAL REPERTOIRE AND INDONESIA MUSLIMS: THEORIES AND EXPERIENCES

3.1. Introduction

Chapter Three has two sections. The first section provides a theoretical explanation of culture's relationship with action among Indonesian Muslim immigrants in Japan. In this section, I discuss the central role of culture in human action based on the available literature. I then discuss Swidler's theory of culture in action which is used in the analytical chapters. In the next section, I discuss the cultural context behind the Indonesian Muslims' religious practices in Japan. In this section, I present the "Indonesian culture" in its different contexts that have influenced the Indonesian immigrants' behavior in the new place.

3.2. Defining culture

As culture conception has a very central place in this dissertation project, especially in its relationship with Muslims' religious practices, first, I need to reflect my conception of culture from the available sources. From the academic works, I agree with scholars including (Keesing, 1974; Noordegraaf & Vermeulen, 2010), stating that it is impossible to make a consensual culture conception for its complexity, and ambiguity. Culture is an elusive concept used and debated by many people of different social and cultural backgrounds (see (Keesing, 1974; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). In everyday life, culture is a common topic discussed by people of different professions including politicians, religious leaders, economists, medical doctors, psychologists, entertainers—regardless of their nationalities and ethnicities—who talk about culture without a shared definition. It has been long described in different ways and perspectives of varied societies. It is not odd that a cultural theorist, Raymond Williams (1983), for example, states that culture is one of the two most complicated words in English language (Sewell, 1999). Every day, "culture" appears in the public talks without a clear definition of which conception it refers to. Some words are associated with culture such as "tradition, custom, habits, lifestyle and civilization." Another fact, "culture" as an academic subject exists in most (if not all) fields of social science and humanities along with their sub-disciplines such as education and marketing management, yet most have different perspectives on the meaning of culture. What is viewed as culture or cultural in anthropology might differ from culture in political science, economics, and applied science's perspectives.

Metaphoric description of cultures is one of the creative ways to make a complicated conception easy to understand. Anthropologists whose definitions of culture are frequently cited use a variety of metaphors and ways of describing culture. For example, Spradley in “Culture and Stress(1972), as cited in A Forte, 1998 has collected eight metaphorical uses of the culture(Forte, 1998). First, culture is used in a “biological way” as bacteria grown in the laboratory. In this sense, second, culture is viewed as a “sign of cultivation” in which certain habits, speech, mannerisms, and social courtesy are internalized. Third, culture is described as an image of “human nature”, characterized as that which distinguishes humans from animals. Fourth, culture is often used as a social group, people bounded by a particular geographical region such as China, Arab, Europe, etc. Fifth, culture has an “omnibus” meaning: the totality of art, custom, belief, institution, knowledge, emotion and thought that typify and integrate a given society. For some, sixth, culture has been defined as “artifacts,” material products created by architects, homebuilders, painters, and chefs (also writers). Seventh, culture has a “behavioral” metaphor focusing on the set of customs distinctive to the group and the observable manifestation of these customs. Eight, referring to Clifford Geertz, metaphorizing culture as “text” (see Hoffman, 2009), Spradley identifies culture in the cognition type of definition. This definition considers culture to be an internalized symbolic system made up of ideas, beliefs, and knowledge (ethos). There is also another metaphor conceptualized by Geert Hofstede , who defines culture in a more cognitive development perspective (Hofstede et al., 1990). He makes a metaphor of culture as “human software.” Culture develops in the way a person uses culture and familiarizes themselves with it, just as a computer software increases its quality for the users when the users familiarize themselves with the application system. Contemporarily, Clifford Geertz’s conception of culture seems to have become one of the most widely recognized conceptions in the academic discourses of culture.

Chronologically, according to Swidler (2013), and Sewell (1999), prior to Geertz, whose conception is now a classic one, culture had been defined in varied ways such as the entire way of life of people including their technology and material artifacts, or everything one would need to know to become a functioning member of the society(see Goodenough, 1970; Koentjaraningrat, 2005). This conception has been gradually displaced in favor of defining culture as “the publicly available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning” (Keesing, 1974; Wuthnow & Witten, 1988). In more elaborative perspective, according to Geertz's (1973) culture is “*a historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conception expressed in symbolic forms by means of which*

men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz, 1973). In Geertz conceptions’ viewing culture as meaning implies attention on cultural phenomena such as beliefs, ritual practices, art forms and ceremonies and on informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and ritual of daily life. Although Geertz’s definition is very popular, cultural conception remains a point of disagreement. The differences in the conception are caused by the different angles experts have looked at culture.

William J Sewell, has mapped out different angles from which scholars have different conceptions of cultures (Sewell, 1999, 2004). According to Sewell, on defining culture, scholars have varied definitions because they look at culture in different ways. First, scholars look at it as a theoretical category or aspect of social life that must be abstracted out from the complex reality of human existence which is not culture. Secondly, Sewell continues, culture is understood as a concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices. In this category culture is commonly assumed to belong to or to be identical with a certain society or sub-societal group.

Referring to the first, according to Sewell, we often consider culture as a social category which must be abstracted out from another aspect or category of social life which is “not” culture such as economy, politics or biology. In this sense, culture ought to be contrasted to another similar abstract. In this category, culture is defined as the whole body of practices, beliefs, institutions, customs, habits, myth, and so on, built up by humans and passed on from one generation to another (p 40). In this category, culture is also defined as an institutional sphere devoted to making meaning—the conception of culture is based on the assumption that social formation is composed of clusters of institutions devoted to specialized activities. These clusters can be assigned to variously defined institutional spheres—most conventionally, spheres of politics, economy, society, and culture can be broken down into a composed sub-sphere such as art, music, theatre, fashion, literature, discourse of sociology and cultural studies, and rarely in anthropology.

To the second conception, following Spradley’s fourth category, Sewell continues that culture is understood as a concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices. In this category culture is commonly assumed to belong to or to be identical with a certain society or sub-societal group. Therefore, we often speak “Indonesian culture”, American culture, Western culture, Asian culture, and so on. In this sense, the opposition is not between culture and non-culture but between one culture (society) and another; between American and European culture; West and East; between Ghetto and mainstream culture.

3.3. Cultural repertoire (toolkits)

In this section, we start discussing the relationship between culture and action which has long become an interesting subject among sociologists. According to Swidler, from interpretive approaches pioneered by Geertz, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Claude Levi Strauss), and literary criticism (Kenneth Burke, Roland Barthes) to culture relationship with social stratification and power (Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu), culture has been understood in its reproduction and experiences (Swidler, 1986). In this chapter, therefore, culture is also understood in its relationship with human action. In other words, our understanding of culture focuses on its influence on individual and social action. In this framework, I would refer mostly to Swidler's conception of culture in action. Combining Ulf and Geertz, she defines culture as "...the set of symbolic vehicles including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, ceremonies, as well informal cultural practices such as language, gossips, stories, and ritual of daily life through which sharing and learning take place (p. 273). In other words, culture is defined in line with ... "the essence of conventional usage" that there are social processes of sharing modes of behavior and outlook within a community.

Culture as the core subject of anthropology (Sewell, 2004) focuses contemporarily on the Geertz' deep description. As part of humanities, anthropology does not talk a lot about causal interpretation of culture. When it comes as a part of sociology, culture is treated in causal relationship as it is familiar in sociology, psychology, communication, or political science researchers. Social scientists have attempted to find a way to explain the relation between culture and human behavior. Sociologists, like psychologists, have abundant theories on the pressure (influence) of social interaction in individual or social actions. Classic sociologists such as Durkheim, Simmel, Berger have elaborated such discussion in most of their lifetime career. They discuss culture, a broader conception of human interaction, not only with other individual(s), but also with their surrounding existence (culture). Sociologists of culture have felt the need to demonstrate that culture has causal efficacy in order to gain recognition in contemporary sociology (Sewell, 1999). In other words, sociological study of culture, is a sociological look at the causality effects to the culture which are "standard" sociological variables such as social class, ethnicity, gender, level of education, economic interest (Swidler, 2001) However, in discourses about culture influencing action, contemporary sociologists have shifted away from earlier Weberian and Parsonian conceptions of culture as value orientation toward what Ann Swidler refers to as "tool kits" or repertoire of action

On the academic discourses of how culture influences action, Ann Swidler has a very important place. Her 1986 article of "Culture in Action" summarizes very clearly the core of her thoughts: First, unlike previous scholars (Weber and Parson) who suggested the centrality of (cultural) ideas and values in driving action, Swidler emphasizes on the important role of set of skills, habits, custom and lifestyle known as cultural repertoire. Value is defined as an element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation (1986; 173). Second, she elaborates on two models of the influence of culture on action—settled and unsettled cultural periods. During the former period, culture independently influences action. Culture only provides resources, from which people can construct "strategy of action." In the unsettled cultural period, explicit ideologies influence action. Furthermore, structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run. Swidler's terminologies of cultural repertoire, strategy of action, settled and unsettled cultural period are explored as follows.

Traditional scholarly discourse of culture's influences on action, represented by Weber, implies that because an individual is holding a certain cultural interest and values such as that of ethnic, nationality, religion, these interests and values make them take a certain action. In other words, certain cultural or religious values and goals (interests) of their group make their action taken for granted. This notion, according to Swidler, is fundamentally misleading, because it provides a confusing explanation with the contradictory facts. In her "Talks of love" (2013), for example, Swidler describes that the changing practices of American Middle class are not caused by the values they believed in since their childhood, but due to new habits, and lifestyles they experience the most. Action can be changing depending on cultural repertoire. In many cultures this is absolutely true. As an example, Muslims read the same Qur'an, as well as Christians around the world read the same Bible that is teaching certain shared values. but the believers show different behavior or action in many issues. How to explain this phenomenon? How does one explain that a student from a Muslim country in Japan or the US can enjoy sipping a cup of wine with his professor, while other Muslim classmates request permission for not attending the class party? What makes their actions different, while both Muslims share the same Islamic values (ideology) on the prohibition of liquor and God's punishment in the hereafter? There are abundant stories about people taking actions differently from their believes (values) would prescribe. Following her predecessors such as Ulf

Hannerz(1969), Keesing (1974), Swidler defines a formula called cultural repertoire or tool kits.

Cultural repertoire or tool kits is Swidler's metaphor/image of culture as a tool kit of symbols, stories, rituals, world views which people may use in varying configuration to solve different kinds of problems (273). This image is to explain her central concern, i.e., "culture influencing action." Like a tool kit box (repertoire), a person selects his or her action depending on the available tools or keys which are familiar and available to him/her. Through the available tools, a person develops competencies, habits, and style on how to practice a task. In other words, Swidler regards cultural values or end goals, which Weber and Parsons regard as factors influencing a person's actions, as something that should not be taken for granted, and may even be misleading. However, there is a set of skills (competences), habits, customs, and lifestyles that create an individual's action. Like artists, magicians, garage men, and athletes, everyone developed their tools which fit their convenience standards, producing their own strategies (Swidler, 2001). They differently make their tools or set the available tools according to their capacity, habits, or styles. They interchangeably utilize the tools in accordance to their functions, convenience, as well as familiarity, and regular habits of the users (solving problems).

In her words, Swidler portrays a cultural repertoire as "*an oddly assorted tool kit containing implements of varying shapes that fit...more or less well, are not always easy to use, and only sometimes do the job*" (2013, p. 24). Through this concept of repertoire, she adds the discussion on the causal role of culture in action and answers to the questions of when "culture influences, or not influences an individual's action. The answer, according to Swidler, is related to the familiarity and availability set of skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles or cultural repertoire.

Swidler's conception of culture as repertoire is a revision on the traditional conception of a causal relationship between culture and action which had been associated with values and interest (Weber and Parson). The traditional assumption on the relation of culture and action is recognized as "*culture influences human action by supplying ultimate ends or values toward which action is directed*" (p. 274)

In other words, this conception rooted in Max Weber and Talcott Parson's studies of culture and social action explains that human action is always guided by goals (interest and values) like "rail switchmen" directing and orienting to the ends of their deeds such as good

morality and to avoid immorality. Referring to Weber, Swidler states that Christians refer to their religious orientation (values) that they must avoid bad deeds because they are afraid of the torment of hell. This is probably similar to the common assumption that all Muslims must orient their deeds toward paradise and avoid hell. This, in reality according to Swidler, is not true. It is not the value or end of the orientation like “a switchman” who directs social action. Related to human action, culture is like tool kits or repertoires. This established concept of culture that provides directing values to human action as rooted in Parson’s and Weber’s theories of social action is considered oversimplifying (see Swidler 1986). Swidler provides another example pointing to the failure of values theory in “the Culture of Poverty.”

Referring to the example from the Culture of Poverty (Lewis, 1963), Swidler argues that regardless of their economic and social background, children of the poor family share the positive values of education, job career, marriage, and family (cultural values). Many of them however, despite agreeing with and believing in these values do not start acting to achieve what they agree with or believe in. For example, when the children are being asked why they do not start stepping toward their valued culture, their responses would be “who am I?” an indirect denial caused by the unavailability of the supporting resources on their hands (their repertoire). Unlike traditional argument that emphasizes on the role of culture on children, Swidler confronts that this was not because the children and the family disagree with the importance (values) of education, career, or marriage, but they have established a line of strategic action from what is familiar to their skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles. Even to imagine going to school might have never come across their minds (1986, p.275.). This example of “culture of poverty” describes many similar phenomena that the different actions selected by people are caused by the cultural repertoire than from the interest and values they believe in. Indeed, the example provides a conceptual explanation of how culture matters.

Culture consists of tools in the forms of publicly available symbols and social practices. These tools include cultural beliefs, world views, rituals, ceremonies, art forms, language, stories, and communication formats. Tools are drawn from both material environments (pots, baskets, and so on) and from symbolic environments (cognitive and emotional meanings). Swidler (1986) explains that cultural tools are the cultural resources necessary to construct strategies of action. Resources can be everything available from beliefs, traditions, rituals, artefacts, environmental condition, geographical situation, social networks.

3.4. Strategies of action

In 'Talk of Love (Swidler & Wood, 2003), Swidler describes strategy of action in various cases of middle-class American men and women who experienced success and failure, the ups and downs in love, and intimate relationships between men and women. She portrays the following attitudes of some informants: accepting their current (during her research period) condition which was not their values trained during childhood, changing minds about the ideal feature of being successful adult man; changing priority in their lives from being too aggressive and possessive to be more down to earth men; to be more realistic about priorities in life; from being a devoted Christian, once was a teenager to be more distancing churches or other religious activities. According to Swidler, one's cultural tool kits shape one's strategies of action. In other words, our cultural competencies or skills make us more likely to do some things than others. Those selected practices, behaviors, action shaped by their cultural repertoire called strategy of action.

Referring to Swidler, strategy of action is persistent ways of ordering action through time (1986; 273). The term strategy is not as a common sense of a set of planning to reach a goal like a strategy (ways) to success, business strategy, military strategy on war, and so on closely means procedures or methods. It is rather a "general way of organizing action structured on the available resources." In Swidler's words, it is an individual action in certain circumstances influenced by his/her set of skills, habit, custom, and lifestyles or cultural repertoire (1986). In this case, I want to emphasize on the strategies of action which (I believe) is influenced by an individual's cultural repertoire. These strategies of action are like guiding manuals for tools use or building plans. Each part has different functions, roles, and assignments; capacities; competences. Imagine the complex strategizing necessary to build or assemble a bicycle or for home decoration. Strategy of action provides one or more general ways of solving life's difficulties—solutions that may be applied to a variety of problems.

To understand how and when culture shapes action, we need to analyze how people actually make use of culture. (Swidler, 2001) states there are three uses of culture by human, or cultured capacities. First, people use culture to learn how to be a particular person. This self-forming utilizes symbolic resources provided by wider culture. Through experiences with symbols, people learn desires, moods, habits of thought and feeling that no one person could invent on her own. Symbols also provide people continuing access to their inner lives, train capacities to think and feel, what Geertz has mentioned as moods and motivation, enable a

person to adopt a line of conduct and carry it out particular lines of action. More importantly is the internal organization of the self—whether, for example, a person resonates to the moods of others and can enter a trance state at ritually appropriate moments (see Geertz (1973), or resist blending the edges of the self into the psyches of others. These internal capacities shape the kind of life a person can construct (Swidler, 2001). In this sense, we can say that culture influences someone’s action through a cultural repertoire formulated for certain competences, including educational and professional competences.

Second, similar to Berger (1967) idea of internalization, culture helps people internalize skills, styles, and habits. These include all the things a person can be good at, from practical skills like knowing how to dress in a suit, having conversation with a new acquaintance, or taking standardized tests; to subtler matters such as keeping “a poker face” when enduring social humiliation or exploding violence when one's honor is violated. Indeed, such skills and habits constitute much of what we actually mean when we observe that someone differs from us culturally or when they feel culturally out of place in an unfamiliar environment. In other words, culture influences someone’s behavior when the process of internalization of cultural repertoire happens. Likewise, cultural internalization is only possible when cultural repertoire is established.

Third, as Margareth, Archer and Dimaggio among others have suggested (Archer & Archer, 1996;(DiMaggio, 1997) culture marks group membership. People use culture to delineate group boundaries and to signal membership to other group members to differentiate themselves from others, and to establish and maintain the alliance. In other words, alliance and affiliation to certain groups will likely influence the people to behave in a direction expected by these social groups. How strong our alliance to a group also determines our strategies of action.

3.5. Settled and unsettled

How do we explain members of a social group making different strategies of action in one shared situation? Why is a culture influential for some people’s action but not for others? Why are the middle-class families in one place very keen to go to school, while the poor in the same are not, although they believe in the similar values about the importance of going to school for their children's career (Lewis, 1963). When does a culture influence a person’s action and when does it not for others? Those are the questions recurring in the discussion of culture’s

consequence on a person's action. In this case, Swidler's two analysis models of "unsettled and settled time" have provided the reference to understand how culture influences action.

In "Talks of love (2001)," Swidler describes rich examples of people's experiences when they broke up their marriage or romantic relationship. Most of them experienced a desperate and stressful period of life. Many went for drugs, hiding themselves from friends, or leaving their churches. They are in a transition (unsettled period), searching for guidance in ways of living, questioning about the past, trying to find meaning in life. After a long time of stepping on their lives, people get used to new skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle making tries out and experiences they can forget about the past "misery" of their lives, getting used (become settled) to the new skills, lifestyle, changing, or forgetting their ideological values of love and marriage. They experience a new settled period of lives. This does not mean that culture influences action more on the unsettled period or the other way around-

Culture influences action in both settled and unsettled situations, but its influence on both has very different features. In unsettled lives, however, (one's) culture is more visible—there appears to be stronger "culture "(ideology), seemingly more active in one culture or known as ideology. They look active and engaging because people use culture/ideology actively to learn new ways of being. The unsettled time refers to period when people are learning new ways of organizing individual and collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until they become familiar. In this stage, doctrine, symbol and ritual directly shape action (1986; 278). In the settled lives culture less visible as people integrate themselves loose and fit toward and are more accustomed with their skills habits and lifestyle. To support her arguments, Swidler provides an example from the phenomena of music among the youth in the U.S.

Quoting Frith (1981) and Gaines (1991), Swidler reports that young Americans are obsessed with music. For many of them, music is about self-existential meaning. However, after young adulthood, being swept by other cultural experiences when they got older, they feel less passionate about music (repertoire) and music becomes more kind of a past time and they feel less passionate about music (repertoire). This is quite similar about the phenomena of Islamic radicalism among the youth in Indonesia, which they experienced mostly during their high school and university periods (Hasan, 2010; Mun'im Sirry, 2020). Once they face "real" life (in Indonesian sense) such as being married, having children, getting into a professional job environment, they may return to their culture and society. Young people are voracious culture consumers because they are still trying out and selecting which part that fits them. They are in

the process of forming and reforming strategies of action—developing the repertoire of cultured capacities out of which they will construct. They keep changing and remodelling—tailing the trends.

In settled life, the causal connection between culture and action are very different. Culture provides the materials from which individuals and groups construct strategies of action (1986: 280), Swidler continues, culture and action are intimately integrated. In other words, a human-culture relationship is like a built in “instinct” of a person making another person act or react automatically according to their familiar set of repertoires. People do not need to think in a while “accordingly” to respond to certain situations. For instance, a train passenger needs not to remember religious or moral values to give a seat to the adult or pregnant passengers. Students who are used to academic life of graduate school for example, would be familiar with the scholarship world and career as well as lifestyle (Holley, 2011). They will likely adopt the academic culture in their everyday life. Because the relation between action and the actor in the toolkit’s framework is like a symbol and its users. The actor makes the culture, while the culture makes the actor. People represent culture by presenting it, thus culture is making the people (Miles, 1997). Culture is ubiquitous, however, it is difficult to untangle what is uniquely cultural since culture and life experience reinforce each other (Featherstone, 2009). Like Geertz’s concept of model of and model for reality, cultural ethos reinforces an ethos and a world view.

On the other hand, in unsettled lives, people use culture to organize new strategies of action and to follow new ways of thinking and feeling. Cultural work is more active and its influence is more visible because the new pattern is in tension with previous modes of action and experiences. Culture operates very differently when it operates as ideology, tradition, or common sense. Culture in the frame of ideology has strong influence on the unsettled periods.

3.6. Culture and ideology

Very important concepts in the analytical discussion through this dissertation are culture and ideology. Referring to Swidler, each has different meanings. Culture (settled culture) consists of tradition and common sense, while the ideology contains ideas of values. Common sense as Geertz states consists of assumptions so automatically as to seem a natural, transparent part of the structure of the world, objectively real and needing no explicit support or elaboration to be true (Geertz, 1975). According to Swidler (1986) the first model (settled) makes actions (strategies), which are seemingly not coherent and inconsistent because they are taken from the

“tool kits” (repertoire) that does not control the action of its users. In the short-term effects, this model does not produce new kits: skills, habits, and styles. Instead, it refines and reinforces them. In the long term’s effects, this model provides resources for constructing strategies of action. It also creates continuity in style, ethos, and especially in organization of strategies and action (See table p 282).

In contrast, the second model, the unsettled culture, provides values that have to be oriented in one’s action (ideologies). It has high coherence and consistency and it competes with other cultural views. As in the short terms effect, it has strong control over action and teaches new models of action. In its long term’s effects, however, its influence depends on structural opportunities for survival of competing ideologies (282). Those who benefit from an ideology will keep it survive.

Swidler distinguishes between culture as ideology and culture as tradition and common sense. In contrast to tradition, which has an implicit and taken for granted meaning, culture as an ideology provides explicit and self-conscious meaning. Ideology is more explicit, less embedded, and more open to challenge. Comorrof (1999: 24) defines ideology as “an articulated system of meaning, values and beliefs of a kind that can be abstracted as (the world view of social groups). Referring to Comorrof, Swidler states ideology is related to hegemony, in a sense similar to that used by Gramsci and subsequently to Bourdieu’s theory that power and domination are consciously or unconsciously established as elements of culture (p 95).

Hegemony and ideology are different in the extent to which they have been naturalized and appear normal. Hegemony consists of constructs and conventions that have come to be shared and naturalized throughout the political community. Because ideology is seemingly a consensus, everyone thinks it is not right to do the opposite ways. Ideology present that everyone accepts it. For instance, the cultural identity of being an Indonesian during the New Order had been in the hegemony of military groups. Meanwhile, ideology is the expression and ultimately the possession of a particular social group, although it may be widely pushed beyond (p.2 4).

An ideology is an articulated self-conscious belief and ritual system aspiring to offer a unified answer to the problem of social action. Tradition, on the other hand, is articulated cultural beliefs and practices, but ones that present themselves as fixed, expected parts of life. In other words, unlike ideology inspiring “universal” enthusiasm, tradition is diverse than

unified, partial than all embracing. For instance, traditional wedding ceremonies may seem flat, forced, or even embarrassing.

Tradition can display and reinforce group ties, but these groups do not need to be exclusive. However, most traditions display and regulate degrees of loyalty, reciprocity, and obligation, like wedding ceremonies. It provides a widely shared system (2013). Many traditions are maintained long after the original rationales are forgotten. For examples are rings exchanged at a wedding, costumes for Halloween, or decorated egg for Easter. Tradition may be given varied interpretation. Traditions are sustained more by practices than by beliefs. In addition, the practices are often those that define informal groups (DiMaggio, 1997), establishing both hierarchies and solidarities,

Ideology usually defines a community. A group defending its boundaries will develop greater self-consciousness and intensity about its beliefs. The explicit practices demanded by the ideology (distinctive clothing codes of secrecy, specialized jargon, or ethical strictures) help members differentiate themselves from surrounding society (Kanter 1972). In pure forms Ideology is almost always the expression of a sectarian community, whether a commune, a religious community, a political movement, or a nation state.

3.7. Settledness and migration

Different cultures have different categorizations of maturity/competence, but we may make assumptions about some indicators. Referring to sociological and psychological frameworks, maturity in social fields is an individual's ability to be accepted socially by the society. The more people socially accept them, the higher their social establishment (settledness). Some variables are very useful to generate this measurement including ages, educational background, professional position, intellectual capacity, and family social status. Related to social status, maturity in economics includes the amount of income, properties, bank deposit possession. Accumulated maturity in the physical, social, and economic settledness contributes someone's' level of settledness and unsettled status. Consequently, it is a very common phenomenon that someone's social leadership confidence is determined by those accumulated competences.

Psychologist, Edgar Doll has developed the useful Vineland Social Maturity Scale (VSMS) measuring individuals' social maturity (competence) from a 1 to 8 scale (Doll, 1953). According to the scale, someone's maturity/competence is determined by their possession of the eight skills, i.e. communication, locomotion (ability of movement), occupation, self-

direction, self-help eating, self-help dressing, and socialization skills. When someone possesses a high score in all eight skills, they are considered having reached high social competence or maturity. In contrast, those reaching low scores on the scale are regarded as having low social competence. The 8 skills of VSMS, likewise, could also be one of the references of “skill” terms in the cultural repertoire. How settled and unsettled international immigrants is, for example, can be measured through their score in those skills. In that sense, we may find how culture influences their actions.

Migration is human activities that indeed fits Swidler's term of periods of social transformation providing the best evidence for culture's influence on social action. Depending on their settled or unsettled status, immigrants' behavior will likely be influenced by their culture (tradition, common sense) or ideologies. International migration provides a state, where most of its participants experience unsettledness. In this state, immigrants encounter different cultures, customs, and traditions that make them experience a transition. In this unsettled cultural period, where people need external support, explicit ideologies often easily influence an individual's action. There are abundant transformation stories of international immigrants starting from “crisis” or unsettled situations, where they encounter people's new ideas that lead them into a new different person with transformed identities.³⁵ A period between old and new cultures is called an unsettled time where immigrants learn how to manage with the new situation. In this framework, acculturation approach often is associated with the immigrants' choice of strategy of action. Depending on the immigrants' “tool kits,” they strategize their actions, which is a kind of acculturation they select before the new culture.

3.8. Religiosity and religious practices

The important portion of the discussion in this project is about Muslim` religiosity or religious commitments as expressed in the immigrants` practices, discourse, and everyday life in Japan. Migration often as a whole or partially becomes the “unsettled” period of life where Muslim immigrants might experience a shift in their religiosity, such as having “positive or negative” experiences, and increased or decreased quality in their religiosity depending on their habits, skills, and styles of culture. Almost every scholar discussing Islam in the non-Muslim society departs from conflicting aspects between Muslim religious culture (being religious) and

³⁵ For example, Ed Husain (2009)

dominantly Western secular culture of the host society (see Chapter One). I, therefore, discuss this discursive concept of religiosity based on these previous studies.

First, the concept of religiosity or religious commitment is something indefinite just like its original word, “religion”. Intra and inter-religious followers subjectively determine both terms of religion and religiosity. Within each religion, different conceptions of being religiously committed circulate. Muslim community alone has a large textual corpus discussing the terms in diverse ways. Likewise, Christianity and other religious communities inherited very large theological manuscripts on how to become devoted Christians. Sociologically, it is impossible to come to a shared conception of being a universally religious devotee. Stark and Glock (1968) who are my guides in providing a sociological view of religiosity or religious commitment do not propose a definition of religiosity. Rather, both propose dimensions of religiosity shared by different religions instead. To interpret Glock and Stark’s view within the Muslim context, I refer to (Hassan, 2007), who did a large scale empirical studies on Muslim religiosity in different countries beginning in the 1980s.

Glock and Stark propose five dimensions of religiosity, i.e., ideological, ritualistic, intellectual, experiential, and consequential dimensions. The first dimension, ideological dimension refers to elements of religious beliefs in a religion to which each believer of the group must adhere. Different religions have different teachings of beliefs becoming the basic teaching of religions. The second dimension, ritualistic, includes every set of acts of religious believers related to the “sacred” dimension in a religion such as worship and other performative action related to God, deities, supernatural power, sin and grace, or “pervasive” order as defined by Geertz (1973). Third, the intellectual dimension includes the knowledge that religious adherents must possess to perform and understand the teaching of their religion. Fourth, the experiential or devotional dimension includes the feeling of religious adherents that resulted from their religious performances and understanding. Does performing certain religious deeds make them happy, feeling amazed, overwhelmed, secured, peaceful, distress, afraid, or optimistic? Finally, the consequential dimension describes every day “secular” acts that are inspired or motivated by one or more previous dimensions. Because of deep knowledge in religious teaching and feeling intimate relationships with God, someone has certain characteristics in their everyday habits and styles, such as more inclusive, exclusive, industrious, ethical, helpful, and more productive, and so on.

The ideological dimension within the Islamic framework, according to Riaz Hassan (2002), copes with aspects of beliefs in the basic tenet which are shared universally by Muslims regardless of their sects or denominations. Belief in Allah and Muhammad as the messenger of Allah, belief in a life after death, rewards, and punishment by God are among basic principles defining someone having a Muslim predicate. There are well-recorded debates about detailed interpretation regarding these basic principles. However, in general, these principles are shared by any Muslim regardless of Sunni, Shiite, Ahmadi, Mutazilite, Kharijite, or Sufis followers. There are also debates about the detailed practices of ritual in Islam, but Muslims universally perform prayers, *zakat* (giving alms), *shiyam* (fasting), and *hajj* (pilgrimage). In terms of intellectual or devotional dimension within Islam, it refers to whether or not a Muslim consults their everyday life to Qur'an—doing a recitation of Qur'an. For experiential dimension, it includes a Muslim's feeling of being close to or distanced from Allah, being saved by the prophet, being more hopeful for God's help. Finally, the consequential dimension is the consequence of one or two previous dimensions in the “secular” act. This includes, for example, Muslims' inclusive or exclusive perception of the non-Muslims' culture and values. Alternatively, whether or not, non-Muslim is “dangerous” to Muslims' faith.

Through this thesis, I assume that being an Indonesian Muslim in Japan is very much influenced or formed dominantly by religious dimensions experienced and practiced in Indonesia. Historical and contemporary cultural dynamics of Muslim societies in Indonesia set certain cultural repertoire for their members. This cultural repertoire is very useful to respond to a new culture in the new society. To consider this consequential relationship between culture and Indonesian Muslims' action in Japan, we should be informed about the Indonesian Muslims' cultural repertoire.

3.9. Islam in Indonesia—cultural repertoire

3.9.1. Ancient Indonesia

In line with many previous investigations on Indonesian immigrant communities (Mulyana, 2012; Padawangi, 2005; Tirtosudarmo, 2005; Widjanarko, 2007) and other transnational immigrant communities, I argue that although settling in a different country, Indonesian immigrants maintain their home country identities. Therefore, the sort of Islamic practices they perform abroad must have represented a feature of Indonesian culture that has formed the characteristics of Islam practiced on the archipelago. This section emphasizes that the aspects of Islam in Indonesia—shortened as Indonesian Islam—cannot be detached from

the historical and contemporary context of the pluralistic Indonesian society. Following Muhammad Ali, what I meant by Indonesian Islam (interchangeably Islam in Indonesia) is the practical Islam, not the normative Islam. The former means Islam which is practiced everyday by ordinary Indonesian people from different backgrounds including location, ethnics, profession, ages, generation, sex entailing some local expression. The latter is more philosophical or ideological perspectives of Islam (Muhamad Ali, 2007). The discussion begins with historical and cultural backgrounds, then the sources of what so-called Indonesian Islam is, and the new trending “global” Islam that challenges the past and existing cultural structure of Islam in Indonesia.

Islam is the largest religion in Indonesia, embraced by more than eighty percent of its 267 million populations.³⁶ However, unlike Islam in many other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Saudi, Iran, Sudan, Brunei, or Malaysia, Islam in Indonesia does not act as a national constitution forming the national identity of the state. Instead, it—as well as other coexisting religious values—is considered as the ethical sources of the nation-state establishment (Effendy, 2018; F. Fuad, 2012; Latif, 2009). In countries where Islam is framed officially as a national identity, there is a greater chance to nationally mobilize Islam in normative ways where certain theological or philosophical approaches of Islam (ideology) are put forward. Moreover, as viewed by many scholars, and I concur, even though Islam is the dominant cultural expression of the country, Islam practiced in Indonesia impresses pluralistic characters differently from that of global Islam dominated by the Middle Eastern expression (see Al Qurtuby, 2017; Hefner, 1987; Schlehe & Nisa, 2016; A. Wahid, 2009; M. Woodward, 2011). In other words, “native” elements have enriched the color of Islam in Indonesia. If we pay attention to the figure 1 on the Indonesian ancient political authorities I presented from several sources (such as (Abbas, 2014; Azra, 2013, 2016; Badrudin et al., 2012; Bruinessen, 1999a; Ricklefs, 2012; Vickers, 1987), we would discover that non-Islamic civilization had inhabited the archipelago for a very long span period that is enough to say their past existence must have an essential influence on the current Indonesian cultural structure.

The current Indonesian cultural identity dominated by Islamic symbols and expression must have roots in their ancient cultural tradition (Abdullah, 1966; Muhamad Ali, 2015; Azra, 2013; Bruinessen, 1999b). As a popular proverb quoted by the first Indonesian president, Sukarno states, “the past makes our presence,” Indonesia today must have also been influenced

³⁶ See (Global Religious Futures, 2016).

by its historical setting. The strong historical existence of varied faith and tradition in the pre-Islamic era influenced the shape of the current Islamic identity in Indonesia as well, and vice versa. It is essential to understand many of the seemingly unique Islamic practices existing in Indonesia are a product of extensive interaction between Islam and the already existing local culture (Bruinessen, 1999a). The formation of the Indonesian state under the secular democratic political system is the product of diverse Indonesian people, along with their cultural and religious diversity (Effendy, 2003; Mujani & Liddle, 2009).

The Indonesian Five Principles called Pancasila as written into the state constitution as the nation philosophy function as the foundation on which the nation was created (Darajat, 2017; M. Fuad, 2004; Latif, 2009). It is said that Pancasila is a shared and extracted very bottom feeling of diverse Indonesian societies. In Geertz's concept of cultural symbol, Pancasila is a shared symbol of Indonesian culture that is not only made by, but also making Indonesia. Pancasila is aimed to be guiding principles that influence everyone on how to behave as an Indonesian citizen in their social fields. Pancasila represents the shared values and goals of being an Indonesian on which every structural and cultural element of the nation is expected to put as their axis. The case of Islam in Indonesia that shares the principles of Pancasila and vice versa is not an exception. It shows how Islam is shaping and is shaped by the available cultural sources of Indonesian society. Taufiq Abdulllah, for example, has written extensive works of *adat* (local tradition) which shape Islam in Indonesia in which he views Islam and *adat* in Indonesia do not contradict, but they influence, each other (see Abdullah, 1966). Abdullah writes about Minagkabau *adat* and *Sharia* which complement each other. There were historical and cultural settings which explain the reasons behind the uniquely pluralistic Islam in Indonesia that is contended to be distinct from that of global Islam as influenced by the Middle Eastern expression (Al Qurtuby, 2017; Muhammad Ali, 2016; Azra, 2016; Barton, 1997; Bruneissen, 2002; A. Wahid, 2006).

Numerous history literature has described that preceding the arrival of Islam on the archipelago currently known as Indonesia, the "natives" of the islands practiced very diverse religious beliefs and traditions rooted in their respective local culture (see, for example, (Muhammad Ali, 2016; M. Woodward, 2011). Adrian Vickers notes, a hundred years ago, ancestral beliefs, Hinduism (and Buddhism) were the dominant practices of old Indonesian society (Vickers, 1987, 2013). Some Islands, especially Java, Bali, Sumatera, Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas, and Papua, have long been led by the great political and religious rulers who

practiced indigenous belief forms as well as Hinduism and Buddhism (Ricklefs, 1991). Wherever we go all over Indonesian archipelago, we find that a strong element of local culture possesses an important place in the “World religions” arriving afterward, especially Islam and Christianity. Most historians agree the Islamic teachers and leaders including the nine saints coming later to Indonesia also had developed their Islamic civilization in harmonious coexistence with the existing local culture (Benda & Raffles, 1970; Hefner, 1987; Mulder, 1994). Indeed, as presented in figure 1, compared to the Islamic periods, the amount of ruling period of the ancient Hindus and Buddhist kingdoms is still longer than that of the Muslim ones (1700-1900). No wonder large parts of the existing Islamic practices on the archipelago reflect the legacy of the local historical expression.

According to experts of Indonesian history (Hall & Reid, 1994; Lombard, 1996, 2007; Ricklefs, 1991, 1993) the oldest ever known kingdom in Indonesia was the Hindu kingdom of Kutai in the northeast of Borneo (in 5 CE). The preceding Hindu kingdoms were: Tarumanegara (West Java 6th Century), Kalinga (Central Java 6-7 Century), Wangsa Syailendra (central Java 8-10 century), Doho, Kediri, Singosari, Blambangan, and Majapahit (between 10 and 15 century) Around the same time, Buddhism was also once recognized as the great civilization on the West part of Indonesia. The world's largest Buddha temple Borobudur, in the heart of Java, has proven the greatness of the Buddhist kingdom and their civilization. In the past, ancient Hindu and Buddhist Wangsa Sailendra kingdoms occupied a large part of central Java.

The Srivijaya kingdom on South Sumatra Island was once a great kingdom reaching its influence as far as now Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, but the Philippines (Lapian, 1982; Rausa-Gomez, 1967) until Majapahit, a great Hindu kingdom from East Java, defeated it. The latter kingdom once became the great ruler of Indonesia, spanning its territories up to two-thirds of Southeast Asian archipelago including now Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and part of Thailand and the pacific islands. Only after the 15th century, the Nusantara kingdoms were occupied by the Muslim rulers who gradually and persuasively introduced Islam to their pupils (Ricklefs, 1993). Through the process of integration, Islam was accepted widely by Javanese people whose tradition was rooted in their syncretic, ancestral, Hinduism, and Buddhism traditions (Indradjaja & Degroot, 2018). There has been great literature describing this process of integration, which is not my dissertation focus. In brief, this is to emphasize that having existed for a long time, no wonder the ancestors' traditions, including Hinduism and Buddhism,

cannot be ignored in the cultural dan historical memories and practices of Indonesian societies despite a new tradition of Islam.

Figure 1/ 03. Great Hindu and Buddhist Kingdoms of Indonesian Ancient Time

Kutai	North Borneo	4	
Tarumanegara	West Java	4-7	
Kalingga	Central Java	6	
Galuh	West Java	6-15	
Srivijaya	Sumatera,	7-14	Sumatra, Borneo, Malay, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam
Mataram Syailendra	Central Java	8-10	
Kediri	East Java	11-12	
Singosari	East Java	13	
Majapahit	East Java	13-16	Almost All Indonesian Archipelago, Malay
Dharmasraya	West Sumatera	11-14	

3.9.2. The arrival of Islam

In a relatively short time, after its first-ever recorded arrival (in the 11th or 14th century) (Ricklefs, 2015), the number of Muslims on the archipelago, especially on Java, had risen (Abbas, 2014; Ricklefs, 2014). According to some records, including Raffles 1830, as quoted by Zamakshari Dhofier, the early Muslim teachers had successfully promoted Islam to laypeople as well as the royal family members (Dhofier, 1990). After weakening, a few Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms also fell into the hands of Muslim leaders, influencing their followers to embrace the Islamic faith. Islam became prevalent practices among the commoners as well as their elites (Dhofier, 1994). Many Hindus and Buddhist kingdoms converted, becoming Muslims. Mataram (Wangsa Syailendra), for example, was once a Hindu kingdom. Then it shifted into a Buddhist kingdom, and it became an Islamic one. Mataram occupied large parts of Javanese kingdoms during the Sultan Agung era (16th century) (Moertono, 2009). Likewise, most of the Sumatran and Malay kingdoms that once were Buddhist under Srivijaya supremacy, then became Muslim kingdoms (Hall & Reid, 1994; Manguin, 1993). There have been theories of why Islam expanded so fast and was accepted quickly, becoming the populous religion in the country. Among the reason was persuasively cultural Islamic propagation made by early Muslim Sufis (spiritualists) and traders in additions to the weakening political authority of the Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms (Dhofier, 1994).

The propagation methods used by early Islamic teachers, according to many religious leaders were insisting on what is now called the cultural integration approach (Ishak & Abdullah, 2012).³⁷ The first Muslim teachers coming from Hadhramaut (Yemen), Gujarat (India), and other parts of the Middle East, were not military forces, instead, they were civilian spiritualists (Sufis), scholars, and traders who promoted Islam not by force but by their active and persuasive engagements with the natives. They integrated themselves into the local culture—by learning the local language, communicating with the natives, living with them as a neighbor, doing business with them, and even married to local women (Azra, 2013). This integration then allowed them to gain community leadership. To sum up, as much literature has said, many narratives on Islamization of royal Javanese and Malays in the ancient period was preceded by persuasive inter-cultural approaches producing the so-called “local Islam” or *Islamicate* Civilization (Hodgson, 1974) accommodating differently mixed cultural expressions. In India, as Hodgson describes, Islam presents the very mixed existing Indian culture and customs including the caste system (1974).

Many students of the history of Indonesia provide the examples that the Muslim saints (Wali) known to be the early teachers of Islam on the Java islands modified some Islamic practices and interpretations according to the Javanese expression and vice versa.³⁸ Their strategies made Islam and Muslims who once were aliens became warmly welcomed. The early Islam practicing Javanese did not wholly leave their Buddhist, Hindu, or ancestral cultural tradition, as seen in many early Islamic heritage, including that of Demak and Kudus mosques as well the royal palaces in Solo and Jogjakarta (Indradjaja & Degroot, 2018). The information about nine Javanese saints always includes the usual usage of old Javanese art instruments and performance to explain Islamic teachings (Daryanto, 2016; Koesoemadinata, 2013; Nugraha & Ayundasari, 2021). The very current evidence of this fact is that not few Middle Eastern commoners as I encountered and their fellows in Indonesia accused Islam in Indonesia as a peripheral Islam whose practices were mixed with other beliefs.³⁹ The mixed practices of Islam, according to them, are far from pure Islam as they thought it usually should be. In the future,

³⁷ Most of religious leaders from the NU group always refer their Islamic missionary to the path of nine saints whose methods taken through the cultural integration approaches. See (Van Dijk, 1998). Also (Chodjim, 2011).

³⁸ See (M. R. Woodward, 1985). Also see (Azra, 2006; Van Doorn-Harder & De Jong, 2007)

³⁹ This claim is very popular among Arabs as narrated by many domestic workers I talked to.

this heritage of uniquely cultural Islam in Indonesia defines Indonesian Muslim identity as what they believe sharing the principles of Pancasila.

3.9.3. Santri, Abangan, Priyayi

This three-chotomies of Javanese Muslim societies were controversial concepts popularized by Clifford Geertz in his ethnography research of Javanese society (Miichi, 2015; Woodward 1989; Hefner, 2011). Promoted in the 1960s, the terms are controversial because they are used seemingly taken for granted as a binary (especially *santri* vs *abangan*) opposition that contradicts categories of the Javanese in either scholarly or popular discourses on the Javanese people and their culture.⁴⁰ Although many scholars criticize the categorization,⁴¹ many old and new scholars of different fields of Java keep using the terms to analyze the cultural structure and worldview of the Javanese society. Moreover, even though Geertz's divisions of the Javanese culture had prompted long debates, his categories still make sense in explaining who the Javanese are, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, especially through his terms of *santri* and *abangan* (see Miichi 2015).

By exploring these three Javanese terms, it is not my intention through this thesis to say that Indonesian identity denotes merely the Javanese ethnicity. Instead, Javanese is a significant ethnic group in any discussion about Indonesian culture and society. In addition, Javanese is the largest ethnic group in the country (more than 40%)(Suryadinata et al., 2003); the early history of Nusantara archipelago always refers to a number of Indonesia's great civilizations in Java, such as Singosari, Majapahit, Padjajaran, Demak, and Mataram kingdoms. Before and after the independence, Java has witnessed important national events led or mobilized in Java, by the Javanese, which extend their role in the political spectrum and leadership. The dominant Javanese ethnics in the national ethnic identity can be seen very clearly during the New Order era (Kahn & Anderson, 1992; Sidel & Anderson, 2002).

The long triumph of the New Order hegemony under the Suharto regime (a Javanese *priyayi*) had strengthened Javanese culture into a central reference of Indonesian national identity (see Anderson & Keeler, 1988; Antlöv, 1995, 2003; Aspinall, 2003; Mulder, 1994).

⁴⁰ It is often used in the popular media when they talk about political affiliation groups. See for example (Effendy, 2003)

⁴¹ Woodward for example disagrees with Geertz's division of *abangan* *santri* and *priyayi* as opposing categories. Because *priyayi* is more about social class; the better terms for *abangan* is "kejawen" The are both *santri* and *kejawen* *priyayi* (see Woodward 1989)

Therefore, to say that Javanese culture is an essential element of Indonesian cultural repertoire would not be an incorrect conclusion. Within this framework, Geertz's promotion of the three categories of Javanese when discussing the religion of Java would be a worthy discussion.

During the New Order, as easily found, the name of state-building, the national political glossaries, and the social and political leadership, much referred to the Javanese symbologies. In addition, during the New Order, large numbers of Javanese natives participate in the national program of transmigration out of the Java Islands, making Sumatera, Borneo, Celebes, and Papua have a significant number of Javanese population (Elmhirst, 1999; Hoey, 2003). Inasmuch, since the National Army has been long historically led by Javanese figures, the cultural superstructure of the institution very much represents Javanese culture (Kingsbury, 2005). Many institutional symbols in Indonesian armed forces are taken from the Javanese legends and folklore. Javanese people also dominated the national armed forces position from its bottom to the top levels (Kasman, Aloysius, 2020; Sihotang, 2016). Soeharto hired many active military elites as state executive apparatus in Java and outside of Java that made Javanese identity a dominant expression of national identity. Soeharto's cultural taste directly or indirectly receives a special place in the Indonesian public space. As many commentators, including AS Hikam, and Nurcholis Majid said, his Javanese world view inspired Suharto's imagination of modern Indonesia (Sarsito, 2006). As Cak Nur commented, possessing the leadership for 32 years, Suharto had represented his "rural" Javanese world views into the national public spaces.⁴²

As Indonesia's largest ethnicity, Javanese culture has a lot of influence on the physical and psychological structure of Indonesian Islamic culture. However, some scholars such as Azra (Azra, 2013; M. Woodward, 2011) critically say that Islam in Indonesia had been influenced by the Sufism culture of India and the Middle East. Javanese culture is an essential factor behind why Sufism or mystical Islam is widely accepted. In other words, as Javanese experts have said, Javanese and Mystical Islamic culture are very good friends (Hefner, 1990). Alternatively, we might say that the spiritualist element of Sufism brought by the Middle Easterners teachers and traders (Hitchcock & Woodward, 1991) fit well with the existing mystical orientation of the Javanese culture. On the different types of Javanese Islam originating

⁴² Private forum I attended in 1998 at hotel Regents now Four-Season hotel Jakarta

from the Javanese culture, Clifford Geertz formulated three categories of Javanese Muslim groups, i.e. *santri*, *abangan*, *priyayi*.

Santri, *abangan*, and *priyayi* were the varieties of Muslims in Java, referring to each cultural system. What I meant by a cultural system, as Clifford Geertz explains, was the setting or cultural repertoire that includes the skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle. Within the Muslim community, according to *santri* themselves as I observed, santris are the core members of the Muslim community in Java as they are the active members of the religious institutions. They show high devoutness to the Islamic faith and practices. They define themselves as engaging Muslim communities in religious events and institutions such as mosques, Islamic schools, mass organizations, and institutions, which requires minimal standards such as hereditary or educational backgrounds.

