Conditions for U.S. Agreement on the Closure of Contested Overseas Bases

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Abbreviations

AFHRA	Air Force Historical Research Agency
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
BSR	Base Structure Report
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
CONUS	continental United States
DNSA	Digital National Security Archive
EASI-I	East Asia Strategy Initiative I
EASI-II	East Asia Strategy Initiative II
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JSO	Joint Staff Office (Japan)
MAG	Marine Aircraft Group
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PACT	Philippine-American Cooperation Talk
PSOE	*Patido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Workers' Socialist Party in Spanish)
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SBF	sea-based facility
SCC	U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
SLOC	sea line of communications
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TVD	*Teatr Voennykh Deistvii* (theaters of military operations in Russian)
UCD	*Union de Centro Democratico* (Union of the Democratic Centre in Spanish)
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Abstract

When and why does the United States accept the demands of base-hosting allies? In general, the United States establishes, maintains and closes its overseas bases according to its strategy. On the other hand, facing host countries' demands for base return, the United States agrees to close the bases that it would have otherwise kept open. It is an interesting and puzzling behavior because overseas bases provide strategic benefits and the United States enjoys a position of superiority over its weaker base-hosting ally. This dissertation asks the following research question: under what condition does the United States agree to close overseas military bases that are contested by host countries? The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the U.S. behavior by testing a hypothesis based on the balance-of-threat theory.

I test the explanatory power of my hypothesis that illustrates a linkage between U.S. threat perception and the conditions of U.S. agreement on the base closure— replication, dispersion or the combination of the two. The hypothesis to be tested is as follows: when an overseas base is contested, the United States agrees to close it under the condition of securing an alternative that has the base capability required to counter the threat. I conduct case studies of Torrejón Air Base in Spain, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, Japan. They are selected due to their variances in explanatory variables. They also serve the purpose of this dissertation as they show that the United States agrees to close the bases despite their distinguishing strategic importance.

I argue that the United States accepts the host countries' demands for base closure in order to meet strategic needs. For that purpose, the base closure is conditional upon securing an alternative base. Furthermore, the closure of overseas bases is not equivalent to force reduction. Behind acceptance of the hosts' demands, the United States makes arrangements to maintain the force capabilities in the region for which the contested base is responsible. These actions can be understood as U.S. determination to keep the commitment to the allies and regional security and maintain the overseas bases that contribute to its primacy.

This dissertation supplements so-called base politics studies that have focused on domestic constituents of host countries. This dissertation shows how the United States explains its rationale for the closure of contested bases. It contributes to our understanding of overseas base closures by showing that the United States rationalizes the base closure agreement in accordance with the logic of balance of threat. While base-related issues tend to be treated within the scope of domestic politics, this dissertation sheds light on the

strategic and military aspect of U.S. base closures. It suggests a possibility to reexamine and re-discuss alternative U.S. force dispositions to meet the changing security environment.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1. Question

When and why does the United States accept the demands of its allies that host U.S. military bases? The United States has overseas bases that are hosted by foreign countries and contribute to U.S. primacy. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, as of 2018, the United States maintains 514 sites in 45 foreign countries.[1] While the United States has 276 sites of embassies, consulates and missions globally, the U.S. military footprints heavily outnumber those diplomatic sites.[2] Notably, the number of overseas bases changes over time.[3] Some host countries have demanded the return of U.S. bases, though some others have been closed in accordance with changes of U.S. strategy. This dissertation specifically asks the following research question: under what conditions does the United States agree to close overseas military bases that host countries have contested? This dissertation focuses on a contested base, which is defined as one that the basing state has interests in keeping open but the host state demands its return, and how the United States deals with such bases.

While the United States has generally realigned its overseas base structure in accordance with changes in international environments and U.S. strategy, some overseas bases have been closed because host countries demanded their return. The governments and/or the citizens of the host countries start questioning the raison d'être of the U.S. military bases stationed in their countries. The anti-base sentiment could develop into a political issue on the national level. Consequently, the host governments request the return of the bases and even the abrogation of the existing agreement that allowed the United States to use the bases. The United States has eventually compromised with them and relinquished these bases. This is an interesting pattern of behavior because it implies that the great power sometimes cannot get its own way.

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[1] U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline, 7*.

[2] David Vine, Patterson Deppen and Leah Bolger, "Drawdown: Improving U.S. and Global Security Through Military Base Closures Abroad," *Quincy Brief* 16, September 20, 2021, https://quincyinst.org/report/drawdown-improving-u-s-and-global-security-through-military-base-closures-abroad/. According to the counting method that the authors adapt, there are approximately 750 U.S. military base sites in 80 foreign countries and territories. The number is nearly three times as large as the diplomatic sites.

[3] Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989); James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New York: Praeger, 1990). For a general tendency of the dynamics of U.S. overseas bases from the 1990s, see Appendix I-A.

Such U.S. behavior, or its concession to the host countries and agreement on base closure, poses a puzzle. The United States agrees to close overseas bases that might otherwise be kept open for U.S. use. Why was the United States able to give up these bases even though it had recognized and asserted their importance? U.S. agreement on closing contested bases contradicts two fundamental understandings on the endurance of overseas bases: benefits of overseas bases and the power disparity in an asymmetric alliance.

Benefits of Overseas Bases

The United States benefits from maintaining overseas bases. They have four major functions: power projection, deterrence, commitment, and redundancy. For the United States as a great power, bases are stepping-stones to project its power and support military actions globally. They also deter an enemy from attacking the United States and its allies and are a sign of commitment to those alliances. They are also sign that the great power is committed to the region of the respective ally. Some bases are simply redundant; however, redundancy has virtue for the great power.

First, overseas bases contribute to the military supremacy of the great power. Bases enable the state to conduct military missions efficiently and influence events even if they are far from the homeland. Jeffrey Record points out that "the projection of U.S. military power overseas has always required a network of secure refueling, resupply, and maintenance facilities on the fringes of the disputed region— a network which, without exception, has been based on land."[4] More broadly, Barry Posen argues that the United States has the command of the commons in the sea, air and space and U.S. bases enable the state to retain the command.[5]

Second, overseas bases intend to deter an adversary or potential one. The purpose of deterrence is to make the adversary think that invasion is costly and prevent it from attacking.[6] Functioning as a "tripwire," bases deter an adversary. If a great power has its own forces in an ally's territory and the ally is under attack, the great power retaliates. In other words, the adversary's attack on the bases risks conflict with the great power. Moreover, bases help lower the chance of successful invasion not only by hardening

[4] Jeffrey Record, *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 1981), 27.
[5] Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (July 2003), 5–46.
[6] Thomas C Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), 78–79.

defensive capabilities but also by making it difficult to predict how the great power would respond. For example, U.S. bases in Europe complicated Soviet calculation because they had multiple and classified roles that could be changed between peacetime and wartime. Besides, bases are established for control and checking purposes. After World War II, the United States stationed its troops in Germany and Japan in significant numbers not only to deter hostile neighbors but also to contain the potential reemergence of the former revisionist powers.

Third, to allied powers overseas bases are sign of the great power's commitment to its alliances. Deploying troops on allies' territory is one of the forms of reassurance to them.[7] To the allies and other powers, including future potential competitors, the overseas bases signal that the great power will commit itself to the region. By reassuring, the great power prevents its allies from rearming themselves or seeking an alternative alliance and hinders non-allies from rising as a great power and challenging the status quo. If they benefit from the great power's provision of security, they are inclined to seek its continuous commitment.

Lastly, some overseas bases can be redundant but still beneficial. A military historian Frederick Kagan asserts:

> Redundancy in war can yield flexibility and security. It ensures that when one system fails for whatever unforeseen reason, another can take its place. It provides the ability to meet unexpected challenges. In military affairs, redundancy is a virtue.[8]

With regard to capability, bases support a variety of means to accomplish a single mission. Take an example of nuclear basing. The United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War relied on overseas bases for delivering nuclear weapons.[9] The bases equipped tactical missiles, strategic bombers, ships and submarines and so on. Their identical mission was to inflict unbearable damage on the enemy, and the mission could be accomplished by any one of the delivery systems even if the others were nullified by the enemy or not used at all. Redundancy can be beneficial when some units continue operating from some bases while the other units and bases have been critically damaged.[10]

In the aspect of location, bases provide substitute options. In a certain region, multiple bases have

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[7] Brian Dylan Blankenship, "Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances" (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2018), 22.
[8] Frederick Kagan, "The Art of War," *The New Criterion*, November 2003, https://newcriterion.com/issues/2003/11/the-art-of-war.
[9] Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, 276-281.
[10] Leo J. Blanken and Jason J. Lepore, "Unpacking the Various Meanings of Redundancy: From Refining the Concept to Military Planning," *Defense & Security Analysis* 28, no. 4 (December 2012): 326–342.

similar functions and capacity; some others are used temporarily for training and exercise without permanent troops being stationed. These bases seem redundant but become valuable when similar bases in the region are not available. For instance, the U.S. Air Force has two flight routes across the Pacific and three across the Atlantic and the availability of multiple routes serves for the most optimal path to various destinations and in case of poor weather, political rejection of the access, or an enemy's attack.[11] Without a substitute, it takes much longer and costs more for their forces to reach a destination. Having a backup base in the same region contributes to maintaining military efficiency. Furthermore, base redundancy can enhance U.S. bargaining leverage.[12]

The other basic understanding is that the United States can advance its interests through asymmetric alliances. An asymmetric alliance consists of a great power and a weaker ally.[13] The great power provides security for its weaker ally, while the weaker grants partial autonomy to the great power.[14] The weaker ally is a host country if it provides military bases for the great power.[15] The great power can shape the weaker ally's policy choice in its favor because the weaker is dependent on the great power's provision of protection. Thus, the great power can decline the ally's demands if they conflict with the great power's policies. In short, the autonomy concession offered by the weaker ally can enhance the great power's freedom of action.

Unresolved Question

Considering these benefits of bases for the United States, how does the existing literature explain the closure of contested U.S. bases overseas? Some scholars argue that strategic imperatives have less effect in the ending of basing access. Robert Harkavy argues that in the post-Cold War era some host countries demanded the re-assertion of their sovereignty and national solidarity. It was accompanied by their

[11] Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Alan J. Vick, *The Posture Triangle: A New Framework for U.S. Air Force Global Presence* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2013), 30.
[12] Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, "'The Empire Will Compensate You': The Structural Dynamics of the U.S. Overseas Basing Network," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 4 (2013): 1044.
[13] James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–933.
[14] Morrow defines autonomy as "a state's ability to determine its own policies." Ibid., 909.
[15] I use 'ally' and 'host country' interchangeably by adopting Morrow's definition of alliance. Morrow presents a broader idea that alliances are tools to "further their pursuit of changes in the foreign policy status quo." Ibid., 905.

recognition that the U.S. deterrent umbrella became less necessary.[16] Kent Calder demonstrates that the strategic aspect is significant in establishing overseas bases but not considered at the termination of basing.[17] At the base termination phase in a basing life cycle, the base's value for U.S. strategy seems less relevant as U.S. military high officials have commented that their military would not stay where they are not welcome.[18]

However, the existing literature's explanations do not solve the puzzle of U.S. agreement on closing contested bases. Facing the contestation of overseas bases, the United States acknowledged the strategic importance of the bases and was inclined to keep them accessible. On one hand, there is a case in which a host country demanded the base closure but the United States did not accept the host's demand. In 1961 Portugal demanded that the United States withdraw its forces from the Azores—Portuguese islands in the Atlantic.[19] As the U.S. Department of Defense viewed the loss of the base as "unacceptable," the United States offered a political concession and avoided agreeing to the Portuguese demand.[20] On the other hand, there are several cases in which the United States, facing hosts' demands for base closures, relinquished the contested bases that would have been kept open otherwise. Good examples are contested bases such as an airbase in Spain and the two large bases in the Philippines. The United States had persisted in maintaining them by emphasizing their strategic importance publicly as well as at the negotiating table. However, the United States eventually agreed on closing them. If the strategic aspect has less impact on the closure, as the previous literature suggests, why did the United States not accept the demand of the hosts from the beginning? If the bases were strategically important for the United States, as it had insisted previously, how was the importance compensated when it considered closing the base?

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain U.S. agreements on closing contested bases by testing a hypothesis based on realism theory. To answer the research question, this dissertation examines the strategic aspect of U.S. base closure that existing literature has overlooked. Concretely, it focuses on the U.S. perception of the international environment and functions of the contested bases. Considering that U.S. bases

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[16] Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (London: Routledge, 2007), 151.
[17] Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 68–69.
[18] See Chapter 4, n. 85, 88, 89, and 90 of this dissertation.
[19] It was a Portuguese retaliatory measure against U.S. decolonization policy in Africa. Luís Nuno Rodrigues, "About-Face: The United States and Portuguese Colonialism in 1961," *Electronic Journal of Portuguese History* 2 no. 1 (Summer 2004), 7–8.
[20] Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 161–163.

contribute to its global reach and support its primacy, this dissertation aims to understand how the United States tries to sustain the overseas military presence by yielding to hosts' demands rather than imposing its policy that the bases were essential for security provision.

2. Importance

This dissertation is important for the following reasons. Firstly, this dissertation examines realist explanations on the behavior of the United States. Considering that systemic changes account for outcomes of states' actions and interactions, realism based on balance of power predicts that a great power will retreat its forward bases as well as its alliances when there are no emerging powers to be checked and deterred.[21] However, the absence of competitors itself does not explain how much military power is enough for a major power to maintain the current position. In fact, the end of the Cold War dramatically reduced the size of U.S. overseas deployment—an outstanding example was West Germany where the United States planned and executed the closure and conversion of its U.S. bases.[22] On the other hand, the United States agreed to close a base in Spain even when the Soviet threat still remained. Is realism accountable only for voluntary base withdrawals but not for contested base closures? Why were some bases maintained while others were closed voluntarily due to the systemic change?

However, these questions do not mean to demolish realism as to the explanation of base closures. Realism has provided various reasons for establishing and maintaining overseas bases, such as power projection, deterrence, alliance commitment, reassurance and global command of the commons. This dissertation attempts to adopt some realist concepts and see how they explain the situation where a great power faces the risk of losing a leg that supports its global military presence.

Secondly, this dissertation contributes to the development of so-called base politics studies by supplementing the U.S. logic of base policy changes. Base Politics is defined as the interactions between sending nations and host nations on issues pertaining to the status and operation of military bases.[23]

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[21] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

[22] 21 of 47 major military bases were reduced in size and personnel, which realized the land return of about 220 square kilometers. Andreas Klemmer and Keith B. Cuningham, Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germany: Scope, Impacts, and Opportunities (Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, 1995).

[23] Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 65.

Identifying key domestic players such as government institutions, municipalities, anti-base protests, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and mass media, base politics studies consider that domestic politics of host states account for the endurance of U.S. overseas bases.[24] These studies unfold the mechanisms of how bases become contested and how the domestic authorities deal with base issues. Meanwhile, base politics studies have difficulty in explaining why the United States needed specific conditions to agree on the base closure and why the conditions vary case by case. By examining how the United States deals with the host's demand for the base closure, this dissertation provides an additional explanation for U.S. base closure agreements.

Thirdly, this dissertation invites the readers' attention to the strategic and military aspect of U.S. base closures. Domestic debates and academic discussions tend to treat the base issues as a domestic problem. When an accident or incident occurs in relation to U.S. forces in foreign countries, citizens react to it. They often request a review of military activities and operations and even the necessity of U.S. basing. Such a social movement gathers concern regarding how the local and central authorities handle the situation and how the central government brings it to an end. Accordingly, academic research such as base politics studies also tends to focus on domestic politics and social movements. However, important underlying factors behind the issues are the strategic and military roles of the U.S. forces and bases. This element tends to be missing in domestic discussions over U.S. bases. I hope to shed some light on the dynamics of U.S. overseas military presence through the analysis of the U.S. strategic perspective, and make a valued contribution to the accumulation of base politics studies.

Lastly, this dissertation can be useful for the real world, especially for host countries by unfolding U.S. basing policies. Currently U.S. bases are located in 45 countries.[25] Base closures matter to the host countries including local communities adjacent to the bases. It is important to know how the United States has sought to maintain military primacy when its forward presence is challenged. More specifically, this dissertation can be useful for reducing the fear that U.S. allies could have with regard to base closure. It is a critical matter for the allies dependent on U.S. military presence for their security. For the allies the bases on

[24] Ibid.; Cooley, *Base Politics*; Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Yuko Kawato, *Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015); Amy Austin Holmes, *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[25] U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline*,7.

their territory are a manifestation of U.S. provision of security and commitment.[26] They are sensitive to a possible fallback of U.S. forward deployment. If U.S. military footprint was reduced or zeroed in an allied country, the ally might have to take alternative measures to ensure its own security. In addition, an ally may be concerned about reducing U.S. forces even in neighboring countries.[27] A decline of U.S. commitment to a region could be a source of fear that it would upset the regional military balance and consequently destabilize the region. Examining the width of alternative options that the United States could take, this dissertation is expected to show the United States' flexibility in thinking of basing. To know what and how the United States tries to achieve through base closures will help the allies look for ways to alleviate their worries of losing U.S. security provision and commitment.

3. Argument

I argue that the conditions of U.S. agreement on the closure of contested bases are coherent with U.S. explanation based on the concept of the balance of threat. The United States accepts the host country's demand and agrees to close the contested base in order to meet U.S. strategic needs. The base closure is conditional upon securing an alternative base. For the United States, the specific conditions—they can be replication or dispersion of the base—are necessary to meet its strategic requirements. In other words, when a U.S. overseas base is contested by a host country, the United States agrees to close the base under the condition of securing an alternative that has base capability to counter the perceived threat. Securing an alternative means obtaining a guarantee or pledge of alternate basing potential. Base capability includes proximity to a potential theater of war, force strength of units stationed in the base, and capacity of the base. When perceiving that the existing threat remains at the same level, the United States seeks to secure an alternative that has the same base capability as the contested base. The alternative needs to have the same level of base capability because the United States thinks it necessary to counter the existing threat. On the other hand, when perceiving that the threat is abating, the United States seeks to secure an alternative that has limited base capability. That is because even if the base capability is reduced, the United States is capable

[26] Bases can be regarded as a tripwire. See Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*. On a perspective considering bases as an item of trade-off between the allied countries, see Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry."
[27] Koji Murata, *Daitōryō no zasetsu* [President Carter's U.S. policy of troop withdrawal from South Korea] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1998); Chihiro Narita, *Okinawa henkan to higashi ajia reisentaisei* [Okinawa reversion and the Cold War system in East Asia] (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin, 2020).

of dealing with the weakening threat.

In addition, I argue that the United States agrees on closing the base when it recognizes a risk of losing access to the host country. Such risk appears when the host government notifies that it would not renew the contract. Abrogation of the basing contract would prohibit the United States from accessing any bases in the host country. Even without the official notification of terminating a basing agreement, the similar risk comes to the surface. When anti-base sentiment develops into a national issue in a host country, American decision makers are worried about a possible worsening situation for its military presence. These situations drive the United States to agree to forgo the right to use the contested base and return it to the host countries.

This dissertation further underlines that the closure of overseas bases does not mean a U.S. force reduction. The United States does accept the host country's demand for base return. However, it does not mean a U.S. compromise because the United States makes arrangements to maintain its force capabilities in the region. This argument stems from an assumption that overseas bases function as nodes that compose a global basing network. James Blaker calls it a basing system: bases distributed all over the world are interconnected and changes in one part of the basing system can affect the whole.[28] From this perspective, the United States seeks to minimize the impact of losing a base on the entire system by base rearrangement. The case studies of this dissertation reveal that the base closure brings little change in the force level in respective regions. Unless the United States recognizes no external threat, the U.S. government agrees on base closure with conditions of alternative bases that meet its security requirements. A basic assumption is that overseas bases benefit the United States in various ways, such as projecting power globally, deterring current and future adversaries, showing commitment to its allies and respective regions, and securing redundancy of military access. Because of these benefits, the United States maintains basing access as much as possible.

Furthermore, this dissertation indicates that being in the region is more important than practical distance from an alternative base to a potential theater of war. In search of an alternative for the contested base, the United States has a wide range of alternative basing locations. For example, in the case of Torrejón Air Base in Spain, some host countries in Europe were mentioned as possible alternatives: namely, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The United States seemed to give weight to

[28] On a basing system, see Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 57–95.

maintain the same level of forces in the southern region rather than keeping an efficient distance from alternative bases to the potential theater of war. Although existing bases in Belgium and the United Kingdom are located in almost the same proximity to a potential theater of war, which is the east side of southern Europe, they were dropped from a candidate list. That is because their geographical responsibility was NATO's Central Region. Eventually, the United States agreed to close the Torrejón base after securing an alternative base in Italy.

U.S. prioritizing staying in a region is seen in the case of the Philippines and Okinawa as well. The vast U.S. naval base in the Philippines was substituted by a small office of about 200 personnel in Singapore. Other functions were spread to existing naval bases in Japan and Guam. The components of the large air base were also dispersed throughout Asia-Pacific. Consequently, the U.S. presence was preserved in the region, albeit much shrunk in terms of the size and function of bases. It seemed more important to demonstrate that the United States would continue its commitment to the region. In terms of Okinawa, the United States was determined to make no change in the status quo of the force deployment in Japan, including in Okinawa. Prior to the base contestation in Okinawa, the United States had developed the post-Cold War strategy for Asia-Pacific to maintain stability by preserving the deployment of 100,000 U.S. personnel in the region.[29] The persistence in the strategy was observed during the entire period of the U.S.-Japan negotiations over the contested base.

4. Definition

4.1. Base

In this dissertation, I define the term 'base' as a contiguous area that the U.S. armed forces use for the purpose of military operations. More concretely, to borrow the typology David Sorenson uses, included are combat-support bases, mission-support bases and training bases.[30] In fact, there are various terms referring to military bases such as sites, installations, facilities, strategic access, forward presence, global posture and foreign military presence.[31] According to the U.S. Department of Defense, a base is defined as: 1) a locality

[29] U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995.
[30] David S. Sorenson, *Military Base Closure: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 4.
[31] Harkavy, *Bases Abroad*, 7–8.

from which operations are projected or supported, 2) an area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support, and 3) home airfield or home carrier.[32] In addition, the Defense Department has compiled an annual inventory of overseas bases named Base Structure Report that contains a wide variety of facilities such as transmitter sites, family housing, golf course, recreation beach and so on. These indirect infrastructures are not subject to this research.

A contested base, the object of this dissertation, is defined as one that the United States and a host country have conflicting demands for—that is, the former has interests in keeping open but the latter demands for closure. This definition is inspired by Cooley who classifies various outcomes of base politics into four types: politicize, contest, accept, and indifferent. He differentiates 'politicize' and 'contest' by what the hosts ask for with regards to U.S. bases in their countries. Base politicization refers to a situation in which national and local politicians and social movements dispute established base agreements and their terms on the contracts. On the other hand, base contestation indicates that these domestic actors challenge the necessity of stationing of U.S. troops, ask for the abrogation of the basing contracts or try to evict the bases. This dissertation focuses on cases in which a host government and/or citizens question the raison d'être and physical presence of the stationing forces and bases rather than criticizing the base agreement or its terms.

4.2. Base Closure

I define base closure as the situation where the user, herein the United States, is no longer granted the usage of a military base and it is returned officially to the host authority. The U.S. Department of Defense does not have a definition for the term, and it varies according to researchers.[33] Base closure is based on mutual agreement between the United States and the host country. U.S. bases are established and used in foreign countries based on various kinds of international agreements such as security treaty, alliance pacts, treaties of friendship and cooperation, status of forces agreements, and memoranda, etc.[34] Such a contract grants the

[32] U.S. Department of Defense, "base," *DOD Dictionary of Military Terms*, accessed January 30, 2022, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/b/2746.html.
[33] For example, the research report on the rearrangement of U.S. bases in Germany in the 1990s defines closure to be the reduction of 80 percent of personnel, area and sites. Klemmer and Cuningham, *Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germany*, 20, n. 2. A study of international law considers base closures to be associated with contract termination, which results in the whole withdrawal of troops from the host state. John Woodliffe, *The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations under Modern International Law* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992).
[34] Woodliffe, *The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations*, 285.

United States "use rights" of a sovereign country.[35] Base closure requires the host country and the United States to mutually agree on terminating the contract and U.S. stationing. An overseas military base closure is therefore a product of the two parties' consultation.

There are similar wordings to closure: consolidation, realignment and return. The first two deals with more than two bases and they are not necessarily accompanied by base closure. They do not fit because the focus of this dissertation is a situation in which the U.S. military stops using a base and it becomes no longer functional for the sake of the United States. Meanwhile, base return indicates that both the control and use rights of the base are returned to the host nation but it could imply U.S. continuous use through a new contract of lease or visit. I sometimes use 'return' in the context where the host countries reclaimed the U.S. bases. Overall, base closure is better suited for usage in this dissertation as it denotes cessation of access and usage rather than consolidation in a potentially nearby alternate location.

4.3. U.S.-initiated Base Closure and Contested Base Closure

This subsection explains differences between a U.S.-initiated base closure and a contested base closure. Figure 1.1 illustrates a simple classification of two types of base closures. One is the closure of bases initiated by the United States. The other is the closure of contested bases. The origin of base closure examination stems from base contestation in host nations. In this subsection, I provide a quick overview of the characteristics of two different types of base closures. The overview shows that contested base closures are transitory and featured as foreign affairs, while U.S.-initiated ones have established procedures, decision process and selection criteria.

[35] Alexander Cooley, "Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet Space," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 100–127. Assuming sovereignty as a bundle of "control rights" and "use rights", he states, "In a leasing arrangement, the host state retains the control rights to a particular asset or territory, while it transfers the asset's use rights to another state in exchange for a rental payment or other form of quid pro quo." This view is coherent with the idea of "leasehold empire" which means that the United States sustains its overseas basing access based on leasing contracts. Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).



Figure 1.1 Types of Base Closures
Source: Author

The United States tends to initiate domestic and overseas base closures when there are changes in the international environment and U.S. strategy changes accordingly. The U.S.-initiated closures of domestic bases and overseas bases have some different characteristics. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is a good example in which the United States aimed to improve efficiency of its forces by closing and realigning mainly domestic military bases and installations. The top of Table 1.1 shows the BRAC decision process. The process involved the Department of Defense, President, Congress and an independent, bipartisan commission. After reviewing and analyzing the recommendations made by the Department of Defense, the commission submits its findings and recommendations to the President. If they are accepted by the President and then Congress, BRAC comes into force.[36] For BRAC, Congress is the most powerful stakeholder because the program is authorized by a series of legislations and because American congresspersons have a strong incentive to sustain the bases in their constituencies.[37] There have been five BRAC rounds: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 2005. The five commissions recommended the closure of 200 major bases and hundreds of minor ones and the realignment of other bases and facilities.[38] The 2005 BRAC

[36] On American politics and the issues of BRAC, see Lilly J. Goren, *The Politics of Military Base Closings: Not in My District* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); David S Sorenson, *Shutting down the Cold War: The Politics of Military Base Closure* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Sorenson, *Military Base Closure*.
[37] Goren, *The Politics of Military Base Closings*; Sorenson, *Military Base Closure*.
[38] Christopher T. Mann, "Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress" (Congressional Research Service, April 25, 2019), 12–13.

Table 1.1 Decision Process of Domestic and Overseas Base Return and Realignment

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
1. The Defense Secretary submits a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to a BRAC comission
2. After reviewing and analyzing the Secretary's list, the commission may accept, reject or modify the list
3. The commission submits its findings and recommendations to the President
4. The President submits the commission's recommendations to Congress or seeks to modify them by disapproving and returning them to the commission
5. BRAC implementations begins by default unless the Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety

Overseas Base Return and Realignment
1. The Unified Commanders with geographic responsibility nominate overseas bases sites for return or realignment based on the criteria
2. All Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other government agencies within theater are notified of the intent to return or realign specific sites and are asked to consider alternative uses
3. The Unified Commander review all nominations for return and transmit proposals to the Joint Staff
4. The Joint Staff, various DoD components, the National Security Agency, and the State Department review proposals
5. Host governments are informed and consulted on the intention of the United States to return or realign certain sites
6. Necessary adjustments are made to the proposal and the package is submitted to the Defense Secretary
7. After the approval of the Defense Secretary, Congress, host governments, and the media are notified

Source: Christopher T. Mann, *Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress* (Congressional Research Service, 2019), 2 (Left); Gary D. Vest, *Report on Overseas Basing* (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1994), 3–4. (Right)

Table 1.2 Selection Criteria for Domestic and Overseas Base Closure and Realignment

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the DoD
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated at both existing and potential receiving locations
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations
7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, mission, and personnel
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and compliance activities

Overseas Base Return and Realignment
1. The nature of the threat
2. Number and types of forces
3. Geographical location - optimum to support assigned mission - proximity to threat - proximity to transportation assets
4. Agreements with host nations - limits on numbers and types of stationed forces - restrictions on type weapons/ ammunition - ability to train (low level flying, night firing, etc.) - host nation support agreements - political sensitivities
5. Existing facility inventory - geographical considerations - flexibility to support current/ probable future missions - age and condition - recurring costs - local area support (utilities, security, political opposition)

Source: *Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume 1* (U.S. Department of Defense, May 2005), D-35–36, https://www.acq.osd.mil/brac/ (Left); Gary D. Vest, *Report on Overseas Basing*, 1994, 3. (Right)

disclosed the eight selection criteria used by the Department of Defense and the BRAC commission (the top of Table 1.2). According to the selection criteria document, the Defense Department has given priority to criteria related to military value such as mission capabilities, availability of facilities, ability to accommodate force requirements and operational costs.[39] The other four were associated with financial, economic, social and environmental impacts.

Similarly, the United States has initiated base closures overseas as well. The United States has maintained an overseas base network since 1898.[40] At its peak, the number of the bases was more than 2,000 sites and they were spread in approximately 100 different nations or areas right after the Second World War[41]. When each war ends, the number of overseas bases tends to drop down due to troop withdrawal and demobilization. Changes in strategy also leads to base closures. For example, the end of the Cold War raised the necessity for the United States to reassess its strategy and force posture that had been targeted to counter the Soviet threat. The necessity was accelerated by the so-called peace dividend— U.S. Congress tightened defense budgets in order to revitalize the post-Cold War economy.[42] The United States planned and carried out force reduction domestically and globally through the Bottom-up Review, which was released in 1993, to optimize the force structure to the post-Cold War era. With emphasis on the necessity to adjust the strategy and force structure to be able to win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously, the review report redefined the force levels of 100,000 for Europe and Asia respectively.[43] Accordingly, Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced that overseas bases had been reduced by 50 percent since 1988 and 92 sites would be closed or shrunk in Germany and South Korea.[44] Similarly, The U.S. Department of Defense published the Global Posture Review in 2004 to be able to respond to new types of threats, which led to base realignment in Europe and Asia.[45]

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[39] *Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume 1* (U.S. Department of Defense, May 2005), D-35–36, accessed April 10, 2022, https://www.acq.osd.mil/brac/.

[40] Some scholars view that the victory of the Spanish-American War of 1898 provided an opportunity for the United States to first establish its overseas military presence on its new possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean—namely the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico. See Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 104–5; Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, 12; Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 10.

[41] Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 21, 37.

[42] For the background and development of the concept of the Base Force, see Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993); Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93): 32–45.

[43] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom-up Review*, 1993.

[44] "White House Indicates President Will Approve Base-Closing List," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1993. p. A5.

[45] Although base realignments based on the Global Posture Review were U.S.-initiated program, included are

The closure of overseas bases involves different parties in the process, as shown at the bottom of Table 1.1. The Unified Commander with geographic responsibility first nominates bases for closure and circulates the proposals to the Joint Staff through other defense and government agencies. Host governments are consulted on the possible base closure in the middle of the process. After the Secretary of Defense approves the package of the proposals, Congress, host governments and the media are notified at the end.[46] The selection criteria for overseas bases also differ from domestic ones. The criteria of both types contain military considerations such as mission capabilities, availability and condition of facilities and areas for maneuver or training, and support from receiving communities. However, overseas closure criteria include the consideration of geographical proximity and host nations' agreements (the bottom of Table 1.2).[47] In the report on overseas basing submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1994, Gary D. Vest, Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, pointed out that, unlike domestic bases, most overseas bases are "non-contiguous parcels of land" constrained by host nations, and stated: "there is no realistic way to compare the return or realignment of an overseas site and the closure of a domestic base."[48] In brief, overseas base closures have different processes and difficulties from those of domestic base closures.

On the other hand, the closure of contested bases has different characteristics from the U.S.-led base closures discussed above. A base targeted for closure is decided by the host nation. There is no standard criterion for the United States to close the base in this case. Unlike the U.S.-initiated base closures and realignments, a decision process is bilateral negotiation in which minister and ambassador-level officials of both countries negotiate about the contested base as well as other issues embedded in the alliance. Usually the two parties establish a temporary consultation body. As for the U.S. side, a regional commander, the Department of Defense and the Department of State are involved in shaping the stance on the negotiation. Congress has limited influence on the negotiation process, while BRAC, for instance, allows Congress to exercise power to approve or reject entire recommendations at the end of the process. However, Congress may constrain the options that the United States could take by restricting government funding with regard to

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some bases that was originally demanded by a host countries and mutually agreed on closure but left unimplemented.

[46] Gary D. Vest, "Report on Overseas Basing" (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1994)., 3–4. This report was accessible at the National Archives in Washington D.C.

[47] Ibid., 3.

[48] Ibid., 2.

base contestation. The issue sometimes becomes a congressional matter because additional costs may be incurred. The financial issues could be the increase in quid pro quo scenarios in the case of maintaining bases, or relocation costs and compensation for environmental damage in case of closing and returning the base to the host state.

5. Methodology

This dissertation seeks to explain conditions in which the United States decided to close a contested overseas base by multiple case studies. I use congruence procedure—a qualitative research method to assess the plausibility of a causal relation by testing whether predictions drawn from the hypothesis are consistent with empirical observations of each case.[49]

5.1. Hypothesis

This dissertation proposes a hypothesis deduced from balance-of-threat theory. This approach meets the purpose of this dissertation to explain the U.S. behavior in relation to its overseas presence. The approach helps reveal how the great power perceived varying threats when the international environment was drastically changing and sought to deal with the transforming threats.

The theoretical premise based on balance-of-threat theory is that the United States seeks to maintain its forward military presence to meet strategic needs. From this premise I develop a concrete hypothesis: when an overseas base is contested, the United States agrees on the base closure under the condition of securing an alternative. The alternative is required to have base capability to counter the perceived threat.

The hypothesis takes U.S. threat perception as the independent variable. The dependent variable is U.S. agreement on base closure with a condition— replication, dispersion, or the combination of them. Between the two variables, there are two intervening variables: the value of the contested base and the base capability required for an alternative.

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[49] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 182–204; Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 58–63.

This hypothesis stands on the assumption that base contestation occurs from host nations. Domestic actors such as the central or local governments, politicians, activists and citizens begin questioning the U.S. bases in the host countries. The degree of base contestation affects U.S. motivation to agree preliminarily on closing the bases as the United States becomes concerned that their opposition may endanger the continuous usage of the bases. The base contestation also influences the range of choice for an alternative to the contested base. For example, base relocation within the host country would not be an option if the legitimacy of the host's opposition were enhanced by national consensus, domestic legislations, and so forth. However, it does not change the causal process of the hypothesis.

5.2. Case Selection

Before selecting cases for hypothesis testing, I identify a general phenomenon and a subclass that this research considers.[50] The general phenomenon is U.S. overseas bases closed in the past. Due to the availability of the data, the general phenomenon is of closed U.S. overseas bases from 1989 to 2018. I have found no official list of closed overseas bases. Harkavy's research, *Strategic Basing and the Great powers, 1200-2000*, has lists of overseas bases of a broad coverage, including those of Mongol Empire, Ottoman Empire, the Age of Discovery, Germany and Japan in interwar period, and United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. Although the list contains base names with starting and ending dates, the listing seems incomplete due to rough definition of base and hence missing bases. In order to collect cases of the general phenomenon objectively, I use the *Base Structure Report* (BSR) by the U.S. Department of Defense. BSR is an inventory of U.S. military installations. It lists existing bases, installations and sites in the United States, its overseas territories and foreign countries. As the reports have been published annually from Fiscal Year 1989 to 2018, albeit with some missing years, I was able to trace which base the United States ceased to be in use. I identify the bases that disappeared at some point and made the list of closed overseas bases (see Appendix I-B). According to my definition, the general phenomenon includes 108 bases that have been closed or agreed to be closed from 1989 to 2018.

The subclass is a group of closed bases that were contested between the United States and host

[50] George and Bennett underline the importance of identifying a general phenomenon and smaller-scope subclass in order to have clear focus for achieving research objectives. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 77–78.

states (see Appendix I-C). Included are actually closed contested bases and also ones that the United States has already agreed on closure. I consider the bases as contested by referring to existing literature and newspaper reports. The subclass contains the following 12 bases: Torrejón Air Base and Zaragoza Air Base (Spain), Hellenikon Air Base (Greece), Yongsan Army Garrison and Koon Ni Air Range (South Korea), Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base (the Philippines), Naha Port, Futenma Air Station, Ginbaru Training Area and Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Okinawa, Japan), and Manta Air Base (Ecuador).

From the subclass, three cases are chosen for hypothesis testing: Torrejón Air Force Base in Spain, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, Japan. The cases have salient variances in the study variables. According to Stephen Van Evera, selecting cases with extreme values on the study variables will help identify causes (or effects) from the background of the case.[51] The three cases have different values in the independent variable, i.e. U.S. threat perception. In the Spanish case U.S. perception of the Soviet threat remained at the same level, while in the Philippine case the United States perceived that the Soviet threat was weakening. In the Okinawan case the Soviet threat disappeared but the United States recognized some security concerns that could be a potential threat. The three cases also present different values in the dependent variable, i.e., the condition of U.S. base closure agreement. The variances are replication (Spain's case), dispersion (The Philippines' case) and the combination of the two (Okinawa's case).

In addition, the three cases serve the purpose of this research: to explain the United States agreeing on giving up the bases despite their distinguishing strategic importance. By this selection criterion, bases in Latin America are excluded. That is because, compared to ones in Europe and Asia-Pacific, they are less relevant to U.S. national security and global power projection.[52] First, the Torrejón airbase was a transit point connecting the Atlantic through the Mediterranean Sea to the Middle East. Agreeing on returning the base to Spain could bring consequential loss because of a concern about "domino effect"—following Spain, some host countries were scheduled to renegotiate their basing contracts with the United States.[53] In that respect,

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[51] Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 80–81.

[52] Robert E. Harkavy, "Thinking About Basing." *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), 29; Michael J. Lostumbo et. al., *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2013), 288. Meanwhile, Michael Desch once argued that the area had great extrinsic value, as the Caribbean sea lanes of communication to Europe were vulnerable to Soviet interdiction. Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery." *International Security* 14, no. 1 (Summer 1989), 113–114.

[53] Accepting Spain's demand would lead to one after another, which could result in fraying in the U.S. basing

Spain is a more suitable case for testing, compared with Greece as negotiations with Spain preceded those with Greek. The situation presumably made it harder for the United States to make a concession on the base in Spain. Second, the U.S. bases in the Philippines had been standing for nearly a century. In Southeast Asia the Philippines was the only location where the United States maintained large scale bases. They were logistic hubs connecting the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Lastly, among the contested bases in Okinawa, the Futenma base has gathered political and academic attention for a quarter century of discordance among Washington, Tokyo and Okinawa.[54] The base has represented a part of the only overseas foothold of the U.S. Marine Corps. The base, along with the other bases in Okinawa, has supported the forces that can conduct a wide variety of operations in the broad area of responsibility stretching from the West Pacific to the Middle East.

To possible criticism of the case selection that the cases are different in character, I claim that their differences do not affect the causal process of U.S. agreement. Spain, the Philippines and Okinawa have different histories of security relations with the United States. The process of establishing alliances and U.S. bases is unique for each host country. The security environment surrounding the countries and their domestic situations and institutions vary in each country. All these differences might hinder truly equivalent comparison. Thus, one would argue that the base closure analysis is case by case. It is no more than an operational, intra-alliance issue that the governments of the allied countries deal with and make arrangements for. However, these differences and uniqueness do not affect whether the United States agrees on the base closure or not, or the conditions upon which those closures are based.

5.3. Why Agreement, Not Actual Closure?

The scope of this dissertation is U.S. *agreement* on closing contested bases, not the implementation of bilateral agreements on base closures. Agreements do not automatically lead to actual closures—implementation is a different issue. Implementation of an international agreement is basically a domestic

network. See Chapter 3, n.112 of this dissertation.

[54] Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, South Korea shows a similar pattern to the case of Futenma. Both of them were preliminarily agreed on closure in the 1990s but the implementation did not happen instantly due to the lack of replacement and financial problems. I conducted preliminary research on the two cases. Shino Hateruma, "Naze kichi henkan wa chōki-ka surunoka? Kankoku to Okinawa ni okeru beigun-saihen kara kangaeru [Causes of Delayed Base Return: Reviewing U.S. Force Realignment in South Korea and Okinawa]," *Ryukyu Okinawa Kenkyu* 5 (June 2017): 49–63. In this dissertation, I chose the Okinawan case for data richness.

matter, and thus the process of carrying out the agreement involves domestic politics and statecraft.[55] Such an approach does not match the research focus of this dissertation. This dissertation seeks to fill in the hole of U.S. behavior—the United States emphasizes the strategic importance of the bases, while it ultimately accepts their demand for the base closure.

Furthermore, clarifying the conditions of base closure agreements is suggestive of whether the agreements can be implemented or not. I argue that the United States agrees to close a contested base after securing an alternative that can counter a perceived threat. In other words, base closure agreement is implemented if the United States secures an alternative base that can respond to its strategic needs. Without an alternative base ready for use, the United States does not return the contested base. In the case of the Torrejón airbase in Spain, the United States agreed on closing the base in December 1988 under the condition of the relocation to southern Italy. However, the relocation destination changed because the original plan was stalled due to opposition from the local community and Congress.[56] The new alternative was an existing U.S. airbase in northern Italy. The United States and Italy made an agreement at the end of 1993.[57] As the Soviet threat had declined by then, it is predicted that the United States did not require certain roles that used to be considered essential to retain.

