

早稲田大学審査学位論文（博士）

Old-timers, Newcomers, and the Borderless-Integration

— A Research of New Chinese Immigrant in Phitsanulok Province,

Northern Thailand

オールドタイマー、ニューカマー、ボーダレス・インテグ

レーション

—タイ北部ピサヌローク県における華人新移民の調査

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Abstract

This research uses a qualitative approach to canvass how China's foreign policy was introduced in an attempt to culturally and transnationally integrate overseas Chinese people, including old-timers (ethnic Chinese individuals with Thai nationality) and newcomers (legitimate Chinese immigrants from mainland China who have not yet obtained Thai nationality) in order to strengthen the state's soft power. This borderless integration is chiefly constructed from three facets: culture building, education, and social media. The culture building angle was initially projected by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO) based on the state's interest at the beginning of the borderless integration. The education angle is based on the Confucius Institute, which has planted within the local institution a focus on Chinese language education, and more importantly, a place designed to speed up the solidarity among old-timers and newcomers. The social media angle involves the use of social media, especially smartphone applications, as a supervising mechanism for reconsolidating the links between newcomers and the state during the migration process. The case study focuses on the fieldwork we had been doing at the Xingmin School in Phitsanulok based on the information given by different interviewees. What new unexpected, but later found out, was that the old-timers had been using a "neutrality policy" in order to avoid sensitive issues that occurred in the Greater China Region when facing the borderless integration. This helped them not only keep the newcomers' interest but also positive standings for themselves. Finally, I would like to reconsider "guanxi," which is the core communicating principle, in the context of borderless integration from a global perspective.

The construction of this paper contains eight chapters and two parts. Abstract, Acknowledgement, List of Tables, List of Figures, and Introduction can be all found before page 30. The first chapter is from page 30 to page 34, which contains three main theories that I discussed: international immigration (pulling and push factors), soft power, and imagined community. Chapter 2 is from page 37 to page 97, which I mainly introduced the formation of overseas Chinese community from 10 century to present. Chapter 3 is from page 109 to 124, which I mainly introduced the policy towards overseas Chinese affairs from the Chinese government from Qing dynasty to the time before 1978. Chapter 4 is from page 130 to 137 in which I introduced the policy of overseas Chinese after 1978. Chapter 5 is from page 139 to 167, I mainly talked different patterns of new Chinese immigrants. Chapter 6 is from page 193 to 247, I mainly talked the fieldwork study that I researched in Phitsanulok province of Thailand. Chapter 7 is from page 255 to 267, I discussed the “borderless integration” between newcomers and old-timers. Final chapter is from page 275 to 278 as summary. Reference page is from page 279 to 293.

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Introduction

1. Background of study

There are two types of “Chinese” living overseas, the new immigrants and the ethnic Chinese, and there are many ways to distinguish them. By the time the massive wave of new Chinese immigrants settled down overseas, carried by Chinese enterprises propelled by the force of the national initiative, *Belt and Road*, their lives were filled with higher education, much more capital, and broader networks closer ties to mainland China. This coincided with the near disappearance of elderly immigrants and their well-integrated descendants, having surpassed the dark period of being oppressed. This eventually helped them get rid of titles such as "Chinese," "ethnic Chinese," or "overseas Chinese," commonly used to clearly distinguished them from the natives or locals.

China has the long, complicated, and divisive immigration history, because “Chinese” are so different in terms of their social behaviors, living habit, regional culture (northern and southern are different), dialects, diet, and traditional conventions. The Chinese people have continually moved overseas to live in other countries out of various purposes. The newcomers are those that have recently left their hometowns in China, while the old-timers are those that have been living overseas with their families and have established their businesses there for a long time. Both old-timers and newcomers are called Chinese, they come from the same nation, but in terms of different time of immigrating, there became significantly different in terms of folk religion, dialect, concept, even ideology, and regional culture. Geographically, it is common that an immigrant from northern China cannot understand the dialect of an immigrant from southern China. Even the ways in which funerals

are held are different between these two regions, for example, with various musical instruments used in the funeral march. Therefore, it has long been recognized that, for the overseas Chinese communities formed in Southeast Asia before the mid-20th century, four social institutions are significant: (1) dialect-or hometown-based associations, (2) temples, (3) schools, and (4) cemeteries (Chiang & Cheng, 2015, p. 94).