Both *abangan* and *priyayi* are commonly considered nominal Muslims. *Abangan* (color: red) is syncretic Muslims blending Islam and Javanese in their everyday practices. Unlike santris (associated color: white or green), they do not regularly perform Islamic rituals, which are considered fundamental by santris. *Priyayi* is the Javanese people from the bureaucrat community. According to Geertz, while *abangan* is syncretic, the *priyayi* is more into blending Islam and Hinduism.⁴³ Influenced by the long period of Western colonization, the Javanese (*priyayi*) often looks upon a bureaucrat as being more honored than the others for their close relationship with the ruling authority. Their lifestyle tends to show their “higher” cultural taste from that of *santri* and *abangan*. The way they speak Javanese and behave in their daily activities such as dining, outfitting, and body language idealize the “royal” families (in their respective levels) (Protschky, 2008). Historically they are colonial patronages selected and educated by the Dutch and favor the “lifestyle” of the Dutch rulers (Sutherland, 1975). The Dutch's social stratification helping the Westerners more respected than any other racial member has influenced the value of their Indonesian employees before the Indonesian commoners. There are many works in the field of letters featuring the elitist *priyayi* whose life is a subject of the Dutch officers’ subordination, but on the other hand, they are mimicking the Dutch to subordinate their own Indonesian fellows. During the New Order early period, the cultural repertoire of *priyayi* was strengthened in bureaucrats as they were the representatives of the ruling powers who have a secure connection with the ruling government (Antlöv, 1995,

⁴³ Some scholars have criticized this definition among them is Woodward saying the terms is incorrect. According to Woodward (1989) the Javanese Islam is either influenced by the Sufism or syncretism.

2003). In consequence, every social group develops its own cultural repertoire, including network and political group affiliation.

The first Indonesian general election in 1955 had witnessed the “sectarian” division of Indonesian society empirically into these categories. Especially in Java (East and Central Java), the *santri* (the Green group) supported Islamic parties such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Masyumi securing 45% of the ballot (Miichi, 2015b). The *abangan* and *priyayi* and the non-Muslims went for Indonesian National Party (PNI) and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), winning $\frac{2}{3}$ of the voters (Liddle, 1996). The political and ideological debates after the election were also so tense among the political and religious groups along with their nationalist (*abangan, secular*) and *santri* (religious) cultural orientation. Believed to be the supporters of PKI, the *abangan* people are among the frequent targets for the anti-PKI groups (especially the *santri*) during the bloody tragedies in 1966 (Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002; Ricklefs, 2012). Some regions whose PKI membership is high were often associated with *abangan* areas. Therefore, the number of executions was high in the area during the anti-PKI movement in 1966-1969 (Chandra, 2019). Although the current political preference of Muslims on Java Islands looked more diverse, it remains showing the quasi-consistent cultural legacy of past political, ideological grouping (such as green /*santri* and red/*abangan*) (Miichi 2015). The National Awakening Party or PKB (green), a political party belonging to *santri*, always wins large margins in East Java. PDIP (red), belonging to the nationalists (*abangan* and *priyayi*) has been unrivaled in Central Java.

Securing power, eliminating PKI, focusing on national economic and political stabilization, Suharto, the second Indonesian President, attempted to block any security threats caused by horizontal conflict from the political and sectarian conflicts. Using his military approach for the sake of the development programs, he succeeded in cutting off the too fragmented political tension into more simplified unification of political parties, i.e. PDI, Golkar, and PPP. PDI was a unification of nationalist and Christian parties backed up by the *abangan* people (Effendy, 2003). The Golkar party gathered the bureaucrats and military forces along with their networks supporting the regimes. PPP was the unification of Islamic parties, a home for *santri* voters.

Before the 90s, Javanese *abangan* and *priyayi* to which Soeharto belongs, along with the military hegemony, had successfully marginalized the *santri* in the national politics (Raillon & Raillon, 1993). Many PPP activists whose backgrounds were *santri* were grounded for being so critical against the government. Rarely has *santri* secured a seat in the public administration

because of their political affiliation. The government, according to the *santri*, intentionally marginalizes the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school system for *santri*) and regards these *santri* as having low skill except for their religious knowledge. *Santri* went to informal schools such as madrasah and *pesantren*, which did not provide competency training for the new order projects. However, this situation—as a blessing in disguise—allows *santri* families to become more active in the independent building capacities, including entrepreneurship fields, and developing modern schooling their children later on (Hs, Mastuki, 2006). In the 80s and 90s, when many more Muslim families joined the middle-class, and Islamic movement got more popularity for opposing the regime, Suharto shifted his strategy by getting closer to the Muslim groups by inviting them into his administration and supporting groups (Bruinessen, 1996; Mujani, 2014). Through Golkar and ICMI (initiated by Golkar politician as well), he accommodated many more privileged Muslim bureaucrats. When ICMI was launched, while Suharto was named “the protector” of the ICMI, more than half of his ministerial cabinets were members of ICMI (Abuza, 2006; Hefner, 1993). Since then, Islam has its place in the public administration, including the military force. The 1990s is the beginning of “Islamization”/ *santri*-nization of public spaces (e.g. Miichi, 2015b), which provides a new cultural repertoire for those grown and educated within the era. The Islamization/ *santri*-nization also transformed many *abangan* families into the “neo *santri* ones who exercised with the cultural practices and values of the *santri*. Some public figures known as *priyayi* and *abangan* became the board of ICMI (Mujani, 2014; A. Wahid, 2006).

While the terms of *santri* and *abangan* might be not familiar for non-Javanese Indonesians, the characteristics of each group—I am sure—are shared by many Muslim ethnic groups in Indonesia or even beyond. *Santri*, according to *santri* community, is often associated with devoted Muslims who observe Islam as a way of life according to their beliefs. In contrast, *abangan* according to *santri* is a nominal Muslim who identifies themselves as a Muslim, but does not perform Islamic teachings and practices on a daily basis. Members of a cultural group often are divided between those who stick to their cultural identities and those who are transformed into a new entity. The history of Islam’s arrival in Indonesian archipelago always recorded at least two groups associated with either the old tradition (*adat, kaum tua*) and the new tradition (revisionists/modernists/) which leave their cultural legacy to their offspring (*kaum muda*). Other terms, the traditionalists and modernists, respectively, are often associated with the first and second groups.

3.9.4. Traditionalist and modernists

The traditionalist and modernist are other typologies of Muslim communities in Indonesia linked to their responses to the new culture. Deliar Noor, an Indonesian senior political scientist of Yale, was among those who popularized the terms in the Indonesian context (see Huisman & Noer, 1978; Noer, 1986). As a matter of fact, in the field of religious studies, the terms are nothing new as many religions and cultural experts have observed such kinds of cultural phenomena of changing society. Once, immigrants in the US were devoted Christian from Europe knowing little about other cultures. After they met different ethnic groups in the new lands and were exposed to the cultural diversity, they rethink their own identities and different strategies of their religious practices (see Yeager, 2009). While one group was accepting others as a part of their cultural group, the others could make different responses. The traditionalists are often associated with those who maintain their old identities and local culture (Herbig & Dunphy, 1998; Miichi, 2015b) in their religious setting. They are also often considered as an umbrella term for the “*Adat*” Muslim communities (Abdullah, 1966), or those who remain conscious of the existence of customary or ethnics law (*adat*) in their religious expression.

Again, like *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi*, the traditionalist and modernist conceptions could not be fixed typologies. Still, it is an open conceptual division explaining Muslim cultural differences (adding) to Geertz’s Javanese Muslim typologies.⁴⁴ While Geert’s formulations describe variants of *Muslim* communities in Java, Deliar Noer’s traditionalists and modernists are additional explanations about Muslim communities in Indonesia, including those of the Malay (Melayu) ethnic members in Sumatera and other islands outside of Java where a three-dichotomies is not recognized. The third category, *priyayi*, which is a mimicry of the bureaucrats during the Dutch colonial era, could not work well in most other non-Javanese ethnic communities. For the non-Javanese, therefore, regarding Islam, traditionalist and modernist Muslims so far have become familiar terms.

Referring to the different responses to the “modernization,” Deliar Noor states the traditionalists tend to maintain their traditional identities both in every day “profane” and in their “sacred” activities. In other words, the traditionalists keep the local mystical cosmologies in addition to their theological beliefs. In Java, for example, they tolerate co-practicing Islamic

⁴⁴ In his article Miichi says the current reality in Indonesian politics does not exactly present the core divisions between Santri and Abangan as Geertz has categorized (Miichi, 2015b).

and Javanese symbols and cultural elements in their rituals, including wedding or mourning. The modernists, in contrast, stand on their rational orientation and refute the mixture expression of religion and local culture which they think such mixture has denigrated the meaning of Islamic practices (Pohl, 2012). The modernists in this frame are associated closely with the ideas and movements of Islamic renewal of Muhammad Abduh, (D. Egypt 1905) and Muhammad bin Abd Wahhaab (D. 1792) (Bruinessen, 2018; Hasan, 2019a; Huisman & Noer, 1978; Mujani, 2014).

Seeing the advancement in Europe and backwardness in the Muslim society, Abduh, Egyptian reformer, made a campaign for Islamic renewal. He emphasized the message of rationality in Islamic understanding. According to Abduh, Muslims must learn sciences and knowledge from the West and not be *apriorist* to Europe's achievement. In contrast to Abduh, the reformation brought by Muhammad bin Abd Wahhab call for the purification of Islam from other cultural elements. The reformation movement, which is behind the establishment of Saudi Arabia kingdom, believes that mixture Islamic practices with other cultural factors had made the Muslim community fragmented, weak, and easily defeated by the European colonialists. To this group, Muslims must purify the non-essential part in their belief and hold puritan religious ideas, which always seek and value the "Genuity" of their religious practices highly according to their early historical teachings. Their different religious orientation is clearly explained when dealing with religious rituals and symbols such as—especially—in the case of "*Slametan* (Thanksgiving celebration)."

The *Slametan* and *tahlilan* can be regarded as "the core" of the Javanese ritual, which are practiced during traditional ceremonies of the Javanese ritual of life passages. As Geertz and others (Beatty, 1999; Hitchcock & Woodward, 1991) explain, one of the examples of *slametan* is that it is held when a human baby in the womb reaches seventh months old, as well as when they were born. The *slametan* again is held when the child steps on the ground for the first-time (*nedeak siti*), when they were circumcised (boy) and for marriage initiation, and finally, after they die. The *slametan* is mobilized on the seventh, fortieth day of burial, and the annual commemoration of the death day (*mendak/haul*). The fundamental beliefs in *slametan* include food offerings for the unseen spirits of the ancestors coming during the feasts. In a *slametan* ritual, led by a religious senior, participants chant and offer various prayers for the prophet Muhammad, for the dead and the bereaved families, as well as for every participant

attending the ritual. At the end of the event, ransom packages, including food and cigarettes, are distributed for the participants.

The modernists, in contrast, are resisting this *slametan* practice for several reasons, such as the irrational theological conception of prayers, which will not help anything for the dead. Offering prayers to the deceased is not recognized in Islamic teachings. In addition, it is because the event spends a lot of budgets and it will not help eliminate the bereaved family's sadness, but instead creates an additional burden on them. The modernists who exercise puritan ideologies argue that Islam must be purified from and not be mixed with local cultural elements. Because of their rational orientation, they get their members generally in the following setting, urban and formally educated and non-Javanese.

Initially, like many other revivalist movements, modernists in Indonesia founded their movement from their concern with the cultural gap between Islam and modern Western societies. The Muslim countries were far behind the Western societies that colonialized them. The only way to achieve similar prosperity and achievement according to them is for Muslims to drive themselves toward the modern Western achievements where science and rationality lie at the center. To achieve their goals, there is no other way except to get rid of the traditionalists' orthodoxy and return to the primary teaching of Islam (revivalism): referring only to Qur'an, the holy book, and Sunnah, the recorded sayings, and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. In consequence, they develop teaching materials that deviate from the established traditionalist practices, which often incite horizontal/grass-root tension in the frontier. The following are some patterned characteristics of the traditionalists and modernists derived from my observation and literature (Peacock, J.L., 2017; Muhamad Ali, 2015).

The traditionalists are Javanese santris as well as *abangan* Muslims. By ethnicity, they are often either Javanese or non-Javanese who cling to their local tradition. By demography, they live mostly in rural areas or small cities where farming and fishery function as the primary industry for the residents. They have a low level of formal education, but have strong tradition in informal education of *pesantren*. In terms of religious organizations, they mostly affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (in Java) or its Islamic organization siblings out of Java islands such as Nahdlatul Wathon (West Nusa Tenggara), As'adiyah and Alkhairat (Central and Eastern Indonesia). The modernists, in contrast, used to make their majority members from the urban areas, having a modern formal education, very popular in islands outside of Java, especially Sumatra and parts of Sulawesi. In terms of social and religious organizations, they affiliated to

some modernist institutions such as Muhammadiyah, the second-largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, Persatuan Islam (PERSIS) (West Java), Masyumi (old-time), and Sarekat Islam along with networks. Like a tree, each organization has branches in every level and location of social fields, including school, profession, and residency areas.

3.9.5. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah

Discussing Islamic social groups and societies in Indonesia, we must include Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The traditionalist organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), coordinates hundreds of thousands of Islamic institutions such as *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), *madrasah* (Islamic school), primary and secondary schools, and higher education institutions with particular cultural repertoire attached to the *pesantren* tradition.⁴⁵ NU also organizes millions of members of Sufi (spiritualist), mystical and healing groups (Javanese: *kanuragan*), martial arts athletes, artists as well as supernatural religious groups. NU also recently runs many social and economic enterprises such as public hospitals, retail chains, banks, pilgrimage, and travel agents.

In terms of their religious teachings, NU, since its early foundation has declared its allegiance to specific reference of Islamic school of thought.⁴⁶ It is a Sunni group that recognizes the Islamic authority after the prophet went to his four successors (*khalifa*), i.e. Abu Bakar (father-in-law), Umar and Usman (influential companions), and Ali (cousin). Contrasting the Shi'ite, which recognizes the authority only through Ali's lineage, excluding the rest, the Sunni is claimed to be the bridge between various extreme Islamic theological groups. It moderates between those approaching Islamic interpretations through the reason only (Mu'tazilite), and those who depend solely on the textual interpretation (Zahiriyah). Also, it is claimed to be the bridge that mediates various opposing Islamic cosmological views, such as those between using the metaphoric interpretation (*takwil*) and those avoiding it. In everyday practices, NU refers to the teachings of Asy'ari (D. Baghdad 936), in the field of theology, of Al Ghazali (D. Thus Iran 1111) in their spiritual (esoteric) practices (*tasawwuf*), and of Syafi'i (D, Fustat Egypt 820) in the Islamic law and jurisprudence. Most Southeast Asian Muslim communities follow the legacy of those great names in Islamic literature.

⁴⁵ Pesantren generally means Islamic boarding school. However, it denotes a certain sub culture of Islamic tradition in Indonesia which includes a certain style of relationship between the pesantren owners, the students and alumni.

⁴⁶ See AD/ART NU (NU Guide Book)

Minus boarding schools, which is the established cultural field of NU, Muhammadiyah runs and coordinates thousands of “modern” schools, higher education institutions, hospitals, mini stores along with their modern organization and management. In terms of religious teachings, Muhammadiyah is also a Sunni Muslim organization that shares many ideas and practices of other global Sunni Muslim groups.⁴⁷ Inspired by the reformation movement in the Middle East and South Asia, historically, Muhammadiyah focused on the renewal in religious thought and school systems. Not as clearly as NU, Muhammadiyah does not declare its scholarly lineage, except historically. It is known that Muhammadiyah's establishment was inspired by the Islamic reform movement of Muhammad Abduh (D. 1905) in Egypt. The last name had been recognized for his accommodating the rationality approaches of Mutazilites (Priatna, 2019).

Inspired by the Islamic renewal in the Middle East, Muhammadiyah stated that Muslims must modernize their school system following the Western system, and purify their religious practices from the non-Islamic traditions. Muslims have to return to the sources of Islam, Qur'an the Holy book and Sunnah (the prophetic tradition), whose central message is rationality—to get rid of the element of non-Islamic tradition (Peacock, J.L.,2017; Bruinessen, 1999a; Rosyadi, 2013). The spirit of reform (returning to Qur'an and Sunnah), according to Muhammadiyah, would be the requirement for a successful Islamic reformation. In consequence, some religious and cultural habits of Muhammadiyah are different from those of Nahdlatul Ulama members, often producing debates and tension in the grass-root level. Unlike NU who are emphasizing on Syafii and recognizing the others, in terms of religious practices, Muhammadiyah follows all of the four imams (the great classical thinkers) of Islamic scholarship, and is open to new interpretation (*ijtihad*). Nurcholis Majid, a leading Indonesian Muslim scholar, illustrates the difference between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah's cultural repertoire as “a library” and its catalog system. The library must have both a collection and catalog system. NU represents the library's collection, and Muhammadiyah acts as the cataloging system. They are together needing each other to form a library. They both represent Indonesian Muslims with the different cultural repertoire referring to the traditionalist and modernist groups (Madjid, 2000).

This division for the outsiders might remain unclear until the person lives in Java and observes different practices of religiosity where NU members have a vibrant expression of the

⁴⁷ See Ad/ART Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Guide Book)

local cultural tradition, including high respect for the knowledge lineage and their recognition of the chains in the Islamic literature authority. The cultural custom of Muhammadiyah, which shares with several contemporary post-Islamist ideologies, have made the ordinary Muhammadiyah members to be prompted to participate in the new ideological movement of post-Islamism (Miichi, 2015a).

Since the 1980s, however, with the wealth of its commodity, Saudi Arabia has expanded its influence on the international and global community, including Indonesia which resulted in the recent popularity of Wahhabi/Salafi groups in Indonesia. Because, Muhammadiyah school of theology, to some extent, shares some principles with Wahhabism and emphasizes independent thinking on religious thoughts (Abduh's influence), often, the Muhammadiyah members are also followers or sympathizers of Wahabism. This is in contrast with the phenomena among the NU members. The basic principles of Wahhabism are indeed attacking many ideas and practices of Nahdlatul Ulama members. To some commentators, Wahhabism is like a global virus that degrades Muslims' respect for their local and ancestral traditions. However, Indonesia has been lucky as long as NU functions as a protecting shield (Yahya, 2018).

3.9.6. Islamism repertoire

Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, Indonesia witnessed the country's most successful performance in economic development. Focusing on maintaining economic growth, the government put "harmony" as the campaigning words against social and political instability (Aspinall, 2003; Honna, 2010). The government, led by Suharto, did not let any security and political instability spoil economic growth. Street protest rallies were very restricted. Often even their human rights violation seemed justified for the sake of public harmony (Arfandianto & Sumarno, 2015; Fatah, 2010; Kingsbury, 2005). There had been many human rights violations during the Suharto era. For instance, the Suharto government applied the so-called "subversive" codes for the opposing sides, through which the government could accuse any resisting activists as a threat against its policy. This threat also deserved a substantial criminal charge. The subversive code used in the Sukarno's Old Order to protect any betrayal or corruption action against the states, was used against any political opposition during Suharto's era (Said, 1987) Many political and human rights activists who presented different political views during Suharto's time were charged and jailed despite unclear evident processes, just as many street criminals (*preman*) were killed anonymously (Beckett et al., 2000; Cribb, 2000).

As an elementary school student, many times I heard the news about the killings. In the 1980s, many unidentified people were found dead, thrown away in the rivers or city canals, wood, plantation farms, or the jungles. The corpses were found with signs that military officers had associated them with a criminal such as having tattoos on the corpse (Also see Barker, 2018). The Suharto administration put a full effort to limit any opposition and troubling ideas and the people behind them. Any public resistance against the government was considered a threat to harmony, so they were threatened. The regime runs active public surveillance and unification of Pancasila's interpretation through extensive training (Arfandianto & Sumarno, 2015). Those who deviated from the homogeneously official interpretation of the state constitution reading would be taken into strict surveillance. Media press, musical concerts, and public publication had to pass government secret agents' reviews. Only those who supported government programs might appear on the open stage (Heider, 1992; Irawanto, 2004; Paramaditha, 2012; Sen & Hill, 2007). Public service officers, as well as military forces and their families, were also obliged to support governments' political parties. They were abundant descriptions of the New Order's militaristic approaches along with their human rights violation, had been portrayed, consequently strengthening the opposition group's cohesion and mobilization, including among young Muslim activists.

Inspired by the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and tired with the New Order's dictatorship, Muslim activists organized varied opposition mobilization among university students (Hasan, 2019b). Following the global trend in Islamic politics, as seen in the Middle East and South Asia, they offered Islamic ideology as the political basis and goals of their attractive movement. They proposed Islamic political platforms (Islamic/Sharia constitution) as a solution for the world's largest Muslim nation's problem (Bruneissen, 2002). There were different transnational existing groups, from those who want to establish a new Islamic state to those who wish to culturally re-Islamize the society. The geopolitical conflict in the Middle East left an effect on the underground Islamic youth movements in the country. The Middle Eastern alumni brought the Islamic political ideologies such as that of Ikhwan *Al Muslimin* (Islamic Brotherhood from Egypt) spirit of a revolution into the country by establishing and developing Tarbiyah groups, especially at Indonesian state campuses (Hasan, 2019b; Miichi, 2003; Mun'im Sirry, 2020). In addition to protesting the new Order authoritarian policies, their "underground" mission was to establish an Islamic government, which based their constitution on the *Sharia*: Qur'an, the holy book, and Sunna the prophetic sayings and deeds; an Islamization of the national political agenda, which would have failed. They never get large

support from the majority of Indonesian Muslim society just as many other similar global Islamist movements.

Having failed to establish an Islamic state, this movement that used to be flourishing in several Muslim countries has shifted its direction. Instead of establishing a state, it is then oriented to create a just society in the Islamic version. In other words, it is an *Islamization* project through customs, laws, and lifestyle. It is about practicing Islam without interfering with the state's political forms. Like the neo-Islamists in South and Southeast Asia, they no longer have the motivation of establishing a state, but sought how to re-Islamize Muslims according to their standard of correct Islam (Roy, 2004). In Indonesia currently, for example, the neo-fundamentalist groups perpetuate the increasing debates against immoral or incorrect Islam (Hasan, 2019b). The failure of political Islam provides insights into how neo-fundamentalism makes Muslim society fragmented because of theological differences. The recent conflict in Muslim countries, including in Indonesia, is not between Muslims and non-Muslims, but among internal Muslims because of conflicting religious interpretations. Muslims hate or dislike other Muslim groups because they are pro to what the neo-fundamentalists are in opposition to, and vice versa. However, their Islamization campaign received a positive response from the youth.

The fundamentalists recruited young bright higher education students into the groups (Mun'im Sirry, 2020), extending the aspiration of political Islam of transnational groups such as Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt and Jemaat Islami (Pakistan) into Indonesia. The story of the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia is very similar to radical movement that Hossein, an ex-Islamist in London wrote in his autobiography (Husain, 2009). Many scholars, including Norhaidi Hasan, Miichi, Yon Machmudi, Muhtadi, Din Wahid as well others,⁴⁸ have written the chronologies of the development of this movement very clearly. To sum up, after several decades, through their educational, social, and cultural programs, the Ikhwani and its "rival" the Wahabi ideologies have become a cultural repertoire of new Muslim generation in Indonesia. They established many economic social and educational centers seeding their communities from preschool students to university ones (See Miichi, 2015b, 2019, 2020; Mun'im Sirry, 2020b). Providing their alumni with enjoyable workplaces for their professional alumni career, at the workplaces moreover, they also build a group network based on their shared ideologies. They take significant positions in many ministerial offices, state enterprises, and campuses. The recent Indonesian government, for instance, feels very difficult to clean up

⁴⁸ See (Hasan, 2010). Also (Muhtadi, 2008; D. Wahid, 2015; Machmudi, 2008).

some of their offices from radical Muslim employees since many of them were backed up by their upper staff. Sri Mulyani, the current Indonesian Finance Minister, has seen how radicalization among her employees has changed the ostensibly pluralistic nature of a state office she leads (Liputan 6, 2020). There is some kind of “formal” exclusive Islamic nuance in the office environment, excluding the others. It presents for instance, in the issues of female outfits and the avoidance of shaking hands of the opposite sexes which impresses segregating identities. Likewise, many state enterprises offices have been reported to have many employees overwhelmed by particular religious sentiments (Detik.com, 2020). They hired Islamic teachers from their own networks (as the instance I provided in chapter one), giving more important stages and popularity for the teachers to become an invited teacher to the state office. The network building is described in many experts’ works as well as in my following observation.

The exclusivist teachers were invited by the Muslim employees' groups using the state or public facilities in their activities. The teachers have their private Islamic schools, pilgrimage, and travel agents, which attract many of their middle-class audience to send their children and to arrange their travel to the holy cities. Of course, we do not talk about employees alone. When we talk about their networks, this includes their subordinates and employees' family members. Furthermore, because the employees have secured professional positions and income, they are middle-class groups whose opinions and advice were often taken for granted by their subordinated members. Many of the employees often widen their networks outside of the offices, through which they can benefit the reciprocity relationship, and accumulate social capital within their networks. Sometimes, they distribute their gift charities to their Muslim networks overseas. The gifts could be in several forms, such as The Holy Qur’an, book sets, mosque carpets and interiors, Ramadan packages, pilgrimage accommodation, as well as sacrificial animals. With aid from transnational networks such as Brotherhood and Salafī, as well as their strong local supporters, they could attract more sympathizers and easily develop their group circles.

Ikhwani, that is rooted in *Ikhwānūl Muslimīn*, or Islamic Brotherhood (Egypt), and Wahhabism (Saudi Arabia), are two contemporary ideologies of social movements associated with transnational and globalized Islam groups (Roy, 2004). The Wahhabi group also called themselves Salaf or Salafī (Indonesia), which means the early followers of the Prophet. Wahhabi is outsiders’ naming for the followers of Muhammad bin Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, the official ideology of Saudi Arabia Kingdom. The groups, or their affiliations,

currently exist in almost all Muslim countries, including Indonesia (P. G. Mandaville, 2003). Both share the same ideas of Islamization of the non-Islamic culture except in one issue: whether Muslims can oppose their government. Sometimes they oppose each other, but most often, especially their grassroots are friends and mixed. In Saudi, however, the Brotherhood is marginalized for their frequent criticisms against the government policy (Lacroix, 2014).

The “Salabi”, which stands for Salafi and Wahhabi, is another term referring to the mixed group of both during the Afghan-Soviet war when they were united against the Soviet invasion (Abou El Fadl, 2005). In Indonesia, Salafism, Wahhabism, and Salabi have occupied many political and social organizations. PKS (Prosperity and Justice Party), the fifth current largest political party, historically was formed by Indonesian *Ikhwan* (salaf) networks in the 80s (Miichi, 2015a, 2020; Muhtadi, 2008; M. Woodward et al., 2013) . The party and their personnel become an essential part of many social and religious institutions such as schools, mosques, orphanage houses, charity, and non-governmental organizations, as well as campuses and press media.

The Wahhabi groups also make similar programs to that of Ikhwani. Additionally, they emphasize their Islamic purification campaign all over Indonesian archipelagos, countering the traditionally established Islamic practices “mixed with the non-Islamic elements. They have their schools, Islamic TVs, radio, and hundreds of propagating websites. Saudi government educational program in Indonesia established a university campus named LIPIA, which stands for *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies), which teaches Islamic studies in more Wahhabian perspectives. (Jahroni, 2012). Many alumni of Middle Eastern universities, LIPIA, and their networks are in the frontlines of the movements (D. Wahid, 2015).

After a few decades, Islamism/radicalism has been a significant part of Indonesian Muslim culture (Miichi, 2016, 2020; Mun’im Sirry, 2020). It was “permitted” to do religious, social, and political activities in public. They even declare their organization’s mission in the national stadium in Jakarta and place their people as legitimate representatives at the Parliament House. Although PKS agrees to participate in the path of Indonesian secular democracy, it cannot be separated from its historical context and the people behind the party who are recognizing and supporting Islamism (Miichi, 2015b, 2020). It successfully gains significant numbers of support, placing the fifth to the seventh position in the latest national political ballot. Although modifying their campaigns in “moderate” images, the party remain promoting many

post-Islamism projects such as the regional laws of *Sharia*, empowering conservatism among the society (e.g., Miichi, 2020; Salim, 2015). In 2007 and 2012, it won several gubernatorial elections in Sumatra as well as in West Java, with the largest ballot nationally. Securing two terms of the gubernatorial election, PKS has a great opportunity to mobilize their social and political influence. It helps the strong growth of conservatism in West Java within a decade (Hasani, 2011).

Through government assistance, they established hundreds of Islamic schools and Islamic projects that strengthen their political orientation, seeding conservatism in the society. Several districts employ Islamic friendly regulations such as veiling for girls and memorizing the Qur'an, bringing the effect to the students' life and view of others. In several surveys, West Java is listed as one of the most intolerant provinces in the country following Aceh and West Sumatera (SETARA 2012). In those provinces, especially Aceh, formalization of Islamic laws takes into effect.

Islamic symbols are everywhere, even among the middle and upper-class families who used to be distancing religious life. There are many Islamic upper-class schools built in big cities to accommodate those wanting both exceptional facilities and Islamic environment (Miichi, 2015b, 2019, 2020). Every female student wears a hijab, whereas the boys wear long pants, which is rarely seen in the past (before the 1998 Reformation era). Even now, hijab for girls and long pants for boys seemingly have become popular codes of outfit for Indonesian teenagers and pre-teenager in most dominantly Muslim towns. Mosques and prayer places are built everywhere, from slum areas to luxurious malls and airports. Many state campuses allow various exclusive Islamic activities and symbols. Popular media such as cinema, television, magazine, and online media are rich in 'cool' Islamic contents (e.g. Miichi, 2015a, 2020) . Islam, as a culture once was familiar in the *santri* communities, is now very central and within easy reach of ordinary Indonesian urban people. They are the "neo *santri*", who have no relationship with the *santri* culture, or kinship and never go to a *pesantren*, but now are playing an essential role in neo *santri* groups, which is a "cool" version of Islamism among the youth. Some ex-Jihadists, and extremists' confession I found from my personal interviews, and their public talks and written diaries inform how they felt "trapped" into an extremist or Jihadist groups.⁴⁹ The process of radicalization goes in the following scheme.

⁴⁹ Interviews with some of ex NII (Indonesian Islamic State) and an ex jihadis in Bogor and Jakarta 2009-2012.

At school, students are introduced into exclusive Islamic codes of conduct. Later on, at the higher education institutions, they participate in exclusive Islamic clubs. Furthermore, at the workplace, they are strengthened with Islamists' labor association. Finally, at their neighborhood's mosques, they practice influencing and mobilizing the people. For Indonesian students, some following conditional factors make it almost challenging to avoid the effects of that conservatively Islamist cultural influence. Some factors accumulatively include: immature ages, Islamic illiteracy, Islamism social groups. The factors result in unsurprising consequences that, for instance, some students went too far by joining a trans-national group targeting the establishment of Islamic State in Indonesia, including the now banned organization of HTI Hizbut -Tahrir Indonesia.⁵⁰ Thus, it is not unusual to find information that a senior Indonesian civil servant (university graduate), along with his family, joined the ISIS fighter group in Syria.

Feeling de-territorialized as Oliver Roy formulated seems to be the strongly shared identity of Islamists from both Ikhwani and Salafi groups and members or HTI sympathizers. They might have different backgrounds of education, socio-economic class, or ethnicities, but they share the same feeling about the lack of Islamic values in their Indonesian culture and society. Referring to their Wahhabi sources, they criticize many established religious traditions practiced by mainstream Muslim communities.

In consequence, the neo-*santri* prefers global public speakers such as Zakir Naik of India, who was also banned in his own country and Bangladesh for his provocative views, to charismatic and prolific local scholars from Indonesia. They show hatred against Indonesian scholars such as Quraish Shihab and Mustafa Bisri or Gus Mus because both are leaders of traditionalist local Muslims. Several surveys have revealed some Muslim scholars (ulama) having backgrounds of Islamism are always listed as the top-ranked most referred scholars (ulama) (Arigi, 2018; Rdwan, 2018). They become very critical to the strong democratic and pro-pluralism leadership in Indonesia and prefer the "iron hand" style of certain world leaders, especially President Erdogan of Turkey. Many of my interlocutors are friends of Sahabat Erdogan fan Page on FB (Friends of Erdogan) in which the posts are about new waves of cultural and political Islamic movements in Turkey and the world. In the last two years, because the "ikhwani" party stands in the opposition group against the current administration of President Jokowi. They often harshly criticize the President's policy and lifestyle, and always propose Erdogan and his policy as the ideal for Indonesia. They keep promoting Erdogan as a

⁵⁰ Affiliated to (global organization) Hizb Tahrir, another faction of Brotherhood organization

pious and charismatic Muslim leader, strong Islamic background, pro Islamization, and good Qur'an reciter. "Erdogan wants to bring back Islam to Turkey, while the Indonesian government wants to marginalize it out from the country," they say. Partially, this current unconfirmed issue is because Jokowi has a strong relationship with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization which maintains strong roots in local Islam and opposes many ideas of the globalized Islam (Islamism). Currently, NU has been promoting what they called "Nusantara Islam" (Indonesian Islam), which calls for more harmonious Islam with the other religions and local culture in Indonesia. In Chapter One, I have provided an instance of NU's new interpretation of the *kafir* (infidel), which should be omitted from public utterance.

3.10. Chapter summary.

In conclusion, this chapter has provided discussion on the theoretical framework of this dissertation project based on Ann Swidler's theories of "culture in action." This chapter provides discussions on cultural repertoire, strategies of action, unsettled and settled lives, and how they are related to an individuals' action. After describing the theoretical framework through which my field works data were analyzed, I have explored the circulating cultural tool kits of Indonesian Muslim society. I discussed very important key concepts such as Javanese non-Javanese, *santri*, *abangan*, *priyayi*, traditionalist, modernist, NU-Muhammadiyah, and unique social-cultural variables on Indonesian Muslim societies. Each social and cultural group described has various set of skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle, which create tool kits for its members, which allow the owner to strategize in certain ways and directions within different circumstances including in the context of international migration.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological aspects of data collection for this dissertation. To gather the data, I used a mixed-method approach to collect the data. It is ethnographic in nature yet it also uses survey research to validate ethnographic findings.⁵¹ During my ethnographic fieldwork, I conducted observations and both unstructured and structured interviews (surveys) to help confirm the data from the former. The chapter begins with conception of ethnography, the procedures I proceed with ethnography works, observation experiences, interlocutors' profile and interviews techniques. At the end, I describe the survey process and questionnaires which are also used for guiding interviews' questions. The analysis of the survey (structured interviews) and the interpretation of ethnographic data I presented in the next chapters.

From some resources (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Dewan, 2018; Geertz, 1973; Gobo, 2008; Lambert et al., 2011; Wolf, 2012), I define ethnography as a method of social and humanities scientific discovery to understand a cultural group, event, or phenomena through the "emic" interpretation of the researcher. The very characteristics of an ethnography project is working long term in the field, interacting directly and closely with the people and culture being investigated. As a method of "cultural discovery," the nature of ethnography is to understand or to provide interpretation about a specific group in objective ways. By objective approach in the scientific framework, I mean providing what Clifford Geertz (1973) called "thick description" or deep interpretation of what the reality is behind the surficial appearance.

Thick descriptions as Geertz (1973) put it is to understand others' behaviors and reality in the objective or "correct" meaning intended by the informants (insiders' view). This includes understanding not only the appearances provided by the observed object, but also something

⁵¹ The mixed-methods have been used for several purposes such as (1) triangulation: seeking convergence of results; (2) complementarities examining overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon; (3) initiation: discovering paradox, contradictions; (4) development; using the methods sequentially such that result from the first method inform the use of the second method using the methods sequentially, and (5) expansion; adding breadth and scope to a project (Greene et al. 1989). In this case my approach closes to numbers 4 and 5.

“inside.” Therefore, ethnographers must be familiar with the symbolic worlds of understudied culture and society. Describing the cultural symbol, Geertz says a symbol is a vehicle form of meaning through which a meaning is shared by and forming the community. In other words, as Geertz differentiates between “act for” from “act of,” symbols do denote or represent culture and also form the culture (Asad, 1983). Geertz metaphorized it in a way that there are different meanings from a naturally reflected eye wink of a person from an unnatural one with a certain intended meaning (Geertz, 1973). The task of the ethnographer is to interpret the meaning behind those symbols in comprehensive and empathic perspectives. As to study the culture of others, some following characteristics are necessary in an ethnographic research approach (Asad, 1983).

First, as the discovery method, it is said that ethnography is a useful approach to deeply understand a small or limited group population, or a group which has never been investigated before or a very restricted one. There are some classic works on closed and restricted groups which probably would never be successful except through ethnographic strategies. There are, for example, ethnographic works on very remote areas in Africa such as Victor Turner’s on Ndembu in Zambia (The Ritual Process, 1967, 1970) (Greene et al., 1989) and on Java Island such as Geertz’s study on Mojokuto in East Java and Hefner’s (1983) study on Tengger mount community in East Java. There are also many works on very restricted limited or marginal groups such as the very popular work about youth criminal group in a European town by J. Patrick (reprinted 2013)⁵² and the criminal gang lifestyle of WF White.⁵³ There is also a work by Humphreys Laud on gays’ lifestyle in the US.⁵⁴

Second, as a method of interpretation, ethnographic study suggests comparison perspectives (Gobo, 2008). The study/field work is done in small or remote places, but it does not expect students to focus specifically on the phenomena on the area alone. The description has to be related to something larger outside of the location. When Geertz did his investigation in Mojokuto, East Java, he did not mean to only work on that particular small village. He linked the village and its social and cultural phenomena to the related outside world and global or intercultural and international phenomena he engaged and concerned with. Therefore, an ethnographer has to supply themselves with a wide variety of literature.

⁵² See (Patrick, 2013).

⁵³ See (Whyte, 2012).

⁵⁴ See (Humphreys, 1975).

Third, to understand what is it in people's behaviors, unlike in a laboratory or experimental research, ethnography does not use experimental or laboratory tests, where research participants need to be tested or intervened in accordance with certain hypotheses. Instead, they are observed in their own ways. In other words, everything must be let in a naturalistic setting (Lambert et al., 2011). There is no intervening attempt to make people behave in accordance to a researcher's hypothesis. It has to be in the way as they are. In consequence, ethnography research needs a long-time field work for observation of the studied objects including one of its activities, learning their understudied people's language.

Fourth, related to the language skill, and long-term field work, ethnography is an activity of understanding the symbolic worlds of the investigated people or culture. Symbol, as Geertz defines, is a vehicle form of meaning. Every group has symbols, which possibly provide different meaning from or similar to that of the others. Thus, to understand the symbolic meaning of the studied objects, an ethnographer needs to conduct creative methods of which is participant observation (Spradley, 2016). To follow these principles in ethnography, the following is a report of the methods through which I proceed data collection. There are at least four characteristics that together make an "emic" perspective in an ethnography possible.

4.2. My ethnography processes

4.2.1. Setting

The research data were collected mainly from the field works in Japan during my four-year residency as a PhD student at GSAP Waseda University from Fall 2014 to summer 2018. My activities during the field works were doing observation and interviews. The survey (structured interview) aims to support the interview data and was not intended a mixed qualitative and quantitative research approach. The field work was conducted in several locations of Indonesian communities in Japan especially in Kanto areas including Tokyo Metropolitan, Chiba, Kanagawa, Ibaraki, Kanagawa, Gunma, Tochigi, and Saitama. However, intensive field works were mostly conducted in some areas in Tokyo and Chiba where I resided and worked as a PhD student. To some extent, because Muslims in Japan often organized a joint program, I also did fields work in non- Indonesian communities. In Tokyo, my Indonesian interlocutors (except *kenshusei* who lived in the same apartment complexes) were scattered in different places, but they often met together in mosques near their apartments. Most of the interviews and observations were conducted at the mosques, informants' or my apartments, campus, or an event venue, and halal Muslim markets, depending on their availability. I also

did field work in two Indonesian towns (Bandung and Yogyakarta) in Indonesia during summer 2017 to investigate the preparation and departure process of *kenshusei* and their life after returning from Japan. Therefore, I observed and talked with Bandung alumni of Japanese higher educational institutions about related issues when they lived in Japan and afterwards.




Figure 01/04: Field works map

In addition, I gathered secondary data from the available literature and drew on my previous memories and research experiences. There are abundant secondary data in this project, especially those related to Islamic activism and Islamism that were taken from my previous personal observation and conversation, past field work research in Indonesia as well as from updated available literature. I also recollected from my memory during my years of studying at an Islamic senior high school, acting as a journalist student, representing my school, traveling around Java Island, visiting and learning from some Muslim activist groups, among whom opposition against the Suharto regime was un-exhaustedly revived. During my undergraduate years of Islamic studies, I familiarized myself with Islamic studies corpus which contribute a lot to perspectives of counter Islamic radicalism research. For the past ten years I have been involved in various research projects on Islamism and activism for which I have visited many different Islamic communities on Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi islands. I also did uncounted interviews with Islamist activists, deradicalized activists, and those active in the project of counter-radicalism. I have written several articles and popular commentaries on this issue since 2005. In addition, I refer to contemporary information about Islamist groups from abundantly

updated works of the experts. My own past field work experiences are also very useful in interpreting the current available data.

4.2.2. Participant observation

As previously said, participant observation is a necessary data collection method in ethnography (Spradley 2013). It is defined as researchers' involvement or participation in the groups' activities. Imagining Geertz working in Bali producing an essay entitled "The Balinese Cock Fight", I also visited several places where Indonesian often meet and get together such as mosques, halal food markets, and many open Islamic class forums. However, unlike Geertz, a stranger to Balinese, needing a few weeks to get into a community group (see Geertz (2000), as a fellow Indonesian, I enjoyed easy access to do my observation among the Indonesians. This is also especially because I have the experience of residing in a few different places outside of Tokyo, and because of my background status as a religious studies lecturer of a State University.

During my residency in Japan, I have experienced living in three different small towns. First, I lived in an international dormitory in East of Tokyo in a neighborhood close to a small station on the Seibu Shinjuku line. It takes around 30 minutes to reach Takadanobaba station, the nearest one to Waseda campus on the SEIBU line. At the time, the dorm was occupied mostly by Indonesians (7 students including me), and other Southeast Asian students from Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Malaysia. Five of six Indonesian students were eligible and available to become my research informants (Muslims, between one-and seven-years residency in Japan) for my project including to participate in an online survey. Furthermore, a senior (*sempai*) became my first bridge to an International Muslim community in Shinokubo town area.

After several months, when my family members (my wife and two children) arrived from Indonesia, I moved to an apartment in Otera city (pseudonym) in Chiba. I chose living in Otera city east of Tokyo after considering advice from some Indonesian friends for my pregnant wife. Because of language barriers, she badly needs help from fellow Indonesian friends to prepare for her maternity, especially in terms of communication with the medical staff and working with hospital papers. Otera city had been known lately as having Indonesian neighborhoods, including some acquaintances and friends who live in the area. Dozens of Indonesian families live around the area. My wife arrived in Japan in January 2015 or between her fifth and sixth month of pregnancy and delivered a baby girl in May 2015. Being a PhD

student with three children in Japan, I encountered some obstacles, and yet some blessings as well. On one hand, because of many family activities, my research progress ran a bit sluggish. However, on the other hand, being with family members provided me more chances to encounter diverse cultural experiences and interlocutors from different backgrounds and circumstances. In addition, I had opportunities to meet and talk with more women, I got many unprecedented reports about Muslim women's lives from my wife during her interaction with her friends and with their children. I got used to visiting many public facilities for family matters such as schools, family *koen* (parks), ward office, kids' clinics, dentist, hospital, family recreation facilities, which provide more comprehensive senses of living as a foreigner and minority Muslim in Japan. If only my wife and kids were not with me in Japan, I would be feeling uneasy with having narratives about women and these things including children, school, and their family lives in Japan. Because I often told my interlocutors about my research topic in Japan, I thought most of the Indonesian neighbors recognized that I was doing research about them too. My status as a father of three children allowed me to have more extraordinary experiences of living as a family in Japan which were beyond the reach of a "single" field worker. After two years in Otera city, I moved to a beautiful seaside area in Chiba-shi, which made me leave my first studied community, but I then found another Muslim community that enriched my data and investigation.

4.2.3. Entry point

Another supporting entry gate to the Muslim groups' community was my occupation status in Indonesia. I have had Islamic studies training since my undergraduate years. Having a background in Islamic studies and being known as a social studies lecturer at a state Islamic institution was a great blessing and also created hindrances. Because of having such a background, I was regarded as an Islamic teacher by my interlocutors. In Indonesia, people with Islamic education background like mine would be labelled as a religious teacher and are often asked for Islamic advices and prayers leadership. Likewise, in Japan I encountered similar experiences. A few people consulted me about halal things. Another asked me about the "*riba*" (usury) in the bank transaction. A woman asked me if I were available to ordain her inter-faith marriage with a Japanese spouse. Because of this status, it was very relaxing for me to get into the community and collect data from my own activities with my interlocutors. Everyone to whom I talked to seems very enthusiastic to share their story and experiences of living in Japan. Many times, people asked me to lead Islamic prayers in public events. Sometimes, even my

interlocutors facilitated me with food and accommodation. On the early days of my arrival in Otera city, after I led a prayer at a mosque where I recited Qur'anic verses, a South Asian Imam approached me and invited me to be a Qur'an teacher for several kids. During the summer season of 2015, I assisted the Imam to teach students Qur'an recitation. This activity led me to know more about my Muslim neighbors, not only Indonesian, but also other international communities. On certain days, I was arranged to teach Qur'an for the children, mostly Indonesian kids, which enabled me to communicate with their parents. Besides talking about their children, I also let them know about my intention to write about them. They seemed happy and were willing to provide special time for some interviews. Being known for having skills in Islamic studies, I was also asked to give some lectures in different places of Indonesian communities especially among student and *kenshusei* groups. Supported by some friends, I was also appointed to be a secretary of the Nahdlatul Ulama special Chapter of Japan (PCINU), which gave me more opportunity to visit several places and audiences on behalf of my organization and research observation. Representing NU in Japan, I had a privilege to visit some spots where Indonesian communities live around Kanto areas, and to deliver religious messages in the NU frameworks. I also joined several Facebook and LINE chat forums of Indonesian Muslim groups where they get together and exchange information.

On the other hand, because of my occupation status in Indonesia and NU activism in Japan, I had some limitations to access information from certain individuals related to the exclusive groups, especially those who knew my involvement with the Nahdlatul Ulama organization. A few Salafi activists I interviewed seemed halfheartedly responding to my questions. They described only a short explanation in addition to "yes" and "no" answers. During the heyday of Indonesian political tension, NU was always considered on the government's side and very clearly opposing the Islamist organizations such as Salafi, Front Islamic Defense (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Meanwhile, Salafi and HTI were very popular among university students in Indonesia (in Japan as well). In that case, I selectively disclosed my identity as a researcher. Alternatively, I observed a few profiles and their activities from their online media such as websites, LINE, Facebook profiles and content. Almost all of my interlocutors are friends on my Facebook account.

"Open" participant observation implies that all of the observed audiences recognize that the ethnographer's presence was for research's sake.⁵⁵ They were aware that I was there for

⁵⁵ A discussion on the issues please see (Li, 2008).

research purposes. Slightly different from this open participant observation, I also did semi open-closed observation depending on the circumstance whether I declared my research intention. At the community group where I resided in Chiba, most of the time I let them know about my status as a researcher of Muslim community in Japan. Some seemed aware of what I meant with academic research, but others seemed unaware about my presence. In most meetings of Indonesian Muslim community, I introduced myself as doing research about Muslim community in Japan, including about themselves. In other group meetings which were sensitive about the research activity, only a few of them, especially their leaders, were aware of my presence as a researcher. Some group activities I joined and attended helped provide me precious experiences and data.