In the case of the Philippines, as the base functions were absorbed into existing U.S. bases in Asia, the U.S. force withdrawal was implemented promptly. Less than a year after the negotiation over the duration of Subic Bay Naval Base failed, the United States handed over the base to the Philippines. The closing ceremony for Subic Bay Naval Base took place on November 24, 1992, ending 94 years of U.S. military

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[55] For example, in the case of the Futenma relocation issue in Okinawa, Yoichi Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryū* [Alliance adrift] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997); Moriya Takemasa, *"Futenma" kōshō hiroku* [Private records of negotiations on "Futenma"] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2010); Morimoto Satoshi, *Futenma no nazo [The mystery of Futenma]* (Tokyo: Kairyūsha, 2010); NHK shuzai han, *Kichi wa naze Okinawa ni shūchū shiteirunoka* [Why are the Bases Concentrated on Okinawa?] (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2011); Miyagi Taizo and Watanabe Tsuyoshi, *Futenma-Henoko yugamerareta nijūnen* [Futenma-Henoko twisted 20 years] (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2016); Sheila A. Smith, *Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia*, (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2006); Alexander Cooley and Kimberly Marten, "Base Motives: The Political Economy of Okinawa's Antimilitarism," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 566–583; Hyon Joo Yoo, "When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (2014): 403–423.

[56] Molly Moore, "Opposition Grows to Building NATO Air Base in Italy," *Washington Post*, June 10, 1990, p. A1.

[57] Temporarily hosted by an U.S. airbase in Aviano, northern Italy, the Torrejón-based fighter wing was engaged in operations in the Middle East and the Balkans. Niklaas A. Waller, *Fifty Years of Friendship and Cooperation: A History of Aviano Air Base 1995-2005* (Aviano Air Base Italy: Office of History, Headquarters, 31st Fighter Wing, United States Air Force in Europe, 2005), 6–7; Joyce L. DeVaux, *A History of the 401st Fighter Wing 1943-1992* (Office of History, 401st Fighter Wing, United States Air Force in Europe, 1992).

presence in the Philippines. As for the Okinawan case, the Futenma base has remained operational despite the return agreement being made in 1996. That is simply because the alternative is not ready for use. It actually strengthens my argument; the United States does not close its overseas base unless an alternative is secured and is ready for use.

5.4. Data for Hypothesis Testing

To observe U.S. perceptions of the international environment and external threats, I use its official documents and strategy reports, such as National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Soviet Military Power, as well as official speeches at Congress and press conferences. I rely on secondary sources to investigate the functions and capability of contested bases and their alternatives. How the U.S. secured the alternatives will be examined through government releases, secondary sources and newspaper articles.

The most critical evidence to prove the hypothesis is the fact that the U.S. secured an alternative base before agreeing on the closure of a contested base. I look for evidence from disclosed official documents, secondary sources and interviews with those who were engaged in the negotiation process.

6. Roadmap

Chapter 2 demonstrates the framework of this dissertation. I present the hypothesis and draw predictions to observe if it is valid or not.

Chapter 3 to 5 are case studies. Chapter 3 discusses the case of Torrejón Air Force Base in Spain for which the base closure was agreed in December 1988. This case shows that U.S. continuous caution to the Soviet threat required a fighter unit permanently stationed in southern Europe so it agreed on returning the Torrejón base to Spain. The condition of the closure agreement was replication of the base in Italy. The United States came to the final agreement with Spain after gaining Italian acceptance of the base relocation.

Chapter 4 explains Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. Contrary to the case of Spain, the United States recognized that the Soviet threat was abating in Southeast Asia. The two biggest bases in the Pacific were to be closed on the condition of dispersion. The Air Force units from Clark were spread far and wide to several existing bases such as Okinawa, Tokyo and Alaska. Although the United States made the decision to relinquish the airbase heavily damaged by the eruption of July 1991, the

United States began arranging the relocations even before the disaster happened. The functions of Subic Bay were planned to be dispersed to Singapore and existing ports in Japan and Guam.

Chapter 5 looks into the case of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa, Japan. The case demonstrates that the U.S. was aware of uncertainty in North Korea and China so recognized the importance of maintaining the force level in Asia-Pacific. The United States agreed to return the Futenma base with a condition of relocating it to an existing base on the island.

In conclusion, Chapter 6 provides the evaluation of case studies and reconfirms contribution to the understanding of the issue. The last chapter further presents limitations of this dissertation and suggestions for future research and offers general conclusions at the end.

I provide collected data of overseas bases and closed bases in Appendix-I, detailed information as a reference to the Philippine case in Appendix-II, and supplementary information related to the U.S. bases in Okinawa in Appendix-III.

Chapter 2. Explaining U.S. Agreement on the Closure of Contested Overseas Bases

1. Introduction

Regarding the question on conditions of U.S. agreement on contested bases overseas, this chapter aims to propose a hypothesis: perceiving an external threat, the United States seeks to maintain its forward presence. In case that a overseas base is contested, the United States agrees on closing the base if it secures an alternative that sustains its required capabilities. This hypothesis is set up through examining previous works on overseas basing and inferring from realism which is helpful to understand the behavior of a great power. The following section reviews existing works. There is a large amount of existing literature about U.S. bases ranging from overall basing strategy to case-specific studies.[58] I treat so-called base politics studies as the existing works relevant to this dissertation because they directly analyze U.S. overseas bases, especially factors of changing U.S. basing policy. The third section elaborates my hypothesis based on the balance-of-threat theory. I discuss conditions for base closure agreement and explain what is required for an alternative to the contested base. The final section presents a list of predictions inferred from the hypothesis. The predictions will be tested by case studies in the subsequent chapters.

2. Existing Literature on U.S. Bases

How do existing works explain U.S. overseas base closures? I first provide an overview of base politics studies that explain mechanisms of changes in U.S. military bases overseas and/or basing arrangements. The

[58] Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas H. Moorer, *U.S. Overseas Bases: Problems of Projecting American Military Power Abroad* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989); James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New York: Praeger, 1990); Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2015); Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., *Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014); Catherine Lutz, *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts* (London: Pluto Press, 2009); Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Hiroshi Honma, *Kakkokukan chii kyōtei no tekiyō ni kansuru hikakuron kōsatsu* [Comparative analysis on status of forces agreements] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2003); Kawana, Shinji, ed., *Kichi mondai no kokusai hikaku* [International comparative studies on base issues] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2021).

studies consider domestic constituents of host countries as a cause of basing outcomes. Next, I point out problems and limitations of the previous studies. Finally, to solve the problems and better understand U.S. agreement on closing the contested bases, I draw inference based on the balance-of-threat theory which provides a theoretical basis to explain U.S. behavior. It is useful for clarifying the link between U.S. perception and policy outcomes of the overseas bases.

2.1. Base Politics Studies

Base politics studies, developed since the 2000s, deal with base-related issues by focusing on the domestic politics of host countries. Previously host nations' resistance and opposition to U.S. military bases were regarded as domestic issues of host countries rather than foreign affairs of the United States.[59] Kent Calder and Alexander Cooley analyze host countries' political characteristics, such as political systems and institutions. Identifying domestic actors that are involved in base-related issues, Calder clearly illustrates interactions among them and how they differ by host countries. Through comparative analysis of domestic politics Cooley demonstrates that the stability of overseas bases is influenced by the level of democracy in host countries.[60]

These scholars indicate that host countries under democratic transition tend to politicize foreign military presence in their countries. In particular, Cooley attributes the base politicization to a democratizing regime's characteristics: weaker constraint of the bilateral contract and underdeveloped institution for managing the alliance. Such a regime antagonizes foreign bases, demanding for restoration of sovereignty, and sometimes in search of quid pro quo. He argues that host states are likely to play a decisive card to terminate the basing contracts and oust the U.S. forces if their regimes are autocracies or democratizers independent of U.S. security or economic assistance.[61]

On the other hand, Calder examines the impact of anti-base protests and how they are constrained by domestic institutional mechanisms. He attributes U.S. base closures to domestic actors in host countries

[59] Kawana, *Kichi mondai no kokusai hikaku*, 25–42.
[60] Cooley's systematic research is epoch-making and influential for research on overseas bases so it has become a reference point for successive researches. For example, Sebastian E. Bitar, *US Military Bases, Quasi-Bases, and Domestic Politics in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
[61] Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).

based on his analysis that in the termination phase of the base life cycle, the allocation and disposition of base-related resources such as budget, land, weaponry and so on, becomes a salient issue, which involve interests of both the host and the basing nations.[62] He points out that various domestic actors and institutions moderate the influence of anti-base movements, and argues that low politics— leaders of host countries use policy tools of coercion and compensation towards domestic interest groups— determines the stability of U.S. military presence in host countries.[63]

Among base politics studies, there are sociological approaches combined with international relations studies. This group of research asks a common research question of why and how anti-base opposition in host countries occurs and when they make an impact on U.S. basing policy. The researches on anti-base movements reveal the causal process from the politicization of bases to various basing policies, including shutting down U.S. bases, changing operational procedures, revising the Status of Forces Agreement and so on.[64] Andrew Yeo argues whether anti-base protests can bring about base policy outcomes as they wish depends on how much consolidated ideas host-government elites have on national security— he calls it security consensus.[65] Security consensus functions as a window of opportunity for anti-base protests. A weak security consensus in which political elites hold varied ideas enables anti-base activists to penetrate the state, gain support from elites and shape favorable policy on bases. On the other hand, under a strong security consensus, anti-base protests have a small window of opportunity to penetrate the state, and face difficulties created by dominant host-government elites who adopt policies undermining the opposition.[66]

Another work by Yuko Kawato also focuses on the impact of protest movements but more on its power of discourse. She explains a wide variety of base policies by focusing on protestor's normative argument and employing domestic factors such as policy makers' perception and domestic institutions.[67]

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[62] Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 69.
[63] Ibid., 250.
[64] Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31. Some other works are as follows. Amy Austin Holmes, *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Claudia J. Kim, "War over Framing: Base Politics in South Korea," *The Pacific Review* 30, no. 3 (May 2017): 309–327.
[65] Security consensus is collective perceptions derived from threat perceptions (material and non-material), domestic ideology, institutions and historical legacies. Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, 14–17.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Yuko Kawato, *Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits* (Stanford,

Yeo and Kawato offer an insight that citizens' opposition to U.S. bases is hindered or supported by policy makers, which eventually affects base policy outcomes. Although a base closure agreement is one of the basing outcomes that they observe, their studies suggest the conditions for the base closure as follows. Yeo's work indicates the United States and the host country agree on the base closure if government elites of the latter have divided ideas on national security as anti-base protests gain political support more easily. Kawato implies the base closure is agreed if policy makers are persuaded by the normative arguments that protesters made.

2.2. Problems of Base Politics Studies

As discussed above, base politics studies suggest that domestic constituents of host countries contribute to changes in U.S. overseas basing policy. However, the studies leave a missing piece in the whole picture of U.S. overseas base closures. Base politics studies pose two problems. The first problem is that they seem to assume that the United States automatically and unconditionally agrees to close the contested bases. The domestic-centered approach has limitations in understanding why the United States needed specific conditions to close the base and why the conditions varied across cases. The conditions for base closure can be replication, dispersion or total withdrawal.[68] For example, when Spain demanded the return of Torrejón airbase, the condition was to replicate the base in Italy. The United States finally agreed on the closure of Torrejón after Italy accepted to have a replica within its territory. In the case of the Philippines, the United States did not require a replica of the Clark airbase and the Subic Bay base. Instead, the functions and capabilities of the bases were replaced by a much smaller presence in Singapore and absorbed into other existing U.S. bases in the western Pacific. Why did the alternative of Torrejón have to be replication, instead of moving to some existing base or dispersing the capabilities? Why did the United States not seek the replication of Clark and Subic Bay? The political and institutional factors of the host side are limited in their explanation of the variance in the conditions that enabled base closures.

The second problem is that base politics studies leave several questions about U.S. behavior

California: Stanford University Press, 2015).

[68] It is possible to assume that a base closure agreement is conditional upon a concession from the host country. Agreeing to hand over the contested base to the host, the United States may gain concessions on a different issue. However, this dissertation focuses on how the contested base moves and is not limited to the bargaining in the scope of the alliance.

unanswered. While base politics scholars emphasize the importance of civil society and how it could affect basing policy outcomes, they presume that the United States would accept the request from the host state readily. For the United States, however, overseas bases are important legs that support its global military primacy. In reality, the United States had been unwilling to accept the hosts' demand for the return of the bases.[69] The United States also resisted the demanding host countries by claiming the strategic value of the contested bases, proposing partial force reduction from bases and trying to extend the withdrawal date. Why did the United States persist in keeping the bases open? What made the state agree on the closure of them eventually? Facing the hosts' opposition, what was at stake for the United States? Although existing works explain well the processes by which the host governments placed demands on the United States for giving up the bases, they do not clarify U.S. strategic calculation in relation to the contested bases.

To fill the hole and fully understand the closure of contested bases overseas, it is important to focus on the U.S. perspective. It is thus necessary to consider the strategic importance of the contested bases, especially how the United States evaluated them. It is also necessary to explore how the United States sought to compensate for the loss of the bases when it accepted the hosts' demands.

3. The Logic of U.S. Agreement on Contested Base Closure

In explanation of U.S. behavior, I make the following premise: the United States as a great power seeks its primacy[70]; and it seeks to maintain the status quo of its military presence overseas to be able to meet its strategic needs. This premise is inferred from realism, specifically balance-of-threat theory. The theory is used as a theoretical basis because it has validity in explaining a great power's behavior. The premise is also reinforced by theories on alliance management. Although the theories of balance-of-threat and alliance politics do not address U.S. base closures, they suggest that U.S behavior is determined by the international system and in relation to alliances. The following subsections overview realism and theories on alliance

[69] For example, Edward Schumacher, "Weinberger, in Spain, Backs U.S. Bases' Presence," *New York Times*, March 18, 1987, p. A12; "Futenma hikōjō no zenmen henkan wa konnan [The complete return of Futenma Air Station is difficult]," *Mainichi Shimbun*. March 8, 1996, morning edition, p. 1.

[70] According to Waltz, what makes a state a great power is a combination of the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18, no. 2 (Fall, 1993): 50. The United States is a great power by this definition during the Cold War and after. He also argues that states try not only to maximize power in the present but also to secure their future positions. Ibid., 63.

management and infer what the theories say about the closure of contested bases. At the end of this section, I construct theoretical logic inferred from the existing theories. The logic provides a basis for the hypothesis introduced in Section 4.

3.1. Realism

Realism offers a theoretical backbone of the reasons for deploying military forces in foreign countries. The basic assumptions of realism are that the world is a state of anarchy; states, as unitary actors, practice self-help to secure their own survival at minimum, and seek "universal dominion" at maximum.[71] States build up their military and aggregate capabilities by strengthening their own armed forces and economic capability (internal balancing) and by forming alliances to balance against other powers (external balancing).[72] Alliances allow great powers to have military bases near the frontline of possible conflicts as well as in peripheral areas. Two fundamental realist theories of balance of power and balance of threat are reviewed here as they provide the logic for U.S. basing policy.

Based on balance-of-power theory, forward military presence is to maximize the state's power and check the rise of peer competitors. The fundamental argument of this camp is that states respond to the distribution of capability. A dominant power deploys its military forces where a competitor is likely to enhance its strength enough to challenge the dominant power. John Mearsheimer states, "as in Europe, American troops were stationed in Northeast Asia during the Cold War to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the region, not to keep peace."[73]

Balance-of-power theory would predict that the United States retreats its forward deployed forces if there is no future competitor to check in the region. Some scholars suggest that the United States should pull its forces back from Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, and let the regional powers balance each other—this strategy is called "offshore balancing."[74] From balance-of-power theory, the following can

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[71] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118.
[72] Ibid.
[73] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 266.
[74] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (August 7, 2016): 70–83; Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (1997): 86–124; Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). For counterargument, Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Should America Retrench?" *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 6 (December 11, 2016): 164–169.

be inferred: unless there are defined powers to the United States, such as the Soviet Union before 1991, the United States would be likely to abandon its overseas bases.

Balance-of-power theory fails to explain the closure of contested bases. The theory predicts that the United States is likely to withdraw its overseas bases if there is no power to check. More specifically, the state would not close a base before 1991 while it would be able to agree on the base closure when there is no major competitor after the Soviet collapse. However, historical facts reject these predictions. The United States conceded to Spanish demands and agreed to return a contested base even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States hesitated to relinquish bases in the Philippines and Okinawa even when there was no major competitor equivalent to the Soviet Union.

Another branch of realism is balance-of-threat theory. It provides a different explanation of the motivations for basing. The theory is established to explain alliance formation, and thus does not touch upon overseas military bases, including their establishment, continuity, and closure.[75] In examining how states choose to ally, Stephen Walt makes an important argument that balancing is more common than bandwagoning as a response to threat.[76] States ally based not only on power but also on threats. Threats are composed of aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. A great power allies with weaker states in order to balance against an external threat(s). The theory implies that overseas bases established and maintained in allied countries serve the purpose of preventing stronger powers from prevailing.

From balance-of-threat theory, it can be inferred that overseas bases are for balancing against a perceived threat. The inference suggests that the changes of base disposition— i.e., establishment, closure, relocation and consolidation— depend on the changes of a perceived threat.

3.2. Theories on Alliance Management

Scholars on alliance management examine the motivation for the formation, endurance, and dissolution of alliances. Among them, Glenn Snyder provides the explanation of alliance formation and management.[77] The latter is related to the theme of this dissertation. He argues that alliances are maintained through

[75] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
[76] Ibid, 5.
[77] Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997).

bargaining between the allied states. Snyder's alliance bargaining model demonstrates that outcomes of bargaining depend not on the parties' national or military power but rather on their dependence on the alliance, their commitment to it and the comparative value on each party's interests at stake.[78] In other words, a party's bargaining position will be weakened if the state is more dependent on the alliance; it is more firmly committed to the alliance; and its ally has greater interests in what they bargain over.

To apply this model to the U.S. agreement on closing the contested base, the United States is likely to yield to a host country's demand when the United States either depends on the alliance more than the ally does; the United States is more firmly committed to the alliance; or the base-hosting ally has greater value on the closure of the contested base than the United States has on keeping it.

Another approach is related to alliance mechanism. James Morrow presents the trade-off model to explain alliance persistence.[79] He defines alliances as tools for great powers to further pursue changes in the status quo of foreign policies, proposing that the motivation for alliance is a cost-benefit comparison.[80] His broader view includes the traditional definition of alliance—states are allied to counter a common threat. He focuses on the trade-off between security and autonomy in forming and managing alliances. The trade-off in an asymmetric alliance functions as follows. In an asymmetric alliance, great powers provide security to weaker allies and gain autonomy benefits, which means promoting favorable changes within the status quo. Weaker powers can enjoy the protection of the stronger ally from external threats by offering concessions, such as military bases and domestic and foreign policies coordinated with the stronger ally. Such concessions that weaker powers offer enable the stronger ally to expand its freedom of action.[81]

How does the trade-off model explain U.S. agreement on closing the contested base? Morrow acknowledges that the attractiveness or incentive of the trade-off could decrease, though the break-up of asymmetric alliances is unusual. He indicates that major powers are not attracted to military bases that weaker powers provide if the location is not strategically important.[82] From this model, it can be inferred that the incentive to close a foreign base becomes higher when the stronger ally sees reduced importance of the base's location. If the attractiveness of the trade-off still holds, how does the stronger ally respond to its ally's

[78] Ibid., 166–172.
[79] James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–933.
[80] Ibid., 905.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., 916.

demand for base closure, i.e. demand for increasing autonomy? A path can be inferred from the model. If the stronger ally wants to reserve the freedom of action, it seeks to gain autonomy concessions from the ally in a different way, or seeks for another partner/ ally that can supply the stronger power with the freedom of action required. In the latter case, the alliance persists but base(s) located in the demanding host country will be relocated somewhere else.

3.3. Theoretical Logic for U.S. Agreement on Contested Base Closure

As far as the United States perceived an external threat, the United States should seek for the status quo in terms of its alliances and overseas military presence. If a host country demands for changes in the status quo, such as the closure of U.S. base(s), rejecting the demand may cause more antagonism toward the United States. Consequently, the disagreement over the contested base would endanger access to the other bases in the host country, and also deteriorate the alliance relationship.

To avoid a worsening situation, the United States chooses to accommodate the base-hosting allies. This behavior is deduced from the theoretical logic demonstrated in Michael Masntanduno's work on U.S. post-Cold War security and economic strategies. From the balance-of-threat theory he infers a prediction that a dominant state seeks to make its superior position long lasting by providing accommodation and reassurance for status quo powers.[83] By being accommodated, the U.S. allies are motivated to stay in the alliance. To apply his explanation based on balance-of-threat theory to U.S. agreement on closing the contested bases, accepting the host's demand ensures the sound relations with the base-hosting allies.

The strategies of accommodation and reassurance generate additional benefit in terms of overseas bases. Listening to the base-hosting ally results in securing the oth r bases in the country. It is expected that an agreement on relinquishing the contested base enables the United States to have stable access to the bases that are excluded from the base negotiations. Since the United States gains freedom of action through bases provided by its allies, as Morrow argues, it is inferred that the United States is motivated to maintain the bases as much as possible.[84] Making a concession to the demanding ally is reasonable behavior for the

[83] Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88.

[84] As discussed above, Morrow's model indicates that the motivation to keep an overseas base reduces if it is considered as strategically invaluable. The global posture review and following base realignments in 2000s attribute to U.S. attempt to adapt its forward deployment to the new security environment.

United States in that regard.

Based on the assumption that the United States seeks to maintain the status quo of overseas bases in its favor, the function and capability of the contested base that is agreed to be closed should be maintained as well. The United States requires an alternative to the contested base. It is a prerequisite that the alternative should be able to counter the external threat that the United States perceives. The United States values its overseas bases in terms of its adversary's military capability and intention to use force as well as geographic proximity, i.e. the disposition and kinds of forces.[85] That is why threat perception is a key indicator in consideration of basing alternatives.

In the following section I present a hypothesis based on the logic above to explain more concretely the conditions of U.S. agreement on closing contested bases.

4. Hypothesis

The hypothesis established from the discussion above is the following: the United States agrees to close the contested base under the condition of securing an alternative that has base capabilities to counter the perceived threat. Figure 2.1 illustrates an arrow diagram of the hypothesis. The value of the contested base based on threat perception determines basing alternatives. Basing alternative is determined by the required base capability based on the value of the contested base.



Figure 2.1 Arrow Diagram Explaining the Hypothesis
Source: Author

[85] This is inferred from Walt's argument on sources of threat: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

The hypothesis consists of three sub-hypotheses.[86] The sub-hypotheses are as follows: (a) threat perception determines state's evaluation of the contested base; (b) the value of the base determines base capability required for an alternative; and (c) when an alternative is secured, state agrees to close the base. At the end of this section, I present predictions drawn from the hypothesis to be observed in the case studies.

4.1. Threat Perception and Evaluation of the Contested Base

When an overseas military base is contested, how does the United States evaluate the base and respond to the contestation? The importance of the base changes according to external threat perception. This subsection corresponds to the sub-hypothesis (a) in Figure 2.1, explaining how the United States responds to the host's demand and evaluates the contested base in accordance with its threat perception.

With regard to a contested base, it is key to examine perceived threat posed to a specific geographical area for which the base is responsible. Examining the formation of alliances, Walt focuses on adversary's aggregate power, military capability and intention of use of force as sources of threat. However, U.S. threat perception in relation to contested bases is area-oriented. That is, an overseas base has missions to pursue in an assigned area. The area is contained within the area of responsibility.[87] For example, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) as of the 1980s had the area of responsibility that covered Europe, all of the Mediterranean, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.[88] Meanwhile, NATO's area was divided into three regions—Northern, Central and Southern Regions.[89] A contested airbase in Spain was responsible for NATO's Southern Region, not throughout Europe or EUCOM's area of responsibility. Facing base contestation, the United States assesses carefully the conditions or changes of an external threat posed in the specific region.

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[86] I use the term "sub-hypothesis" as Van Evera calls it "explanatory hypothesis" that are embedded in a theory. Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1997), 35.

[87] Area of responsibility is a pre-defined area associated with a combatant command with which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. See "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as of November 2022," accessed May 24, 2022, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf. As of 2022, the United States forces currently have six geographic combatant commands: Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Indo-Pacific Command, Northern Command, and Southern Command. For instance, the area of responsibility of the Indo-Pacific Command covers from the western border of India to the waters off the west coast of the United States, and from the North Pole to Antarctica. "About U.S. Indo-Pacific Command," U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed May 24, 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/.

[88] Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 75.

[89] "The Beginnings of NATO's Military Structure," NATO On-line Library, updated January 2006, accessed May 25, 2022, https://www.nato.int/docu/nato-mil-stru/html_en/natomilstru_03.html.

U.S. threat perception with regard to contested bases is featured by the following three elements: regional military balance between the United States and the state that poses a threat, offensive capability and aggressive intention of the threatening state. First, the United States is cautious about military balance against its major adversary in the region for which the base is responsible. Threat perception is influenced by quantitative comparison of the number of weapons and manpower deployed in the region. If the regional military balance is in favor of the adversary, the United States is likely to perceive it as a threat. Second, the United States also pays attention to the adversary's offensive capability that would be projected in the said region. Unlike the aforementioned military balance, it is about the quality of weapons that the adversary deploys to the region. Included are offensive and provocative weapons necessary for invasion. The disposition of those weapons and troops is also taken into consideration. Third, the adversary's aggressive intention is the other component of U.S. threat perception. The United States assesses whether its adversary has determination to change the status quo.[90] A threatening adversary is believed to desire a favorable change in the distribution of power and in geographic scope. The aggressive intention is identified through U.S. observation of the adversary's speech and behavior.

The United States pays attention not only to a major external threat but also to regional concerns. If a state is believed to have all three elements, the state poses a salient threat to the United States. Even a weak state with no competitive military power against the United States could be perceived as a concern or a potential threat if judged as having aggressive intentions. To the United States such a weak state is not perceived as an imminent threat because it does not have means to translate its revisionist intention into action. The United States recognizes it as a regional concern. The state may develop into a status-quo or revisionist power. As the future of the state is unclear, the United States remains cautious about the state posing a concern about regional security.

To operationalize U.S. threat perception in consideration of how to respond to base contestation, I examine the relative change of U.S. threat perception during the time from the base contestation to the base closure agreement. It is reasonable to see how the United States perceives external threat at that time rather than quantifying the threat perception over time. I analyze whether the United States perceives that the

[90] Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14-15. She differentiates expansionist and opportunistic intensions by the degree of determination. I consider aggressive intension as whether a state seeks to resist and change the status quo in which the United States has a dominant position.

existing major threat tends to increase, decrease, remain at the same level or disappear in the said time period.

U.S. evaluation of the contested base represents whether it is crucial or expendable for the overall security of the United States. To operationalize how the United States evaluates a contested base, I use the selection criteria that the U.S. Department of Defense adopted for nominating overseas bases for return or realignment as part of the BRAC in the early 1990s.[91] The selection criteria for overseas base closure or realignment have five categories: the nature of the threat, number and types of forces, geographical location, agreement with host nations, and existing facility inventory.[92] In applying the selection criteria to the evaluation of contested bases, the major indications for U.S. evaluation on a contested base are threat and operation support capabilities. On one hand, the nature of and proximity to the threat determines the value of contested bases. This point is closely related to the previous discussion on U.S. threat evaluation. On the other hand, the value of the base also depends on its capabilities to support assigned missions. Included are whether the base is optimal in assisting designated missions and flexibility to support current and probable future operations.

Based on the criteria, I presume that the United States evaluates a contested base as followings: vital and hard to replace, partially replaceable, and replaceable. Firstly, a base is considered as vital and hard to replace when there is an evident threat posed to the area for which the base is responsible. Such a base thus has clear mission assignments and capabilities to support missions. If the base offers versatility for different missions and operations at various locations, it is also valued as vital and hard to replace. Secondly, a base is considered as partially replaceable when a threat is distant, albeit emerges as a regional concern. Its mission support capability is still useful and valuable. However, as the nature of the threat is at a manageable stage, the relocation of some functions from the base is acceptable. Lastly, a base is considered as replaceable when the major threat diminishes. Accordingly, the possibility of contingencies declines. The situation also reduces the need for mission assignments. The base's replaceability increases if other bases can absorb the capability to provide support for future operations.

How do I observe U.S. evaluation of the contested bases? Base evaluation appears in the speech and action of the United States. First and foremost, the United States declares its intention to retain the

[91] Gary D. Vest, *Report on Overseas Basing,* (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1994), 3.
[92] Ibid. Also refer to Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

contested base because it is best to keep the base available. The intention of maintaining the base is expressed toward various counterparts such as the negotiating partners and the people of the host country, U.S. legislators, U.S. allies and the state that poses a threat. It becomes a signal that the United States is determined to sustain the deployed force level and remain committed to the region. The state also provides explanations of intentions for domestic parties concerned. The overseas base contestation sometimes comes up for discussion at the legislative level of the United States because legislators are concerned about how much national budget is spent for sustaining the overseas base in question.

While the United States prefers to retain the base, threat perception influences the evaluation of the contested base. The United States examines whether the base is vital or replaceable for balancing against the perceived threat. If a perceived threat remains significant, the United States considers the base as vital and hard to replace. The United States has low incentive to move the base somewhere else because it thinks that the change of force posture would affect the power balance in the region. Thus, the United States does not make public that it seeks for an alternative to the contested base or that it studies the possibility of replacement. On the other hand, if a perceived threat is abating, the United States considers the base as replaceable. Withdrawing from the host state would have no harmful influence with respect to dealing with the threat. In fact, the United States publicly looks for ways to substitute the base. That is because the United States considers the base relocation would not change the regional power balance. When the perceived threat is declining, the United States expects that no country would take advantage of a power vacuum created by relocating the base from the host country to somewhere else.

In spite of the intention, however, there are certain situations in which the United States has to consider the possible closure of the base. For example, a host state may notify the United States of not renewing the existing base contract. Notification is a direct cause of the United States' accepting the host demand as the contract defines. Another situation is where the host legislature may not ratify a renewed base contract. In this case, the new contract is not enacted, which provides no legal grounds for basing in the host country. Furthermore, in addition to the host administration and legislature, its public may make the United States consider a possible base closure. When the United States sees the anti-base sentiment among the host's public develop into a national issue in the host country, the United States is driven to consider ways to ease the antagonism for continuing military presence in the country. In these cases the United States comes to

make a preliminary agreement to return the contested base to the host country.[93]

Why does the United States yield to the host states? It is because each of these situations creates a risk of losing all the bases in the host country, including the contested base and other important bases for dealing with the existing major threat. If there is a perceived threat, losing entire access can be an unbearable risk for the United States. In this case, it accepts the host's demand and seeks for an alternative base to sustain its military capability. The acceptance may allow the United States to renegotiate with the host state for securing the other base(s) in the country. It also helps maintain the alliance even if the basing contract is abrogated because the ally is assured that the United States is not domineering and pays respect to the weaker ally. Considering that the balance-of-threat theory assumes states' balancing behavior as a response to external threats, it is critical for the United States to keep good relations with its ally.

4.2. Base Capability Required for an Alternative

This subsection discusses the sub-hypothesis (b) in Figure 2.1. Requirements for an alternative have two aspects: physical and psychological. Physical, or purely military requirements indicate arms, number of personnel, equipment, facilities and their location. Psychological aspect of base capability requirements refers to the signaling function of bases. The purely military requirements are directly related to threat perception. Threat perception influences what base capability is required for an alternative. I introduce a concept of base capability that contains combat power of the unit stationed in the base, distance to the theater of war, readiness and speed of force delivery, manpower and material resources, and sustainability of operations. I extract three elements of base capability that are considered in search of an alternative: proximity, force strength, and capacity.

The first element to be secured is proximity to the major threat or the possible theater of war. Distance matters in considering the location of an alternative base. Nickolas Spykman stated, "power is effective in inverse proportion from its source."[94] Similarly, Kenneth Boulding introduced the concept of

[93] Good examples are Spain, Okinawa, and South Korea. For details, see Chapter 3 (Spain) and Chapter 5 (Okinawa) of this dissertation. In the case of South Korea, the United States and South Korea made a preliminary agreement in 1990 on closing and relocating the Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul. However, due to a disagreement over the cost sharing, the plan became derailed. The relocation agreement was restored as the Yongsan Relocation Plan in 2004. Jae-Jung Suh, "Transforming the US-ROK Alliance: Changes in Strategy, Military and Bases," *Pacific Focus*, 24, no. 1 (April 2009): 73.

[94] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*

"loss of strength gradient," presenting that the further from home a state conducts military operations, the less strength it can demonstrate in the field.[95] He also underlined the important role of overseas bases to compensate for the loss generated by the distance from home.[96] Referring to Boulding's theory, Michael Desch further argues that overseas bases, especially in peripheral areas, are "force multipliers" for great powers.[97] Proximity matters for various kinds of bases not only for main operations but also for transit, staging, logistics, maintenance, and storage. The loss of strength gradient becomes critical, for instance, if transit or logistic support bases are located far from the possible theater of war or main operating bases. That creates longer and costly supply lines, which undermines the power projection capability.

When the United States perceives a major threat remaining at the same level and the possibility of its aggression in the area assigned to the contested base, an alternative for the contested base is secured in the area to sustain the lines of logistic support and maintain a distance to the theater of war which is assigned for the troop stationed in the contested base. When the United States perceives the major threat declines, proximity to the threat or the theater of war becomes less salient. That is because a military contingency that would necessitate the base is unlikely. Nevertheless, withdrawing the forces to the continental United States (CONUS)[98] is not an optimal option, as it would make the lines of communications much longer and costly. Considering overseas bases as a force multiplier, an alternative is secured in the area of responsibility—broader than the geographical area assigned to the contested base. It is partly because responding to the base closure demand does not change the force structure per se. It is also because the United States seeks to maintain a sign of commitment to the region. This point is discussed later in the psychological aspect.

The second element is force strength that basically means what the forces can do from the base. The units permanently stationed in the contested base indicate force strength. There is a wide range of such units: infantry division, armored division, fighter wing, missile wing, homeport of a naval fleet, to name but a few. Each unit has its own mission and equipment to achieve it. For instance, U.S. Air Force Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan is a home of the 18th Wing whose mission is to "project decisive airpower to ensure

(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1942), 165.

[95] Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper, 1962), 230–231.

[96] Ibid., 262.

[97] Michael C. Desch, "The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," *International Security* 14, no. 1 (1989): 99.

[98] According to the Department of Defense dictionary, CONUS indicates U.S. territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North America between Canada and Mexico. *DOD Dictionary of Military Terms*, accessed February 14, 2022, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.

regional stability and security."[99] The base accommodates combat-ready aircraft including 54 F-15s for air superiority, 15 KC-135s for air refueling, two E-3s for airborne warning and control, and nine HH-60s for search and rescue.[100] The Kadena base's main force is the combat aircraft of F-15s. Other aircraft and support operations are subordinate units that enable the main force to conduct its mission continuously.

When the United States perceives a major threat and the possibility of its aggression in a certain area, an alternative for the contested base should have the same force strength without a change of the stationed units or the quantity of equipment, manpower and material resources. That is replication— keeping all the units and moving them from the contested base to the alternative. By doing so, force strength is sustained. On the other hand, dispersion is to divide the stationed units and relocate them to different bases. Dispersion could include various forms of basing—for example, sea basing, rotational and temporary deployment, prepositioning, and so on. Unless the alternative bases are close to each other, it becomes difficult to conduct the same mission at the same speed as before. In that situation, force strength is reduced.

The third element is whether an alternative has a capacity to accept the units transferred from the contested base. Depending on what kind of units to be relocated, the alternative needs to have area to equip not only operation-related facilities, such as a runway, hangar, harbor installations, repair facilities, and ammunition storage area, but also indirect facilities, such as quarters, commissaries, welfare and recreational facilities, and family's housing and schools, if necessary.[101] Additionally, an alternative may be required to have a capacity to accommodate follow-on troops in case of military conflict. If it is an airbase, for example, the alternative should hold additional facilities such as apron, hangar and barracks for reinforced aircraft and personnel.

When a major threat and the possibility of its aggression are perceived, an alternative for the contested base should have a capacity to accommodate the relocated units entirely. If an external threat is perceived to be abating, the contested base is moved to several bases that can accept each set of dispersed units.

On the other hand, requirements for an alternative have a psychological aspect as well. That is

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[99] "Kadena Air Base," U.S. Air Force, Accessed May 16, 2022, https://www.kadena.af.mil/About-Us/.
[100] Ibid. As for the numbers of the aircraft, refer to Valerie Insinna, "For the F-15 Enterprise at Kadena Air Base in Japan, It's an Expertise Problem," *Defense News*, March 3, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/kadena-air-base/2018/03/02/is-the-f-15-fleet-at-kadena-air-base-worse-off-than-those-stateside/.
[101] Vest, *Report on Overseas Basing*, 2.

the signaling function of bases. An alternative is required to signal U.S. commitment to the region for which the contested base is responsible.[102] Putting bases in foreign countries is a costly signal against the adversary, which deters its aggression.[103] The signaling function is important in relation to the allies as well. If alliances are a means of balancing, as balance-of-threat theory proposes, a great power has to retain its allies in its camp and prevent them from switching over to the adversary. Overseas bases can function as a way to make the allies feel secure and defended. Bases, or forward deployed troops, can function as tripwire by which the United States will be automatically involved in regional conflicts.[104] In order to deter its adversary and potential rising powers and reassure allies in the region, if the contested base is to be moved out of the host country, the alternative may need to be located in the same region.

This requirement could contradict the aforementioned military aspect. It is possible that proximity, which is one of the elements considered in search of an alternative, and presence in the region are not always congruent. Even if an alternative is as geographically close to the theater of war as the contested base is, the alternative could be outside of the region that the contested base is responsible for. Then the alternative is not expected to function as symbol of U.S. commitment in the region. The state could expose reduced commitment by relocating the contested base out of the region. If being in the region is given priority over proximity, it implies that signaling function is considered more important than purely military aspect.

4.3. Condition for Base Closure Agreement

With what kind of an alternative base the United States agrees to close the contested base? This subsection talks about the sub-hypothesis (c), the final arrow in the diagram of Figure 2.1. There are mainly three basing alternatives: replication, dispersion and total withdrawal.[105] Replication is the most desirable alternative if

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[102] Region here is defined as a geographic area assigned specifically to the base through strategic plans and/ or higher commander authority. Region used in this context is different from and geographically smaller than a command area of responsibility. As for area of responsibility, see n. 84.

[103] James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414; James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90.

[104] Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 47. For discussion on the tripwire logic and effect, see Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, "The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression," *Texas National Security Review* 3, issue 3 (Summer 2021): 33–53.

[105] I call 'basing alternatives' instead of 'alternative bases' because theoretically an alternative does not have to take the form of a base where troops are stationed permanently. Basing alternatives can be a wide variety of military presence, including sharing bases with host country's armed forces, rotational deployment, temporary

the United States considers the contested base as vital and hard to replace. Dispersion is the optimal alternative to the base that is evaluated as replaceable. Total withdrawal includes relocating the base to another base out of the area of responsibility or dismissing the unit(s) located in the base. This will be likely to occur when there is no perceived threat and the base has little strategic value.

If the contested base is considered vital and its base capability needs to be sustained, the United States cannot relinquish the base as the host country demands. It is a difficult choice for the United States because of several problems. First, agreeing to abandon the base may send a wrong signal to the threatening power and induce its opportunistic attack or aggressive response.[106] Second, scaling down the force can be read as the decrease of reassurance and make other U.S. allies in the region feel insecure. Third, in terms of military efficiency, losing the contested base without any alternative base affects U.S. ability to respond to regional contingencies. It may have to take a detour that consumes more time and resources to transfer the necessary forces to the theater of war. Giving up the vital base with no condition means a scale down of the force level in the region, which is not strategically acceptable for the United States. In order to counter the external threat, the vital base needs to be replicated with the same capability as the contested base has.

On the contrary, when the United States evaluates the contested base as replaceable and considering that its base capability can be reduced, the United States has wider options for substituting the contested base. Although possible options are base replication and dispersion, the latter is an optimal alternative. Replication has several hurdles if the base capability can be reduced. Creating a new base in a foreign country usually involves complex and time-consuming processes—negotiating with the host nation as well as persuading Congress to budget for base construction or relocation.[107] Some states are willing to host an alternative base in exchange of quid pro quo.[108] However, the United States may have difficulty in financing the costs associated with the base replication especially in the time of fiscal deficit. Furthermore, there is a risk of overextension. Keeping the existing force level overseas in excess of lessened security imperatives facilitates the great power's decline. MacDonald and Parent argue that "when ends are too

visit for training and joint exercise, prepositioning, port calls, and so on.

[106] In terms of signaling, see Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."

[107] Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Alan J. Vick, *The Posture Triangle: A New Framework for U.S. Air Force Global Presence* (Santa Monica: Calif., RAND, 2013), 71.

[108] In terms of U.S. post-WWII base expansion through the invention and usage of quid pro quo, see Shinji Kawana, *Kichi no seijigaku [Base Politics: The Origins of the Post War U.S. Overseas Bases Expansion Policy]* (Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō, 2012).

ambiguous for available means, states are overextended" and eventually overtaken by more prudent states.[109] Ultimately, when the contested base is valued as replaceable, dispersion is the preferable alternative.

To summarize the above discussion on the components of the hypothesis, Table 2.1 shows the relation of threat perception, base capability and basing alternatives applying to the three case studies that this dissertation examines. The first row illustrates a situation where the United States perceives that the major threat remains at the same level and the probability of its aggression in the region. The United States values the contested base as vital and hard to replace. Base capability required for an alternative is the same as that of the contested base. Thus, it is replicated somewhere within the region. The second row indicates a situation in which the United States perceives the major threat is abating in the region. The United States evaluates the contested base as replaceable. Base capability required for an alternative is reduced. The alternative is to disperse the units and functions of the current base to several bases in the region. By doing so, rapidness and efficiency decreases, which results in reduced base capability. Nonetheless, it would not affect the overall military capability to confront the threat. The third row depicts a situation when the United States perceives no major threat but certain security concerns that could develop into a threat. Base capability required for an alternative remains the same. Still, a certain level of efficiency and readiness could be reduced because the security concerns and the possibility for armed conflict are not so imminent. In this case, the alternative is a combination of replication and partial dispersion. Lastly, the bottom row is a hypothetical situation in which the United States perceives no threat or security concerns. Such a case does not require any base capability to be secured, so an alternative is not necessary. The units of the contested base are disbanded or withdrawn completely from the region.

[109] Paul MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," *International Security* 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 19.