From my personal experiences back to my college years, conflicts happened in the Chinatown in Philadelphia between newcomers and old-timers have occasionally occurred, most of them are caused by economic dispute. Although there are regional and historical relationships among speech groups, this is not the case with regard to newcomers and old-timers, which could prove the fundamental causation strife. In Philadelphia's Chinatown, where a karaoke club owned by a newcomer was destroyed by a group of old-timers during the night one day before it opened (T.T. personal communication, 2019). The first reason for this was that the newcomer did not followed the rules made by old-timers as the newcomers have to pay a "protection fee" or "membership fee" before the opening day of any new business. As result, the new business was crashed down, just because the opening ceremony for the club (and the date on which it was held) was not reported and permitted by the "leaders" of Philadelphia's Chinatown. Another plain assumption given by the interviewee was that the new and fantastic-looking Karaoke club could possibly take all the business away from older ones owned by the old-timers.

My memory resonated to the words said by Chang (2003) when I was reading her *A Narrative History: The Chinese in America*. Chang mentioned in *Chapter 15: newcomers*,

new life, the chaotic 1960s that the old-timers didn't welcome the newcomers at all. The old-timers despise the newcomers who could not speak good English, some of the newcomers could not even speak a English word. The teenagers of newcomers did not learn English well in time, their school performance was too poor, and after dropping out, they went to the streets to become young gangster. "ChingChongs" was the discriminatory name for those newcomers, literally it means the parasite of Qing dynasty, as fightback, the newcomers called the old-timers as "Tow Gee" and "Juk Sing", these two words indicate to aborigines and the stem of bamboo. The pole of bamboo is empty and compartmentalized, the water absorbed by bamboo is sectionalized by each compartment, which draws analogy to the old-timers do not belong neither Western or Chinese. Conflicts often erupt between rival gangs, in the past few years, incidents of killings among young people have escalated into sword and gun fights (Chang, 2003, p. 357). Here is a part of detailed description about the conflict between juvenile newcomers and the descendants of old-timers:

Our Chinese-American children are forced into desperation and often beaten badly. After school, once they leave the playground, they will stop us at the bus station or tram transfer station. This is not just a one-time revenge. They beat us once they see us. Just laugh at any foreign classmates in the class, or bump into their brothers or cousins in the hallway, and we will be out of luck. Those guys have been fighting among the gangs in Hong Kong and Macau since they were young, and the local gangs are very powerful. Some of them even spent a long time in the dark prison when they were young (Chang, 2003, p. 357).

Conflicts could also be ideological. As in Hong Kong, most new immigrants came from mainland China and were educated in different ideologies and histories, especially the younger generations who were informed by highly censored knowledge from the mainland. Business interests are put first in most situations in Hong Kong, as an interviewee described. The best way to sell a property or an insurance contract to a new immigrant is to either not speak about politics or nod along with them on any political dispute, particularly over Hong Kong and mainland China, which, undoubtedly, had to be a pro-central government. Otherwise, the Chinese clients were not happy (P.W. personal communication, 2019).

How to bring the old and new “Chinese” together as a unified coalition or league in overseas has become the research question for China’s government. The 'sinicization' doctrine and policy are part and parcel of Xi Jinping's vision for a 'New Era' (Vermander, 2019, p.1). Sinicization indicates the procedure that brings Chinese culture, especially the Han culture, to other non-Chinese societies, such as education and ideology, as well as moral standards. Thus, in order to boost the nation's soft power overseas to have more negotiable conditions with foreign competitors, a big player has shown up in an attempt to interflow these two groups with somewhat similar histories but substantially different Chinese 'cultures'—old-timers and newcomers—by inwardly building a concept of "standard Chinese." This is designed to unify them under the name of a past-tense blood-linked nation. It could also be considered a solution for a recent issue that needs to be solved as quickly as possible—talent drain, which made China desperately demand more human capital and top

talents, who are qualified to an interdisciplinary standard with transnational backgrounds in the wake of an aging society.