During my residency in Japan, I regularly visited mosques, attending Islamic group forums including intensive Ramadhan festivals, attending wedding, death and burial ceremonies, community gathering and festivals, and several other activities which provided me with a large opportunity to meet and talk with Indonesians and observe them closely. I also visited some Indonesian interlocutors, and even stayed overnight at their apartments. Some events or interviews ended very late at night. In such circumstance, I was unable to catch the latest train to my home.

4.3. Interviews

4.3.1. Interlocutors

In total, I have talked to more than hundred Indonesians in Japan whom I could consider as my interlocutors especially those living around my area, and regular visitors of Indonesian “mosque” in Meguro. I met them in several places most regularly at mosques after Friday prayers and Indonesian Islamic gatherings. I often talked with them about their life experiences in Japan. After being observed, some Indonesians were “upgraded as my research informants, others were just “supporting informants” because often have similar experiences and too busy to make a certain interview appointment, and unwillingness to talk openly in the research setting (with interview guides and questions).

Within the “formal” research setting, I have interviewed 75 informants including 12 trainees, 15 workers, 25 professionals (skilled workers), including 5 health care workers and nurses, 8 dependents, and 15 students. There were however only 64 of them have filled the survey questioners. By formal setting I mean the interviews were conducted on their consents and their willingness to answer in structured questions, in addition to non-structured interviews.

The structured questions (questioners), I made to anticipate unconfirmed answers during the interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted in informal atmosphere and in very long hours, to provide a comfortability when answering questions. The interview section about respondent's' religious understanding, opinion, and attitudes toward the others often take times and prompts depth discussion providing interesting but overload information (I might use it for other research purposes). On the respondents' figure please refer to the figure 2/IV appendix.

Most of the interview's contents were recorded and transcribed. Analysis of their interviews are provided partially in the next chapters. Some interviews, however, only highlighted the informants' main points and statements. The interview ran between 60 minutes and five hours. During the interviews, in addition to survey questionnaires (structured questions), I also referred to additional questions for qualitative narratives. These include, for example, informant's family backgrounds, life experiences in Indonesia, religious affiliation and activities in Indonesia, their Islamic understanding, preparation for Japan, and life in Japan. Some short answers but taking time if conducted through face-to-face interviews were included in the survey questions.

Not only the informants were selected on the basis of their jobs, or visa status, but they were also selected in accordance of varied backgrounds such as their Islamic group affiliation and religiosity orientation. This means that very often I did not start a "formal" interview with an informant until I knew some of the ideological tendency from previous observation. After knowing informants' religious orientation, I approached them persuasively. Importantly, I emphasized informants' selection on their eligibility and availability. As I have limited access to some female Muslims in Japan, my wife assisted me in observing a few women groups and individuals. She also arranged some meetings with female interviewees. After interviews, I made sure whether my informants have a Facebook account and allowed me for a friendship list. The interviews often began with topical questions on their life history from their family background to their arrival in Japan which includes their childhood, schools in Indonesia, religious life in family, school and other social environments. Next question is about their ideological, ritual, intellectual, social relation, and experiential dimensions of religiosity which are presented in the survey questionnaire. In addition to face-to-face interviews, right after or a few days after. I also distributed online questionnaires to people whom I have interviewed or observed or follow. However, unlike survey questions addressed to the informants in indirect (online), non-interactive ways, and within fast and limited time, the interview questions were

given in a more direct, interactive, and casual approach. The interview questions guideline was also partially taken from the following survey questionnaire with more qualitative approaches.

4.4. Survey

During summer 2015, I started my field work, collecting data through observation and interviews. During the period, I began distributing survey questionnaire on the religiosity of Indonesian Muslim community in Japan. The questioners were often distributed on the same day or a few days after I visited or interviewed the targeted individuals. The survey was addressed to the interviewees residing in Japan for more than 12 months. With this criterion, assumedly, the informants have enough exposure to the varieties of Japanese society and culture. The survey participants are invited randomly from different Indonesian Muslim groups such as university students, *kenshusei-jesshusei*, health care workers, Japanese spouses, and skilled workers. The questioners were mostly distributed through online forms. Some however filled in the printed forms, which I transferred them into the online forms. The invitation link for the survey contribution was distributed through respondents' email addresses and their social media account such as Facebook Messenger and LINE. A few did fill the form from my personal computer and tablet. I asked the participants to select an answer in varied multiple choices with their own devices.

While the survey was very important, its quantitative result was not designed as separated from its qualitative research approach. Instead, it aims to help me understand my field work situation and validate the findings from interviews and observations. The survey plays an important role in verifying the details of respondents' data, which are frequently missing in interviews. Unstructured interviews, as part of ethnographic strategies, can take too much time for respondents' "long personal" conversations that may or may not directly answer a research question. Tolerating these circumstances, on the other hand, is critical for ethnographers in order to maintain respondent comfort and openness. It is critical for an interviewer to patiently listen to the respondents' lengthy and detailed responses. In this case, however, I may not have enough time to ask detailed variables or respondent opinions. On another occasion, some respondents were hesitantly expanding on their brief responses. In both circumstances, which are common in ethnography fieldwork, respondents' responses on the survey questionnaire provide data for cross-checking their utterances in the interviews. In most cases the data in the survey and ethnography strengthen each other.

Since my research purpose is to understand the relationship between culture and action, I believe the survey helped provide a description of the Indonesian behaviors in Japan, yet hardly the consequential relationship between culture and action. In other words, the survey was intended to enrich the observation and interview data. Most of the questions in the survey, when applicable, however, were also applied during the interviews in addition to some of life story questions we described previously. Some survey questions were adopted and modified from available survey questions commissioned by Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict 2008-2012 (PI: Mark Woodward) and Research and Development Division of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 2012 (PI: Nooryamin Aini), where I was a member of the research team.

To formulate the survey form, I used a Survey Monkey online form. The survey instructions and questions were written in Indonesian language. There were 64 participants who filled in the survey within one year. However, although the participants represent a small population, their responses, I thought, represent qualitatively the objective reality I encountered among the Indonesian in Japan (as well as in Indonesia). Most of the survey questions were designed for this dissertation data analysis purpose. A few, however, were added for other purposes. The survey result will be presented in the next chapter.

4.5. Chapter summary

To some up this chapter has described the methods I used to collect data. Using ethnographic approaches, I did observation and interviews. I applied both “open” and “closed” participant observation in the fields. As for the interview techniques mostly, I did face to face interviews. Also, I did both telephones and online interviews for few respondents and for additional interviews when face to face ones is not possible. Survey questioners were distributed among the interviewees.

The field research was conducted between 2015 and 2018 collecting data from around hundred Indonesian Muslims from different social and cultural background including students, *kenshusei-jeshusei*, corporate employees, spouses of Japanese, nurse and irregulars. The research is conducted in Kanto or Tokyo Great Area especially in Tokyo and Chiba. For the purpose of the informant security, the names of the respondents are written anonymously. Interpretation of the collected data is presented in the next three chapters.

CHAPTER 5

THE RISE OF ISLAMIC CONSERVATISM AMONG INDONESIAN MIGRANTS: A SURVEY

5.1. Introduction

This Chapter describes the result of the survey of Indonesian Muslim Religious Practices in Japan conducted in mid-2015 to mid-2016. It aims to provide general portrayal of the Indonesian Muslims' religious practices tendency in Japan in addition to qualitative interpretation provided in Chapter Six. Based on the structured interviews, we found that moderate and inclusive religious practices remain the dominant tendency of their religious practices. However, the ratio percentage between the conservative-exclusive and moderate-inclusive is pretty small, which could be a warning for the rise of conservatism among the Indonesian Muslim community in Japan. The smaller number of conservative Muslims, but being more active in social mobilization, makes their existence influential and seems dominant.

There were 64 survey participants, including 21 students, 9 *kenshusei-jesshusei*, 6 nurses, 8 spouses of Japan nationals, 14 professionals, 3 dependents (housewives), and 70% of them were male, 30 percent were female, aged 21 to 50, and the majority were in their 30s.⁵⁶ There are a few interviewees who have been living in Japan for more than 20 years, however, mostly between two and five years). In terms of their ethnicity, Javanese, Sundanese, the Minangs, Buginese/ Macassarese, and Malays, respectively, contribute the five largest Indonesian Muslim immigrants in Japan. Coincidentally, they are also among the big Muslim ethnic groups in Indonesia

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Laki-laki (male)	70.18%	40
Perempuan (female)	29.82%	17
TOTAL		57

Figure 01/05: Profiles of respondents: Sex

⁵⁶ Majority of the respondents were MA and PhD students.

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
1-2 Tahun (yrs)	40.98%	25
3-5 Tahun	36.07%	22
6-10 tahun	13.11%	8
11-15 Tahun	3.28%	2
16-20 Tahun	4.92%	3
Lebih dari 20 Tahun	1.64%	1
TOTAL		61

Figure 02/ 5: respondent's length of stays

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Pelajar (students)	47.54%	29
Kenshusei-Jesyhusei	13.11%	8
Perawat-Nurse/Careworker	8.20%	5
Professional/Corporate employee	21.31%	13
Pasangan Jepang (A spouse of Japanese)	1.64%	1
Keturunan Jepang (Japanese descendent)	0.00%	0
Permanen Resident	0.00%	0
Dependent	3.28%	2
Other	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	4.92%	3
TOTAL		61

Figure 3/V: Respondents' occupation/ Visa status

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
SLTP/SMP Sederajat (Junior high school)	0.00%	0
SLTA/ SMA Sederajat (senior high school)	22.03%	13
S1 Sarjana (undergraduate/B.A)	28.81%	17
Pasca sarjana S2 (Master/specialist)	37.29%	22
pasca sarjana s3 (doctoral program)	11.86%	7
TOTAL		59

Figure 4/V: respondents' educational background

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Aceh	1.79%	1
Melayu	5.36%	3
Minang	7.14%	4
Betawi	0.00%	0
Sunda	28.57%	16
Jawa	39.29%	22
Madura	1.79%	1
Bugis/ Makassar	8.93%	5
Sasak	0.00%	0
Gorontalo	0.00%	0
Temate	0.00%	0
Arab	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	7.14%	4
TOTAL		56

Figure 5/V: Respondents' ethnicity background

5.2. Survey questions

The survey asks several questions representing eight topics or issues. The first section is about the participants' **personal identities** including: name (optional), age, sex, occupation, field of jobs/study, home town in Indonesia, length of stay in Japan, living location (town) in Japan, ethnic identity, marital status, number of family members, phone number, and Facebook ID. Not all of the identity questions were answered completely, especially name and phone number.

The second topic is about their **Islamic educational background**. I asked about the length of the participants' experiences of the formal Islamic education programs from between 0 year and more than ten years. Referring to the education system in Indonesia, from elementary school to higher education programs, ten years of study would be the average duration for a student to get a specialist degree majoring in Islamic studies with a strong background (from junior high school to university). In the interviews, I also asked informants' non-formal Islamic educational experiences.

The third topic is about the **level of religious devoutness** (religious commitment) in the ritual dimension. We asked about informants' active participation in Islamic ritual and activities. This topic includes questions about their regularity of going to mosques, their regularity of going to Islamic gatherings, and their frequency of becoming volunteers or board members of an Islamic events or programs. Multiple choices of the answers were provided from NEVER (*tidak pernah*), ONCE (*pernah*), OCCASIONALLY (*kadang kadang*), OFTEN (*sering*), ALWAYS (*selalu*).

Fourth is related to the **intellectual dimension of religiosity**, which is about the sources of religious knowledge and information. In addition to the second issue about the formal Islamic education where they build intellectual Islamic capacity, the survey asked about the Islamic references or source of informants' Islamic understanding, to whom they refer their Islamic understanding and practices. We asked their frequent consultation to the following religious sources of information including: 1. parents, 2. brother or sisters and friends, 3. religious teacher, 4. politicians, 5. printed book, 6. audio visual materials, 7. online websites 8. social media—Facebook/Twitter/Instagram. Multiple choices of the responses were provided from NEVER (*tidak pernah*), ONCE (*pernah*), OCCASIONALLY (*kadang-kadang*), OFTEN (*sering*), REGULARLY (*selalu*).

Fifth, representing the social dimension of religiosity, which is very important to the whole dissertation project, the survey came with the topic of Muslim's attitude toward the others. We asked the degree of **Muslims' social acceptance** (inclusivism) toward and resistance or distances from members of other groups (exclusivism) having different identities. We measure Muslims' accepting attitude of the others ranging from the most intimate (inclusive) to the most distanced ones (exclusive). In this topic, I adopted Bogardus' 1-7 scale of social distance measurement (Bogardus 1930). In order, from 1 to 7 scale, as a spouse (1), family/friends (2), workplaces' mate (3), neighbors, a resident in the same complex (4), a resident of the same city (5), a resident of the same country (6), and a stranger (7). When scoring ONE, a person has a very high degree of acceptance as available to make others a spouse. Scoring SEVEN means he or she is very resistant against the others and considers the other as STRANGER. The social distance scale measures informants' cross-matching over those who have different faith/religion, ethnicity, social class, political ideology, affiliated organizations, nationality, and sex orientation.

The sixth topic is about life experiences in Japan related to the **halal consumption concerns**. As halal is very important concern among Muslim in Japan, I included several questions in the halal issues framework. Halal means lawful, and according to Islamic law, it is a form of food identity for Muslims. This implies Muslims cannot consume non-halal food (haram), making Muslims strategize their food consumption in non-Muslim countries like Japan either in conflicting or integrative approach. This topic describes the participants' exclusive and inclusive social interaction with others in the halal issues settings. To collect the data, we asked (1) whether the respondents consume food with official halal brands only; (2) whether they visit restaurants or food stalls with halal label only, (3) whether they consume food which is processed and cooked by Muslim only, (4) regardless of the volume or size when containing non-halal material, whether its status remains haram (unlawful) to consume, (5). whether they purchase the halal food regardless of the expensive price. Informants were asked to select whether they strongly disagree, disagree, do not know, agree, and strongly agree to each statement. Agreement with those statement (questions #1-4) indicates some degrees of conservatism and exclusiveness among the respondents (conflict approach). Deep narratives of this question of attitudes regarding others and the last topic are presented in the next two chapters.

The seventh topic is related to Muslims' inclusive and exclusive social interactions with others in different contexts of Japanese society—such as at schools and workplaces, as well as neighborhoods. This includes questions whether they (1) attend party invitation from non-Muslim friends, colleagues, neighbors; (2) whether they consume food at a party served by non-Muslims; (3) whether they bring their own food at party for a religious reason; (4) for parents, whether they allow their kids to play with their non-Muslim friends; (5) for female Muslims, whether they only opt to go to female doctors because of religious reasons; (6) whether they avoid visiting non-Muslim's residence for religious reasons, because they have (a) dog(s) as their pet. Negative responses toward these questions (Nos. 1, 2, and 4) and positive response toward the others (Nos. 3, 5, and 6) potentially widen the social distance from the non-Muslims. In this case, we grouped them a support for exclusivism and inclusivism for those respond positively toward number 1,2,4 and negatively toward number 3, 5, and 6.

The eighth topic is about Muslims' religious habits of practices in Japan related to their **cultural background in Indonesia**. This is to classify Muslims' possible backgrounds such as traditionalist, modernists, NU, Muhammadiyah, Salafi/Wahabi, exclusive, inclusive, Islamist members, supporters or sympathizers. The identification for each background is presented in the previous chapter. We asked the informants' opinion within the Islamic legal status of several following practices according to their beliefs and Islamic understanding. We provide five popular legal standing of Muslims' Islamic practices, i.e. 6. obligatory (*harus/wajib*), 5. recommended (expected/sunnah), 4. allowed (*dibolehkan/mubah*), 3. not favored (*tidak disukai/makruh*), 2. prohibited (*terlarang/sinful*), 1. unknown (*tidak tahu*). Asking respondents' opinion, we cross-matched the legal status above with certain practices. For obligation and prohibition, according to Islamic tradition, there is a consequence on Muslims who violate these legal regulations, i.e., God's reward (heaven) for those obeying and God's threat for those disobeying (hell's torment).

The question includes their opinion for the following familiar practices among the traditionalists⁵⁷ (such as NU members), i.e. (1) visiting graveyard (*ziyarah*), (2) prayer of seeking help from the dead holy saints (*wasilah*), (3) using rosary during prayer (*tasbih*), (4) praying in loud voice (*jahr*), (5) attending the anniversary event of the prophet (*mawlid*), (6) wearing face-covering veil (*niqab*: Arabic, *cadar*: Indonesian), (7) man and woman shaking

⁵⁷ Similar questions are often used by researchers to identify respondents' close association with traditionalist or modernists and with NU or Muhammadiyah (e.g (Miichi, 2015b).

hands. Approving or supporting the practices of number 1-5 describes their traditionalist Muslim identities. Objection against the practices is a common indicator among Wahhabi or Islamism supporters and sympathizers as well as very literalist Muhammadiyah members. Most moderate Muhammadiyah members usually share some traditional practices. However, they still have exception against some traditionalists' rituals. Positive response toward question number 6 and negative response toward question number 7 represent conservative gender dynamics which are common among Islamism and post Islamism ideology holders.

The next issue is about Muslims' views on the others' cultural values such as democracy and human right. I further include these statements: (8) "I support to establish Islamic state"⁵⁸; (9) Indonesia deserves to be established on the Islamic state system⁵⁹, Sharia, or *khilafah*; (10) Western countries such US and UK have a contribution to develop democracy in the Muslim countries⁶⁰; (11) Western countries such US and some European countries have a contribution in economic development in the Muslim countries⁶¹; (12) Western countries have a contribution to develop women right in Muslim countries⁶²; Question number 13 is void (for other purposes). (14) loyalty for my nation first then my religion⁶³; (15) non-Muslim can be a leader for Muslim⁶⁴; (16) Women can have an equal leadership as a man; (17) women can take a divorce initiative against her husband (*talaq*). Support for number 8, 9, 14 and objection against number 10, 11, 12, 15, 16,17 are common shared marks among conservative-exclusive groups such as Islamism and post- Islamism sympathizers.

In the survey, we also ask some opinions which are popular among Islamism supporters and sympathizers. This question intends to understand whether Islamism practices exist among the Indonesians in Japan. Referring to previous literature review (theory chapter), those who support the Islamism often view Western countries as enemies of Islam.⁶⁵ Because of their anti-Islam policies, Western countries' cooperation and contribution with the Muslim societies are

⁵⁸ Exclusivist for positive answer

⁵⁹ Exclusivist for positive answer

⁶⁰ Inclusivist for positive answer

⁶¹ Inclusivist for positive answer

⁶² Inclusivist for positive answer

⁶³ Inclusivist for positive answer

⁶⁴ Inclusivist for positive answer

⁶⁵ See (Mujiburrahman, 2006)

often perceived as a camouflage for a hidden agenda.⁶⁶ There is a circulating discourse that “the West cannot be a friend of Muslim”.⁶⁷ One of the popular rhetoric among Islamists says “Christian and Jews (Western) never ever sincerely cooperate with you (Muslim), until you follow their path of life; becoming a Christian and follow the Jews.⁶⁸ A Muslim should take a pre-caution before making any relationship and friendship with them.” To detect whether this opinion exist, we asked the informants several questions, including first, whether Western societies such as US, UK, and Australia have any contributions in developing democracy in Muslim countries. Second, whether they agree if the Western societies have some contribution to the economic development of Muslim countries. Third, whether Western societies have some contribution in upgrading women status in Muslim countries. Rejection against the answers denotes exclusivism. “Strongly disagree, and disagree” choices inform the degree of exclusivism.

I also asked the informant’s opinion on nationalism, which is theologically “heretic” according to many Islamist activists in Indonesia. Many Islamists believe in the existence of the global Muslim community (*ummah*) where a Muslim’s relationship with other Muslims should not be limited or grouped by the geographical territories rather by the shared one ideology under one Islamic governance system (P. G. Mandaville, 2003). Thus, I asked informants whether defending the nation (patriotism) must be put forward before defending the global *ummah*. In addition, whether they agree that *khilafah/Sharia* becomes the national constitution of Indonesia. Finally, another marker of existing Islamism idea is extreme injustice ideologies against women. I, therefore, asked the informants some related questions including: whether female Muslim can lead among themselves and among the men in public? Another question, whether a wife can take divorce initiative against her husband. There is a popular religious interpretation that a divorce request must be coming from the husband’s approval. Referring to the collected data, we can sum up the following results

5.3. Survey result

5.3.1. Islamic educational background

From this survey, we found that the majority of informants (57%) have zero experiences of formal Islamic education. No one (0%) had experienced Islamic education of up to ten years.

⁶⁶ See (Mujiburrahman, 2006)

⁶⁷ (Muhtadi, 2008)

⁶⁸ See (Abou El Fadl, 1994; An-Na’im, 2009)

There are a few participants (25 %) who have studied for around three years (junior high school), around 7 % has experienced more than six years.

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Tidak pernah/ 0 tahun (Never)	57.14%	36
Pernah kurang dari 3 tahun (Less than 3 yrs)	9.52%	6
3-6 Tahun (yrs)	25.40%	16
6-10 tahun (yrs)	7.94%	5
Lebih dari 10 tahun (more than 10 yrs)	0.00%	0
TOTAL		63

Figure 06/ 5: Respondents' length of religious education

This means my majority informants (57%) have limited capacity (skills) in diverse normative Islamic literature. This fact is supported by the evidence that most of the informants do not have any formal Islamic educational experiences such as going to Islamic institutions (*pesantren*), madrasah, State Islamic Junior and senior high schools, or Islamic higher education institutions belonging to either the state or private organization. The result is also consistent with our previous discussion about Indonesian Muslims who have limited skill in Islamic studies (repertoire chapter).

5.3.2. Religious devoutness

How pious/devoted Indonesian Muslims to their religion are. We measure the religious devoutness from how often the respondents participate in several activities such as communal prayers, gathering activities, and organization service. Based on their regular prayers and participation in communal gatherings, majority informants gave high scores for strong commitment group answers, OCASSIONALLY and OFTEN (26 and 19%). Meanwhile, on the organization activism they scored highest for ONCE and OFTEN (25 and 14 %).

	TIDAK PERNAH (NEVER)	PERNAH (ONCE-TWO TIMES)	KADANG-KADANG (SOMETIMES)	SERING (OFTEN)	SANGAT SERING (VERY OFTEN)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Shalat berjamaah di masjid atau mushalla (prayer at mosque)	6.35% 4	17.46% 11	41.27% 26	30.16% 19	4.76% 3	63	3.10
Mengikuti pengajian atau kelas kajian Islam (Islamic studies tutorial)	4.76% 3	19.05% 12	39.68% 25	30.16% 19	6.35% 4	63	3.14
Menjadi pengurus atau kepanitiaan dalam organisasi sosial keagamaan (Islamic organization activist or committee)	22.22% 14	39.68% 25	9.52% 6	22.22% 14	6.35% 4	63	2.51

Figure 07/V: Percentage of religiosity devoutness

Many previous surveys including that of Riaz Hassan (2007) and (Pew Research Center, 2018). Have included Indonesia as one of the world's most religiously committed Muslim countries. They measure, for example, quantitatively from how many times a day Indonesians do their prayers. This seems not far from correct as we see a comparable situation among Indonesian Muslims in Japan. From the survey and observation, I could conclude that, first, in majority, Indonesian Muslims in Japan have strong commitment to their religion as expressed in their active participation in ritual and Islamic group gatherings. In addition to their self-

description as obedient Muslims (69 %), in the survey, most of them experienced or stated positive things about those religious rituals and activities. The majority of my informants admitted that they OFTEN go to the mosques more than once a week and pray five-time prayers a day. Smaller number (6%) answered they never go to mosque compared to those who occasionally and regularly go to the mosque (41% and 30%).

Measuring their religious commitment, I also looked at their occasional attendances at the Islamic studies gathering. Everyone has an experience attending an Islamic class gathering in Japan at least once, but the majority of them replied they sometime (39 %) and often go to the gathering (30 %). Third, as previously mentioned, Indonesian Muslim communities were very active in organizing public lectures to upgrade their Islamic knowledge. This activity needs many people to prepare and organize to make it successful (social work). Joining the group, and helping them voluntarily (such as preparing the venue, inviting and hospitalizing the speaker, mobilizing the audience, and tidying up the location after the programs) indicates someone's active involvement in the group's social project (religious group commitment). Therefore, I also consider having the experience to help organize an Islamic activity as an indicator of religious commitment. Majority of the informants have once (25 %) or more experiences (14%) in helping to serve, or organize public programs such as voluntary projects at mosques, Islamic classes, festivals, or gatherings. These facts support the majority of my informants' self-claim of being religiously committed Muslims (69%).

5.3.3. Islamic literacy

The next issue is about the sources of respondents' religious reference. From the answers of the prepared questions, we found that informants give respectively the highest score for social media (51%), friends (51%), religious teachers (46%)

Related to their high enthusiasm and limited religious intellectual capacity that were revealed in the previous response, we further asked informants how they got information or literature sources in upgrading their Islamic understanding. Majority of the informants answered that they consulted their understanding through their religious teachers. However, Interestingly, they mostly consulted their religious understanding through the internet sources. This means only those that are popular on the online media will get the informants' attention. In this case, social media, i.e., Facebook, and online video, i.e., YouTube, ranked the highest for accessed source of Islamic literacy. While my survey did not provide names of favorite preacher, during the in-depth interviews I always asked to whom (Islamic experts) the

informants referred most of their Islamic understanding available online. Many of my informants watched live and recorded YouTube videos of AA Gym, Khalid Basalamah, Arifin Ilham, and Yusuf Mansur. This finding is in consistent with several previous research findings on Muslim youth in which Indonesian Muslims have a very high score accessing “online” preachers.⁶⁹ As for additional information, AA Gym was one of the very popular preachers since the 2000s before his popularity decreased and was recently replaced by Ustadz Abdus Shomad (UAS) and other preachers. It has been said that AA Gym was very attractive among the youth because of his new interactive methods, soft and easy language. However, AA Gym was also very popular for some conservative views on Islam including his views and practice of polygamy, women in public life, non-Muslim political leadership, literalist method of Islamic interpretation. AA Gym himself does not have a strong background of formal Islamic education as many other contemporary new religious preachers.⁷⁰

	TIDAK PERNAH (NEVER)	KADANG-KADANG (SOMETIMES)	SERING (OFTEN)	SANGAT SERING (VERY OFTEN)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Orang tua (termasuk, kakek kakek, nenek paman bibi) (parents and seniors)	8.06% 5	25.81% 16	33.87% 21	32.26% 20	62	2.90
Teman/ saudara (bukan keluarga inti) (close friends and sibling)	1.61% 1	32.26% 20	51.61% 32	14.52% 9	62	2.79
Pengajar agama (guru, ustadz, kyai) (Religious teachers)	4.84% 3	29.03% 18	46.77% 29	19.35% 12	62	2.81
Tokoh politik/pejabat pemerintah (policy makers)	54.84% 34	37.10% 23	6.45% 4	1.61% 1	62	1.55
Printed media(buku, majalah, koran)	6.56% 4	39.34% 24	40.98% 25	13.11% 8	61	2.61
Audio/Visual media (televisi, radio, CD)	8.06% 5	35.48% 22	41.94% 26	14.52% 9	62	2.63
Online media (FB, youtube, web streaming dll)	1.61% 1	24.19% 15	51.61% 32	22.58% 14	62	2.95

Figure 08/V: Islamic reference

⁶⁹ PPIM, Convey, see (Garadian, 2021).

⁷⁰ Biografi Aa Gym (Abdullah Gymnastiar) - Biografi Tokoh

5.3.4. Muslim-non-Muslim relationship

The survey reveals that different ethnicities and social classes do not matter most for becoming a spouse (most intimate relationship) (49%), and different sexual orientation scores the most distanced one (7) (44.83%). Different social classes, political ideologies and organizations respectively stay between those two opposite edges. The majority of the informants make the highest score for any other identity differences including sexual orientation and religious background as a friend at workplaces or schools. However, it must be considered important, regardless of their religious organization affiliation. Around 11 percent show exclusive views by seeing other religious adherents only as co-resident of one building apartment. In addition, among the informants only two percent accept people with other religious orientations as spouses and a family member. In other words, the majority of respondents do not agree with interfaith/inter-religious family. The survey also witnessed Indonesian Muslims integrative willingness (inclusivism) practices as shown in their attitudes to friends and neighbors. Around 70% agree to let their children play with non-Muslim children, while most of them do not let them eat food from their school (42%) or from non-Muslims' friends' house. Conservatism is also present in their positive response to question number 5 and 6 with less percentage for question # 5. On number 5, while most of them are male informants, around 20% agree that female Muslims must go to the female medical doctors only against 53%

who disagree. On the dog’s issue as a pet (#6), for the religious reasons, majority informants do not favor going to visit non-Muslims who have a dog as a pet (45%).

Figure 09/ V: Muslim and social distance

5.3.5. Halal issues

As for the first question (halal labels only), the difference/deviation between those who agree (including strongly agree) and disagree (including strongly disagree) to choose food with an official halal label (Q1, see the halal question list) is less than 10 percent for those disagreeing. The deviation percentage was very small for those who selected “halal label only”.

	1. SEBAGAI PASANGAN SUAMI/ ISTRI (AS A SPOUSE)	2. SAUDARA/ SAHABAT DEKAT (SIBLING/CLOSE FRIENDS)	3. TEMAN SEKOLAH/PARTNER KERJA (FRIENDS AT SCHOOL OR WORK PLACE)	4. TETANGGA SATU KOMPLEK PERUMAHAN/APARTEMEN (A NEIGHBOR)	5. WARGA SATU KAWASAN TINGGAL (MISAL MENTENG) (RESIDENT OF A COMPLEX)	6. WARGA SATU KOTA (CONTOH JAKARTA (A RESIDENT OF A CITY))
Berbeda Agama (different religion)	1.64% 1	42.62% 26	39.34% 24	4.92% 3	3.28% 2	1.64%
Berbeda suku/ras (different ethnicity)	49.18% 30	22.95% 14	19.67% 12	1.64% 1	0.00% 0	3.28%
Berbeda kelas sosial (kaya vs miskin, pejabat vs bawahan) (different social status)	36.07% 22	34.43% 21	18.03% 11	6.56% 4	1.64% 1	1.64%
Berbeda ideologi/dukungan politik (different political ideology)	20.34% 12	32.20% 19	33.90% 20	5.08% 3	3.39% 2	3.39%
Berbeda organisasi masyarakat (HMI/IMM/NU/Muhammadiyah) (religious organization)	27.12% 16	44.07% 26	15.25% 9	8.47% 5	5.08% 3	0.00%
Berbeda negara (country)	24.59% 15	29.51% 18	27.87% 17	0.00% 0	3.28% 2	4.92%
Berbeda orientasi sex (straight vs Lesbian, gay, bisex, transgender) (sexual orientation)	0.00% 0	10.34% 6	29.31% 17	6.90% 4	3.45% 2	5.17%

This means that the perception between those who are considering official halal labels important is fewer than those who are considering it insignificant. This shows informants’ higher inclusivism in halal conception and practices as the informants seemingly do not consider halal could be defined only by certain official authority (such as that belonging to the Malaysian ministry of religious Affairs or Indonesian Council of Ulama). There is possible halal label conception made by non-official authority. Similar inclusivism is shown in the informants’ answers to question number two (Q2), “whether they agree to go to a restaurant with halal label only.” The objection responses to this question are 10% higher than the approved response. Similar high divergence belongs to those favoring objection showing informants’ inclusive approaches. The inclusivism also won the number in the next question.

Regarding Q3, whether they consume foods made by Muslims only, most of the respondents disagree (58%) against those who are approving (around 33%). This means majority informants do not look exclusively at the restaurant owners' or their staffs' religion. Majority respondents view the food maker does not necessarily have to be a co-Muslim.

The next question measures whether the informants have an alternative view of halal as it is not a taken for granted conception. 80% of the informants agree (strongly agree 45%) for their opinion that whatever the size or volume, big or small, when it comes from haram substance, it remains haram (not edible). The small part will contaminate the whole body of materials. Anything coming from a pig regardless of its body parts, size, and smell remain haram. In contrast to the available conceptual theories on many literatures, a very small number of informants consider any possible alternative views (15%). Consistent with the previous question, the next opinion strengthens the evidence of their persistence for the halal consumption. Majority of the informants (80%) will purchase the halal product even though they are more expensive than the non-halal products.

The result for this question about non-Muslims' food also finds the majority of the informants (85%) are positive with the statement about going to the non-Muslims' party invitation, meaning majority will go for non-Muslim invitation. 10% of them do not know, and only 5% agree with the opinion. The next opinion, however, is more interesting because more than 50% (57) agree and very agree, while they attend non-Muslims' invitation they will not eat and consume the food. In consequence, around 44% say they will bring their own food during their non-Muslim parties. The informants' answers show their inclusive and conservative practices at the same time—attending the invitation (inclusivism) not consuming the host food (exclusivism).

	SANGAT TIDAK SETUJU (VERY DISAGREE)	TIDAK SETUJU (DISAGREE)	TIDAK TAHU (I DO NOT KNOW)	SETUJU (AGREE)	SANGAT SETUJU (VERY AGREE)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Hanya mengkonsumsi makanan, minuman, atau produk lainnya yang BERLABEL HALAL RESMI dari badan/organisasi sertifikasi halal (only consuming food with halal label from accredited organization) .	9.38% 6	31.25% 20	9.38% 6	28.13% 18	21.88% 14	64	3.22
Hanya mengunjungi rumah makan atau restoran yang BERLABEL Halal. (only attending restaurant with halal label)	7.81% 5	37.50% 24	12.50% 8	28.13% 18	14.06% 9	64	3.03
Hanya mengkonsumsi makanan yang dimasak/dibuat oleh orang Islam. (only consuming food made by Muslim)	9.52% 6	46.03% 29	12.70% 8	25.40% 16	6.35% 4	63	2.73
Sedikit atau banyak, kelihatan atau tidak kelihatan jika salah satu bahan makanan, minuman, produk kosmetik mengandung material dari jenis yang haram maka saya tidak mau memakai atau mengkonsumsinya. (I will no consume or wear food, or accessories containing non halal material even very little")	6.25% 4	10.94% 7	3.13% 2	35.94% 23	43.75% 28	64	4.00
Lebih mahal tidak masalah yang penting halal! (I ll purchase the halal even more expensive)	4.69% 3	10.94% 7	4.69% 3	29.69% 19	50.00% 32	64	4.09

Figure 10/V: on the “Halal” behavior

5.3.6. Niqab (*cadar*)

We include a question on *cadar* (Indonesian) *niqab* (Arabic) because wearing head and face cover is basically not required according to Islamic texts, while only lately—with the growth of conservatism—some Muslims believe it as recommended by the Islamic law for wearing *cadar* as it was practiced by some of the prophet’s wives (Nisa, 2012). Although once it was a rare practice, wearing *cadar* is recently getting popularity and socially endorsed by some Muslim communities in Indonesia, obviously among post Islamist groups such as Salafi and Tablighi families, the growing conservative factions in Indonesia. Some Islamic schools affiliated to *Salafi* and *Tabligh* have even urged wearing *cadar* as an official female students’ outfit.

Similarly, question number 7, man and woman shaking hands, is also controversial. In the past, men and women shaking each other's hands when they meet as friends was just a common phenomenon at schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods. Only after the recent growing phenomenon of Salafism that the segregation between male and female has gained more popularity. Male cannot shake female friends' hands, as exemplified by a House of Speaker from Islamic party PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid, when rejecting Michael Obama's offering of her hands. Traditionalist NU and modernist Muhammadiyah members might also practice the custom, but it is not as typical as Salafi and Tabligh members do. They often flexibly shake or do not shake female's hands depending on the reasons and cultural habits. In the public affairs such as government meeting, they would not act as what Hidayat Wahid did to Mrs. Obama. Agreeing with the 6th and 7th question can be a marker of Salafism practices (conservatism). Sharing affiliation or showing sympathy with Islamism or Wahhabism ideology is also reflected in their supporting for or resistance statement against the opinions of discussion in next C 8 section.

5.3.7. Local and transnational Islam

	HARAM/ TIDAK BOLEH (PROHIBITED)	MAKRUH/ TIDAK DISUKAI (DISLIKED)	MUBAH/BOLEH (PERMITTED)	SUNNAH/ DISUKAI (PREFERRED)	WAJIB/ HARUS (OBLIGATION)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Ziyarah makam /mengunjungi kuburan (visiting graveyard)	0.00% 0	3.13% 2	56.25% 36	39.06% 25	1.56% 1	64	3.39
Washilah/ Meminta pertolongan melalui orang shaleh/wali yang sudah meninggal (seeking prayers through "holy" man like saints)	61.90% 39	9.52% 6	19.05% 12	9.52% 6	0.00% 0	63	1.76
Memakai tasbeih saat berdoa atau berdzikir (Kristen :Rosario) Using rosario during prayers	4.92% 3	8.20% 5	68.85% 42	16.39% 10	1.64% 1	61	3.02
Berdzikir dengan suara (jahr) doing contemplation in laud chants	0.00% 0	15.87% 10	63.49% 40	19.05% 12	1.59% 1	63	3.06
Ber-Maulid Nabi seperti membaca Barzanji atau Burdah sebagai tradisi memperingati kelahiran nabi S.A W; attending maulid	9.68% 6	16.13% 10	45.16% 28	25.81% 16	3.23% 2	62	2.97
Niqab / memaki cadar /penutup muka untuk perempuan (wearing cadar/ burqa)	3.28% 2	13.11% 8	42.62% 26	39.34% 24	1.64% 1	61	3.23
Perempuan/laki laki bersalaman dengan yang bukan mahromnya (man-woman shaking hands)	45.16% 28	29.03% 18	24.19% 15	0.00% 0	1.61% 1	62	1.84
Mendukung terbentuknya negara Islam berdasarkan syariat; Establishment of Islamic state	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0	0.00

Figure 11/5: traditionalist, modernist, and Islamist backgrounds

From this survey we found that the majority of the informants used to practice above various Islamic local traditions in Indonesia or think that practicing such local custom or tradition is counted as good deeds (40-60%). There are a smaller number of informants who think those practices are not Islamic, especially about *wasilah* (60%) hence prohibited. Referring to the previous theoretical chapter, I have argued that Muslims practicing local

Islamic expressions as formally grouped in NU communities make the largest Muslim population in Indonesia. It is not incorrect to say that the majority of Indonesian Muslims in Japan are also culturally rooted in NU (traditionalists), followed by Muhammadiyah members.

According to the survey result, as well interviews, at their home towns, majority informants (56%) used to perform *ziyarah* (graveyard visit) in Indonesia, attending *slametan* (63% communal chanting) at their villages, or hometown, attend *maulid* (prophet's birth anniversary) annually, doing 'dzikir' after every prayer, including Qunut during subuh prayer. Majority of them also think attending *slametan* is not a problem according to Islam. To say that the majority of Indonesians in Japan were rooted in NU's cultural tradition, I think is partially true, as the majority of *kenshusei* and ex *kenshusei* who remain in Japan were born and grew up in rural or small towns in Java, bases of NU and *abangan* communities. However, those practices were also shared by *Abangan* communities.

Not surprisingly, many university students (assumedly from educated families) living in cities also come from or had family ties in the rural villages in Java. In addition, many informant students, who experienced living or have been living in metropolitan areas, were second generations of a family experiencing urbanization in the late 70s or early 80s. This is to say that even though many of them are currently "less religious" or more familiar to the Muhammadiyah, Salafi/Wahhabi, or Ikhwani practices, their parents or grandparents' religious practices might be rooted in NU or *Abangan* traditions. Many of those studying and living in Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta (big cities in Indonesia) came from surrounding smaller towns or villages rooted in local traditions.

This survey does not intend to find the valid number of the NU and Muhammadiyah as well as the quantity of the other Islamic organizations' members. However, transnationalism theory—reflected in Indonesian immigrants' social and cultural presentation in Japan—that seems to work well among Indonesian immigrants in Japan provides a sense of their assumed quantity. With exception of young age and high education level background among the students, which is a common cultural background of Indonesians in Japan, the social and cultural backgrounds of Indonesians in Japan also represent the similar setting of contemporary Indonesian Muslims in their home country. While the largest Indonesian Muslim population in Japan possibly affiliated with NU cultural backgrounds, especially among *kenshusei*, the second largest of them possibly affiliate to Muhammadiyah, especially among the students. Some cultural characteristics among Indonesian Muslim students in Japan represent the cultural

setting of Muhammadiyah community in Indonesia in terms of their average level of educational background and socio-economic status. Many students come from many Muhammadiyah homebased cities in Java, and outside of Java in Sumatera, Sulawesi, and Borneo. Students' social cultural backgrounds from middle class urban families represent the common cultural background of Muhammadiyah members in Indonesian cities. In terms of religious practices, in congruence research about Muhammadiyah members, part of them, recently share some religious practices with the Salafī group. In Indonesia, many of those resisting local Islamic practices are unclearly mixed groups of Salafī and Muhammadiyah members. Sharing the ideas of "Return to Qur'an", and rationality ideas, Muhammadiyah members often becomes the market targets of the Salafī groups opposing the local "irrational" and mystical Islamic practices (Jahroni, 2007).

5.3.8. Islam, democracy and human right

For the question on western countries' contribution for democracy development in the Muslim countries, around 41% of the informants disagree and strongly disagree with the opinion. Around 33% of the informants agree and strongly agree with the opinion. Around 26% do not have any idea about the opinion. From the results, there is a significant percentage of the resisting informants devaluing the role of Western nations in the developing democracy in the Muslim countries. This is in contrast to the fact that, historically, democracy is a cultural value developed by the United States and some other Western countries.

For the next question about Western countries' economic contribution in Muslim countries, majority informants disagree and strongly disagree (45%). A smaller percentage (36%) agree and strongly agree with the opinion. Thus, we understand that a significant number of informants resist the opinion that Western societies have a contribution in the economic development of Muslim countries. Resistance against the West seems consistent in their strong rejection against the statement meanwhile Indonesia has been long time doing business with Western countries and in some sectors rely on them. This resistance against the West is also shown in their views against the next opinion on women status in Muslim countries.

The majority of the informants (54%) disagree and strongly disagree with and only 20% agree with the opinion that Western countries have contribution in upgrading women status in Muslim countries.

Related to the Islamism ideas, on the relation between nation and religion, majority of the informants (54%) say religious group interests (global *ummah*) is more prioritized than the

national interest (nationalism), which only score 23%. Finally, on the *Khilafah/Sharia* system, whether it suits the Indonesian governance system, majority of informants, 40% disagree and 34% agree and strongly disagree. Although those disagreeing have smaller numbers, it is a significant percentage that more than 1/3 of the informants agree with the *khilafah* system in Indonesia.

Another controversial debate in the contemporary Islamic discourses is about women in Islam. Women in Islam has been a controversial issue as various unjust practices and oppression against women in Muslim societies are very widespread. Some traditional and conservative Islamism groups treat women in very discriminative ways, including considering them only as domestic care takers. In some very ultra-conservative groups, women cannot go out of their houses even for school purposes. In the context of gender justice and equality promoted by many progressive Muslim theologians, we asked the issue by providing questions in this section: whether female Muslim can lead among themselves and men. Surprisingly majority of the informants (61%) disagree with the opinion and only 28% agree that women can take a public leadership.

Woman position in certain Muslim societies is very vulnerable and so is their status according to some Islamic texts. For example, a wife cannot file for divorce except when the husband trespasses Islamic law, under which, often a husband exercises his power over his wife's rights. Islamic law is often interpreted according to the husbands' personal interests that are influenced by patriarchal culture which often ignore the wife's freedom and rights. Many women are not able to defend themselves from their violent husbands. Thus, we asked the informants' opinion about a woman's right to file divorce request. The survey result shows that conservative opinion holders remain high (38% disagree with the opinion) although the majority do agree with the opinion (48.7%). Thus, we conclude international migration seemingly makes little changes in Muslims' inclusive views and practices of treating women in spite of their inter-cultural exposure in Japan.

	SANGAT TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK TAHU	SETUJU	SANGAT SETUJU	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Negara Barat (seperti Amerika dan Eropa) berperan besar dalam mengembangkan demokrasi di negara-negara Muslim"	14.29% 9	28.57% 18	20.63% 13	30.16% 19	6.35% 4	63	2.86
Negara-negara Barat berkontribusi besar dalam pembangunan ekonomi di negara-negara Muslim	14.52% 9	35.48% 22	16.13% 10	30.65% 19	3.23% 2	62	2.73
Negara-negara Barat punya peranan besar dalam menaikkan derajat peran perempuan di negeri-negeri Muslim	26.98% 17	30.16% 19	22.22% 14	17.46% 11	3.17% 2	63	2.40
Bangsa Barat mempunyai standar moral yang lebih rendah daripada negeri-negeri Muslim?	6.45% 4	27.42% 17	29.03% 18	27.42% 17	9.68% 6	62	3.06
Kesetiaan kepada bangsa dan Negara harus didahulukan dari kesetiaan kepada umat"	17.46% 11	41.27% 26	19.05% 12	17.46% 11	4.76% 3	63	2.51
Negara Islam berdasarkan SYARIAT termasuk dalam bentuk khilafah tidak cocok diberlakukan di Indonesia	13.33% 8	18.33% 11	25.00% 15	33.33% 20	10.00% 6	60	3.08
Perempuan bisa menjadi pemimpin bagi sesama mereka sendiri dan atau untuk laki-laki	16.13% 10	38.71% 24	6.45% 4	37.10% 23	1.61% 1	62	2.69
Istri dapat menggugat (Menceraikan) suaminya	14.52% 9	19.35% 12	11.29% 7	43.55% 27	11.29% 7	62	3.18

Figure 12/5: Islam and new culture

5.4. Chapter summary

The survey result shows first that there are varied religious practices among Indonesian Muslims in Japan from moderate to conservative ones, from inclusive to exclusive ones. Secondly, there are also varied cultural and social backgrounds of Indonesian Muslims including their ethnic, rural-urban origins, Islamic organization affiliations, hometown tradition and customs, political ideologies and educational background which might have somethings to do with these diverse practices. Third, a very important fact, most of the informants have little experiences of formal Islamic education which might lead their Islamic literacy depends on the

online and secondary resources. Fourth, conservatism and Islamism exist, albeit in smaller numbers than the moderate and inclusive ones, and they have little to do with Japan's political context. The existing Islamism discourses and practices only deal with the Indonesian cultural and political context in Indonesia. Fifth, the overall findings show that transnationalism theory works well in the sense that the religious practices of Indonesians in Japan is a representation of what has been practiced in Indonesia.

The result shows that Indonesians in Japan represent their population in Indonesia in which moderate and traditional Muslims remain the dominant Muslim groups in the home country. Likewise, the rising tendency of religious conservatism in Japan is also related to what has happened in Indonesia in terms of the rise of conservative Islam. NU and Muhammadiyah remain the largest cultural background of the Indonesian Muslim communities along with their varied style of religiosity. Young age and education background of science, however, become the exceptional variables as most of the Indonesian immigrants are in their young productive ages and have a good educational background, especially among students and professionals. They are, however, the leading groups which actively engaged in the social and religious mobilization among Indonesian communities in Japan. The questions of “who they are, what religious orientation and practice they mobilize, what makes them as they are” were some of the issues that become important discussion in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 6

MUSLIMS' EXCLUSIVE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES, THEIR CULTURAL REPERTOIRE AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

6.1 Exclusive religious practices

6.1.1 Introduction

The previous chapter based on the structured interviews has found the growing tendency of exclusive religious practices among Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan. This chapter is my ethnographic interpretation toward this exclusive strategy of action and the cultural factors behind the phenomena. It describes why people get interest more in conservative or fundamentalist religious ideas and develop exclusive attitudes (strategies) by showing their cultural repertoire back in Indonesia and their engagement with new ideologies and their supporters encountered in Japan. While the previous chapter provides a general picture of Indonesians' divergent Islamic practices and fundamentalism tendency among them, this chapter reports the relationship between their exclusive religious practices, cultural repertoire, and migration life experiences in Japan through recorded narratives from my informants.