Table 2.1 Linkage between Threat Perception and Basing Alternatives

U.S. threat perception	Evaluation of the contested base	Base capability required for an alternative	Condition of U.S. agreement
The major threat remains the same level	Vital and hard to replace	Maintain the same capability	Replication
The major threat is abating	Replaceable	Readiness and military efficiency can be reduced	Dispersion
No major threat but security concerns remain	Vital but partially replaceable	Maintain the major capability; military efficiency can be reduced	Replication & partial dispersion
There is no threat or security concern	Unnecessary	None	None (i.e. total withdrawal)

Source: Author

4.4. Predictions

At the end of this chapter, I draw predictions from the hypothesis—the United States agrees to close the contested base under the condition of securing an alternative that has base capabilities to counter the perceived threat. Multiple predictions are drawn from the sub-hypotheses previously discussed. Below is a list of the predictions derived from the three sub-hypotheses.[110]

Sub-hypothesis (a): U.S. threat perception determines its evaluation of the contested base.

Prediction a-1: The United States insists on the importance of the contested base.

Prediction a-2: The United States may accept force reduction but does not agree to the return of the base.

Prediction a-3: If the state posing a major threat proposes a concurrent force reduction, including closing the contested base, the United States rejects the proposal.

Prediction a-4-1: Perceiving that the major threat remains at the same level or that there are potential threats, the United States claims that there is no other way to counter the threat than maintaining the

[110] A situation when there is no perceived threat can be inferred from the hypothesis as shown in Table 2.1. However, as far as I have observed, there is no case to match the situation in reality. For that reason, predictions under the situation are omitted from the list.

base.

Prediction a-4-2: Perceiving that the major threat is abating, the United States thinks that there are other ways to sustain the military operations that the contested base has been engaged in.

Prediction a-5-1: If the United States perceives that the major threat remains at the same level or that there are potential threats over a period of time before the base negotiation until the end of the negotiation, U.S. negotiators and high officials do not publicly mention the possibility to relocate the base.

Prediction a-5-2: If the United States perceives that the major threat is abating over a period of time before the base negotiation until the end of the negotiation, U.S. negotiators and high officials publicly mention the possibility to relocate the base. They make it public because they expect that it would not affect the regional power balance.

Prediction a-6: The United States accepts the host's demand when it sees a possibility of losing access to the other bases in the host state, including the most significant one(s).

Sub-hypothesis (b): The value of the contested base determines base capability required for an alternative.

Prediction b-1-1: If the contested base is considered vital, the alternative is to replicate the contested base. It should be located no further than the contested base from the expected theater of war.

Prediction b-1-2: If the contested base is considered vital, the alternative will be located in the same region that the contested base is responsible for.

Prediction b-1-3: If the contested base is considered vital, the alternative should accommodate all the units, including combat and non-combat forces, stationed at the contested base.

Prediction b-1-4: If the contested base is considered vital, the alternative should have capacity to house the units stationed at the contested base. The alternative should be equipped with necessary facilities and infrastructure to support the forces.

Prediction b-2-1: Even if there is no major and imminent threat perceived but there is a possibility of military conflict in the area assigned to the contested base, an alternative base should sustain main capability to support combat forces that can respond to the contingency.

Prediction b-2-2: If the contested base is considered vital but partially replaceable, the alternative should be a combination of replica that can accommodate the main units and dispersion by which other elements are relocated somewhere else.

Prediction b-2-3: If the contested base is considered vital but partially replaceable, the main capability of the contested base should be located close to the expected theater of war.

Prediction b-2-4: If the contested base is considered vital but partially replaceable, the minor capability of the contested base should be separated and absorbed into a base within the area assigned to the contested base.

Prediction b-3-1: If the contested base is considered replaceable, the alternative is to disperse the capability of the contested base to several bases.

Prediction b-3-2: If the contested base is considered replaceable, the units at the contested base should be relocated within the area of responsibility.

Prediction b-3-3: If the contested base is considered replaceable, the forces should not necessarily be accommodated into one base. The relocation destination can be multiple. The alternative can be smaller than the contested base.

Sub-hypothesis (c): When an alternative is secured, the United States agrees to close the contested base.

Prediction c-1: Before finalizing an agreement on the contested base closure, the United States seeks to secure an alternative by arranging the base relocation. If the alternative is planned to be located in another country, a new host country's acceptance precedes the final agreement of the base closure.

5. Summary

This chapter has built the hypothesis based on balance-of-threat theory to explain the conditions for U.S. agreement on the closure of its contested bases. The hypothesis illuminates the relation of threat perception and the conditions of the base closure. I have drawn the predictions from the hypothesis. What needs to be observed is U.S. perception of the prevailing external threat, its assessment of the contested bases and base

capability to be retained, and its effort to secure an alternative base before finalizing an agreement with the host country.

The following three chapters test the hypothesis to see if the predictions are congruent with observations in the cases. The first case is the base contestation in Spain in the latter half of the 1980s when the United States perceives that the Soviet threat is remaining in southern Europe. It is expected that the Spanish case should correspond to the first row of Table 2.1. The second case is the base contestation in the Philippines at the end of the 1980s to 1991 when the United States perceives that the Soviet threat is weakening in Southeast Asia. The Philippine case should match the second row of Table 2.1. The third case is the base contestation in Okinawa in 1995-96 when there is no major threat as the former Soviet Union but the United States is concerned about emerging security concerns such as North Korea and China. The Okinawan case is expected to apply to the third row of Table 2.1.

Chapter 3. Spain

1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to explain the case of Spain by using the hypothesis of this dissertation. Spain demanded the reduction of U.S. bases in Spain in the latter half of the 1980s and requested the closure of an airbase. That was the time when the United States perceived the Soviet threat as remaining in southern Europe. In December 1988, the base closure was agreed upon the condition of replicating the base in Italy. The hypothesis is that the closure of a contested base is agreed on when a basing state secures an alternative that retains military capability to counter perceived threats. If the hypothesis is valid, it should be observed in the Spanish case that the United States 1) perceives that the Soviet threat remains at the same level and values the contested base as vital and irreplaceable, 2) seeks to maintain the main capability of the base, 3) seeks to secure an alternative of replication that can serve the same capability and function as the base has, and 4) agrees on closing the contested base after securing the alternative.

The United States and Spain began negotiations for a new basing contract in the summer of 1986. During negotiations over a year, Spain demanded the U.S. forces' withdrawal from Torrejón Air Base. Meanwhile, the United States emphasized the importance of the base and did not yield to Spain. However, the United States eventually accepted the Spanish demand in January 1988. It managed to maintain the base's capability within southern Europe by obtaining Italy's agreement on relocating the base to its territory. The United States and Spain signed a new security treaty in December 1988, officially pledging that Torrejón would be closed in three years while the rest of three U.S. bases remained.

This chapter argues that the final agreement of closing the Torrejón base was accompanied by the condition of replication, and it was linked to U.S. threat perception of the Soviet military power posed to southern Europe. The Torrejón base was to be relocated to Italy because the United States perceived the Soviet threat as remaining, and thought it important to keep the capability in the region. In the latter half of the 1980s, U.S. official reports assessing the Soviet Union's military power underlined that the United States remained aware of Soviet threats despite bilateral arms reduction initiatives. According to secondary sources at that time, there were several options for the fighter wing based in Torrejón, such as relocation to other

countries within and out of the region. However, replicating Torrejón's base function in Italy was agreed because it would retain the West-East military balance and clear domestic and international political hurdles.

Existing literature explains this Spanish case by focusing on the impact of Spain's democratization on U.S. base continuity. Democratization challenges the legacy of preceding autocracy or dictatorship that admitted U.S. military presence in the country. U.S. bases in host countries in transition to democracy tend to be criticized and politicized in search of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and party consolidation.[111] The Spanish case is consistent with the existing explanation. However, there is still room to explain U.S. agreement on closing the contested base from U.S. perspective. In addition, existing literature overlooks the situation at that time which made it difficult for the United States to relinquish the base. First, the major threat to the United States was not abating. The Soviet Union was reforming internal and external policies, but U.S. caution toward the Soviet Union was maintained. Second, there was concern about a domino effect—U.S. compromise to a host country could encourage another host to bargain over foreign military presence, which could end up with the fraying of the U.S. basing network. Spain was first in line to negotiate on U.S. basing before the expiration of the ongoing contract, followed by Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and the Philippines.[112] Despite these difficulties, how was it possible for the United States to relinquish the base in question that the United States would have maintained if it were not contested?

This chapter first touches upon the foundation of the U.S.-Spanish security relations, particularly basing agreements. After overviewing how Spain brought issues pertaining to U.S. bases to the national level in the mid-1980s, I examine whether observation of the Spanish case is congruent with the predictions drawn from the hypothesis. U.S. threat perception, evaluation on the base in question, and arrangement for an alternative will be examined. Threat perception is retrieved from U.S. public reports and high officials' statements released a couple of years before and during basing negotiations. I analyze the relative change of the threat perception during the period. How the United States evaluated the Torrejón base appears in the U.S.

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[111] Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alexander Cooley and Jonathan Hopkin, "Base Closings: The Rise and Decline of the US Military Bases Issue in Spain, 1975-2005," *International Political Science Review* 31, no. 4 (September 2010): 494–513.

[112] Refer to David B. Ottaway, "Foreign Aid Cuts, Hostility of Hosts Seen as Perils to U.S. Bases Abroad," *Washington Post*, November 24, 1987, p. A11; Richard F. Grimmett, *Current Issues with the 'Base-Rights' Countries and Their Implications* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 5, 1988); Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 262.

explanation to the public. I collect U.S. congressional testimonies of the high officials of the U.S. government and military as well as their comments reported by newspapers. They can be regarded as official and institutional, rather than personal, because they are generally prepared within respective departments involved in the negotiation or relocation examination process. Thus, I regard these comments as the U.S. position in general. To find the process of the United States securing an alternative for the Torrejón base, secondary sources are of great help due to limited access to diplomatic documents. Data from the secondary materials tells us what elements consisted as an alternative and how the United States sought to secure it.

2. From Base Establishment to Contestation

Before the main discussion, this section presents an overview of the development of the United States-Spain security relations and basing arrangements. The overview is followed by a brief introduction of U.S. bases in Spain. I will also demonstrate how the U.S. bases in Spain became contested; Spain's democratization led to a demand for the reduction of U.S. forces.

As the Cold War intensified in the early 1950s, the United States became interested in Spain because of its geographical advantage. The Pyrenees, the northern edge of Spain, could be a natural defense wall that would enable a rear attack if the Soviet forces invaded Western Europe during the Cold War. For the West, Spain had geographical advantages, such as staging bases for tactical aircraft, naturally guarded evacuation and emergency stations, control over sealanes between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and capability to launch simultaneous attacks from south and east.[113] In 1953, the United States and Spain signed the Pact of Madrid that consisted of three agreements: the Defense Agreement, the Economic Aid Agreement, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.[114] The Defense Agreement granted the U.S. access to military bases in Spain, but the United States was not obliged to defend Spain. The establishment of military bases in Spain

[113] Arthur Preston Whitaker, *Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Liability* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1961), 48.

[114] Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Spain (TIAS 2849), Defense Agreement between the United States and Spain (TIAS 2850), and Economic Aid Agreement between the United States and Spain (TIAS 2851). The texts are available in U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 4, Part. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953). For deeper analysis on pre-agreement situations and conditions of the 1953 agreements, refer to Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 252–254; Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 243–247.

was under "the policy of strengthening the defense of the West" and for that purpose the United States pledged to provide Spain military and economic aid as enhancement of Spanish defense efforts. With the given assistance, Spain purchased aircraft and weapons from the United States, which resulted in approximately 70 percent of Spanish weapon procurement relying on the United States.[115] As the 1953 Defense Agreement was valid for 10 years and the term of validity of the renewed agreements were five years, the two governments needed to negotiate basing rights and the amount of aid every time the expiration date approached.

After 1964 and onwards, the U.S. manpower in Spain was maintained around 9,000. U.S. personnel were stationed mainly in three U.S. Air Force bases and one U.S. Navy base (Figure 3.1). One of the two major U.S. bases in Spain was Torrejón Air Base that accommodated the headquarters of the 16th Air Force, equipped with fighters and tanker aircraft. Morón Air Base and Zaragoza Air Base were staging bases for contingency. The former was used for training of fighters and bombers. The latter was to assist U.S. aircraft training. Rota Naval Station, the other major base in Spain, supported the 6th Fleet operations in the western Mediterranean, intelligence gathering and anti-submarine missions.[116] Located at a geographically advantageous position, the naval base with a major airbase covered from the eastern Atlantic through the Gibraltar Strait to the western Mediterranean by supporting U.S. Navy's airborne anti-submarine warfare and ocean surveillance operations.[117]

U.S. presence in Spain was stable during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. However, after his death in 1978, Spain underwent democratization and began reviewing its security relationship with the United States as well as Spanish defense structure. A centrist party, the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD), took over the reins of government. The UCD government and the Parliament finalized Spanish entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the other hand, the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (*Patido Socialista Obrero Espanõl*, PSOE) claimed that Spain's membership in NATO should be based on political consensus.

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[115] Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 252. He noted that it was difficult to quantify the total amount of Spain's benefits from the 1953 agreements because of inconsistency in data provided by the State Department and additional aid provision through the Export-Import Bank. See Sandars, 249.
[116] Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 266.
[117] Richard F. Grimmett, *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 27, 1977), 16.



Figure 3.1 Map of the Major U.S. Bases in Spain
Source: *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean: Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations*, 95th Cong. (March 27, 1977), 14.

When the PSOE took office in October 1982, the socialist administration sought pragmatic foreign and security policy. Although it decided not to join the NATO integrated command structure, the PSOE had not officially refused NATO or the bilateral relationship with the United States.[118] The PSOE was interested in NATO because it wanted to restore sovereignty lost in the past 150 years of isolation and political crisis. It also expected the security relationship with the United States would retain options for future cooperation as a part of the West.[119] The socialist party recognized the necessity to improve Spanish defense capability and to review its defense structure to contribute to Western security.[120]

However, the PSOE's approach to NATO was criticized by local anti-NATO and anti-U.S. protests. Towards the 1980s, anti-U.S. sentiment was on the rise in Spain. In the local election of 1979, socialist leaders were born in the municipalities that hosted U.S. bases. The leaders of Zaragoza, Rota and Torrejón requested

[118] Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain, NATO and Democracy," in *Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 97–98.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Narcis Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," in *Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean*, ed. Robert O'Neill (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 6.

the planning of U.S. base reduction, collection of car tax, and provision of related subsidies.[121] Furthermore, demonstrations took place in front of the bases. In particular, a protest rally held in March 1984 gathered approximately 100,000 people as well as the local politicians to criticize the PSOE's weak-kneed security policy.[122] The public opinion also indicated that less people considered that joining NATO would serve Spanish national interests.[123]

The PSOE government decided to hold a national referendum on continuous membership in NATO on March 12, 1986. To gain more popular support for pro-NATO campaign, the then Prime Minister of Spain Felipe González attached three significant conditions to the referendum: 1) Spanish membership would remain outside of the NATO military command structure, 2) storing, stationing or introduction of nuclear weapons would be banned from Spain, and 3) "progressive reduction" of the U.S. forces in Spain would be achieved.[124] About 53 percent of voters agreed on Spain remaining in NATO. The result gave a solid foundation for the PSOE administration to challenge U.S. continuous presence. Then Defense Minister of Spain Narcis Serra considered U.S. force reduction supported by the public as an opportunity to prove to the ally that democratized Spain can have an equal and mature relationship.[125]

Prior to the expiration of the five-year base agreement made in 1982, Spain and the United States began the first negotiation in July 1986. From then on, the Spanish administration consistently requested that the renewal of the base agreement should exceed "symbolism" and bring "significant" U.S. force reduction.[126] From the Spanish point of view, the reduction of U.S. presence seemed legitimate because the Spanish proposal of its new commitment to the defense of the West by modernizing its military force would help reduce the burden of U.S. forces stationed in Spain.[127] In the beginning rounds of negotiation, both parties exchanged position papers. According to a Spanish daily newspaper, *El País*, the Spanish position paper examined defense needs of Spain and NATO, and called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the airbases

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[121] John R. Dabrowski, "The United States, NATO and the Spanish Bases, 1949-1989" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1996), 229–230.
[122] Cooley, *Base Politics*, 76.
[123] In the national survey, 75 % thought that joining NATO would serve Spanish national interests in 1975. The support declined to 27 % in 1978, and to 17 % in 1983. Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain, NATO and Democracy," 109–110.
[124] Alan Platt, "NATO's Southern Flank: A Troubled Region," in *Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues*, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 166.
[125] Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 12.
[126] Platt, "NATO's Southern Flank: A Troubled Region," 167.
[127] Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 11–13.

of Zaragoza and Torrejón.[128] However, the negotiation over the airbase was not easy as discussed below. The two parties did not reach a compromise even after the seventh round of negotiations on 5 and 6 November 1987.

3. Role and Function of Torrejón Air Base

The Torrejón base became a point of dispute during the bilateral negotiation for a new contract. At the point of time before the United States and Spain entered into base negotiations, Torrejón airbase was important for the following reasons. First, rotation deployment to Italy and Turkey was for rapid response to contingency in East Europe. Second, it was considered a staging, reinforcement base. Third, it was useful for strategic airlift that enabled U.S. aircraft to travel most efficiently. The latter two points were not only for counterattack to Soviet aggression but also for regional contingencies and conflicts outside of the NATO area.

The airbase had played a strategic role, since the United States began the force deployment in Spain in 1953. The United States 16th Air Force supported the Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations in Morocco and Spain with B-47 medium bombers and tankers.[129] The role of the strategic bombers flying from Torrejón was to implement the NATO strategy of massive retaliation.[130]

The strategic importance of Torrejón changed over time. From 1963 and onwards, Rota Naval Base assumed tasks that had been assigned to SAC, which undermined the value of the air bases of Morón, Zaragoza, and Torrejón for massive retaliation.[131] However, Torrejón was reevaluated when the NATO had adopted the Flexible Response strategy in 1967, which aimed to deter Soviet incursion and war by a triad of forces: conventional forces, short and intermediate range nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces.[132]

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[128] Félix Bayón, "Un Documento 'Congelado' Desde El 27 de Mayo [A document 'frozen' since May 27]," *El País*, July 7, 1986, p. 14; "Negotiations Begin on Troop Reduction," Associated Press, July 10, 1986, Factiva. It was reported that Spain and the United States shared interest in diverting the attention away from Rota. "US Offers to Reduce Troops at Spanish Base," *Guardian*, July 12, 1986, Factiva.

[129] "Sixteenth Air Force (Air Forces Cyber) ACC," Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), accessed May 22, 2022, https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1994990/sixteenth-air-force-air-forces-cyber-acc/. SAC is a U.S. military command that served as the bombardment arm of the U.S. Air Force. It was responsible for U.S. nuclear weapons as well as the bombers and missiles capable of delivering those weapons.

[130] Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 4. As for NATO's strategy of massive retaliation, see "Strategic Concepts: NATO's Strategic Documents since 1949," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated November 29, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm.

[131] Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 4.

[132] *Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense of the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 100th Cong., 5 (August 4, 1987) (statement of

Torrejón received the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) composed of three squadrons under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.[133] The 401st TFW was first equipped with the F-100 which was converted to the F-4E Phantom II by July 1970. In addition, due to the closure of U.S. bases in France in the mid-1960s, Torrejón became the main airlift access point in the Mediterranean region.[134] Torrejón started hosting F-16 aircraft as the replacement of the F-4D in 1983. They represented the primary tactical nuclear delivery systems in Southern Europe.[135] In short, Torrejón contributed to NATO's Flexible Response strategy by accommodating aircraft that could increase both conventional and nuclear capabilities.

A main mission assigned to the 401st TFW was a strike operation that would be launched from Incirlik, Turkey, and Aviano, Italy.[136] The triangular rotation of Torrejón, Incirlik and Aviano "would be crucial to interdiction of a Soviet advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf."[137] The combat radius of F-16 is 500 miles (860 kilometers) and the range is approximately 2,000 miles (3,200 kilometers).[138] Thus F-16s can fly from Torrejón to the front without refueling and fight near the border with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) sphere. Indeed, according to *The Guardian*'s report, American officials argued that F-16s based in Torrejón covered a broad operation area that "stretches as far east as Turkey and also includes part of central Europe" and "would include the Southern Soviet Union in the event of war."[139] Furthermore, because the F-16 can equip nuclear weapons, its dual capability contributed to NATO's combat power on the southern flank.[140] In addition, Torrejón served as a "major staging, reinforcement, and logistic aircraft base and for U.S. forces, as well as a major communications center."[141] It had been involved in missions beyond the NATO area, such as the Middle East and North Africa. For example, the United States had used Torrejón to refuel its planes flying to Israel in the Yom Kippur War.[142]

Norman C. Wood, (Maj. Gen.), Director, Intelligence, U.S. European Command).

133 Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 4–5.

134 AFHRA, "Sixteenth Air Force."

135 Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 266.

136 Grimmett, *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, 18.

137 Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989), 296.

138 "F-16 Fighting Falcon," AFHRA, accessed May 22, 2022, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104505/f-16-fighting-falcon/.

139 Paul Ellman, "Gonzalez Determined on US Cuts," *Guardian*, June 26, 1987, p. 8; Paul Ellman, "End for Planes in Spain?" Guardian, November 5, 1987, p. 23.

140 Eugene D. Price, "The Decision to Provide a Base for US F-16s and Italy's Role in NATO," *Italian Politics* 4 (1990): 197.

141 *Grimmett, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, 18.

142 Rafael Luis Bardaji, "Los desacuerdos del acuerdo [The disagreements of the agreement]," *El País*, December 15, 1986, p. 18; Angel Viñas, "Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements, 1953-1988: A Spanish

4. U.S. Threat Perception

In the basing negotiation period from July 1986 to December 1988, how did the United States assess the strategic environment in Europe, more specifically southern Europe, and how did it affect the importance of the Torrejón airbase? The importance of the Torrejón base was related to the U.S. assessment of the strategic environment of the region for which the combat units in the base were responsible. This section investigates whether the United States recognized threats in the area where the 401st TFW was responsible— over the Mediterranean Sea, to Italy and Turkey, and the United States called the area NATO's Southern Region. During negotiations with Spain, the United States recognized the Soviet threat in the said area and its threat perception of the Soviet remained solid when it accepted the closure of the base.

The overall U.S. threat perception of the Soviet Union was not abated from 1986 to the end of 1988 during the U.S.-Spain basing negotiations. Annual reports of the Secretary of Defense to Congress continuously claimed that Soviet military power remained as the biggest threat to the United States, its interests, allies and friends. The Annual Report Fiscal Year 1988, published in January 1987, asserted, "In every corner of the globe, America's vital interests are threatened by an ever-growing Soviet military threat."[143] The Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 1989, published in February 1988, warned that despite the domestic political and economic reform in the Soviet Union, it still allocated resources to its military and expectedly sought to achieve quick penetrations into the NATO region.[144] Recognizing its own capability to deter the Soviets from starting a war or even challenging a small sector in Europe, the United States was paying close attention to the Soviet that had advantages in most categories of forces, such as conventional ground and air forces, nonstrategic nuclear forces, and chemical capabilities. The United States assumed that the Warsaw Pact would take offensive maneuvers and penetrate deep into the rear of NATO.[145] Therefore, the United States and its allies had to brace the defense line of all flanks.

To narrow the focus to NATO's Southern Region, the area corresponded roughly to what the Soviets called the Southwestern TVD [*Teatr Voennykh Deistvii*, or theaters of military operations] that included Mediterranean littoral countries, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the southwestern Soviet Union. The U.S.

Perspective," *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, 3, no. 7 (September 2003): 23.

[143] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1988, 4.

[144] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1989, 31–32.

[145] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*, 65.

Department of Defense predicted that the Soviets could enter into the region even if the possibility was not as high as the NATO Central Region.[146]

> The Soviets plan operations in the Southwestern TVD to support their advance in the Western Theater and to establish dominance in NATO's Southern Region. In wartime, Soviet plans for offensive operations in the region include an attack through neutral Austria into southern Germany and northern Italy. Soviet plans also include operations to seize the Turkish straits would be accomplished by coordinated ground, airborne, and amphibious operations. Warsaw Pact naval forces in the theater organized into a combined Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would attempt to clear the Black Sea of NATO naval forces and would attempt to prevent Allied forces from using the eastern Mediterranean to reinforce their defenses.[147]

The United States expected that for the Warsaw Pact it was necessary to secure the Black Sea for "the movement of Soviet land forces into Greece and Turkey" and the Pact had higher-quality equipment, such as surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.[148] It meant that there was a possibility for U.S. fighters to have to make a sortie from bases in Turkey and Italy to prevent Soviet invasion.

The United States recognized that the air power was shifting positively to the adversary in terms of quantity. The comparison of NATO-WTO combat aircraft presented in the Soviet Military Power 1988 showed fighter/ interceptor and bomber/ fighter-bomber of the Warsaw Pact outnumbered that of NATO.[149] For Soviet southwestern TVD, 910 tactical fighter aircraft were deployed in 1986, although the number decreased by 50 in the following two years. In contrast, NATO Air Forces maintained 620 fighters and bombers in the Southern Region.[150]

Soviet missiles were another source of threat posed in NATO's Southern Region. The Department of Defense *Annual Report to Congress FY 1988* warned that the Warsaw Pact increased the number of longer-range, dual-capable, surface-to-surface missiles which threatened the survivability of NATO's air forces and air defense systems.[151] In fact, the Soviet Union maintained about 200 tactical SSM missiles in the southwestern TVD throughout the latter half of the 1980s.[152]

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[146] In 1985, the Congressional Research Service provided flank assessment particularly on NATO's southern region. The U.S./Soviet Military Balance Assessments and Statistics 1980-1985 underestimated a possibility for the Soviet military to crack the southern flank due to its limited access to the Mediterranean Sea. John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Assessments and Statistics 1980-1985* (Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 1985).
[147] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1986*, 61.
[148] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change*, 1989, 97.
[149] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 1988, 115.
[150] "NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons: Defense of Southern Region," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed July 15, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_138256.htm.
[151] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1988, 30.
[152] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1986*; *Soviet Military Power, 1987*; *Soviet Military*

Arms reduction initiatives between the two superpowers did not automatically reduce U.S. threat perception of the Soviet. The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. It contributed to ease the U.S.-Soviet tension because it banned the use, possession and test of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles that could travel 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Paradoxically, however, the regulation on their nuclear options meant the increasing importance of conventional forces as a means to deter Soviet aggression. Before the INF Treaty enforcement, the Department of Defense maintained awareness of Soviet military development,[153] and addressed the necessity to continue improving U.S. conventional forces.[154]

Spain, however, did not share the threat perception of the Soviet with the United States. For Spain, the Soviet threat was not so obvious. According to a Spanish journalist, Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, the Spanish socialist administration did not depict the Soviet Union as a military threat to its country or Western Europe.[155] At most, the Spaniards considered Morocco an adversary because of a territorial dispute. Spain had two separate enclaves contested by Morocco in the northern edge of Africa—Ceuta and Melilla.[156]

Another reason for Spain's little attention to external threats was domestic instability. Angel Viñas, the then senior advisor in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, analyzed that "a precondition of meeting external threats is the ability to strengthen internal structures and eliminate domestic vulnerabilities."[157] The PSOE government had to take a wide perspective of external economic and military factors because Spain depended on external raw material, trade with Western Europe, and maritime access, and so on. Internal terrorism was also a concern of the government. PSOE's preference to NATO had no relation to concerns over threats of WTO but rather it was for domestic considerations. The Socialist government sought to utilize NATO membership as a means of modernizing and controlling the Spanish military to avoid coup d'état and attack by anti-government organizations.[158]

Power: An Assessment of the Threat, 1988; *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change*,1989.

153 U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 67.

154 U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1989, 56.

155 Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain, NATO and Democracy," 105.

156 Ibid., 101.

157 Angel Viñas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in *NATO's Southern Allies Internal and External Challenges*, ed. John Chipman (London: Routledge, 1988), 172–173.

158 Douglas T. Stuart, "Continuity and Change in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance," in *NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, & Prospects*, ed. James R Golden (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 91.

5. U.S. Evaluation of the Torrejón Base

This section clarifies a causal link between U.S. threat perception and its evaluation of the contested base. If the hypothesis is correct, the following should be observed: the United States should

- insist on the importance of the contested base
- propose force reduction but does not yield to the return of the base
- reject a proposal from the Soviet Union on a concurrent force reduction, including the closure of the contested base
- claim that there is no other way to counter the threat than maintaining the base
- not publicly mention the possibility to relocate the base
- accept the Spanish demand when it sees a possibility of losing access to the other bases including most significant ones.

5.1. Importance of Torrejón

Based on the threat assessment discussed in the previous section, the United States argued the importance of the Torrejón base domestically and internationally. U.S. military officials first declared that it would be the best to keep the TFW in Spain. For example, Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, testified that "Our first choice would be, because of the importance of that southern flank of NATO, to stay at Torrejón and continue" before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations in April 1987.[159] James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Safety, also testified that, "Certainly we would like to be able to keep the fighter wing that is presently located at Torrejón. We would like to keep them in Spain in the southern flank of NATO."[160]

The United States offered two main reasons why the wing or the Torrejón base was necessary in

[159] *Military Construction Appropriations, FY88: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations*, Senate, 100th Cong., 455 (April 1, 1987) (statement of Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department).
[160] *Military Construction Appropriations for 1988 Part 5: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 100th Cong., 553 (April 2, 1987) (statement of James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Installations, Environment and Safety, Air Force Department).

southern Europe. First, the military balance was in favor of Warsaw. American high-ranking officials were aware of the NATO-WTO power imbalance in this region. For instance, Secretary of State George Shultz argued, "The INF Treaty underscores the importance of conventional military capability in NATO. There are imbalances and they need to be corrected."[161] Assistant Secretary of the Air Force McCoy presented the same assessment that the southern flank of NATO was "already less than satisfactory balanced compared to the adversaries we face."[162] American officials reportedly asserted that on the verge of the arms control agreement "the role of tactical jet fighters like the F-16 become more important to European security and should not be tampered with at this time."[163] As the INF Treaty prohibited ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, the F-16s of the 401st TFW became a vital intermediate-range nuclear delivery system in NATO's Southern Region. In other words, from the standpoint of U.S. officials, the treaty heightened the value of the wing in the region.

Second, related to the first point, the wing was committed to the defense of NATO. As Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, testified on February 9, 1988, "The base in Spain was home to air units that had very clear NATO missions for forward defense through Italy and Turkey."[164] Comptroller Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Helm stated on March 1, 1988, "We would like to keep those F-16's in Europe if possible. They are really key to our NATO defense structure," and asserted "the 401st is vitally important for NATO's deterrent." [165]

The United States offered small concessions during the negotiations with Spain. When the first negotiation round took place in July 1986 and Spain requested the return of the Torrejón base, then U.S. Ambassador to Spain Thomas Enders responded that his country was willing to replace 500 U.S. personnel at the Torrejón base with Spanish civilians.[166] At the end of the year, while Madrid told Washington that the

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[161] *Review of U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,* House, 100th Cong., 62–3 (Feb. 2, 1987) (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary, State Department).
[162] *Military Construction Appropriations, FY88: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 100th Cong., 456 (April 1, 1987) (statement of Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department).
[163] Paul Delaney, "Spain Rejects U.S. Deal on Bases, Foreshadowing the Treaty's End," *New York Times*, November 5, 1987, p. A1.
[164] *Developments in Europe, Feb. 1988: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,* House, 100th Cong., 31 (February 9, 1988) (statement of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, State Department).
[165] *Military Construction Appropriations for 1989: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 100th Cong., 4, 15 (March 1, 1988) (statement of Robert W. Helm, Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, Defense Department).
[166] Platt, "NATO's Southern Flank: A Troubled Region," 167. He states that the preliminary talk was held on

withdrawal of U.S. forces from Torrejón was *sine qua non*, Shultz just agreed to work for force reductions.[167] The United States reportedly suggested to Spain that the fighter jets based in Torrejón would be relocated to another base in the country: Zaragoza, Morón, or Rota, but the host country rejected all.[168] In February 1987, the United States proposed a package deal including that Spain would take responsibility for a branch of the command at Torrejón and Spanish personnel would replace some U.S. positions.[169] In addition to proposing a series of compromises, the United States resorted to the reduction of foreign assistance to Spain by 72 percent.[170] However, the Spanish socialist government did not change its bargaining stance.

Furthermore, the United States refused a Spanish proposal to substitute the reduced U.S. forces by military buildup. The PSOE administration had appealed and carried out Spanish armed force modernization since 1983. The Spanish government prioritized the Air Force modernization, purchasing 72 F/A-18 fighter aircraft for three billion dollars from the United States.[171] Spanish Defense Minister Serra argued that Spanish military modernization in coordination with NATO would contribute to NATO's common security by increasing roles of the Spanish forces in NATO instead of providing military bases for the United States.[172] He also avowed, at the International Institute of Strategic Studies conference in Barcelona in September 1987, that Spain would make substantial contribution to NATO as the United States would bring substantial force reduction in Spain.[173] However, U.S. defense officials did not share the view. For instance, on March 19, 1987, John J. Maresca, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO policy, testified that the United States did not presume that Spain could take the responsibility of the

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July 10, 1986. On the other hand, Morten Heiberg points out that it was June 10, 1986 when the delegations of the two countries met for the first official round of negotiations. In the meeting, it became clear to the Spanish side that "Washington would only agree to a 10 percent cut in the aircraft stationed at Torrejón." Morten Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco, 1975-1989: The Will of the Weak* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2018), 177.

167 Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco*, 180–181.

168 Hella Pick and Paul Ellman, "Spain Issues Bases Ultimatum," *Guardian*, December 12, 1986, Factiva; "Gonzalez sfida gli USA [Gonzalez challenges the United States]," *La Repubblica*, March 17, 1987, https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1987/03/17/gonzalez-sfida-gli-usa.html; Paul Delaney, "U.S. and Spain Still Far Apart in Talks on Bases," *New York Times*, October 4, 1987, p. 14.

169 Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco*, 183.

170 Ibid. The U.S.-Spain base contract had been based upon the trade-off in which the United States provided Spain economic and military assistance in exchange for basing access in Spain.

171 Dabrowski, "The United States, NATO and the Spanish Bases, 1949-1989," 252. For defense policy shift and reforms under the PSOE administration, see Viñas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," 175–186.

172 Serra, "Spain, NATO and Western Security," 13.

173 *Financial Times*, "Negotiations Between Spain and the United States," September 15, 1987, Factiva.

401 TFW because Spanish F-18s would be committed to Spanish national defense.[174] On April 1, 1987, Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, explained that the sophistication of fighter aircraft and the reinforcement by additional numbers were a privilege of U.S. forces that the Spanish armed forces lacked.[175] In short, the United States did not acknowledge that upgrading the Spanish Air Force could make up for reduced security made by the withdrawal of the 401 TFW.

5.2. Bases at Stake

A breakthrough occurred after 16 months of negotiations when Spain notified the United States that it would not renew the existing base agreement on November 10, 1987. Spain did so because both sides could not reach a compromise. At the seventh round on 6 and 7 November, Spain informed the United States beforehand that it would sign a new agreement if 72 F-16s were to be withdrawn.[176] However, a U.S. offer was a withdrawal of one of the three fighter squadrons based in Torrejón.[177] Spain was dissatisfied and criticized the offer for making no difference in usage of Torrejón. A Spanish high official explained to the New York Times that three fighter squadrons deployed in Spain, Italy and Turkey in rotation, and one squadron, or 24 planes, were constantly stationed at Torrejón; thus, U.S. compromise was "something short of that."[178] Spain's notification set a deadline. Unless a new basing agreement is signed by May 1988, U.S. forces would have to leave Spain within a year. In other words, the United States would lose access not only to Torrejón but also to two other airbases, a naval base, and nine minor installations.[179] Moreover, Spain attempted to draw U.S. concession by proposing U.S. conditional usage of Torrejón in crisis situations.[180] A new agreement was necessary for the United States to retain its military access in the country.

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[174] *Military Construction Appropriations for 1988: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations*, House, 100th Cong., 250 (March 19, 1987) (statement of John J. Maresca, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and NATO Policy, Office of Assistant Secretary, International Security Policy, Defense Department).

[175] *Military Construction Appropriations, FY88: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 100th Cong., 456 (April 1, 1987) (statement of Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department).

[176] "Negotiators Fail to Agree Before Nov. 14 Deadline," Associated Press, November 6, 1987, Factiva.

[177] Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco,* 184; Delaney, "Spain Rejects U.S. Deal on Bases, Foreshadowing the Treaty's End."

[178] Delaney, "Spain Rejects U.S. Deal on Bases, Foreshadowing the Treaty's End."

[179] Frances Kerry, "Spain Formally Tells U.S. It Will Not Extend Defence Pact," Reuters, November 10, 1987, Factiva.

[180] "Spain Softens Base Stance, but Says No to U.S. Planes," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, November 20, 1987, p. 2.

Washington seems to have decided to accede to the Spanish demand after the Spanish notification. When Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández-Ordóñez told U.S. Ambassador in Madrid Reginald Bartholomew, in the beginning of December, that the 401st TFW would have to leave within three years, Bartholomew promptly informed Shultz. On 7 January 1988, Bartholomew delivered a message from Washington to Fernández-Ordóñez that "the United States would seek a new location for the TFW, and if unable to do so, it would start dismantling it."[181] The United States and Spain announced a preliminary agreement on January 15 that 72 F-16s based at Torrejón would be removed within three years of the effective date of a new agreement.[182]

6. Required Base Capability and the Alternative

Observing alternative options of Torrejón Air Base, this section articulates requirements for an alternative to the base. I trace how and when the United States obtained guarantee of the alternative. Regarding base capability, the hypothesis predicts that the alternative should 1) be located in the proximity of areas of potential conflicts, 2) maintain the same force strength as Torrejón, and 3) be able to accommodate the necessary facilities to support the relocated units. With regard to the timing of agreement, it is predicted that the United States should be guaranteed the alternative before finalizing the base closure agreement with Spain.

6.1. Searching for an Alternative

Based on the assessment of threats and military balance in southern Europe, the United States considered that it was critical to maintain the 401st TFW in the region. Disbanding or retreating it to the continental United States (CONUS) would have negative consequences in terms of regional security. Strategically, it would mean lessening U.S. commitment to the security of the West and impairing the credibility of NATO. Deterrence might fail to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union and arising from the Middle East and North Africa. It might create a logistical disadvantage as well. Even if the wing were deployed from CONUS

[181] On this diplomatic process, see Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco*, 185. Heiberg conducted thorough research on the U.S.-Spain basing negotiations through Spanish materials and American archival documents currently available.
[182] Jeffrey R. Smith and David B. Ottaway, "U.S. to Pull Fighter Jets from Spain," *Washington Post*, January 15, 1988, p. A1.

to troubled areas in Europe, the Middle East, and so on, it would take much longer and more resources.[183]

In order to meet the Spanish demand and, at the same time, maintain the combat capability of the wing in the region, the hypothesis predicts that the United States should secure a replica of the Torrejón base. There were a couple of requirements. First, the replica should be located somewhere in NATO's Southern Region— namely, Portugal, Italy, Greece or Turkey. Second, in terms of capacity, it should have facilities where F-16s could operate— including a runway, control and communication facilities, hanger, and barracks and so on— or area to be able to accommodate such equipment. Third, there should be a political situation that can accept the replica.

Italy cleared all the criteria. On February 23, 1988, the United States and Italy reached preliminary agreement on rebasing the 72 F-16s from Spain to Italy. Italy examined options and decided on Crotone in southern Italy as a new home of the fighters in June 1988. Italy, located in southern Europe, was satisfactory in terms of proximity to the threats from the Soviet Union and out-of-NATO areas.

Following discussion is how a replacement location for Torrejón was sought out. A wide range of options from Mediterranean littoral countries to Great Britain appeared in newspaper reports. Since there seem no declassified official documents that would reveal U.S. selection and negotiation processes with parties concerned, exploring secondary sources helps unfold which alternative locations were possibly examined, for what reasons some of them were judged as inappropriate, and how the United States secured an alternative to Torrejón.

As for the timing of such exploration, there seems little evidence open to the public that the United States began seeking alternatives for Torrejón before it accepted the Spanish demand in January 1988. George Bader, Principal Director for European and NATO Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), testified that the United States had not asked Italy or Turkey if they were willing to accept the wing as a permanent basis in February 1987.[184] Similarly, Defense Secretary

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[183] Grimmett refers to an estimate that it would take eight to ten days for the 401st to redeploy from CONUS to Europe. Richard F. Grimmett, *Military Bases in Europe: The Crotone Issue* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 6, 1990), 5. Another source demonstrates calculation that a wing of three squadrons flying from CONUS to the Middle East would require approximately 90 refueling sorties and 40 transport sorties. Ralph E. Jackson, "Relocating The 401st Tactical Fighter Wing" (Master thesis, University of Maryland at College Park, 1991), 30–31, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a281968.pdf.

[184] *Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY88-FY89: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs,* House, 100th Cong., 25 (Feb. 3, 1987) (statement of George Bader, Principal Director for European and NATO Policy, Office of the Assist Sec for Intl Security Policy, Defense Department).