Instead of “sinicization,” I’d like to use the word “integration” to describe this phenomenon which is not only appeared domestically, but has been borderlessly expanding its spectrum. To understand immigrant community is important because there are millions of immigrants are moving either transnationally or domestically, and they are contributing the world economy. Particularly the Chinese immigrant, not because the population is huge, but also the range is the widest. From the U.S., Europe, Africa, to Southeast Asia, Chinatowns are everywhere as we can in any downtown city of any country. Many scholars have done tremendous studies on the ethnic Chinese society, such as William, G. Skinner, who was researching the Chinese community in Thailand. However, today’s situation is totally different from before, instead, we shouldn’t just rely on the past researches, rather we should focus on today’s new immigrants because that is a much diverse, various, mysterious community that ever happened in Chinese immigration history, since most of them were growing up along with the globalization, internet, and huge capital that their homeland – China is holding. Thus, this study will concentrate on the new Chinese immigrants, who had left Chinese since 1980s. origin, procedure, development, orientation, and policy of “borderless integration.” I will also use the knowledge that I learned during the fieldwork in Phitsanulok Province to prove the accuracy, reliability, and facticity of this study.

Before moving to the next part, it is necessary to confess that I originally intended to make a comparative study on the situation of new Chinese immigrants between urban area

(Bangkok) and rural area(Phitsanulok), but due to duration of the fieldwork, and particularly the gap between the reality and expectation of Phitsanulok Province, and the other limitations, such as since the outbreak of the pandemic in the beginning of the 2020, global traveling was not as convenient as before the outbreak, thus to travel again from Japan to Thailand became nearly impossible in 2020. Thus, my focus has changed from comparative study to one area-focused study.

Furthermore, I would like to explain the gap between the reality and expectation of Phitsanulok Province that I have mentioned in previous paragraph. Although the nickname of Phitsanulok Province is called the crossroad of Indochina, where has been functioning as the economic hinge for connecting China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, but the reality was not that much close. Phitsanulok has been called the crossroads of Indochina since 1995, and several projects were already started a decade ago, but what actually happened here is far below expectations. According to the Asian Development Bank (2010),

Potential development of commercial interchanges like Phitsanulok's Indochina Crossroads have remained untapped; and (v) the lack of a master plan for sectoral development across the corridor means that project interventions are often fragmented and lack support from other sectors like infrastructure, finance, human resource development, and central or provincial economic policies. (ADB, 2010, p. 10).

Takahashi (2013) also mentioned that in a previous conference, citizens put forward their opinions on the city's future transportation construction,

Starting at 1 p.m., after the lecture, students and vocational school students and middle school students began to exchange ideas. The elderly also expressed their opinions. [Where should the subway station be built], [there is often water on the road from the city center to the Naresuan university], [it needs further development], [traffic accidents are too common. If this continues, they cannot compete with other advanced countries], [residents living along the train often report that the noise is too much].

Most of the time we estimate a development degree of a city from experiencing the development degree of city's transportation. There is a high-speed railway under construction from Bangkok to Phitsanulok as I saw it every time on the train bouncing from Bangkok to Phitsanulok that takes six hours. The high-speed railway project starts from Bangkok, as the train goes further, the construction gradually disappeared, not even touching the neighboring province. Currently, there are two ways to go to Bangkok from Phitsanulok by public transportation, one is taking an hour plane, another is a 6-hour train ride. A taxi application "Grab" which is the most popular smart phone application for calling taxi in Southeast Asian region, is not available in Phitsanulok. In Phitsanulok, there is neither public subway shuttling locally, nor public buses, the most common transportations are motorcycles and private cars. Students can take two types of public transportation, one is the free bus that shuttles within the campus, and the other is the van that can lead to the downtown. Students can also take the van from the city back to the campus. The van is actually just a type of scooter has only two seats with seat belts on it, and the students on the van can only sit in the back box, which can fit around ten people. Generally speaking,

if students do not have their own motorcycles, it will be very difficult to travel even to very close location.