Through several cases, first, I want to present the growing tendency of religious conservatism among Indonesian Muslims. Secondly, through the transnationalism perspectives, I argue that the rise of conservatism among the Indonesian people in Japan is related to new repertoire of Islamism in Indonesia, and new ideologies experienced in Japan. Transnationalism helps the emigrants' cultural repertoire continued and extended in the new places.⁷¹

Consistent with the previous chapter's finding about the growing fundamentalism among university students and alumni (corporate employers), this chapter discusses why and how this tendency happens and its impacts to the socio-religious dynamic among the Indonesian Muslims in Japan and their incorporation with the Japanese society. Previously, we have argued that Indonesians with their student and professional status have significant roles in the

⁷¹Trans-nationalism is the idea that human relations and social fields span national borders. It is the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their place of settlement (Levitt, 2001; Schiller et al., 1992)." In other words, transnationalism relates to new phenomena of migration, which does not only engage activities in the new society, but also in their sending countries and beyond (Levitt, 2001).

Indonesian community religious organization and mobilization. This chapter aims to describe how this social process goes amongst the Indonesian Muslim community in Japan. The discussion is structured as follows; First is the conceptual emphasis on conservatism and exclusivist religious practices. Second is the ethnographic narratives of the conservatism among different Indonesian groups taking some cases of “halal” Christmas celebration issues and non-Muslim public leadership. Third, focusing on the university students’ phenomena, I discuss the cultural repertoire, new ideologies, and migration life circumstances as the factors behind (my argument on) growing Islamic conservatism exclusivism in Indonesian Muslim migrant groups in Japan.

6.1.2. Conservatism-exclusivism ideological roots

Based on observations and interviews, we have exposed the existence and tendency of Islamic conservatism among Indonesian migrants in Japan. Although quantitatively, the moderate and inclusive Muslims remain the dominant characteristics of Indonesian Muslims in Japan, the minority conservative-exclusive Muslims, lately, have been dominating the public appearances and discourses within the internal Indonesian Muslim communities in Japan. Their organizations frequently appear in public with various programs and mobilize people for participation. Several mosques in Tokyo have witnessed the frequent gathering of Islamist Tarbiyah *liqa* and *halaqah*⁷² style meeting led by Indonesian Muslim activists. Online social media such as Facebook and Instagram also repeatedly record their gathering activities attended by persons linked to fundamentalist groups in Indonesia. Although mainstream inclusive Muslim migrants are the majority of Indonesian Muslim groups, they rarely mobilize themselves in shared programs aiming to promote their moderate understanding of Islam or to strengthen their organization cohesiveness. During my four-years residency in Japan from 2015 to 2018, majority Indonesian Muslim gatherings in Tokyo staged religious speakers who promoted conservative and intolerant views. Even the Islamic forum supported by the embassy apparatus facilitated the presence of conservative speakers of Salafi, Wahhabi, and Islamist orientations.

⁷². Liqa (Arabic) means meeting. Halaqoh (Arabic) means group meeting shaping O circle, where the Murabbi (instructor), lead at the centre of the circle. Their main activity is reading Qur’an and its translation. It is very common meeting style of the Islamism activists among university students. Male and female have their different group or are segregated by a curtain/ screen (although done in public park). Discussion on this topic, see (Latief, 2010)

To sum up our previous chapter’s discussion, the Islamic conservatism is defined as a perspective of understanding Islam as a textually taken for granted as practiced by the early Muslim generation during the periods of the prophet Muhammad and his companions (Saeed, 2020).⁷³ The textual resources compiled from the 6th and 7th century are understood in verbatim, meaning without historical, sociological and cultural interpretation (R. M. Scott, 2009). In the modern age, this way of Islamic understanding, historically, regained popularity during the colonial era, as a response to the Western rulers’ conquest of the Muslim world (Nasr, 1995). To compete with the Western advances and modernization, conservatism’s illusionary onset message was that Muslims need to be united under its most original sources of teachings, i.e. Quran and Sunna, without referring scholarly interpretation (A. Wahid, 2009). Their popular slogan in Indonesia is “return to Quran and Sunna.” According to this ideology, local cultural elements in the classical Quranic interpretation have tarnished Islamic tradition and weakened Muslims’ fighting spirit against colonialization. There was an argument that classical interpretation of Islam had been very much influenced by the local cultural context of each period and territories causing world-wide Muslims’ political fracture. In more contemporary days (late 20th and early 21st centuries), these conservative methods of Islamic understanding result in the Wahhabi and Qutbism “purification”⁷⁴ orientation of Islamic ideologies and movements (fundamentalism). In Chapter Three, I have described its historical development which is sketched as follows.

Global Salafism and movement Orientation	Islam ABOVE the others	Islam AGAINST the others	Politics	Figures and Institutions
Salafi (Ikhwani)/ Brotherhood ----- - Politics State	OTHERS ARE Less Islamic Incorrect Muslim	Takfir Underground movement against the state -Terrorism	To establish Islamic State People will follow after State	NII Sayid Qutb Ikhwanul Muslimin Hammas Hizb Tahrir
Wahabi=> Culture People	Others are less Islamic ->Bid’ah, Syirk	Takfir ideology consequences ->following the state Seclusion	Non-Political When everyone conducting Shariah, Islamic state will come	Bin Baaz, Al Albani, Ustmain Saudi Arabia council of Ulama
Salabi=> Politics People/culture State	Others are less Islamic ->Enemy, Munafiq Syirk, Bid’a	Takfir ideology -against the state Muslim should establish God’s law Warfare /terrorism	Combined political and culture Islamic state needed to establish Sharia	Radical and terrorist groups Jamaat Islami (Pakistan, Bangladesh) HTI (Indonesia) Taliban, Alqaeda (Afghanistan) NII -JI (Indonesia)

⁷³ See (Bruinessen, 2011)

⁷⁴ Qutbism is ideological movement which was inspired by the ideas and aspiration of Sayid Qutb, a leader of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Brotherhood) in Egypt. See (Tibi, 2002)

Figure 01/6I: Salafism in Indonesia (and Japan)

This Wahabi (Salafi, preferred name by insiders) purification ideology aspiring to this so-called “original Islam” is the idea that true Islam should not be mixed with elements of other cultures (Roy 2005, Tibi 2002). This kind of textual Islamic reading produces the ideas of Islamic purification and “aspiration” to return to the life of Muslim community in its early formation (6-7 Century) which produces contradictions and incompatibilities with the 21st century’s multiculturalism values. Meanwhile, Qutbism fundamentalism refers to the “purification” in Islamic politics that a Muslim must establish Islamic political power to establish the Islamic values against the Western civilization (Tibi 2002). Purification, the heart mission of the Islamic fundamentalism, produces exclusive attitudes toward the others whose views and practice are different (called *syirk/idolatry*, and *bid’a/heresy*). Historically, this school of thought was rooted in the thought Muhammad bin Abd Wahab, a religious teacher, co-founder of the Saudi Arabia kingdom and maintained by “state” council of ulama (Muslim scholars) of Saudi Arabia (Esposito 2005). Contemporarily, after the Afghanistan war against Soviet Union, Salafism (their preferred name) in its varied factions has mixed with the ideas of Sayid Qutb (Salafi Ikhwanul Muslimin). Therefore, they are named Salabi—El Fadl’s abbreviation of Salafi and Wahabi (Abou El Fadl, 2005). This version of Salafism recently has been the most important and fastest growing Islamic faction which promotes and influences on the global Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. My field work in Japan also witnessed growing tendency of those varied fundamentalism orientation among minority Indonesian Muslim migrants. Following their reference groups in Indonesia, the Indonesians’ fundamentalism in Japan also has varied scales of conservatism.

By the degree of their strictness in conservative understanding and exclusive attitudes toward “the others”, the fundamentalist practices among Indonesian migrants in Japan have their root at least in two factions of Salafism, i.e. purist Wahabi,⁷⁵ and Salabi (mixed Salafi (Brotherhood) and Wahabi), (see figure 01/VI)⁷⁶ Reflecting Islam and Muslim responses when encountering a new culture, I adopt Paul Knitter’s theory of “Christian and the others” (Knitter,

⁷⁵ In fact, they are called in the academia and outsiders as Wahhabi, the followers of Ahmad bi Wahhab. They however prefer to be labelled as Salafi. The Salafi is a contested term used to claim that one’s group is the most correct one according to Islam. What I mean the Salafi in this context is Wahhabi ideology and groups.

⁷⁶ on this division of Salafi groups see Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi movement. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29(3), 207-239.

1985) from the classic work of Niebuhr describing Christian community were divided into the resistant, acceptant and pluralist. Each model has different level of acceptance toward the others (culture). Following Knitter, I also divided Salafism into a few groups depending on their level of exclusivism. “Each faction shares different levels of exclusivism from low level, “Islam above the Culture” to high level of exclusivism “Islam against the Culture” with exception in politics. First level or low level of purist Wahabi claims in absolute truth of Wahhabism, claiming the others as wrong, *syirk*, *bid’a*. However, they do not accuse the others to the worst level “*Kafir*” (infidel), “deserving torments of hell”. They, according to the group, remain a Muslim. However, they are considered as degraded ones, less Muslims, imperfect Muslims. They believe that in order to be a true Muslim, someone needs to follow their beliefs and practices of Wahabism.

The second level, (Islam against the culture), unlike the first level, claims those who do not obey the command of God (in their version) shall be named not Muslim (infidels). They are called Salafi *takfiri* or Salafi *jihadi* because they believe everyone who is violating the laws of God is categorized as less Muslim, hypocrite, and should be punished. Thus, rejecting the truth claim of Wahabi Islamic understanding by intention is considered as enemy (infidel) and those *kuffar* challenging Islamic belief shall be fought (Alfadl 2005). This is the reason why many Brotherhood activists were executed in Saudi Arabia for their challenging ideas against the Saudi government. None of my interlocutors in both groups have reached this level of extremism. This can logically be understood for a few factors. First, Muslim community in Japan is a super minority group whose social and cultural environment would not help this kind of group formation. Second, this *takfiri*/ Salafi Jihadi, unlike the purist Salafi, has a very small membership in Indonesia. Third, as a consequence of their theological teachings of “*daarul Islam* and *daarul harb*”⁷⁷ (Islamic and enemy’s abodes), they hardly make majority non-Muslim countries as their migration destination.

While purist Wahabi and Salabi share both low and high levels of exclusivism (Islam above culture, Islam against culture), they were different in activism ideology. The purist Wahabi does merely cultural *dakwah* (propagation) concerning everyday Muslim practices including beliefs and rituals, whereas they hardly participate in the establishment of political

⁷⁷. According to this doctrine, the world is divided into two regions; *daarul Islam* (Islamic abode) and *daarul kuffaar* or *daarul harb* (infidel region). Accordingly, except for a short term and important purposes, Muslims should not come to *the daarul harb* because it is the enemy’ territory providing risks and dangers for Muslims’ security and faith

authority. The purist Salafism's (Wahabi) purification ideas are centralized over the individual expression of religiosity which has to suit with Quran and Sunnah. The adherents of this Wahabi ideology concern with individual Muslims' ritual and everyday symbols of devoutness such as physical appearances (wearing like South Asian or Middle Eastern outfits) and avoiding debates with the others, especially critics against the government. Thus, contemporary purist Salafi ideology is less influential in the global Muslim world than the neo-Salafism mixed between Wahhabism and *Ikhwanism* (Salabi, see Chapter Three). In Indonesia, as a minority group, the purist Salafi respond to the cultural differences not by challenging the others or criticizing the government but often by a strategy of self-alienation. Many extreme Wahabi groups establish their gated compounds, or neighborhoods, where strict Wahabi lifestyle is applied.

In Japan, the "seclusion" strategy takes a form in their minimal contact or avoiding interaction with the outsiders as much as they can for religious reasons. Alternatively, they interact with the outsiders (including non-Muslims) by modelling "market interaction" where a shopper talks minimally with a shop owner; only for billing payment's sake. They communicate with the others in workplace setting focusing on nothing except about the job-related matters. Very rarely my informants fit 100% to this purist Salafism category developed in Indonesia. In Japan only those "exceptional" people with a specific "advantageous" opportunity could strategize their religious practices in this style. Among them are a few Indonesians with very exceptional condition of their workplaces such as those working at the Saudi Arabia and Indonesian embassy properties, Indonesian State Enterprise offices in Tokyo whose clients mostly are Indonesians (and Muslims).

Secondly, the Salabi (see Figure 01/VI) are the *haraki* (movement) Salafi, those the fundamentalists seeking "Islamization" of Indonesia society through its culture and politics at the same time. Politics and cultural aspects of Islam are not separated. In other words, in addition to embracing the first ideology (Islamization through culture: (mostly in ritual), this second group aspires to an Islamization of Indonesia through political approaches (Islamism) as well. In other words, they desire to secure political authority in Indonesia to transform Indonesian culture into more Islamic one (in their version). There are two approaches within this Islamist framework. First, those who fight for their goals through constitutional procedures of democracy or domesticated Islamists (e.g (Miichi, 2020;M. Woodward et al., 2013). They use secular democracy system that they disagree with to succeed their goals to establish Islamic political system. The Justice and Prosperity party (PKS), and the Crescent Party (PBB) for

example, are two Indonesian Islamist parties which were originally established for this Salabi aspiration. In other words, they are Islamic political Islamist groups transformed into domesticated one (M. Woodward et al., 2013)).

Another division within this *Salabi* framework is those disagreeing with the democracy system, aspiring to change it with their Islamic version based on Sharia. This group believes that secular culture could not be changed into Islamic one except by changing the current political system (e.g Tibi 2002). This Salabi movement has similar goals to that of the previous groups, in addition to their exceptionally “non-compromising” approaches. They are the radical Islamist groups opposing the Indonesian secular constitutional system, seeking a change in the national political system according to their Islamic vision. Contrasting to the previous Islamist political group, the radical Salabi group does not participate in the legitimate democracy competition because they consider democracy a part of the un-Islamic system they should avoid (*bid'a*). They try to achieve their mission through religious and social organizations, and cultural institutions that play important role in the Indonesian society. Like the purist Salafi organizations, they also establish many institutions such as schools, corporations, charity programs, student organizations that attract young followers. The banned controversial Islamist organizations such as Indonesia Islamic State (NII) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) are among those contemporary Islamism organizations in Indonesia representing this radical ideology.

6.1.3. Conservatism-exclusivism among the youth: cotemporary phenomena

Many Indonesian university students in Japan I met, although they did not disclose their affiliation with controversial organizations such as NII or HTI, share some similar aspirations in politics and Islamist ideologies. Those experiencing “Islamist” involvement and experiences in Indonesia aspire Indonesian culture in more “Islamic nuance” with *Sharia*, the *khilafa system*, instead of current secular and less Islamic one. From the structured interviews, and their social media postings, we understand that many of them think Indonesia should use Sharia as the Indonesian constitution. Others relate the nation’s social and economic problems with the “sinful” and un-Islamic approaches to the national government programs (HTI activists).

The Islamism difference between PKS and HTI ideologies exists in their stance over the Indonesian constitution and focus of the movement. The PKS view is that the constitution need advancement to be more Islamic (Islam above culture), while the HTI saw the constitution and the whole system of Indonesian politic as un-Islamic, hence the need for total change (Islam

against culture). Before HTI was banned by the Indonesian government in 2017, it was the most outspoken Islamist group promoting such radical views. HTI activists spread their ideological influence among university students through training, and establishment of chapters at many universities (Mun'im Sirry, 2020). During my field works in Tokyo, there were some HTI sympathizers promoted verbal aspirations circulating among Indonesian migrants in Japan promoting the HTI's mission and ideas. They campaigned that sharia is the only solution to solve Indonesia's social and economic problems including poverty, corruption, nepotism, deforestation, prostitution, but natural disasters. Few HTI members and sympathizers including those in Japan think the current Indonesian constitution is *thaghut* (enemy) which have to be avoided and altered into Islamic one. Most HTI organizations share ideas with the PKS and other fundamentalism followers in religious identity except in its unconstitutional opposition against the legal government and national political system.

The existence of HTI members or supporters in Japan is demonstrated by their public statement on Facebook account commenting on several political events in Indonesia. The supporters installed HTI symbolic flags on their vehicles, Facebook profile account or news feed before HTI was officially banned by the government in 2017. During these days of prohibition decree launch, HTI mobilized big demonstration against government decree to shut down their organization (2017). Many-Indonesians in Japan show their sympathetic views and commentaries. Many of my interlocutors are fans of HTI leading speaker and writer; ustadz Felix Siauw, and other speakers promoting the Islamism. During these days they responded negatively to the HTI's shut down.

The radical Islamist group and individuals among Indonesian immigrants is a super minority group within minority Indonesian Muslim population in Japan. Moreover, as a new Muslim group and are in their early formation, hence, hardly found Indonesians with jihadi Salafism ideology. In this type of Jihadis ideology, the Salafi views the others who deviate from themselves as kafir (infidels), not Muslims although they believe and practice Islam. In the most extreme form, the Jihadist believe that the non-Muslim are enemies, and therefore, are allowed to be eliminated. ISIS, ALQAEDA, Jamaah Islamiyah (Indonesia) Boko haram (Nigeria), Taliban (Afghanistan) developed this takfiri-jihadi views.

The existence of the Islamist ideologies among Indonesians in Tokyo is also known from the regular visit of several Islamist speakers invited by Indonesian Muslim organizations in Japan. Some pro-Islamism speakers have been routinely invited for public speeches

facilitated by the Indonesian embassy apparatus. Among them are Zaitun Rasmin, Bachtiar Nasir, Tengku Zulkarnain (Died 2021), Felix Siaw, Khalid Basalamah, Syafiq Basalamah and several other controversial speakers affiliated to Ikhwani and Salafi ideological groups in Indonesia. Their public speeches and group meetings, while they did not touch the political issues, maintain and strengthens the conservative ways of understanding Islam (conservatism repertoire) and the social cohesion of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups in Japan. The following narratives about halal food consumption strategies and issues of Christmas celebration among different groups in Japan marks the new tendency of conservatism as result of Islamic public discourses and ideologies in Japan dominated by the conservative groups.

6.1.4. Conservative-exclusive religious practices: instanced cases

6.1.4.1. Case one: halal discourses and practices

Finding halal food has been one of Muslims' central concerns in Japan (Henderson, 2016). This is probably caused by the fact that Muslims are a minority group whose food culture is different from that of the Japanese. Their most distinct custom is the prohibition of pork as food materials and ingredients. Halal, which means permitted to be consumed, has something to do with the food substances and its processing. Halal foods must not contain any *haram* (prohibited) contents, mainly pork, and alcohol with some varied arguments about the latter (Mukherjee, 2014). The non-confirmed halal status of food is called *syubhat*, which means unconfirmed halal, and Muslims according to certain Muslim perspectives need to avoid the *syubhat*.

As previously discussed, the conservative Muslim group tends categorize halal by referring merely on the halal signature and substance without referring to further contextual argument of the halal-haram such as cultural factors and the legal philosophy behind the halal and haram verdicts. In the past, Muslim immigrants in non-Muslim countries used to eat beef or goat meat together with non-Muslims (Fischer, 2011). Neither they asked whether the beef, chicken or goat meat was from the animals slaughtered by a Muslim as it is growing tendency among Indonesian Muslim groups in Japan recently. Old Muslim immigrants in the Western countries (Fischer, 2011). Used to select meat, beef, goat and chicken regardless religious background of the butchers or slaughters. Currently the religion of the slaughters has become a big concern among Indonesian Muslim immigrants as it is required in the "global halal" standard. In addition to several following conservative understanding of halal-haram resulting in some following exclusive actions;

1. not consuming food except with halal label. To some conservative Muslims even though the food does not contain haram substance as long as does not come with halal label, they are regarded *syubhat*. For few people, it has to be official label from certain religious authority such as JAKIM (Malaysia), MUI (Indonesia) and MUIS (Singapore).
2. not visiting restaurants or food stalls except with halal signature. The restaurant must not sell alcoholic drinks.
3. not consuming foods made by non-Muslims
4. not attending non-Muslim party invitation
5. not allowing children play outside with the others.

As previous survey has reported they are not dominant but growing practices among Muslim Indonesian migrant communities in Japan.

6.1.4.1.1. ‘Global halal’ ideology: contradicting halal in Islam?

Respecting, maintaining others’ right, avoiding prejudice, not insulting and humiliating others are among the very undisputable ethical teaching of Islam on Muslim’ social interaction. *Akhlaq al karimah* or good conduct as the core message of Islam refers to those ethical conducts between human beings. However, because of Muslims’ uncompromising halal conception and its institutionalization globally, those basic Islamic ethical values, the foundation of Islamic cosmopolitanism (e.g., Aljunied (2016) seem faded under the institutionalized halal aspiration. Muslims’ persistence on the “global halal standard”, (which I called “substantive conception of halal”) as Gabriel Maranchi (2012) has investigated, form uneasiness among non-Muslim (also some Muslims) that many experts think alien to the Islamic cosmopolitanism. Many Singaporean non-Muslims he has interviewed leave questions of Muslims’ demand for “table separation” in the public dining. They asked “what is wrong with us (non-Muslims) that Muslims do not allow themselves to dine with us.” Some assumed that Muslims might think that they and non-Muslim are not equally human beings that they should sit separately when dining in the public. Currently, similar negative reaction exists among Balinese against the ideas of halal tourism. Feeling threatened by the mushrooming “halal” food stalls and restaurants, many Balinese create “haram” food courts and restaurants.

Some Indonesian Muslim scholar including Nadirsyah Hossein, Ayang Utriza Yaqin, Moh Himmi have criticized the phenomena of global halal alertness as much focusing on the

substance or material of halal and less paying attention on its social relationship consequences. In other words, they look at Islamic laws merely from the substantive perspective and ignore functional perspectives. The latter perspective implies that every product of Islamic laws (such as verdict, fatwa, jurisprudence) has social and philosophical functions.

When talking about halal consumption, as I observed (e.g. (Hosen, 2015) the Islamic legal sources, i.e. Qur'an, Hadith, and great Muslim Scholars' works talk quantitatively more often about the way people should afford their wealth including the food they consume than merely about the substances. In *Ihya ulumuddin* by Al Ghazali, great Sunni scholar (D 1111), halal (lawful ways) is always in adversary with the haram ways or *dzulm* (unlawful). *Dzulm* is always associated with any unlawful conduct/action which jeopardize other individuals. Within Islamic ethics, halal way always relates to the way people treat others in good manners and not disadvantaging others. Haram/*dzulm* ways in the everyday activities include stealing, bribing, prostitution, corruption, fraud, and damaging or destroying others' rights and properties. Halal/haram always relate to the individual right and the Muslim obligation to respect one's right and dignity. Many classical Muslim scholar's works always have a work chapter on such consensual topic instead of the controversial topic of halal animals (dog, horse, amphibia animals, snake, insects, etc.) or other food resources. This indicates that social ethic and morality is equally or more central in Islamic teaching to or than group's cultural identity such as halal food substances.

Some following cases and statements reflect these phenomena of conservatism in halal issues. Extreme conservatism in halal understanding has created a somewhat uneasy relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim, as well as between conservative, moderate and "secular" Muslim. Referring to this institutionalized 'global halal' conception, some Muslims are too obsessed with their standard and do not tolerate the others deviating conception and practices. Thus, by emphasizing on the substance conception of halal (pork-less materials) the virtue of cosmopolitan Islam (tolerance and respecting others' rights) seems covered under halal as a group's identity. The exclusivists are more likely to select "particular" halal conception instead of the definite one: respecting others' right. Thus, the cosmopolitanism in Islam seems unrecognized. Some following instanced cases support my findings on conservative halal perspectives and its social consequences.

Case one is about halal issue breaking up a friendship. It occurred in Spring 2015, when a few Indonesian female Muslims met up in Vida's house in a neighborhood in Chiba, East of

Tokyo. As the host, Vida (25, Javanese, newly married to a Bangladeshi) welcomed the guests with milk tea and crackers for refreshments. However, until the end of their visit, the guests did not touch the crackers and beverages until someone told her about the halal issue later. One of her guests explained that the milk tea she bought contains (assumedly) non-halal substance. In addition, the crackers contain gelatines. They assumed gelatine always contain non halal materials (pork). Vida felt embarrassed because as a Muslim, she did not want to serve her friends *haram* (non-halal) refreshments, at the same time, her habit of drinking the milk tea was humiliated before the friends. “It is only a mixed tea and milk, how come they claimed it is haram. Vida was very disappointed with her friends’ actions. “I feel I was justified that I do not know how to behave as a Muslim; as if I were not respecting my guests by serving what they did not like.” She regretted this unexpected incident.

Case two, (halal and prejudice between Muslims), is similar. In May 2015, an Indonesian tourist had a heart attack when visiting Disney Land and died at a hospital. The tourist’s family contacted and asked the Indonesian embassy to assist them in handling the body; including treating it in Islamic ways; bathing the corpse, wrapping and making prayer on it before sending it to Indonesia. Division of social and religious affairs of the Embassy (as usual) contacted the Indonesian mosque people (KMII) who are accustomed to handling this issue. One of the KMII people informed about the plan and asked me if I was available to join them washing the corpse and making prayer afterwards.

After completing the washing and wrapping the body, around ten volunteers came to the lobby of the Embassy office to have dinner. A staff of the embassy brought us dinner boxes. They were put on the table, but no one seemed willing to take them. I tried to follow the reaction of Mr. Amal who invited me to participate in the program. Actually, I was starving and about to grab one of the boxes. However, I was amused by the fact none of the volunteers took it, which would make me ashamed if I had done so. It turned out that there were debates among them about the dinner’s halal status. I noticed disappointed faces from the embassy staff, explaining that the dinner contained no pork. Mr. Amal (43, a Javanese) who was an Islamic studies instructor at the Indonesian School of Tokyo (SRIT), asked everyone to get ready to go to an Indonesian restaurant. A few minutes later, we then on a car departed to an Indonesian restaurant not far from the embassy headquarter. Arriving at the restaurant, I asked Mr. Amal why we left for a restaurant, while the embassy staff had served us dinner. Amal said they bought them from a Japanese restaurant which has no halal menu. “Although they provide

chicken, it is not halal chicken,” he continued. “Does anyone guarantee that the pan they used for chicken is not the same pan they use for pork?” I just realized what was going on, since back in Indonesia, it is rude to reject somebody’s meal offer, especially from the co-religionists whose food’s halal status is taken for granted.

Case three is related to Johan’s story of halal and self-sacrifice/burden, Johan (46, online grocery shop owner) told me his opinion about halal standard. He reported that many Indonesians do not obey their religious rules. Johan told stories of how Indonesian friends of him are negligent about the halal status of their food. “They think all meat except pork is halal,” he said. Johan argued that this is incorrect. Johan says that a Muslim must eat meat from lawful animal slaughtered by a Muslim. He said “You cannot take a piece of meat from anyone until you are sure it was from an animal slaughtered by a Muslim.” Johan often posts his “halal standard” opinion on Facebook while promoting his halal sale items that sometimes attract opposing comments from the others. One of his postings was about Uighur Muslim refugees in South Thailand who refused to eat until they are certain it is halal. He wrote “How about us (in Japan). Johan said that our faith in Japan is very weak compared to the suffering of the Uighur refugees. He implied that some Muslims in Japan remain selecting “*syubhat*” but consuming haram food, while the halal choices are available (including his shop items).

Johan’s view quoting the Uighur report in fact is alien within Islamic concept of halal food implying during the emergency and the lack of (clearly) halal food, one might eat the *syubhat* and even the haram. There is a hadith, “if you are not sure about the food you eat (halal or haram), say in the name of Allah, the most gracious and merciful, then go with it” (it becomes halal). In Islamic legal theories (Sharia), it is said that the purpose of Sharia (Islamic law) is to protect the human life (*nafs*) that is often interpreted as health and life. Therefore, many classic legal scholars produce theories concluding that emergency can change the lawfulness status for the sake of human life, health (*nafs*), a goal of Sharia. What Johan seemingly did not realize about the report was the political aspiration behind the demand among the refugees, that he used it as a reference to judge the Indonesian Muslims in Japan generally as having weak faith.

This baseless understanding of halal standard seems pervasive among Indonesian community in Japan that a few Indonesian refugees during 2011’s earthquake emergency questions the emergency food provided by Japanese or international communities.⁷⁸ From the

⁷⁸ Besides information from the hearsays. See for example following report (Sanusi, 2016).

hearsays, it seemed there was a sense of assumption that the food was not halal. I also encountered this pervasiveness of these phenomena among my interlocutors during an emergency drill in my region in Chiba.

There is a similar case of “self-burdening” halal during humanitarian emergency. Once, on a disaster evacuation drill, at a public school in Otera city, a committee staff from the ward office gave participants including me and other Indonesian friends (Panji, 45, and Edo, 41, and Tuti—all are graduate students with their family dependents) samples of emergency lunch containing only rice and a little salad on it. On the salad, there was a slice of very tiny meat which was suspicious (maybe pork). We discussed about eating the rice that might contain pork. Arriving at our apartment, I asked them about the “emergency food.” All of them replied (without further confirmation from the Ward Office staffs) had thrown away the rice because they believed the rice was also contaminated by the tiny piece of suspiciously pork looking meat. I myself only threw out the meat. This experience answers my curiosity about Muslims’ rejecting humanitarian emergency food during disasters as previously reported.

Case four is “global halal standard and prejudice”. It is difficult to explain not only to non-Muslims but also controversial to some Muslims about the global halal standards that require Islam as the religion/belief of a slaughterer. Most non-Muslims—I think including the Japanese—understand that Muslim do not eat pork but not about the latest requirement which says Islam should be the religious background of the slaughterers or butchers. The requirement would lead to other questions such as “why us” and “what is wrong with us?” Halal issues have created some tensions in Europe departing from this complex question “why us (non-Muslim/what wrong with us)”.⁷⁹ What makes us different that our market must be separated.” For Muslim commoners this “why” question is a difficult question because it leads to further questions. For example, if a non-Muslim cannot be a slaughter for Muslim meat, what is inside Muslims’ mind about non-Muslims? Contemporarily, for some non-mainstream Muslim, this global standard has violated the direction from the Qur’an about non-Muslims’ slaughtered animals because it is clearly declared that an animal slaughtered by people of the book/ahl kitab (Jews, and Christian) are edible for Muslims. Other tiny progressive Muslim’s view—even other religious believers—are considered equal to ahl kitab (more details in the next chapter).

⁷⁹ See for example the report (McAuley, 2018) also (Bowen, 2021).

A senior Indonesian Christian I encountered in Tokyo also revealed his grief about this situation. In the past, (before the mushrooming Islamist groups in Tokyo), Muslim and non-Muslim used to get together, camping, barbequing, making party together with Muslim friends. Now, this kind of occasion is very rare. One of my informants (male, 50s, a journalist) says our Muslim (new and few old) friends do not invite us, and when we invite them, only few would come. In the past, during great holidays such as Eid or Christmas celebration, we used to visit each other and eat each other's food. Of course, we served Muslim halal food. When I asked him what did he mean by halal food. He answered pork-less food. When I asked whether he heard that halal meat has to be from animals slaughtered by a Muslim, he said he has only heard about it lately. Indeed, for many Muslims it is difficult to explain directly to their non-Muslim friends that they are suspicious about the offered meat. The uncomfortable feeling to explain about this halal global standard conception for non-Muslim Japanese makes many Indonesians strategize their halal practices under some following alibies.

1. "Allergies to pork products and their derivatives". Many Muslim parents whose child (children) go(es) to Japanese primary school do not subscribe to the school lunch because the lunch has some non-halal menu, including "non-halal" beef and chicken. A mother of a 2nd grade student says "It is easy to say that Muslims do not only eat pork but also other pork derivatives such fat oil and gelatin. However, it is difficult to explain that we do not eat non-pork menus that are not standardized according to Muslim diet, such as "non-halal" beef and chicken. In addition, what there is also a question whether the pan the school used for cooking is interchangeably used for halal and haram meat and ingredients (fat oil). It is not easy to explain and it sounds too demanding. "I do not want to make them (school) busy with our requests." A mother says (it is found there were only four Muslim students at her son's school. "Therefore, I only informed them that my child has allergies to pork or any food containing it. Because school lunch menu often contains pork, I better not subscribe to it and provide home-made lunch box everyday instead." Many Indonesian parents subscribed partially, bringing their own lunch box when scheduled menu contains pork (see next chapter).
2. "I have dined at home": Some Muslim do not want miss a party but do not want to eat at the party for the halal menu reason. An informant (a Kensusei) told he only ordered orange juice. For easy explanation, when somebody asked him why he only

drink a juice. He has prepared an answer, I have dined before arriving here. “Then you lie to your friends,” I asked a kenshusei at a Salafi forum during a break. He says “it is ok to lie to infidels” (non-Muslims), he replied.

3. Another informant only said that they are not accustomed with a certain food. A corporate employee says, when his friends finally asked him to select his favorite restaurant for his appetite, he brought the group to Indonesian halal restaurant. Other than middle class professional worker might not be able to do this. Saadi (24, dependent, Buginese), the wife of my Indonesian informant, Radif (30, a Javanese), did not want to eat the meals provided by the hospital during her maternity period at her hospital because she was suspicious about the food’s halal quality. She only said that she is not accustomed with the Japanese food. In Japan she pretends that she always makes Indonesian food. She would rather pay another Indonesian friend to cook her lunch and dinner instead. Both informants were actually fine with the Japanese food if it has halal certificate or made by Muslims.
4. How to avoid gathering activities with non-Muslims providing free food? Tete, a mother of a child going to Japanese school provided the following information: “My son will just skip from the activities (such as a day trip, camping, long day extracurricular activities) with different reasons. [This is] mostly because my son has other another assigned activity.” In 2015, as I lived near her house, I witnessed how Tete protected her children from the *syubhat*. Her sons did not subscribe to school *bento*, and they did not eat out when traveling. She limited her son to play with his Japanese peers outside the class time, afraid of being given non-halal snacks. For the halal reasons, she also prefers to escape any communal gathering where food is provided by non-Indonesians. Tete views it is the responsibility of Muslim parents to protect their children from non-halal food.

The behaviors presented above show what might be categorized conservative religious practices of halal because the practices exclude others in the way they degrade other practices of fellow Muslims. For example, the guests are leaving the foods offered by fellow religionists untouched because of different standards of halal (e.g. in the cases of Vida and the embassy incident). Vida did tell her feeling about how sad she was in spite of her uneasiness and inability to counter her friends' encouragement. On the embassy case, it is clear from the staff's facial expressions that they feel sorry and disappointed about the incident.

From the following cases of Johan (Uighur story), Teteh (a mother of 3rd grade student), Sa'adi (hospital story), Panji, Edo, Tuti (evacuation drill), I also witnessed their exclusive views toward the non-Muslim for the sake of their standard of religious identity practices. In other words, from the perspective of Islamic legal philosophy, they put forward a group symbolic identity over the purposes and function of the Islamic law (halal-haram). From those conservative Muslim perspectives, what they did could be considered a survival strategy of Muslim minority before the dominant culture. However, on the other hands, from the perspective of outsiders, this could jeopardize themselves in terms of their health and life (in a real situation, not in an evacuation drill, or the case of Johan, and disaster emergency cases) and social relationship with others (non-Muslims or Japanese). Our informants did not openly explain to their Japanese non-Muslim counterparts about their “global” standard of halal which they believe not easy for them to do so. Therefore, they only make excuses, pretending that their children are allergic to food containing pork. They think it would be difficult to explain their version of global halal conception. They say Japanese understand the halal concept dealing with pork and alcohol only, but most do not understand that all meat is not halal when slaughtered by non-Muslims (according to the informants).

These conservative practices are, in fact, according to some Islamic experts a deviation from the goals and principles of Islamic sharia aiming for establishing the “easiness” in practicing religion and social harmony within a society. As we see from the instances and were admitted by some informants that what they practiced of global halal standard created some difficulties in their dietary lifestyle in Japan, and often lead to some inharmonious human relation, which is an important message in Islam. There are many other similar exclusive Islamic practices disturbing inter-religious and cultural relation in the fields of which, one of the most recurring debates among Indonesian Muslims in Tokyo is about Muslims offering Christmas greeting.

6.1.4.2. Christmas and New Year greeting

New Year might be the most anticipated holidays season in Japan after Golden Week. Both long holiday seasons provide a long break for everyone in Japan after an exhausting working period. New year season is probably more special because it is preceded by Christmas holiday (informal) season that could collect two weeks holiday long in total (for informal sectors). Japanese people enjoy them by visiting families, shrines, eating out together, and crowding tourist areas, but not for some Indonesian Muslims in Japan, especially the Kanto

area, where I did my fieldwork. They spend both relaxing days by joining an Islamic learning camp which they call “*dauroh*” (literally translates to circle: Arabic).⁸⁰ The holidays provide an opportunity for them to meet with fellow Muslims and learn Islam closely with instructors whom they invite from Indonesia.

That year (2015) was similar to the previous year ‘s (2014) public lecture and “*dauroh*”. They coincidentally were held in three places, Balai Indonesia (Indonesia School Auditorium) Meguro, Darul Arqam mosque Asakusa, and Tsukuba Mosque near Tsukuba University campus. The public lecture at Balai Indonesia and *dauroh* were organized by different Indonesian Muslim groups (linked with Indonesian *Salafi networks*). Hundreds of Indonesians from other prefectures came to Tokyo and Tsukuba to attend the two or three days *dauroh*. Some people even participate in two places depending on their schedules. Around a hundred attend Islamic program at Meguro school; A hundred more people attended *dauroh* in Asakusa, and around sixty people went to Tsukuba Mosque. Some of the participants, including women and children, came from outside of Tokyo, and they made their accommodation at these mosques. The organizing committee provides them free lunch and dinner. A similar program was also organized by Indonesian communities each in Sendai, Osaka, and Fukuoka, and are aired through an online streaming application which I subscribed to. The two or three nights *dauroh* is an opportunity for the members to know each other and strengthen their close relationship beyond their towns, prefectures or social media.

There are various basic topics of Islam which they studied in the *dauroh*. However, talks and discussion in class are always related to the current Islamic discourses and events in Indonesia including Muslims’ view on non-Muslim political leadership in their conservative perspectives. Also, because the program is always held between Christmas and New year holidays, topic related to Christmas and new year events always re-occurred. One of the repeated Islamic discourses occurring in Indonesia and other Muslim countries during the Christmas and New Year season is about Muslim’s attitude toward Christmas, New Year, and Valentine celebration. Do Muslims celebrate Christmas, New Year, and Valentine? Some Muslim groups believe that Muslims must respect other people celebrating their sacred days, allowing them to greet “merry Christmas” to Christians. However, the speakers in the *dauroh* and public lecture on the three venues during the year-end holidays all share one opinion that

⁸⁰ “*Daurah*” meaning a short training is term used very popular among the Salafi members for the similar activities in Indonesia.

Muslims must not greet Christmas as it denigrates the very fundamental idea of God in Islam. Therefore, for Muslims even greeting “Merry Christmas” to their Christian friends is prohibited. The lecturer says “it is a part of the fundamental notion of Islam that Jesus is not the son of God. When you greet Christmas, this means automatically you believe that Jesus is the son of God.” Many Indonesians living in Japan hold this belief that Muslims are not allowed to greet Christmas.

Another reason of why wishing “Merry Christmas” is prohibited, according to some scholars, is its similarity to the act of adopting non-Muslim appearance (Arabic; *tasybih*) which is not permitted. Muslims must not take the non-Muslim style in their appearance. They refer to a recorded statement of the prophet (*hadith*) that a Muslim who adopts non-Muslim identical appearance means he belongs to the non-Muslim group. Like Christmas, New Year, and Valentine celebrations that are not Islamic traditions, everyone who join in, following their custom are identified as a member of that tradition; they are no longer Muslims (extreme view).

This discourse of prohibition of greeting Christmas has increased strongly in Indonesia every end of the year along with the popularity of online social media networks, at least within the last ten years (Manan 2016). As online media become very popular and certain Muslim groups or individuals have utilized it to spread their interpretation. They use their religious sources and facts to support their arguments. They also refer to an incorrect verdict of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) stating that greeting Christmas wishes is prohibited, while MUI has never institutionally declared it.⁸¹ The discourse, however, became stronger in recent days (2014) of political rivalry, after Mr. Jokowi, a religious and nationalist figure, became the 7th president. Mr. Jokowi, according to his opposing groups, is not “Muslim enough” to lead the world's largest Muslim country, stigmatized as a secularist, and seen as an Islamophobic regime. His attention for the minority non-Muslim groups including Christians according to the opposing groups is too much. His visit to Christian regions in Eastern Indonesia and staying a few days with the Christian communities during the Christmas days represents an un-Islamic act. Therefore, extremist Muslim resistance to him gets stronger. Many opposing statements against his Christmas visit as well as aspiration of banning Muslims from Christmas greeting rose everywhere including among Muslims in Japan. Many Indonesian Facebook friends in

⁸¹ See (Nurita, 2019).

Japan quoted a very popular global Muslim public speaker, Zakir Naik, “Muslim should not state Christmas greeting.”⁸²

Many Indonesian parents asked their children to refrain from their school activities related to Christmas. They forbid their children to sing Christmas songs, as well as draw or handcraft Christmas accessories. They do not let their kids attend their school Christmas party, and they do not even allow their children to be touched by Santa. Tete (the previous halal respondent), for example, besides not allowing her two sons to go to school Christmas celebration, she half-heartedly accepts an invitation for New Year parties organized by international communities. She does not allow her two children to attend the Christmas festival because they would sing Christmas songs praising Jesus Christ and their tradition. Tete, for example, prefers not to attend the New Year Festival organized by International Friends Association, as it must be accompanied with Christmas properties, she says. This exclusive strategy toward Christmas celebration is very common among and shared by many Indonesian Muslim residents in Japan reflecting the growth of conservatism among the group. Without further investigation the discourse has clearly left many suspicious questions among non-Muslim about the current phenomena among Muslims who seems very exclusive; unwilling to join the Christian happiness during the Christmas by greeting “merry Christmas.” (Responses toward these questions will be provided in the next chapter).

6.1.4.3. Non- Muslim leadership

The tendency of conservatism among Indonesian Muslim residents in Japan is also shown in their political aspiration for the Jakarta gubernatorial election 2017.⁸³ Although Indonesians in Japan do not vote for the governor position, many of them actively participate in media social campaign against the opinion viewing a non-Muslim can become public leader in Indonesia. Unfortunately, Ahok a substitute of the previous Jakarta governor becoming a president, made a controversial statement leading to the nationally massive resistance against his candidacy. Ahok’s videoed statement on Quran was mis-interpreted by many Muslim

⁸² Zakir Naik is a Muslim global preacher, the owner of Peace TV Channel. He is suspected for Islamic radicalism and his shows are banned by Indian government. On his Christmas greeting please see (Naik, 2018).

⁸³ Many scholars have identified the successful event of 14/1 and 1212 and its reunion as the rise of conservatism in Indonesia (e.g. Bagir & Fachrudin, 2019; Burhani, 2018; Miichi, 2019; Sebastian et al., 2020)

groups across the country. They demanded that Ahok should be punished and jailed, hence his candidacy should be annulled.

November 4 2016, Indonesia witnessed one of the highest temperature of words war between two streams of Muslim communities in Indonesia which defended themselves and defamed each other in the name of Islamic faith. Hundreds of thousands (claimed to be two million) people, who joined a street rally demanded a tribunal for a Chinese and Christian governor, called themselves defenders of Qur'an and was accusing other Muslims who challenge the rally as hypocrite Muslim (Miichi, 2019). The second group, which has less articulated voices, argued against the first group referring to either the different version of Quranic interpretation, common sense, "secular" notion of democracy, and human rights. In different ways, almost all Indonesian Muslim active users of Facebook expressed their supporting or opposing statements either goes for the first or the second groups. Not exceptionally the Indonesians living in Japan, many cannot hide their support for the first or second streams as well as defaming each other.

The strike demanded that Ahok, the then-incumbent Jakarta governor, be arrested for blasphemy against the holy Qur'an, the most sacred book for Muslims. Ahok who holds two minority statuses—a Chinese and Christian—is accused of misusing a Quranic verse (5:51) for his political favor when he gave a talk in Seribu Islands, North Jakarta. His taped video and its fraud transcript went viral inciting massive anger. Ideas supporting and opposing the rally did not only appear on Jakarta streets, but also on the "walls" of my Indonesian Facebook friends, my interlocutors in Japan. Following their Facebook status, I found very strong support for the rally among them. Although some Indonesian Muslim and non-Muslim in Japan also express their support for Ahok, however the opposing voice sound dominating.

All the supporting people share an idea that the rally against Ahok was a good endeavor of Muslims to defend the pride of Islam, since someone has insulted the Qur'an. Others even come to a conclusion that the rally is a part of *jihad* (holy war), which is a call for every Muslim to join in if possible. One informant (44 years old), who is a state employee and a PhD student, says "*if I were in Jakarta, I would join the rally. I am sorry I could only pray for their success from Japan. I am jealous of my friends participating in this protest rally. "Good luck! Allah bless you my brothers,"*" The others shared footages, posters supporting the mass movement and prayed for their success.

They praise God as the incident (Ahok's controversy) makes millions (hundred thousand) of Indonesian Muslims feel united. Devi, (38) PhD student who is also a state employee put in her words. "Allahu Akbar (Allah is great), this is what is called People Power. It is very easy for Allah to make people's hearts hungry for the truth. Do never Insult Qur'an because the punishment from Allah is so severe. Allahu Akbar," she adds.

In the following Facebook status, Devi, "Never be afraid to defend Islam and *Qur'an* until you die. Allah the only who will help us." Devi keeps posting updates of the protest rally from her perspectives until today (2018).

Olly (47 years old), a spouse of Japanese shared a video narrating how "beautiful" the national mosque in Jakarta when Muslim are united for one intention. He shared a footage of Jakarta filled with humans in white robes. "*When Allah makes people move! He also keeps updating the protest rally time by time*". Olly shared videos showing how positive the demonstrators are. The participants respected each other, they did not destroy the public facilities, they even swept the street and brought their own trash bags. He also posted a sarcasm poster saying "*non-Muslim insulting Qur'an is something ordinary. It is extraordinary however a Muslim defends the insulter of Qur'an.*"

While mass strike in hundred thousand people is rich in security and violence risks, my interlocutors keep emphasizing on the positive side and the success of the strike. They show the unity of Muslims, their care of others, their attention of cleanliness and peaceful rally. Even when there was not anticipated riots and clash with the police personnel, they claimed it was initiated by provocateur not the rally participants. They also accused police and intelligent personnel behind the violence clash and riot. When the riot escalated, they say it is made in purpose to impress the negative effects of the rally.

Around two hundred people were injured and one died for unknown reasons. There was also a riot in another area where a convenience store was ransacked. Most of my Japanese interlocutors' Facebook comment status has changed. Most were silent. But others like Devi, and Radif kept forwarding opinion that the riot was caused by provocateurs, not the Islamic Defenders Front, a radical organization leading this movement, which is now banned in Indonesia.

Radif (33 years) shows photos people who provoked the violence, forwarding FPI's official release press and its footages. Most blame the absence of the president who hesitated to meet the demonstrators. Radif shared status noting that our president ran away when his people wanted to meet him. "Where is your heart Mr. President?" Huda (35 years old) remained cynical about President Jokowi who is "running" when his people come. I cannot imagine our president hiding from his own people, and going to the airport for nothing. It makes no sense that he is blocked by the street traffic. Why didn't he take a helicopter?" Huda says, arguing against the state secretary's statement. Jumi (45 years old) shared senior politician Amin Rais' statement saying that the president had insulted his own people with his hesitancy to meet them. Likewise, Devi wrote. "Our president is insulting ulama." One day later, Latif as well as Devi who changed his profile picture with a demonstration poster posted a video capturing people's enthusiastic movement from small villages surrounding Jakarta to come together to the capital to send their words against Ahok.

Yusuf (36, years old) a caregiver, on the other hand, after posting several statements about his support for the rally finally says: May Allah increase the faith of those who challenge against the rally. He argued strongly with his FB friends as well. On his wall he says "this rally" had made our long relationship broken. I am okay with that. If you want to unfriend me, please do that! If not, I also can unfriend you (with a smile icon). Of course, this response is in relation to his heated debate between him and his friends who are supporting Ahok and Jokowi. Wati (47 years old, Japanese spouse) made a lamentation on this "tragedy" claiming those who are hesitant to go on the strike or support the strike as having covered hearts. She prays (through FB) "May Allah uncover the seal," she says.