Weinberger revealed that the United States was not under negotiations with either Morocco, Portugal or Turkey by March 1987.[185] However, the U.S. edition *Newsweek* unveiled in November 1987—soon after the Spanish government announced no renewal of the basing contract—that Washington secretly sought for rebasing the Torrejón-based wing in Sicily, Italy.[186] At the same time, senior officers at the Torrejón base confirmed that the United States was actively looking for alternative sites, according to an American magazine, *U.S. News & World Report*.[187]

In newspaper reports, following countries were mentioned as relocation candidates: Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Morocco, Belgium and the United Kingdom. In February 1987, after six months had passed since the United States and Spain began negotiations, the Italian defense minister mentioned that the F-16s in Torrejón would move to Portugal, not Italy.[188] In November 1987, Portugal seemed flexible to accept the fighter units. For example, Portuguese top leaders implied that the government was open to consider the redeployment issue if the United States raised it to the discussion table.[189] Portugal had no U.S. bases on its mainland but one U.S. Air Force base in the Azores, its remote island territory in the Atlantic. Morocco, Turkey, Belgium and the United Kingdom also appeared in the press as a possible new home of the wing.[190]

There were logistical and political reasons why all these countries were dismissed from a candidate list. A newspaper article reported that the options of Britain and Belgium seemed to be rejected because they were considered too far, albeit without clarifying a source.[191] Assuming the 401 TFW was deployed to Aviano and Incirlik, airbases in Britain and Belgium were actually closer to the forward bases

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[185] Edward Schumacher, "Weinberger, in Spain, Backs U.S. Bases' Presence," *New York Times*, March 18, 1987, p. A12.
[186] Harry Anderson, Tom Burns, and Theodore Stanger, "The Message from Madrid," *Newsweek*, November 16, 1987, p. 83.
[187] James Wallace, Richard Z. Chesnoff, and Robert Kaylor, "When the Stepping Stones of World Power Are Rocky Bases," *U.S. News & World Report*, November 23, 1987.
[188] Carlos Elordi, "Le Basi USA in Spagna Si Tingono Di Giallo [US Bases in Spain Dye Yellow]," *La Repubblica*, February 28, 1987, https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1987/02/28/le-basi-usa-in-spagna-si-tingono.html?ref=search.
[189] Anderson, Burns, and Stanger, "The Message from Madrid"; Wallace, Chesnoff, and Kaylor, "When the Stepping Stones of World Power Are Rocky Bases."
[190] Tom Burns and Francis Ghiles, "Madrid Says US F-16s Must Go," *Financial Times*, March 17, 1987, p. 48; Jim Hoagland, "Spain Tells U.S. to Remove F16s," *Washington Post*, December 24, 1987, p. A1; Wallace, Chesnoff, and Kaylor, "When the Stepping Stones of World Power Are Rocky Bases"; "They Can Do without Torrejon," *Economist*, November 14, 1987, p. 19.
[191] Stephen Milligan and John Witherow, "Sicily Site for Evicted US Fighter Jets," *Sunday Times*, January 17, 1988, Factiva. A ground-launched cruise missile unit was stationed at Florennes Air Base in Belgium. The base was to be closed to comply with the INF Treaty. Soon after the treaty was signed, Belgian Defense Minister suggested the F-16s be redeployed to Florennes. Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 20.

than Torrejón was (Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1). For out-of-area missions, too, these options would serve well. In other words, they were in such close proximity that they could reinforce the defense in the Southern Region and also engage in operations beyond the Mediterranean area. Although there seems no concrete evidence that the United States examined and rejected the two options, they were possibly considered as a weak candidate because of the geographical responsibility. As previously discussed, the United States was insisting that the 401 TFW was an important element in the Southern Region. If the wing's home base was moved to either Britain or Belgium in NATO's Central Region, it might have given a sense of weakening the defense in the southern flank.

Figure 3.2 Map of the Torrejón Alternatives
Source: Made by author using Google Map.
Note: Signs on the map are rough location. Torrejón, Aviano and Incirlik plotted with circles are the operation bases of 401TFW. Five square signs on the map indicate the possible alternatives to the Torrejón base: Lajes in Azores, Portugal, Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, Florennes in Belgium, Comiso and Crotone in southern Italy. There were several U.K. airbases used by the United States and no news report mentioned any specific name as a Torrejón alternative. Lakenheath is chosen for reference.

Table 3.1 Distance between the Forward Bases and Respective Alternatives

(nautical miles)

	Torrejón (Spain)	Florennes (Belgium)	Lakenheath (UK)	Langley (US)
Aviano (Italy)	776	407	608	3,830
Incirlik (Turkey)	1,822	1,543	1,730	4,979
Israel	1,912	1,733	1,929	4,148

Source: Made by author.

Note: Distance calculated by Great Circle Mapper, http://www.gcmap.com/
Langley Air Force Base in Virginia is chosen here for reference. Located in the east coast of CONUS, the Air Force base can support operations of F-16s. Israel on the left column represents one of the destination samples in the Middle East for reference.

In the case of Portugal and Turkey, political acceptance was missing. Portugal was a U.S. base host sustained by a quid pro quo. The United States provided Portugal with economic and military assistance in return for basing access. Portugal had been considered as a potential fallback base for the 401st TFW. However, the situation changed when Lisbon protested that the possible reduction of U.S. aid would not be sufficient to maintain its military footprint in the host country.[192] At that time, the U.S. government was suffering Congress' prohibition of funding for the Torrejón relocation. It was unlikely that the Department of Defense could convince the legislative branch to provide Portugal with additional amount of foreign assistance. The situation was similar in the case of Turkey. Turkey also showed its dissatisfaction with the level of U.S. security assistance.[193] For Portugal and Turkey, it was more about how much financial aid the United States could offer for rebasing the fighter units to these host countries.

On the other hand, Italy seemed an accommodating and suitable home for the wing. Italy expressed concerns about regional security. After the U.S.-Spain Joint Statement on January 15, 1988, Italy showed concerns about U.S. presence in southern Europe. For example, Italian Defense Minister Valerio

[192] Karen DeYoung, "Spain, U.S. Remain Stalled on Bases Pact as Deadline Nears," *Washington Post*, September 17, 1987, p. A41.
[193] Richard F. Grimmett, "U.S. Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region" (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 7, 1986), 53; Henry Gottlieb, "US Bases," Associated Press, November 29, 1987, Factiva.

Zanone emphasized that his country would not allow the U.S. F-16s of the wing to return to the United States.[194] He repeated later that relocating the wing to Italy was "only suitable solution" to keep the important fighters in Europe for the defense of NATO's southern flank.[195] Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita said that Italy's acceptance of the 401 TFW would contribute to continued "military equilibrium" between NATO and WTO at the interview with the *Washington Post*.[196]

6.2. Securing an Alternative

Location for the base replacement was debated in the United States and Italy respectively. They also had bilateral consultation, such as a meeting of Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and Italian officials in Rome on February 4, 1988.[197] Mostly three locations were mentioned— Comiso in Sicily, Aviano in northern Italy and Crotone on the southern edge of the Italian Peninsula. The first two were facilities used by the U.S. military and the other was a small civilian airport. In Comiso Air Base, the United States had deployed 4,300 personnel and 112 cruise missiles that were subject to withdrawal due to the INF Treaty.[198] Aviano Air Base accommodated rotational deployment and exercises through the 1970s and 80s, and remained stand-by status with no unit permanently stationed.[199] The Sant'Anna airport near Crotone had a military radar facility in operation.[200]

Comiso and Aviano often appeared in media reports related to the Torrejón issue. As early as November 1987, it was reported that Washington had quietly explored the possibility of Comiso.[201] The two

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[194] Italian Defense Committee of the House of Representatives. *X Legislatura – IV Commissione Permanente (Difesa)* [10th Legislature 4th Permanent Commission (Defense)] (February 2, 1988), accessed 18 February 2020, www.camera.it/ dati/ leg10/ lavori/ Bollet/ 19880202_ 00_ 02.pdf.
[195] Roberto Suro, "Italian Cabinet Accepts NATO F-16's," *New York Times*, June 5, 1988, p. 3.
[196] David B. Ottaway, "Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1988, p. A28.
[197] Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Asks Italy to Take F-16 Jets That Spain Has Ordered Removed," *New York Times*, February 4, 1988, p. A6.
[198] Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 201, quoting *International Herald Tribune* 14–15 May, 1983.
[199] William M. Butler, *Fifty Years on NATO's Southern Flank: A History of Sixteenth Air Force 1954–2004* (Office of History, Headquarters, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe, Aviano Air Base, Italy, 2004), accessed December 8, 2018, https://hoseyfiles.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/20040501-16af-heritagepam.pdf; Niklaas A. Waller, *Fifty Years of Friendship and Cooperation: A History of Aviano Air Base 1995-2005* (Aviano Air Base: Italy: Office of History, Headquarters, 31st Fighter Wing, United States Air Force in Europe, 2005), 6, accessed December 8, 2018, https://www.aviano.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/Aviano%20History%2050th%20Anniversary-English.pdf?ver=2016-09-23-052357-290.
[200] Ottaway, "Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria.".
[201] Anderson, Burns, and Stanger, "The Message from Madrid."

sites were considered as strong candidates, as Department of Defense officials debated in January 1988.[202] However, similar to other candidate host countries, political and technical factors affected the selection in Italy. The city of Comiso opposed hosting the fighter jets from Spain. Comiso citizens had protested against nuclear missiles deployed at the base. They would be unlikely to welcome dual-capable F-16s.[203] Facing the communist mayor's negative attitude, the Italian administration seemed to have little hope for the option by February 3, 1988.[204] As for Aviano, the location seemed troublesome because northeastern Italy had high population density, and busy air traffic.[205] These conditions would make it hard to expand the runway for fighter planes and to conduct sufficient practice and operation. Another reason for Aviano to be rejected seemed to be its function. *Jane's Defense Weekly* on June 11, 1988 quoted Defense Minister Zanone's comment that a substitute of Torrejón should be located at a "nuclear-safe" base.[206] Aviano had nuclear warheads storage. His comment implied that the fighters would fly from a rear base to Aviano, load nuclear weapons, and advance toward the frontline in Turkey or Greece.[207]

Crotone was a final possible candidate because of logistical advantages in hosting the wing. The Italian Ministry of Defense compiled the examination results of possible options, and submitted the report to Defense Minister Zanone on June 14, 1988.[208] On the same day he revealed his decision of accepting the Torrejón relocation to Crotone.[209] The site was selected because it had aeronautical radar facilities available, training area nearby, and no impact of civil air traffic.[210] The choice was not so controversial, as the majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Italian lower house) voted for supporting the cabinet decision on June 30.[211] Soon after Defense Minister Zanone pronounced his decision, the U.S. President Ronald Reagan appreciated Italy's acceptance of 72 F-16s.[212] On August 4, 1988, the Department of State explained to the House

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[202] Elaine Sciolino, "The Sun May Set on More and More U.S. Bases Abroad," *New York Times*, January 24, 1988, p. A2; Sciolino, "U.S. Asks Italy to Take F-16 Jets That Spain Has Ordered Removed."
[203] Loren Jenkins, "Italy Considers Accepting U.S. F16s from Spain," *Washington Post*, February 2, 1988, p. A10.
[204] Price, "The Decision to Provide a Base for US F-16s and Italy's Role in NATO," 205.
[205] Ibid.
[206] "Italy Approves US Plans for F-16s," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, June 11, 1988.
[207] Ibid.
[208] Vincenzo Nigro, "Per gli F-16 la base sara' Crotone [For the F-16 the base will be Crotone]," *La Repubblica*, June 15, 1988, https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1988/06/15/per-gli-16-la-base-sara-crotone.html.
[209] Ibid.; Ottaway, "Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria."
[210] Ottaway, "Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria"; "Italian Site Confirmed as New USAF Fighter Wing Base," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, June 25, 1988.
[211] Price, "The Decision to Provide a Base for US F-16s and Italy's Role in NATO," 206.
[212] "Reagan Praises Italy's Willingness to Consider Taking F-16s from Spain," *European Stars and Stripes,*

Committee on Foreign Affairs that Crotone was selected to be the new home of the fighters, and the United States, Italy and NATO were under discussion regarding a construction program.[213]

While searching for alternatives to the Torrejón base, the United States sought to divide costs pertaining to the base relocation among NATO member countries. It was because the U.S. Congress prohibited appropriating military construction funds in connection with relocation of the 401st TFW to another country.[214] In fact, legislators had appealed that any construction costs associated with the move should be the responsibility of NATO from 1987.[215] Then U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alton G. Keel sent a letter to then NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in February 1988, noting that the relocation of the fighter wing based at Torrejón was an issue of NATO, and requesting funding for it.[216] Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft IV visited Europe and urged the allied governments to make greater contributions to the multilateral alliance.[217] Eventually, defense ministers of the NATO members agreed on financing all the required costs of the wing relocation through the Infrastructure Fund at the Defense Planning Committee on May 26.[218] The U.S. government clarified later that it would contribute 27.82 % of the Infrastructure Fund.[219]

After reaching an agreement on withdrawing from the Torrejón base in January 1988, it took another 11 months for the United States and Spain to reach a final conclusion. The two countries confronted each other on a remaining critical issue of nuclear weapons. While Spain was opposed to the United States

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June 15, 1988 p. 4; Ottaway, "Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria."

213 *Developments in Europe, August 1988: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,* House. 100th Cong., 53 (August 4, 1988) (Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the State Department and responses thereto).

214 "Funds for Relocating Spanish-Based Jets Barred Under Spending Bill," Associated Press, December 31, 1987, Factiva; Grimmett, "Current Issues with the 'Base-Rights' Countries and Their Implications," 18.

215 *Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1987*, Pub. L. No. 100-71 (July 11, 1987) https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/1827?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22torrejon%22%5D%7D&s=6&r=1; *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991*, Pub. L. No. 101-189 (Nov. 29, 1989) https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/2461?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22torrejon%22%5D%7D&s=6&r=2.

216 Sciolino, "U.S. Asks Italy to Take F-16 Jets That Spain Has Ordered Removed."

217 John J. Fialka, "NATO Defense-Cost Debate Intensifies: Allies Disagree on How to Pay for Transfer of Jets," *Wall Street Journal*, May 25, 1988, p. 20.

218 Edward Cody, "Allies Formally Ask Italy to Provide Base for F16s," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1988, p. A21.

219 *Developments in Europe, August 1988: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 100th Cong., 54 (August 4, 1988) (answers to the House Foreign Affairs Committee's follow-up questions to Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, State Department).

deploying nuclear weapons in Spanish territory, the United States wanted to apply to Spain its worldwide policy of neither confirming nor denying nuclear weapons. The both sides reached an agreement that consensus of the Spanish government would be required for installing, storing and introducing nuclear and non-conventional weapons.[220] Ultimately, the agreement upheld U.S. access to the remaining three bases and its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Ambassador to Spain Bartholomew and Spanish chief negotiator Máximo Cajal signed the Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation on December 1, 1988. The new agreement included that the United States would return the Torrejón base by 1992; provide no aid for Spain; be allowed to use the remaining three bases― Rota, Zaragoza and Morón—as well as nine communication posts; and Spain would not inspect U.S. navy ships calling at Spanish ports.[221]

7. Summary

On the whole, the hypothesis explains the case of Spain by showing the linkage between U.S. threat perception and the condition of the base closure agreement. With regard to U.S. attempts to maintain the contested base, there is congruence between the observation of the case and the predictions drawn from the hypothesis. Firstly, the United States consistently asserted that the 401st TFW based in the Torrejón base was important for defense of NATO's southern flank during the negotiation with Spain. U.S. defense and state secretaries and defense high officials made such statements to Spanish negotiators, to the press, and before Congress until the finalization of the new U.S.-Spanish agreement in December 1988. Secondly, proposing minor force cuts to Spain in the negotiations, the United States did not accept the Spanish demand to return the base. Thirdly, it was also congruent that the United States changed its attitude when it faced a possibility that the basing access to other bases would evaporate. After Spain notified the United States of its intention not to renew the basing agreement in November 1987, the basing country yielded to the Spanish demand. It was because the absence of a new contract would mean no access not only to Torrejón but also to other three major bases in the host country.

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[220] Heiberg, *US-Spanish Relations after Franco*, 187.

[221] *Agreement of Defense Cooperation between the U.S.A. and the Kingdom of Spain with Annexes and Notes* signed on December 1, 1988, accessed July 30, 2018, https://es.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/madrid/sections-offices/office-defense-cooperation/agreement-defense-cooperation/.

The hypothesis would enhance its explanatory power if there were clear evidence that the United States was examining alternative sites and negotiating with the future host country, Italy in this case, before it accepted the Spanish demand in January 1988.

Nonetheless, the hypothesis could not predict how the United States chose an optimal alternative out of multiple options. In terms of conditions of an alternative, as it was predicted, the United States secured an alternative that could retain the military capability in southern Europe, and then officially agreed with Spain to return the contested base. The United States obtained Italy's acceptance to host the 401st TFW in the country in June 1988. At the end of the year, a new U.S.-Spanish agreement was signed. Significantly, however, the observation indicated that it was more important for an alternative to be located in the same area of responsibility than to be located in the same proximity to an assumed area of operation. The United States insisted that it was necessary for the TFW to be deployed in southern Europe because its major mission was to defend NATO's southern flank. Relocation candidates such as Britain and Belgium, albeit reportedly, were actually closer to the possible area of operation, i.e. the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. However, no U.S. officials mentioned in public that they studied these options. To clarify why proximity was less significant as a requirement for an alternative, more focused observation is necessary.

Although this hypothesis did not aim to explain U.S. decision-making, this case study provided a task to be solved. That is, the case study did not show how much risk the United States had faced before its decision on accepting Spain's demand. By the time Spain notified the United States of not renewing the basing contract, how much had the United been worried about the possibility of worsening the bilateral alliance? Had the United States considered Rota Naval Base as a more important strategic base and been willing to keep the base unaffected? These questions may lead to a greater understanding of the U.S. evaluation of the contested base.

Chapter 4. The Philippines

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the case of the Philippines by using the hypothesis. If the United States perceives that the major threat is abating, the hypothesis suggests that the closure of a contested base is agreed on when the United States secures an alternative that can sustain the necessary military capability despite reduced efficiency. If the hypothesis is valid, it should be observed in the Philippine case that the United States 1) perceives the Soviet threat abating and evaluate the contested bases as replaceable, 2) seeks to sustain minimum required base capability, 3) seeks to disperse the capability from the contested bases to several bases in Asia-Pacific, and 4) agrees on closing the contested bases after securing the alternative bases.

In this case, the United States agreed to close the two extensive bases in the Philippines, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, after arranging the dispersion of them to other existing bases in Asia-Pacific. In September 1990, the United States and the Philippines began negotiations for a new basing contract before the expiration of the current agreement. During the negotiations over a year, the United States emphasized the importance of the two bases. It insisted on gradual force reduction, while the Philippines demanded force withdrawal in a shorter period. Meanwhile, the United States had studied possible alternatives of the Philippine bases. As for the Clark air base, the United States had been arranging the dispersion of the units before the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo damaged the base. As the estimated recovery cost was unaffordable, the United States decided to give it up in July 1991. In terms of Subic Bay, the two parties agreed in August 1991 to extend the lease for another 10 years, but the agreement did not come into effect due to the disapproval of the Philippine Senate. Since the two governments were unable to reach a mutually acceptable compromise on the phase-out period, the United States accepted the closure of the naval base in December 1991.

This chapter argues that the respective decisions on closing the Clark base and the Subic Bay base were followed by the United States' examination of base relocation options and redeployment of critical elements of the bases. The alternative options and U.S. choice of base dispersion were coherent with U.S. threat perception. The United States perceived a weakening Soviet military power in Southeast Asia towards the end of 1980s. From Clark, fighter units, which were the major component of the base, were pulled back

to Alaska, and other functions, such as airlift, special operations and training, were moved to Japan and Singapore. From Subic Bay, known as a logistical hub for U.S. naval activities, various functions including ship repair, maintenance, storage, logistics command, and naval aviation training, were dispersed to Guam, Japan, and Singapore. Most of the relocation examination and arrangement were done before U.S. decisions on the closure of each base. The United States accepted the Philippine demand to relinquish the large bases held for over 90 years because dispersion would enable it to maintain required military operations and continue to show its presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is an accumulation of research on U.S.-Philippine security relations and, among them, related existing literature explain this Philippine case by shedding light on the impact of the Philippines' democratization on the continuation of U.S. bases. Same as the Spanish case, the Philippines under democratic transition is likely to contest U.S. military presence in the country for reversion of territorial integrity, restoration of national sovereignty, and denial of the previous dictatorship and its legacy.[222] In addition, some other research scrutinizes "people's power" movement and explains domestic mechanisms that result in Philippine decision-makers' firm stance against the basing state.[223] The Philippine case is well explained by existing literature, particularly from the perspective of the host country. However, a puzzle is the U.S. attitude towards the contested bases and the host country's demand. If it were assumed that the United States wanted to retain the bases by all means, it could have accepted the Philippines' offer so that the host country would permit U.S. continuous basing. It is possible to think that the United States was in a situation where it could accept the host's demand at that time.

This chapter first reviews the background of the base contestation, tracing the past U.S.-Philippine basing agreements. The background is followed by a brief introduction of the bases in question. Next, I examine whether observation of the Philippine case is congruent with the predictions drawn from the hypothesis. Section 4 to 6 focus on U.S. threat perception, evaluation on the contested bases, and arrangement

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[222] Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008); Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Alan J. Vick, *The Posture Triangle: A New Framework for U.S. Air Force Global Presence* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2013), 106.

[223] Roland G. Simbulan, "Behind and Beyond the Bases Negotiations," *Public Policy Journal* 2, no. 2 (March 1998): 165–167; Roland G. Simbulan, "People's Movement Responses to Evolving U.S. Military Activities in the Philippines," in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, ed. Catherine Lutz (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 145–180.

for alternatives. U.S. public reports and statements made by high officials show how the United States evaluated the Clark base and the Subic Bay base. I collect congressional testimonies of the American senior officials of the government and the military as well as their comments reported by newspapers. To find the process of the United States securing alternatives for the two bases, secondary sources are of great help due to limited access to diplomatic and congressional documents. Data from the secondary materials still tell us what elements constituted the alternatives and how the United States sought to acquire them.

2. From Base Establishment to Contestation

The background of U.S. military presence in the Philippines dates back to the 19th century. Winning the U.S.-Spanish War in 1898, the United States obtained the Philippine islands. Military bases, such as Clark and Subic Bay, were constructed by 1901. After the Pacific War, the Philippines became independent in 1946, though U.S. military bases remained. In 1947 the United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) regarding the bases in the Philippines. This allowed the basing state to use 23 military facilities of about 2,500 square kilometers for 99 years with no fee. The basing contract was followed by the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951. Article IV of the treaty underlined the responsibility for both parties to respond in case of an armed attack on either of them in the Pacific area.[224]

[224] "Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, signed at Washington on August 30, 1951," Republic of the Philippines, accessed May 31, 2022, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1951/08/30/mutual-defense-treaty-between-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-united-states-of-america-august-30-1951/.



Figure 4.1 Map of the major U.S. Bases in the Philippines
Source: Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 65.

However, shortly after the MBA was concluded, there were crimes and accidents related to the U.S. military and the inequality of the MBA became a big issue domestically.[225] The two governments plunged into the revision of the MBA. The MBA was revised for the first time in 1959, which improved conditions for the Philippines. The United States and the Philippines agreed on, for instance, holding prior consultation on the usage of the bases, and shortening the duration of the basing agreement from 99 to 25 years.[226]

[225] Satoshi Nakano, "Firipin no beigun kichi mondai: shokuminchi jidai kara 1992 nen made [U.S. Bases Issues in the Philippines: From the colonial era to 1992]," in *Amerika no sensō to zainichi beigun* [American wars and U.S. forces in Japan], ed. Hiroshi Fujimoto and Masashi Shimakawa (Tokyo: Shakaihyōronsha, 2003), 180.
[226] Ibid., 182; Christopher Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford, New

However, the 25-year duration was not enforced until the two parties signed a separate agreement in 1966. Consequently, the 1947 MBA was set to expire in 1991.

After Ferdinand Marcos assumed the presidency in 1965, the two countries held basing revision negotiations twice. As the United States was able to retain the bases in the Philippines, the United States pledged to provide the host country compensation, or rent in the name of aid.[227] The 1979 agreement also required renegotiating the leasing period every five years until the 1991 expiration date. In the following review of 1983, the amount of the compensation increased up to 900 million dollars for the next five years.[228] During Marcos' era, the U.S. bases were maintained stably, but his dictatorship and worsening social conditions accumulated discontent among the people.[229]

In 1986, Marcos' authoritarian regime was replaced through democratic processes and Corazon Aquino led the new administration. The democratizing regime imposed difficult conditions for U.S. forces to continue its presence in the country. Firstly, a new Philippine constitution was established with a majority vote at the national referendum in February 1987.[230] Article 18, Section 25 of the new constitution banned foreign military bases, facilities, and troops in the country after the expiry of the current MBA in 1991, and would permit foreign military presence only with the approval of the Senate, and if required, majority vote of a national referendum.[231] In addition, Article 2, Section 8 determined to pursue a nuclear free policy. The new constitution establishment cast a shadow over U.S. presence in the Philippines after 1991.

Secondly, the first basing negotiations under the Aquino administration were held in 1988 to review the MBA. The Philippines heightened the compensation request, believing that the U.S. military bases in the

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York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112.

227 Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 114; James A. Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 120; Nakano, "Firipin no beigun kichi mondai," 194; Patricia Ann V. Paez, *The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of RP-US Relations* (Manila: Center for Strategic and International Studies of the Philippines, 1985), 93–94. As for Marcos' motivation for requesting "rent," see Paez, 37.

228 William E. Berry, Jr., *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of the Special Relationship* (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 282; Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 115.

229 Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 118–121. Regarding Filipino politicians and intellectuals' antagonistic attitude towards Marcos, see Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants*, 129–131.

230 June Kronholz, "Overwhelming Approval of Constitution Strengthens Aquino's Moderate Stance," *Wall Street Journal*, February 4, 1987, p. 35.

231 William E. Berry, Jr., *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of the Special Relationship*, 286–287.; "The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines," Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed August 5, 2019, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/.

Philippines only served for U.S. global and regional interests.[232] It demanded that the United States should pay 1.2 billion dollars annually for the coming two years, although the current payment was 180 million dollars a year.[233] The U.S. agreed on providing the host 962 million dollars of aid support for 1990 and 1991 in exchange for continued use of the bases.[234]

Thirdly, when the constitutional time limit was approaching, the United States and the Philippines agreed to negotiate for a new basing contract in May 1990. It was more significant than the 1988 negotiation because it was not for revising the MBA but for replacing it. Facing the expiration of the MBA, Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus and U.S. special negotiator Richard Armitage organized a panel, known as the Philippine-American Cooperation Talks (PACT). Both sides of the panel were close to respective top leaders: the U.S. panel was integrated in the National Security Council, and the Philippine panel was placed under the Office of the President.[235] Supported by nationalistic public opinion, the Philippine panel demanded the United States comply with the termination of the 1947 MBA, which was in force until 1991.[236] The PACT took place seven times, nearly once a month, and ended in July 1991. Notably, PACT did not address the Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951, as American officials insisted on no discussion of the treaty "until after the base negotiations were concluded."[237]

3. Role and Function of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base

The U.S. bases in the Philippines sit at the junction between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The location allowed the U.S. military forces to rapidly conduct intervention and combat operations in Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and as far as the Persian Gulf.[238] Covering these vast areas, the Philippine

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[232] Berry, *U.S. Bases in the Philippines*, 294

[233] Mary Williams Walsh, "U.S., Philippines Locked in Bases Talks; Ultimate Fear Is Manila Will Oust Them," *Wall Street Journal*, August 4, 1988, p. 17.

[234] Jonathan Stromseth, "Unequal Allies: Negotiations over U.S. Bases in the Philippines," *Journal of International Affairs* 43, no. 1 (1989): 196.

[235] Josie H. De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation and Decision Making" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Queen's University, 1996), 163; Marita Castro-Guevara, *The Bases Talks Reader: Key Documents of the 1990-91 Philippine-American Cooperation Talks* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1997), 20–21.

[236] Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 35–62; Marita Castro-Guevara, *The Bases Talks Reader*, 41–68.

[237] George McT. Kahin, "The U.S. Philippine Security Relationship: Dependent on the Bases?" *South East Asia Research* 1, no. 2 (September 1993): 138.

[238] Christine Wing, "The United States in the Pacific," in *The Sun Never Sets...*, eds. Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1991), 132.

bases enabled the United States to defend the sea and air routes, support ground warfare in defense of U.S. friends and allies, and deter Soviet interference.[239]

3.1. Clark Air Force Base

Clark Air Force Base accommodated 48 F-4s serving for the 3rd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) and the 90th TFS under the 13th Air Force. The chief mission of the 13th Air Force was to provide a tactical air arm in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and to conduct air defense activities in the Western Pacific Air Defense Region, including the Philippines, Taiwan, the rest of Southeast Asia, and a part of the Indian Ocean. The two squadrons served for air defense of the Philippines.[240] Clark also accommodated a small number of MC-130 and MH-53 which belonged to two squadrons under the 353th Special Operations Wing. The wing was activated in April 1989 "to train for unconventional warfare and special operations activities in the Pacific area of operation," including helicopter air refueling, humanitarian and disaster relief, search and rescue, and aero medical evacuation.[241] In addition, the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing with C-130 transport aircraft, which engaged in various missions in Southeast and Northeast Asia, was based in Clark until October 1989 and moved to Yokota, Tokyo.[242]

Covering approximately 53,000 hectares (530 square kilometers) of land,[243] Clark was the most capable logistic point in the West Pacific. The airbase with an all-weather runway could handle approximately 2,900 tons of cargo and 3,500 passengers a day and 1,200 transit aircraft per month.[244] It also had extensive storage capacity for ammunition, fuel and war readiness materials.[245]

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[239] Alva M. Bowen, Jr., "The Philippine-American Defense Partnership," in *Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy*, ed. Carl H Landé (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1987), 462.
[240] *Background on the Bases: American Military Facilities in the Philippines* (Manila: U.S. Information Service, 1986), 14. Each of the squadrons based at Clark consisted of 24 fighter jets.
[241] "353th Special Operations Group (AFSOC)," AFHRA, accessed August 11, 2019, https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432584/353-special-operations-group-afsoc/.
[242] "374 Airlift Wing (PACAF)," AFHRA, accessed August 11, 2019, https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432715/374-airlift-wing-pacaf/.
[243] *Background on the Bases: American Military Facilities in the Philippines (Second Edition)* (Manila: U.S. Information Service, 1987), 14.
[244] De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation and Decision Making," 176., citing Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden F Bello, *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (Australia: Penguin Books, 1986), 103.
[245] Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*, 116–17.

In addition, what made Clark valuable was an adjunct air training range, called Crow Valley. The Crow Valley range was equipped with electronic simulators and had air-combat trainees build up their skills in a wide range of realistic settings.[246] Not only the U.S. and the Philippine forces but also other U.S. allies and partners, such as Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia, used Crow Valley for multilateral training exercises.[247]

3.2. Subic Bay Naval Base

Subic Bay Naval Base, serving as a service and support center for the 7th Fleet was established in a naturally protected deep-water harbor and had berthing space that could accommodate aircraft carriers.[248] It was also equipped with three floating dry docks to accomplish almost all tasks that were operated at dockyards in the United States, such as major ship repairs and reexamination of ship's engine.[249] The Subic Bay base was the largest overseas naval facility in the world because of the fact that 10 to 15 ships could be moored per day on average.[250]

Cubi Point Naval Air Station beside Subic Bay had a 2,400-meter runway. As the primary land base for 7th Fleet carrier striking force, Task Force 77, Cubi Point could accommodate approximately 200 aircraft at a time.[251] It was also useful for landing practice for naval aviation. The air station also served for P-3 antisubmarine warfare aircraft engaged in surveillance operation in the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean.[252]

The Subic Bay base was a large-scale military complex with storage facilities. The naval supply depot had storage capacity of over 110 million gallons of petroleum, oil and lubricants, and dealt with more than four million barrels of fuel a month. The naval magazine storage handled about 25,000 tons of ammunition a month and stockpiled ammunition worth about 300 million dollars.[253] The Subic Bay/ Cubi Point complex

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[246] Dave Griffiths, "Thunder at Crow Valley," *Air Force Magazine*, August 1987., pp. 52-56.
[247] Ibid., 56; De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation and Decision Making," 168.
[248] A. James Gregor and Virgilio Aganon, *The Philippine Bases: U.S. Security at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987), 34.
[249] *Background on the Bases*, 13.
[250] Alvin J. Cottrell and Robert J. Hanks. "The Military Utility of the U.S. Facilities in the Philippines," *Significant Issues Series* 2, no. 11 (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1980).
[251] *Background on the Bases*, 13; Gregor and Aganon, *The Philippine Bases*, 36.
[252] *Background on the Bases*, 13.
[253] Gregor and Aganon, *The Philippine Bases*, 35.

occupied about 25,000 hectares (250 square kilometers), which made the base one of the largest naval bases in the world.[254]

The Philippine bases, including the two large bases and four minor facilities, supported global U.S. military operations.[255] They would provide backup for contingency in Northeast Asia and serve as a transition hub bound for the Indian Ocean.[256] They served as a key rear base during the Korean War in 1950-1953; as a springboard for interventions in the Taiwan straits and Indonesia in 1958,and Thailand in 1962; and as a main staging area for the Vietnam War in 1964-1965.[257] During the Vietnam War, Subic Bay and Clark were staging bases to move personnel and material to and from Vietnam, although no offensive operations or attacks against Vietnam launched directly from them.[258] Right in the middle of the basing negotiations, the United States used the bases for transit during the Gulf War in 1991.[259]

In the meantime, there was a debate on the necessity and dispensability of U.S. bases in the Philippines among American practitioners and experts of diplomacy and defense. Opinions in favor of dismantling the bases emerged in the late 1970s, when there were concerns about political instability under the Marcos regime and changing security situations in Asia, such as U.S.-China rapprochement and the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia.[260]

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[254] Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*, 112.
[255] De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines: A Study in International Negotiation and Decision Making," 174. Following are other four minor facilities. San Miguel Naval Communication Station, technically belonging to the Subic Bay base, provided communication links necessary for operations of the 7th Fleet. Transmitter site Camp O'Donnell Camp was a home of the 3rd Tactical Electronic Warfare Training Squadron. The San Miguel communications station and Camp O'Donnell maintained a communication network to support the 7th Fleet activities both afloat and ashore. Wallace Air Station hosted 848th Airborne Warning and Control Squadron and provided air control, radar coverage, and satellite intelligence relay. John Hay served as U.S. Air Force's rest and recreation center.
[256] Bowen, "The Philippine-American Defense Partnership," 10–12.
[257] Walden Bello, "Moment of Decision: The Philippines, the Pacific, and the U.S. Bases," in *The Sun Never Sets…: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases*, ed. Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard (Boston: Mass.: South End Press, 1991), 150.
[258] Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 118.
[259] William Branigin, "U.S. Warns Manila on Bases Stance," *Washington Post*, January 10, 1991, p. A14; *Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY92-FY93 (Part 5): Review of Proposed Economic and Security Assistance Requests for Asia and the Pacific: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 102nd Cong., 108 (March 6, 1991) (statement of Carl W. Ford, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs, Defense Department).
[260] The famous advocate of Soviet Containment, George Kennan argued that U.S. vital interests were no longer in Southeast Asia, and the original justification of maintaining the bases in the Philippines was undermined. George Frost Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 92–98; Paez, *The Bases Factor,* 118–129; Sandars, *America's Overseas Garrisons*, 118.

4. U.S. Threat Perception

In the early 1990s, particularly in the period between before and the end of the basing negotiation, how did the United States assess the strategic environment in Asia-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia? How did the assessment affect the importance of the Clark airbase and the Subic Bay naval base? The importance of the two bases was related to the U.S. assessment on the strategic environment of Southeast Asia. This section investigates whether the United States recognized threats in the area where its military forces based in the two bases were responsible—from the Western Pacific and South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. A finding is that even before the negotiation, the United States had recognized the Soviet threat abating in the said region. The weakening threat was attributed to a visible force reduction of Soviet forces in Cam Ranh Bay from 1989.

The U.S. forces in the Philippines were expected to counter the Soviet's forces in the Pacific TVD [*Teatr Voennykh Deistvii*, or theaters of military operations] and the Far East TVD. The Pacific TVD was more relevant to the Philippine-based U.S. forces because in the Far East theater the United States would primarily use facilities in Japan and/or South Korea. *Soviet Military Power 1988* analyzed Soviet aims in the Asia Pacific region as follows. In the event of a global war, the East Asia and Pacific theater would be featured by air and naval battles because of the geography and force allocation[261] *Soviet Military Power 1987* provides the overview of Soviet naval development in Asia.

> The Soviet Navy has maintained a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968, primarily to support the USSR's foreign policy and to counter Western navies operating in the region. Soviet naval force levels peaked in the region in 1980 in response to the Iranian and Afghan crises, but since then Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean has steadily declined to its mid-1970s level. This decline is due largely to the change in regional tensions affecting the U.S. and USSR.
> The Soviets began deploying naval forces to the South China Sea in 1979 as Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated into open border conflict. Cam Ranh Bay quickly became the focus of Soviet activity in the South China Sea and is now the site of the largest concentration of Soviet naval units and aircraft deployed to a naval facility outside the Warsaw Pact.[262]

The South China Sea and the straits in Southeast Asia were important sea lines of communications (SLOC) for the Soviet Union as well as the United States. The Cam Ranh Bay installation was to assist the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet in navigating the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and further to the Persian Gulf.[263] Clyde

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[261] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 1988, 123.
[262] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*, 69.
[263] Clyde Haberman, "Challenge in the Pacific," *New York Times*, September 7, 1986 , p. SM26.

Haberman, Tokyo bureau chief for New York Times described in his article in September 1986, "The Cam Ranh installation serves as a Soviet counterpoint to the United States bases in the Philippines."[264]

The United States regarded the Pacific Ocean Fleet of the Soviet Union as "a well-balanced naval force," because it possessed strategic strike, anti-surface and anti-submarine strike capability.[265] As of 1986, Cam Ranh Bay contained 25 surface vessels, 5 attack submarines, 16 Tu-16 intermediate-range bombers, 14 MIG-23 interceptors, and 8 Tu-95 reconnaissance planes.[266] The United States assumed that these warfare assets pose "a limited direct threat" to SLOCs between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and to U.S. bases and forces in the Philippines.[267]

The United States cautiously watched Soviet military power projected from Cam Ranh Bay. *Soviet Military Power 1987* revealed the Soviet Union was developing Cam Ranh Bay into a base for extended naval and air operations in Southeast Asia. For instance, expansion of port facilities supported 25 to 30 Soviet ships routinely patrolling the South China Sea.[268] In 1987, the Cam Ranh Bay-based Soviet forces were engaged in intelligence against Chinese and U.S. naval activities in the region.[269] According to Reuters, the number of interception of U.S. military aircraft by Soviet fighter jets increased in 1987.[270] At a meeting of the Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral David Jeremiah with Pentagon reporters in March 1988, he revealed that the Soviet military, especially MiG-23 from Cam Ranh Bay, scrambled U.S. aircraft more frequently over recent months.[271]

The observation of Soviet aggressive aerial reconnaissance patrols was reflected in official reports of the U.S. Defense Department. Acknowledging that the Soviet Union increased its electronic surveillance in the Western Pacific, the United States surmised that the opponent aimed to improve tactical early warning and tracking of U.S. and its allies' activities in the region. *Soviet Military Power 1988* warned that the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force's Tu-16 and Soviet Air Force's Tu-95 were strategic bombers that posed

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[264] Ibid.
[265] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*, 68.
[266] Haberman, "Challenge in the Pacific"; Alva M. Bowen, *Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 20, 1986), 8.
[267] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 124.
[268] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*, 137–38.
[269] Ibid., 69
[270] "U.S. Admiral Says Soviet Jets More Active in Western Pacific," Reuters, March 28, 1988, Factiva.
[271] "Soviets Stepping Up Aerial Patrols Along Asian Coastline," Associated Press, March 28, 1988, Factiva.

"serious medium- and long-range threats to U.S. forces and bases in the Pacific region."[272] As of February 1988, Pentagon was aware of the Soviet Pacific Fleet reinforced by new cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, so affirmed that Soviet naval and air operations were posing a threat to Southeast Asia SLOCs and to U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea.[273]

On the whole, however, the United States evaluated the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the region as acceptable. The United States saw the opponent under a disadvantage in dispatching its force from its homeland bases to Pacific SLOCs and going across U.S. allies to attack key spots.[274] In a simple comparison of military manpower, the U.S. forces in the Philippines outnumbered the Soviet forces in Cam Ranh Bay by over six to one.[275] In February 1988, Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that the force dispositions of the United States and its allies in the Pacific was sufficient to deter a Soviet major attack.[276] Admiral Ronald Hays, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), also offered the same view in the following month.[277]

In addition, U.S. threat perception of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia reduced in 1989 and on by the partial withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay and the decline in naval activity. The United States recognized the Soviets reducing their force level at Cam Ranh Bay in 1989, according to *Soviet Military Power 1990*.[278] As for Soviet air power, on January 18, 1990, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman disclosed that the Soviet Union withdrew MiG-23 fighters and Tu-16 bomber and reconnaissance aircraft from the base in Vietnam, although he did not mention the number of the planes pulled back.[279] Newspaper

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[272] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 123.
[273] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1989, 35.
[274] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 124.
[275] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1988-89* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 27–28, 44. As of 1988, the number of U.S. personnel in the Philippines was 16,400 (9,300 airmen, 5,900 sailors, and 1,200 Marines). Meanwhile, the number of Soviet personnel in Vietnam was 2,500.
[276] *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 100th Cong., 53 (February 18, 1988) (prepared statement of William J. Crowe, Jr. (Adm.), Chairman, JCS).
[277] *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 100th Cong., 165 (March 15, 1988) (statement of Ronald J. Hays, (Adm.), CINCPAC).
[278] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1990*, 17. *Soviet Military Power, 1989* paid little attention to the Soviet's military presence or its threat in Southeast Asia, while it dealt with Soviet naval operations in the Far East intensively. *Soviet Military Power, 1989*, 112–120.
[279] "Soviets Say They Withdrew Some Planes from Cam Ranh Bay," Associated Press, January 18, 1990, Factiva.

reports made by interviews with Pentagon officials clarified that the only squadron of MiG-23 (estimated 12 to 14 planes) and part of the squadron of Tu-16 flew back to the Soviet Union, leaving 6 Tu-95 reconnaissance aircraft.[280] Given the MiG-23s had been assigned to escort Tu-16s, whose mission was anti-ship attack, since 1984, their pullout meant that the Soviets had ceased air defense operations.

Not only the withdrawal of the fighters and bombers but also the shrinkage of the Soviet naval power lowered U.S. perception of the Soviet threat. According to *Soviet Naval Development 1991*, the United States knew that the Soviets had scaled down their naval forces from Cam Ranh Bay, as well as air forces, by early 1990, to the level sufficient for local defense at the base, such as one or two submarines, several surface combatants, a repair ship and some other auxiliaries.[281] Rear Admiral Timothy Wright, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, pointed out that the Soviet Union had started troop reduction on the Sino-Soviet border and in Cam Ranh Bay.[282]

Nonetheless, U.S. military high officials warned that Soviet military cutbacks from Cam Ranh Bay did not mean the disappearance of the major threat in the region. Asked whether the Soviets were still a threat in the region, CINCPAC Admiral Huntington Hardisty testified, "the Soviet military capability has improved, however the political will to use that capability seems lessened."[283] Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Wright emphasized that the United States needed to remain cautious continuously because the Soviets maintained war-fighting capability in East Asia, and their intentions could be changed easily and immediately.[284] Nonetheless, in terms of Soviet forces in Cam Ranh Bay, the remaining components of the Soviet threat were not so formidable, because the United States confirmed most of the Soviet warfare assets were removed from Cam Ranh Bay.