Thus, comparing the current situation of Phitsanulok with Bangkok, new Chinese immigrants as business purpose came to Thailand tend to choose the latter or Chiang Mai, which has more convenient transportation, better investment space and a larger Chinese population so they are able to speak in the same language and start business in easier ways. Therefore, in the case of Phitsanulok, except for a small number of self-funded or state-sent students, the most common Chinese immigrant is the Chinese language volunteer. In addition, from the information given from the Chamber of Commerce of Phitsanulok, there is no individual Chinese investor has been found in recent years.

2. Research question

This article seeks an answer to the question: what has driven the “borderless integration” between newcomers and old-timers? And how, in what processes that this has been gradually happened? I’ll try to explain my research by using descriptive analysis from historical review till the newest fieldwork that I have researched in 2019, and it is possible by jointly reviewing the changing function of *huiguan*, which is one of the core factor in any overseas Chinese society along with the geopolitical changing between local country and China, and also the present economic phenomenon should be viewed as well, because of the growing capital and investment from mainland China to Southeast Asia has brought in more and more newcomers, through observing their business activities and social

behavior, we could answer the question more correctly. *Guanxi* – connection or network, is another unignorable hidden rule that is existing in any Chinese culture based community. I will explain the triangle but also reciprocal sustaining relation among the *guanxi*, *huiguan*, and borderless integration.

Table A details of sub-questions in the frame of two main research questions

<p><i>What has driven the “borderless integration” between newcomers and old-timers?</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Who are the old-timers (the ethnic Chinese)? 2. Who are the newcomers (new Chinese immigrants)? 3. Why borderless? 4. What is integration? 5. Why do they have to be integrated? 6. (If they have to) What makes them being integrated? In what policy? 7. What they think of being integrated? How they react to it?
<p><i>How, in what processes that the “borderless integration” has been gradually happened?</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the role that <i>guanxi</i> (network) has been functioning? 2. What is the role that <i>huiguan</i> (Chinese association) has been functioning?

	<p>3. Any other factors that has been pushing the process this integration?</p>
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3. Research purpose

The globalization becomes more and more important, “immigrant” has become an inevitable topic to pay attention for every country because immigrant could bring the destination country prosperity, including economic growth, abundant culture, diversity, more colorful society. On the other hand, pessimistically and sensibly to say, the population of immigrant could possibly become a hidden problem if, from their point of view, are not being treated fairly, correctly. Anything sensitive including daily conversation, comment on the internet, historical, religious, or nationalistic discussion, could pull the trigger of destroying the security of society. Therefore, to understand them is the most imminent task for all the policymakers. My thought might meet trouble halfway especially for the situation of Japan, where ranked as top level around the world in terms of social security and famous of low crime rate, the security issue caused by the population of immigrants seem impossible and even unimaginable to be happened, but the question of how to make the immigrant adopt the destination country successfully that they are willing to hold passion and dig up the value of themselves in Japan, or that their ability could be contributed for Japan could be a research topic for Japanese policymaker. All I have said can be summarized as to have a better integration in Japan.

Various conflicts and discrepancies would be obviously seen by the encountering of these two groups of “newcomers” and “old-timers”, although both of them are called Chines, as I have mentioned in previous paragraphs, the experiences of myself on overseas. Thus, this study may seems possibly to make certain recommendations on the “immigrant policy” which could be useful for Japanese government to dealing this current matter of concern as to understand Chinese community better. Chinese immigrant is the research subject of this study, which seizes a huge percentage out of the total population of immigrant in Japan. Therefore, me as a Chinese student, I think I could contribute a little in terms of comprehending Chinese community according to their social behavior, language, and communal activity that we can together make a more diversity, with mutual-understanding, easily adopted, and friendly society. Hopefully this study will help both Japanese policymakers to complete more on immigrant law, and Chinese immigrant to adopt better and live fruitfully in Japan.