These wars of words made by Indonesian people in Japan who are thousands of miles away from the capital of Indonesia represent the rise of conservatism among Indonesians in Japan. While the gigantic crowd and mass strike both in 2016 (4/11) and the following year 2017, 12/12 represent the rise of conservatism in Indonesia, its shared aspiration was also circulating in Japan. Many Indonesians in Tokyo on the day of demonstration meet together in the public area and show their posters supporting the Jakarta strike. Who those people are and what makes themselves aligned with conservative ideologies and groups? The following explanation about cultural repertoire of Indonesians in Japan is expected to answer the discussion including the other two previous instanced cases.

6.2. Cultural repertoire

6.2.1. Salman mosque as youth cultural repertoire

A strict adherence to a conservative version of Islam among Indonesians in Japan as shown in the above three cases is a product of the "Islamization project" influencing Indonesia's youth. The phenomenon is so pervasive in many big cities in Indonesia, especially in campus communities which attract abundant studies (Hasan, 2009).⁸⁴ Most of the interlocutors of this project are young people between their twentieth and forties (most of them were in their thirties). They are graduate students, nurses, *kenshusei*, workers, and corporate employees in Japan.

The following case of the Salman Mosque community in Bandung, the capital of West Java and its "little brother" mosque in Meguro Tokyo explains how the conservatism phenomena among Indonesian students continued and strengthened in Japan. Through this finding, I do not intend to say that between Salman (Bandung) and Meguro Mosque exist institutional or official relationships, rather than saying that personal networks among ITB Muslim students represent the typical networks and ethos of Muslim students in Japan. A special attention emphasizes on the science and engineering background which has been the concern of many studies about youth radicalism such as that of Sirry (2020), Hasan (2015) Gambetta & Hertog (2017). The sections below first narrate the conservatism cultural repertoire among Muslim activists at the ITB campus in Bandung city, West Java. Second, this study provides descriptions of how the ideologies continue and strengthen among the university students in Tokyo Japan.

6.2.2. Inside the Salman mosque: overview

If we have to find one crucial "epicenter" in spreading the Islamic militancy for the youth in Indonesia, we would have to look back to Salman mosque's role a few decades ago. By militancy, I meant group solidarity or a state of being in solidarity with their globally communal (ummah) problems, and having a strong desire to work voluntarily in any condition (or to sacrifice themselves) to work on the problem solution for the sake of the groups (in political terms).⁸⁵ The mosque located on the campus of Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) had been the inspiration for alternative Islamic activism since the early 1980s (Miichi

⁸⁴ See other works for instance; (Afrianty, 2012; Arifianto, 2019; Bruneissen, 2002; Suyanto et al., 2019)

⁸⁵ Hossein, the Islamist, ibid

2003; Barton 2009; Hefner 1993). By alternative activism, I mean their claim of a-political movement as a result of the Suharto's program of Campus Life Normalization (NKK/BKK) programs aiming to domesticate student protest and opposition movements against the New Order (Hasan 2019b). Because of the New Order policy, including surveillance over the activists, students tried to find alternative groups that could provide a sanctuary for their interests in Islam. Claiming to be non-political group, students of various universities established a network called Tarbiyah (Arabic: education) movement, an embryo of an Islamist political party, the current Prosperity and Justice Party (previously the Justice Party). Not only ITB students, but also other college and university students around the capital of West Java did learn Islamic activism through the mosque's various programs. The aspirations for modern Islam and social welfare orientation in their "Islamic resurgence" framework had incited many other national campuses to follow Salman's steps. Salahuddin mosque of Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta), Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque of UI, and Al Ghifari mosque of Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB, Bogor) are among those campus mosques inspired by Salman which successfully operated and managed the mosque in "modern" standard and "political" orientation.⁸⁶

By modern standard, I mean the mosque's function is broadened according to the "middle class" urban Muslims' aspiration, which is not only a place for prayer and ritual activities as a "traditional" mosque does, but also for community development centers. Located on the campus grounds, Salman and other similar campus mosques were expected to represent the role of academic campus as the transforming actors for the society. The mosque runs several activities such as a coffee shop, public library, book store, mini market, Islamic banking, kindergarten, entrance test tutorial, meeting package, pilgrimage, and travel agent. Many of them have been established since the 1990s. They also often organized national meetings coordinating young Muslim activists, Islamic propagation (dakwah) training for the youth, and a regular public lecture. One of their most successful programs was Latihan Mujahidin Dakwah (Training for Islamic Propagation Activists), recruiting selected activist students from different campuses in Indonesia (Miichi, 2003); Barton, 2009). Supported by Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), the participants were trained under the supervision of a charismatic HMI (Muslim Students Association) and Salman senior activist, Imadudin Abdurrachim (D. 2008) for several days (Collins, 2004). After the training,

⁸⁶ There have been several studies on campus radicalization, and mosques on campus play an important role in the movement. See (Afrianty, 2012; Latief, 2010; Mun'im Sirry, 2020).

the participants created an alumni network and implemented the training instructions to their mosques upon their return.

Dr. Imadudin Abdurrakhim, an ITB professor, a well-known senior activist of HMI, was a chair of the International Islamic Forum of Student Organization IIFSO, a network of the global Brotherhood.⁸⁷ Dr. Imad was also known as a board member of WAMY, World Assembly of Muslim Youth (INSIST), closely associated with a Saudi ideological organization (Wahabi). Dr. Imad himself, besides an HMI activist having close association with the Masyumi aspiration, had strong Masyumi family ties, enabling him to have a close relationship with Mohammad Nasir, the charismatic and leader of Masyumi, and the founder of DDII (Khazanah Republika, 2018).

Masyumi (Council of Indonesian Muslim Association) used to be the union of many Indonesian Islamic parties. However, because of political and cultural disagreements between the modernist and the traditionalist factions, the traditionalist NU organization established their own party (Bush, 2009).⁸⁸ Historically, through political approaches, Masyumi kept aspiring to change the state constitution under Islamic influence.⁸⁹ Once the party was banned for their involvement in an illegal military movement, under the leadership of M Natsir, Masyumi was transformed into a religious organization called the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII). This status of Da'wah (missionary/propagation) organization enables DDII to set partnership and cooperation with similar international organizations such as that in the Middle East and maintain its benefits and influence to its constituents in Indonesia. Even the DDII founder, M. Natsir, became a Saudi "representative" in Indonesia through his strategic position as a chairman of *Rabitah Alam Al Islami* (World Muslim League) (Hasan, 2007). It is through DDII (Natsir) that Saudi financial support went for many Islamic educational institutions and propagation programs in Indonesia, including campus organizations such as Salman (Hasan, 2019b), ARH, Alghifari, and Solehuddin (ITB, Depok, Bogor, Yogyakarta). Through Dr. Imad, DDII supports the Salman programs, including his outstanding program, LDM. Following Salman, other campus mosques also seeded their influence on the everyday lifestyle of the Muslim students.

⁸⁷ IIFSO is part of global Brotherhood organization see (Gmbwatch, 2019). Also see (A. F. N. Fuad & others, 2019).

⁸⁸ (Fealy, 2012), also (Lucius, 2003; Madinier & Feillard, 2014; Munhanif, 2012).

⁸⁹ (Fealy & Platzdasch, 2005)

6.2.3. Salman's lifestyle

In its heyday, Salman acted like other "on campus mosques" during the New Order era. Maintaining the look of a neutral Islamic community center, the mosques were occupied by Muslim student activists affiliated or connected to the "local" Brotherhood groups called *Tarbiyah* (Education) group. What happened when people from the same ideological groups dominated a neutral public institution; its board and staff? Domination does not mean by the number of people, but is often by the loud voice they had prepared. Their existence is, of course, not officially mentioned in the structural board of the Salman. Although their presence is underground, its militancy atmosphere was identified very clearly in their typical programs and activities. There were (and are) many *liqo/halaqah* groups surrounding the mosque building every after-prayer time. *Liqo* (Arabic: meeting) is a limited meeting in a circle form where a mentor is set as the axis while students make a circle (Hilman Latif). The meeting was always filled with basic Islamic tutorials, including Qur'an recitation, led by a *murobbi* (teacher). *Murabbi's* task is to supervise his/her members Islamic understanding as well as members' everyday activities in accordance of Islamic teaching.

As a member of a *liqo*, there is no specific requirement to become a *murabbi*, except for seniority and loyalty factors to their upper leaders. Often, the *murabbi* had very limited or no background of formal Islamic training. However, the members are expected to take the words of the *murabbi*. They established an underground cell system similar to direct selling or multi-level marketing (MLM) scheme that makes them stay connected with their immediate members and leaders only. Deep knowledge and criticism were undervalued as they would denigrate the group's "leadership." Regardless their insufficient knowledges and reference, the *Murabbi* have authority to transfer their Islamic interpretation to their members and the members have to obey them. Some very extreme groups affiliated with the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) even prohibited their members from reading important Islamic books that criticize Islamic practices in the society.⁹⁰ This is what we previously called a hegemony, where everything looks normal, however there is ideological domination being exercised.

Further, underground membership recruitment became their primary activity. A successful member is determined by their achievement in the recruitment program they underwent. The more members they got, the stronger their position in the leading group. These

⁹⁰ An interview with ex NII member, Bogor 2012, See Amin, A, *Deradikalisasi Berbasis Pesantren*, Harmony, September 2013.

liqo activities were prevalent in many state campuses and even became officially quasi-institutionalized. Indeed, Islamic classes on campus should refer to the central government's official authority in their curriculum whose content ought to support government programs. However, looking at their available teachers and lacking of monitoring, they established an Islamic tutorial activity in cooperation with the *liqo* or external groups. Many of their aspirations were adopted in the campus policy by setting Islamic classes and mentorship programs in harmony with the *liqo* system. DDII has a significant investment in its influence on campus Islamization by its financial aid for the mosques and providing training for their leaders and management staff. Students and staff, lecturers, and professors were involved in this "faith" project. Some science and engineering departments at IPB, UGM, or UI, for example, had been stereotyped as grounds for the Islamism centers. Despite students' training on professional skills, they were situated in a department atmosphere dominated by Islamist networks' circles. (Please refer to the previous chapter about Islamism and post Islamism). A volume of *Ulumul Qur'an* journal in 1994 had a special issue reporting how this unique Islamization phenomenon at "secular" campuses seemed stronger than even on Islamic universities such as State Institute (IAIN) or State Academy of Islamic Studies (STAIN).

6.2.4. Post Islamism lifestyle

One of the characteristics of post Islamism (Salafism) is its ignorance of politics (during the New Order) and a strong emphasis on practicing Islamic culture (see Miichi, 2020). In that sense, many university students, not only ITB but also other campuses, view putting Islam into the practice of everyday life as the ultimate goal of their individual and group aspiration. Because of the New Order regime's repressive power, there is a movement wave among the Muslim student activists to focus on their individual piety only. There was little movement to change the Indonesian "secular" institution politically.

After the Reform Era in the 2000s, however, since Islamic parties were created, there were gradual changes in campus mosques. Through the internal and external campus student organizations such as *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Da'wah Institute or LDK)* and KAMMI (National Front of Indonesian Muslim Students), they become an indirect supporting organization for the Justice (and prosperity) party. While mosques on campus should be neutral and not be involved in practical politics, but as most mosques' activists are also KAMMI or LDK members or have a close personal connection with the Islamist networks, mixed Ikhwani and Wahabi (Salabi) conservative activism have become more apparent. Ideologically, they are

political groups like Ikhwani (seeking political Islam through democracy procedures), but religious ideologies, rituals, expression, and experiences follow the Salafi habitus. Since then, many big campuses' communities have witnessed the growth of Salafi sub-cultural habits, customs, and lifestyles portrayed in their ideological orientation, rituals, and lifestyles.

In terms of ideology, they claim to be affiliated neither with NU nor Muhammadiyah, yet they share the purification aspiration wishing for an Islamic culture, which is unmixed with other non-Islamic expressions, including local tradition. In theological thought, they approach from very literal methodological interpretation resulting in conservative and even ultra-conservative understanding of Islam. However, Salafi/Wahabi has various levels of theological fundamentalism between the soft and the most extreme form of Salafism. In its general form, some Salafi groups, for example, express a conservative conception of *shirk/syirik* (idolatry and any act which is associated with these practices) which include human and animal crafting in the form of statue, painting, sculpturing are prohibited. They argue that such crafting tends to be considered as attempts to be equal to God by creating images of living creatures. In Indonesia and other parts of the world, many Salafi communities implement these rules in everyday lifestyle; “no TV and no music rules” at their home.

The Salafi are also stringent in their conception of sinful deeds (*maksiat*) by following the interpretation of Quranic verses literally as practiced by the prophet's companions in the seventh century (Umar & Woodward, 2020). Thus, they prohibit watching television images, listening to music, and exposing any part of the body (for a woman), or even doing transactions with banks. Conventional Bank (not Islamic Banks) take their benefits from interests, which according to them is considered as usury. I met a few student activists who finally withdrew from their school because of conflicting ideologies between their everyday practices and the new doctrine of aspiring Islam as the only way of life.

Notably, women in Salafi groups have very limited liberty (Hasan, 2019a; Miichi, 2020). The Salafi use very patriarchal approaches to reading the Qur'an (Nisa & others, 2012). While they are not the dominant Muslim students' group on the campus, local community (school) acceptance to their intolerant behavior toward the culture of others indicates their support and cooperation with the exclusive ideological orientation and practices. Contrasting the modern views on women, according to the Salafi *ulama* (remember a woman's question in the first chapter), women cannot go out of the house and get a job without “men's” permission. As it is practiced in Saudi society for decades, they could not communicate with male strangers

without their husbands' consent. They cannot drive a four-wheeled vehicle or have any other jobs that are considered as a man's tasks (Shannon, 2014) . Their higher voice than man's voice in public is even sinful. The best position for women is at home caring for the households, serving the husband and their children (Wagemakers, 2016).

For the Salafi men, they usually maintain some physical symbols such as; having unshaven beard, wearing *Jubah/imamah* (Arabian or Pakistani outfits) style, avoiding *isbal* (pants avoiding the ankle), rejecting shaking hand between male and female (restriction on the male and female relationship). However, their militancy form is familiar to the Ikhwani global style. Several Salman activists and alumni I encountered shared a strong sense of Islamic political identity whose solidarity is based on religious identity. Aspirations for an Islamic state, Khilafah, and other kinds of Indonesian Muslims' political identity always become their loudest critical voice. The scholarly reference of their theological basis often refers to their Islamists' religious ideologies such as Hasan Al Bana, Syed Qutb and Al Maududi. Their works form the ideologies of the Islamists (on their ideas, please refer to the previous chapter).

6.2.5. Cultural repertoire socialization

Salman, as a religious institution, officially does not have any political affiliation, just like many other campus mosques' claims. It is effortless, however, to understand their ideological orientation from the people running the mosque, the type of activities, the imam or the preachers, and the guest speakers, and the content of their preaching. Early people who organized the Salman movement were Muslim activists who had a strong relationship with fundamentalism activities and networks (Hariyadi, 2016). In other words, it is not incorrect to say that one (the strongest) of Salman's cultural repertoires was Islamism. Therefore, students having been active there would probably are incited to Salman activism, including those who worked underground. How does this happen? The following below is my observation result.

At the registration days, a freshman was introduced by seniors to internal and external campus organizations (clubs), including Islamic organizations such as Salman Mosque club. For some students, this could be their first exposure to the students' Islamic organization. For many students previously involved in the ROHIS⁹¹ organization (majority of them), however, they must have been told by their seniors or mentors about Salman activities where they can continue their previous activism during their secondary school period. On the other hand, they

⁹¹ ROHIS standing for Rohani Islam (Islamic Spiritual) is an Islamic organization at senior high school.

feel supported because many Muslim parents from rural families sending their children to ITB might be concerned with the urban youth lifestyle. Several big cities, such as Bandung, are stereotyped with the global youth lifestyle, where sinful deeds (*maksiat*) are overwhelming. Many of the parents are concerned with their children, especially their daughters being away from home. The growing Islamic dormitories around the cities have witnessed the demands of “religious” families whose children study in Bandung (as well as other cities).⁹² In this sense, Salman's existence in the heart of the campus has also provided them a measure to calm their worries.

Salman and similar mosque movements are so attractive for young people because they offer a practical image of modern Muslim societies. In Indonesia, there were stereotypes that Muslims (*santri*, the base of *NU*) used to be associated with anti-modernity—they were considered busy only with their own tradition and orthodoxy (Dhofier, 1994). Their life focuses only for life after death (hereafter). They do not have a repertoire of modern society founded on the principles of rationality and science. They live a very ascetic way, putting aside the "non-spiritual" lives. The modernist Muslims have wished to have their peace heart (spirituality) and mind (rationality) combined (Mujani, 1994). Middle class Muslim in the urban society aspire to have their younger generation having both religious loyalty, skills, habits, custom, and lifestyle of modernity—of which science and professional career become the measurement. This image seemingly counters the traditionalist repertoire as it views religion more to the ascetic lifestyle, poverty, distancing the worldly affairs. There were somehow old negative stereotypes toward the traditionalist “*santri*” considered ignorant to the “current” life, focusing only on hereafter life. They found Salman activists as well as other campus Muslim activists provide definite answers for their wishes.

Salman activists are often Muslim students who learn not only about Islam, but also modern sciences (math, physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, computer sciences). They are prepared to be the future leaders who are accustomed to not only religious scholarship, but also the social, economic, and political ones (Najamunnisa et al., 2018). Most of the members of the Salman club were science and engineering students. Therefore, they were assumed Muslims who have a strong ability to integrate religion and science, where for some traditional

⁹² However, many parents do not know the ideological “kitchen” of some Muslim dormitories. Some recent dormitories are actually home base of HTI activists targeting the tenants for their group membership. They offer some supporting facilities such as cheap price, additional Islamic tutorials, Islamic activities, and regulation that lead them to be interested in HTI (Mun'im Sirry, 2020).

communities learning “not religious” sciences are not recommended. Becoming a Salman activist would give a positive impression as a religiously pious scientist or engineer. This state seemingly makes the wish of modern(ist) Indonesian Muslims realized their public motto of a future Muslim leader who must have their minds made in America, Germany, or Japan, but have their heart made in Mecca.⁹³ This portrayal of future Muslim leaders must have attracted young students who have no background in formal Islamic training and are not accustomed to the Islamic corpus. In conclusion, Salman (and other mosques) provide the cultural repertoire, including social groups and human resources, to help prepare future Muslim leaders accordingly.

6.2.6. Hasballah from Salman: A new contemporary model

In Indonesia, ITB is portrayed as the local version of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology of the US. ITB is always listed as Indonesia’s three best universities, with the University of Indonesia (UI, Jakarta) and Gadjah Mada University (UGM, Yogyakarta). Public opinion is that whoever gets enrolled in ITB would have a prosperous professional career. Therefore, the passing grade of ITB’s entry exam is among the highest in Indonesia.⁹⁴ This public expectation seems not too ambitious, as ITB Alumni lead various sectors of the national business leaders. ITB alumni always secure ministerial positions competing nationally with alumni of two other prestigious universities—University of Indonesia (UI) and Gadjah Mada University (UGM).

Moreover, ITB alumni have always secured more positions than any other universities’ alumni in the State Enterprise Companies (BUMN),⁹⁵ where they also built alumni networking. Giant state companies such as Pertamina (Gas and Oil), PT Timah (Mining), Adi Karya (infrastructure), Telkom (communications), and many others are more often led and filled by ITB alumni. According to QS World University ranking, survey revealed that ITB alumni have the highest level of confidence for job placement after their graduation (Harususilo, 2019). This is likely because of their alumni network’s successful achievement.

There is a repeated national survey concluding that competition for enrolment at ITB is extremely tight. The preliminary selection is so competitive that only those from the best senior

⁹³ Such a quote I often heard from Habibie, the Chairman of ICMI.

⁹⁴ See (Kasih, 2020).

⁹⁵ See (Husaini, 2020).

high schools have an excellent opportunity for acceptance. In other words, Salman congregation members as an ITB community contain very selected intelligent people with very high motivation, skill, habits, and lifestyle of “competitive” individuals. In this type of “middle class” campus community, we can understand why the mobilization of the Salman community in Weberian perspectives seems very effective and well organized. The Salman Mosque community, in other words, has successfully challenged the public perception of observing Muslims (*santri*) as being busy with their old traditions and cannot integrate themselves with the modern society and sciences as well as lacking of discipline. This type of Muslim intellectual represented in Salman fellows fits the model of “modern” Muslims as perceived by Middle-class Muslims in urban communities (Hefner, 1993; Mujani, 2014). A portrayal of public impression (expectation) on Salman (ITB) student can be seen recently from public reception for Muzammil Hasballah, the young imam of Salman Mosque who had attracted public attention for his skills and status as an ITB student.

There are many excellent Qur’an reciters in Indonesia whose recitation skill exceeds Hasballah’s. However, public appreciation to Hasballah seemed very extravagant for his status as an ITB engineering student. It began when Hasballah’s video of when he was reciting Qur’an went viral on social media in Indonesia. The video also described Hasballah (24) as an Acehese student of ITB and a Salman activist. Just as a typical university student, he wore a casual outfit indicating that he is not a typical imam. He is an ITB student who has the skill in Qur’an recitation. On the mainstream and social media, he received very positive public comments, even flirting comments from younger female Muslims or the older ones. “What beautiful sounds he has, a student of ITB, memorizing the Qur’an in heart what a perfect boy”, and other comments in the tone of “I want to be his wife, even his second wife!” Another middle-aged lady says, “his Quranic recitation soothes my heart, I want to hear his holy voice every day. I want my daughter to marry him!”

Having not graduated from his engineering department (2020), Hasballah now is more well known as a reciter of the Qur’an and invited on various occasions and he even creates his own social media channels (Instagram and YouTube). He was also hired as an endorsement model for Muslim outfit products. Lately, he has married a young lady in love with Hasballah (which is considered a positive achievement according to some people). Indeed, without his status as an ITB engineer student, his recitation skill, which is similar to many other ordinary skilled reciters, would not be too much taken into account for public appreciation. Hasballah’s

fandom phenomena also can be considered as a shift in the role model of Salman from a charismatic intellectual and activist like Imadudin Abdurrakhim to a more populist millennial figure, a Qur'an reciter and Youtuber such as Hasballah.

6.3. Ideological influence

6.3.1 (from Salman to) Meguro Mosque

To relate Meguro Mosque (Indonesian Mosque in Tokyo) with Salman is my symbolic explanation of institutional changes from a site for religious worship (communal prayer) into a center of activism. Coincidentally, Salman mosque in Bandung and Meguro mosque in Tokyo shared some similar characteristics including their types of activities as well as the social and cultural settings of the people behind the activities. In terms of their original functions, historically, both shared a group intention to provide a place for Muslim daily prayers in the public space dominated by people assumedly do not seriously observe faith matters ("secularist"). Both are public places where religion "should not" be the central locus of their attention. ITB campus is a public scientific center where religion is "normally" in the periphery. At the same time, Indonesian School in Tokyo is a public educational place where all faiths are expected to be equally recognized. In addition, the Meguro Indonesian School is a public place surrounded by non-Muslim neighborhoods.

Furthermore, from the development process point of view, in the beginning, each mosque was only a classroom (ITB) or a meeting hall (Meguro) used by a limited group before they were turned into a permanent mosque building. Before their establishment, there were also resistance, pro and contra about the establishment of the mosque. The proposal did not comply with the principles of the religious neutrality of the campus (ITB) and state school (SRIT), which are expected to treat other religious followers fairly.⁹⁶ Finally, after they have been established, both used to be originally a neutral mosque belonging to the public (public foundation, Salman) and ministry of foreign affairs (SRIT). After a while, to some extent, they are dominated by people who shared similar ideologies and persisted to maintain their group and networks' existence. On paper, they are indeed seen as a neutral institution having no affiliation in the political interests or certain ideological orientation. However, inside, through their personal networks, they successfully established a "mechanical" system that maintains and develops their interest of group existence.

⁹⁶ Sejarah masjid Salman Republika (Rizqa, 2019).

The Meguro Mosque is now run independently by the Indonesian School of Tokyo belonging to the Indonesian embassy. However, for a long time, more than a decade, historically, religious activities on the site used to be held under the leadership of KMII people. Therefore, what I mean by Meguro Mosque throughout this thesis is not the mosque building alone, but also the KMII institution, the community group running the activities at the mosque. After taking the then *Mushalla*, and now mosque as its headquarter, KMII seems to have special privilege to exercise with the state's properties within the compound. The school looks like a site for Islamic activism as well. Moreover, through the state's facilities, KMII used to enable the school to invest its networks' social capital.

The now Meguro Mosque having been established in 2018 used to be only a small prayer room. However, it has an expansive function for the Indonesian Muslim community in Tokyo. Indeed, while Indonesian Muslims were scattered everywhere in Kanto areas, they seriously regard the existence of KMII for their regular big Islamic programs. There were many organization's names that used to do Islamic activities on this compound, but these activities were always organized by the same people. KMII, JMS, SRIT mosque/*mushalla*, now Meguro Indonesian Mosque (refer to previous chapter), consisted of the same people. In the following, what I meant by the Meguro Mosque refers to those inter-related community organizations and their activists.

The site, physically known as the Meguro Mosque, was not planned as a mosque building. The building used for mosque purposes is actually a school complex building of the Indonesian School of Tokyo (SRIT). Before Ramadan 2018, the space popularly known as the Indonesian *mushalla* and mosque was only a small room on the first floor modified as a prayer room (*mushalla*). On the second floor is a multipurpose auditorium called Balai Indonesia (Indonesia Hall) that functions as a place for Friday prayer. Occupying around twenty square meters, the *mushalla* room cannot accommodate the Friday prayer attendants who always exceed more than two hundred people. While the prayer room is initially provided for the SRIT Muslim students during the working hours, it is used for the public out of the office hours. Before the permanent mosque project was accomplished, what makes an Indonesian mosque (written on google map) was both the small room on the first floor used for everyday prayer and the hall room on the second floor (Balai) used for Friday prayers collectively. Although having a narrow prayer room, SRIT *Mushalla*/mosque has been very popular for its intensive

activities. The Indonesian two-story mosque now has been established on the adjacent ground of SRIT/Balai Indonesia.

Located inside the Indonesian embassy property, the Meguro mosque's legal status represents the unique relationship between religion and state in Indonesia, which recognizes all existing religions as foundational sources of the country, and an aspect of Indonesian cultural identity. Therefore, many religious buildings such as mosques, churches, and temples are constructed on the state property. Although there is no formal relationship between the *mushalla*/mosque congregation (KMII) and the embassy, both are inter-dependent in various public Islamic affairs. The *mushalla*, which is now becoming a mosque, sits on a property belonging to the embassy. The embassy employs KMII to help various programs related to Muslim community in Japan. KMII used to claim it as the headquarter of its organization before it is taken over exclusively now by the embassy as an impact of reported radicalism issues on the complex.⁹⁷

Third, like Salman that is mobilized by young, educated, middle-class energetic Muslims such as professors, university senate members, successful alumni, MIT/Meguro mosque is run by people with more or less similar characteristics. On the top level of the KMII organization are university professors, researchers, professionals, embassy staff, local state enterprise representatives, salarymen, and graduate students. They act as the financial and managerial thinkers of the organization. On the operational level such as everyday service, mass mobilization, and facilities maintenance, however, ordinary members and volunteers play important roles. The latter group consists of mostly active students, Japanese spouses (Indonesian husbands), and workers living surrounding Meguro. Coincidentally, KMII headquarter is located near a top campus in Tokyo where around two hundred Indonesian students are registered and are dominantly ITB alumni. Several of my interlocutors witnessed this campus just like the Tokyo version of ITB. "Wherever you meet Indonesian students there, possibly you meet ITB alumni or its exchange students." They said. Islamic atmosphere among Indonesian students is also so strong just like around Salman area. There, Indonesian students among other nationalities run a prayer room used for daily and Friday prayers. The Muslim students establish a Muslim student group called MIDORI, which helps Muslim students in various matters such as prayers and halal food information as well as personal assistance of

⁹⁷ There are some Indonesian groups in Japan complain on the KMII programs inviting pro-Islamist preachers to Japan

various matters. Many of the Midori members (Indonesian Muslim Students Club) are very active members and volunteers of KMII as well as other Islamic organizations in Tokyo including Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), an Islamic party, historically formed by campus Islamist activists.

6.3.2. Mosque's transnationalism

Within the transnationalism framework, I consider that the SRIT *mushalla*/mosque is a transnational space and organization that advocates two cultures simultaneously: the hosting culture—Japan, and the origin or the sending culture—Indonesia.

First, the SRIT mosque congregations live in Japan, earning life, working with Japanese companies, and having the environment where they are exposed to the Japanese culture. Second, however, their thoughts, communication medium, friends, foods, even fashion, and some of their customs remain Indonesian. SRIT *mushalla* is one actor that maintains the Indonesian Muslim identity in Japan. Once a person steps onto the SRIT ground, they will seemingly no longer feel that they are in Japan. They will no longer feel the stress of being immigrants and Muslims in Japan with their problem of language or food, and of course, minority status. KMII has become the leading organization that provides this Indonesian atmosphere to its congregation. Individually, facilitated with the advance of communication technology, Indonesians, just like other current immigrants, can easily communicate with their contacts in their origin places in Indonesia. However, they remain feeling lonely without being affiliated to ethnically Indonesian groups. In terms of their religious group membership, KMII might provide a needed solution for this kind of being in a group and make them remain connected to their home culture. Some Indonesian and Japanese customs are mixedly used, representing the transnational culture of the Indonesian immigrants.

6.3.3. Activities

There are several events and programs held on the site throughout the year, which are participated by not only SRIT students but also general Indonesian Muslims in Great Tokyo. In addition to the daily and Friday prayers, participated by around 500 to 1000 attendants (during holidays and Ramadhan), the school used to accommodate thousands of people in its several programs, especially Golden Week, Ramadan, Eid, and New Year programs. There were around 2500 attendants at the public lecture during the Golden Week of the last three years and shockingly around 5000 attendants during the 2017 and 2018 Eid prayer (KMII report).

During the Golden Week holidays, Ramadhan event, Spring breaks, in addition to several accidental programs, the mosque organized cultural and religious festivals which include fun games, competition, limited, and public lectures mostly for Indonesians, and occasionally for Japanese. In the activities, popular public speakers or figures were invited from Indonesia to deliver talks. On the weekends, big congregations of around 100-200 also regularly meet in the early morning between 4 and 6 AM (summer) or between 5 and 8 AM (winter) for the dawn prayer, morning sermon, or breakfast together. Besides these school and regular programs, the site is also used for incidental Islamic programs such as charity mobilization, women forums, new converted (*muallaf*) classes, and “meet and greet” meeting with religious leaders from Indonesia. While other Indonesian religious communities used the school hall, not on a weekly or monthly basis, the Muslim communities used the *mushalla* daily. The school has an Islamic teacher who also serves as an Imam and a consultant at the SRIT complex. It is interesting to know that almost every program held there provides free Indonesian food and drinks. During Ramadan month, the *mushalla* distributes free breakfast for anyone attending the dusk prayer and breakfast for those doing *i'tikaf* (silent meditation). This Indonesian *mushalla* or mosque represents the growing Islamic activities in Tokyo organized by Indonesian Muslims.

South Asian communities in Japan built most of the existing mosques in Japan, but many of the mosque staff I interviewed in Great Tokyo agreed that lately Indonesians' engagement in the mosque activities are great. The imam in Gyotoku and Nishi Chiba mosques, whenever I encountered, keeps praising the Indonesian Muslim community's cohesion in the mosque areas. Many Indonesians, besides attending prayer rituals every day and Islamic lecture on Saturday night (for male), many females also organize a weekly meeting. Similar praises I heard also from other imams from different mosques in Tokyo such as that from Assalam mosque Okachimachi and Makki mosque. In fact, Indonesians actively attend religious meetings at international mosques in Japan, but they also make their Muslim group based on their living areas and professions (please refer to the previous chapter). Every prefecture in Japan has Indonesian Muslim groups that organize themselves in many group activities, mostly lectures. They associate themselves with the local mosques. The above activities would hardly occur without the cohesion of Indonesian communities grouped in different organizations, but centralized in KMII, the Indonesian Muslim Community Family Association.

KMII, an abbreviation for the Family of Indonesian Muslim community, as written on its official website, is a holding or an umbrella organization for existing different Indonesian Islamic organizations in Japan. Like in Indonesia, in Japan, there are NU, Muhammadiyah, Salafi, and Tablighi members. KMII claimed as an umbrella of these different Muslim organizations. According to the KMII board, they represent these differences in Indonesian Muslim communities. From the point of view of other organizations' view, however, they say they were never contacted by the KMII to make such an organization, since KMII was already there when the Indonesian organization was about to be established. NU and Muhammadiyah spokespersons say that KMII has been there before either NU or Muhammadiyah chapter of Japan was established. KMII was only a consensual organization between several early Indonesian Muslim immigrants living in Tokyo wanting to help organize programs for Indonesian Muslims. Despite their undocumented establishment facts, their work and program were effective because of at least two factors, i.e. internal group cohesion and support from the embassy. Cohesion means solidarity bond among the members and board of KMII, which was produced from their shared similar social religious background. The following narratives of the interlocutors' shared cultural background and repertoire of KMII and Salman members reflect the setting why Meguro mosque becomes the center of activism as Salman does.

6.3.4. Meguro congregation: unsettled lives background

Nasril (40), Rahman (39), Sofyan (48), Arhan (35), Gugus (41), and Tamziz (29) (pseudonyms) are a few ITB alumni I frequently encountered in Tokyo.⁹⁸ They are all active members of KMII. Even three of them, Rahman, Sofyan, and Gugus were members of the KMII board. All of them also are active members of different Islamic organizations in Tokyo which often held their event and activities at SRIT complex. They all share the exclusive strategies we have described as well some conservative ideas about non-Muslim leadership (status), gender equality, Muslim non-Muslim relationship, and women in Islam. Coincidentally they all have participated in various Salman programs in Bandung when they were undergraduate students.

In the period I met them, except for Nasril, a postdoctoral fellow at a university in Shinjuku-ku, and Sofyan, a Ph.D. holder from a national University outside Tokyo, the rest were Masters and Doctoral students at various universities in Tokyo metropolitan areas. I met them quite often at a mosque every Friday afternoon, Muslim market in Shinokubo or

⁹⁸ They are all pseudonyms

Indonesian regular meeting groups in Meguro, Otera city, and Okachimachi. There are many ITB alumni in Japan pursuing further academic programs either for a Master or a Ph.D. I also met several ITB alumni conducting postdoctoral research or teaching exchanges. A few of them got their Undergraduate and Master degrees from ITB (Nasril, Arhan, Gugus), several of them conducted both Master and Doctoral programs in Japan (Sofyan, Rahman). Excluding the focused informants, many people studied one to three semesters at ITB, which helped them be more interested in the Islamic activities of Salman. In Great Tokyo, excluding ITB alumni, there are many other Indonesian campus alumni (UGM, IPB, ITS, UNAIR, UNDIP) who share similar experiences of being Muslim activists in their previous campus, and now become a student or a researcher at Japanese universities. The following description discusses their “unsettled” life conditions in Japan and their socio-cultural backgrounds, connecting them with the new ideological groups and their repertoire in Japan.

6.3.4.1. Financial condition

Being able to go to universities in Indonesia and further their academic programs, most Indonesian students in Japan are mostly from either middle or upper-class families. The middle-class person in Indonesia is often categorized as those having settled jobs and can afford basic needs such as housing, foods, schools, and health care service. In a more quantitative framework, I follow the World Bank's definition, which refers to the average daily purchase between 7.5 and 38 US\$ (PP 2016). Those spending more than 38 US\$ per day are categorized "upper" class, and those spending lower than 7.5 are classified Aspiring Middle Class (3.3-7.4), the Vulnerable (2.2-3.2), and the Poor (lower than 2.2). Generally, the skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle of the middle and upper classes would be different from those of the vulnerable groups. In this sense, studying abroad is beyond low-income families' imagination.

Considering the living cost in Japan, by current Indonesian standards, those studying abroad have an exceptional achievement that would be almost impossible for Middle-class individuals or families without public scholarship programs. According to an informal website of Expatriate communities (Middle class in Japan: an upper class for Indonesians), the basic need of monthly living in Japan (Tokyo) per individual is around 229,332 Yen (the highest scholarship value from the Indonesian government for a family of three) or 448,363 for a family of four. This amount witnessed by the expats is even almost twice as much as the daily spending values of the starting upper-class individuals in Indonesia. Except for the settled and upper-class families, in Indonesian standard, it is difficult for the middle-class family to live in Japan

with that amount without external financial support. The expensive tuition and living cost in Japan, especially in Tokyo, would be the first challenge for anyone wishing to live in Japan. Even those receiving public scholarships would experience a cultural shock period, prompting them to strategize with Japan's new lifestyle.

Students' financial sources might be able to trace their family's social status and their settled or unsettled life in new places. Some students coming from the Jakarta upper-class families, who self-financed their undergraduate study programs. However, they still tried to find a part-time job (*baito*) in Tokyo. For example, Robin, the only son of a Jewelry shop owner in the heart of Jakarta, works at a bento factory. Likewise, Diana, who is the daughter of a high officer at a foreign affairs ministerial department, makes her income from a Japanese design company. These undergraduate students said that their parents pay their tuition fees, meals, and housing. They need additional support for extra expenses used for hobbies (i.e. sports and music) and social activities (i.e. eating out and parties). However, the language students of *Nihongo Gakko* (non-university language centers) I met rarely come from upper-class families (See also Fatima). Most of them are from the average Indonesian middle class or aspiring middle-class families. The latter group came to Japan to get more money from their upgraded Japanese language skills. Many of them even are from low-income families who were trapped into heavy loans of student tuition. They also have sold their farmlands and other essential properties. They even worked beyond the legally permitted 28 hours per week to pay the tuition fee of their language school. Finally, this kind of student sometimes ends up working illegally in the rural areas after their two-year language student visa expires (see Fatma Djafri 2020). Most graduate students I interviewed, on the other hand, have secured financial support from the public scholarship institutions either from Indonesia or Japan.

Except for Arhan (from a private campus in Tokyo), all of the informants above went to Japan on scholarship programs. In Tokyo, Arhan could study from partial tuition financial assistance, and help from his wife who was accepted one year later as a student at TOKODAI. Because of his tight budget, he cut his purchases, including commuting budget from the residence to his campus. From Odaiba, where he lived with his wife, he cycled daily to Shinjuku in almost two hours. Then, except for Gugus, a state employee receiving a monthly salary from his office in Jakarta and the scholarship, the other informants rely merely on scholarship financial assistance ranging from 150,000 to 250,000 Yen. A large amount of money in Indonesia is a minimal amount to live in Tokyo for a family. Sofyan, whom when I met was no

longer a university student, acknowledged a similar financial situation when he was a graduate student. This situation prompts them to strategize their life expenses in Japan.

One of their usual strategies is, first, to find cheap *housing* (apartments) outside of Tokyo. Most of my Tokyo informants, therefore, live outside of big central towns of Tokyo such as Nakano-shi, Ichikawa-shi, Chiba-shi, Higashi Murayama, Koganei, Kodaira, Fuchu, and some areas closer to Yokohama. In these areas, the apartment rental price is between 50K and 80K a month, excluding power, gas, water, and waste. Those who live in Japan without families/dependents can find international dormitories owned by private institutions such as charity and religious foundations. Another usual strategy is avoiding eating out, which can be as expensive as two or three times the price of cooking at home. I encountered Indonesian families everywhere in Japan, seemingly always cooking at home or bringing lunch bento from home. Besides conforming to the halal and the Indonesian taste, cooking at home makes the food expenses cheaper. Some also have dietary problems with non-Indonesian foods. For single students, spending 50 thousand Yen/person/month for food would already give good food. Another strategy is to avoid the hazards of too many unnecessary goods. Some Indonesian family students live in international dormitories in Odaiba, yet none of them rent the family size rooms whose price is not affordable on their scholarship.

In addition to the accommodation strategies, many Indonesians, as well as (others) strategize on their purchasing amenities. There are specific periods, dates, times, and locations where customers will get a good price. A reasonable price is always the keyword of my informants when asking their purchasing power. In Japan, there are periods where everything is on sale with a very considerable discount, especially around seasons of Golden Week, Christmas, New Year, the Emperor's birthday, Chinese lunar celebration, and several other national and traditional holidays. These are times when people, including Indonesians, rushed to the market to buy groceries and when Indonesian students went out to hunt Japanese electronic products.

In Indonesia, Japanese products are top-rated for their quality, but many people cannot afford them for the price. Therefore, they often buy fake products or a product made by different brands. However, when they live in Japan, they are looking for Japanese products, even the second-hand ones. Indeed, Japan has an outstanding culture of reusing products. Coincidentally, all the informants I met love used Japanese products. There are many thrifts or second-hand shops which sell used but still the right products. Many Indonesians I met recognize thrift chain

stores such as Hard Off, Book Off, Tre Fac Style stores where they can purchase good clothes, electronics, toys, households, kitchen utensils, and seasonal things with very cheap prices. Several stores at the big mall in Japan also sell used branded linen products that they cannot afford in Indonesia. Several online used item stores are top-rated among Indonesians such as Craigslist, Amazon, Rakuten, and eBay. Several Indonesians in Tokyo also created online chat groups of used goods. They can get and put information about free unused, good households, such as a freezer, TV set, washing machines, stoves, kitchen set, furniture, AC, desktop, mattress, bed frame, etc. Most of my Indonesian interlocutors living in apartments utilize the used amenities they purchase from second-hand stores or received from their seniors leaving Japan. This financial situation already indicates the unsettled economic status of some typical Indonesian students (as well as others) in Japan. Being a graduate student in Japan is already unsettled period for young Indonesians. Moreover, at the same time when they were breadwinners, they depend their family income on the scholarship financial support. They indeed experienced very hard times.

6.3.4.2. Young aspiring middle class family

All of the above interlocutors are married and are breadwinners for their family members coming to Japan. In fact, there are also many married Indonesian graduate students living alone in Tokyo (campus dormitories), leaving their families in Indonesia. They go home to Indonesia, once or twice a year. Except for Tamyiz, who was just married recently, most interlocutors have married one to five years before getting the scholarship in Japan, having one to three children (Sofyan now 4, Nasril 2, Rahman 2). This status makes most of their time in Japan likely spent between their campus labs and family apartments. On the weekends, they spend their time with family or with Indonesian group gatherings. Additionally, because most of their children were in the young ages between one (Nasril's youngest daughter), and 13 (Sofyan's oldest' daughter), they had to be around the family most of the time except on weekdays. Of course, this status forced them to strategize between being a graduate student and a family breadwinner and the fathers for their children.

In terms of location of residence, most of my interlocutors' current residency was urban areas. Although they grew up in different towns or cities (Nasril—Makassar, Gugus—Malang, Rahman—Banyuwangi) in Indonesia, they currently live in Bandung. Furthermore, although they did not grow up in Bandung, they are married to a woman of Bandung resident or nearby cities. Most of them grew up in urban areas at least after starting middle school. On Java Islands,

middle school campuses are commonly located in the district (small city). Few of them experienced Madrasah school (one to three years) during elementary school as extra non-formal classes. Most of them have concise formal Islamic training.

6.3.4.3. Islamic illiteracy

Massive urbanization in Indonesia (Java Islands) only started at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s when Jakarta accomplished its first highway projects connecting it with the surrounding cities of Java (Silver, 2007). Before the mentioned era, most Indonesians had their cultural roots in rural areas whose economic activities centralize over agriculture. Within this era, the distinction between *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi* is well recognized. Even in the 1980s, I can tell my memories of how people differentiate between the *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi* families. *Santri*, at the time, was considered an insignificant group in Indonesian national politics. In contrast, all of my informants were grown in the heyday of the “santrinization” era (the 80-90s), where Islam begins to strongly dominate the public spaces: schools, media, and workplaces.

Growing up in a *santri* family and neighborhood, I found circulating stereotyping among our *santri* elders when talking about the non-*santri* people (*abangan* and *priyayi*). *Abangan* is associated with those who are minimal in communal religious activities participation, Islamic literacy, and daily prayers. During the Old and the New Order, *abangan* was often associated especially with those who politically vote for nationalist parties, such as PNI and PKI, or PDI—Indonesian Democracy Party. *Priyayi* is an *abangan* and *santri* associated with the state apparatus.

Those born in the 1980s, such as most of my interlocutors, must have experiences at least part of their childhood in their parents' or grandparents' villages. Most of the rural areas in Java were occupied with a strong local tradition of Islam (traditionalists). However, all interlocutors grew up between the late 80s and 90s, where Islamization was so strong in urban middle schools. The period was the beginning phase, where my interlocutors constructed their Islamic identity. Studies of Islamic resurgence have overlooked many prominent middle school campuses in the big cities in Java, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Solo, Yogyakarta, Bogor, Surabaya, Malang where my interlocutors underwent their junior and senior high school years. Therefore, although their parents and grandparents were traditionalist practitioners, they did not care or did not pay attention to their children's new ideologies and practices. Lack of Islamic literacy makes them have no choice except to follow the dominant groups surrounding them.

In that sense, we can conclude that there is a secure connection between the lack of literacy and social grouping in the formation of identity among the young students and probably their parents.

In terms of religious organizations, most of their family originates in a culture associated with modernist Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS neighborhoods. None of them were grown in NU families or areas except Sofyan's wife's family who are from an NU background. This is not to say that ITB has only students with non-NU backgrounds. Indeed, there are many ITB students with NU backgrounds. Rahman, despite growing up in a rural village in Banyuwangi East Java, a home for the traditionalist NU, he along with his family were from an ordinary *abangan* background. However, since he was doing his senior high school in the town, he was introduced to the ROHIS activities that he continued after he was accepted in ITB.

6.3.4.4. Language skills

New comers are vulnerable for any new ideas and opinions from the older ones who are more experienced about the new places. The lack of language skills and local knowledge of tradition and custom make them more stressful than what they had thought about life in Japan. They are indebted for the assistance from their Indonesian contacts in various matters such as opening bank account, housing, insurance, and administration processes at ward offices. Usually, because the contact is a member of an Islamic organization, they likely will suggest the new arrivals to join their group where these newcomers will get more friends and help. For Indonesian students, this opportunity becomes an initial step where they start living in a new community. Often the many already settled Indonesians donate their unused stuff such as kitchen utensils, winter coats, futon, blankets, even furniture, and electronics. This care and attention make the newcomers feel welcomed and have group bonding and solidarity. This situation becomes their entrance point to affiliate to the new group and network group. All of the students and alumni revealed their difficult story of their first arrival and their dependency on their seniors at the universities. They all feel indebted with the seniors who have helped them. In return, now when they are settled as a salaryman (Sofyan) and others, they feel motivated to pay forward for the kindness of their seniors in an Indonesian community group (dominated by Salafi followers).

6.4. Consequences

In Indonesia, being ITB students, my interlocutors had participated in various Islamic activities on or off-campus, including Salman public lecture and *liqo* forum. All shared that Salman greatly influences the students' Islamic activities and provides an opportunity to learn Islam and helped build or revive their Islamic identities. Although none of them have reached "top leadership positions," all of them share a consensus that Salman has a very positive impact on their religious identity of being a young Muslim. The Islamic activism nuance in Salman had given them a new horizon of a "new" Islam, not similar to what they experienced in the villages centralizing over rituals. While in Salman, they learned Islam as a "way of life." Therefore, they have participated in various Salman's programs such as attending lectures or a *liqo*, helping to organize fundraising, or helping to forward information about Salman programs on their social media accounts. In other words, they have been familiar with the environment of "Islamic fundamentalism" which leads them to the same group in Japan. How they meet their Indonesian "environment" in the new place can be illustrated as follows.

Once accepted for the scholarship program in Japan, the recipient contacted their old friends, seniors, or acquaintances for first arrival accommodation arrangements such as housing, banking, etc. Once arriving in Japan, they were picked up by their Indonesian contacts at the airport or train station, and stayed a few days before getting settled rooms or apartments. Some students get cheap dormitory rooms, still, they often stay a few days at an Indonesian friend's room before they get a dorm one. Staying at the friend's apartment also helps them learn new customs of living in very limited spaces in Japan which includes managing garbage disposal, not making noise, and several apartment regulations they never encountered in Indonesia. Some students came with insufficient cash before they got their first transfer from their scholarship institution, in that case, their Indonesian friends usually kindly helped them. Indeed, many migration experts describe old and new immigrants' relationships which emphasize the old settler's skills and ability. In that situation, in most cases, my inexperienced interlocutors are very dependent on their old friends. As the newcomers, they follow what their senior says about where to go for halal grocery, where to find halal market, and where to go for Islamic prayers as well as Islamic studies class. In such an unequal power relationship between the new and old settlers, the newcomers are potentially influenced by the old immigrants' strategies and ideologies.