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[280] "Moscow 'Withdrawing Most of Its Offensive Forces from Vietnam,'" *Straits Times*, January 17, 1990, Factiva; Michael Gordon, "Soviets Said to Withdraw Fighters and Bombers from Vietnam Base," *New York Times*, January 19, 1990, p. A6.

[281] Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 1991, 41.

[282] *Overview of Recent Events in the East Asian and Pacific Region: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 101st Cong., 2 (February 22, 1990) (statement of Timothy W. Wright, (Rear Adm.), Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Defense Department).

[283] *National Defense Authorization Act for FY91: H.R. 4739 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, Authorization and Oversight: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services*, House, 101st Cong., 190 (February 7, 1990) (statement of Huntington Hardisty, (Adm.), CINCPAC).

[284] Wright, *Overview of Recent Events in the East Asian and Pacific Region*, p. 2.

5. U.S. Evaluation of the Clark Base and the Subic Bay Base

This section examines whether the United States valued the two bases in the Philippines in accordance with its threat perception of Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, or more broadly the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Based on the hypothesis, the following should be observed in relation to the base evaluation: the United States should

- insist on the importance of the contested base
- propose force reduction but does not yield to the return of the base
- reject a proposal from the Soviet Union on a concurrent force reduction, including the closure of the contested base
- think that there are other ways to sustain the military operations that the contested bases had been engaged in
- publicly mention the possibility to relocate the bases
- accept the Philippine demand when the alternative is secured.

U.S. threat perception of lessening Soviet threat did not appear in the explanation of the importance of the contested bases; the United States continued to underline their strategic and operational values. Instead, the threat perception appeared in U.S. flexibility about Philippine base alternatives. As the perceived threat was less hostile, the United States thought it was not necessary to completely replicate each of the bases and possible to relocate them to other sites in the Asia-Pacific region.

5.1. Consistent Emphasis on the Importance of the Bases

Before and during the two basing negotiations in 1988 and 1990-91, the U.S. government had continued claiming the importance of the military presence in the Philippines through official reports and congressional testimonies. The United States Information Service published a sourcebook titled *Background on the Bases: American Military Facilities in the Philippines* in 1986 and 1987. It provided an overview of the function and strategic importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines as well as their positive impacts on the Philippine economy. In the foreword of the second edition, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Nicholas Platt highlighted that the bases, as “an essential element of the external defense of the Philippines,” played a role

to "deter potential threats, … and contribute significantly to world peace, global stability and the defense of freedom and democracy."[285]

Soviet Military Power 1988 valued forward deployment to facilities in Asia-Pacific, since they enabled the United States to deter the Soviet Union and maintain war-fighting capability. The report as well as *Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress 1989* stated that the location of the Philippines, at the crossroad of Southeast Asia and West Pacific sea lanes, was geographically important, and the two bases of Clark and Subic Bay contributed to protecting vital interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.[286]

On February 7, 1990, CINCPAC Admiral Hardisty testified about the value of the bases in the Philippines before the House Armed Services Committee, underlining their role as staging bases and the excellent training areas. He remarked that the country hosted 65 percent of training in the western Pacific and training ranges and facilities at Crow Valley were "not available anywhere else in the Pacific and would be extremely difficult to replace."[287] He further commented that he preferred to keep U.S. forces in the Philippines in the testimony. Similarly, State Secretary Richard Cheney testified that the United States hoped to be able to continue on access to Clark and Subic Bay at Senate Appropriations Committee in June 1990:

> They [Subic Bay and Clark] are important facilities for several reasons, partly because we think the Philippines are an important part of the world for us, partly because our presence there we believe is a stabilizing factor in the region. The other nations in the area are happy to have a U.S. presence. We also are able to do things in the Philippines that are very hard to do elsewhere in the Pacific. Specifically, that includes training.[288]

A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, known as the East Asia Strategy Initiative I (EASI-I) published in April 1990, presented a force reduction plan crafted by the Pentagon to readjust the post-Cold War environment. Although the report demonstrated drastic cuts, for example 7,000 personnel in South Korea, and 5,000 to 6,000 in Japan, the United States planned a reduction of 2,000 personnel in the Philippines. Notably, it asserted U.S. intention to sustain military presence in the country.[289]

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[285] *Background on the Bases*, 1987, 3.
[286] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat*, 124; U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, 1989, 36.
[287] Hardisty, *National Defense Authorization Act for FY91*, 157 (February 7, 1990).
[288] *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY91 Part 1: National Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 101st Cong., 326–7 (June 12, 1990) (statement of Richard B. Cheney, Secretary, Defense Department).
[289] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990, 13.

In summer 1990, Richard Armitage, whom President George Bush appointed as the special negotiator for Philippine bases in April 1990,[290] wrote an article overviewing U.S. security interests and force structure for the 21st century, and summarized the value of the U.S. bases in the Philippines as follows. They were "valuable first and foremost because of the training," and secondarily beneficial "for logistics support, and lastly as a political symbol of U.S. engagement in Southeast and Southwest Asia."[291]

In addition to constant emphasis on the Philippine bases' importance, the United States had been cool to several Soviet proposals of mutual force withdrawal from Southeast Asia. As early as July 1986, in a speech in Vladivostok, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev implied that he would respond if the United States should give up the Philippine bases.[292] On September 16, 1988, Gorbachev made a public speech on Soviet initiative toward Asia, and proposed a deal that his country would give up Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, its largest foreign naval base, if the United States withdrew from the Philippines.[293] At that time, the Soviet Union deployed in Cam Ranh Bay 2,500 personnel, two to four submarines, seven battleships and 10 support vessels as well as several fighter squadrons.[294] However, the United States responded skeptically to Gorbachev's proposal of mutual retreat.[295] In January 1990, the Soviet Union announced to pull its air force from Cam Ranh Bay.[296] Regarding Soviet frequent proposals, Admiral Carlisle Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, criticized that it was a poor trade-off between Cam Ranh Bay and the bases in the Philippines, since "we give up something we have relied on very heavily over the years," while "they [the Soviet Union] give up something that really adds very little at the present time to their capability."[297] The same argument was made by Ronald Lehman, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He considered the trade-

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[290] Robert Pear, "Bush Names Envoy for Manila Talks," *New York Times*, April 11, 1990, p. A6.
[291] Richard L. Armitage, "U.S. Security in the Pacific in the 21st Century," *Strategic Review* 13, no. 8, (Summer 1990): 16.
[292] Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Analyzes Gorbachev's Bid to China Soviet Seen Seeking Greater Role in Asia," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1986, p. A15.
[293] Michael Dobbs and David Remnick, "Gorbachev Unveils Initiative: Overture to Asia, Offer on Radar Are Centerpieces," *Washington Post*, September 17, 1988, p. A1; De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines," 148.
[294] Dobbs and Remnick, "Gorbachev Unveils Initiative." The data in the article is consistent with that of Military Balance. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1988-89*, 43–44.
[295] Fred Kaplan, "Gorbachev Offers to Trade Closings of Pacific Bases," *Boston Globe*, September 17, 1988, Factiva.
[296] Andy Pasztor, "Soviet Military Cut in Vietnam Puts Pressure on U.S.," *Wall Street Journal*, January 26, 1990, p. B5B.
[297] *National Defense Authorization Act for FY91: H.R. 4739 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services*, House, 101st Cong., 386–387 (February 20, 1990) (statement of Carlisle A. Trost, (Adm.), Chief of Naval Operations).

off as not attractive because the United States would lose those bases that reflected its "vital interests" in exchange for the Soviet's losing just power projection.[298]

During the negotiations for a new basing contract, the United States showed its intention to continuously use the bases in the Philippines and not to abandon them in the short term. The negotiation panel called PACT began in September 1990. The main point in dispute was the phasedown period of U.S. bases in the Philippines. The host state demanded the handover of the sovereignty of the bases and the continuation of compensation and aid. It offered the United States a force withdrawal period of up to seven years. On the other hand, the United States proposed a phasedown, not phaseout, of both the Clark airbase and the Subic Bay base. In addition, the United States repeatedly insisted that relocating the Subic Bay base would take 10 years or more. Even after the sixth, second last PACT, the United States held its ground, claiming that it would require at least 10 years for gradual withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bay.[299] U.S. special negotiator Armitage explained in the letter to his counterpart, Foreign Affairs Secretary Manglapus, the reasons for the decade-long phasedown withdrawal as follows.

> "We [the United States] came into this process fully believing that a duration of 10-to-12 years, incorporating a systematic phasedown and a Philippine option for phaseout, would be fully protective of your [the Philippines'] sovereign concerns and your nascent conversation process. We also believed that such a duration would satisfy U.S. strategic requirements, the need of our Military Services, and the concerns of our mutual friends in a part of the world where some element of predictability and gradualism is a necessary antidote to the uncertainty occasioned by great changes in the world's geopolitical scene."[300]

Furthermore, the United States offered a counterargument to claims that the decline of Soviet threat undermined the importance of Philippine bases. For instance, a senior military officer tried to convince Congress by justifying the U.S. presence in the Philippines not only for countering Soviet threat but also for regional stability. CINCPAC Admiral Hardisty articulated that, "the Pacific fleet force levels were not predicted or built on the Soviets being Cam Ranh Bay. It was more of a regional threat and our interests all the way out to the Indian Ocean."[301] He also stressed that the U.S. military presence in the Philippines

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[298] *Hearings on Arms Control in Asia and U.S. Interests in the Region: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 101st Cong., 172 (March 13, 1990) (statement of Ronald F. Lehman, II, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).

[299] "Document 6.10: Letter of Special Negotiator Richard L. Armitage, Washington, DC, to Sec. Raul Manglapus, Manila, in Reply to the 4 June 1991 Letter of Sec. Manglapus conveying the Philippine Proposal for a Duration of 6 Years Plus a One-year Withdrawal Period," 4 June 1991, in Castro-Guevara, *The Bases Talks Reader*, 304–307.

[300] Ibid., 305.

[301] Hardisty, *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY91*, 189 (February 7, 1990).

played a role as a stabilizing force which helped most of the nations in the region allocate their resources to economic development.[302] The EASI-I stated, "the U.S. presence in the Philippines clearly serves U.S. and Philippine interests beyond containment of the Soviet Union."[303]

5.2. U.S. Flexible Stance on the Bases in the Philippines

Continuously insisting on the strategic and geopolitical importance of Philippine bases, however, the United States did not hide that it had been examining options to replace the long-standing bases. In 1985, the Senate Appropriations Committee, which was concerned about the future of Philippine bases due to local political and economic instability under Marcos regime, ordered the Defense Department to conduct a study of alternate locations for the mission conducted in the Philippines.[304] The study was to be submitted to Congress by March 1986, though it seems not currently available.[305]

At a press conference in Canberra on May 13, 1988, CINCPAC Admiral Ronald Hays confirmed that he was studying alternatives for the Philippine bases. Admitting that the negotiation with the Philippines was going to be difficult, he said, "we have no option but to take a serious-minded attitude about the alternatives."[306] The Department of Defense was reportedly reviewing the possibility of Philippine bases alternatives. Washington Post staff writer Patrick Tyler revealed that a high-level study in the Pentagon was presented to Defense Secretary Cheney and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in December 1989. With a pessimistic view that the U.S. basing in the Philippines would not last until the next century, the study concluded that the United States could "afford to lose forward bases in the Philippines" by using facilities on Guam, Okinawa and Singapore.[307]

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[302] *Military Construction Appropriations for 1991, Part 5: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 101st Cong., 201–202 (February 28, 1990) (response of Huntington Hardisty, (Adm.), CINCPAC).
[303] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990, 14.
[304] *Military Construction Appropriation Bill, 1986: Report together with Minority Views*, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 99th Cong., Report no. 99-168 (October 31,1985), 12–13.
[305] Author consulted archivists both at the Library of Congress and the National Archives and Records Administration in July 2019. Although it was possible that the document was declassified, the archivists were unable to identify it at that time.
[306] "S. Korea, Singapore Alternatives to U.S. Bases in Philippines," Reuters, May 13, 1988, Factiva.
[307] Patrick E. Tyler, "Cheney, Powell Are Told U.S. Can Cut Korean Forces, Give Up Philippine Bases," *Washington Post*, December 20, 1989, p. A7.

At the House Armed Service Committee on February 7, 1990, CINCPAC Admiral Hardisty revealed that he submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense a contingency plan to relocate the forces from the Philippines in one year, and indicated that there were alternatives.[308] He also testified before the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that he composed the base relocation study for 16 to 17 months and that the troops in the Philippines would fall back to Guam, Hawaii, Alaska and the West Coast of the United States.[309]

In addition, U.S. leaders proclaimed that the United States could withdraw under certain conditions. At the Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 16, 1988, which was in the middle of negotiations with the Philippines to review the MBA, State Secretary Shultz testified what the United States had told the Philippines: if the latter regarded U.S. facilities as a source of rent and continued the increase of it, the former would leave "because we only want to be at a place where we have an ally that wants us there."[310] In addition, Shultz underlined the American position: "if we have to find other places for our ships and planes, we can do it, although those two bases, Subic and Clark, are essential."[311] State Secretary James Baker maintained the position held by his predecessor. During the congressional discussion on foreign aid on February 22, 1990, Baker presented his personal view that the United States ought to leave if the majority of the Filipino people and their government did not desire to provide facilities serving U.S. security interests.[312]

Similarly, when U.S. special negotiator Armitage made an opening remark of the exploratory talk in Manila on May 14, 1990, he explicitly told the Philippine delegation that the U.S. forces would leave if the United States were asked.[313] His position was backed by U.S. President Bush. At a press conference in the White House on May 16, 1990, Bush commented on basing negotiation with the Philippines, "If we're not

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[308] Hardisty, *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY91*, 176 (February 7, 1990).
[309] *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY91: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 101st Cong., 18–19 (March 1, 1990) (statement of Huntington Hardisty, (Adm.), CINCPAC).
[310] *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1989: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 100th Cong., 295 (June 16, 1988) (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary, Department of State).
[311] Ibid., 296.
[312] *Authorization Request for Foreign Assistance, the Department of State, and USIA for Fiscal Years 1990-91(Part 1): Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 101st Cong., 65 (February 22, 1990) (statement of James A. Baker, III, Secretary, Department of State).
[313] Castro-Guevara, *The Bases Talks Reader*, p. 57

wanted there, we're not going to be there." To a question by the press if the United States could protect interests without a presence in the Philippines, he confirmed that he was looking at other options.[314]

In sum, in terms of the importance of the Clark airbase and the Subic Bay naval base, the United States showed contradicting attitudes about them. On one hand, it emphasized consistently their strategic values towards the end of the negotiation, and sought for longer duration of the bases. The United States did so partly because base redundancy would contribute to deterring any regional powers, stabilizing the region, and protecting U.S. interests in the region. As discussed later, this behavior represented the U.S. intention of maintaining its commitment to Asia Pacific. On the other hand, the state publicly mentioned a possibility to relocate the bases in the Asia-Pacific region, and stated that it was ready to leave the host country if wished. This behavior is consistent with U.S. perception of the abating Soviet threat. The Philippine bases were losing their long-standing role as a counterforce against the Soviet power projected from Vietnam.

6. Required Base Capability and the Alternatives

This section looks into alternative options of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. In particular, it scrutinizes requirements for the alternatives and the process of how and when the United States secured the alternatives for the Clark base and the Subic Bay base. Regarding base capability, the hypothesis predicts that the alternative should be dispersion of the base capabilities, and that securing the alternative should precede the final decision of closing the contested bases.

It is noted that timings of agreement on closing Clark and Subic Bay are different. As for Clark Air Base, it was July 1991 when the United States notified the Philippines of its decision to relinquish the base. On the other hand, the United States agreed at the end of 1991 to end stationing at Subic Bay. The United States sought to acquire alternatives by redistributing the units from the Philippines to several existing bases in the Asia-Pacific region and negotiating with a new host state that could accept partial relocation of military functions.

[314] U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1990* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 732.

6.1. Examined Alternatives

The United States did not think it possible to duplicate the two bases somewhere in the region. The reason was concisely summarized in the testimony of CINCPAC Admiral Larson at the House Armed Services Committee in April 1991. First, Subic Bay's ship repair facility was supported by a very skilled and relatively cheaper Filipino work force. Second, the Philippine bases were located on the crossroad to the Indian Ocean where many SLOCs concentrated. Third, the training ranges, particularly the Crow Valley Ranges adjunct to the Clark base, would be "most difficult to replicate."[315]

Prior to U.S.-Philippine negotiations, U.S. senior military officers, as witnesses before congressional committees, referred to several alternative locations. These places were all in the Asia-Pacific region: namely, Guam, Tinian or Palau, Singapore, North Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Hawaii. In February 1990, CINCPAC Admiral Hardisty, in his answers submitted for the congressional record, argued that Andersen Air Force Base and the Navy's ship repair facility in Guam would take on additional roles in case of losing access to the Philippine bases.[316] On the other hand, at the same testimony, he pointed out some issues embedded in Guam. A large influx of military personnel would not be well received because the island was crowded with tourists and leisure sites, and the infrastructure would not have capacity for the population increase. Although ship repair facilities could be relocated to Guam, the other problem was the lack of skilled labor force.[317] Admiral Hardisty repeated this point that Guam could not entirely replace Subic Bay in terms of real estate, capability, and labor force.[318] Naval Operations Chief Admiral Trost testified that loss of access to the bases in the Philippines would be offset by access to military facilities in Guam, a ship repair facility, a naval supply depot, and ammunition storage and other facilities in Japan. He added that the training function provided at Clark would be hard to find an alternative.[319] Admiral Hardisty also explained that

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315 *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993: H.R. 2100 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services*, House, 102st Cong., 835–836 (April 10, 1991) (statement of Charles R. Larson, (Adm.), CINCPAC).

316 Hardisty, *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY91*, 202 (February 7, 1990).

317 Ibid., 189.

318 *Military Construction Appropriations for 1991, Part 5: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 101st Cong., 192 (February 28, 1990) (statement of Huntington Hardisty, (Adm.), CINCPAC).

319 *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1991, Part 1: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 101st Cong., 522 (February 22, 1990) (statement of Carlisle A. Trost, (Adm.), Chief of Naval Operations).

Korea or Japan could not replicate the functions of Clark, particularly training.[320] The State Department revealed that the Defense Department's report, which had been requested by Congress after 1988 MBA review, examined a variety of potential alternatives including U.S.-affiliated islands, such as Guam, Tinian or Palau.[321] These discussions indicate that the United States considered it possible to disperse the functions of the Clark base and the Subic Bay base throughout Asia-Pacific.

Although the study that U.S. high officials referred to during congressional testimonies seems unavailable at the moment, some suggestions presented in an open source close to the U.S. government are similar to the alternative options that high officials referred to. The source is *The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations* published by the RAND Corporation in August 1989.[322] The RAND report is valuable because it should have been read and examined in the Department of Defense. The research was conducted in RAND's National Defense Research Institute federally funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It was prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of Defense. The purpose of the study was to calculate the incremental costs of *replicating* the capabilities generated by the Philippine bases, not *duplicating* the facilities [emphasis in original].[323]

Table 4.1 shows six options the report analyzed. The options varied from access to U.S. Pacific territory only or existing bases in U.S. allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to new access to Southeast Asian countries as well as Mainland China and Pakistan. One of the conclusions the RAND report reached was that "the bases are not irreplaceable: A wide range of possible alternatives exists both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere."[324] It recommended Flexible Access as the best option because it was politically feasible and financially acceptable.[325]

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320 Hardisty, *Hearing on Military Construction Appropriations for 1991*, 202 (February 28, 1990).
321 *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1991, Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 101st Cong., 227 (March 1, 1990) (response of the Department of State).
322 Donald Putnam Henry, Keith Crane, and Katherine Watkins Webb, "The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations," Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of State (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, August 1989).
323 Ibid., 2.
324 Ibid., viii.
325 Ibid., 14.

Table 4.1 Six Option Packages Examined by RAND

Capability		Location					
		1. Unconstraind Access	**2. Limited ASEAN Access**	**3. No ASEAN Access**	**4. No ASEAN/ NEA Access**	**5. U.S. Territory Only**	**6. Flexible Access**
Clark	Fighter basing and training	Butterworth (Malaysia)	Brunei	Darwin (Australia)	Darwin	Andersen (Guam)	Andersen
	C-130 basing and training	Butterworth	Kadena (Japan)	Kadena	Darwin	Andersen	Andersen
	Regional air training	Butterworth	Brunei	Darwin	Darwin	Nellis (Nevada)	Darwin
	Strategic lift	Kuala Lumpur	Singapore	Ishigaki-jima (Japan)	Kadena	Kadena	Kadena
Subic Bay	Ship repair facility	Labuan (Malaysia), Chingtao (China), Karachi (Pakistan)	Singapore, Chingtao, Karachi	Ulsan, Chingtao, Karachi	Guam, Karachi, Fremantle (Australia)	Guam, Tinian	Singapore, Ulsan
	Naval supply depot	Labuan, Chingtao, Karachi	Singapore, Chintao, Karachi, Ulsan (Korea)	Ulsan, Chingtao, Karachi	Guam, Karachi, Fremantle	Guam, Tinian	Singapore, Ulsan, Guam
	Naval magazine	Labuan	Songkhla (Thailand), Singapore, Sasebo (Japan)	Darwin	Darwin	Guam	Guam
	Naval air logistics	Labuan	Singapore	Kimhae (Korea)	Guam, Fremantle, Diego Garcia	Tinian	Singapore, Ulsan
	P-3 basing and operations	Labuan	Kadena	Kadena, Palau	Palau	Guam	Guam
Total annualized costs (thousands of FY90 $)		193,482	452,888	682,614	1,012,042	1,441,530	744,736

Source: Compiled by author from Donald Putnam Henry, Keith Crane, and Katharine Watkins Webb, *The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations, Executive Summary* (RAND Corporate, 1989), 31-36.

In fact, the option to disperse the functions to existing U.S. bases in the region, which senior military officers and the RAND report were inclined to, could result in reduction of military efficiency. There were studies regarding alternative options for U.S. bases in the Philippines,[326] and several studies argued that dispersion would cost a lot and possibly diminish U.S. ability to defend the SLOCs and interests in the region. Among them, often cited was a Congressional Research Service's report titled *Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options*, written in 1986 by Alva M. Bowen, who was a specialist in national defense and previously served as U.S. Navy captain and operated in the western Pacific.[327] David Hegarty's work in 1988 referred to Bowen's analysis on alternative options. Bowen and Hegarty both considered distance to be critical in U.S.-Soviet competition over the sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, and more broadly, the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean. They demonstrated that time on station would be reduced by 15 to 20 percent if naval and air forces were operating in Southeast Asia from Guam or Japan, located 1,500 to 2,000 miles farther than the Philippines.[328]

To overcome the disadvantage of distance and maintain rapid response capability in the Asia-Pacific theater, Bowen estimated that it would require the increase of ships to sustain the force level on station.[329] Another way of shortening response time was prepositioning, as retired U.S. Marine Corps General George B. Crist suggested. If military equipment and materiel are prepositioned, whether afloat or ashore, in or adjacent to potential crisis areas, the U.S. military could reduce response time and necessary airlift.[330] Referring to Crist's argument, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Richard B. Southard, Jr. suggested that a

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[326] Paez, *The Bases Factor*, 123–141; Gregor and Aganon, *The Philippine Bases*, 71–92; Alva M. Bowen, Jr., "U.S. Facilities in the Philippines," in *The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future: American and Philippine Perspectives*, ed. Fred Greene (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 112–125; David Hegarty, "US Bases in the Philippines: Redeployment Options," in *US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications*, ed. Desmond Ball (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1988), 57–70.

[327] Alva M. Bowen, *Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 20, 1986). Setting analysis criteria of political feasibility, operational effectiveness, and cost considerations, he examined three redeployment options: 1) existing U.S. bases in Japan (including Okinawa), Guam, and Hawaii, 2) expanded U.S. facilities in Micronesia, and 3) new bases in the nations surrounding the South China Sea, including Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.

[328] Bowen, *Philippine Bases*, 17; Hegarty, "US Bases in the Philippines," 61. For details on a relationship between distance and force requirements, refer to Appendix II.

[329] Bowen, *Philippine Bases*, 18. He estimated that the U.S. Pacific Fleet's battle force would require additional one or two carrier battle groups and supporting forces in peacetime. In wartime, three to four additional battle groups would be required due to the absence of land-based fighter cover.

[330] George B. Crist, "A U.S. Military Strategy for A Changing World," *Strategic Review* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 21.

maritime prepositioning ship squadron be deployed in the vicinity of Singapore, in addition to the existing squadrons at Diego Garcia and near the Marianas, to somewhat ameliorate the time and distance problem.[331]

From the point of view emphasizing distance, the final outcome that the United States made would be an unreasonable option.[332] The studies done by specialists other than the U.S. government indicated that retreating the deployment line eastward without force augmentation would sacrifice U.S. rapid force projection. In fact, those studies stood on the premise that the United States would sustain the operational capabilities. However, since the fall of 1989, the United States had been planning the so-called 'Base Force' strategy to retrench the force size that was prepared for the Cold War and maintain sufficient forward force capability.[333] In Asia-Pacific, the strategy planned to reduce the force strength by cutting about 32,000 personnel gradually in the next five years.[334] Consequently, the United States chose to disperse the functions of Clark and Subic Bay with no force reinforcement to compensate for the distance disadvantage.

6.2. Gradual and Substantial Relocations

Based on the dispersion options, the United States sought to secure alternatives. Required base capabilities were to sustain operation activities in Asia-Pacific. A wide range of relocation options were expected, not necessarily limited to Southeast Asia, as the Soviet presence in Vietnam was perceived as less aggressive. As for the capabilities of Clark, it is predicted that combat forces as well as non-combat forces should be located somewhere in Asia-Pacific. In terms of those of Subic Bay, the functions should be maintained in the region to support activities of the7th Fleet and secure the lines of communications throughout the region.

First and foremost, the United States managed to maintain its military presence in Southeast Asia in case of force withdrawal from the Philippines by Singapore's offer of use of its facilities. It implies that even much smaller sites in Singapore were able to satisfy a part of the base capability requirements. On August 4,

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331 Richard B. Southard Jr., "The Loss of the Philippine Bases: Effects on USCINCPAC's Ability to Employ His Forces," Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College, (February 13, 1992), 28.
332 In consideration of operational effectiveness, cost and political feasibility, Bowen predicted that initial (or immediate) redeployment of the Philippine bases would be dispersed to existing bases in the Western Pacific without adding forces that would compensate for the reduced efficiency. Bowen, *Philippine Bases*, 35.
333 With regard to the decision-making of the Base Force strategy, see Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992* (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993).
334 As for U.S. force planning in the post-Cold War era, see William T. Tow, "Changing US Force Levels and Regional Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no. 2 (August 1994): 10–43.

1989, Singaporean Minister of State for Finance and Foreign Affairs George Yeo announced in the Parliament that the country was willing to offer the U.S. military access to some of its military facilities.[335] According to the Department of State, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew brought the offer to the United States in January 1989, and then the Departments of State and Defense studied the possibility.[336] In October 1989, the United States responded to Singapore's offer, proposing an increase in ship and aircraft visits, joint exercises on a regular basis, expansion of use of ship repair and maintenance facilities in Singapore, and the deployment of about 170 U.S. personnel to support the increase.[337] In the end, the two countries reached an agreement; Vice President Dan Quayle and Prime Minister Lee signed the Memorandum of Understanding in Tokyo on November 13, 1990. The agreement enabled U.S. forces to increase the use of Sembawang Port for naval maintenance, repair and supply; to conduct fly training missions on a rotational basis at Paya Lebar Airport; and to add approximately 150 U.S. military personnel to be stationed in Singapore.[338]

One of the highlights of this agreement was that U.S. forces would not be stationed in Singapore permanently. The United States considered the new arrangement a "modest increase" of existing bilateral military cooperation. At that time about 20 American personnel was stationed, U.S. naval vessels had been using Singapore's port for over 25 years, and U.S. transport aircraft were allowed to transit there.[339] Singapore hosted 76 U.S. Navy ships in 1989 and 80 in 1990, and two Air Force visits in each of the two years.[340] Although greater access in Singapore was too small to supplant Philippine bases, according to Congressional Research Service analyst Jeffrey Young, U.S. officials considered the new agreement with

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335 "Singapore Willing to Have Some US Military Facilities," *Straits Times*, August 5, 1989, Factiva. According to the news source, by making such an offer, Singapore intended to "make it easier for the Philippines to continue hosting American bases" and to sustain the power balance in the region.

336 *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1991, Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 101st Cong., 229 (March 1, 1990) (response of the Department of State).

337 U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1989* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 566.

338 Jeffrey D. Young, *U.S. Military Interaction with Southeast Asian Countries* (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, February 27, 1992), 9. For a brief summary of security relations between the United States and Singapore, see Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin, 2000), 209.

339 Charles Smith, "Port in a Storm," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 150, Issue 7 (November 22, 1990): 10–11; Steven R. Weisman, "Singapore to Allow Greater U.S. Military Presence," *New York Times*, November 14, 1990, p. A9; "Singapore Willing to Have Some US Military Facilities," *Straits Times*.

340 "U.S. Military Team Begins Base Discussions in Singapore," Reuters, November 26, 1990, Factiva.

Singapore as "an important signal that the United States is not 'pulling out' of Southeast Asia."[341]

Other alternatives were arranged without a search for a new host state. Some Air Force units were pulled out as far as Alaska or even disbanded. The Clark airbase was a home of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) composed of the 3rd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) and the 90th TFS, which of each had 24 F-4 fighter/bombers. On November 7, 1990, the U.S. Embassy in Manila issued a statement to remove the 3rd TFW, the largest U.S. unit based at Clark.[342] The 3rd TFS was originally scheduled to be replaced with a squadron of F-15E at the beginning of 1991, but they were ultimately assigned to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska instead.[343] The 90th TFS was to be removed in May 1991, which was announced in advance in April 1990.[344]

Table 4.2 Dispersion of Clark Air Force Base

Assingment			Type of aircraft	Number of aircraft	Date of Move	Destination
13th Air Force	3rd Tactical Fighter Wing	3rd Tactical Fighter Squadron	F-4	24	December 19, 1991	Eielson AFB (Alaska)
		90th Tactical Fighter Squadron	F-4	24	May 29, 1991	Elmendorf AFB (Alaska)
23rd Air Force	353 Special Operations Wing	1st Special Operations Squadron	MC-130	3	February 5, 1992	Kadena AFB (Okinawa)
		31st Special Operations Squadron	MH-53	5	June 29, 1991	MCAS Futemna (Okinawa)
834th Airlift Division	374 Tactical Airlift Wing		C-130	16	October 1, 1989	Yokota AFB (Tokyo)

Source: Number of aircraft is retrieved from *Military Balance 1989-1992*. The rest is retrieved from United States Air Force Historical Research Agency, "3 Fighter Training Squadron," https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432814/3-fighter-training-squadron-aetc/; "90 Fighter Squadron (PACAF)," https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432156/90-fighter-squadron-pacaf/; "1 Special Operations Squadron (AFSOC)," https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/433958/1-special-operations-squadron/; "353 Special Operations Group (AFSOC)," https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432584/353-special-operations-group-afsoc/; "374 Airlift Wing (PACAF)," https://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432715/374-airlift-wing-pacaf/.

[341] Young, *U.S. Military Interaction with Southeast Asian Countries*, 9.
[342] David Schlesinger, "U.S. to Remove All Its Fighter Aircraft from Philippines," Reuters, November 7, 1990, Factiva.
[343] "F-15 Jets Planned for Philippines to Go to Alaska," Reuters, November 8, 1990, Factiva. According to the AFHRA factsheets, it was the 90th TFW that was redeployed to Elmendorf AFB and replaced with F-15s. It completed the transfer on May 29,1991. On the other hand, the 3rd TFS was moved to Eielson AFB, redesignated as the 3rd Fighter Training Squadron on December 19, 1991. Their F-4s were replaced with UH-1. "90 Fighter Squadron (PACAF)," AFHRA, accessed June 22, 2018, http://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432156/90-fighter-squadron-pacaf/; "3 Flying Training Squadron (AETC)," AFHRA, accessed June 22, 2018, http://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432861/3-flying-training-squadron-aetc/.
[344] "U.S. to Remove All Its Fighter Aircraft from Philippines," Reuters, November 7, 1990, Factiva.

Although the United States was rearranging the forces at Clark, a natural disaster played a decisive role to make the United States reconsider the value of the base. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, on June 15, 1991, situated about 16 kilometers west of the Clark base and about 40 kilometers northwest of Subic Bay, severely damaged the airbase. The United States first showed its hope to maintain it.[345] However, the future of the Clark base was clouded, as the Air Force estimated that it would cost 520 million dollars to recover the base to its pre-eruption condition.[346] Especially as Congress could be hesitant to pay the cost to restore the base from which the U.S. forces might have to leave in the near future.[347] On July 15, 1991, about a month after the volcanic disaster and right before the final PACT, U.S. special negotiator Armitage issued a statement to return the Clark base to the Philippine government.[348]

Some relocation plans became public after the U.S. decision to close Clark and Subic Bay. In regard to the Clark base, public confirmation of relocation plans for aerial training at Crow Valley and the 13th Air Force headquarters followed U.S. announcement of relinquishing the airbase in July 1991. Although there were various reports on the future of the Crow Valley,[349] it was revealed in May 1992 when CINCPAC Admiral Larson explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska was the only alternative for it.[350] However, acknowledging Eielson's disadvantage of the lack of availability

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[345] Defense Secretary Chaney, Pentagon spokesman, and U.S. Embassy spokesman in Manila stated that the United States wanted to continue to use Clark and Subic. Charles Aldinger, "U.S. Says Philippine Base Talks on Hold for Cost Assessment," Reuters, June 18, 1991, Factiva; "Pentagon Slates Philippines Base Talks," Associated Press, June 25, 1991, Factiva; Ruben Alabastro, "U.S. Says It Won't Abandon Volcano-Hit Air Base in Philippines," Reuters, June 25, 1991, Factiva.

[346] Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. to Reopen Talks on Damaged Philippine Bases," *Washington Post*, July 11, 1991 p. A21.

[347] Clifford Krauss, "Volcano Is Unforeseen Third Party in Talks on Bases in Philippines," *New York Times*, July 11, 1991, p. A12.

[348] William Braginin, "U.S. Says Mt. Pinatubo Has Ended Clark Field's Attraction as a Base," *Washington Post*, July 16, 1991, p. A8.

[349] A couple of reports said no decision was made on a substitute for Crow Valley. John M. Broder, "U.S. Reaches Accord with Manila, Will Leave Clark Air Base," *Los Angeles Times*, July 18, 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-07-18-mn-3381-story.html; "Closing of Clark Air Base to Force Shift in U.S. Training," *Aviation Week & Space and Technology*, July 22, 1991. On the other hand, some others mentioned Alaska. William Branigin, "U.S. Agrees to Quit Base in Philippines, Keep Use of Subic," *Washington Post*, July 18, 1991, p. A19; Lawrence MacDonald, "U.S. to Leave Clark, Stay at Subic 10 Years under Pact with Manila," *Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 1991, p. A8.

[350] *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY93 and the Future Years Defense Program Part 1: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 102nd Cong., 248–289 (March 4, 1992) (statement of Charles R. Larson, (Adm.), CINCPAC); *Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bases: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 102nd Cong., 30 (March 5, 1992) (statement of Charles R. Larson, (Adm.), CINCPAC).

for joint training with U.S. friends and allies that had taken place at Crow Valley, he clarified that the U.S. military had conducted a training range survey in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia.[351] In terms of 13th Air Force headquarters, little discussion or report was found on its relocation. According to the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), the headquarters was relocated to the Andersen base in Guam on December 2, 1991.[352] Table 4.2 shows a summary of the dispersion of elements based in Clark Air Base.

The announcement of relinquishing Clark made the Subic Bay base an agenda left in U.S.-Philippine negotiation. The seventh and last PACT was held in July 1991, and eventually, the series of negotiations was consolidated into the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security that the two governments signed in August 1991. The new agreement allowed the United States to use the Subic Bay base for the next 10 years.[353] However, the Philippine Senate rejected the ratification of the treaty in September 1991.[354] The United States and the Philippines renegotiated on the terms of U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay in November 1991. The host state offered a three-year extension for usage of Subic Bay, but both sides did not compromise on U.S. possible introduction and storage of nuclear weapons in the Philippines.[355] As a result, the two parties agreed to terminate the additional talk about the issue on December 27, 1991.[356] It meant that the United States accepted the withdrawal from the Subic Bay base within a year.

Dispersion arrangements were revealed after the acceptance of closing Subic Bay. The United States made another agreement in principle with Singapore to move a navy logistics command from Subic Bay on January 4, 1992. It was only about a week after the officials of the United States and the Philippines agreed

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351 Larson, *Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bases*, 30–31 (March 5, 1992).
352 "Thirteenth Air Force (Air Forces Pacific) (PACAF)," AFHRA, accessed October 8, 2019, http://www.afhra.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/432189/thirteenth-air-force-air-forces-pacific-pacaf/.
353 As for the conclusion of the final PACT and the contents of the treaty, see De Leon, "United States Base Closures in the Philippines," 249–255.
354 William Branigin, "Base Treaty Rejected by Philippines," *Washington Post*, September 17, 1991, p. A21.
355 William Branigin, "Given One Year's Notice, U.S. Begins to Pull Out of Subic Base," *Washington Post*, December 28, 1991, p. A15.
356 "Philippines Gives U.S. 1 Year to Quit Navy Base," *Washington Post*, December 27, 1991, p. A18. The Philippine Foreign Office sent a formal notice of terminating the MBA, which determined that U.S. forces had to withdraw from Subic Bay Naval Base by the end of 1992. A Filipino local radio reported that the Philippine government received a reply from the U.S. government to accept the notice of termination by January 9, 1992. "Manila Gives Formal Notice to U.S. on Base Withdrawal," *New York Times*, December 31, 1991, p. A2; "Philippines Announces US Acceptance of Withdrawal from Subic Bay," *BBC*, January 10, 1992, Factiva.

to terminate the basing contract effective by the end of 1992. At the end of the visit to Singapore, President George Bush announced the transfer of the office of the 7th Fleet's Commander Task Force 73, accompanying up to 200 personnel.[357] Furthermore, the Department of Defense's report to Congress, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, published in 1992 (EASI-II), revealed that the U.S. Navy would redeploy 1,200 uniformed personnel to Guam along with an aerial logistics support squadron, a Navy SEAL unit, explosive-disposal unit, and personnel for ship repairs and a naval hospital.[358] At a committee hearing on the implications of loss of access to the U.S. bases in the Philippines on March 5, 1992, Admiral Larson disclosed that the ship repair functions would be redeployed to Yokosuka, Guam, Sasebo and to commercial contracts, and Yokosuka would probably take up over half the roles.[359] He added that the number of personnel who served at Subic Bay and Cubi Point could be reduced from 6,000 to 1,800 to maintain the critical functions at the existing bases.[360]

6.3. Conditions of Agreement on Closing Clark and Subic Bay

To analyze the different timing of U.S. decisions on the closure of the two bases, there are financial and strategic reasons. First, the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was a direct and decisive factor in the decision to relinquish Clark. The recovery from the serious damage was estimated to be too costly to persuade Congress to permit funding for it, particularly under a fiscal constraint.[361] The decision to abandon the Clark base was the result of cost calculation; the restoring and retaining cost exceeded the cost of losing and replacing the base.

The other reason is more strategic. For the United States, Clark was more expendable than Subic Bay.

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[357] Moon Ihlwan, "Bush Visit Crowns U.S. Efforts to Find Asian Base," Reuters, January 4, 1992, Factiva; John E. Yang, "Singapore Agrees to Host Navy Unit: Bush Unveils Planned Move from Subic Bay," *Washington Post*, January 4, 1992, p. A13. About CFT 73, see "Command History," Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, accessed May 21, 2022, https://www.clwp.navy.mil/History/.

[358] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992, 14–15.

[359] *Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bases: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House, 102nd Cong., 29 (March 5, 1992) (statement of Charles R. Larson (Adm.), CINCPAC).

[360] Ibid., 30.

[361] Pamela Fessler, "Mount Pinatubo May Reshape Debate over Military Bases," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, June 29, 1991; Krauss, "Volcano Is Unforeseen Third Party in Talks on Bases in Philippines." Representative Patricia Schroeder was a vocal advocate quitting the negotiations with the Philippines and blocking payment for repair of the damaged Clark base and base lease. Susanne M. Schafer, "Base Talks Renewed under Cloud?" Associated Press, July 11, 1991, Factiva.

Evelyn Colbert, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in 1978-1980, analyzed that the Navy did not have and could not get Subic Bay's assets out of anywhere else in Asia-Pacific, while the forces had been removed from Clark even before the eruption, adding that the airbase was considered less important even in the second half of the 1970s.[362] Moreover, retired Air Force General Russell Dougherty, former Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command, explained the difference in dependency on forward bases between an airbase and a naval base at the committee hearing on power projection without forward presence. According to him, Navy forces were dependent on logistic support on the ground, while Air Force forces could "project firepower quickly independent from forward basing."[363] He implicitly proposed making a deal to retain Subic Bay at the cost of losing Clark.[364] Although there is no evidence that the decision-makers made such a judgment in deciding to abandon the airbase, the view is a plausible explanation of the United States seeking to retain the Subic Bay base afterwards.

To agree on leaving Subic Bay, the United States not only dispersed the functions of the naval base to the existing bases but also showed an attitude that the state was willing to stay in Asia through the negotiations with the Philippines. When the governments of the United States and the Philippines signed the new treaty in August 1991 but the Philippine Senate rejected it shortly afterwards, President Bush told the special negotiator Armitage that the United States succeeded in proving to its friends and allies in Asia that the United States did its best and it was the Philippine Senate that decided to evict U.S. forces.[365] During the U.S.-Philippine base negotiation period, the United States sent a clear message constantly that it would keep its presence in Asia.[366] Furthermore, Armitage made diplomatic efforts to reassure the Asian partners—namely, Japan, Australia and Singapore—by visiting and/or communicating with them while bargaining with the

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362 Fessler, "Mount Pinatubo May Reshape Debate over Military Bases," 1771–1772.
363 "U.S. Power Projection and Decline in Overseas Bases and Defense Resources," in *Building a Defense That Works for the Post-Cold War World: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services*, House, 101st Cong., 332 (March 27, 1990) (statement of Russell E. Dougherty, (Gen., ret.), former Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command).
364 Ibid.
365 Richard Armitage, interview by author, Washington D.C., March 9, 2017.
366 U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990; U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992; George Bush, "US-Australian Friendship Remains Firm and Deep," in *US Department of State Dispatch*, January 13, 1992, 14–16, ProQuest Military Database; George Bush, "The US and Singapore: Opportunities for a New Era," in *US Department of State Dispatch*, January 13, 1992, 19–22, ProQuest Military Database; U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 1992, 10.