6.5. Chapter summary

To sum up, this chapter has described conservative religious practices among Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan, their cultural repertoire, and migration life circumstance which make them vulnerable for new ideologies. The chapter confirms that the growing exclusive practices among Indonesian in Japan are shown in the three instanced cases: halal consumption practices, Muslims greeting Christmas, and non-Muslim leadership discourses.

Extreme halal alertness and conservative global halal conception have presented inconsistency of the goals of Islamic sharia of which to maintain the existence of *nafs* (life and health) of human race. Conservative concepts and halal practices have also created disharmony in social interactions and, to some extent, prejudice and tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. Likewise, Muslim conservative understanding of Christmas greeting to the non-Muslim and their political views of non-Muslim leadership describes Muslim's problem to the values of multicultural and pluralistic society. The three cases producing exclusive attitudes toward non-Muslims leave questions of the cosmopolitanism within Islamic culture.

The chapter argues that the conservative-exclusive Islamic practices above are caused by Islamism cultural repertoire background and ideologies pervasively spreading among Indonesian youth, especially among university students. The chapter also illustrates the rise of conservatism among the youth in Indonesia that is represented by Indonesian migrants in Japan. The Salman-Meguro networks' relationship illustrates the role of young educated, middle-class Muslims at the center of Islamic fundamentalism including among the migrant communities. Salman and Meguro hegemonized by Islamism networks formulate repertoire and ideologies that further influence their members including those who emigrate overseas. The unsettled or vulnerable status of the Indonesian migrants ranging from shortage of financial support, language, skill, cultural shocks, and Islamic illiteracy leads them more influenced by the conservative and exclusive ideologies. All the structural and cultural repertoire of Islamism in Indonesia, which is the contemporary phenomenon among the youth, direct their exclusive strategies of religious practices in Japan.

CHAPTER 7

INCLUSIVE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND REPERTOIRE

7.1. Introduction

This chapter presents contrasting portrayals from the previous chapter about Indonesian immigrants' exclusive Islamic practices. Previously, I have discussed the cultural repertoire of Islamic conservatism among the youth in Indonesia that influences the Indonesian immigrants in Japan. Additionally, I also discussed unsettled lives' characteristics of the Indonesian people in terms of Islamic illiteracy, social, economic, cultural, and social hindrances, leading them to intensive contacts with the new conservative ideologies and groups. Using a similar transnationalism approach,⁹⁹ this chapter also argues that cultural repertoire at home country and migration experiences contribute to the inclusive Islamic practices in Japan.

By providing contradicting narratives, the chapter aims to strengthen the previous argument on the important role of pre-departure cultural repertoire and post-migration hardship experiences in connecting to the new exclusive ideology socialization. However, unlike the previous interlocutors whose strategies of responding to the multicultural others were more in "exclusive-conflict" approaches, the following interlocutors responded to the cultural differences in "inclusive-integrative" frameworks. Another purpose of this contradiction is to provide "reversal evidence" from my previous finding about the exclusivist informants.

I stated previously that among the exclusivist informants' variables are young productive age (between twenties and forties), Islamic illiteracy, social, economic, cultural hindrances, intensive contact with the new conservative ideologies. On the contrary, the opposing variables, including middle age (in forties and upper), Islamic literacy, social, and economic competence (settledness) will likely enact and enable them to interact conveniently and closely with people from different backgrounds. As a result, international migration has a different role in these people's cultural and religious transformation. For immigrants prepared with conservative repertoire, international migration led them into more conservative and exclusive practices. For those prepared with inclusive and moderate Islamic repertoire, which

⁹⁹ About transnationalism concept, please refer to previous Chapter VI

is the focus of this chapter, international migration experiences have strengthened their inclusive cultural and religious practices.

Six narrating informants in this chapter represent other Indonesian immigrant groups possessing different religious stances. Presenting informants' inclusively religious and cultural practices along with their cultural repertoire, this chapter also provides "controlling variables" for the previous informants in the earlier chapter

In this chapter, I divide two types of inclusive strategies, civic inclusivism and theological inclusivism. Referring to Diana Eck's concepts of civic and theological pluralism (Eck 2007), the civic inclusivism strategy is defined as inclusive or tolerant behaviors based on the everyday human "secular" interaction and socialization. In this formulation, inclusive views and attitudes toward the others are influenced more by the consequences of their habits, customs, and lifestyle of coexistence and social interaction than by their theological knowledge (skill in religion). In this type of strategy, theological supplements such as religious knowledge or theological literacy (skills) do not play significantly in a person's action. They judge their actions mostly based on the common sense of human social contract and interaction. That "Man needs to be reciprocally accepting others to be accepted socially by others" can represent the concept. The learned "divine" judgment that supports their practices, if available from Islamic sources, is only complementary for their strategies. The Muslims' cosmopolitan civic inclusivism, more or less, is impressed by the past and current cultural setting of their life. While theological inclusivism is based on the owners' skills in Islamic tradition/corpus through the formal or informal trainings in addition to their habits, custom and lifestyle. In other words, within this theological inclusive framework, there is a strong emphasis on the skills in Islamic literature besides other aspects of culture.

7.2. Inclusive strategy

How inclusive a person, as shown in their tolerant action toward others, is generally caused first by their skills, habits, customs, and lifestyle constructed from their childhood to their adulthood. Family, school, workplace, and neighborhoods, where people spend their lives, formulate cognition and behavior toward others in certain situations (Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin, 1997). In regular times, those who grew up in multi-ethnic and religious families will have exposure to different religious traditions and, therefore, affect their behaviour (Wijisen & Suhadi, 2014). Kinship has been a paramount concern of anthropologists to understand the

chain of cultural transmission (Soekanto, Soerjono, 1969).¹⁰⁰ In this subject, sociologists and anthropologists see a person's action cannot be detached from their cultural backgrounds first created in their family. From Berger's *Sacred Canopy* (1996), we understand as Durkheim has said that the individual behavior is derived from the internalization of the outer world which they first experienced from the parents and family (Berger, 1967).

Schools, clubs, and workplaces are also providing a social environment where habits, customs, and lifestyles were structured. Homogenous schools and workplaces will have less exposure to the different religious and cultural traditions than those heterogeneous ones (Moore, 2007; Tyack, 2007). School provides a long span where someone builds their habitual responses toward something in certain situations. The "social pressure" of the school system, which includes curriculum, teachers, regulation, extracurricular activities, and peer group, is a cultural repertoire of schools that influence students' behavior (Holley, 2011). The workplaces can possess this level of influence. Because they provide a long-term social interaction between the colleagues, depending on the workplaces' social environment, a person could build a mentality and repertoire of inclusivism or the opposite. As Hofstede's theory of working place's culture, inclusive workplaces provide inclusive cultural repertoire for their workers, and vice versa (Hofstede, 2011). When family, school, workplaces, and neighborhoods have a similar inclusive cultural repertoire, their members will accumulate their inclusive strategies. The following interlocutors provide this explaining insight.

Dodo (50/M), Lucky (47/M), Diva (36/F), and Hafa (44/F) were raised religiously in Muslim families, practicing Islam since their childhood, hence introducing themselves to me as Muslims. However, it might be challenging to find their Islamic identity from their outer-appearance, usually shown in the popular media. They look like ordinary or common people in Tokyo, working in Japanese or international environment where most of their co-workers are non-Muslims, male and female mixed working groups. They do not wear Muslim ethnic attire, such as South Asian, or Middle eastern outfits. They also enjoy Japanese cultural lifestyle, commuting on the train every day, hanging out at Japanese cafes or restaurants, favoring Japanese cuisine, watching Japanese movies, sports, and music as well as exercising *karaoke*. They let their children study and enjoy friendship with their Japanese schoolmates. They do not mind medical service (for men) or beauty treatment (for women) done by male or female staff. Diva and Hafa are female Muslims who go to the Japanese beauty salon whose workers are

¹⁰⁰ See also (Levi-Strauss, 1965)

men, shopping for everyday beauty products in Japan, and do not reject shaking hands with male friends. Except for religious rituals, both do not wear veils inside or outside the house. In contrast to the exclusivists, they both also do not limit themselves with female medical doctors when they visit hospitals or clinics. Politically, they all disagree with religion as the basis of Indonesia's political identity as it flourished in the 2014 and 2019 Indonesian presidential elections.

What my interlocutors acted in Japan was something usual in Indonesia before the 2000s. Since then, Islam, as a political identity, has blown Indonesian public life, and gradually Islamic symbols, including head cover or veils for women, appear everywhere, including at schools and workplaces (e.g. Amrullah, 2011; Lindquist, 2004). Before Islamism and post Islamism have strengthened, Indonesian Muslims, even the *Santri* community looking like in the current Islamic fashion, would be unfamiliar. However, many female Muslim public figures remain wearing Javanese-Islamic outfits. Hafa, Diva, and several other Indonesian women in Japan are among Muslims who prefer to exercise Islam in the way they experienced in Indonesia's "past".

Being a Muslim cannot be measured from the physical and outfit appearance (Hassan, 2005). From their ideological and intellectual dimension, in Glork and Stark's "religiosity" dimension, all informants have fulfilled the requirements of being a Muslim. All of the interlocutors, as they admitted verbally and wrote on their Indonesian identity card (are Muslims). Ideologically, they believe that: Allah is God; Muhammad is His messenger; and there are many messengers of Allah. They also believe in God's works, and in the hereafter, which are among the fundamental foundations of Islam. Lucky and Dodo also go to Friday prayer regularly.

In fact, according to a prophetic saying, a person's reciting "*shahadat*" confession that Allah is God and Muhammad is His Prophet has indicated a person's status as a Muslim. Indeed, Dodo and Lucky admitted sometimes they do not, by standard, correctly perform the five pillars of Islam (as they confessed), i.e., confession into God, doing prayers, fasting, religious alms, and performing pilgrimage to the holy lands. However, they all believe in these doctrinal ideologies. Lately, however, they feel alienated from the broader mainstream Muslim in Japan group because they perform non-standard Islamic practices by the majority. For example, Dodo and Lucky agree that drinking wine is not 100% haram depending whether a person gets intoxicated or experiencing harmful effects on their health. Lucky does not drink wine, while

Dedy used to drink (wine) socially and for health purposes. All eat meat except pork, although they are slaughtered in Japan and have no halal label. They often go together with their Japanese colleagues for a party. In Bogardus' social distance scale (Bogardus), they have a deficient score of social distance toward other people from different ethnic and religious groups. All make others as their co-workers, even partners. All work as professionals (corporate employees) at Japanese and international companies. Except for Dodo and Diva, all are married to foreigner spouses.

Lucky is married to a Japanese woman, Hafa is married to an American living in Japan, and Diva remains single (2021). All their spouses have converted to Islam, married in Islamic way although they—according to the interviewees—remain "minimalist Muslims". All of their partners occasionally drink alcohol, especially when meeting their co-ethnic/national friends, but have stopped eating pork. However, Lucky's wife still eats pork, and Lucky tolerates the habits as an individual choice. He believed in the Quranic verse "there is no force in Islamic practice." Dodo is married to a Christian converting to Islam, but he himself still drinks wine outside the house for health treatment and socialization. All, however, are used to eating at Japanese restaurants and eating all meat menus except pork. I did extended interviews with them at Japanese and Thai restaurants, and we ordered steak or chicken (all of them pay the bills!), in addition to seafood. Hafa and Diva do not wear the hijab (veils). In brief, they practice and believe in the opposite direction of what the exclusivists do.

They do not think international migration activities are only for men. According to Hafa and Diva, women migrate to safe places, where their rights and existence are guaranteed, and Tokyo is one of the world's safest places for women to work. It is even safer than those of the Muslim countries. They think some conditions allow them to leave a prayer or collect them at one time. They feel guilty and less perfect whenever they forgot to pray. They also consider that veiling is not an obligatory religious command. If it were sinful to uncover their heads, they believe that God is the most gracious and merciful, therefore their sins will be forgiven. They just cannot imagine being socially rejected by their co-Indonesian social groups because they do not expose their "religious" identities.

The halal category is not as restricted as for the exclusivists. They have a very high level of acceptance toward the others, making them friends, leaders, even spouses, which is very restricted to the exclusivists. They greet people's birthdays and allow greeting Christmas, New Year, Valentine, Chinese New Year, and other religious greetings, including traditional

Japanese festivals, which are considered prohibited according to the exclusivists. They allowed their kids to go to Japanese school and did not mind the food and their absence from Islamic study instruction. They can eat all the school meals except pork for which they prepare substitutes. For their kids, they allow male and female mixed interaction and activities contrasting some exclusivists who do not allow their children for swimming class and some other mixed school activities. They themselves often go in mixed male and female Indonesian "*tabehodai*" groups during Golden Week and the end of the year for *nomikai*.

Interestingly, although Lucky himself does not drink alcohol or eat pork, he does not prohibit his wife and son from eating pork. For Lucky, both his wife and son are in the stage of learning Islam, whose restriction is conditional. He said there should be no force in religious faith, and he believes there is no sin for kids. For instance, he considers eating school food, as long as it is not pork (in the meat form), is alright for his son when he was just a kid, although he indeed insists on not eating *buta niku*/pork—and his son gradually learns Islam himself. Lately, his son does not eat pork, but he still tolerates his mother (Lucky's wife) eating pork when both were in his grandparents' companions.

Because of their similar views and strategies of being Muslim in Japan, it is not strange to find them often in one friendship forum for a shared goal. They share an ideology of anti-Islamic radicalism and experience marginalization from the Muslim “mainstream” group in Tokyo. They (especially Lucky) were involved in the social media campaign against the Islamic radicalism and terrorism. They established a limited informal group called *Bhinneka* (diversity), which functions as a forum for socialization among those with similar inclusivism voices among Indonesians in Japan.

One way to measure Muslim inclusivism was by asking informants' opinion about the Islamic State of Iraq and Syam (ISIS)¹⁰¹ and by their position in the case of Ahok, a local Chinese Christian becoming the then-DKI Jakarta governor. In the exclusivist group, there were still unclear opinions about their positioning. They do not want to focus their voice on ISIS's wrong behavior, according to Islam. However, they tried to relate their barbaric practice with unjust American policy and Western colonialization against the Muslim South. Some do not take seriously that ISIS did exist, while others believe in a conspiracy theory that ISIS is a US project. The inclusivist group agrees that ISIS does exist. They are corrupting the Islamic

¹⁰¹ Arizona State University, Survey on Islamic Radicalism in Southeast Asia and Africa 2011, unpublished questioner

teachings and, therefore, should be eliminated. Lucky and Dodo, the founders of Bhinneka, even reveal their intention of establishing Bhinneka is to make its multicultural/multi-religious members understand that Islam and ISIS are nothing but on the opposite ends of Islamism. Both want to make the non-Muslim friends in the group understand that people like themselves are against ISIS terrorism. Lucky admitted there were senses of Islamophobia among his non-Muslims friends. Therefore, Lucky and Dodo often harshly raise their loud voice when criticizing other Muslims who are indicated of having somehow insensitive feeling toward the act of terrorism produced by radical views in the religion.

One indicator which shows opposing position among the exclusivists and inclusivists' strategies is reflected in their social media reaction to the global terrorism of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The first group keeps quiet about the terrorism news and information as they think the report was already aimed to strengthen the impression that Islam is associated with terrorism. They keep considering that the West media had a plan to denigrate Islam as a religion of terrorism. Some also believe in the conspiracy theory that was very loudly voiced by the Islamist preacher from India, Zakir Naik, who was favored by the exclusivists. On the other hand, they were very reactive to much-unverified information (often hoax), revealing minority Muslim communities in several countries were attacked or discriminated. From 2014 to 2019, several terrorist attacks were claimed by ISIS/ISIL: Boston, Belgium, Paris, London, Sri Lanka, and Surabaya (Indonesia). On the other hand, the inclusive groups show their sympathies to the victims and are consistently regretful of the rise of Islamic radicalism (including Islamism) in the Muslim world. They follow the global trend in the media by installing the flag of the attacked country on their Facebook profile pictures.

Another sign of inclusive strategy is detected from their political preference on the religious bases, which was very clear in the case of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. This election campaign has made religious issues the center strategy to prevent Ahok, a Christian Chinese from winning his second term as a Jakarta governor. There was a national mobilization through millions of mass demonstrations to press the central government as seemingly shows its support for Ahok's constitutional right. Street movement for a political purpose wrapped by intolerant religious interpretation has awakened national public concern of politicization of religion (see previous chapter). Pro and contra debates and conflict in the grass-root had reached to the unimaginable level of the gubernatorial election, which indeed influenced the divided nationwide ballot in the 2019 presidential election. The division also

existed in Japan. The intolerant movement in the name of religion was assumed as an alternative way to block the chance for Ahok to reach the next level of national leadership, which is also regretted by many Muslim leaders. According to Lucky and his friends, this mass mobilization shows the incompetence of Indonesian Muslims with democracy they disagree with. Thus, they take a positional stand to support the Ahok campaign in Japan and Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections.

7.3. Civic cultural repertoire

The four informants show inclusive strategies, but they do not have formal Islamic education experience background. They have been long practicing the inclusive strategies before knowing religious interpretation supporting their practices. Hafa (41, Javanese, Indonesian instructor), and Diva (34, Javanese, salary-woman), as well many other female interlocutors not wearing hijab (veils), mostly not because of sudden influences from the scholarly inclusive reference such as that of leading *mufassir* (Quran expert) Quraish Shihab and other Indonesian scholars¹⁰² whose opinion legalizes their practices. They admitted that they do not understand available Islamic literature, which supports their ideas against fundamentalism readings, but they assumed that Islam would not put women's outfits as a prioritized concern. "God is more concerned with your hearts than your dress," both say. They also believe in God's mercy and forgiveness when humans excuse themselves for trespassing His orders.

Based on Glock and Stark's religiosity conception, previously discussed (see chapter three), Diva and Hafa, could score highest in the religious experiences and consequences dimensions. The experiential dimension includes the feeling of being a religious adherent which resulted from their religious performances and understanding. Whether performing certain religious deeds make them feeling good, feeling amazed, overwhelmed, secured, peaceful, or in Geertz's words (1973), having mood and motivation. In this case both Diva's and Hafa's feeling being devoted Muslim through her performing everyday practices of being good to everyone not only Muslim but also non-Muslims as result of the habits, custom, and lifestyle experienced (inherited) from her closest people such as parents, family and their predecessors. On the contrary both would feel not in "mood and motivation" if both follow the religious practices exercised by the conservative Muslims. Such cultural repertoire was inherited from

¹⁰² Some Indonesian scholars argue that "veil" is Arab traditions not exclusively Islamic attire

those people, externalizing them how being good to people. Following parents and predecessors can be regarded as one way of being religious (in more functional definition). By not following the majority Muslim practices in Japan does not make them feel less religious or not devoted Muslims.

Glock and Stark's consequential dimension describes every day "secular" acts that are inspired or motivated by one or more previous dimensions. The secular acts of Diva, Hafa and represented in their "cosmopolitan" attitude toward the others (joining party, attending friends' a Christmas celebration as well other religious festival, and playing music "secular" as result (consequence) of their "moderate, inclusive lifestyle in Japan, and life experiences they pass through. This is likely because their habits of cosmopolitan interaction with other people impact their inclusive views and religious practices through which they welcome others in their close distance. In contrast, they have a low score in the ritual and intellectual dimensions part as they do not possess in-depth information and knowledge of Islam and very often excuse themselves from social gatherings which involve surrounding Muslims (ritual). Except for Lucky who has an essential religious background, although not including formal Islamic education, the others have no or minimal Islamic formal education experiences.

Most of the informants do not have further Islamic instructions except from what they learn in their school, home, and neighborhood habits during their life periods in Indonesia. The National curriculum in Indonesia from the elementary school to the higher education levels obliges every school to provide religious instruction taught by religiously practicing teachers. However, the national Islamic curriculum mostly talks normatively from within internal religious teachings, such as ideological, and ritual aspects without further elaboration on the existing difference practices in the fields.

7.3.1. Dodo

7.3.1.1. Strategy; inclusive from the Root

Inclusive families, schools, neighborhoods, and workplaces play essential roles in a person's life experiences and cognition, constructing a person's inclusive strategy of religious practices. Raised in inter-faith family, growing up in a multi-religious neighborhood, having exposure and direct personal and social interaction with non-Muslims on everyday bases at school and neighborhood, engrossed in his hobby and profession as IT specialist, Dodo (50, married, two sons) almost has no chance of getting close to the conservative communities that might influence his mind about the others. Sympathetic feeling to the Christian friends from his

direct friendship and co-existence as a family has overwhelmed any unfriendly ideas and exclusive behavior toward non-Muslims. Thus, although Dodo has a little competence in Islamic literacy, his possession of such “emic” interpretation has influenced his inclusive attitudes toward the others. To Dodo, International migration he experienced has strengthened his possessed habits and professional lifestyle of inclusivism.

Dodo was born and raised in Manado, North Sulawesi, having several years of living experiences in Bandung, West Java, during his childhood. His parents were Acehnese (father) and Sundanese (mother). According to Dodo, his father was a grandchild of a charismatic Muslim leader in Aceh. He has a Minahasan wife, a Christian converting to Islam, who was his junior at the senior high school (10-12K). His sons go to senior and junior high schools in Japan. They live in a big 3 LDK apartment. In the Japanese income perspective, Dodo is among the settled middle-class group. He makes around 500K a month. His expenses were mostly for an apartment, his son's educational programs, and his mother's health treatment in Indonesia. Dodo lives with a family of four with his wife, and their two sons.

Dodo is an IT specialist in a luxurious hotel chain in Japan whose job position is responsible for the whole IT system of the hotels, such as maintaining digital facilities and systems of the hotels. When a problem in a hotel's computer and digital system occurs, Dodo is the person in charge of taking care of the problems. He has been in this position for more than five years after a long time working in Tokyo under a top-rated IT system company. After several years in Singapore, he was transferred to Tokyo, a city he loves most. Defining himself as a Muslim, at his workplaces, he used to interact with people from different ethnicities, traditions, and religious backgrounds. His previous job placements were in Manila, the Philippines, Bangkok, and Singapore before he was finally placed in the current place Tokyo. Once, he was the only Asian in his team, and he is the only Indonesian team member most of the time. He spoke English for the non-Japanese and speaks Japanese to the Japanese, although—he admitted—he is frail in writing and reading the Kanjis.

His arrival in Japan some twenty years ago began with his career in IT. He has been working independently with computer technology since he was a student at a high school in Manado, where he also established computer skill courses. He never attended a university, but was very skillful in IT as a hobby. He then joined a computer specialist project in Jakarta, where he learned more knowledge about computer technologies from his colleagues at the office. A

few years later, he joined an international company and was finally placed overseas, leading to his latest place, Japan.

As a Muslim, Dodo admitted that he prayed every day, although not always five times/day. Sometimes he combines two prayers at one time at his apartment before or after attending the office. When a hotel room is served for his overnight hours, there is no problem with prayer activities. According to him, the essential aspect of prayer is "*khusu*," being intimately conscious in doing interaction with God. He tried to achieve this state as passionately as possible until he sometimes left the time without completing the prayer because he could not concentrate. Once, he also skipped a Friday prayer, going out from the Indonesian mosque when the preacher delivered a sermon with a political hate speech. This idea is a rare opinion I heard circulating within certain Muslim spiritualists. Dodo could not tell the Islamic reference which supports his opinion. However, this is the usual practices he has maintained for a long time, he says. Dodo's little Islamic knowledge came from his mother, school teacher, mosque, and popular media. He did not read the Qur'an in the Arabic language.

I noticed Dodo's inclusive views from his postings on the Facebook forum of Indonesian Community in Japan, which he moderates along with his friends. Within the heyday of religion as a political identity in Indonesian national political campaigns, it was easy to see how people considered others from their views of others. One of the very exclusive views say that Muslim should not accept a non-Muslim as their leader (or even a friend). Therefore, a Muslim cannot choose them for a leadership. I found Dodo was among those who were against this view. Later on, he initiated the establishment of the Bhineka (Diversity) group in Japan to accommodate the concern of Indonesian people in Japan about the issue of pluralism in Indonesia. Following its name, Bhineka invites only those who support tolerance in ethnic and religious differences. I found a few other informants from his group who share similar life strategies of being a Muslim in Japan.

The establishment of Bhineka, according to Dodo, aims to attract people to understand each other's religious traditions correctly. Especially, according to Dodo, it is an effort to decrease the Islamophobia among Indonesian non-Muslim in Japan. Not only among Japanese, but Islamophobia was also very clearly apparent among fellow Indonesian non-Muslim immigrants. They often associate Muslims with radicalism and terrorism. Especially during the heyday of ISIS, where two Japanese were beheaded by ISIS fighters, Muslims in Japan, including himself, often received cynical looks and comments from their surroundings, even

from fellow Indonesians in Japan. They often suspiciously asked about ISIS according to his Islamic view. By joining Bhinneka, they will be able to see directly in practice how Muslims like him behave accordingly and sharply opposing the radical and terrorists' ideas. In their closed Facebook group, he, along with several other members, circulates news and ideas rejecting Islamism, radicalism, and terrorism. All Muslim members loudly speak their voices against Islamism popularized by groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and 212 movements. They keep posting and promoting voices of Indonesian anti radicalism active prominent speakers such as Nadirsyah Hosen, Said Aqil Sirodj, Quraish Shihab, Banser NU, Yahya Staquf, and Sumato Al Qurtuby.

On halal issues, Dodo does not eat pork because he believes in his Islamic tradition. However, he eats beef and chicken although they do not come with the "halal" label. He believed that except for pork, he could eat all meat in Japanese restaurants from the beginning of his arrival in Japan. When making an appointment for this interview, Dedy enjoyed selecting food in Japanese restaurants, ordering food with either chicken and beef as the menu. On the issue of non-halal restaurants for their mixing between halal and non-halal meat, Dodo believes that what is haram (forbidden) is eating the pork, how people process the food is not the issue in halal and haram. With his views, he is not bothered by the question of halal in Japanese food. Dodo also does not agree that non-Muslims cannot slaughter animals whose meat is allowed for Muslim consumption. Dodo does not know if theological reasons support his strategies, but he says he just does not understand if Muslims cannot consume meat from the non-Muslims' slaughter. On alcoholic drinks, Dodo does not 100% believe it is forbidden for Muslims. Therefore, he still sips it occasionally. He used to believe as far as it is not intoxicating it is alright to drink alcohol. Because of warnings from his sons, he lately tried to avoid drinking alcohol, especially at his home. Therefore, he only ordered fruit juice on any occasion with Japanese friends.

7.3.1.2 Cultural repertoire

Dodo's current strategies cannot be detached from the cultural repertoire, which he experiences from childhood to adulthood and the current life. The place where he lived when he was a child was a very multicultural neighborhood. He used to live in Manado, where Christian is the dominant religion just as within the neighborhood, he used to live in. Dodo's living experiences in Manado had made him very open-minded. He used to go to a Christian elementary school and Christian senior high school. He has very positive views about his

childhood experiences with his schoolmates. Although he was among the minority students at the school, all of his friends and teachers had respected him and treated him well. He was selected as a student leader for several years. As a leader, he often mobilized his class members for school activities, including religious activities. Very often, he led the committee organization for Christmas or Easter celebrations. The school let him take Christianity classes in addition to Islamic classes he takes for credit. On Islamic holidays all of his Christian friends visited him and wished him very good wishes. He thinks that it was the beautiful moment he experienced, whereas now it is a rare occasion. This experience continued and strengthened when he was a student at a Christian school for his senior high school, as more intimate friendships with non-schoolmates escalated.

Not only was his school life that produced repertoire for Dodo, but also his neighborhood. Although his family was only a minority group in the Christian neighborhood, they felt secured. They could enjoy living in coexistence with their Christian neighbors. They visited and greeted each other during Christian and Islamic festivals and often helped each other. A shared feeling of cooperation and togetherness was so strong that it makes him very regretful to see the current development of religious intolerance in Indonesia. Positive impressions of his Christian friends in Manado influenced his attitude toward the others, including his strategies when living in Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, and now in Tokyo. His working experience in a very inclusive atmosphere in very cosmopolitan cities strengthened his positive views about the others.

Another cultural background is his family-in-laws' Christian background. His wife was a Christian converting to a Muslim. They have no problem with it and let her choose her faith. They respect her choice. They often go out together, visit each other, and communicate, although his wife has changed her faith. He feels so good about Manado's life, leaving it as cognition skills, habit, and custom, even the style of his inclusive views. According to Dodo, although he has mixed blood of Acehnese and Sundanese, he likes to be called a Manadonese, linking to a city where he was raised. His international exposures of working together with not only Muslim, but also mostly non-Muslim, influence his positive views over the others and his current strategies of being a Muslim in Japan.

7.3.2. Lucky

7.3.2.1 Self-deradicalized

In the 1990s, Islamist movements and their various organizations have been very active recruiting new members or seeding its influence on different student organizations and activities (Abuza, 2007; Hasan, 2009). Thousands of students reportedly joined the underground group of NII seeking to establish Islamic State of Indonesia (Abduh, 2001). Some were on the waiting list to be sworn by the underground activists if they passed the training phase. Others were being directed by the covered Muslim leaders to be supporters, sympathizers, or friends of the NII or at least not opposing the NII ideologies. It is impossible to know the valid number of the NII members, but surely it was easy to find many students who support the ideas of Islamic State or Sharia constitution. In late 1979, when Nurcholish Majid declared “Islam Yes! Political Islam No”, there was public anger against him and accusing him of promoting the idea of secularization. Political Islam has been long conservatively understood as the same as Islam. Religious conservatism that circulated in many Muslim groups including in Islamic students’ organization was an entry point for the growth of Islamism. Those students joining the youth Islamic organization often become targets of the NII cadres around them. Many agreed to join, but many others including Lucky do not agree. Lucky was a member of Rohis and Tarbiyah which were known as the embryo of the Islamist movements at campuses and fertile fields for NII member recruitment. Lucky represented those who interacted with the Islamist groups, but rejected their persuasive recruitment, and even criticized them. How could he experience close contacts with the aggressive Islamists but at the same time could secure himself from their association? In this chapter, I argue that Lucky’s cultural repertoire of a social science undergraduate, and graduate student, as well as an active member of moderate Islamic group under very influential pluralist national figure, make him have an open mind and moderate Islamic thoughts. This prepared cultural repertoire has strengthened and consolidated from his migration experiences in Japan.

Lucky (47, corporate employee, married, a son), a manager at an international travel corp. was born and grew up in Tegal, a medium city on the north coast of Central Java. Like many other cities in the north of Java, Tegal has been long known as a center for *santri* merchants. Lucky was raised in a middle class and religious family. Lucky's father worked at an offset printing company as well as being a religious teacher for the local community. His father was a student of several Islamic teachers in the region. Basically, Lucky's father felt

more as a *priyayi* than as a *Santri* because he worked for a (private) company, unlike most *santri* families in his town who were farmers and merchants. His mother had Masyumi (modernist) backgrounds as she attended Islamic classes hosted by a Masyumi figure in Tegal. However, Lucky's grandparents were local NU leaders. Therefore, while his father rejected the invitation for *slametan*¹⁰³ from his neighbors, his grandfather, in contrast, was alright with it. Nevertheless, his father did not force Lucky to follow either him or his grandfather's habits. This independence, facilitated by his father and his family's habits to decide their own responsibility, including on the financial issues, could be the supporting factor for Lucky's future independence attitudes.

There are not many memories about his family life that support his current strategies of action in Japan except about his father having provided two things, basic Islamic literacy and self-confidence. From his childhood, the family has provided him basic understandings and skills of Islam: Qur'an recitation and basic Arabic, which was very meaningful for his future life at the schools and university years to defend themselves from efforts by Islamists to persuade him. Lucky joined the outer layer of Islamic student group or Rohis activities since his middle school period.¹⁰⁴ However, Rohis cannot make him deeply engaged with the hardcore of Islamism. According to Lucky, what Rohis had attracted him was a positive popular perception about Rohis's personal and religious approaches to help students become more focused on their successful goals. In fact, as Lucky has already been learned about basic Islam from home, he was not so excited with Rohis religious activities.

Entering university life, Lucky again joined the Rohis group. The Rohis group members at university campus often acted as the think-tank group of the Tarbiyah organization. Tarbiyah is more like a "united" Ikhwan factions at campus. However, because he has necessary Islamic literature skills, he quickly become a mentor (*murabbi*) for the freshmen Tarbiyah members. Basic understanding of Islam and the necessary skills in Islam enable a person to be socially independent against the Islamist group's pressure. Furthermore, Lucky was a political science student who was trained with critical thinking and knowledge on political ideology. Another place that attracted his interest during his undergraduate program was HMI (Muslim Student Association) organization. Luckys' multiple feet standing on different Islamic organizations

¹⁰³ Please refer to chapter three on theories

¹⁰⁴ ROHIS Rohani Islam, Islamic student group in senior high school, often sponsored by their Islamist alumni. Please see previous chapter. Also see (Arifianto, 2019).

along with their different ideologies shows his openness during his early stage of activism. In many radicalism literatures, as I also contribute, being open to all different thoughts, including reading all various kinds of literature is a way that one can self-deradicalize, and free himself from extreme and radical groups (Amin, 2012).

As an HMI activist, he read and favored the notions of HMI charismatic figure, Cak Nur or Nurcholish Majid, who successfully built the organization's intellectual culture. Through HMI, Cak Nur spread his moderate Islamic views concluding that Indonesia is a modern secular state, which at the same time accepting the Islamic values as the inspiration for the nation state-building. Being an HMI activist, Lucky has sharpened his feeling and skill of critical thinking, which according to Lucky, has influenced his habits and lifestyle. In this sense, following Cak Nur, according to Lucky, Islam in Indonesia should be compatible with Indonesian culture. As an HMI trainer, he read a lot of Cak Nur's works and reading these works had made him more understand about how to be a Muslim intellectual in modern Indonesia. He thinks Cak Nur's thoughts as well other figures' inclusive thoughts had made him immunized from the radical views and groups surrounding him.

7.3.2.2. Migration to Tokyo

Lucky married a Japanese woman two years before he was accepted in Tokyo University, even before graduating from his undergraduate program of University of Indonesia (UI). He first met his wife in Jakarta when she did research and took the Indonesian language class at University of Indonesia Depok. They both share some related research theme interests, becoming friends, and engaging for marriage. Lucky says he did not imagine she loves him as he thought he only knew her as a friend. When a man and woman fell in love, and there were no obstacles to marry, there was no reason not to get married," says Lucky remembering his "strange" decision to get married at a young age. What drove him most for marrying her is her decision to convert to Islam because of him. She became a Muslim because she loves him, as a Muslim man, he thought to marry her is the best thing he can do to pay back her sacrifice.

7.3.2.3. Religious Practices

Lucky's inclusive strategies are very apparent in his Facebook account. Lucky is very popular in the Indonesian community in Japan Facebook Forum not only because of his frequent promoting company's products of ticket selling but also his comments on radicalism issues in Indonesia. He consistently shows his voice against radicalism. He is sharply criticizing Habib Rizieq, the great imam of FPI, and his organizations and followers (Islamic Defender Front) for

their violently racist and discriminating actions (extremely exclusive). He often called Rizieq in the improper calling (according to the Habib fans). He also often openly argued with those who supported or defended the radical groups such as HTI and its supporters' groups such as PKS, and some of its famous politicians. Lucky is very critical toward the current incumbent Jakarta Governor as he thinks the governor has taken care of the radical networks in order for him to win the governor's seat. He very often shows pictures describing his activism for Indonesian unity in diversity. Probably he is more active in promoting his counter radicalism narratives than his business products.

Lucky has around two thousand friends' accounts, on Facebook mostly Indonesians in Japan. He also followed and often spread ideas of Indonesian anti radicalism figures and voices such as that of Nadirsyah Hosen, Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Quraish Shihab, Gus Mus, Gus Baha, Banser, and NU as well as social media activists such as Denny Siregar, Eko Kuntadi, and Abu Janda. Often, he was involved in long conflicting online debates in defense of his arguments. As a sales manager for Southeast Asian markets in Japan, his position does not make him cautious about his statement. He says he knew his comments often made other people feel intensely criticized. He does not mean to hurt people's feelings. "It is just a consequence of the truth," Lucky argues that he is responsible for everything he wrote. "When you say the truth, many people might leave you, but more people will come," he says. He does not want to hide his expression for the sake of his market interest.

"Business is business. Those Indonesian people who were against me finally often buy tickets from me as well. I do not want to lie with my faith," Lucky says. Lucky reveals that many people tried to report his social media attitude to his boss. However, these efforts had failed. He says that as long as it is a personal matter that is nothing related to the company's business, his boss has put trust in Lucky more than to strangers. Lately, during the 2019 political ballot counting at Indonesian School in Tokyo, where he acted as a Jokowi volunteer, a person had slapped Lucky by hands on his face. The video went viral, becoming the "case" of the local security office. Majid, the slapper, has long been known as a political activist who advocated bringing some "Islamist" and Salafi teachers to Japan.

On his Facebook wall, Lucky wrote about various topics from personal activities, living in Japan, business matters, and mostly his views about Indonesian politics and religious ideology in Indonesia. He often relates his Japanese stories in transnational perspectives through which Indonesia remains the center of his thoughts. In an interview, he says that he

does not want to return to Indonesia so far because, in Japan, he can do many things for Indonesia. Besides working and caring for his family, Lucky spent most of his time with Indonesian friends or on Indonesian matters. Lucky is outspoken about challenging Islamism in Indonesia. Although it is too risky, Lucky dares to criticize very popular Muslim public figures supporting Islamic exclusivism/ conservatism such as Abdus Shomad, Arifin Ilham, AA Gym, and Rizieq Shihab and other popular media online preachers (Arigi, 2018). Lucky, therefore, openly challenged the KMII programs using public funds to pay those controversial speakers.

According to Lucky, many Indonesian preachers coming to Japan were not teaching the right Islam. They aim to strengthen their own Islamist networks. They come here “to poison” (Lucky’s verbatim word) the Indonesian youth to become supporters of radicalism. He is against the coming of those radical preachers in Japan because when radicalization is among Indonesian people, it will affect all Indonesians in Japan, especially himself. This is corruption in religion, which will, in return, disadvantage Indonesian as a whole in Japan. They bring their own political interests under the banner of Islam.

He collaborated with some other Indonesians in fighting against radicalism in social media. Having academic skills, Lucky often wrote very impressively when describing his opinion. He sometimes used the direct or indirect statement, metaphor, or satirical statements, also comedy genres that attract hundreds to give him likes, love, on his Facebook account.

7.3.2.4. Repertoire explained

Lucky’s’ training background from social science department is an important asset of his cultural repertoire that likely influences his current resistance (action) against Islamic radicalism. If only his background were ‘hard science’ as most informants at the previous chapter, he would probably have shared similar conservative ideas and practices to group. There have been experts’ warnings that student of natural science (hard science) in Indonesian are more susceptible for radicalism infiltration than students of social science and humanities. My observation as well as available research findings in Indonesian witness the fertile phenomena of fundamentalism among natural sciences and engineering students.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Indonesian national education system has divided students’ major into natural and social sciences fields since their senior high school (upper secondary school/ grade 10-11). The division has consequences attributing more privileges to the natural sciences students: They can choose both natural and social sciences fields as their major for the university level while the social science students are only able to select the social sciences fields. While medical, science, and engineering fields are for the natural sciences group, strangely

One clue of the cultural factors embedded in hard science students is their custom to think in binary models (probably) influenced by their habit in positivism perspective of natural laws, impacting their views of Islam. A common habit and life style among Muslim students of hard science that view religion (Islam) not to be discussed but enough to be believed and to be practiced. Hence, they view Qur'an as the source of Islamic tradition as taken for granted no need of critical reading to understand it as many social sciences and humanities students accustomed to do. Discussing religion in complexed ways (in philosophical, sociological, historical, perspectives) would not increase a Muslim's faith but potentially will decrease one faith instead.

Lucky, like other students of social sciences and humanities in Indonesia have different set of cultural tool kits which prevent them from becoming obsessed by certain Islamist ideologies. Moreover, much critical groups against the Islamist student's movements appear from among social science and humanities students. Lucky's experiences as social science academia, along with other cultural influences describe this "expected" social scientists' cultural tool kits putting him in the frontiers against religious exclusivism in Japan.

Those who observed Lucky's behavior on his Facebook account might not think that Lucky's position in Japan is a manager at a commercial business company. He keeps arguing with people disagreeing with his opinion or short statements in terms of Islamic radicalism discourses. He also keeps allowing hate comments and even implicit threats against him on Facebook for his political and ideological stance. According to Lucky, bad or hate comments against him on his Facebook shows the quality of the commentators and affects him nothing. "So far, customers keep coming," he says. Anwar, a businessman who is a close friend of Lucky, commented on Lucky's "activist-like" attitudes as his actual identity. He is an activist, not a salaryman. "He works but he does not need money," Anwar adds jokingly. On his Facebook profile identity, Lucky puts his previous position as a lecturer in political economy at University of Indonesia, Jakarta. Lucky described his personal identity to me as very much shaped by his past and long career as a campus academic and activist. In Japan, he completed his Master's degree program at Tokyo University. Soon after completing his undergraduate

department of economics, geography, and military academy in Indonesia require natural science backgrounds. To be grouped in natural science major, therefore, students must have high grades especially in math, biology, and physics. These privileges possessed by the sciences students, as Gambetta and Hertog (2017) have found seems to be their customs of having high expectation, goals, and competition for the future yet become fragile when they meet discontent and failure.

program in political sciences, he was recruited as assistant lecturer at his previous campus, University of Indonesia, in Jakarta. At the same time, he is working as a researcher at the Japan studies center, leading him to further scholarship opportunities to study and get a graduate program in Japan. He took a graduate program at Tokyo University through the University-to-University program, where he represented his Indonesian campus.

Related to Lucky's academic backgrounds, his major in social science is another cultural tool of why his strategies deviate from that of other Indonesian graduate students. Sharing evident with D Gambetta and S Hartog in "Engineer of Jihaad," (2017), the previous chapter narrates the dominant cases and growing phenomena of exclusivism among graduates with the science and engineering backgrounds. The case of Lucky having strong background in social science provides a controlling evident from the side of different backgrounds. It is essential to pay attention to Lucky's significant background and department studies, which he affiliated with. We have discussed in Chapter Six previously that ironically many sciences and engineering departments' apparatus at Indonesian higher educational institutions have been obsessed with "religious piety." The establishment of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Associations) by Muslim activist from the science and engineering backgrounds with its motto equilibrium of *dzikir* (worship) and *pikir* (thought) was also one of the supporting evidences besides its political goals.

Infiltrated by underground ideologies, many students and academic staff including professors were busy with the issues of integrated religion and sciences, aspiring religion above sciences. Busy with their own subject and obsessed with religious authority, many students of sciences do not recognize the complexity of social sciences where religion is placed as equal to other social institutions. Therefore, in Indonesia, students of social sciences and humanities, especially religious studies, have more immunity to challenge religious exclusivism (Amin, A., 2012). As Lucky was majoring in political science, it is no doubt that he is familiar with available works of literature viewing religion in the context of social science. In that sense, he has an intellectual capacity to self-counter extreme ideologies around his environments. In addition to the scholarship repertoire, Lucky's inclusive behavior, I believed, is also derived from his activities at the Muslim Student Association (HMI). Under the influence of the HMI great thinker, Nurcholish Majid, many HMI activists including Lucky hold the inclusivism behavior in their individual acts.

HMI is associated historically with modernist and revivalist Masyumi, making it a favorite “home” for many Muslim activists sharing modernist religious and political ideologies. Not surprisingly, HMI has large membership in regions where Masyumi used to have many constituents. Later on, however, HMI developed its own cultural repertoire of young intellectual Muslims responding to Islam and modernism issues. Through the role of its central figure, Nurcholis Majid, HMI has established organization system and environments which create its members and activists to become open-minded or moderate modernist Muslims.¹⁰⁶ One thing that is very encouraging in the organization milieu was to be open-minded Muslims, enlarging their horizon, not limiting themselves to one source of information and knowledge. Critical thinking has been one of its basic training curriculums. Majid himself, as an HMI reference figure, is recognized as a pluralist champion. However, Cak Nur’s influence is not the only story of HMI.

Being an open organization, and sharing a historical background and ideologies of Islamic revivalism with other organizations, HMI personnel and institutions are not free from the influence of other alternative ideologies including conservatism.

One of the instances is their division of HMI which supports and rejects Pancasila as the only Indonesian national ideology.¹⁰⁷ Sharing certain conservatism ideologies, it is not surprising that at the grass root level, as shown in its national board, HMI members are not immune from the infiltration /influence of Islamism waves. Notably, many local HMI leaders were also Ikhwani or Salafi activists, supporters, or sympathizers, and use the HMI networks for their ideological and political benefits. They are called the political faction of HMI which used to be associated strongly with intellectualism. Lucky is an HMI member who was (as he stated) more influenced by the intellectualist faction within HMI. Therefore, even though he used to be a member of Tarbiyah movement at UI (most of local HMI members at UI are also members of the Tarbiyah, he reported), he can self-deradicalize from the movement.

In addition to his campus and interest club (hobby) environment that established skills of inclusive repertoire, his career in Japan in the field of tourism industry required practices of inclusivism. Lucky has been working in Japanese travel and tourism companies for more than ten years after completing his Master's degree. He used to work in an online international hotel

¹⁰⁶ One of Cak Nur ideas is Islam which is compatible with the secular political system

¹⁰⁷ HMI-MPO is a faction within HMI organization rejecting Pancasila as the Asas Tunggal, for further reading see (Morville, 2005).

reservation and now online airline ticketing. He indeed must avoid an attitude of exclusivism toward his customers as well as his colleagues at the offices. Before securing a position as an international manager, he used to have some freelance jobs on the weekend as a tour guide for international tourists. He also often helps the Indonesian government officers, becoming their interpreter. In other words, his workplaces also contributed significantly to his inclusive outlook.

7.3.3 Hafa

7.3.3.1 Nationalist, religious family

What makes Hafa, the following informant, become exceptional from the other informants' repertoire in Indonesia is that she never joined the Rohis group in Indonesia, either when she was at senior high school or at university. She focuses only on her undergraduate program and takes more "secular" school extracurricular activities (i.e., Scout and Student Red Cross group). The military background of her family where she was born and raised, provides her nationalists cultural repertoire. Unsurprisingly, her father and uncle suggest she participate in "nationalist" extracurricular groups such as Scout and Red Cross groups during her middle school. The fact that because she lives in somebody else's family, for the sake of her role model, a beloved mother, Hafa felt she had a big responsibility to pay back the love of her mother and kindness to her aunt's family as her surrogate mother. In other words, because Hafa was raised in a very nationalist family, she has a cultural repertoire which distanced and protected her from the exclusivist conservative Islamic groups and practices either in Indonesia or during her migration life in Japan.

7.3.3.2. Social and cultural background

Hafa (45), born in Madiun (East Java), identifies herself as a Javanese woman although she spent most of her life in Bandung, West Java, home for Sundanese ethnic group, before moving to Japan. Her father, who was a military officer and her mother, used to be a bank clerk in Jakarta, had partially *priyayi* cultural characteristics.¹⁰⁸ They were from Madiun, and Kediri, East Java. Her grandfather (from her mother) was a veteran posted as a *Mantri* (a state officer) in a village. Hafa and their family lived in a military compound in Madiun before her mother passed away. Even though her mother passed away when she was just six years old, Hafa said that her mother was the center of reference throughout her life. Her mother was once a banker

¹⁰⁸ About *priyayi* please refer to the previous theoretical chapter (Geertz, Javanese religion 1960)

working in Jakarta (which was a rare position for women in the 1960s). She chose to live with a low military officer living in a military housing complex. However, she was very active in socializing and mobilizing other soldiers' wives to support their husband's service and support the military compound's life. Along with her friends of the compound, she exercised with some activities such as sport, and art, including volleyball, dancing, music, singing, and gardening. She said she was envious of her mother's multiple talents, kindness, and being loved by everyone.

After her mother passed away, in her third grade of elementary school, she moved to Bandung West Java to be cared for by her aunt (mother's sister), who was also married to a military man. Her father believed, as a growing young girl, she needed a company from a trusted woman like her mother. As a military man, he was afraid he was unable to educate a girl in a direction that she needed. In addition, her aunt was the closest person to her mother before she died, and her uncle (aunt's husband) was also a military man, and they have two daughters and one son. Hafa was raised by her aunt's family far away from her father. Hafa is very thankful to her uncle, although he has three children, his uncle was a disciplined man who educate and treat them fairly. Although her father kept visiting her, this kindness from her new family makes her feel bound with them. Every Time she visited Indonesia, she had to see him and his family.

Hafa defines her family in Bandung as so religious that she could recall how often she was absent from the mosque prayer service. The family was a member of the mosque at the compound and even becomes the mosque board taking care of the mosque maintenance and programs, making them feel ashamed if not attending the mosque service. They did not attend the mosque only when they were in the "monthly period" or had evening scout activities at school or out of the town. Along with the three other girls, her cousins, she always went to the neighboring mosque for evening and morning prayers (Maghrib, Isya, Subuh). Even when she returned back from outdoor scout activities before the sun rose, they ought to go to the mosque, or otherwise, her uncle would get angry at the girls. Besides performing congregational prayers, they studied Qur'an reading as well as attending weekend Islamic classes. At that time (in the 80s), Hafa recalled that Islamic enthusiasm was rising in the urban areas of Bandung. Her uncle, like everyone else, seemed attracted by the new phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the city. However, they did not wear a hijab at school, since wearing veil at that time was not so popular among public school students.

After completing her senior high school, Hafa was accepted to the Japanese language department at Indonesia University of Education (UPI) in Bandung. She chose Japanese as her major because she thought it would provide the soonest job opportunity after the program. She has a great opportunity to become a local manager at one of a few international (Japanese) factories surrounding Bandung. Undergoing this undergraduate program, she became more affirmed to make a career at one of those international companies. By having a job as soon as possible, she can be independent of her family. However, after a few semesters, she found that her Japanese skills remain so weak. Even after three years of learning Japanese, she remained unable to communicate well with her Japanese acquaintance. She found her seniors were more skilled in Japanese, and they had good positions at the companies and had experiences of at least one-year residency in Japan. After failing several times in the scholarship competition, she decided to take a language program (*Nihonggo gako*) for two years.

Just as many other students of Nihongo Gakko, Hapsary experienced tough times studying language and, at the same time, doing a part-time job (*baito*). Hafa needed *baito* to pay her tuition, fulfill her daily accommodation, and pay her 300,000 Yen loan from her relatives. Although illegal, accumulating more and more hours of *baito* is very popular among Indonesian students as the income give opportunities to save more money. However, most of them failed in the programs. They could not improve their Japanese skills because most of them do not practice in the workplace. They work with machines, ending up at their mediocre career after finishing their language program. Motivated by her planned career to work as a managerial staff in Indonesia, she ignored many opportunities of overload workings and selected only for *baito* with “communication practices” such as front officer, clerk, waitress, or receptionist positions. She got some intended vacancies, such as sales representatives or cashier at several food shops and a cafe. Her position as a sales staff at a bakery shop provided her opportunities to meet people from different backgrounds, including a white American who later on became her husband.

7.3.3.3. Religious practices

The inclusive practices of Hafa can be observed first from her attitude towards several following issues. First, similar to Diva, she thinks that working as a career woman is allowed and does not go against the Islamic law. Hafa says that everyone needs to work to get economic resources to fulfill their basic needs, be independent of others, and possibly help others with vulnerabilities. Because she has income resources, she can help some of her Indonesian

extended family with their schools and emergency expenses when needed. For good intention, she believes Islam does not prohibit women from having their own careers and income. Contrasting the opinion of the *Daar Kufir and Daar Islam*, Hafa believes migration overseas is an individual choice guaranteed by Islam and does not necessarily relate to either sex or gender status. Time has changed, and so have Islamic interpretations. Unlike those who believe that women should not go overseas without a guardian's company, from the beginning, Hafa aspired to study abroad to get a better career in Indonesia. Thus, even though her husband suggests that she does not work and rather spends his money on her purposes, she persists on working and using her own money for complementary needs. This notion contrasts with the exclusivists' ideas that a wife should not resist their husband's requests. To her husband, she insists that most of her income would be used for her extended families in Indonesia. For one year after being married, she remained working in Jakarta while her husband was in Tokyo.

Hafa is married to an American living and working in Japan. To her husband, who has converted before marriage, Hafa does not ask him to pray every time or fast the whole month during Ramadan as ordinary Muslims do. Her husband occasionally prays, but also sometimes does not because he is too busy. During Ramadan, especially during summer, while she keeps fasting, she allows her husband not fast because his main job is teaching and talking to students. Because her husband often feels thirsty, she tolerates him to drink mineral water. She does this also to her son, who is still at elementary school and considers him still in training just like her husband. Hafa believes she needs to introduce Islam to her husband and child persuasively. She thinks being openly disclosing their Islamic identity to the other is already a good and significant step. Their inclusive strategy is also shown in their meat selection attitudes.

Numerous Muslims in Japan as shown in the survey strictly avoid non-labeled halal meat because non-Muslims slaughtered them. Hafa, along with her family members, does not take pork as their menu, but they eat meat (beef or poultry) from Japan or Western countries without halal labels. Hafa also let her son consume school food without pork for religious faith. She prepared him an alternative food whenever pork was scheduled for the students' menu. Hafa and her husband do not drink alcohol, yet they both tolerate friends' and husbands' family who drinks at her company. Friends and family often come over visiting them, and they drink at her apartment. She also allows him to invite his friends to come over and tolerate them bringing their own liquor. She thinks to be in Japan where drinking is one of Japanese customs, she needs to respect the local customs while maintaining their own Muslim identity.

Likewise, on her habit of five times prayer a day, she paid respect to the Japanese custom on the usage of public property. "We cannot use public property for our own interest, such as religion," Hafa says. Therefore, she prefers not to pray in the campus' public space, such as the classroom, lobby, stairs, etc. On working days, at the campus, she collects her prayers at home and does not pray at campus because she says campus does not provide a prayer room. In fact, she might pray at the empty classroom or student public room, but she thinks she would occupy a public place for personal faith and would attract other's attention, which is not the goal of her prayers.

Respecting the local culture is also the reason behind her strategy for the Christmas celebration. As a Muslim, Hafa, along with her family, does not celebrate Christmas. However, she tolerates her son attending Christmas celebration at his school as every Japanese student does. She also always sends Christmas greetings to her family in the US and colleagues in Japan. Furthermore, she allows her son to receive Christmas gifts from her family in the US. In addition, she presents gifts to their families in the US when celebrating Christmas in the US. For Hafa, Christmas in Japan (elsewhere) is just a cultural celebration, not 100% faith matters. She is attending their celebration just as they attend Eid al-Fitr and Ramadan as a part of her family tradition.

As for wearing veil, Hafa does not wear a veil except for religious purposes such as attending religious gatherings at Islamic studies clubs or prayers service. She thinks veiling is not a religious obligation. She said that she recently referred to the Qur'an's interpretation that the veil is obliged for the Prophet's wives to differentiate them from the slaves. It is only the identification of ways related to the Arab culture, not religious matters. Because Islam forbids discrimination against women, it is illogical that the Prophet discriminate against the slaves from wives through the veil as God's order. It is the prophet's identification as human relationships to the timely culture, not the universal and absolute message in Islam," Hafa says, quoting a reference of Quraish Shihab, Qur'an professor in Indonesia.

7.3.3.4. Cultural repertoire

The military and Javanese culture were two crucial social and cultural elements of Indonesian politics during the New Order era, during the time of Hafa's parents' upbringing. Any author writing about the New Order era would centralize the Javanese and military culture behind Suharto's leadership and lifestyle (Dewey, 1999; Honna, 2010). Therefore, nationalism during the New Order was often interpreted as a centralization of governance where military

and Javanese elites took essential roles in the fields. However, one "effective" policy acknowledged during the New Order was their serious policy against sensitive SARA (ethnic, religion, race) tensions and conflicts. Through their policy of Pancasila as the single philosophical foundation of any social and religious organization, Suharto utilized his iron hand to protect the country from the emerging SARA conflicts, which would disturb his policy of developmentalism (Panggabean, 2018). Suharto administration consistently oppressed the extreme right (Islam) and left (Communism) exclusive groups' voices for their potential threat against the government security programs, suspected of challenging the Indonesian national unity. Hafa was raised in this "military" environment, which was assigned the task to secure this policy.

Reading Hafa's stories, I believe Hafa's mother had an inclusive personality. She actively engaged in several cultural activities such as traditional dancing, singing, and volleyball, all of which need open inter-cultural interactions. Whether *abangan*, *santri*, or *priyayi*, as Geertz had described, all share one common thing about respecting Javanese tradition, as shown in Hafa's mother's attitudes. This active and inclusive personality aspiration was "transferred" to Hafa's mind. Hafa says, her mother was a beautiful woman and very kind to everyone. She believes what people do good for Hafa now is a good "karma" from her mother. The family's inclusive habits, customs, and lifestyle lead Hafa to the inclusive friendship and group at her school periods.

Following her uncle's advice, who was a scout trainer, since junior high school, she joined Young Red Cross (PMR) and scout clubs (Pramuka). Both are two youth organizations created by the New Order government policies, whose strong messages were "Indonesianism" (Pancasila: diversity; inclusivism)(Kristiono et al., 2019).¹⁰⁹ During her senior high school period, she did not join the Rohis club. Hafa said she was not attracted to the school's religious club because she thought she had already exercised enough similar religious activities at home. Hafa thinks she was better participating in other groups providing her different experiences from that of her home activities. In this case, Hafa was already on her track, stepping the inclusive paths. By selecting more inclusive student friendships and clubs, she distanced away from potentially exclusive "religious" networks, which could lead her in the opposite direction.

¹⁰⁹ About Pramuka and PMR see also (Juwita & Suwanda, 2014).

Youth Red Cross and the scout movements provided behavioral influences on its participants just as possibly Rohis. In general, the scout movement conceptually and practically provides training on how to survive in difficult situations. In this state, every scout member needs to focus on problem-solving, not sectarian or private interests. Group management and leadership are some of their essential trainings in order to survive in the group. As group members always have different personal, social, or cultural backgrounds, inclusiveness is a required attitude for group cohesion and cooperation. Everyone in the group must adapt to each other's characters. Flexibly adjusting to different situations and contexts is another word of adaptation. Scouting is about solving our everyday lives in nature with laws of adaptation to some extent is contrasting religious dogma very popular in a particular Rohis group (i.e. male and female relationship).

There was a proverb for the scout members "when rattan is not available, use tree roots (literal translation)". This means that a person needs to be able to adapt to different methods to achieve their goals. Scout skills of adaptation is the key principle of acculturation. Thus, fast adaptation seems to be the skill Hafa possessed, which is the crucial success toolkits of her future survival. The adaptation skills are represented in her passion for getting a good career in order to pay back everyone's kindness under the influence of her mother's inspiration. Through her adulthood, she kept thinking about living independently, not burdening her aunts' family. In other words, she adjusted herself to her passions.

Despite their love and fair treatment, as her aunt's family raised her, inasmuch, she felt burdened by her dependence status to her aunt. She wanted to get rid of her uneasy feeling as soon as possible. Therefore, when she was admitted to the university, she maintained that goal and passion by focusing on the undergraduate program. There were no other plans after completing her undergraduate program except seeking to get a good job position in Bandung. Concerning her problem (needing the soonest established job), she decided to enroll in the Japanese language department, which she thought provided many job opportunities. This strategy of focusing on her undergraduate program and her previous habits of veering away from insignificant activities made her successful in her plans both in Indonesia and Japan.

Motivated by her career planning and burdened with the biggest loan she ever took, her passion for paying all the debts made her work hard, finding ways of survival in the new country. In Japan, Hafa practiced her adaptation skills for the survival strategy—by acculturation, accepting, and accommodating the local habit and customs, while maintaining

her personal and cultural identity. She accepted herself as an Indonesian working and living in Japan, having to adjust to the various local contexts. Survival is the most critical thing encouraging her to tolerate many new habits, customs, and lifestyles.

During her Gakko period, she focused on improving her Japanese language skills, meeting with Japanese people, speaking in Japanese, making friends, and working with them. Her main activities were studying at the college and working for *aru baito*. She rarely joined Indonesian community meetings held in the local mosque. She did even not know if there exists such a group called Indonesian Muslim Community Association. Furthermore, her feeling of independence after completing her program in Japan made her more comfortable to be more independent, including in her decision to marry a foreigner. This marriage situated her in three cultural "spaces" (Indonesia, America, and Japan). Furthermore, it implies her more inclusively cosmopolitan strategies of being a Muslim in Japan.

7.3.4. Diva:

7.3.4.1. Having fun as de-radicalization

A number of studies reveal that many Islamic radical groups adopt criminal gang groups in terms of their underground member recruitment (e.g. Abduh, 2001; Valasik & Phillips, 2017). There were sequential phases including introduction, indoctrination, examination, probation, and initiation for a candidate to get into the organizations' core membership (Dandurand, 2015). For NII, for example, which recruits their members from Islamic students groups such as Rohis and KAMMI, they often make introduction or socialization phase by making a friendship, and joining Islamic group circle studies (*halaqah*). The candidates who were selected are upgraded through some trainings and monitored tasks making an indoctrination phase, furthered with some tasks to be accomplished such as recruiting other members and making donation (examination), continued with breaking relationship with the outsiders, loved ones such as spouses or family, making big fundraising (probation), doing an initiation in various forms such as stealing close relatives' wealth including that of their parents, harming others, and finally making destructive violence.¹¹⁰ In this scheme, joining Rohis or KAMMI and some other Islamic groups was only a step away to radicalism pathways. Not surprisingly through personal and persuasive approaches, many middle school students with support from their teachers, alumni, and parents join Rohis and KAMMI. Many Rohis

¹¹⁰ See Mataharitimoer, Forbidden Jihaad, Lentera, 2008. see(Amin, 2012).

members, however, get into the groups with various motivations, from learning basic Islam, making more friends, learning organizational leadership, attracted with the peer groups support for school program, even because of a crush on their male or female friends active in Rohis. Diva, one of my informants, says she used to participate in Rohis and KAMMI because she loves to join street rally against the New Order government policy especially against Suharto in 1998. In the introduction phase, a member still has a chance to leave the program flexibly without any serious conflict with the other members as Diva did. Joining other organizations such as IPPNU and making contacts with friends from different backgrounds make her stay open minded and keep an inclusive religious and cultural repertoire.

7.3.4.2. Social and cultural background: repertoire

Diva (39, F, administration officer, Javanese) was born in Yogyakarta (Central Java) and raised in Jember (East Java) during elementary school and Surabaya (East Java), where she attended junior and senior high schools. Her father was a state employee. Therefore, following her father, Diva moved from one city to another (Yogyakarta-Jember- Surabaya-Sidoarjo). While she resided most of the time in Surabaya-Sidoarjo (East Java), before moving to Japan, according to Diva, her grandfather's village in Jember provided her lovely memories of being fully cared for by her extended families. Her grandfather, besides taking her to farms and fishing ponds, often took her to the public gatherings of "*slametan (religious feast)*, *haul (death anniversary)* and *maulid*" (the prophet's birth anniversary) which are very popular Muslim traditions in Java. When she was in Surabaya, once to twice a month on the weekends and during long school holidays, she returned to Jember, seeing her grandfather and his family. As usual, she was staying in the village and participating in several female Muslim activities as part of local *Muslimat* NU programs.

Admitting to being not very religious, Diva defines herself as having a mixed NU traditionalist commoner and *abangan* identities. From the side of his father, Diva feels she has *santri* blood as her grandfather partially practiced *santri* tradition. From her Jogjaneser mother's side, Diva thinks she inherited *abangan* habits. However, because she grew up in Jember, she feels more as a part of *Nahdliyin* (NU) community (*santri*) than *Abangan* one. Unlike many of her childhood friends bearing Arabic names, her name, like Hafa, is taken from the old Javanese language. Sharing Kuiper's research finding, (Kuipers & Askuri, 2017). I found her name justifies her cultural background as halfheartedly from the *santri* group. Diva never experienced living in *pesantren*, although there are a few *pesantren* not far from her home in

Jember or Sidoarjo. However, because she grew up in the middle of *santri* neighborhoods and interacted intensively with them, she was familiar with the religious practices of NU grass-root communities and feels bonded with them.

Related to places of her childhood and where she grew up, as a body of local politics literature describes, Jember, along with other surrounding areas forming a "horse tread" shape (*tapal kuda*), have firmly rooted Nahdliyin (members of NU). This opinion is valid, as shown in their everyday religious practices, as well as political affiliation. Whatever the NU political elite directs would be a political indicator of the preferred ballot from the people. *Pesantren* and their Kyais (leaders) become the central reference of the society in their social and cultural fields (Hikam 1989). In this case, the kyais and their families, according to Diva, did not alienate Javanese culture from their Islamic practices. The syncretic practice of Islam and Javanese mystics as Geertz called "Javanese Religion" is everywhere in Java. This everyday habit that Diva saw through her life in Java has injected her sense of cultural tolerance.

According to Diva, during her period in the village, Muslim life in the above (Geertzian) formula of Javanese religion was just standard everyday practice. There is a common phenomenon where Muslims observed Islamic practices, but at the same time they also exercise various Javanese beliefs. People did not actively aspire for Islamizing culture, prioritizing Arab culture within Islamism and post Islamism perspectives. Living in the rural village during her childhood, she thought the most impressive memory was people can become a "good" Muslim without losing their Javanese identity. They were not bothered by the current trend of Islamism, which disharmonizes Javanese and Islamic cultures. These living memories of experiencing integrated Islam and Javanese culture in the family and neighborhood have become her immune system from the exclusively new milieu in the middle school periods.

When she was still in middle school, as Diva recalled, she and her friends wore veils only for religious activities. They uncovered them in other activities such as when doing sport, scout, or other outdoor activities. In her village, at that period, people did not pay attention to her unveiled outfits choices. "Look at our pictures while at the schools. Most of us did not wear *hijab*," Diva says.

Although ROHIS was a strong organization at the school she joined, she acted unconsciously as a passive member, which she recently thinks that she was not eligible to become a core member. Like everyone else at the school during that time, she did not recognize the Islamist direction of Rohis. She enjoyed various activities of Rohis and its brother or sister

organizations at the university level, such as Tarbiyah and KAMMI. Diva guessed their cohort Rohis friends probably considered her as only an irrelevant young student who viewed Rohis only for her socialization. As a teenager, what Diva thought about Rohis was making friends and new leadership experiences. Diva was happy with Rohis because, within the Rohis project, she was for the first-time handling responsibilities of leading a group of friends in a formal way (including organizational management and administration).

Finishing her undergraduate degree in Japanese Education at Surabaya State University, under a scholarship program, Diva first came to Japan as a graduate student with the same major at a campus in Tokyo. Upon completing her MA degree, she returned home to Indonesia, working as a lecturer in Japanese language at several universities in Jakarta. However, Diva felt upset for her failure to get tenure as a state lecturer, while she had undergone two years of service. Diva then tried to find a new job with a Japanese corporation, ending up at Panasonic in Jakarta. After several months of working in an HRD position, representing her office, she went to Japan for an internship. Now, Diva is working at an international corporation in Tokyo, focusing on global talent recruitment. Her main task is to find and match job seekers and the available job positions within or outside of Japan. She now feels at home in Japan and thinks she would not return for good to Indonesia even for retirement. She thinks she would not be able to find an ideally matched husband in Indonesia at her age, whereas a life of being an aged single in Indonesia is socially painful. Older single women shoulder negative stereotyping and association besides a lack of friendly public facilities. It is always better to live in Japan than in Indonesia, even during retirement time.

7.3.4.3. Strategies

At her office, Diva works with Japanese and international staff. Her works also include meeting Japanese or international clients. In this workplace environment, Diva admits she often joins informal meetings or Japanese style gatherings such as friends' birthday parties, and "nomikai" whose menu includes pork and alcoholic beverages. Diva admits except pork, she has no problem to eat beef and chicken although not halal-labeled. She understands that most animal meat is halal to be consumed. As for alcoholic drinks, she also drinks wine a little bit for socialization, while attempting not to be intoxicated. According to Diva, alcoholic drinks such as Sake are part of the Japanese gathering culture. She admits she cannot 100% leave that Japanese corporate culture. She admits this should not be proper conduct for a Muslim, but as

far as it is only tiny sip and not making her drunk—or for specific necessary purposes—she thinks it is alright for her to do that.

7.3.4.4. Repertoire explained

Just as previous informants' life story experiences, Diva's case explains several fundamental theories in socialization, interaction, or communication. All agree that interaction with others plays a vital role in shaping a person's responses (behavior or strategies) toward others. Social and cultural interactions which produce positive experiences (perception) with others in the long run, in return, would become habits and lifestyle of the actors. Diva's long span of social interaction and exposure with Javanese and diverse Islamic culture in her local context has been becoming her cultural repertoire for quasi-similar situations in the new places during her settled time.

Diva has some different life experiences, i.e., joining the supporting Islamist groups such as Rohis and KAMMI and developing exclusive ideologies. On the other hand, her family and neighbors provide an inclusive environment where Islam and Javanese culture coexist harmoniously. As in Japan, Diva developed strategies of inclusivism. She thinks her Javanese cultural background and NU-inclusive religious tradition have contributed to her strategies of action in Japan. On the other hand, some controversial perspectives in the Rohis and KAMMI, which she encountered in the middle and higher education schools, make her gradually leave them. She deradicalized herself.

Diva grew up in rural areas, not far away from the big city of Surabaya. While she attended middle school in the small cities of Mojokerto and Sidoarjo, she spent most of the holidays in her village in Jember. Javanese people in rural areas generally provide a different cultural repertoire from that of the urban ones. What rural Javanese culture looks like could be inferred from Andrew Beatty's works based on his ethnographic research in the late 1990s in Banyuwangi. This region with its other surrounding regional areas such as Probolinggo, Jember, and Situbondo are collectively called "horse tread", where Diva develop typically shared similar cultural characteristics. According to Beatty, the rural areas of Java (Banyuwangi), like other Javanese rural areas, witnessed a similar phenomenon of a strong belief in the ancestors' spirit. Supernatural beliefs remained an essential element of the Javanese society despite the ongoing modernization. Many people remain believing in spirits existing in sacred places like forest, sea, and mountain. Others also remain going to holy people, *dukun*, *shaman*, and *orang pintar* to cure their illness, *jodoh* (spouse/love life), wealth, and political

power. Spending most of her time in the city for her school, Diva did not do most of these practices, but she witnessed people around her who did those practices and thought it was part of Javanese culture.

Although her mixed *abangan* and *santri* cultural elements characterize Diva's family's identity, Diva defines her family background historically as having mixed *abangan* and *santri* cultural backgrounds. However, more recently, they get closer to the religious culture of the local community in Jember. In general, her parents only followed what were the dominant values in the neighborhood. Diva herself thinks her Muslim identity was conditioned by her peer groups in the village and neighbors out of the school. Her parents sometimes forgot to pray, and rarely joined public religious gatherings. From her grandparents' side, Diva defines them as a partial *santri*. However, it was not as strong as *santri* and official members of NU as she recognized. In the minimalist category, by cultural characteristics, Diva's family belongs to traditionalist NU, the dominant local cultural background. As previously mentioned, she often participated in religious activities based on NU traditions. She read Barzanji (a book of praises for the Prophet) during the *maulid*, doing *ziarah*, and attending public prayers such as *tahlil*, *istighosah*, etc.¹¹¹ From those practices, it is understood, emotionally, she has a close relationship with NU tradition and political preferences. She understands how tolerant NU was from her memories back in her teenage years, as she feels intimidated now by the new "mainstream" Islam. Currently, many of her friends challenged her for not practicing Islam in the way they do. She remembers the best memories of her friends, families, and relatives at the village and Surabaya, who did not mind the cultural varieties of Muslim communities, including those who are not wearing hijabs.

In the heyday of Islamism and Post Islamism, where their followers and sympathizers have attacked the local traditions of mixed Javanese-Islamic culture, she feels they have hijacked her Islamic identity. The attackers shared the same identity as hers, but they insulted and attacked Muslim people who do not share similar Islamic views. She used to be quiet about her inclusive strategies in Japan. However, people started attacking her for what she practiced, making her bondedness with her identity and the past memories be revived. She attacked them back loudly through her Facebook account. In that sense, because she does not possess in-depth knowledge of Islam, she refers to Muslim scholars she thinks justify her strategies. Thus, although having no strong abilities to understand the issue independently. She felt better and

¹¹¹ On those terms, please refer to the theory and method chapter (Chapter Four)

pleased to follow the current ulama (NU) with a similar notion or characteristics to her ulama in the past during her childhood.

The reason which must be considered of why Rohis and KAMMI experiences did not influence Diva's strategies of action is caused by the fact that Diva's participation in Rohis and KAMMI is merely more for fun and exciting leadership training than ideological engagement. Similar to Lucky, Diva considered her Rohis experiences nothing more than socialization and leadership exercise. Both Diva and Lucky think Rohis and KAMMI activities at that time were critical to the New Order government and had not yet reached the intention of changing the Indonesian constitution. Diva remembered what she liked most from Rohis and KAMMI activities at that time were a street protest rally against the New Order in 1998. Although she was still a middle school student, along with KAMMI fellows, she joined a public protest rally. Most of Rohis or KAMMI members did not realize that within the organization were team members who monitored their members and investigated whether someone's membership status would be upgraded as to have special member status. A Rohis informant says people with a strong knowledge of Islam like Lucky or "joyful" like Diva would be not their primary targets. Unless both have their own intention to engage with a deeper layer of the Islamist organization, they will remain at the outer layer of the organization circles (Tarbiyah, Rohis, KAMMI, PKS).

Additionally, it is about the cultural characteristics of East Java regions and their society who are dominated by the NU cultural and structural organization. The aggressiveness of local Rohis or KAMMI in East Java (Surabaya), where Diva lived, was still overshadowed by NU student organizations and *pesantren* culture outside the school and campus. There are many contradicting NU's ideas from that of Rohis and KAMMI influenced by Ikhwani and Salafi ideologies. In that situation, Rohis and KAMMI in East Java would not be incomparable to their strong existence in West Java or Jakarta.

7.4. Theological inclusivism

The source of the prohibition of eating pork refers to Quranic verses saying that the textual meaning of "*lahm*" (Arabic) is meat. The Qur'an always does not define in detail what meat means, whether it is indeed meat in common understanding, including fat, heart, bone, eye, leather, and skin. Some scholars believe meat in the Qur'an is a general category that people usually eat: meat. However, this does not mean that anything other than meat is fine. In Islamic jurisprudence, there are methods of interpretation, including rigorous and relaxing methods. The textual meaning implies it as meat only but it does not include other parts of a

pig. While for the other, which is for all mainstream Muslim scholars (*jumhur*), meat is a metaphor of the pig animal as a whole. Therefore, consuming any part of the pig's body (pork) is prohibited. Others are debating whether the prohibition applies only in consumption or using for human accessories, including their outfits such as shoes, gloves, bags, or others. The debate is caused by the available presence in the Islamic corpus about substance change. One circulating question amidst the discussion is 'if pork is prohibited material, would it bear the same prohibited status when it has transformed into other forms such as powder, liquid, gas, or mixed with other substances and transformed into very different forms?' In his booklet about *halal and haram*, Professor Nadirsyah Hosen, an NU scholar and a professor of Comparative Islamic Law at Monash University describes the theory of *istihalah* or the changing substances.

Once a substance is a haram, it turns halal when its physical appearance, smell, and taste has transformed into another halal substance. Nadirsyah illustrates Syafii's theory (D. 820, Cairo) of *istihalah* in water. According to the Syafii school, someone cannot use the bath water for ablution except for more than two *kulah* (120 liters). The size refers to the standard logic in a significant volume of water. In the big pool, small dirt substance is not observable. This dirt substance cannot be seen, smelled, or tasted. The dirt is mixed with, and disappearing in an enormous volume of water. It is, therefore, taking ablution from the river is always accepted. Although assumedly there might be dirt in the water from human or animal waste, but because they cannot be seen, tasted, and smelled, the river is always considered clean water for ablution (this talk occurred in medieval Islam when polluted rivers were not imaginable).

In the case of pork, quoting the thought of Hanafi school of Islamic law, Nadirsyah (2015) views seasoning, emulsifier materials which do not physically present "pork" substance any more are not automatically haram. The substance from pig has mixed with other clean substances, transformed in another substance or form. It no longer becomes pork or bovine element. It has become another substance which cannot be defined as pork. Likewise, in the case of *khamr* (alcoholic) from the extracted grapes, "it turns halal when it becomes vinegar" Nadirsyah says quoting Hanafi arguments. Classic Islamic jurisprudence corpus is very rich in debates about very complicated things or specific events that are enjoyed only by limited people. The debates reflect the different methodological interpretation approaches.

A noted discussion on the halal matters includes the concept of halal meat relating to the slaughterer's religious faith. There is a debate about the conception of "*Ahl kitab*" or the people (friends) of the Books referring to the followers of three Abrahamic religions, Judaism,

Christianity, and Islam. Textually, it is written in the Qur'an, Muslims can eat meat from the *ahl kitab* people's slaughtering (Al-Maida: 5). At least two questions were arising in contemporary Islam related to this *ahl kitab* conception. First, do *ahl kitab* remain existing in the contemporary era? Second, does the *ahl kitab* concept apply only for the three Abrahamic religions? Furthermore, how about other religious or faith followers such as the Hindus, Buddhists, Shinto, Taoists, and local indigenous religious followers?

Responding to the first question, two groups have different arguments. The first group argues that *ahl kitab* does not exist anymore because the *ahl kitab* in the prophet's era were related to those who were living in Medina and Mecca, having a good relationship with the Muslim community in the time of the prophet (Ibn Taimiya; Hambali). The second group says the *ahl kitab* includes the followers of those religions in the current time (All the Imam). In addition, minority Muslim groups expand the *ahl kitab* concept for other religious believers such as the Hindus or Buddhists with the following argument: because Qur'an was revealed in the 6th century within a specific period and for specific people (Quraish Shihab and Alimun Hanif). Logically, the Qur'an does not talk about something unknown to its audience. Some scholars, such as Majid, Munhanif, and Shihab, using contemporary methods of interpretation, argue that the Qur'an was revealed with the language and stories familiar to its audience. Thus, the Qur'an is rich in narratives about previous civilizations such as Egypt, Rome, Persian, Babylonia, which were familiar to the ears of its audience during its revelation period. Thus, none of the stories of the great civilizations of China and India exist in the Qur'an because they were not familiar to Arabs during that time. Quraish Shihab says "Imagine someone who is talking to a person: They would not talk about something the person does not understand or not familiar with what they talk about, otherwise the audience will just leave the one who talks."

The above discussion is understanding Islam from the legal perspectives, which is commonly practiced by the Sunni Muslim world. There are debates among the non-Sunni legal schools, as well as from other than legal approaches, such as reasoning (logic) and spirituality (ethics), which were popular among Muslims in a particular culture. According to this latter group, what was more important in Islamic laws is their goals to make the practitioners get close to the Creator God. There is no value for someone doing Islamic practice without paying attention to the goal of Islamic laws. Within Islamic corpus, also, there are debates over this position about who has the authority to understand the humans' hearts. There is no agreed measurement of a person's heart quality defining spirituality level (intimacy with God).

Although a minority, many Muslims, especially those grouped in the Sufis orders, have this interpretation of esoteric approaches. In that frame, to some minority spiritualists or mysticism practitioners, legal interpretation is often ignored. Therefore, they often practice something “alien” to the mainstream Sunni Muslims. There were rumors among Javanese *santri* in East Java about a Muslim leader (kyai) who often visited pubs or night clubs, and also drinking. The story, however, clarifies that any bottled liquor on his hand turned into mineral water. My two following exceptional informants belong to each of both groups. First, Raji represents those practicing Islam in spiritual/ mystical guidance. Second, Himmi represents very few Indonesians in Japan practicing Islam strongly from his intellectual competence. Both make an instance of practicing moderate-inclusive Islam from their skill in theological sources

7.4.1. Interlocutors and their repertoires

Most of the interlocutors of my research project both from the exclusive and inclusive groups do not have in-depth knowledge in Islamic studies. During a four-year residency in Japan, I rarely met Indonesian people who have lived in Kanto regions for long terms and possessed strong Islamic literacy. I met many Muslim scholars coming as tourists strategizing their inclusive approaches from their skills in Islamic tradition literature. They enjoyed visiting Buddhist and Shinto shrines, observing religious and traditional festivals, visiting Japanese or international restaurants such as sushi, beef ramen, udon, and seafood restaurants, McDonald’s, KFC, Starbucks. They did not make different faiths or religions as barriers for their visiting and enjoying the culture of “others”. They viewed that religion provides them judgment for a strategy of being a Muslim in a new place. However, I would not include tourists as my informants because they have a different reason, traveling, which is granted some excuses in Islamic obligation.

As Islamic training experience very significant cultural skills leading to the moderate-inclusive religious practices¹¹², the first category I set for those included in this inclusive group would be those who are very familiar with the Islamic tradition literature. In this case, I adopt the existing system of Islamic education operationalized by the Indonesian Department of Religious Affairs whose educational period covers more than ten years (15 years from 1st grade to the undergraduate programs) for my measurement. Those who consistently join Kemenag (Ministry of Religious Affairs) programs from elementary to undergraduate levels would be

¹¹² There have been several researches concluding such findings including that of PPIM, SETARA, Wahid Institute in the last five years

enough to be entitled Islamic studies specialists. Likewise, in this same level are those who devoted their lives in the *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) whose lives are devoted to learning Islamic tradition and lifestyle. The “specialist” category might be too a high standard for the research field in Japan (or where-else). Therefore, it can be waived for a shorter period. Six to ten years length of training (formal or informal) is the average period of those interlocutors.

On Java island, there were thousands of *pesantren* that have devoted santri for Islamic learning. Nevertheless, each *pesantren*'s characteristics seemingly are influenced by their particular cultural repertoire, including, most importantly, their guardian's strong personality characters and social religious and political group affiliation networks. Depending on the *pesantren* guardians' expertise and lifestyle, among the *pesantren* are those touched by social and religious activism. Many of them were touched by the milieu of spiritual and mystical exercises or scholarly and intellectual environments. However, most *pesantren* shared similar necessary Islamic studies and Arabic language skills, making them familiar with basic Islamic corpus. Except Himi, most of the “inclusive” interlocutors in this chapter did not possess this aura of "authentic" *santri*.

Although other interlocutors such as Lucky and Raji also have very inclusive strategies, they both never formally experience learning Islamic texts from which they might be able to collect information from first-hand literature. On the contrary, they have their information only from other secondary resources. In this case, I included both informants as they both equally have basic Islamic studies from their limited informal learning and a few years of formal Islamic education. Although not trained in Islamic studies, they are familiar with some literature from the accessible sources as well as intensive tutorials. Raji (54) sometimes refers his strategies to his Islamic knowledge and experiences.

7.4.1.1 Raji: The spiritual way

Although Raji has only a few years of formal Islamic training experiences, he admits his migration to Japan was a part of his individual intention to experience the God's verse. “I am not looking for wealth,” he says repeatedly. Besides, he has a ‘private’ spiritual guide in Indonesia to whom he consults most of his religious understanding. In other words, Islamic theological interpretation is a strong basis for all Raji's everyday religious practices. Raji was born in Malang, East Java, but raised in Central Borneo as the first generation of a trans-migrant family. In the late 1970s, his parents joined the inter-island migration program living in the

middle of Borneo island. Life on the island was so difficult that they felt the government had thrown them away. They were placed in a very remote area, in the middle of a jungle, far away from the cities. There was no electricity to turn on electronic devices, no proper road suitable for the vehicles. They often suffered from drought and malaria as well as other diseases because of the water problem and lack of health facilities. Some parts of Borneo islands were satirically labelled as more abundant in oil and coal than clean water. Therefore, this island is easily burnt during the summer. Health and educational facilities were so inadequate that children have to go on foot for several kilometers to reach their middle school locations. As farmers, trans-migrant families often faced problems with stocks and transportation. They have no storage facilities to preserve their rice, corn, cassava harvest stocks and could not sell them to the city due to the lack of public transportation. Leaving their commodities rotten is something usual for Raji and his neighbors, fellow trans-migrant families.

Tired of the life hurdles, after graduating from senior high school, Raji departed for Jakarta, where he worked as labor in several field projects including on sailor's vessel. Besides working, he continued practicing his martial arts classes. Later on, this hobby led him to participate in the Indonesian martial arts club in Japan, where he met his future Japanese wife. Being two years in Jakarta, he received information about a chance to study the language and work in Japan. Applying for the opportunity, he had to pay around thirty million IDR (around 300,000 Yen currently) to the placement agent, including for the tuition fee. However, upon arrival in Japan, the tuition had not yet been paid, and he could not contact the receiving party. Additionally, he had only 3000Y in his hands. The condition made him feel very betrayed as well as suffering. Luckily, the language school he attended could find him a job as a paper courier and cut his salary for the tuition.

Raji intended to return to Indonesia after studying language in Japan, but he faced an unpredictable situation of 1998's Asian financial crisis. Therefore, he decided to continue working in Japan. He has experienced different job positions, including courier, restaurant staff, *combin*i staff, travel guide, and driver. He also took a part-time job as a Karate teacher at an Indonesian school in Meguro and joined the Pencak Silat club at the school. A few years later, Raji got married to a Japanese lady he met at the club. After more than fifteen years in Japan, he now holds a permanent resident status.

Although raised in Borneo, Raji defined himself as a Javanese. Having no experience studying Islam formally in *Pesantren*, he self-willingly often went to *pesantren* and listened to

the *pesantren* figures' speeches. Either in Borneo or Java, he attended *Slametan* and observed how Islam was being practiced by the Javanese, which is familiar to his ancestors' practices. His current favorite religious references are mainly Javanese and NU religious leaders or public figures, including Said Aqil Sirodj, Anwar Zahid, Gus Muwafiq, Gus Mus, Gus Baha. In the past, he always listened to Zainuddin MZ audio preaching.

Raji is probably among the few unusual Indonesian immigrants I have encountered. He says that his coming and residing in Japan are motivated by the primary goal: to experience God's different creation. He refers to a Qur'an verse saying that "God creates humans in different sexes, nationalities, and ethnicities in order to know each other" (Al Isra 23). Knowing each other is similar to learning from each other's strengths and weaknesses. Raji says that besides the written verses in the Qur'an, God creates non-written (*kauniyah* verses) signs which are available on earth and requires human attention. What he has been doing in Japan, according to Raji, is a part of fulfilling God's order to read, observe, and understand the *kauniyah* verses. "Many Muslims forget about these God's commands," he says. Because of this motivation, although in Japan, where people commonly work very hard to get more and more income, he maintains a living a "slow" one. He worked only to fulfill his basic needs. There is no intention to build a big house or buying a car for his relatives in Indonesia, as well as to multiply his bank savings. In Japan, as long as he is working, a person can live and have a shelter," he says. When I met him, he had a part-time job only as a driver for a travel company. Raji also told his neighbor's impression of him whenever he returned home to Indonesia for vacation. They do not believe that he lives and works in Japan because he usually acts as a local farmer whenever he arrives at his village in Borneo or Malang. He went to the farm, cutting the grass, and feeding his relatives' livestock.

After living in Japan since 1994, he says that Japan, along with its society, is another sign (verse) of God's might and existence. God says that he can create anything He wants and that Japan is one of God's wills about His creation. Raji then explains how Japan is already applying Islamic principles which are written in the Islamic texts. Islamic texts both in Qur'an and prophetic tradition harshly condemn corruption, lies, fraud, corruption, and disorderliness, and Japanese society has already anticipated and performed these Quranic commands in their actions. According to Raji, Japan is among the highest human civilizations that place honesty, cleanliness, orderliness, and public comfort as their cultural worldviews. "They are treating creatures, nature, and humans very well, as God creates humans and nature perfectly." This

reality of life in Japanese society is another sign of God, where Muslims also need to pay attention to. Japan has acted what the Qur'an says while Muslims do not. In fact, Muslims need not only to learn from the printed verses in the Holy Book, but also presented real action on the field. Raji thinks what he is doing in Japan is within this theological framework.

Further, Raji states that there is no perfect individual or society. Therefore, we need to learn from other cultures to know each other's strengths and weaknesses, to support, and help each other for humans' sake. Indonesians (Muslims) need to learn from Japan about living in an advanced civilization. Likewise, Japan needs to learn from Muslims about religious motivation. Raji criticizes the Japanese way of hospitality, which he thinks is often based on materialism. Raji provides examples of how *combin*i staff enthusiastically welcome the customers. "They treat the customers like a king exclusively inside the *combin*i." While outside of the *combin*i, we seemingly act that we have never met each other.

Experiencing God's signature seems the central attention of Raji, in which he always says this is only God's will. He relates his first arrival in Japan with the works of God. Indeed, when coming to Japan, he did not have enough money. However, shockingly the "Nihongo Gakko" he attended found that he had not yet paid the tuition for starting the classes. Returning to Indonesia is impossible because he did not have airplane tickets. However, because he had a student visa, he was assigned a job as a newspaper deliveryman and was provided a big empty house in Naka-Meguro. From this baito, he can pay his living costs as well as pay his tuition. While Raji has uniquely inclusive views about Japan and its culture, some of his following views represent his inclusive strategies.

Referring to early Islamic propagation on Java islands, Raji talked in very appreciative ways about Islam in Japan. According to Raji, quoting historians, the successful Islamic propagation on Java islands is caused by the fact that Islam arrived in Java brought by the scholars (ulama) who accommodated local culture. Javanese saints and kyai did not leave their Javanese root, therefore, Islam was warmly accepted. Quoting 'traditionalist" scholars, Raji tells the story of nine saints on Java islands and their Javanese accommodation culture in Islam. Raji agrees with the idea of Islam Nusantara popularized by PBNU, which has made Islam's appearance in Indonesia very peaceful. He predicts that if those Muslims coming to Japan follow the path of nine Javanese saints, there would be no suspicion and rejection from the local communities. Islam Nusantara is another debate in Indonesia as well as in Japan, where the Trans-nationalist groups, Wahabi and Ikhwani show their strong opposition.

Raji disagrees with some Salafi preachers coming to Japan, speaking on their heart's content disregarding Japanese society and culture. In that interpretative framework, Raji also disagrees with circulating exclusive ideas on halal issues, such as not accepting or attending non-Muslim invitation. He eats seafood most as well as beef or chicken with no "halal" labels. "No problem, they are from *Ahl kitab*'s slaughtering," he says. During our interviews, he criticized the 212-protest movement as a "duck crowd". "They do not know the political motivation behind the crowd movement," he continues. Raji also opposes Habib Rizieq's role in radical views of racial and ethnic minority discrimination including their resistance against non-Muslim leadership.

7.4.1.2. Hidi: Intellectual path

The next interlocutor I met in Japan is Hidi (38), a doctoral student at state University. In contrast to the growing tendency of fundamentalism among science and engineering students in the public universities in Indonesia, Hidi, a biologist, shows different orientations. From his social media, blog, and direct interaction, I found Hidi shows very inclusive views aspiring moderate Islam. He talks about several contemporary social-religious issues, including non-Muslim political leadership, Islamism phenomena, halal consumption, and practices. Hidi stated that he is a fan of Gus Dur, an Indonesian pluralist Muslim leader, and he makes friends with some other pluralist figures. Hidi was a chair of Nahdlatul Ulama special chapter of Japan, an organization that aspires a moderate and tolerant Islam, a blessing for all human kind (*Rahmatan lil' alamin*).

Hidi was raised in a very religious family in a village in Pati, north region of Central Java. Pati is well known as one of the centers for Islamic learning with its surrounding cities, especially Rembang, Kudus, and Demak. The regions were historically the center for the early Islamic Kingdoms in Java. Therefore, it is not unusual that intellectuals take many historical and vital contemporary positions in Indonesia's largest Islamic organization (PBNU) from these regions called the Saints' towns (Demak and Kudus), or *Santri* towns (Pati and Rembang). Hidi was born and raised at the core of this cultural environment.

Although Hidi completed his undergraduate and graduate training in the department of pure sciences (biology), he has a solid Islamic studies background. Totally, since elementary school, he has attended more than ten years of Islamic schooling, including six years of formal Islamic education at *pesantren* Raudlatut Thalibin, belonging to one of NU top leaders. He maintained his interest in Islamic studies through NU's informal learning group circles after the

pesantren period, despite majoring in biology at one of Indonesia's top universities. NU is a strong civil society element that maintains systematic mechanisms in the bottom-up schema of scholarly discussion to solve social economic and religious problems (Riza, 2004). The meeting forum, called *Bahtsul Masail*, provides opportunities for its members to consolidate their Islamic knowledge skills.

Every village has a learning circle that discusses local religious-social problems. The group members always make discussions in the Islamic legal perspectives on how Islam sees these matters (mostly public matters). When the village forum cannot reach a satisfying opinion, they bring into the upper-level discussion of the ward, city, or provincial forums. Likewise, when the provincial forum could not produce an agreed answer, they would bring matters to the national level. Each level represents a more qualified and broader audience. This consistent mechanism has produced young scholars among NU members, although they did not have any university training. The mechanisms produce some kind of recognition of a person's competence through their presentation and debates. Hidi is one of the young NU scholars whose formal higher education is about science and engineering, but he keeps developing Islamic literacy through this NU mechanism. Nadirsyah Hosen, an Islamic legal professor of Monash University, a scholar of NU, even praised him for his ability to read and comprehend complicated texts. In his online blog and social media, Hidi often writes pieces commenting on public discourse with firm reference from the classical texts.

He clarifies the definition of "auliya" in the Qur'an of Al-Maidah 151, which many Muslims use as a reason why Muslims should not prefer non-Muslim leaders. Quoting many rare classical works in detail, he provided his lengthy explanation about the text, concluding that there is no such prohibition. His scholarly remarks went viral and became a reference argument for the political debate in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Living in Japan, Hidi publicly wrote about his habit of eating ramen without a halal logo, which he bought from around Kyoto station. He said that many Muslim friends in Kyoto accused him of not being religious enough for eating ramen as it contained a piece of beef or chicken (not pork). He explains the reason why he selects the "subhat" menu. He wrote a long note, providing varied Arabic references from the great classical prominent Muslim scholars such as Ibn Katsir (D 1372, Syria), Zamaksyari (D 1143, Iran), Muhammad Abduh (D 1905, Egypt). He quotes more contemporary scholars such as Al Qordhawi (B 1926, Egypt), and Wahbah Zuhaily (D 2015, Syria) through which he concludes that halal and haram has no

uniform definition. He agrees that pork is universally haram. There are many different opinions about the halal status of other animal meats slaughtered by non-Muslim. Classical Muslim scholars also have no consensus on the category of "People of the Book" (*Ahl kitab*).¹¹³ In addition to Muslims, some defined it exclusively for Christians and Jews whose slaughtered meat is also halal for Muslims. Others believe that *ahl kitab* also includes non-Abrahamic religions' followers such as Hindus and Buddhism (as well as Japanese religion). Hidi also provides arguments of how "Islamic slaughtering" is not a monolithic conception. There are no similar methods between one culture and another when slaughtering their animals. He believes that both Sunni and Shi'ite have varied voices regarding the issue of slaughtering (Setiawan, 2012). He refers to a prophetic saying that "if you are not sure about the Islamic way of slaughtering that makes your food halal, you have to be sure you recite in His name (bismillah) or the name of God, turning what is *syubhat* into halal.

Hidi's inclusive views are also seen from his defense for Gus Dur's controversial opinion and position. Gus Dur or Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth Indonesian president, was the chair of PBNU and a respected Muslim scholar. He was considered as always challenging the mainstream voices. One of his controversial statements was that the Islamic greeting of "*assalamu 'alaikum*" could be altered in local expressions such as "good morning." Gus Dur also disagreed with the majority opinion in the case of South Korean company MIWON scandalous products accused to be mixed with pork oil, and the aspiration to shut down the factory. Gus Dur disagreed with the opinion of "haram" product of Miwon and thinks about the role of the Miwon's company in providing jobs for the people and challenges the mainstream idea of shutting down Miwon company. Gus Dur's advocacy for minority groups such as Chinese in Indonesia also received considerable opposition.