Philippines.[367] Armitage recalled the instruction that President Bush gave him before the PACT:

> The *only* concern the United States had was whether people in Asia might mistake leaving the Philippines for leaving Asia. President Bush had asked me to negotiate the basing agreement but he said to me, "we do not need this agreement at all. The Cold War was over. The Subic Bay and the Clark base were not important to us except that it indicated that we were staying in Asia." He said, "I do not care so much if you do not get the agreement. If you can, that would be good; but if you cannot, that's fine. But please make sure that you are diligent in visiting our Asian friends, particularly Japan." [emphasis added][368]

As the United States managed to redistribute the base functions and made diplomatic efforts to signal its intention to maintain the presence in Asia, it accepted the withdrawal from Subic Bay at the end of 1991.

To summarize this section on Philippine base alternatives, U.S. words and actions in relation to the contested bases were consistent with U.S. threat perception of weakening Soviet threat. The United States began a study of redeployment options in the event of loss of access to the military bases in the Philippines even before the bilateral negotiations for a new basing contract. The U.S. high officials' statements in public indicated that the feasible option was dispersion among the U.S. existing bases in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. forces compromised operational efficiency to some extent by redistributing the functions of Clark and Subic Bay to the facilities that offer smaller capacity, more limited access and longer lines of communication. Nevertheless, the remaining basing network enabled the United States to show its presence through continuing military activities in the region.

7. Summary

The Philippine case is generally explained by the hypothesis as it shows a linkage between U.S. threat perception and the conditions for base closure agreement. With regards to U.S. attitude towards the contested bases, the observation exhibits that the United States continued on emphasizing the importance of the bases and hoped to maintain them despite waning Soviet threat. Since the U.S. senior officers argued that it was impossible to replicate the extensive and staging bases anywhere else near the Philippines, it must be best

[367] In the interview with the author, Armitage revealed that he visited Tokyo eight times every time after the negotiations with the Philippines; visited Singapore three or four times; and provided updates for the Australian ambassador in Washington. He added that the diplomats of the three countries, especially Australia, tried to send cables to the Philippine Foreign Ministry and persuade the decision-makers. See, for example, Rene Pastor, "U.S. Presence Helps Asia Develop in Peace- Singapore Premier," Reuters, April 11, 1991, Factiva.

[368] Armitage, interview. Verbal emphasis made by the interviewee.

for the United States to retain the bases. From 1989, Soviet force reduction at Cam Ranh Bay became visible, which lowered the strategic value of U.S. bases in the Philippines. It was evident when U.S. high officials began mentioning concrete alternative options for the bases from 1989 and on, and American leaders, including the president and the chief negotiator, did not hide a possibility to withdraw the forces from the Philippines.

In terms of conditions of Philippine bases alternatives, the requirements for alternatives correspond with U.S. perception of abating Soviet threat. Acknowledging reduced strategic imperatives for U.S. presence in the Philippines as counterbalance to Soviet power, the loosened tension enabled the United States to disperse the base functions to existing U.S. bases in Asia-Pacific and take more relaxed force posture. The alternative of the Clark airbase was to relocate a fighter squadron to Alaska, disband the other fighter squadron, and redeploy special operation units to Okinawa. The Crow Valley training range, adjunct to Clark, was removed to Alaska temporarily. The alternative of the Subic Bay base was to increase access to Singaporean port for naval maintenance, repair, and supply, redeploy ship repair functions; move other capabilities to U.S. naval bases in Guam and Japan; and relocate the naval logistics command to Singapore.

However, the Philippine case has one point of minor inconsistency between the observation and the predictions. The timing of securing the alternatives seems slightly different from the predictions. For example, U.S. decisions on some substitutes of the Subic Bay base became public right after, not before, December 1991 when the United States agreed to concede the base within a year. It is hard to trace U.S. pre-arrangements because most of the relocation sites are existing bases of the U.S. forces, such as Guam and Japan. The United States and Japan have agreed that prior consultation is not required except for major changes in the deployment and the equipment of U.S. forces into Japan.[369] Considering that the announcement of the relocation plans came soon after U.S. acceptance of closing the last naval base, it is natural to assume that the United States had sought to acquire the alternatives before the final agreement on the base closure.

[369] According to the Government of Japan, major changes in the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces are equivalent to one army division or one naval task force. "Nichibei ampo joyaku: Shuyo kitei no kaisetsu [Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: Explanation of the Major Provisions]," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed February 17, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/jyoyaku_k.html; Kenji Matsuyama, "Nichibei ampo jōyaku no jizen-kyōgi ni kansuru 'mitsuyaku.' ['The secret agreement' about prior consultation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty]," *Issue Brief* 672 (Tokyo: National Diet Library, March 9, 2010).

There is another point to address, although it does not directly influence the hypothesis. In this case study, it was not observed that the United States had particular incentives to agree on closing the contested bases. In the cases of Spain and Okinawa, the United States had faced risks of losing other bases in the host countries and had incentives to strengthen the alliance relationship. The United States did not seem to have those risks in the Philippine case because the United States perceived the major threat declining and thus valued the bases as replaceable. For the same reason, the United States possibly saw no need in enhancing the alliance. In fact, the basing negotiations in 1990-1991 left the Mutual Defense Treaty untouched. It can be assumed that the United States did not have to worry about the continuation of the alliance tied by the treaty.

The highlight of the Philippine case is that the endurance of U.S. commitment to the region was at stake with regard to withdrawing the forces from the Philippines. As the perceived threat was weakening, the U.S. bases in the Philippines reduced the strategic value. However, the United States did not promptly agree to hand them over to the host. That was because the United States was concerned whether its force withdrawal might be translated as reducing its commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. In order to avoid Asian allies and friends from misunderstanding the U.S. move, the United States signaled its intention to maintain its regional commitment both inside and outside of the negotiations with the Philippines. The basing arrangements accompanied by the base closure agreement showed that even the smaller, dispersed footholds were enough to show its commitment. The United States further expected that the process of the United States trying to remain in the region would be a sign of commitment. That is why the United States sought to sustain the bases that had been losing strategic value until the very end.

Chapter 5. Okinawa

1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to explain the case of Okinawa by using the hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the closure of a contested base is agreed on when the United States secures an alternative that retains military capability to counter the perceived threat. If the hypothesis is valid, it should be observed in the Okinawan case that the United States 1) perceives regional security concerns, albeit not equivalent to the preceding Soviet threat, and values the contested base as vital and irreplaceable, 2) seeks to maintain the major capability but allows certain reduction in readiness and military efficiency, 3) seeks to secure an alternative of the combination of replication and dispersion that can respond to regional contingencies, and 4) agrees on closing the contested base after securing the alternative.

In this case, the United States agreed to close the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma which Okinawa Prefecture demanded in 1995. The kidnap and rape incident by three servicemen against a local schoolgirl in September 1995 ignited rage among Okinawan citizens toward U.S. military presence in the prefecture. A great number of people participated in protest rallies, and the Okinawan governor demonstrated the demand for base reduction in various ways. On the other hand, the governments of the United States and Japan were accelerating consultations for redefining the alliance after overcoming the period of alliance adrift in the early 1990s. Tokyo and Washington were worried that the rising anti-base movements in Okinawa would make it difficult to continue a stable U.S. presence and hinder the prospected development of the security alliance.[370] From these concerns, the United States agreed with Japan to return the Futenma base. After the preliminary agreement in April 1996, the United States and Japan examined alternatives to the base within Okinawa. To meet the military requirements and at the same time lessen the burden on Okinawa, the two governments reached an agreement in December 1996 to construct a sea-based facility to replace the Futenma base while particular functions were relocated to some existing U.S. bases in and out of Okinawa.

This chapter argues that the final agreement of returning the Futenma base was conditional on relocation within Okinawa, and it was linked to U.S. threat assessment of the East Asian regional environment

[370] Funabashi Yoichi, *Dōmei hyōryu* [Alliance adrift] (Iwanami Shoten, 1997). Details will be discussed in Section 5.2.

in the post-Cold War period. Although the security concerns were not comparable to the former Soviet threat, East Asia witnessed emerging sources of instability such as North Korean nuclear development and uncertainty of China's future direction from the early 1990s. According to the final agreement, the helicopter units based at the Futenma base were to be relocated to a newly constructed facility offshore in Okinawa. Even before the Futenma issue was brought to the diplomatic agenda, the United States did not intend to change the force structure that solidified the presence of the Marine Corps in Okinawa. Among three options of alternatives, which were all supposed to have required capabilities, the United States and Japan reached a final one that was expected to have less impact on Okinawa. This case is unique in that the two governments considered the political aspect, or concerns for the Okinawa public, in the course of finalizing the condition of the base return. It is noted, however, that the governments' consideration for the local citizens did not necessarily meet their expectations. Though it goes beyond the scope of dissertation, the agreement afterward shows the conditional agreement of 1996 has not gained consensus among the people living under the certain influence of the U.S. military presence.

In this case there are numerous publications from various perspectives and approaches.[371] Well explored and explained are the influence of anti-base mobilization and political interactions between the central and the local governments.[372] The existing literature sheds much less light on U.S. perspective, which leaves a couple of puzzles. First, why did the United States agree to let go of the base that had already been valued as strategically important even after the end of the Cold War? As discussed later in Section 3, the post-Cold War strategy for Asia-Pacific reconfirmed that U.S. presence would remain the status quo to be able to respond to possible contingencies and continue to be committed to the region.[373] It leads to the second puzzle

[371] For example, Alexander Cooley and Kimberly Marten, "Base Motives: The Political Economy of Okinawa's Antimilitarism," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 4 (July 2006): 566–583; H. D. P. Envall and Kerri Ng, "The Okinawa 'Effect' in US–Japan Alliance Politics," *Asian Security* 11, no. 3 (September 2015): 225–241; Masamichi S Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, "Okinawa: Women's Struggle for Demilitarization," in *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, ed. Catherine Lutz (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 243–269.
[372] Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008); Andrew Yeo, *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Yuko Kawato, *Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015) ; Hyon Joo Yoo, "When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (2014): 403–423; Claudia J. Kim and Taylor C. Boas, "Activist Disconnect: Social Movements, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Bases in East Asia," *Armed Forces & Society* 46, no. 4 (2020): 696-715.
[373] U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995.

of protests' impact on the base closure agreement. The case of Okinawa witnessed significant anti-base movements but they were rather small compared to the previously examined cases; in the cases of Spain and the Philippines, the demands for base reductions were nationwide and the governments and the legislatures questioned the U.S. presence. Did the return of Futenma mean that the United States made a concession to Okinawa which had a relatively small scale of the anti-base protest?

This chapter first reviews the background of the base contestation, tracing the path of Okinawan struggle with the U.S. bases. Section 3 briefly introduces the roles and functions of the contested Futenma base. The following sections examine whether observation of the Okinawan case is congruent with the predictions drawn from the hypothesis. Section 4, 5 and 6 focus on U.S. threat perception, evaluation of the contested Futenma base, and negotiations and arrangements for alternatives respectively. U.S. government reports and statements made by high officials indicate how the United States evaluated the base. To find the process of the United States securing an alternative to the Futenma base, useful sources are two collections. One is a collection titled "Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000" in the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA).[374] The other is a series of U.S. declassified documents related to the 1995-1996 negotiations. The documents are compiled by Masaaki Gabe and available at the University of Ryukyus Repository.[375] The combination of written sources, including the partially declassified official records, newspaper articles and memoirs, and interviews with the people who were involved in the process helps grasp what the United States was thinking at that time.

2. From Base Establishment to Contestation

U.S. military bases in Okinawa were established during the Pacific War and expanded afterwards. Okinawa became a field of battle between Imperial Japan and U.S.-led Allied Forces. As soon as U.S. forces entered and seized the main island of Okinawa in April 1945, they began constructing military bases for their future attack on the Japanese mainland. After World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan

[374] Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), "Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1961-2000," accessed February 17, 2022, https://proquest.libguides.com/dnsa/japan1961. Hereinafter abbreviated as DNSA.

[375] Masaaki Gabe, *Higashiajia takokukan anzenhosyō wakugumi sōshutsu no tameno kenkyū: Beigun purezensu no taiyō* [Research to create an East Asia multilateral security framework: The state of U.S. presence], 2008, http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/6967. Hereinafter abbreviated as Gabe, 2008 KAKEN.

Security Treaty were signed in 1951. The former allowed the United States to base its forces without explicit guarantee for them to protect Japan; the latter granted the United States rights of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the Ryukyu Islands and other designated islands.[376] This arrangement separated Okinawa from Japan, putting the former under the U.S. control for about 27 years.

U.S. military presence in Okinawa was increased and reinforced through the 1950s and 60s. U.S. military bases in mainland Japan and Okinawa supported the operations in the Korean War. After the cease-fire, the United States realigned its forward deployed forces in Asia. At the same time, the U.S. military faced strong anti-base opposition and movements in mainland Japan, which fostered the force realignment. Consequently, the Marine Corps moved from several camps in mainland Japan to Okinawa in 1955.[377] The realignment of U.S. forces in Japan resulted in the concentration of forces on Okinawa. The number of U.S. military personnel in 1953 was approximately 186,000 in mainland Japan and 23,300 in Okinawa, but that in 1960 changed to 46,000 and 37,000 respectively.[378]

As in mainland Japan, the people in Okinawa protested against the U.S. military presence. The people of Okinawa associated their resistance to Japan's territorial integrity and developed an atmosphere in favor of the return of the U.S.-occupied islands to Japan. The movement led to U.S.-Japan negotiations over the status of Okinawa in the late 1960s. During the negotiations, Tokyo sought to apply its constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to Okinawa, while Washington tried to obtain a guarantee of free access and the introduction of nuclear weapons to the bases in Okinawa.[379] It resulted in Okinawa's reversion to Japan in May 1972 with most of the U.S. bases maintained. It is noted that a U.S.-Japan secret agreement granted the United States the re-entry of nuclear weapons to post-reversion Okinawa in case of emergency.[380]

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[376] Kosuke Yoshitsugu, *Nichibei ampo taisei shi* [History of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements] (Iwanami Shoten, 2018).

[377] Tomohiro Yara, *Okinawa to kaiheitai: Chūryū no rekishiteki keii* [Okinawa and the Marine Corps: Historical Development of Basing] (Jumpōsha, 2016); Akiko Yamamoto, *Beikoku to nichibei Ampo joyaku kaitei: Okinawa, kichi, dōmei* [The United States and the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: Okinawa, Bases and Alliance] (Yoshida Shoten, 2017).

[378] Hirofumi Hayashi, *Beigun kichi no rekishi* [History of U.S. Bases] (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012), 127.

[379] Takuma Nakajima, *Okinawa henkan to nichibei anpo taisei* [Reversion of Okinawa and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements] (Yūhikaku, 2012).

[380] Yukinori Komine, "Okinawa Confidential, 1969: Exploring the Linkage between the Nuclear Issue and the Base Issue," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 4 (2013): 807–840. On the negotiations over the secret agreement, see Kei Wakaizumi, *The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations*, ed. John Swenson-Wright (Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).

The reunification with Japan did not dissolve the discontent with U.S. bases among the people in Okinawa. Rather, post-Vietnam War U.S. strategy accelerated the base concentration in Okinawa by redeploying its forces from mainland Japan.[381] The people of Okinawa continued to bear the costs of the U.S.-Japan security system, undergoing accidents and incidents pertaining to the U.S. military. The situation formed unique triangular relations between Okinawa, Tokyo and Washington.[382] Okinawa protested over the U.S. military presence and sent petitions to Tokyo and to Washington. Tokyo was responsible for providing Okinawa with development aid as well as compensation for the bases, and also for consulting Washington over the issues raised from Okinawa. Washington provided security and protection for Japan, while Tokyo sought to ensure provision of bases for the United States.



Figure 5.1 Map of the U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa
Source: *Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa*, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Report (Washington D.C., March 1998), 17.

[381] Shinji Kawana, *Kichi no shōchō 1968-1973: Nihon hondo no beigun kichi "tettai" seisaku* [The Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Bases 1968-1973: The Policy of Withdrawal from Mainland Japan] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2020).
[382] Masaaki Gabe, "It's High Time to Wake Up: Japanese Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century," in *Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity*, eds. Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

There was no major change in the U.S. force posture and bases in Okinawa until the beginning of the 1990s. The island prefecture accommodated the bases of all four U.S. military services. The number of personnel changed between 60,000 and 70,000 every year through the 1970s and 1980s.[383] The total base area remained more than 250 square kilometers, which was about 12 percent reduction from that of the time when Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972.[384] The Air Force operated Kadena Air Base; the largest airbase in Asia Pacific after Clark Air Base in the Philippines was closed. The U.S. Army Garrison Torii Station supported logistics and communication. U.S. naval forces were located at White Beach. The comparatively smaller Naha Naval Port supported sealift ships and amphibious ships for unloading material for all the services. Marine Corps facilities were dispersedly located within the island. Its warehouses held war reserve supplies of 14,400 tons of ammunition, 5,000 items of equipment for personnel and units, and 50 million gallons of fuel.[385] Not only the land but also specific areas in the air and sea were provided for U.S. military operations and daily training.

However, Okinawa and the U.S. forces in the island prefecture faced a significant turning point by a critical incident pertaining to the U.S. military. On September 4, 1995, three American servicemen kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl of Okinawa. The major crime shook the local people, and eventually, the foundation of U.S.-Japan security relations. Although it was not the first major case in which U.S. personnel committed crimes against local citizens, anti-base protests in response to the brutal case became significant in the post-reversion history of Okinawa in terms of size and inclusiveness.[386] A massive rally held on October 21, 1995 gathered approximately 85,000 people. Behind the outburst of anger was the accumulation of inequality.[387]

Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Masahide Ota sought to let voices from Okinawa be heard through several measures. Firstly, at the prefectural assembly regular meeting on September 28, 1995, he announced his decision not to sign the land-lease documents.[388] Without a governor's proxy signature, the usage of

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[383] Refer to Appendix III-A.
[384] Refer to Appendix III-B.
[385] U.S. General Accounting Office, "Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa," Government (U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1998), 25.
[386] The immediate reaction of the people of Okinawa was their questioning of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Since the SOFA allowed the US military to detain the suspected servicemen until prosecution by Japanese authorities, local police were not able to take the three accused military personnel into custody.
[387] Miyume Tanji, *Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa* (London: Routledge, 2006).
[388] Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, Regular Meeting on September 28, 1995 (In Japanese). Although the proxy

land provided for the U.S. military would lose a legal basis. Secondly, he began demanding the return of Futenma Air Station because it had not only caused a noise issue but also had potential risk of serious accident.[389] The base had been a serious concern among the people of Okinawa as his predecessor had also claimed the return of it since the mid-1980s.[390] Finally, he sought to establish an independent economic structure for the prefecture. As a part of the initiative, the Okinawa Prefectural Government released the Base Return Action Program that aimed for the gradual return of all the land taken as U.S. bases over a period of 15 years in order to redevelop the area.[391]

In order to respond to the heated situation and discuss concrete measures to reduce the "burden" on the people of Okinawa, the two countries formed a special organization, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November 1995.[392] The first meeting of the committee confirmed the following: first, to examine effective measures to realign, consolidate and reduce the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa; second, to consider concrete solutions to problems of training and noise derived from the U.S.

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signature was just an administrative procedure, Ota considered it as an opportunity to make the central government listen to Okinawan voice. His decision implied a demand for "peace dividend" in Okinawa after the Cold War ended, rather than how strong the impact of the case was. Taizo Miyagi and Tsuyoshi Watanabe, *Futenma-Henoko yugamerareta nijūnen* [Futenma-Henoko twisted 20 years] (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 2016), 30. For details about Japanese domestic politics over the land-lease issue and the consequences, see Aurelia George Mulgan, "Managing the US Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese Democracy," *Japanese Studies* 20, no. 2 (September 2000): 159–177. Regarding Okinawa's attempt to reduce the burdens of U.S. presence and its consequences, see Shino Hateruma, "Okinawa's Search for Autonomy and Tokyo's Commitment to the Japan-U.S. Alliance," in *The Influence of Sub-State Actors on National Security: Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy*, ed. Minori Takahashi (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 85–109.

[389] Masahide Ota, *Okinawa no ketsudan* [Decision of Okinawa] (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsya, 2000), 201–204; GRIPS C.O.E. Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Yoshimoto Masanori (moto okinawaken fukuchiji) oraru hisutori* [Masanori Yoshimoto (Former Vice-Governor) Oral History] (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2005), 99; Funabashi *Dōmei hyōryu*, 39–40.

[390] Junji Nishime, who served as Okinawan Governor from 1978 to 1990, visited Washington D.C. twice during his service. At his first trip in 1985, he visited secretaries of state and defense and a Commandant of the Marine Corps to request the reduction of the bases, such as Naha Port and Futenma Air Station. Robert D. Eldridge, "Post-Reversion Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Relations: A Preliminary Survey of Local Politics and the Bases, 1972-2002," *U.S.-Japan Alliance Affairs Series* 1 (Osaka University, May 2004), 31–32.

[391] The Base Return Action Program aimed at transforming Okinawa to a base-free prefecture by achieving base returns over three phases. Futenma and Naha Port were included in the first phase to be returned by 2001. Kadena Air Force Base was categorized into the third phase to be returned by 2015. "Kichi henkan akushon puroguramu [Base Return Action Program)]" *Okinawa Times*, January 31, 1996, p. 2.

[392] SACO was consisted of the following members: From the United States, Assistant Secretary of State, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs of the Joint Staff, J-5 Director of the Pacific Command, Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy in Tokyo; from Japan, Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General, Defense Policy Bureau of Japan Defense Agency, Director General of Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and Chairman of the Joint Staff Council. The rank of the SACO members was higher than that of members of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee in which they discuss issues related to the Status of Forces Agreement. Takeshi Fukuda, "Okinawa beigun kichi no henkan: SACO gōi no jisshi jōkyo o chūshin ni [The return of U.S. military bases in Okinawa: Implementation of SACO agreement]," *Reference* (Tokyo: National Diet Library, October 2003), https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/999974.

bases; and third, to report the result of considerations within a year.[393] Ryutaro Hashimoto, who had a personal feeling toward Okinawa, became the prime minister in January 1996.[394] At his first summit meeting on February 23, 1996, Hashimoto informed U.S. President William J. Clinton that Okinawa requested the return of Futenma.[395] Clinton neither accepted nor disagreed with the issue. This meeting initiated a secret consultation of the U.S. and Japanese high officials who aimed to derive some results on the Futenma base before Clinton's visit to Tokyo in mid-April.[396]

3. Role and Function of Futenma Air Station

The user of Futenma Air Station is the Marine Corps. Its fundamental mission has been to penetrate into enemy territory, establish a bridgehead and lay the foundation necessary for the rest of joint force entry.[397] Their distinctive feature is an integrated force in ground, air and maritime domains. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a basic organization, consisting of four deployable elements: command, ground combat, aviation combat and logistics combat.[398] Different sizes of MAGTF are organized in accordance with immediate tasks. They vary from a battalion-size Marine Expeditionary Unit with 2,000 to 3,000 personnel, Marine Expeditionary Brigade with up to 20,000 personnel, to larger Marine Expeditionary Force which is a primary standing warfighting organization.[399]

The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), the only one based overseas, consists of the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), 3rd Marine Logistics Group, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and III Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group.[400] A MEF has "the capability for projecting offensive combat power ashore" as well as the self-

[393] "Okinawa kichi 'ichi-nen inai ni ketsuron' [Okinawa bases 'conclude within one year']," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 21, 1995, morning edition , p. 2.
[394] Regarding Hashimoto's personal feeling for Okinawa, see Takemasa Moriya, "Kichi riken ni furimawasareru Futenma, nitibei dōmei [Futenma and Japan-U.S. alliance swayed by local interests]," *Chuo Koron*, January 2010, 107–108; Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu*, 31–32, 140–143.
[395] Makoto Iokibe and Taizo Miyagi, eds., *Hashimoto Ryutaro gaikō kaikoroku* [Ryutaro Hasimoto's memoir on foreign affairs] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 65–67. Hashimoto confirmed the Governor Ota's strong demand for the return of the Futenma base.
[396] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 49–50,62–63; Tanaka, *Gaikō no chikara* [The Power of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nihonkeizaishimbun Suppansya, 2009), 76–83.
[397] U.S. Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2013*, 6.
[398] Ibid., 12–13.
[399] Ibid., 13–15.
[400] "III Marine Expeditionary Forces," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed January 11, 2022, https://www.iiimef.marines.mil/.

sustaining capability in combat for 60 days.[401] Most of the units of III MEF have been stationed in Okinawa. The home of the 3rd Marine Division is Camp Courtney; Marine Corps Air Station Futenma is a strategic airfield for the 1st MAW; Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen provide Marines accommodation and training areas; and Camp Kinser has warehouse space for reserve supplies. There are some other vast training areas and an auxiliary airfield. These bases spread all over Okinawa Main Island.

Aircraft based in Futenma are a leg of the forces, providing airlift for the infantry and artillery units. As of April 1991, 74 aircraft belonged to Futenma Air Base.[402] It housed 53 helicopters, including 24 CH-46F and 12 CH-53E that transport cargo and fully equipped Marines. There were also 8 attack helicopters (AH-1W) and 9 utility combat helicopters (UH-1N). Moreover, the base possessed 21 fixed-wing aircraft including 12 KC-130 that is capable of refueling those helicopters as well as fixed-wing aircraft, and three light passenger and cargo aircraft of UC-12F and CT-39G. All these aircraft, except the last two, belonged to the Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), one of the two aircraft groups subordinating to 1st MAW.

The Marine Corps started using the Futenma base in 1960 when the Air Force handed over control of the base to them.[403] After fighting the Vietnam War, MAG-36 was redeployed to the Futenma base. In 1976 the headquarter of the 1st MAW was moved from Iwakuni to Futenma, which realized the Marine Corp "many years of desire" to enhance the capability of ground-air integrated operations.[404]

The Futenma base has been tasked to serve the Fleet Marine Force aircraft in support of ground forces, intermediate aircraft maintenance facilities, and tenants' administration and logistics. The base itself has not been directly engaged in combat operations. In the meantime, its user units conducted a number of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Japan, Southeast Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean.[405]

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401 "What is II MEF?" U.S. Marine Corps, accessed May 27, 2022, https://www.iimef.marines.mil/About/What-is-II-MEF/.
402 "MCAS Futenma Master Plan" June 1992. In Gabe, 2008 KAKEN.
403 Fumiaki Nozoe, *Okinawa beigun kichi zenshi* [The complete history of U.S. military bases in Okinawa] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2020), 77.
404 Ibid., 132.
405 "Marine Aircraft Group 36: About," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed January 11, 2022, https://www.1stmaw.marines.mil/Subordinate-Units/Marine-Aircraft-Group-36/About/; "Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 36: About," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed January 11, 2022, https://www.1stmaw.marines.mil/Subordinate-Units/Marine-Aircraft-Group-36/MALS-36/About/.

4. U.S. Threat Perception

The U.S. threat perception in Asia Pacific right after the Soviet collapse was minimal but still warranted. In the first half of the 1990s the United States saw uncertainty in this region. Unlike the significant Soviet threat in the past, North Korea and China were not comparable threats but posed a security concern. North Korea could develop nuclear weapons and take part in nuclear proliferation. China could rise as a non-democratic power. An allied partner Japan was an economic competitor for the United States. There was even a concern that Japan could step into rearmament.

As of 1990 the United States acknowledged that there was no major threat in Asia-Pacific. In the United States' assumption, it would be a change of its own behavior that could create a threatening situation. The United States considered that reducing its commitment would generate a security vacuum that any other regional powers try to fill in and it would lead to an arms race and destabilize the region.[406]

The situation over North Korea was not favorable to the United States—it actually deteriorated toward the mid-1990s. As of 1992, the United States was concerned about North Korea's military buildup, especially its continuous increase of ballistic missiles that would cover South Korea and mainland Japan.[407] The United States watched North Korea cautiously as a possible source of military conflict. For example, in the Bottom-up Review of 1993, the United States rebuilt its force posture under assumption of a major regional conflict in the Korean Peninsula. The United States recognized that North Korean armed forces outnumbered that of the United States and South Korea in peacetime, though North Korean airpower was inferior to the allied forces in quality.[408] Furthermore, John Deutch, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) testified at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 22, 1996 that the threat from North Korea was traditionally considered as an all-out invasion of the South.[409] However, he pointed out that North Korea's growing uncertainty would increase the possibility of quick invasion, which would provide short warning.[410]

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406 U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990, 7.
407 U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992, 5–6.
408 *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995—S. 2182 (H.R. 4301) and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services*, House, 103rd Cong., 990 (March 24, 1994) (statement of Walter B. Slocombe, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy).
409 *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad*, Senate, 104th Cong., 39 (February 22, 1996) (statement of John M, Deutch, Director of CIA).
410 Ibid.

North Korea's suspected nuclear development program and non-cooperation with international inspection intensified the confrontation with the United States.[411] On March 20, 1996, Lieutenant General Malcolm O'Neill, U.S. Army, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, commented that South Korea and the U.S. Forces supporting South Korea would be under the most direct threat of ballistic missiles.[412] On the other hand, on April 17, 1996, he testified that he would consider North Korea's ballistic missile system as a strategic threat to the United States.[413] He stated a reason that the North Koreans showed no intention to wage tactical theater warfare or hitting South Korea but the only target for North Korea was the United States.[414] In fact, the Pentagon elaborated a plan to reinforce U.S. forces in South Korea as a coercive measure and envisaged the possibility of using U.S. bases in Japan in case of North Korean pre-emptive attack.[415] Ultimately, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* of 1995, known as the Nye report, underlined that "North Korea remains a source of unpredictability and potential danger for the region… North Korea's conventional military threat to the Republic of Korea has not abated, and requires continued vigilance and commitment of United States forces."[416]

China was another growing concern because of its military buildup and lack of transparency. In 1990 the United States considered China as not "a major military threat" because it put military modernization at the bottom of priority.[417] However, in 1995 the United States saw China cautiously when it was gradually increasing its military force and yet its long-term goal was not necessarily clear.[418] Nonetheless, China was far from being a major competitor as the former Soviet Union. The United States

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411 John M. Collins, *Korean Crisis, 1994: Military Geography, Military Balance, Military Options* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 11, 1994); Richard P. Cronin, *North Korea: U.S. Policy and Negotiations to Halt Its Nuclear Weapons Program; An Annotated Chronology and Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 18, 1994).

412 *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,* Senate, 104th Cong., 66 (March 20, 1996) (statement of Lt. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, U.S. Army, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization).

413 *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 104th Cong., 443 (April 17, 1996) (statement of Lt. Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, U.S. Army, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization).

414 Ibid.

415 William H. Perry, *Kaku naki sekai wo motomete* [In Search of No Nuclear World] (Tokyo: Nihonkeizaishimbun Suppansya, 2011), 109–110.

416 U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995, 18. The strategy report was called the Nye report because Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) worked on its creation.

417 U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990, 3.

418 U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 1995, 15.

under President Clinton chose engagement with China not containment.[419]

During the U.S.-Japan negotiations on U.S. bases in Okinawa, political and military tension heightened between China and Taiwan. China conducted a missile exercise near Taiwan on March 8, 1996 to threaten Taiwan's first presidential election. The United States responded to the Chinese provocation by sending one aircraft carrier battle group in the strait and one near the sea.[420] At the hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 22, 1996, the U.S. government assessed the possibility of China's attack on Taiwan and the threat posed by the recent tensions as to be low.[421] The Department of State disclosed its assessment that China committing the aggression on Taiwan depended more on actions taken by Taiwanese authorities than on Chinese military capabilities.[422] Sharing the common view, the Department of Defense and CIA further expressed concern that the potential for hostilities would be amplified by accident or miscalculation.[423]

The other concern for the United States in the early 1990s was its sour relations with Japan. While the Clinton administration sought to adjust the trade imbalance with Japan, the bilateral relationship was drifting. Then-Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa appointed an advisory commission to review the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, under which Japan contributed to regional peace and stability alongside the United States, and to search for an alternative guideline for the new era. The report submitted by the commission in August 1994, known as the Higuchi report, recommended that Japan promote international and multilateral security cooperation through the United Nations and regional frameworks. On the other hand, the Higuchi report clearly stated that the U.S.-centered alliance network would be irreplaceable and sustainable, even if U.S. relative power, particularly in the economic realm, would decline and consequently

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[419] William H. Perry, "U.S. Strategy: Engage China, Not Contain It," (remarks at Washington State China Relations Council, Seattle) U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), October 30, 1995, accessed on March 3, 2015, http://defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1023.

[420] Perry, *Kaku naki sekai wo motomete,* 141–142.

[421] *Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence*, Senate, 104th Cong., 130 (February 22, 1996) (written responses from Barbara Larkin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State); *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations*, House, 104th Cong., 11 (March 14, 1996) (statement of Dr. Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

[422] *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, 130 (February 22, 1996) (statement of Larkin, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State).

[423] *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, 12–13, 34 (February 22, 1996) (John M. Deutch, Director of CIA); *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,* 11 (March 14, 1996) (statement of Campbell).

international economic conflicts would be more likely.[424]

However, American observers of Japanese politics interpreted the aforementioned recommendation as a hedge against the fading interests of the United States in the region.[425] They reacted promptly to the Japanese reexamination process.[426] They were concerned that Japan's drift would bring unfavorable consequences for the United States. Reportedly, some within the Clinton administration worried that if the United States hammered Japan on trade issues, it would stray from the alliance, which could threaten Asian countries with the thought of the possible remilitarization of Japan and endanger vital US bases in the country.[427]

The Japan watchers' concerns yielded a new policy for Japan in the report, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, or the Nye report.[428] Published in February 1995, the report emphasized the deterrent role of U.S. military presence in the region. Based on realist logic, it signaled that without U.S. presence Asian countries would step up military buildup and threaten neighbors, which would create instability.[429] To prevent this situation and demonstrate commitment to security in the region, the report recommended maintaining the US forward deployment of 100,000 personnel in the future. The Department of Defense emphasized that such force posture was a commitment of enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and a physical manifestation of U.S. commitment to peace and stability.[430] In the case of Japan, the US intended to retain more than one Air Force wing, the Navy's 7th Fleet activities, and a Marine

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[424] "Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, 'The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century' (Higuchi Report)," "The World and Japan" Database, accessed February 17, 2022, https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPSC/19940812.O1E.html.

[425] Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* (DIANE Publishing, 1994); Daniel Williams, "Rebuilding Military Ties to Tokyo: 'Nye Initiative' Launched to Address Post-Cold War Security Concerns," *Washington Post,* February 19, 1995, p. A48.

[426] David L. Asher, "A U.S.-Japan Alliance for the next Century," *Orbis* 41, no. 3 (June 1997): 343–374.

[427] Williams, "Rebuilding Military Ties to Tokyo." Facing the internal pressure from financial circles that were inclined to drive Japan to bay, national security experts sought to focus on and reinforce the alliance relationship with Japan. Norimoto Mizusawa, "Joseph Nye no nichibei dōmei eno shikaku [Joseph Nye's intention in redefining the U.S.-Japan relationship]," *Meiji Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyujo Kiyo* 46, no. 2 (March 2008): 223–240.

[428] The then Director General of Defense Policy Bureau, JDA, Akiyama thought it facile to view that the Nye report initiated the U.S.-Japan arrangements for redefining the alliance. From his perspective, after Washington and Tokyo both began searching for a new bilateral relation in 1992 and 93, "Higuchi report triggered" the birth of the Nye report and also led to the new National Defense Program Outline. Masahiro Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta* [Japan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue Begins] (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), 61.

[429] U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. 1995, 9.

[430] *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait*, 12 (March 14, 1996) (statement of Kurt M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

Expeditionary Force in Okinawa for air and sea supremacy and rapid deployment.[431]

Going through the Higuchi report and the Nye initiative, the United States and Japan planned to construct a substantive structure of the security cooperation. There were upcoming arrangements for strengthening the alliance such as the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (to be promulgated during Clinton's visit scheduled in Nov 1995), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and the subsequent review and formulation of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation.[432]

5. U.S. Evaluation of the Futenma Base

This section clarifies a causal link between U.S. threat perception and its evaluation of the contested base. If the hypothesis is correct, the following should be observed: the United States should

- insist on the importance of the contested base
- propose force reduction but does not yield to the return of the base
- claim that there is no other way to counter the threat than maintaining the base
- not publicly mention the possibility to relocate the base
- accept the Okinawan and Japanese demand when it sees a possibility of losing access to the other bases including the most significant ones.

This section examines whether the United States valued the contested Futenma base in accordance with the U.S. threat perception in East Asia. While there was no major threat comparable to the former Soviet Union, the United States was concerned about smaller uncertain sources of regional instability, such as North Korea's nuclear development and possible proliferation of weapons, China's rise, territorial disputes and so on. Such a regional situation made the United States want to maintain its forward presence in Japan, including Okinawa. The Marine Corps in Okinawa was valuable because they were capable of being deployed to the initial stages of contingencies throughout the region. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma became the center of the discussion after Prime Minister Hashimoto brought it up at the summit meeting with President Clinton at the end of February 1996. Until then U.S. high officials highlighted the

[431] Ibid., 25.
[432] The Joint Declaration on Security would be made public in November 1995 as a culmination of reviewing the alliance. However, President Clinton could not make a visit to Japan due to domestic affairs, so the schedule for the declaration was suspended to April 1996.

importance of U.S. military presence in Okinawa while refraining from directly mentioning the Futenma base or publicly discussing its strategic importance.

The first subsection shows arguments by U.S. high officials about the importance of the Marine forces in Okinawa. The following subsection narrows the focus on Futenma. It shows that the United States agreed to return the base to alleviate the anti-base tension in Okinawa and gain Japanese public support for reinforcing the U.S.-Japan alliance.

5.1. Importance of the Marine Corps forces in Okinawa

The United States asserted that it was important to maintain the Marines in Okinawa throughout the 1990s. Prior to the 1995 incident in Okinawa, the United States had determined to maintain the Marine Corps in Okinawa. That had already appeared in U.S. government documents in the first half of the 1990s. The Bottom-up Review, which induced drastic force reduction mainly in Western Europe according to changes in the international environment, did not transform the structure of U.S. forces in Japan. The Department of Defense report to Congress, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* (known as EASI-I), aimed to reduce some 5,000-6,000 personnel particularly in Okinawa within one to three years. No major bases in Okinawa were nominated for closure, while the report indicated that it was necessary to consolidate the bases in Okinawa in order to ease the local pressure.[433] The subsequent report known as EASI-II of 1992 reported that the previous initiative restructured and cut down some Marine units in Okinawa, which resulted in 3,500 personnel reduction. However, the report showed no plan for further reduction of the Marine Corps in Japan.[434] As discussed in the previous section, the Nye initiative of February 1995 determined the policy of continued commitment in East Asia by maintaining a force strength of 100,000 personnel.[435] The Nye report clearly stated that a Marine Expeditionary Force would remain on Okinawa.

Based on the Nye initiative, the American leaders presented no intention or plan to change the force posture or structure in Okinawa during the SACO discussion period. SACO would propose recommendations within the limits that the Nye initiative had set. When Defense Secretary William J. Perry

[433] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1990.
[434] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress*, 1992.
[435] Acknowledging Okinawan had legitimate concerns over base concentration, Nye warned that the set number would not be changed because U.S. forward presence provided the stability, or the "oxygen." Joseph S. Nye Jr., "U.S. Presence: Oxygen for Asia," *Washington Post*, December 1995, p. A27.

visited Tokyo in November 1995, he clearly stated at the Japan National Press Club that all the arrangements for reducing the impacts of U.S. presence on Okinawa "must be made within the constraint of keeping a total of 47,000 troops in Japan."[436] In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 1996, he reiterated that the SACO and its working groups were discussing adjustments of U.S. forces facilities and activities but those adjustments would not affect the force strength sustained on the island.[437] In the background book prepared prior to Defense Secretary Perry's visit to Tokyo in April 1996, Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, confirmed that SACO would "not address U.S. force structure or operational readiness for U.S. forces in Japan."[438]

In congressional hearings, military leaders claimed the importance of U.S. military presence in Okinawa but not specifically that of the Futenma base. In the nomination to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Admiral Joseph Prueher was asked about the importance of U.S. presence in Okinawa to operations of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). He emphasized, "the strategic importance of Okinawa and the forces forward deployed there, in relation to critical sea lines of communication, the Korean Peninsula, and Asian region, are pivotal."[439]

Geography and military assets disposed on Okinawa enabled the Marine Corps to conduct rapid deployment operations. Prueher clarified that the Marines on Okinawa can be deployed in the event of a regional contingency by seven to ten days faster than Hawaii or the continental U.S.[440] Furthermore, he emphasized that they could respond rapidly to various crises throughout the region and such flexibility

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436 Nicholas Kristof, "U.S. Apologizes to Japan for Rape of 12-Year-Old in Okinawa," *New York Times*, November 2, 1995, p. A7. Kristof wrote, "He [Perry] pricked balooning hopes in Okinawa that the furor over the rape might lead to the closing of a major base."

437 *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY97 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 104th Cong., 130 (March 5, 1996) (statement of William Perry, Secretary, Department of Defense).

438 The background book has been declassified and available at DNSA. "Special Action Committee on Okinawa," prepared by Kurt Campbell, in *Secretary of Defense Perry Visit to Tokyo, 14-15 April 96, Background Book*, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000, DNSA.

439 *Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Second Session, 104th Congress: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services,* Senate, 104th Cong., 35 (January 26, 1996) (statement of Joseph Prueher, (Adm.), U.S. Navy). However, in the hearing two months later, he testified that the strategic importance of Okinawa had nothing to do with the outcome in Korea. *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY97 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services*, Senate, 104th Cong., 864 (March 28, 1996) (statement of Prueher, CINCPAC).