Moreover, his visit to Israel and his "private" diplomacy with Israel received attacking remarks. In his opinion, Hidi says that those who attacked Gus Dur's struggle did not know Gus Dur's motivation and backgrounds. Only those following the track records of Gus Dur will understand that Gus Dur's struggle is indeed for the universal mission of humanity, "which is the ultimate mission of Islam on earth," Hidi says. In this frame of networks, we understand why Hidi shows very inclusive voices and perform inclusive strategies of being a Muslim in Japan.

¹¹³ People of the book refer commonly to the followers of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam whose slaughtered animals are permitted for Muslims.

7.5. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have provided a contrasting informants' cultural repertoire as well as their inclusive religious practices in Japan. Through the different informants' narratives along with different cultural variables from those of the previous chapter, I have proven that transnationalism works well in explaining the relationship between the immigrants' cultural and religious practices in host and home countries. In those frameworks, I concluded that the inclusivism repertoire prepared in home country has continued and strengthened in Japan from their escalating exposure with different cultures and faiths. To some Indonesians, migration experiences have endorsed them to be outspoken with their anti-radicalism which they think will threaten their multicultural migration life in Japan and the future of Indonesia. The informant's outspoken inclusivism is driven by their feeling threatened by the existence of fellow Indonesian exclusivists growing in the last two decades.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

8.1. Highlighted discussion

8.1.1 Muslim immigrants' divergent religious practices and their cultural factors

In this dissertation, I have discussed divergent religious practices among Indonesian Muslim immigrants in Japan. I have presented the relation between these divergences with the immigrant's cultural repertoire and transitional lives of Muslim immigrants in Japan. I found that exclusivist and inclusivist frameworks in their different stages are models of Muslim approaches toward other culture. This concluding chapter aims to highlight the findings discussed in the previous chapters. Additionally, it reflects how the internal dynamics within Muslim community influence their interactions with the host society. Finally, it ends with statements of recommendation and academic contribution.

Within the field of international migration studies, the influx of Muslim migrants in many non-Muslim countries has raised questions of whether they can effectively integrate into the host society. Referring to Portes (1981), I define integration as social incorporation where there is equal opportunity for migrants for social, economic, and cultural attainment as the natives. In this framework, incorporation requires acceptance and welcoming policy of the host society

This question, very apparent for Muslim immigrants, departs from the pre-assumption that Muslim/Islam is a cultural group historically in adversity with Western civilization (e.g. (Jervis & Huntington, 1997; B. Lewis, 1990; Pipes, 2018). There have been abundant investigations in North America and Europe narrating such portrayals (Al-Natour & Al-Natour, 2015; Bowen, 2010; Chozin, 2013; Said, 1981; Shaheen, 2016). Taking the case of Japan, a new immigrant, non-Western country, this thesis examines to what extent such assumption holds. This thesis also proposes a perspective that emphasizes the diverse Islamic practices among minority Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan.

Utilizing Swidler's theory of cultural repertoire, I have examined the diversity of religious practices (religiosity) among Indonesian migrants in Japan. I have found that diverse cultural repertoire and ideologies have influenced Indonesian Muslims in Japan in their different practices. Ethnicity, custom, tradition, educational and family backgrounds, Islamic

literacy, institutional and organizational affiliation, personal lifestyle, etc., all contribute to the makeup of religious attitudes these immigrants utilize in the host country.

During the “settled period” of the immigrants in Swidler’s concept, the cultural repertoire, a set of skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles of Muslim migrants, influences the migrant's strategy of religious practices. In this framework, Indonesians whose background is from a moderate, inclusive, and cosmopolitan cultures will likely develop similar strategies of religious practices in Japan. The strategy also determines who they socialize with. Vice versa, those whose cultural repertoire is founded on conservative; exclusive, fundamentalist ideals will likely select the strategy of conservative-exclusive religious practices. Life experiences in the new country, however, may also transform immigrants' religious practices

8.1.2. The transitional time leading to immigrants’ religious and cultural transformation

As migration provides a "transitional" period, the immigrants often change their behaviours or practices inconsistently. In the new places, (cultural) ideology works to influence the immigrants' behaviors. There are many of my interlocutors had experienced or are experiencing this transitional period during their residency in Japan, hence becoming more active in, and engaging with religious groups and their dynamics than when they were in Indonesia.

The transitional time is a period when an immigrant explores new cultures, skills, habits, customs, and lifestyles. Some migrants are transformed from being a devoted Muslim, regularly going to the mosque, fasting during Ramadhan, often going to religious community gatherings, to becoming a less religious individual with less focus on religious activities and organization. Exposure to a new culture and overcoming cultural hurdles such as language barriers and different customs, may lead immigrants to question their own beliefs or identity

It is not unusual that many students and *kenshusei*, who account for a majority of Indonesian migrants, found themselves in such a transition. Often this crisis is caused by their limited Japanese language skills, shortage of financial support, cultural shock, and various unexpected incidental emergencies. Within this time, in the short term, an "unsettled” Indonesian will likely accept new ideas, practices (ideology) brought by people who help alleviate their crisis. In this time, close friends, contacts, or groups surrounding them could be the agent that transfers those ideologies, including Islamic conservatism and exclusivism.

Those who grew up with exclusive or inclusive repertoire in Indonesia and go through a transitional period in Japan, in the short term, could change their practices based on the influence of a new ideology. However, in the long run, when the immigrants return to their home environment, they might revert to their old repertoire. How long someone will sustain a new ideology is dependent on social or economic advantages they might receive. As long as the ideology provides them with social or economic benefits and opportunities, they will likely adhere to it.

Many immigrants are impressionable during this transitional period and vulnerable to new ideologies. For the immigrants, the influence might go in different directions: Some become assimilated, abandoning the old religious tradition, while others may become more fundamentalist and alienated. The transitional lives they experience will decide to which of acculturation model (transformation) they will undergo. My investigation of Indonesian Muslims in Japan finds that those with a shortage of Islamic literacy and background with cultural and economic problems will likely be influenced by their new cultural resources such as friends, neighbors, and community ideologies. Many feel they have become “better” (fundamentalist) Muslims after living in Japan participating in religious groups and engaging with new understanding of Islam

Related to that immigrants’ transitional situation, Islamic groups in Japan have played a significant role, in that they act as a surrogate family for the new comers needing assistance. The Islamic groups, infiltrated with Islamist personals have provided meaningful social roles for their members which they do not find it at their workplaces in Japan. The Islamic groups become a forum where immigrants feeling lost in their identity have chance to make friendship with “respected” seniors and successful old comers who make them feel relieve from distress outside of their group. Religious groups provide social activities and spaces, personal assistance, and facilities that make them feel free from the burden of being overseas immigrants.

8.1.3. Exclusivism as trending strategy of religious practices

The religious practices in this research often relate to the phenomena of international migration entailing cross-cultural interactions between people of different traditions and religious backgrounds. I, therefore, investigate Muslims' religious practices that intersect with non-Muslims' cultures and traditions such as Muslim halal diets, religious festivals such as Christmas celebration, views on non-Muslim political leadership, gender equality, democracy, and human rights. On these issues, in the minority status and migration setting, I found both

inclusive and exclusive strategies of Islamic practices with each subdivision category (e.g., civic and theological inclusivism).

The inclusive practices present an "acceptance" model of Islamic religiosity that loosely fits with the local values. Inclusivism also implies an opportunity for "negotiation" with symbols of other religious commitments due to the cultural hurdles they experienced overseas. The exclusive practices provide non-negotiating strategies of religious practices to the local context of culture and migration hardship. The former strategy is often used to harmonize commitment with the inside group and sharing with the others, while the latter usually are forced only to strengthen their in-group loyalty. The inclusive strategy orients to the integration or incorporation, while the exclusive strategy supports seclusion or alienation. While Inclusivists use cultural inclusivity as their primary cultural strategy, the exclusionists in contrast, makes use of exclusive culture toward the others. Contemporarily, however, there is a trending exclusivism among Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan although the inclusivists remain the dominant group.

Approaching the transnationalism framework, referring to our survey, the percentage of those who utilize an inclusive strategy of Islamic practices according to our survey and observation is larger than those relying on an exclusive strategy. There are some indicators related that demonstrate this. First, inclusivism is the formal normative "expectation" of Indonesian society in general as written on the Indonesian constitution, the Pancasila and their everyday practices. Secondly, many civil groups strive to call for inclusive activities and values. For instance, within Indonesian communities in Japan, some ethnic, professional, and interest/hobbies groups inclusively reach their members from different backgrounds and bridge their religious and cultural differences. From two types of inclusive religious practices (civic and theological inclusivism), I observed the inclusive civic members have the most prominent factions. Utilizing the transnationalism perspectives, I found that dominant civic inclusivist practices in Japan have represented a similar situation in Indonesia. Similarly, the growth of exclusivism among Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan also represent the growing tendency of Islamism among the youth in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, while exclusivists have a smaller quantity, they seemingly have strong voices because they are socially and politically active and have obtained numerous leadership

positions, and have often become community leaders where other groups were apathetic.¹¹⁴ This ethos is related to their members' high educational background, as many have graduated from Japanese universities, providing them with more privilege than other ordinary Indonesian migrants. Some believe that having a degree from a Japanese university allows them to more easily navigate Japanese society and experiences, which helps them become more socially and economically established. Because of this, they easily attain honor and respect from other Indonesian migrants. In Indonesia, many college and university students have been becoming increasingly Islamists. Unsurprisingly, the Islamism tendency continues developing, and become growing norms among many middle-class Muslims. The exclusivism among Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan is an extension of similar growing tendency of Islamic exclusivism in Indonesia as a result of Islamic fundamentalism efforts which have flourished since the 1980s.

On "which cultural repertoire influences Islamic practices of the Indonesian Muslim immigrants in Japan most?" I see that both the performers of exclusive and inclusive strategies in Japan have a relationship with their cultural repertoire in Indonesia and the ideologies the exclusivist encounter in Japan. For instance, (not always the case) the *kenshusei* from the rural areas of Java predominantly have a cultural repertoire of the traditionalists affiliated to NU. While students often coming from the urban areas are often motivated by their modernist cultural repertoire of Islamic practices (Muhammadiyah or other modernist groups often the case). The exclusive repertoire among the students and others is related to their preconceived repertoire or ideologies from their home country, which are strengthened when they arrive in Japan and are exposed to new ideologies during their unsettled periods. In addition to the available exclusive repertoire from their home country, experiencing unsettled lives in a new place may make them prone to conservative groups' ideologies.

Some immigrants' life experiences and social backgrounds, including their Islamic illiteracy, inexperienced overseas life, new family lives, insufficient financial support, and limited Japanese language skills makes them strategize from what they must do "normally" (for example learning Japanese before coming to Japan), making them absorbed into conservatives' networks and ideologies. Even those from an ideally "moderate" culture environment when

¹¹⁴ University students have been historically and contemporary recorded as the important players in Indonesia's political reform

experiencing such a crisis will likely seek intimacy from whoever might help them, including those with these exclusive ideological influences.

8.1.4. Islamic exclusivism and the problem of integration in Japan

Although the majority Indonesian in Japan are moderate-inclusive Muslims (at least in my personal statistics), their inclusive religious practices are influenced by their daily traditions. Our previous references about tradition characterized it as more implicit (taking forms in habits, customs, myths, stories etc.) than an explicit ideology (taking form in texts, signs, doctrines). The tradition is often taken from “secular” human values regardless of their religious identities and less influenced by inclusively Islamic theological texts. The former is called “practical Islam” and the latter is called the normative Islam (Ali 2011). Contemporary global normative Islam, especially Muslims’ world view toward the others, however is dominated by conservative-exclusive religious texts and authorities (Saeed 2020). The practical moderate inclusive Islam (Washatiya Islam) toward the other believers, therefore sounds less recognized and any challenges made by individuals or Muslim organizations to support them would face strong resistance (Saeed 2020). Thus, not surprisingly diverging practical Islam in Japan remain foreign. Furthermore, limited representations of inclusive Islam against the hegemonizing exclusive views, and the active conservative mobilization creates misperception. As a result, the rising voice and public appearance of conservative Islam “validates and strengthens” the already existing negative perception toward foreigners and especially regarding Muslims among Japanese citizens. In that sense, cultural incorporation is a problem not only from the internal dynamics of normative interpretation of Islam but also from external dynamic of Japan’s multicultural practices.

The discourse of immigrants in Japan and their societal integration centers on the national government’s half-hearted position to enforce policies establishing a social, economic, and cultural institution that ensures the immigrants' incorporation ((e.g. Holbrow & Nagayoshi, 2018; Kato & Lu, 2021; Keizo, 2008; Liu-Farrer, 2020). Conventional immigrant countries have both immigrant "controlling and managing" policies, while Japan has only the former (Takenoshita, 2016). Unlike some old immigrant countries providing national policies supporting equal opportunity for immigrants' economic, social and cultural incorporation. The Japan central government hesitantly, provides top-bottom “policies” which encourage social integration/incorporation realized. This tendency seems acquired from the existing traditional myth that Japan is a "homogenous" society, which makes foreigners, especially Muslims, as

well as other religious foreigners remain at the "border" of Japanese society (Onishi & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2003).

Although it has been established that Japan is currently a multicultural country, the perception that Japan is homogenous remains widespread in society (e.g. Befu 2001, Kwak, 2009; Morita, 2019; Roberts, 2015; Roberts & Weiner, 1999; Vestre, 2011). The circulating myth was perpetuated after Japan closed its borders to foreign workers from the postwar period until the 1970s. In addition, since the 1960s, Japan had mobilized its people from rural areas to work in urban areas to run their manufacturing industries, proving that Japan could sustain its industries independently. The postwar awakening, becoming a prosperous industrialized society, has prolonged this perception of a homogenous society. However, this myth results in the discriminatory attitudes among ordinary Japanese toward foreign immigrants to some extent (Morita, 2019).

One example which represents the way Japanese society views foreign immigrants, according to Takenoshita (2016), is how Japanese employers treat foreign workers. He points out that there is workplace discrimination against immigrants in Japan, stemming from employers' understanding that immigrants (including the skilled ones) are temporary rather than permanent residents. Therefore, employers do not invest in immigrant workers because they perceive that immigrant will eventually leave their jobs. Therefore, stereotypical views of immigrants in Japan have led to discriminatory treatment of immigrant workers in the workplace. This discrimination could be the reason why the professional promotion of the foreign workers is slower than their fellow Japanese.

Compared to other countries, this discrimination makes Japan less attractive for skilled labors (Takenoshita 2016). The government half-heartedly produced policies facilitating immigrants' integration, representing ordinary Japanese people's general attitudes toward immigrants. While even skilled workers who have obtained Japanese university degrees are discriminated against in the workplace, the situation is even worse for unskilled workers whose jobs are in sectors considered undesirable by Japanese. As many experts have observed, the discriminatory attitudes toward foreign immigrants are even more visible in Japanese policies related to the internship training system. On paper, the program aims to transfer the technological skills to the trainees from developing countries, while in practice, it is used to get cheap labor (also see Satoshi Kamata, 2008). As many experts and I have observed, most *kenshusei* think they work equally hard, even harder than their Japanese fellows; however, the

trainees receive a smaller salary (Maemura et al., 2009; Roberts & Wilkinson, 1996). The discriminating attitudes toward the unskilled workers outside of the factory building sector could be even worse. Their multiple disadvantages such as foreigner status, lack of Japanese skills, low educational background, working in the 3 Ds (dirty, demanding, dangerous) sectors make them out of the margin of the Japanese society.

Referring to Portes (1989), Levitt (2001) and Ebaugh and Chafez (2002)'s incorporation perspectives, one thing I can learn from anti-immigrant sentiment, is how it adds to immigrants' psychological discontent that influences their unsettled lives during their transitional period. As repeatedly mentioned earlier, the transitional period spurs migrants to find a way to eliminate their discomfort. The newcomers will regularly consult with experienced migrants with similar shared experiences (Levitt, 2001). Due to cultural shocks and desperate economic conditions, friends and community groups, and their ideological orientation such as Islamism can act as what Connor called a "balm" to decrease the immigrants' pain and distress (Connor, 2012). Newcomers often become dependent on the experienced migrants for their information and direction. The case of growing conservatism and exclusivism of the Indonesian immigrant community in Japan captures one of the unwritten or side effects from this Muslims' strategy to cope with distress in the new place. Finding a shelter in its different forms such as Islamic meetings or consulting groups could be directly motivated by the immigrants' distress. Incidentally, as a result, several groups have been hosts for the Islamist networks.

In addition to unwelcoming attitudes of ordinary Japanese society toward foreigners, which create integration problems, the rising negative stereotyping over Islam among ordinary Japanese have added more pressure on Muslim immigrants. In other words, Muslims have two minority burdens: foreigners and members of culture stereotyped as a threat toward global security and peace. Some surveys about Japan's public perception of Islam and Muslims show prevalent negative views toward Islam and Muslims in Japan. Muslims are often associated with backwardness, violence, and terrorism (Kenji, 2013; Miura, 2006). As the survey revealed, this negative view is caused by the fact that Japanese public perception is very dependent on information from the Western popular media. Since the 9/11 World Trade Center

attacks, Muslim group activities in Japan have been subject to security surveillance.¹¹⁵ The discourses on potential Muslim threat within the country rose again whenever there is a major violent attack by Muslim terrorists around the world, especially, during the heydays of ISIS where two Japanese journalists were beheaded. Although a few of the respondents in my study reported verbal attacks made by Japanese individuals related to the ISIS news, more than an ordinary foreigner, bearing Muslim identity in Japan causes a double burden for Muslim immigrants. This external pressure has ensured exclusive Muslim cohesion has strengthened. In Lewis A. Coser's social conflict theory, this shared feeling of being pressured strengthens the internal group (Coser L.A 1998). During this time, when group cohesion gets reinforced, extremists could benefit from external pressure and discrimination to justify their exclusive and hatred ideologies toward others and get support from the groups.

In short, although this research has found that the increasing presence of Muslim conservative-exclusivism mainly reflects the similar trend in Indonesia, the lack of a pro-active immigration and integration policy at the national level and the perceived temporality of the migrants' presence by the Japanese society might have functioned to keep the Indonesian migrants socializing within its co-ethnic religious community, allowing the transnational religious influence deriving from their home country to develop in the destination country.

8.1.5. Is Islamic exclusivism a security threat for Japan?

The existence of Islamic conservatism ideologies in Japan as represented in the Indonesian migrant community might have attracted further questions about whether they can feasibly integrate into Japanese society. In this case, we should highlight immigrants' integration in Japan and the characteristics of conservatism and exclusivism among Indonesian Muslims in Japan. One question stemming from the integration discourses is whether Indonesian exclusivism threatens Japan's public security? To answer this question, we must first recognize the characteristics of Indonesian conservative Muslim groups in Japan.

First, the conservative-exclusive Muslims are not a dominant group within Indonesian Muslim communities in Japan, even though they are growing. Their prominence is slowed as there some migrants return to their home country, because most Indonesians are temporary immigrants. Most of them are trainees and students who will return to their home after

¹¹⁵ See <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/13/issues/shadow-surveillance-looms-japans-muslims/> also see Takahashi, Saul J. "Muslim surveillance in Japan: a narrative aimed at trivialization." *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 4.2 (2018): 195-209.

completing their contract or study programs between one and four years. In the case of the students and alumni eligible to make a career in Japan, although their number have been increasing lately, a greater number remain choosing to return home than seeking a career in Japan. Majority of respondents from the professional groups wished to work in Indonesia if the salary is compatible to that of the Japanese. Considering the “unwelcome” Japanese working environment for the foreigners, and strong corporate culture which is alien to the Indonesians making some of my respondent look forward to terminating their stays in Japan if they get better position in Indonesia,

Secondly the characteristic relates to the different levels of conservatism. Referring to Chapter Six, while conservatism exists among Indonesian migrants, it has different practices and features. Some practices are rooted in Salafi, Ikhwani, Tablighi, etc. Some people show a different level of conservatism when dealing with rituals and customs, such as Salafi and Tablighi. Others concern with politics as well, such as the Ikhwani (Brotherhood). There is a different level of conservatism, ranging from very extreme (against the others) to the low level of conservatism (above the others). As long as the conservatism does not reach the level of Salafi Jihadi (violent), which is the case of the minority of the Indonesian Muslims in Japan, the conservative existence would not be a serious problem.

Third, conservatism and exclusivism results in tension or conflict mainly around rituals and less with politics, except in Jakarta’s 2017 gubernatorial and 2019 presidential election. Moreover, the political tension occurs among Indonesians, centralizing over Indonesia matters. When they argue about social and political stances, they debate the domestic political discourse in Indonesia. Rarely do Indonesian Muslims discuss Japan's political discourses. Thus, the discourse of sharia and *khilafa* among Indonesians as a solution for national problem does not address certain issues in Japanese politics or society. It is centered around Indonesian politics. This phenomenon shows how transnationalism works among Indonesian migrants in Japan (see the case of Ahok, chapter Six).

Fourth, among Muslim migrants, especially among permanent residents, there is also a growing awareness of counter-radicalism against the conservative and exclusive groups. They realize that the growth of Islamic conservatism and exclusivist groups and movements will one day jeopardize their lives in Japan. Because the fundamentalists bear the Indonesian identity, the opposition realizes that such a socialization strategy could jeopardize their careers and existence in Japan. If they keep silent doing nothing, they think they are not responsible for the

possible "threat." They say it is easy to confront extremism as long as the conservative-exclusivist group is still small. It would not be so not easy to do the same thing if the extremist groups were to get bigger. Through the transnational network, they affiliate themselves with some similar anti-radicalism groups and figures that work to counter the conservative and exclusive ideas in Indonesia, also circulating in Japan.

In conclusion, within those contemporary Indonesian Muslim characteristics, I would say that there would be predicted little threat from the Muslim minority toward Japanese society in the short term. The problem will more often occur among and about Indonesians themselves. Therefore, it is baseless to worry about Indonesian Muslims' existence in Japan. In the long term, however, if the migration policy has changed (relaxing policy for unskilled and refugees), which is unlikely, and the Muslim population reaches a significant quantity, there could be room for extra precautions, or a new analysis and conversation would be required

8.2. Recommendations

Regarding the research findings highlighted above, I would like to recommend some points for further academic research and policy decisions related to this subject. First, in terms of academic research, it is essential to pay attention to the usage of the theory, subject of the study, and area studies that can be developed and expanded for further research.

Swidler's theories of cultural repertoire explaining culture's impact on the action utilized in this project can operate in the analysis of Islam and its intersection with "other" cultures. Within the framework of religious and cultural transformation in the age of globalization, Swidler's theories can be adopted to investigate different strategies of action in which Muslims act in different circumstances. So far, there have been limited sociological and anthropological studies on how culture influences action in Muslim societies. Post Huntington's thesis of "the clash of civilization," diverse religious practices of Muslim society responding to other cultures requires further study. How to explain these diverse practices (strategies) can be explained through the application of Swidler's concept of "cultural toolkits."

Much current research on Islam and other cultures, including, for instance, Islam, radicalism, and terrorism, depart primarily from the ideological/theological aspects influencing action as if taken for granted. Therefore, there is an ambivalent explanation about the diversity within Muslim religious practices. Similar novelty could be applied in Muslim practices intersect with cultural expression such as halal food consumption, halal tourism, veiling female Muslims, Islam and pop culture, sport and Islam, and especially contemporary issues of

Muslims' perception and attitudes toward the Covid 19 pandemic. Within those frameworks, a Muslim encounters new habits, customs, and lifestyles.

Regarding the research subject and area, the population can be expanded to include Muslim communities and other religious and cultural groups including different religious communities from different or similar countries. Other Indonesian religious communities in Japan also deserve further study because many of them share similar experiences to that of Muslims. For the growing Indonesian diaspora community, similar cases and perspectives can be used to study religious identity transformation among Indonesians in different countries, including Europe, the US, Australia, and other East Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China.

Secondly, as for public policy, I will first address the Indonesian government and the stakeholders related to migration issues. For the Indonesian government and society struggling against the Islamic resurgence of radicalism among the youth, it is imperative to understand that transnational migration, participated in chiefly by young people, can be a fertile channel for the growth of radical ideologies. This fact can be true because radically conservative ideologies can influence young individuals selected for overseas scholarship and internships in Japan and other countries during their unsettled times abroad, especially when the migrants previously have joined a group of those ideologies during their school or university periods in Indonesia. They might consider trans-national migration as an opportunity for an expansion of their views and networks. The possibility of adhering to the radical Islamic views can be doubled among the emigrants when they lack Islamic literacy and experience economic, social, and cultural hurdles of migration (transitional period). During this unsettled period in Japan or other countries, immigrants will select their action from the available cultural resources, including the conservative ideological groups which might have helped them feel "settled."

As for Indonesian public policy recommendations, the public authority needs to take serious steps in the national school and university systems to securing them from the radical infiltration. As many reports have revealed, Islamist groups have used educational institutions to accumulate soft power through students, parents, staff, and teachers' silent support.

Successfully sending their members for overseas study can benefit a group or institution's social reputation. In Indonesia, an overseas academic degree is a point of pride and helps someone become more confident in securing a professional job or getting a public leadership position. It is a common political phenomenon that when a high-profile Islamist

secures public leadership, they will promote policies that benefit their groups' interests. To prevent the growth of radicalism among students, the government should make public educational institutions from elementary school to the university campus a neutral institution that is not aligned with any religious organization. Otherwise, moderate Islamic environments and curriculum can be made in support of religious diversity in Indonesia. The government must also formulate a control system monitoring private schools' religious teachings and activities to develop moderate Islamic toolkits. In this case, the government can cooperate with Islamic civil organizations whose cultural repertoire of religious inclusivism is well recognized, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Preventing schools from moving towards conservative, exclusivist ideologies can filter bright students who likely want to further their study overseas are holding moderate and inclusive views. In consequence, they are likely to return with more inclusive views bridging people from different societies and cultures.

For this plan, there should be an awareness about the importance of education as an essential social agent to build a cultural repertoire, including religious repertoire. The Ministry of Indonesian education should emphasize the education system supporting public educational institutions' neutrality from religious group domination to protect students from exclusivism influence.

In the near short-term period, in addition to the language training, the Indonesian government should provide pre-departure training for the *kenshusei*, nurses, and students to socialize their work conditions and focus on their tasks and goals. The government should invite recognized religious leaders and teachers to promote inclusive Islamic practices and dispell myths that it will taint their faith and spoil their incorporation with the local culture and society. Through the Indonesian embassy or school, the government should provide religious teachers or experts who also support the inclusive interpretation of Islam in international contexts. The Indonesian embassy should work together with inclusive religious organizations in Indonesia and their representatives in Japan to be very selective to facilitate the arrival of conservative Islamic speakers to Japan.

For Japanese policymakers, it is recommended that they to pay more attention to the ideas of social incorporation/integration requiring policies of integration that establish institutional programs both for the immigrants' the Japanese society (see the previous section on integration). In this framework, integration implies the mutual contribution of each side, Muslims and the Japanese. On the one hand, Muslim migrants, both unskilled and skilled forces

(including students), badly need income to sustain their family lives and welfare in Indonesia during their study programs in Japan. In that position, immigrants need to be accustomed to the local habits, customs, and lifestyles to establish a productive relationship between the employees and employers, between the guest and hosting society.

On the other hand, Japanese society badly needs a labor force to run and maintain its economic productivity amidst its workforce shortage. Japan is experiencing a shrinking population. Without incoming immigrants including trainees, nurses, and care workers, Japan, with its aging population, will not be able to compete with other growing industrial countries. Japan needs to facilitate the immigration with policies and attitudes that support immigrants' incorporation. Japan's government needs to pay attention to the already existing scholarly suggestions on immigrant integration policies.

Scholars have strongly noted that institutional arrangements of all kinds — in law and policy, education, labor market, and social attitudes and norms — play a crucial role in migrants' successful or unsuccessful economic incorporation. The Japanese government needs to put the theories into practice by creating programs for immigrants and Japanese society. As for the latter, Japanese society must strengthen its identity as a multicultural society and set policies that decrease or alleviate the myth of a "homogeneous" Japan, which result in discriminatory attitudes toward foreigners.

It is important to note that the willingness of immigrants to integrate and incorporate into the host society is very dependent on the accepting and non-discriminatory attitudes of the host society. The rise of exclusivism among Muslims often stems from their unsettled lives caused by the transitional time where migration hurdles make them suffer, consequently finding an exclusive group as their new shelter. As a result, they are influenced by the new ideological group as expressed in their exclusive attitudes toward others. Moreover, Japanese society also needs to deal with exclusivism by soft approaches to create a foreigner-friendly society.

8.3. Contribution

Through Indonesian Muslim migrants in Japan as a case, this study has contributed to the discussion of several subjects, mainly first, Islam and the other culture, second, Islam in Japan, and third, youth and Islamic radicalism.

This study is exceptional in its intensified discussion on the causal relationship between religious practices (action) and culture. Many sociological studies on Muslim behavior

analyze descriptively Muslims' different behavior without further looking at the cultural factors behind the behaviors. In other words, while studies on Muslims' divergent religious practices have successfully made a classification of Muslim practices based on the theological and political orientation., they, however insufficiently explain contradicting facts among the group members despite shared theological or political views. By utilizing Swidler's approach of the causal relationship between culture and action, this study has filled this gap in the discussion.

Secondly, looking at the divergent religious practices of Muslims in Japan, this study of Islam in Japan has one stepped forward of the discussion centralizing over the minority status and life condition of Muslim migrants. This study has emphasized on the different expressions of Muslims in Japan caused by the immigrants' cultural resources and its impacts on their incorporation into the Japanese society and culture. Our findings of exclusive and inclusive ideologies and practices circulating among Muslim immigrants can be further developed in the study of Islam intersecting with different cultural expressions in Japan. It is a new theme that seemed to depart from major studies about Islam in Japan.

Finally, this study has contributed to the discussion on youth and radicalism in Indonesia. The rise of Islamic radicalism has been one of the concerns of the Indonesian government and society. Scholars have paid attention to the school and universities which have been niches for Islamist's recruitments. Islamic radicalism among the youth has been a concern of academia and public policymakers by concentrating their focus on the role of higher educational institutions and "online" behavior among the youth. The concept of settled life during the transitional period of immigrants I utilized in this project could analyze different circumstances of crisis among the youth, which lead to conservatism -exclusivism ideologies.

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APPENDIX

IDENTITAS DAN SIKAP KEBERAGAMAAN MINORITAS MUSLIM DI JEPANG

Survey questionnaire and response summary


Q1 Data diri responden. Mohon diisi selengkap mungkin

Answered: 63 Skipped: 1

ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Nama (optional) / lokasi kampus/ tempat tinggal	76.19%	48
Sex/Jenis kelamin	98.41%	62
Status: aktif/non aktif/alumni	87.30%	55
Jurusan/ bidang kerja	87.30%	55
Lama tinggal di Jepang (dalam tahun)	93.65%	59
Kemampuan berbahasa Jepang: Jelek / bagus/ Bagus sekali	95.24%	60
Jenjang pendidikan terakhir (SLTA,SMA, S1, s2, s3)	92.06%	58
Suku	85.71%	54
Email Address, Akun FB, Twitter (optional)	36.51%	23
Status perkawinan	61.90%	39

Q2 Jenis Kelamin saya (Sex)


Answered: 57 Skipped: 7



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Laki-laki (male)	70.18%	40
Perempuan (female)	29.82%	17
TOTAL		57

Q3 Lama tinggal di Jepang (length of stays in Japan)


Answered: 61 Skipped: 3



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
1-2 Tahun (yrs)	40.98%	25
3-5 Tahun	36.07%	22
6-10 tahun	13.11%	8
11-15 Tahun	3.28%	2
16-20 Tahun	4.92%	3
Lebih dari 20 Tahun	1.64%	1
TOTAL		61

Q4 Status Visa/Residen di Jepang/Bidang kerja (Residency status)


Answered: 61 Skipped: 3



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Pelajar (students)	47.54%	29
Kenshusei-Jesyhusei	13.11%	8
Perawat-Nurse/Careworker	8.20%	5
Professional/Corporate employee	21.31%	13
Pasangan Jepang (A spouse of Japanese)	1.64%	1
Keturunan Jepang (Japanese descendent)	0.00%	0
Permanen Resident	0.00%	0
Dependent	3.28%	2
Other	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	4.92%	3
TOTAL		61

Q5 Kemampuan bahasa Jepang (Japanese skill)


Answered: 61 Skipped: 3



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Buruk Sekali (Very Poor)	0.00%	0
Buruk (poor)	54.10%	33
Cukup (Fair)	18.03%	11
Baik (Good)	26.23%	16
Baik Sekali (Very Good)	1.64%	1
TOTAL		61

Q6 Jenjang Pendidikan (educational background)


Answered: 59 Skipped: 5



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
SLTP/SMP Sederajat (Junior high school)	0.00%	0
SLTA/ SMA Sederajat (senior high school)	22.03%	13
S1 Sarjana (undergraduate/B.A)	28.81%	17
Pasca sarjana S2 (Master/specialist)	37.29%	22
pasca sarjana s3 (doctoral program)	11.86%	7
TOTAL		59

Q7 Status Pernikahan


Answered: 55 Skipped: 9



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Single	38.18%	21
Menikah	61.82%	34
Pernah Menikah	0.00%	0
TOTAL		55

Q8 Suku/ Ethnicity

Answered: 56 Skipped: 8



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Aceh	1.79%	1
Melayu	5.36%	3
Minang	7.14%	4
Betawi	0.00%	0
Sunda	28.57%	16
Jawa	39.29%	22
Madura	1.79%	1
Bugis/ Makassar	8.93%	5
Sasak	0.00%	0
Gorontalo	0.00%	0
Ternate	0.00%	0
Arab	0.00%	0
Other (please specify)	7.14%	4

Q9 Secara umum bagaimanakah tingkat KETAATAN anda dalam mempraktekan keyakinan dan ajaran agama anda ? (how committed are you to your religion)


Answered: 63 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Sangat tidak taat (not very committed)	0.00%	0
Tidak taat (not committed)	1.59%	1
Kurang taat (less committed)	17.46%	11
Taat (committed)	69.84%	44
Sangat taat (very committed)	11.11%	7

Q10 Pernahkan anda mengenyam pendidikan di lembaga pendidikan keagamaan (Have you ever attended religious school?) seperti MTS/Aliyah/PTAI)?


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ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Tidak pernah/ 0 tahun (Never)	57.14%	36
Pernah kurang dari 3 tahun (Less than 3 yrs)	9.52%	6
3-6 Tahun (yrs)	25.40%	16
6-10 tahun (yrs)	7.94%	5
Lebih dari 10 tahun (more than 10 yrs)	0.00%	0
TOTAL		63

Q11 Seberapa seringkah anda terlibat dalam kegiatan-kegiatan berikut ini? (How often do you participate the following activities?)

Answered: 64 Skipped: 0



	TIDAK PERNAH (NEVER)	PERNAH (ONCE-TWO TIMES)	KADANG-KADANG (SOMETIMES)	SERING (OFTEN)	SANGAT SERING (VERY OFTEN)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Shalat berjamaah di masjid atau mushalla (prayer at mosque)	6.35% 4	17.46% 11	41.27% 26	30.16% 19	4.76% 3	63	3.10
Mengikuti pengajian atau kelas kajian Islam (Islamic studies tutorial)	4.76% 3	19.05% 12	39.68% 25	30.16% 19	6.35% 4	63	3.14
Menjadi pengurus atau kepanitiaan dalam organisasi sosial keagamaan (Islamic organization activist or committee)	22.22% 14	39.68% 25	9.52% 6	22.22% 14	6.35% 4	63	2.51

Q12 Seberapa seringkah anda mengakses atau mendapatkan informasi dan pengetahuan KEAGAMAAN dari sumber-sumber berikut? (How often do you get Islamic knowledge from the following sources?)

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


	TIDAK PERNAH (NEVER)	KADANG-KADANG (SOMETIMES)	SERING (OFTEN)	SANGAT SERING (VERY OFTEN)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Orang tua (termasuk, kakek kakek, nenek paman bibi) (parents and seniors)	8.06% 5	25.81% 16	33.87% 21	32.26% 20	62	2.90
Teman/ saudara (bukan keluarga inti) (close friends and sibling)	1.61% 1	32.26% 20	51.61% 32	14.52% 9	62	2.79
Pengajar agama (guru, ustadz, kyai) (Religious teachers)	4.84% 3	29.03% 18	46.77% 29	19.35% 12	62	2.81
Tokoh politik/pejabat pemerintah (policy makers)	54.84% 34	37.10% 23	6.45% 4	1.61% 1	62	1.55
Printed media(buku, majalah, koran)	6.56% 4	39.34% 24	40.98% 25	13.11% 8	61	2.61
Audio/Visual media (televisi, radio, CD)	8.06% 5	35.48% 22	41.94% 26	14.52% 9	62	2.63
Online media (FB, youtube, web streaming dll)	1.61% 1	24.19% 15	51.61% 32	22.58% 14	62	2.95

Q13 Bisakah orang-orang yang berbeda karakter dengan anda berikut ini menjadi orang yang terdekat terhadap anda. Seberapa dekat /jauhkah hubungan anda dengan mereka?

Gambarkan kedekatan anda dengan mereka dengan meng-Klik skor 1-7 pada kolom yang tersedia.
 Keterangan SKOR sbb:1. Sebagai pasangan, suami atau istri.2. Sebagai sahabat dekat (misal di tempat tinggal atau di tempat kerja)3. Sebagai anggota satu kantor, proyek, kegiatan, sekolah,atau kelas 4. Sebagai tetangga satu bangunan apartemen/komplek perumahan5. Sebagai sesama warga satu kawasan tempat tinggal (misal Waseda/Shinjuku) 6. Sebagai sesama warga satu kota7. Stranger atau visitor (orang asing yang tidak dikenal) (Describe your closeness relationship with the following people by giving score 1-7 scale. 1 indicate the closest and 7 the most distant)


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	1. SEBAGAI PASANGAN SUAMI/ ISTRI (AS A SPOUSE)	2. SAUDARA/ SAHABAT DEKAT (SIBLING/CLOSE FRIENDS)	3. TEMAN SEKOLAH/PARTNER KERJA (FRIENDS AT SCHOOL OR WORK PLACE)	4. TETANGGA SATU KOMPLEK PERUMAHAN/APARTEMEN (A NEIGHBOR)	5. WARGA SATU KAWASAN TINGGAL (MISAL MENTENG) (RESIDENT OF A COMPLEX)	6. WARGA SATU KOTA (CONTOH JAKARTA) (A RESIDENT OF A CITY)
Berbeda Agama (different religion)	1.64% 1	42.62% 26	39.34% 24	4.92% 3	3.28% 2	1.64% 1
Berbeda suku/ras (different ethnicity)	49.18% 30	22.95% 14	19.67% 12	1.64% 1	0.00% 0	3.28% 2
Berbeda kelas sosial (kaya vs miskin, pejabat vs bawahan) (different social status)	36.07% 22	34.43% 21	18.03% 11	6.56% 4	1.64% 1	1.64% 1
Berbeda ideologi/dukungan politik (different political ideology)	20.34% 12	32.20% 19	33.90% 20	5.08% 3	3.39% 2	3.28% 2
Berbeda organisasi masyarakat (HMI/IMM/NU/Muhammadiyah) (religious organization)	27.12% 16	44.07% 26	15.25% 9	8.47% 5	5.08% 3	0.00% 0
Berbeda negara (country)	24.59% 15	29.51% 18	27.87% 17	0.00% 0	3.28% 2	4.92% 3
Berbeda orientasi sex (straight vs Lesbian, gay, bisex, transgender) (sexual orientation)	0.00% 0	10.34% 6	29.31% 17	6.90% 4	3.45% 2	5.08% 3

Q14 Deskripsikan pengalaman hidup anda sebagai seorang Muslim di Jepang dengan memilih respon yang tersedia sbb: sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, tidak tahu, setuju, sangat setuju. (tell your life experiences in Japan by selecting "very disagree, disagree, I do not know, agree and very agree")


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	SANGAT TIDAK SETUJU (VERY DISAGREE)	TIDAK SETUJU (DISAGREE)	TIDAK TAHU (I DO NOT KNOW)	SETUJU (AGREE)	SANGAT SETUJU (VERY AGREE)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Hanya mengkonsumsi makanan, minuman, atau produk lainnya yang BERLABEL HALAL RESMI dari badan/organisasi sertifikasi halal (only consuming food with halal label from accredited organization)	9.38% 6	31.25% 20	9.38% 6	28.13% 18	21.88% 14	64	3.22
Hanya mengunjungi rumah makan atau restoran yang BERLABEL Halal. (only attending restaurant with halal label)	7.81% 5	37.50% 24	12.50% 8	28.13% 18	14.06% 9	64	3.03
Hanya mengkonsumsi makanan yang dimasak/dibuat oleh orang Islam. (only consuming food made by Muslim)	9.52% 6	46.03% 29	12.70% 8	25.40% 16	6.35% 4	63	2.73
Sedikit atau banyak, kelihatan atau tidak kelihatan jika salah satu bahan makanan, minuman, produk kosmetik mengandung material dari jenis yang haram maka saya tidak mau memakai atau mengkonsumsinya. (I will not consume or wear food, or accessories containing non halal material even very little)	6.25% 4	10.94% 7	3.13% 2	35.94% 23	43.75% 28	64	4.00
Lebih mahal tidak masalah yang penting halal! (I will purchase the halal even more expensive)	4.69% 3	10.94% 7	4.69% 3	29.69% 19	50.00% 32	64	4.09

Q15 Gambarkan sikap anda di sekolah, kampus, tempat kerja, dan tempat umum (describe your position to the following statement) lainnya di Jepang terkait dengan pernyataan-pernyataan berikut. Pilihlah salah satu respon berikut: sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, tidak tahu, setuju, sangat setuju


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	SANGAT TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK TAHU	SETUJU	SANGAT SETUJU	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Tidak menghadiri undangan pesta atau acara makan dengan teman, atasan, atau kolega yang bukan Muslim. (not attending party invitation by non-Muslim)	25.00% 16	56.25% 36	10.94% 7	6.25% 4	1.56% 1	64	2.03
Menghadiri undangan pesta dari non-Muslim tapi tidak ikut makan hidangannya. (attending the party but not consuming the food)	4.69% 3	37.50% 24	10.94% 7	39.06% 25	7.81% 5	64	3.08
Menghadiri undangan pesta dari non Muslim-tapi membawa/ menyiapkan makanan sendiri. (attending the party but bringing own food)	7.94% 5	33.33% 21	11.11% 7	38.10% 24	9.52% 6	63	3.08
Mengizinkan anak-anak anda bermain di rumah tetangga non-Muslim (allowing children to play with neighbor)	0.00% 0	6.67% 4	21.67% 13	48.33% 29	23.33% 14	60	3.88
Saya mengizinkan anak saya mengkonsumsi makanan (spt bento) dari pihak sekolah.	12.90% 8	32.26% 20	35.48% 22	14.52% 9	4.84% 3	62	2.66
Menkonsumsi makanan yang tidak jelas "kehalalannya" demi menghormati pengundang/ tuan rumah.	26.56% 17	37.50% 24	12.50% 8	17.19% 11	6.25% 4	64	2.39
(Khusus Muslimah) Untuk perawatan kesehatan saya hanya berkunjung ke dokter perempuan	2.50% 1	37.50% 15	15.00% 6	30.00% 12	15.00% 6	40	3.17
Saya tidak suka berkunjung ke rumah orang yang memelihara anjing, karena anjing binatang najis.	9.52% 6	26.98% 17	11.11% 7	38.10% 24	14.29% 9	63	3.21

Q16 by selecting either Wajib (obliged) Sunnah (preferred), mubah (permitted) Makruh (disliked) and haram (prohibited)

Answered: 64 Skipped: 0




makam / tasbeh r dengan id Nabi memaki n/laki g
 /mengunj Meminta saat r dengan id Nabi memaki n/laki g
 ungi... perta... berdo... suara seperti memba... cadar laki terben...
 /penu.. /penu.. knya...

IDENTITAS DAN SIKAP KEBERAGAMAAN MINORITAS MUSLIM DI

	HARAM/ TIDAK BOLEH (PROHIBITED)	MAKRUH/ TIDAK DISUKAI (DISLIKED)	MUBAH/BOL EH (PERMITTED)	SUNNAH/ DISUKAI (PREFERRED)	WAJIB/ HARUS (OBLIGATION)	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Ziyarah makam /mengunjungi kuburan (visiting graveyard)	0.00% 0	3.13% 2	56.25% 36	39.06% 25	1.56% 1	64	3.39
Washilah/ Meminta pertolongan melalui orang shaleh/wali yang sudah meninggal (seeking prayers through "holy" man like saints)	61.90% 39	9.52% 6	19.05% 12	9.52% 6	0.00% 0	63	1.76
Memakai tasbeih saat berdoa atau berdzikir (Kristen :Rosario) Using rosario during prayers	4.92% 3	8.20% 5	68.85% 42	16.39% 10	1.64% 1	61	3.02
Berdzikir dengan suara (jahr) doing contemplation in laud chants	0.00% 0	15.87% 10	63.49% 40	19.05% 12	1.59% 1	63	3.06
Ber-Maulid Nabi seperti membaca Barzanji atau Burdah sebagai tradisi memperingati kelahiran nabi S.A W; attending maulid	9.68% 6	16.13% 10	45.16% 28	25.81% 16	3.23% 2	62	2.97
Niqab / memaki cadar /penutup muka untuk perempuan (wearing cadar/ burqa)	3.28% 2	13.11% 8	42.62% 26	39.34% 24	1.64% 1	61	3.23
Perempuan/laki laki bersalaman dengan yang bukan mahromnya (man-woman shaking hands)	45.16% 28	29.03% 18	24.19% 15	0.00% 0	1.61% 1	62	1.84
Mendukung terbentuknya negara Islam berdasarkan syariat; Establishment of Islamic state	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	0	0.00


Q17 Pilihlah sangat tidak setuju, tidak setuju, tidak tahu, setuju, dan sangat setuju untuk pernyataan-pernyataan berikut ini.

Answered: 63 Skipped: 1



Negara Islam
berdasarkan...

IDENTITAS DAN SIKAP KEBERAGAMAAN MINORITAS MUSLIM DI



	SANGAT TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK SETUJU	TIDAK TAHU	SETUJU	SANGAT SETUJU	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Negara Barat (seperti Amerika dan Eropa) berperan besar dalam mengembangkan demokrasi di negara-negara Muslim"	14.29% 9	28.57% 18	20.63% 13	30.16% 19	6.35% 4	63	2.86
Negara-negara Barat berkontribusi besar dalam pembangunan ekonomi di negara-negara Muslim	14.52% 9	35.48% 22	16.13% 10	30.65% 19	3.23% 2	62	2.73
Negara-negara Barat punya peranan besar dalam menaikkan derajat peran perempuan di negeri-negeri Muslim	26.98% 17	30.16% 19	22.22% 14	17.46% 11	3.17% 2	63	2.40
Bangsa Barat mempunyai standar moral yang lebih rendah daripada negeri-negeri Muslim?	6.45% 4	27.42% 17	29.03% 18	27.42% 17	9.68% 6	62	3.06
Kesetiaan kepada bangsa dan Negara harus didahulukan dari kesetiaan kepada umat"	17.46% 11	41.27% 26	19.05% 12	17.46% 11	4.76% 3	63	2.51
Negara Islam berdasarkan SYARIAT termasuk dalam bentuk khilafah tidak cocok diberlakukan di Indonesia	13.33% 8	18.33% 11	25.00% 15	33.33% 20	10.00% 6	60	3.08
Perempuan bisa menjadi pemimpin bagi sesama mereka sendiri dan atau untuk laki-laki	16.13% 10	38.71% 24	6.45% 4	37.10% 23	1.61% 1	62	2.69
Istri dapat menggugat (Menceraikan) Suaminya	14.52% 9	19.35% 12	11.29% 7	43.55% 27	11.29% 7	62	3.18