440 *Nominations Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 35 (January 26, 1996) (statement of Prueher, (Adm.), U.S. Navy).

sustained "credible power projection capability."[441]

Moreover, General Charles Krulak, Commandant of U.S. Marine Corps implied that the sustainability of U.S. forward presence in the Pacific could be endangered if Marine Corps were ousted from Okinawa. Touching on the fact that Japan bore 54 percent of the direct costs of U.S. troops in Okinawa, Krulak warned that the United States would have to absorb those costs if its forces were removed from the island, which might lead to questioning the policy of forward deployment in the Pacific.[442]

5.2. Importance of Futenma Air Station

Prior to the summit meeting in February 1996, the United States maintained a hardened attitude on the issue of the Futenma base as well as other U.S. bases in Okinawa. The summit officially put the Futenma base on the table of the SACO negotiations. The United States preliminarily agreed on the return of the base in April 1996. This subsection elaborates the following two incentives in the background of the agreement: the need to soothe public antagonism of U.S. military presence; and the need to foster public support for a stronger security relationship between the United States and Japan. Importantly, the United States insisted that the base return would be bound to a condition of relocating the Futenma-based helicopter squadrons within Okinawa.

In the early period of the SACO negotiations, the United States adopted an inflexible attitude. While Japan sought for a breakthrough for base reductions, the United States opposed changing the status quo of bases in Okinawa. The American team emphasized that the United States could not diminish the functions of Futenma Air Station because it was an essential military foothold.[443] The team provided a small concession of a partial relocation. It proposed to relocate an airlift unit of fixed aircraft from Futenma to possibly Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Yamaguchi.[444]

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[441] Ibid.

[442] *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY97: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 104th Cong., 249 (March 27, 1996) (statement of Charles Krulak, (Gen.), Commandant, USMC).

[443] The cited comment of the American team at the third round of SACO was anonymous. The comment was followed by the interview of Robin Sakoda, who attended it as Senior Country Director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He said that the Defense Secretary ordered the American team not to do something that would impact the operational capability of Futenma."Okinawa ampo to kichi no hazama de [Okinawa between the Japan-U.S. security treaty and U.S. bases]," *NHK Special,* broadcasted on July 2, 2000, on NHK.

[444] "Bei, Futenma hikōjō yusō bumon no hondo iten wo teian [U.S. suggests relocation of Futenma's airlift unit to mainland Japan]," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 18, 1996, morning edition, p. 1.

Facing the American hardened stance, Japanese government high officials had a pessimistic view on the base return. Before the summit meeting, Masaki Orita, Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Masahiro Akiyama, Vice-Minister of Japan Defense Agency (JDA) thought that the United States would never return the Futenma base. The Japanese high officials had consensus that it was impossible for the United States to give up the base and shared their view with the prime minister.[445]

After Hashimoto's remark on Futenma at the summit on February 23, 1996, the first U.S. reaction reported in Japan was disagreement about the return of the base. Thomas Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Campbell commented that they could not accept the return of Futenma which Okinawa Prefecture requested because the base was critical both in peacetime and wartime.[446] U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale also revealed his idea that the base return seemed difficult.[447] JDA Vice-Minister Akiyama felt that the attitude of the U.S. counterparts became tougher after the summit meeting.[448] Meanwhile, limited members of the SACO Working Group secretly proceeded with consultations during the time between the summit in February and the public announcement in April.[449]

The agreement to return the Futenma base was made out of a sense of danger for U.S.-Japan security foundation and a need to strengthen bilateral security relation. On one hand, both Washington and Tokyo considered that some impactful measures needed to be taken to improve civilian-military relations. Defense Secretary Perry had thought it necessary to make a dramatic decision to *return* a base to alleviate the anti-base sentiment in Okinawa [emphasis in original].[450] Hitoshi Tanaka, Deputy Director-General,

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[445] Masaki Orita, *Gaikō shōgenroku: Wangan sensō, Futenma mondai, Iraku sensō* [Oral history on diplomacy: Gulf War, the Futenma Issue, Iraq War], ed. Ryuji Hattori and Jun'ichiro Shiratori (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 193–194; Masahiro Akiyama, *Moto bōei jimujikan Akiyama Masahiro kaikoroku* [Former Vice Defense Minister Masahiro Akiyama's memoirs], ed. Naotaka Sanada, Ryuji Hattori and Yoshiyuki Kobayashi (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2018), 134–35; Hitoshi Tanaka, *Gaikō no chikara*, 75.

[446] "Futenma hikōjō no zenmen henkan wa konnan [The complete return of Futenma Air Station is difficult)," *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 8, 1996, morning edition. p. 1.

[447] "Okinawa no beigun kichi mondai 'Futenma' henkan wa konnan Mondale [Mondale says the return of 'Futenma' is difficult]," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 14, 1996, morning edition, p. 2.

[448] Akiyama, *Moto Boeijimujikan,* 137. From his subjective point of view, he suggested that the SACO interim report should contain at least wording of a future consideration of the Futenma return but did not receive a positive response from the U.S. side. Masahiro Akiyama, interviewed by author, online via Zoom, December 23, 2021.

[449] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 49–50,62–63; Tanaka, *Gaikō no chikara*, 76–83.

[450] Perry, *Kaku naki sekai wo motomete*, 129; Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu* , 77.

North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA, recalled that both sides shared a sense of crisis that the U.S.-Japan security partnership would collapse.[451] An event made the members of SACO working group have a common recognition of necessity for base reduction in Okinawa. They visited and viewed Okinawa from above on March 6, 1996. According to Tanaka, when they saw how densely populated around the Futenma base with their own eyes, "we had a shared concern that not solving the issue might result in losing essential support of the Japanese for the Japan-U.S. security arrangements."[452] Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hubbard also described the visit as a "breakthrough."[453]

Meanwhile, the U.S. and Japanese governments recognized the necessity for pressing forward with the bilateral security arrangements. The two countries had begun reviewing the security arrangements after the Higuchi report and the Nye initiative, and through experiencing the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994. They were planning to release a joint declaration on U.S.-Japan security cooperation in April 1996. Updating the U.S.-Japan defense guideline was the following agenda. Perry considered that SACO should serve as a tail wind for renewing the guideline.[454]

Japan also thought of reinforcing the alliance beyond dealing with the base issue. Hashimoto ordered the government officials to give priority to the Okinawa base issues because the settlement would ultimately increase domestic support for the subsequent process of bilateral security cooperation, including establishing a new U.S.-Japan defense guideline.[455]

The Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996 also heightened the need for solving the base issue. On March 8, China launched missiles near Taiwan as an exercise. The Chinese action did not lead to an argument for redefining the value and roles of U.S. forces in Okinawa. Rather, it fostered an incentive for the United States to cement the alliance with Japan. In an interview with NHK in 2000, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Campbell commented that the United States thought it critically important to show the consolidated U.S.-Japan alliance in this complex unstable region.[456] This regional event made the United States

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[451] Hitoshi Tanaka, interview by author, Tokyo, February 19, 2019.
[452] Tanaka, *Gaikō no chikara,* 79–80.
[453] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu*, 56–57. Seeing how large the Kadena airbase, Hubbard provided direction to examine possibility to consolidate Futenma into Kadena.
[454] Ibid., 88.
[455] Editorial Committee on "Politician Ryutaro Hashimo," *Rokujū-ichi nin ga kakinokosu seijika Hasimoto Ryūtarō* [61 People Write down a record of politician Ryutaro Hashimoto] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju kikaku syuppanbu, 2012), 272–273.
[456] NHK, "Okinawa ampo to kichi no hazama de"; Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta,* 197–198.

determined to solve the issue of U.S. forces in Japan in a visible way.

The United States thought that the return of Futenma would require base replication in Okinawa. In fact, prior to Hashimoto's remark at the Santa Monica summit meeting, the United States was also considering the return of the base only with the condition of replication in Okinawa. When Defense Secretary Perry provided a briefing for Clinton about a week before the summit in Santa Monica, he advised the president to forge ahead with the base return, emphasizing that the return of Futenma would necessitate replication within Okinawa.[457] Considering that U.S. forces in Okinawa could respond immediately in the event of contingency throughout East Asia, Perry decided to hand over the base under the "absolute condition" of relocating it somewhere in Okinawa.[458]

The Japanese side also assumed the Futenma replication within Okinawa. Hashimoto thought that he must accept relocation in Okinawa.[459] In terms of the helicopter squadrons stationed in Futenma, SACO did not look at options other than replication within Okinawa.[460]

The United States and Japan reached an agreement in principle on returning the Futenma base to Japan. At a joint press conference on April 12, 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and Ambassador Mondale announced that the United States would return the entire Futenma base within five to seven years. The return would be realized with several conditions: 1) constructing a heliport in certain existing base in Okinawa, 2) equipping additional facilities at Kadena airbase to consolidate some functions of Futenma, 3) relocating 12 KC-130s to Iwakuni, 4) transfer Iwakuni-based AV-8 fighter and attack aircraft to the United States; and 5) studying the possibility of emergency and contingency use of civilian and Self Defense Forces airports.[461] Following the announcement, the SACO interim report was publicly released on April 15, 1996. The report clarified that the SACO would submit recommendations with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.[462] Two days later, Clinton and Hashimoto signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in Tokyo. In the declaration, the two leaders expressed contentment with the progress that the SACO

[457] Perry, *Kaku naki sekai wo motomete*,130.
[458] Ibid.
[459] Iokibe and Miyagi, *Hashimoto Ryutaro gaikō kaikoroku,* 70.
[460] Hitoshi Tanaka, interview; Akiyama, interview; Nobushige Takamizawa, interview by author, online via Zoom, January 7, 2022.
[461] "Futenma zenmen henkan Hashimoto shusho ireino chokusetsu kosho [Complete return of Futenma, Prime Minister Hashimoto's exceptional direct negotiation)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 13, 1996, morning edition, p. 3.
[462] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "MOFA: The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report," April 15, 1996, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html.

had made by then.[463]

6. Required Base Capability and the Alternative

Observing alternative options of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, this section articulates requirements for an alternative to the base. It then traces how and when the United States obtained the guarantee of an alternative in the course of examining several options with Japan and settling on the final option. Regarding base capability, the hypothesis predicts that the alternative should 1) be located in the proximity of areas of potential conflicts, 2) maintain the same force strength as Futenma, and 3) be able to accommodate the necessary facilities to support the relocated units. To draw more detailed predictions in the light of U.S. threat perception discussed above, alternative options should include any bases in mainland Japan as well as Okinawa. In order to address the perceived security concerns, which were not even an imminent threat, dispersion to mainland Japan could be considered as an alternative to Futenma. With regard to the timing of agreement, it is predicted that the United States should be guaranteed the alternative before finalizing the base closure agreement.

6.1. Requirements for an alternative to the Futenma Base

What was required for an alternative to the Futenma Base? Based on the U.S.'s evaluation of the Futenma base, I analyze what base capability—proximity, force strength and capacity—was considered necessary to be maintained. There seemed no tangible threat or possibility of military operation except the Korean Peninsula, although III MEF based in Okinawa had missions to respond to a wide range of unpredictable contingencies from the Western Pacific to the Middle East. Therefore, discussion on proximity was more related to Marine Corps' integrity and political consideration rather than strategic aspects. In terms of requirements for force strength and capacity requirement, the Marine Corps clearly demonstrated that an alternative should replicate Futenma's functions. Replication meant that the alternative needed to have the capability to accommodate and support not only the standing helicopter units but also reinforcements in case of contingency.

[463] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "MOFA: Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," April 17, 1996, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html.

First and foremost, the prominent assignment for the Futenma base as of the mid-1990s was to be engaged in a Korean contingency. The background book, which was prepared prior to Defense Secretary Perry's visit to Tokyo in April 1996, enclosed a document titled "Relocating Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)" that articulated what conditions and capabilities must be maintained if Futenma were subject to closure within five to ten years.[464] The document underlined that the base was a gateway used by the Marine Corps and United Nations forces in case of a Korean conflict and insisted that the Marine forces located at Futenma were "crucial to campaign plans for a Korean contingency."[465] In fact, OPLAN 5027, which is a basic war plan made by U.S.-Korea Combined Forces Command, assumes that the Marine Corps would conduct amphibious assaults into North Korea and also send troops from Okinawa as augmentation forces.[466] In short, the alternative needed to essentially have base capability to support war operations on the Korean Peninsula.

Proximity to the Korean Peninsula seemed to be an unquestionable condition to be secured. It was considered important to secure the proximity of Marine Corps' aviation forces, ground troops and training facilities. Moving the Futenma base out of Okinawa was not an option on this point. Supporting the aviation elements, Futenma provided a leg for Marine ground elements. Separation of the land forces and the aviation support would reduce rapid deployment capability.[467] From the explanations on the Marine Corps in Okinawa, their justification with regard to proximity can be summarized as follows: in peacetime both the ground and aviation combat elements had to conduct joint training; in contingency situations, separated

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[464] "Relocating Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)," in *Secretary of Defense Perry Visit to Tokyo, 14-15 April 96, Background Book*, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000, DNSA. This two-page document has a blurred part that could read the document was classified by Major General Robert Foglesong and dated on March 12, 1996. It is not sure whether he is the author of the document. He was the Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, the Joint Staff and also a SACO member. Masaaki Aihara seemed to have cited a similar document, though he wrote that it was a fax from PACOM to III MEF dated on March 11, 1996. Masaaki Aihara, " Futenma kichi isetsu keikaku ni okeru bei kaiheitai no ito to eikyō [The Intention and Influence of the U.S. Marine Corps Regarding the Futenma Base Relocation Plan]," *Bōeigaku kenkyū* [Defense Studies], no. 59 (September 2018): 21–40.

[465] "Relocating Futenma Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)," in *Secretary of Defense Perry Visit to Tokyo, 14-15 April 96, Background Book*, DNSA.

[466] Kyoji Yanagisawa, *Yokushiryoku o tou: Moto seifu kokan to bouei supesharisuto tachi no taiwa* [Questioning Deterrence: Dialogue Between Former Government High Official and Defense Specialists] (kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan, 2010), 26; Narushige Michishita and Kiyohiko Azuma, "Chōsen hantō yūji to nihon no taiou [Contingency in the Korean Peninsula and Japanse Response]," in *Chōsen Hanto to Higashi Ajia* [Korean Peninsula and East Asia], eds. Seiji Endo and Ken Endo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015), 182–83.; "OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War – West," *Global Security*, accessed January 22, 2022, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm

[467] Satoshi Morimoto, *Futenma no nazo* [The Mistery of Futenma] (Kairyusha, 2010), 106; Noboru Yamaguchi, interview by author, Tokyo, February 27, 2019.

disposition would add transportation time, which would degrade operational efficiency and readiness of the Marine Corps.[468]

Although relocating the entire Marine Corps forces to mainland Japan might be an option, it could cause a political problem. Theoretically speaking, mainland Japan, especially the western part, was closer to the Korean Peninsula, and therefore, was expected to shorten the deployment time in the event of a crisis on the peninsula.[469] Besides, Marine Corps ground troops were to be transported by ship from Sasebo Naval Base in Nagasaki. Defense Secretary Perry clarified that 7th Fleet would provide them with amphibious assets as "a major portion of the sealift" in case of any Korean conflict.[470] Thus, it would enhance the military efficiency if moving the whole set of Marine ground and aviation elements were redeployed to mainland Japan. However, it would be difficult to arrange bases for them. The Japanese government would need to find locations, negotiate with local authorities, and arrange facilities to accept the relocated units and assets.[471]

Tokyo assumed that the mainland Japanese would not support the increase of U.S. footprints in their backyard and Washington viewed such political difficulty as Japanese hesitation. Ambassador Mondale recalled that Japanese leaders "did not want to kick us out of Okinawa."[472] Admiral Prueher, CINCPAC, testified before the House Appropriations Committee on March 13, 1996 that the Japanese government, not the people in Okinawa, wanted the U.S. forces there.[473] Additionally, he shared his personal view, "the mainland Japanese have no appetite for moving forces from Okinawa up there."[474] The Secretary of Defense

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[468] *Department of Defense Appropriations, FY97: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 104th Cong., 249 (March 27, 1996) (statement of Charles Krulak, (Gen.), Commandant, USMC); Noboru Yamaguchi, "Why the U.S. Marines Should Remain in Okinawa: A Military Perspective," in *Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1997), 98–110.

[469] Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon explained that four U.S. amphibious ships homeported in the Sasebo naval base would come down, load and transport Marines and equipment deployed in Okinawa. Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'hanlon, "The Marines Should Come Home: Adapting the U.S.-Japan Alliance to a New Security Era," *The Brookings Review* 14, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 10–13.

[470] *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1997, Part 1: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 104th Cong., 146 (March 7, 1996) (response of Perry, Secretary of Defense).

[471] Morimoto, *Futenma no nazo,* 107, 111.

[472] *Interview with Ambassador Walter Mondale*, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 2004, 18.

[473] *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1997, Part 2: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations*, House, 104th Cong., 46 (March 13, 1996) (statement of Prueher, (Adm.), CINCPAC).

[474] Ibid.

had the same perspective. In an interview with NHK in 2017, Perry confessed that "the Japanese had very little enthusiasm for going to other places" except Okinawa.[475]

As for force strength, the alternative was required to maintain Marine heavy and medium helicopter squadrons and sustain the integrated combat capabilities of the Marine Corps. While air refueling wings and certain logistic support units could be absorbed into the existing bases out of Okinawa, the Futenma-based helicopter units would have to remain in Okinawa.[476] In short, the helicopter squadrons were the minimum requirement.

Moreover, required force strength could be increased approximately four times in the event of certain contingencies. During contingencies, a Futenma replacement base would need to support not only Marine transport helicopters but also transit aircraft and follow-on echelon aircraft. According to the 1st MAW, the Futenma base would be used by 300 aircraft, including 71 in place aircraft, 142 transiting aircraft and 87 follow-on echelon aircraft.[477] An alternative base was expected to accommodate forces, serving as a launching pad, staging and prepositioning area in case of contingency.

With regard to capacity, an alternative was to accommodate the Futenma-based helicopter squadrons. That is, it would be required to embrace necessary facilities—"runway, taxiway, parking ramp and direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, and base operating support, as well as quality of life facilities."[478] According to the Marine Corps Forces Japan staff study on requirements for a replacement facility of Futenma Air Station, a 5,164-foot (1,573-meter) runway was required to support safe operation of MV-22 that had been planned to replace CH-

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[475] "Perry no kokuhaku: Moto beikokubōchōkan Okinawa e no tabi [Perry's Confession: Former Defense Secretary Trip to Okinawa]," *ETV*, broadcasted on November 18, 2017, on NHK. He and other U.S. high officials later expressed their views that it was the Japanese government who did and should decide the relocation site and that the U.S. government would consider if the Japanese government did not need the U.S. forces stationed there. However, Perry's remark seems contradicting to his previously cited one (n. 457, 458) in which he asserted that the return of Futenma had to follow on replication within Okinawa.

[476] "Bei, Futenma hikōjō yusō bumon no hondo iten wo teian," *Asahi Shimbun*, February 18, 1996; William L. Brooks, "The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006," Asia-Pacific Policy Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 2010), 13.

[477] In January 1996, Campbell requested and received two separate briefings from 18 Fighter Wing based in Kadena Air Force Base and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing based in Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on contingency requirements for Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station respectively. "Information Paper: Briefing on MCAS Futenma Contingency Requirements," in Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 215–227; Masakatsu Ota, "Futenma hikōjō ni 300 ki [300 Airplane in Futenma Air Station]," *Kyodo News*, May 3, 2007.

[478] The Joint Staff, "Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs," in Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 392.

46.[479] The study concluded, "all operational capabilities currently at Futenma must be replicated at the new air station or otherwise elsewhere on the island."[480] An alternative was expected to hold comparable capacity to replicate the base functions.

6.2. Examined Alternatives

During the SACO negotiations, how was the condition for return of the Futenma base discussed, developed and finalized? The original relocation plan was prepared by the publication of the SACO interim report on April 15, 1996. After the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in February, an unofficial negotiation began to discuss conditions for the return of Futenma.[481] As Tanaka recalled the SACO negotiations, the working group sought to relocate everything that could be relocated out of Okinawa.[482] On March 12, 1996, Campbell drew a notional relocation plan in preparation for Perry's visit to Tokyo in April. The plan included construction of a heliport adjacent to Kadena Air Base, relocation of KC-130s to Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Yamaguchi, Japan, and usage of Japanese air bases in case of emergency/contingency (Table 5.1).[483]

Table 5.1 Developments of Futenma Relocation Plan

	Notional Relocation Plan March 12, 1996	SACO Interim Report April 15, 1996	SACO Final Report December 2, 1996
Helicopter squadrons	Construct heliport adjacent to Kadena AB	Construct heliport on other US facilities and areas in Okinawa	Pursue construction of sea-based facility off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa
Refueling transport squadron	Relocate KC-130s to Iwakuni MCAS or Kadena AB	Transfer KC-130s to Iwakuni	Transfer KC-130s to Iwakuni
Logistic support	-	Develop additional facilities at Kadena	Develop additional facilities at Kadena
Contingency use in the event of a crisis	Retain operational flexibility through reliance on Japanese air bases	Joint-US-Japan study	Study

Source: "Relocating Futenma MCAS," *Secretary of Defense Perry Visit to Tokyo, 14-15 April 96, Background Book*, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part III, 1961-2000. (DNSA); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The Japan-U.S. Special Action Committee (SACO) Interim Report* and *The SACO Final Report*.

[479] "Staff Study: MCAS Futenma Replacement Airfield," Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 234–239.
[480] Ibid., 238–239.
[481] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 49–50,62–63; Tanaka, *Gaikō no chikara*, 76–83.
[482] Tanaka, interview.
[483] Kurt Campbell, "Relocating Futenma MCAS," declassified on March 12, 1996, in *Secretary of Defense Perry Visit to Tokyo, 14-15 April 96, Background Book,* DNSA.

Since the interim report was released on April 15, 1996, a major candidate had been consolidation to Kadena Air Base. JDA pursued the possibility of the option. JDA officials scrutinized the consolidation plan based on an assumption that Kadena would be stably maintained in the foreseeable future.[484] Takemasa Moriya, Deputy Director of the Defense Bureau, JDA, thought so because Okinawa Prefectural Government's "Base Return Action Program" put the Kadena base in the last of the three-phased removal plan.[485] The Japanese side presented the Kadena consolidation plan to Campbell on August 31, 1996. Campbell advised them to bring it to PACOM. A team of JDA officials flew to Honolulu to obtain approval.[486]

The Okinawa Prefectural Government had an understanding about the Kadena consolidation option, while the local municipalities adjacent to the Kadena base were opposing it. Once the option was reported, the leaders and local councils lifted up their voices by resolutions against it along with citizens' protest rallies.[487] Nonetheless, Okinawan Vice-Governor Masanori Yoshimoto commented in his oral history that he thought it possible at that time to absorb the Futenma function to an existing U.S. base, namely Kadena.[488]

However, the United States disfavored the consolidation option. That option had mainly two difficulties: an operational/ technical disadvantage and a political concern. The U.S. military, namely United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and the Air Force, disagreed with the Kadena consolidation on the grounds that the option would reduce USFJ readiness. According to the technical assessment report made by USFJ and dated on July 26, 1996, problems on safety, operations and facilities would be solved by additional measures; however, the collocation of Futenma and Kadena base functions would critically reduce readiness during contingencies.[489] The report pointed out that Kadena was already near its full capability on ground in contingency operations and thus military requirements would overflow by adding Futenma functions.[490] It is noted, however, the U.S. military did not have consensus about the opposition to the consolidation. The Marine Corps was in favor of moving the Futenma operations to the Kadena airbase. While the commander

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[484] Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta,* 204–5.
[485] Moriya, "Kichi iiken," 106–120.
[486] Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta,* 205–6.
[487] "Okinawa, 'Daitai kichi' ni ikari futatabi [Okinawa again shows growing anger towards 'replacement base'],"*Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1996, evening edition. p. 21.
[488] GRIPS C.O.E. Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Yoshimoto Masanori ōraru hisutorī,* 181.
[489] "SACO Process, July 1996: Technical Assessment of the Feasibility of Relocating the Operational Capability of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Kadena Air Base Proper," Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 292–364.
[490] Ibid, 299.

of the 18 Wing, Air Force disagreed with the option because it would inhibit Kadena's ability to carry out contingency operations, the commander of Marine Forces Japan judged that the readiness issue would be cleared if necessary measures were taken.[491]

The Air Force's hardened attitude was transmitted to some high officials of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. They shared awareness of the safety and readiness issues of the Kadena/Futenma collocation. In the technical assessment, USFJ and the Joint Staff Office (JSO) confirmed the following: first, the collocation would impair US forces readiness in peacetime and in times of emergency/ contingency; second, collision risk would emerge between U.S. military aircraft and civilian aircraft at Naha International Airport; and third, an alternative airport for Kadena was required for peacetime and contingency operations.[492] As JSO Chairman Shigeru Sugiyama had heard about the opposition of the Air Force, he directed Major General Toshikatsu Yamaguchi, Director of J3, JSO, to examine operational problems of the consolidation.[493] Sugiyama briefed Prime Minister Hashimoto on problems of air traffic control and safety in case of collocation of air operations of Futenma and Kadena.[494]

USFJ was also concerned about political aspects of the consolidation option. The USFJ assessment report recommended as a whole not to relocate Futenma to Kadena in view of possible reduction of U.S. forces readiness as well as a political concern:

> The dimensions of U.S. forces "geographic footprint" on Okinawa would be reduced as the result of a Futenma-to-Kadena relocation. However, our assessment is that the reduced size of the footprint will inhibit U.S. forces ability to maintain existing readiness and carry out assigned missions during contingencies. Additionally, in terms of the increased noise complaints and safety concerns, the size of the "political footprint" will be larger than before collocation.[495]

Not only the military but also the U.S. Department of State opposed the option because of political

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[491] Ibid., 299–300.
[492] "US/JAPAN (USFJ/JSO) Bilateral Findings Concerning Consolidation of MCAS Futenma and Kadena AB," Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, p. 364.
[493] *Ōraru hisutorī: Reisenki no bōeiryoku seibi to dōmei seisaku 5: Yamaguchi Toshikatsu* [Oral History: Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy during the Cold War] (The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015), 197–198.
[494] Ibid. Yamaguchi's remark in his oral history was contrasting to that of civilian officers of JDA. The bureaucrats who were inclined to the Kadena consolidation option cited the briefing to the prime minister in the context that the consolidation would be possible. Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta*, 206; Moriya, "Kichi riken," 109; Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 197–198.
[495] "Technical Assessment," Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 341. Satoshi Morimoto, who served as the defense minister in 2012, analyzes the reason for USFJ rejection of the Kadena consolidation option and states that if Marines cause incidents or accidents, the Kadena Air Force Base would have to deal with settlement procedures and become the target of criticism. Morimoto, *Futenma no nazo*, 122–123.

concerns. Deputy Director-General of MOFA Tanaka recalled that representatives from the State Department were concerned that if the Futenma element was converged at Kadena and some accident or incident occurs, "Kadena would be the next target, which might result in losing one of the strong foundations of USFJ."[496] Similarly, according to Funabashi, a State Department official addressed five points of why the department was reluctant to the option: 1) high risk of aircraft accidents, 2) reduction of Marine capability to conduct contingency operations due to inability to deploy C-5A transport aircraft at Kadena, 3) Kadena's relatively good relation with the local communities, 4) Kadena's strategic importance for the foreseeable future, and 5) likelihood for Kadena to become a political symbol criticized by anti-base protests.[497]

While the Kadena consolidation option seemed deadlocked, the United States brought up a second option. At a meeting with Koichi Kato, Secretary-General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in Tokyo on August 1, 1996, Campbell showed his reluctance to pursue the Kadena consolidation option.[498] Furthermore, the U.S. side revealed the idea of constructing a heliport in an existing Marine Corps base—either Camp Hansen or Camp Schwab—and making the airport for joint military-civilian use for Okinawan economic and social promotion.[499] In fact, this was one of four additional options that the USFJ suggested in the aforementioned technical assessment report. Constructing a heliport in a Marine Corps camp was the most viable option among them as it cleared all capacity conditions.[500]

A third option emerged from the United States. At the SACO Working Group in Tokyo on September 13, 1996, Campbell proposed a sea-based facility (SBF) as an option for the Futenma relocation facility. The Japanese members of the working group were cautious about the "dream-like option" because it would put the other land options at a disadvantage and ultimately reach a point of no return.[501] Meanwhile, Hashimoto and Perry entered into the offshore facility option with enthusiasm.[502]

The third option became more likely as it gained top leaders' assent. The President and the Prime

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[496] Tanaka, interview.
[497] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 200.
[498] "Bei, Futenma daitai shisetsu de, Kadena kichi e no isetsu ni shokyoku shisei [U.S. negative attitude toward Kadena consolidation as Futenma replacement]," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 1, 1996, evening edition, p. 1.
[499] Morimoto, *Futenma no nazo*, 119.
[500] USFJ proposed the following options: 1) new runway and facilities in the vicinity of ammunition storage point near Kadena; 2) new civilian/ military joint use airfield near Camp Schwab; 3) relocate some MCAS Futenma operations to Ie Jima; and 4) use mainland Japan bases for contingency deployment of USMC helicopters. "Technical Assessment," Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 344–353.
[501] Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta*, 207; Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu,* 210.
[502] Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu*, 213, 217.

Minister practically decided on the SBF option by the end of September. At a talk in Okinawa on September 17, 1996, Hashimoto made it public that the United States proposed the SBF and he thought it worth considering.[503] Furthermore, at a meeting in New York on September 24, Clinton and Hashimoto mutually confirmed that the SBF option would be mainly considered.[504] Although SACO officially had the three options remaining on the table, it proceeded with the SBF option.

Toward the end of the SACO consultations, the two governments discussed technical, more detailed aspects of the Futenma replacement facility. The working group met in Washington D.C. on October 21 to 23, 1996 to clarify the operational requirements for the alternative facility. The discussion went into lengths of runway, sizes and construction methods of the replacement facility. The United States indicated that the replacement facility would be required to support operations of the MV-22, planned to be a successor to the CH-46. Japan sought for a smaller facility and a shorter runway and preferred a platform to land reclamation. After the working group, Marine Corps reiterated that they preferred a land facility in accordance with the SACO interim report rather than a deep-sea SBF that would equip the minimum length of 4200-foot (1,280-meter) runway and all the facilities of the Futenma base onboard.[505] According to the comments of the Marine Corps Forces Japan that were forwarded to the commander of USFJ on October 28, 1996, the Marine Corps was concerned about the quality of life of assigned personnel in the case of the all-in SBF.[506]

A fax from the USFJ headquarters dated on October 30, 1996 showed that the United States and Japan examined the existing options by scoring 14 items in four categories of safety, operations, facilities, and public affairs. Table 5.2 shows the result of the examination. It indicates that the Kadena consolidation was inferior to the other options. The best option was Camp Schwab with a long runway. That was followed by Camp Schwab with a short runway, large sea-based facility, and small sea-based facility.

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[503] Yoichi Kato, "Kaijō ni futai heripōto [Offshore heliport]," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 17, 1996, evening edition, p. 1; "Hashimoto Ryutaro syushō no Okinawa kōen yōshi [Summary of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's public speech in Okinawa]," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 1996, morning edition. p. 2.
[504] Akira Tatematsu, "Futenma heripōto isetsu, kaijō an o jiku ni [Futenma heliport relocation, offshore becomes the main option)," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 25, 1996, evening edition. p. 1.
[505] "Clarification on Futenma Relocation Options" dated on October 28, 1996, Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 399–401; "Memorandum for the Director, J-5A, of The Joint Staff," dated on October 29, 1996, Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 404.
[506] Ibid., 400.

Table 5.2 MCAS Futenma Relocation Matrix

	Kadena Consolidation	Camp Schwab		Small Sea-based Facility	Large Sea-based Facility
		Short runway	Long runway		
Safety					
1. potential conflict with existing air traffic (air traffic deconfliction)	2.5	10	7.5	10	10
2. proximity to population centers (risk to personnel/ property on or near airfield)	2.5	10	10	10	10
3. terrain (obstacles, high terrain)	10	5	5	10	10
Safety Score:	15	25	22.5	30	30
Operations					
1. contingency response capability	5	5	7.5	2.5	5
2. ramp loading (deployment/ redeployment)	7.5	7.5	10	10	10
3. heavy aircraft operations (capability)	10	0	10	0	0
4. ability to meet training requirements	5	10	10	2.5	7.5
5. combat capabilities degradation during construction period	0	10	10	5	5
Operations Score:	27.5	32.5	47.5	20	27.5
Facilities					
1. quality of life	10	0	0	0	0
2. cost	10	0	0	0	0
3. environmental impact	5	5	5	2.5	2.5
4. technical (engineering) risk	7.5	10	7.5	0	0
Facilities Score:	32.5	15	12.5	2.5	2.5
Public Affairs					
1. public opposition	2.5	5	5	7.5	5
2. "lightning rod" effect	0	7.5	7.5	10	10
Public Affairs Score:	2.5	12.5	12.5	17.5	15
	77.5	**85**	**95**	**70**	**75**

Legend (weighted scale)
0 = Most unfavorable
2.5 = Slightly unfavorable
5 = Neutral
7.5 = Favorable
10 = Most favorable

Source: Gabe, 2008 KAKEN, 498.

Although it is not clear who created this matrix for what purposes, comparing the matrix with the actual results of SACO gives a hint for what the United States emphasized. The comparison table illustrates that the SBF scored lower than the Camp Schwab option in terms of training requirements and engineering

risks, but higher than that in terms of safety and public affairs. According to Nobushige Takamizawa, Director, Defense Operations Division, JDA, the U.S. side seemed particular about the "lightening rod" effect mentioned in the matrix.[507] It is presumed that by choosing the offshore facility the United States aimed to separate the troops from populated areas in Okinawa and avoid future public outburst against the U.S. bases.

6.3. Final Outcome

At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on December 2, 1996, Defense Secretary Perry, U.S. Ambassador Mondale, Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda and Chief Defense Agency Fumio Kyuma approved the SACO recommendations to pursue a sea-based facility as a replacement of the Futenma base, reduce and consolidate particular bases, adjust military training and operational procedures, implement noise abatement measures, and improve procedures of the Status of Forces Agreement. The SCC valued the base consolidation plan highly because it would lead to more than 20 percent reduction of the total acreage of U.S. bases in Okinawa.[508]

Furthermore, a sea-based facility was chosen as the Futenma replacement facility because of several advantages compared to the other two options: Kadena consolidation and replication in Camp Schwab. According to the SACO final report, while all the three options would sustain operational capabilities of U.S. forces, the sea-based facility option was considered optimal in terms of Okinawan citizens' safety and quality of life. It also had an advantage that it could be removed when no longer necessary.[509]

The SACO final report stated that the Futenma base would be returned within the next five to seven years after the replacement facility was completed and operational.[510] By the SCC approval of the SACO recommendations, the United States obtained a guarantee for the alternative to the Futenma base.

Futenma's multiple functions were to be relocated to several places. First, the helicopter operational functions would be absorbed into a new sea-based facility that would equip an approximately 1,500-meter runway, direct air operations support infrastructure and indirect support facilities. The

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[507] Takamizawa, interview.
[508] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "MOFA: The SACO Final Report December 2, 1996," December 2, 1996, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html.
[509] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "MOFA: The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an Integral Part of the SACO Final Report)," December 2, 1996, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.
[510] Ibid.

replacement facility would be constructed off the east coast of the Okinawa main island. Second, the air refueling function with 12 KC-130s would be transferred to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi. Third, the Kadena airbase would accommodate the other maintenance and logistics functions that could not be transferred into the sea-based facility or Iwakuni. Fourth and lastly, the emergency and contingency use function would be further studied by the United States and Japan.

7. Summary

The hypothesis explains the case of Okinawa in respect of the conditions and timing of U.S. agreement on the base closure, while having a little incoherence of the base evaluation and the base capability required for an alternative.

With regard to the United States attempt to maintain the contested base, there is congruence between the predictions drawn from the hypothesis and the case observation. First, the United States consistently insisted on the strategic importance of keeping the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa. The policy was already established by the post-Cold War U.S. strategy for Asia-Pacific. Washington remained firmly opposed to changing the status quo of U.S. presence in Okinawa. Second, the United States proposed partial reduction from the base such as relocation of KC-130 aircraft to the Iwakuni base, Yamaguchi. The helicopter wings stationed in Futenma were excluded from relocation out of Okinawa because they were vital in response to a Korean contingency and inseparable from Marine ground combat elements both in peacetime and wartime. Third, the United States agreed to return Futenma Air Station, considering that the situation called for a significant base return to secure stable usage of the existing bases. Furthermore, it was not predicted but observed that the decision was made in the hope of gaining Japanese public support for the future development of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Observation was congruent with the predictions on timing of the agreement. The United States obtained a guarantee of an alternative before officially agreeing to return the contested base.

The case study revealed a contradiction between a prediction based on the observation of U.S. threat perception and the actual observation of U.S. evaluation of the contested base. Based on the observation of U.S. threat perception, it could be predicted that the United States should evaluate the Futenma base as replaceable. It was the time when the major threat of the Cold War era evaporated; despite the security concerns, a situation was unlikely where the Marine Corps in Okinawa would be critical. In case of

contingency in the Korean Peninsula, mainland Japan, especially the western part, was actually closer to the theater of war and more efficient in terms of mobility at sea. The tension over the Taiwan Strait was not at the level that would require Marine Corps' rapid deployment. Notwithstanding, the United States valued higher than predicted.

The other inaccurate point was a prediction on proximity requirement. The proximity to threat was irrelevant in adding or selecting alternative options. Instead, the geographical condition of an alternative was fixed by the following two reasons. The Nye initiative determined the force structure and the exact number of troops to be maintained in mainland Japan and Okinawa. In the light of military efficiency and the Marine Corps' integrity—the Marine helicopter units needed to be located near its ground combat elements. Therefore, alternatives other than replication within Okinawa were not considered from the outset.

The study on the Okinawan case revealed an interesting fact. In the course of selecting a final option, the United States as well as Japan considered the political feasibility of the Futenma relocation. By the final agreement in December 1996, the two governments sought an alternative to the Futenma base. There were three candidates and all were located in Okinawa. The SACO negotiators examined possible locations and forms of alternative facilities. They considered not only military aspects, such as location, the runway length and infrastructure, but also political aspects such as reactions of the people of Okinawa and environmental impacts. As a result, a sea-based facility in the east coast of Okinawa was selected as the alternative base of Futenma. Although this chapter does not cover the implementation of the base closure agreement, the tortuousness of the Futenma issue implies that the central governments' consideration did not match Okinawa's demand.

Chapter 6. Conclusions

I have done three things in this dissertation. First, I solved the puzzle of why the United States accepted the closure of its overseas bases, although it had interests to keep the bases open. Second, I explained the U.S. behavior of agreeing on closing its overseas bases. Finally, I tested my hypothesis based on balance-of-threat theory by examining three cases of contested bases overseas. My hypothesis is that the closure of a contested base is agreed on when the United States secures an alternative that retains military capability to counter the perceived threat. In other words, when a host country demands a base closure, the United States agrees on the base closure under the condition of securing an alternative that has base capability to counter perceived threat. I have verified that that the United States agrees on closing its base after an alternative is guaranteed.

In the concluding chapter, I first provide a final evaluation of hypothesis testing. Next, I reconfirm contributions that the dissertation makes to understanding of U.S. overseas base closures. Furthermore, I present the limits of this dissertation and several suggestions for future research. Finally, I draw general conclusions and policy implications with regard to overseas bases.

1. Evaluation of Hypothesis Testing

In the beginning of this section, I overview the case studies, highlighting the variables of U.S. threat perception, U.S. evaluation of the contested base, base capability required for an alternative, and the outcome of conditions for base closure agreement. First, the Spanish case exhibited that the U.S. perception of the Soviet Union required a replica of the contested base in southern Europe. Spain demanded the return of Torrejón Air Force Base, while the United States refused it because the tactical fighter wing stationed there was considered necessary for defending the southern flank of NATO. The negotiation ignited in July 1986 came to a deadlock. However, Spain eventually notified the United States of not renewing the base contract in November 1987. That caused a risk for the United States to lose access to all of the bases in Spain, including the critical naval base in Rota. To avoid that, the United States made a preliminary agreement to return the Torrejón base and sought to secure an alternative for it. Italy decided to accept the fighter wing of Torrejón in February 1988. The United States made a final agreement with Spain to close the Torrejón base in December 1988.

Second, the Philippine case showed the lowered threat perception did not require replication of the contested base. Instead, the United States thought that dispersion served the purpose to meet reduced security imperatives. The Philippines hosted two major U.S. bases: Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The U.S. forces had to leave the country after 1991 as the new Philippine constitution, which was established in 1987, banned stationing of foreign armed forces. The United States recognized that both bases provided good training and logistics support and served as a political symbol of U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific. However, witnessing the shrinking Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in 1989, the bases were valued as replaceable assets. The United States publicly mentioned and actually studied possible relocations to some existing bases in the western Pacific. On the other hand, the state insisted on the strategic values of the contested bases in the Philippines and sought for a longer duration of them. This can be understood as the United States attempting to show its intention of staying committed to the region.

As for the Clark airbase, the force reduction or withdrawal was arranged through 1990. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was the decisive factor of the U.S. decision to close the Clark base which was severely damaged by the volcanic disaster. The units were dispersed to U.S. bases in Okinawa, Japan and Alaska. Although the United States demanded duration of the Subic Bay base for at least 10 years, it could not reach an agreement with the Philippines and had to withdraw by the end of 1992. Meanwhile, the United States secured a much smaller presence in Singapore by relocating the naval logistics command from Subic Bay. Other functions such as ship repair were moved to Yokosuka, Sasebo and Guam. Although the relocation agreement and arrangements were disclosed in public, it is surmised that the United States had negotiated and arranged the relocations before it agreed on relinquishing the Subic Bay base.

Lastly, the Okinawan case exhibited security concerns, albeit not equivalent to the threat posed by the former Soviet Union, demanded the status quo of U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The agreement in principle on the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was driven by a concern that the bilateral security arrangements would collapse and by an incentive for strengthening the alliance. The base return was conditional on replication in Okinawa due to U.S. strategy of maintaining one Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, the Marine Corps' integrity of combat and airlift forces, and expected political difficulty on the Japanese side. The United States assessed that Futenma's airlift function of helicopter squadrons was a crucial

capability to be maintained within Okinawa. The two countries concluded the near one-year intensive negotiations with an agreement that the Futenma base would be returned after a sea-based replacement facility was completed and ready for use.

However, the hypothesis has a couple of limits in explaining the cases. The hypothesis was not strictly valid in respect to proximity of required base capability. The hypothesis predicted that an alternative should be located no further than the contested base from the theater of war. However, the case studies indicate that proximity was not necessarily a significant factor when the United States considered alternatives to the contested bases. For example, it was reported that air bases in Belgium and Britain were nominated as an alternative to the Torrejón base in Spain. They were close to the theater of war that the fighter wing in Torrejón would be deployed to in the event of Soviet invasion. However, the two candidates were rejected because they were out of NATO's southern region. This case study indicates that an alternative located within the same area assigned to the contested base was more important than the actual distance to an expected theater of war.

The Okinawan case provided common findings. Based on U.S. perception that regional concerns were emerging but still far from becoming significant, it was predicted that replication and dispersion in mainland Japan should be examined. However, the width of relocation option was much smaller: the United States had no intention to modify the force structure and the size of the troops in Okinawa. That attitude stemmed from the post-Cold War strategy that defined U.S. commitment to regional security through military presence. The other observation, different from the prediction, is related to base capability to be secured. During the SACO negotiations, the Marine Corps brought up an issue of introducing the MV-22 as replacement to the CH-46 transport helicopter stationed in Futenma. The combat radius of the MV-22 was much longer than the aging helicopter, which would not necessitate being based in Okinawa.[511] It could be observed that alternative options were expanded when the negotiators found the advanced aircraft would be deployed in the future.[512] However, it was observed that it actually became a matter of capacity whether a

[511] Japan Ministry of Defense, *MV-22 Osupurei: Bei kaiheitai no saishin'ei no kokuki* [MV-22 Osprey: U.S. Marine Corps' State-of-the-Art Aircraft], June 2012, p. 3, accessed February 17, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/osprey/haibi/pdf/mv22_pamphlet.pdf.
It is noted that the brochure was revised after Osprey-related accidents occurred. Ryo Aihara, "Osupurei 'anzen' shūsei e [Osprey 'safe' to be revised]," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2017, morning edition. p. 4.

[512] Nonetheless, an aircraft replacement plan would not make a change in the discussions because, as Blaker indicated, "basing parameters were to be set by the technology that already existed, not by technology that might be available in the future." James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (New

replacement could support operations of the MV-22.

2. Contribution to Understanding U.S. Agreement on the Closure of the Contested Overseas Bases

In this section, I reconfirm the importance of this dissertation by presenting the findings.

2.1. U.S. Threat Perception Constraints Alternative Choices

This dissertation shows how the United States explains the rationale of the closure of contested overseas bases. In the explanation of U.S. decision-makers, U.S. threat perception affects the agreement on closing a contested base. This dissertation examined linkages between threat perception and the value of contested base, and between the base value and base capability required for an alternative. Perceived threat determines the value of the contested base and what base capability was required for an alternative. Perceiving that the Soviets constantly posed a threat to southern Europe, the United States required keeping a tactical fighter wing in the region. As it cautiously watched several sources of instability in East Asia, the United States persisted in the status quo of force posture in Asia-Pacific. Accordingly, the contested Futenma base had strategic value with prime mission to respond to a contingency in the Korean Peninsula, which set a limit on the scope of alternatives to Futenma. On the contrary, when the United States perceived that the Soviet threat decreased, the value of Clark and Subic Bay bases also declined. Based on such threat perception, the United States publicly stated the bases were replaceable and had a wide range of choices as their replacements.

Strategy based on threat perception determines the scope of alternatives to the contested bases. The United States meets the host countries' demand within the range that it would keep the force structure in the region. For instance, in the Spanish case, the United States insisted that the tactical fighter wing had to be in the southern region to defend NATO's southern flank. In the Okinawan case, the U.S. strategy for Asia-Pacific specified in advance that the United States would keep one Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa. This is similar to the case in which the United States voluntarily closed overseas bases due to changes of international environment and strategy. No matter whether the United States closes overseas bases at its own initiative or not, the base closure together with the relocation is arranged within its strategy. In other words,

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York: Praeger, 1990), 27.

base closure demands do not change the strategy; they only lead to the change of base disposition within the region.

An important contribution to the existing literature, especially base politics studies are the following finding of this dissertation: the United States rationalizes the agreement on contested base closure by explanation based on balance-of-threat theory. The existing works on base politics attribute basing outcomes to domestic politics of host countries. They systematically explain when domestic oppositions matter and how they politicize U.S. bases in host countries. This dissertation supplements the studies by adding U.S. factors to explain the process from base politicization to U.S. agreement on the base closure. Facing the demands for base closures, the United States had to find equilibrium between appeasing anti-base sentiment in host countries and securing the optimal force disposition to be able to counter the existing threats.

2.2. Staying in the Region Matters

The United States considers not only the purely military aspect of operational capabilities but also the psychological aspect that U.S. bases are signs of commitment. As discussed above, the United States weighed being in the region—concretely, maintaining the forces stationed at the contested base in the same area assigned to the base— more heavily than proximity to threats. This meant that operational efficiency was not a priority for the United States. For example, the United States chose to stick to southern Europe rather than moving the F-16s to central Europe. It persisted in keeping the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa and insisted that a Futenma alternative should be within the island. If only military efficiency mattered to the United States, the alternatives to Torrejón and Futenma could be located out of Southern Europe and Okinawa respectively. Military efficiency could be maintained or even improved by the alternative of Belgium or Britain in the case of Torrejón, and mainland Japan in the case of Okinawa.

Moreover, the case studies revealed that the United States managed to maintain its force strength in the area of responsibility even if its troops were reduced or zeroed in the host country that demanded base return. Not only the results but also the processes indicated the U.S.'s intention to keep itself committed in the region. The United States did not accept promptly or willingly the host countries' demands to return the U.S. bases. Instead, the basing state suggested a reduction of personnel and airplanes based in the contested base, sought to extend the duration of the base use, and reiterated the strategic importance of those bases. By

this negotiation behavior, the United States demonstrated its resolve to be committed to southern Europe in the Spanish case, to Southeast Asia in the Philippine case, and to East Asia in the Okinawan case.

2.3. Motivations for Agreeing on Closing the Contested Base

The existing works have not theoretically explained motivations for the United States to accept the base closure demanded by the host countries. It was puzzling especially when the United States recognized the value of these bases in accordance with perceived threats. This dissertation clarified that there was something to be secured by compromising on the contested base. Although it was not deeply examined and proved in the case studies, they suggested that it was the potential loss of other more important bases in the host country and prospect of better relations with the host. When Spain notified the United States of not renewing the base agreement, the basing state faced a possibility to lose access to other bases in Spain, especially Rota Naval Base, which played an important role to support the 6th Fleet operations in the Western Mediterranean. By accepting the return of Torrejón, the United States obtained continued use of Rota, other bases and sites in Spain. Similarly, Kadena Air Force Base seemed critically important to the United States in the period when it recognized sources of instability in Asia-Pacific after the Cold War ended. By agreeing on returning Futenma, the United States aimed to avoid Kadena from becoming a target of criticism.

The other motivation was enhancement of security relations with the host states. This was evident in the case of Okinawa. The United States relinquishing the important base had a symbolic meaning to the people of the host countries. The United States thought that it could enhance the Japanese public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance by showing flexibility to the host country. If it were the return of minor or inconspicuous bases or just base realignment within a particular area, it would not be expected to have the similar effect. When the United States perceived external threats on one level or another, it was necessary to strengthen the security cooperation while securing the access to its military bases to counter the threats.

These motivations were not observed in the Philippine case. This was likely because the United States did not need to maintain the large presence in the Philippines, acknowledging that the Soviet Union was downsizing the forces at Cam Ranh Bay. The United States decided to relinquish the Clark airbase because the recovery cost was estimated to be too high to convince Congress. It gave up the Subic Bay naval base after failing to gain concessions from the host state. Eventually, the U.S. forces completely withdrew

from the Philippines by 1992, but the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, which was signed in 1951, remained untouched. Considering that the treaty was not disputed during the basing negotiations, it can be assumed that the United States regarded the continuous security relationship as given.

2.4. Other Findings

There are two additional findings drawn from the three case studies in terms of base negotiations. The case studies clarified who in the United States were in charge of contested base closures. To negotiate over a contested base and other issues, the United States and the host country form a negotiation body: the Spanish Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State held rounds of talks; the Philippine-American Cooperation Talk (PACT) was formed; and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established. Members of each organization differed. They are organized temporarily to discuss intensively on U.S. bases in their countries. These consultation organizations were not eternal; once an agreement was reached, the organizations were dismissed.

Participants involved in the processes differed case by case. It is noteworthy that in the Spanish case the United States used NATO to solve the base relocation issue. The United States asked the multilateral security institution to share the responsibility in securing an alternative to the Torrejón base because it was a NATO issue. Ultimately NATO officially asked Italy to accept the relocation from Torrejón and decided to fund for it. The Spanish case had a unique condition. Meanwhile, since there was no multilateral institution in Asia, the base issues in the Philippines and Okinawa were handled bilaterally: the United States and respective host countries.

The other finding is the involvement of the U.S. Congress. Congress was powerful in Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), authorizing a series of legislations and being the final decision maker. Compared to the case of U.S. domestic base closures, Congress had less influence on the closure of contested bases overseas. It is noted, however, that Congress pressured the U.S. governments in the cases of Spain and the Philippines. Capitol Hill questioned the reason to maintain the presence in the countries that tried to oust U.S. forces. Some congress members were critical about continuing forward deployment in those countries.

Meanwhile, such voices were not heard from Capitol Hill in the Okinawan case. It was partly because Spain and the Philippines were recipients of military and economic assistance from the United States.

Japan, in contrast to the two countries, shared the costs of U.S. forces in Japan. Congress just watched closely the process of the bilateral negotiations on Okinawa because it would not affect the federal budget.[513] The other possible reason for a quiet Congress in the Okinawan case was the U.S. government's intention. According to Yoichi Funabashi's *Alliance Adrift*, the government sought to avoid the issue from moving up to congressional discussion. It worried that if a conflict between the Air Force and the Marine Corps emerged in Congress, it would call into question the meaning of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region.[514]

3. Limits and Suggestions for Future Research

This dissertation has several limitations. The first is the measurement of U.S. threat perception. I defined it as threat perception held by the United States or the Department of Defense as a whole. Analyzing only the public reports and remarks in public does not really tell how exactly the U.S. decision-makers of the base issues assessed an external threat at that time. This dissertation therefore resulted in examining whether there was a causal linkage between U.S. *public explanation* of threat and the condition of base closure agreement. There might, or might not be a gap between the threat perception expressed in public and one held by decision-makers. An alternative method to overcome the limitation is to investigate threat perception held by individuals who were supposed to be influential in basing negotiations such as the president, secretaries of state and defense, and negotiators. It is expected to require thorough research on declassified documents and archives. Yarhi-Milo's research on policymakers' perception of intentions of an adversary offers help in identifying research objects.[515] It will deepen the analysis of the influence of threat perception on U.S. basing policies. It will also contribute to the development of base-related studies.

The second limitation is the lack of decisive evidence of U.S. negotiation with potential host countries in advance of base closure agreement. The hypothesis will gain more validity by clarifying a

[513] The Futenma relocation issue later became entangled, involving relocation of some Marine elements from Okinawa to Guam. It gathered the attention of Congress and resulted in influential congresspersons' request for the Department of Defense reviewing the ongoing relocation plan. "Futenma teitai ni kikikan [A Sense of Crisis about Stagnation of Futenma]," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 12, 2011, evening edition, p. 2; Kosuke Saito, "Zaigai kichi saihen o meguru bei kokunai seiji to sono senryakuteki hakyū [U.S. Domestic Politics on the Realignment of Overseas Bases and Its Strategic Effect]," in *Okinawa to kaiheitai: Chūrū no rekishiteki keii* [Okinawa and the Marine Corps: Historical Development of Basing], Tomohiro Yara et al. (Tokyo: Jumposha, 2016), 143–171.
[514] Yoichi Funabashi, *Dōmei hyōryu* [Alliance Adrift] (Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 221.
[515] Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), 56.

remaining question of whether the United States had a certain prospect of securing an alternative when it made a preliminary agreement of giving up the contested base. For example, how far did the United States proceed to a discussion with Italy on relocating the Torrejón base, and similarly with Singapore on relocating the Philippine bases? The hypothesis suggests that securing an alternative should be critical for the United States in agreeing on the base closure. More thorough archival research will make the argument more convincing.

The case studies raise another question: why did some countries accept the U.S. forces transferred from the contested bases? There should be some motivation for accepting the relocation. It could be threat perception shared with the United States, fear of abandonment or longing for U.S. aid.[516] It could involve domestic politics that the base politics studies have explored. This dissertation did not focus on these countries' perspective but suggested at least that they consider the U.S. military footprints necessary and important for the security of the respective regions. It can deepen the analysis on how the United States maintains basing networks.

A study on other cases involving negotiations on contested bases may help generalize the findings of this dissertation. One candidate is U.S. withdrawal from France in the late 1960s. French President Charles de Gaulle sought to withdraw from the NATO Integrated Military Organization and, in 1966, denounced the bilateral agreements with the United States on bases, communication networks and pipelines.[517] At that time, there was a sign of détente after the United States and the Soviet Union prevented the escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Bases in France were dispersed: headquarters were transferred to Belgium and West Germany; air bases were relocated to the United Kingdom and other western countries; and some other U.S. troops were sent back to the homeland.[518] Examining how the United States perceived Soviet threat posed to Western Europe and dealt with the French demand would deepen the understanding of U.S. agreement on contested base closures. There are other cases of base contestation. The validity of the hypothesis will be reinforced by increasing the number of case studies.

Furthermore, the hypothesis can be refined by including a case study in which the United States

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[516] Shinji Kawana, *Kichi no seijigaku* [Base Politics: The Origins of the Post War U.S. Overseas Bases Expansion Policy] (Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō, 2012).
[517] Kentaro Yamamoto, *Dogōru no kaku seisaku to dōmei senryaku* [Charles de Gaulle's Nuclear Policy and Alliance Strategy] (Nishinomiya: Kwansei Gakuin Shuppankai, 2012).
[518] Ibid., 157.

did not make a concession to a host's demand of base closure. As briefly introduced in Chapter 1, Portugal in the 1960s is a candidate case.[519] More thorough data collection may find similar cases. Comparison between U.S. agreement and disagreement on base closure may show significant difference in variances of the study variables—U.S. threat perception, U.S. evaluation of the contested base and required base capability.

If one could expand the scope of analysis subjects to include all closed bases overseas, it might be interesting to examine variances among different services.[520] Some of my interviewees suggested that U.S. ground forces such as the Marine Corps in Okinawa were an important element of deterrence.[521] If so, to what extent did this idea affect the U.S. decision of base closure? Are the Army or the Marine Corps expected to deter an enemy better than the Air Force or the Navy, which is why their camps are hard to be closed?[522] The mobility and flexibility of base disposition might be influenced by the nature of the services, their roles, political power of each service, or organizational motivations.

4. General Conclusions

This dissertation asks a bigger question: when and why does the United States accept the demand of host countries? In answering the question, I draw a general conclusion that the United States seeks primacy and thus makes much of its overseas bases and alliances. As Barry Posen argues, to the United States, overseas bases are important pillars of its command of the commons.[523] The United States has maintained a vast basing network—as of now no other country can have global reach as the United States does. It has 514 sites

[519] The cases of France and Portugal mentioned here are not chosen as study cases because I set the time frame of this research from 1989 to 2018. Refer to the case selection criteria in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.
[520] This point can be a common research interest with quantitative research on bases and deployments. See Michael A. Allen, "Agendas for Continued Research on Basing and Troop Deployments Overseas: A Memo on What We Have and What We Need," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, N.Y.: Social Science Research Network, September 6, 2021).
[521] Noboru Yamaguchi, Kyoji Yanagisawa, *Yokushiryoku o Tou: Moto seifu kōkan to bōei supesharisuto tachi no taiwa* [Questioning Deterrence: Dialogue Between Former Government High Official and Defense Specialists] (Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan, 2010), 132; Noboru Yamaguchi, "Why the U.S. Marines Should Remain in Okinawa: A Military Perspective," in *Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Toward a More Equal Partnership*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1997), 104; Masahiro Akiyama et al., *Moto bōei jimujikan Akiyama Masahiro kaikoroku* [Former Vice Defense Minister Masahiro Akiyama's Memoirs] (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2018), 152–153.
[522] Allen, "Agendas for Continued Research on Basing and Troop Deployments Overseas," 5; Dan Reiter and Paul Poast, "The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter Aggression," *Texas National Security Review* 4, Issue 3 (Summer 2021): 33–53.
[523] Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (July 2003), 16.

in 45 foreign countries.[524] It outnumbers by far Russia with overseas deployment in nine foreign countries and China in two.[525] To maintain the global power projection capability and the primacy in the military realm, the bases and allies are valuable.

I can generalize the U.S. behavior at least when it faces the hosts' demands for base closure. U.S. agreement on closing the contested bases is rationalized by their explanation based on threat perception. The United States provides consistent explanation in dealing with base contestation as follows: because of the strategic imperatives, the United States values the existing bases overseas and assesses what base capability is required to sustain them. The United States further seeks to preserve good relationships with its allies because they provide stable access to the rest of the bases.

Furthermore, it is important to note that U.S. agreement on closing the contested bases seems like a concession to the host country; however, the United States does not compromise on its force structure. By arranging the relocation of forces stationed at the contested base, the United States nullifies or minimizes the loss of the base. The United States thus sustains its capabilities in the region for which the base is responsible, and maintains its global base network. Nevertheless, this dissertation indicates that multiple basing options can be drawn from U.S. threat perception. It is possible to reexamine and re-discuss alternative options to adjust the U.S. force posture to changes in the security environment. In other words, it is important to constantly check whether the current forces and their disposition meet the security requirements. This dissertation proposes discussion of base issues pertaining to U.S. overseas bases from a strategic point of view.

[524] U.S. Department of Defense, *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline*.
[525] The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2021*, 205, 258. UN mission excluded.

Appendix I. Overview of Closed U.S. Overseas Bases

Appendix I exhibits data related to the case study selection discussed in Chapter 1. It contains three tables. Appendix I-A illustrates a general tendency of the dynamics of U.S. overseas bases. Appendix I-B is a list of the general phenomenon, or the universe of cases, which is closed U.S. overseas bases. Appendix I-C is a list of U.S. overseas bases closed or agreed to be closed.

The main source of the two lists is the Base Structure Report (BSR) that the U.S. Department of Defense has made open to the public annually since 1999. Based on the annual report of U.S. bases inventory, I develop a list of closed U.S. overseas bases. It the serves a purpose of providing an overview of how much and where the U.S. has relinquished its basing access towards the end of the Cold War and after.

The BSR discloses the list of military installations and sites that the Department of Defense and each of the U.S. military services hold in the U.S., its territories and overseas.[526] The inventory contains the size and the location of, the number of personnel and civilian workers in each installation, as well as the Plant Replacement Value (PRV) that indicates the estimated cost of replacing the existing physical asset. Utilizing the series of the BSR, I employ a simple listing method for collecting closed bases: if a base is not listed on the report of a certain year and thereafter, I assume that the base is closed. A list of closed overseas bases is composed by investigating the installation inventory year by year and collecting removed bases.

There are a couple of notes to make with regards to utilizing the data from this report for listing base closures. The first point is related to the definition of bases. The BSR deals with installations and sites that are not equivalent to this research's definition of bases. In this research, a base means a military complex that is composed of facilities and buildings serving for military operations. On the other hand, for administrative and accounting reasons, the BSR includes buildings and constructions not directly related to military operations such as barracks, depots, piers, hospitals, recreation centers and schools. In order to sort out the bases from the installations in BSR inventory, I set up coding rules as follows:

- If the site name indicates a contiguous area such as camp, station, *kaserne* (barracks in

[526] Although Harkavy presents the extensive list of overseas bases of the empires in history, the U.S. bases in the post-Cold War period and now seem incomplete. Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000* (New York: Routledge, 2001). 175-256.

German), air base, naval air facility, or port, it is assumed to be a base.

- Storage, depot, family housing, hospital, and quality-of-life facilities are excluded because they are secondary installations associated with main operation bases. When a troop or unit is disbanded, these associated facilities will be closed accordingly. These facilities can be closed after integration into another existing major base.
- If a facility is located in the same city which accommodates a base, assume it as a contiguous part of the base.
- Buildings and small (less than 50 acres) isolated structures are excluded.

For example, below are the U.S. Army installations in Japan listed in the BSR 2015 and how I code.

SITE	NAME NEAREST CITY	TOTAL ACRES	CODING
Akasaka Press Center	Tokyo	7	Excluded
Akizuki AMMO Depot	Akizuki	138	Excluded
Camp Zama	Sagamihara	578	Listed as a base
Hiro AMMO Depot	Kure	88	Excluded
Kachin Hanto Area	Kachin Hanto	84	Excluded
Kawakami AMMO Depot	Higashi-Hiroshima	644	Excluded
Kure Pier 6	Kure	4	Excluded
Naha Port	Naha	139	Listed as a base
POL Facilities	Yomitan-son	347	Assumed as Torii Station
Sagami General Depot	Sagamihara	528	Assumed as Camp Zama
Sagamihara FH Area	Sagamihara	149	Assumed as Camp Zama
Torii Station	Yomitan-son	505	Listed as a base
Yokohama North Dock	Yokohama	121	Excluded

Second, the BSR only includes installations and sites of a certain footage and value. An established display criterion for overseas installations to be listed is larger than 10 acres *or* higher than 10 million dollars of PRV.[527] Installations are excluded if they satisfy neither of the criteria (herein I call them unlisted sites). If a site appears in the report of a year and is not shown in the following years, there are two possible situations. The site could be returned to a host country or be reduced in size or value. In fact, it is impossible to trace whether an unlisted base is closed unless the closure is announced publicly. Inevitably my listing method

[527] Exceptions are FY1999 and FY2001. The criteria of the former are 10 acres *or* PRV 1 million dollars, while that of the latter is *only* PRV 10 million dollars.

does not reflect the closures of unlisted bases. However, this issue is not significant to this dissertation because small installations are less likely to be contested due to their little impact on local communities.

This listing method serves for the purpose of this research, which is to explain closed bases followed by contestation and bilateral negotiations. The listing is also consistent with the previous studies on base politics that treat base as one single unit or a complex as defined in this research.

The following three tables are made based on the BSR. Appendix I-A provides a quick overview of overseas listed in the BSR each year. Colored parts indicate that the base exists in that year. The BSR Fiscal Year 1999 is considered as a reference point because the previous series—FY 1989, 1991 and 1993—list much fewer installations. If any of the previous ones become a reference point, that would mean the increase of bases, which differs from the reality. It is reasonable to assume that the United States did not expand overseas basing between 1989 and 1999.

Next, based on the BSR, Appendix I-B presents the list of closed bases extracted from Appendix I-A. The detailed list includes functions and area of each base as well as the number of personnel stationed at each base. The bases with an asterisk (*) are identified as contested bases.

Lastly, Appendix I-C shows the total number of overseas installations. The bar graph is simply a collection of portfolio summaries of the BSR each year. Thus, counted are overseas installations and sites that the BSR identifies. As mentioned above, listing of installations and sites varies according to the then PRV (area, the other criterion, is less likely to change). For that reason, it is difficult to read from the graph whether the number of bases actually decreased or that of *listed* bases decreased. Nonetheless, the graph helps grasp the tendency of U.S. overseas presence in decline over the past two decades.

Acronyms used in Appendix I

AB	airbase
ACT	activity
AFB	Air Force base
AS	air station
AUTEC	Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
BSR	Base Structure Report
CEB	combat equipment base
COMFLEACT	commander fleet activities
CONUS	continental United States
DET	detachment
GP	group
HSG	housing
JMF	joint maritime facility
MCB	Marine Corps base
NAF	naval air facility
NAVACT	naval activity
NAVCOMSTA (COMM STA)	naval communications station
NAVREGCONTRCTR	navy region control center
NAVSUPPACT	naval support activity
NAVSUPPFAC	naval support facility
NAVUNSEAWARCEN (NUSWC)	navy undersea warfare center
NSA	naval support activity
PRV	plant replacement value
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
STOR	storage
TNG	training

I-A. Total Number of Overseas Bases (FY 2002 – FY 2018)



Notes: BSR FY 2001 and earlier do not provide portfolio summary.

I-B. U.S. Overseas Bases at a Glance




Country
Base Name
1989
1991
1993
1999
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2017
2018
Germany
Mannheim
Munich
Neu Ulm
Norddeutschland
Nuernberg
Oberdachstetten TNG Area
Patch Barracks
Pirmasens
Rheinberg
Rhine Ordance Barracks
Schweinfurt
Smith Barracks
South Camp Vilseck
Stuttgart
Vilseck
Warner Barracks
Wiesbaden
Wildflecken
Worms
Wuerzburg
Zweibruecken
Tempelhof Central Airport
Bitburg AB
Rhein Main AB
Hessisch Oldendorf
Wuescheim AB
Ramstein AB
Hahn AB
Pruem AS
Sembach AB
Spangdahlem AB
Lindsey AB
Zweibrucken AB
Greece
Hellenikon AB
Iraklion AB
NAV SUPPACT Souda Bay
Greenland
Sondrestrom AB
Thule AB
Honduras
US Army Honduras
Iceland
Naval Station Keflavik
Grindavik
Italy
Camp Darby
Camp Ederle
Livorno Supply & Maint Area
Vicenza
NAVSUPACT Maddalena
Support Activity Naples
Air Station Sigonella
San Vito AB
Comiso AB
Aviano AB
Mannheim Class III Point
Schweinfurt TNG Area
Wiesbaden Army Airfield
Wuerzburg TNG Areas
Wuerzburg Hospital
& TNG Areas
Bitburg Communication, Fam HSG & Storage
Hahn communication station
Sembach Admin Annex
Zweibruechen Fam HSG Site
nsa souda bsouda bay
NSA Souda Bay
Soto Cano
Keflavik
NSA Lamaddalena
NAVSUPPACT Naples
NSA Nap Naples
NSA Naples Support Site
NAVSUPPACT NAPLES IT
Sigonella
NAS Sigonella
San Vito Air Station
Comiso Family Housing Site


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2017
2018
Japan
Naha Port
Camp Zama
Torii Station
Naval Air Facility Atsugi
Fleet Activities Sasebo
Fleet Activity Yokosuka
Kadena AB
Misawa AB
Yokota AB
Camp Butler
Camp Courtney
Camp Foster
Camp Fuji
Camp Gonsalves
Camp Hansen
Camp Kinser
Camp Lester
Camp Mctureous
Camp Schwab
Gimbaru TRN Area
Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield
Kin Blue Beach
Yomitan
MCAS Futenma
MCAS Iwakuni
NAF Atsugi
COMFLEACT Sasebo
COMFLEACT Yokosuka
COMFLEACT Sasebo
COMFLEACT Yokosuka
McTureous
Iwakuni
Korea
Bayonet TRN Area
Bullseye 01
Camp Ames
Camp Bonifas
Camp Carroll
Camp Casey
Camp Castle
Camp Colbern
Camp Eagle
Camp Edwards
Camp Essayons
Camp Falling Water
Camp Garry Owen
Camp Giant
Camp Gray
Camp Greaves
Camp Henry
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Camp Hovey
Camp Howze
Camp Humphreys
Camp Jackson
Camp Kwangsa Ri
Camp Kyle
Camp Liberty Bell
Camp Long
Camp Red Cloud (Bullseye)


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2017
2018
Korea
Camp Market
Camp Morse
Camp Mercer
Camp Nimble
Camp Page
Camp Red Cloud
Camp Sears
Camp Stanley
Camp Stanton
Camp Walker
Camp Yongin
Cheju do TRN CTR
H220 Heliport
K-16 Air Base
La Guardia
Mobile
Niblo Barracks
Tango
Yong Pyong
Yongsan Garrison
Yongsan Area
Kunsan AB
Kwang Ju AB
Osan AB
Suwon AB
Taegu AB
Mu Juk
MCB Camp S D Butler Okinawa JA (Mu Juk)
Camp Mu Juk
Marshall Island
US Army Kwajalein Atoll
Luxembourg
Bettembourg Site
Sanem Site
Netherlands
Soesterberg AB
Brunssum Pomms
54th ASG
Brunssum CEB
Brunssum Support Site
Coevorden Pomms
Hendrik Mine
Rotterdam
Schinnen Emma Mine
Vriezenveen Pomms
Vriezenveen CEB
Volkel AB
Norway
Flesland AB
Rygge AB
Sola AB
Oman
Seeb MPT
Thumrait Map
Panama
Defense Complex Panama
Fort Clayton
Naval Station Panama Canal
Naval Security GP ACT Galeta
Howard AFB
Philippines
NAV Air Station Cubi Point
NAV Station Subic Bay
Clark AB
Portugal
Lajes Field AB
Qatar
Al Udeid AB



Note: The names of countries and bases are maintained as in BSR. Names of some bases change over time. The change is reflected within the colored areas. For example, the Rota naval base appears as NAV Station Rota from 1989, as Rota in 2007, and as NS Rota from 2008 and thereafter.

I-C. List of Closed Bases

Country		Base	Year of Closure		Facilities and Functions	Acres	Number of Personnel	Source	Notes and Source on the Closure
Belgium		Florennes Air Base		AF	air defense	212	1364	BSR1991	485th Tactical Missile Wing, a groud-launched cruise missile wing, was to be withdrawan under INF Treaty. (Duke, 32)
Bermuda		Naval Air Station Bermuda	1994	NA	patrol	1453	1156	BSR1993	
Denmark		Karup Air Base	2014-	AF		72,409		BSR2014	https://www.army.mil/article/126666/dod_announces_return_of_sites_to_host_nations_in_europe
Equador	*	Manta Airfield		AF		102	13	BSR2010	
France		Istres Air Base	2004?	AF	support	1	—	BSR2006	https://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-military-s-mission-in-france-concludes-with-end-of-operations-at-istres-1.26670
Germany		7th Army Tng Cmd		AR					
		Ansbach		AR	housing, barracks, training, arsenal	1929	605	BICC, 90	
		Aschaffenburg		AR	housing, training, barracks, arsenal, communications	3635	785	BICC, 88	
		Asgsburg		AR	supply, housing, barracks, training	2979	1222	BICC, 90	
		Babenhausen Kaserne							
		Bad Kreuznach		AR	airfield, housing, hospital, arsenal, barracks	242	755	BICC, 87	
		Bad Toelz	before 1991	AR	airfield, training		390	Duke, 98	
		Bamberg		AR	arsenal	456	260	BICC, 91	
		Berlin		AR	communications, housing, barracks, rec, hospital, arsenal, training	2078	3271	BICC, 95	
		Frankfurt		AR	housing, training, barracks, airfield, hospital, recreation, arsenal	714	4109	BICC, 92	
		Fulda		AR	training, barracks, housing, arsenal, airfield	6361	4157	BICC, 94	
		Garmisch		AR	training, barracks, recreation	365	2	BICC, 91	
		Giebelstadt Army Airfield							
		Goeppingen	before 1991	AR	HQ/Admin, communications, training, housing		4100	Duke, 113	
		Hanau		AR	arsenal, training, housing, barracks	746	4065	BICC, 93	
		Heidelberg		AR	barracks	34	29	BICC, 84	
		Heilbronn		AR	housing, barracks, arsenal, communications, training	1165	935	BICC, 90	
		Karlsruhe		AR	arsenal, depot, barracks, airfield, barracks, communications, housing	2078	3320	BICC, 85	
		Mainz		AR	barracks, housing, airfield, depot, arsenal	1192	827	BICC, 87	
		Munich		AR	barracks, housing, communications	378	828	BICC, 96	
		Neu-Ulm	before 1991	AR	missile defense, training, barracks		3700	Duke, 131	
		Norddeutschland		AR	housing, hospital, barracks, communication	906	4194	BICC, 95	
		Nuernberg		AR	housing, barracks, training, arsenal, recreation, hospital	9871	7433	BICC, 89	
		Pirmasens		AR	communications, arsenal, barracks, training, hospital, supply	4629	3179	BICC, 87	
		Rheinberg		AR	communications, arsenal, ousing, barracks	246	277	BICC, 88	
		Schweinfurt		AR	training	12010	0	BICC, 89	
		Stuttgart		AR	housing, barracks, housing, airfield, hospital, arsenal	1308	5162	BICC, 84	
		Wildflacken		AR	barracks, housing, supply, air defense (tactical defense site), training, arsenal	18023	2224	BICC, 91	
		Worms		AR	housing, barracks, communications, recreation, supply, training, air defense (missile stations)	262	1212	BICC, 86	
		Wuezeburg		AR	barracks, training, arsenal	2174	2344	BICC, 89	
		Zweibruecken		AR	recreation, barracks, air defense (missile station) housing, airfield	101	1166	BICC, 86	

Country		Base	Year of Closure		Functions	Acres	Number of Personnel	Source	Notes and source on the closure
Germany		Rhein Main Air Base	2005	AF	maintenance	441	369		https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/rhein-main.htm
Greece	*	Hellenikon Air Base		AF		176	1482	BSR1993	https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/01/29/Greenham-Common-among-bases-slated-for-closure/8825633589200/
		Iraklion Air Base	1994	AF		247	796		https://apnews.com/article/3f48ef9593d76212087880 78f4c52536
		Greece Nav Comm Sta		NA	communications	499	388	BSR1991	
Greenland		Sondrestrom Air Base		AF					
Iceland		Keflavik Air Base	2006	NA	airfied	23339	81	BSR1991, 2007	
Italy		Comiso Air Base		AF	air defense	379	19	BSR1991	*DoD Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992: Hearings Before a Subcommitee of the Committee on Appropriations*, Senate, 102st Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 2521, Part 4.
		La Maddalena IT	2008	NA	repair, maintenance for submarine	3417	110	BSR2008	https://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-navy-closes-base-on-sardinia-1.75755
Japan	*	Naha Port	agreed in 1974	AR					
	*	Futenma Air Station	agreed in 1996	MC					https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html
	*	Gimbaru Trn Area	2011	MC	training	148		BSR2011	Okinawa Prefectural Government, *Okinawa no beigun kichi* [*U.S. Bases in Okinawa] 2018.*
	*	Yomitan (Aux Airfield)	2006	MC	training, communications	467		BSR2007	
Korea		Camp Bonifas		AR		36	3	BSR2007	
		Camp Castle	2015	AR					https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/805052.html
		Camp Casey	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					
		Camp Colbern	by 2017	AR		76	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Eagle	by 2019?	AR		113		BSR2018	https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/1963637/usfk-basing-and-relocation-program/
		Camp Edwards	by 2017	AR		62	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Essayons	by 2017	AR		76	0	BSR2007	
		Camp Falling Water	by 2017	AR		59	0	BSR2007	
		Camp Garry Owen	by 2017	AR		70	0	BSR2007	
		Camp Giant	by 2017	AR		42	0	BSR2007	
		Camp Gray	by 2017	AR		2	1	BSR1999	
		Camp Greaves	by 2017	AR		59	0	BSR2007	
		Camp Hialeah	by 2017	AR		133	0	BSR2011	
		Camp Hovey	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					
		Camp Howze	by 2017	AR		157	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Jackson	2020	AR					https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISX20201211_0001267287&cID=10301&pID=10300
		Camp Kyle	by 2017	AR		36	243	BSR2006	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Liberty Bell		AR		17	0	BSR2005	
		Camp Long	by 2019?	AR		84		BSR2018	https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Releases/Article/1963637/usfk-basing-and-relocation-program/
		Camp Market	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					
		Camp Mercer		AR	engineer battalion	8	561	BSR1991	
		Camp Morse	agreed in 2004	AR		8	0	BSR1999	
		Camp Nimble	by 2017	AR		16	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Page	by 2017	AR		468	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Red Cloud	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					

Country		Base	Year of Closure		Functions	Acres	Number of Personnel	Source	Notes and source on the closure
Korea		Camp Sears	by 2017	AR		32	0	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Camp Stanley	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					
		Camp Stanton	by 2017	AR		67	325	BSR2007	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Cheju do TRN CTR		AR		12	0	BSR2007	
		H200 (helipad)	agreed in 2002 & 2004	AR					
		La Gauardia	by 2017	AR		34		BSR2006	https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/802260.html
		Mobile		AR		2,761	5	BSR2006	
		Niblo Barracks	2020	AR					https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/article/003/0010237456
	*	Koon Ni Air Range	2005	AF					Yeo 2006
	*	Yongsan Garrison	agreed in 2002	AR					
Luxembourg		Bettembourg Site	2006	AR	storege, maintenance of equipment & supplies	117	9		https://www.stripes.com/news/luxembourg-is-familiar-ground-for-maintenance-squadron-1.92677
Panama		Panama Defense Complex	1999	AR					
Philippines	*	Clark Air Base		AF		56952	8761	BSR1991	
	*	Philippines Nav Comm Sta		NA	communications	4233	234	BSR1991	
		Subic Bay Naval Magazine		NA	storage, arsenal		305	BSR1991	
Spain	*	Torrejon Air Base	1994	AF	airfield	3682	4052	BSR1991	
	*	Zaragoza Air Base		AF	training	2983	966	BSR1991	
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands		Kwajalein Missile Range		AR	national test range	3568	—	BSR1991	
Turkey		Diogenes Station		AR	communications	382	292	BSR1991	
		Pirinclik Air Base	1997	AF	intelligence	176	115		DoD press release 1997Feb
United Kingdom		Burtonwood Army Depot	1994	AR	storage, supply	1735	39	BSR1993	
		RAF Greenham Common		AF		2957	219	BSR1991	https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/01/29/Greenham-Common-among-bases-slated-for-closure/8825633589200/
		RAF Molesworth		AF		46	21	BSR1991	
		RAF Wethersfield		AF	reserve airfield	801	521	BSR1991	https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/01/29/Greenham-Common-among-bases-slated-for-closure/8825633589200/
		NSGA Edzell	1997	NA	communications	457	833		
		JMF St. Mawgan	2009	NA	underseas surveillance	0	10		https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy-to-close-last-facility-in-u-k-by-may-1.87203#.YpmvkTlWIqs.link
		RAF Bentwaters	1993	AF	housing	1089	3148		https://www.bcwm.org.uk/bentwaters/
		RAF Chicksands	1997	AF	communications	411	1267		https://www.forces-war-records.co.uk/units/564/raf-chicksands
		RAF Upper Heyford	1994	AF	housing	2126	3903		https://www.forces-war-records.co.uk/units/712/raf-upper-heyford
		RAF Woodbridge	1993	AF	housing	994	165		https://www.bcwm.org.uk/woodbridge/
		RAF High Wycombe	2007	NA	admin, housing	93	227	BSR1991	https://www.americanairmuseum.com/place/173

Note: The bases with an asterisk (*) are identified as contested bases.

Duke in Source refers to Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Yeo is Source refers to Andrew Yeo, "Local-National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements," *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 21, no. 2 (2006): 34-60.

Appendix II. Comparison of Alternatives to Subic Bay Base

This appendix is for the case of the Philippines in Chapter 4. Two tables of Appendix II-A and II-B illustrate the relationship between distance and force requirements. Both of the data deal with mobility of naval power. II-A indicates that the farther a base is located from an operating area, the less efficient it becomes and the more carrier task groups are required to sustain the naval presence at the operating area. II-B shows distances and required transit time between any two naval bases in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

II-A. Distance and On Station Time

Distance Base-Operating Area	Roundtrip Transit Time, 15 knots	On Station Days, 60-Day Cycle (assumes 10 days at base)	On Station Time as a Percentage of Total Cycle Time	No. Carrier Task Groups Required for Two on Station
1000 n.m.	5.5 days	44.6 days	74%	3
2000 n.m.	11.1 days	38.9 days	61%	3
3000 n.m.	16.6 days	33.4 days	56%	4
4000 n.m.	22.2 days	27.8 days	46%	5
5000 n.m.	29.6 days	20.4 days	34%	6

Source: Alva M. Bowen, Jr. *Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options,* CRS Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 20, 1986), 17.

II-B. Distance between Ports in Asia-Pacific

From	To	Distance	Transit Time (days)	
			15 kts	20 kts
San Diego	Guam	5379	15	11
	Singapore	7736	21 .5	16
	Subic Bay	6604	18	14
	Diego Garcia	9963	27 .5	21
	Bandar Abbas	11117	31	23
	Yokosuka	4923	13 .5	10
	Pearl Harbor	2285	6 .5	5
Yokosuka	Guam	1352	4	3
	Singapore	2889	8	6
	Pearl Harbor	3397	9 .5	7
	Subic Bay	1758	5	7
	Bandar Abbas	6270	17 .5	13
	Diego Garcia	5116	14	10 .5
Subic Bay	Singapore	1327	4	3
	Guam	1499	4	3
	Diego Garcia	3554	10	7 .5
	Bandar Abbas	4708	13	10
	Cam Ranh Bay	700	2	1 .5
Singapore	Bahrain	3652	10	7 .5
	Pearl Harbor	5881	16	12
	Guam	2585	7	5 .5
	Cam Ranh Bay	786	2	1 .5
Fremantle	Diego Garcia	2850	8	6
	Bahrain	5203	14 .5	11
Guam	Yokosuka	1352	4	3
	Diego Garcia	4812	13 .5	10
	Cam Ranh Bay	2112	6	4 .5
	Bandar Abbas	5966	16 .5	12 .5

Source: Southard, Richard B., Jr. “The Loss of the Philippine Bases: Effects on USCINCPAC’s Ability to Employ His Forces.” Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College, February 13, 1992, p. 8. Accessed October 7, 2019. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA249898.pdf.

Appendix III. U.S. Bases in Okinawa

This appendix is for the case of Okinawa in Chapter 5. Two tables below gives the background of U.S. bases in Okinawa after its reversion to Japan in 1972.

III-A. The Number of U.S. Personnel Stationed in Okinawa



Source: *Statistics on U.S. Bases and Self Defense Forces Bases in Okinawa*, Military Base Affairs Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government, March 2021, 22-25. Accessed February 11, 2022.
https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/r3_toukei_1_gaikyo2.pdf.

Note: The data is based on hearing from the U.S. forces in Okinawa acquired by the Military Affairs Division. The U.S. forces in Okinawa have not provided data since 2012.

III-B. Area of U.S. Bases in Okinawa



Source: *Statistics on U.S. Bases and Self Defense Forces Bases in Okinawa*, Military Base Affairs Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government, March 2021, 10-11. Accessed February 11, 2022.
https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/r3_toukei_1_gaikyo2.pdf

Note: The base area includes one exclusively used by the U.S. forces and ones used jointly with the Self Defense Forces.
The index number indicates changes relative to the area as of May 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan.

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