4. Hypothesis

There is massive difference between new Chinese immigrants and old Chinese immigrants, whether in terms of their growth background, education level, economic level, their own conditions, or reasons for immigration. The first reason is because their common hometown, China, whether in terms of social stability and political stability situation, are totally different from the first immigration period. The second reason is that most the old immigrants are forced to immigrate to foreign countries when they have no choice. Many old-timers come from Guangdong and Fujian provinces, as we know these two places were

in political turmoil meanwhile facing economic poverty. Many people choose to leave their homes and even go abroad to find financial sources to support their family. However, after studying the former researches, and most importantly, after my own field investigation, the reasons of why newcomers go abroad are different from the reason of old-timers. I will combine the previous literature research and research in the following chapters. Own site visits carefully explain the reasons why new immigrants choose to go abroad.

As I stated in previous paragraph, there is a certain gap between the status quo and development blueprint of Phitsanulok Province. Although before going to Phitsanulok, I did researches on the prior literature on new Chinese immigrants, but the Phitsanulok area is still an academically unexplored area, so I can only use the study of new immigrants in other Southeast Asian countries as the basis in order to create my own hypothesis, such as studying the newcomers of Cambodia and the Philippines. However, Thailand's national conditions are still very different from other ASEAN countries even though some of them are the neighbor of Thailand. It is because that Thailand has never brought war to its homeland in history, even though it is still called a developing country, but it has a certain infrastructure and saves economic accumulation, so it is different from Philippines, where economic situation and politics are still relatively turbulent, and different from one of its neighbor country Cambodia that experienced genocide during the Cold War. This field study was a very big test and challenge for myself, not only because of the academically unexplored situation of Phitsanulok area, but also because I can only use Chinese and English to investigate and interview as well as read and translate literature, my Thai language

level is zero. In addition, the time for this field investigation is only 3 months, reasonable and adequate arrangements must be made every day to gain something.

Thus, the first hypothesis is that based on the fact that the Phitsanulok area has been called the crossroads of the Indochina area, so I assume that most of the new immigrants from China should be entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs. Although they may have better economic conditions than the old-timers who came before, the newcomers believe that in a region with development potential like Phitsanulok, through managing entrepreneurship and business, newcomers should be able to gain more benefit economically than managing business in China. And I speculate that new immigrants may also be investors. There are two economic corridors in the Phitsanulok region, which run through almost the entire Indochina region, covering several countries that are economically the pillars of the Indochina region. Investors from China are generally more daring to challenge and risk investment boldly to attempts, so I think they will focus on investigating and observing the Phitsanulok area, so as to explore the most investment-returning commercial lifeline in this area, such as the chances along the railways. Purchasing lands along the high-speed railway or railroad, establishing small shops such as restaurants on the street near to the station, or develop tourism. So my first speculation is that most of the newcomers from China should be investors or industrialists.

My second hypothesis is that the majority of Chinese newcomers may have come to Phitsanulok Province as foreign workers especially the labor forces. The basis for this assumption is the same as in the previous paragraph. It is precisely because the Phitsanulok

area is and will be the crossroads of the Indochina area, where now is hiding huge development potential and room for economic growth. Therefore, a massive labor forces is essential for the development of this city in terms of building infrastructure, transportation, service industry, commercial zone and other urban systems. At the same time, although China's domestic labor costs have risen compared to the decades after the reform and opening up policy, but from the global angle, China is still one of the main countries that export and provide relatively cheap labor forces. So I hypothesize that most of the new immigrants who come to Phitsanulok as laborers.

My third hypothesis is that from a regional perspective, most of the new immigrants may come from Hainan Province. According to the writings of Skinner (1957), the first group of Chinese immigrants to reach Phitsanulok were the immigrants from Hainan. They were professional at logging and worked hard and could turn the vast forests into treasures on their brave hands. According to my subsequent field investigations, this point was confirmed that the Hainan Association is one of the oldest Chinese association built in Phitsanulok, which proves that Hainanese may be the first Chinese immigrants to settled down in Phitsanulok. According to the researches of the old-timers in the previous research, immigrants from China usually bring the people who close to them or whom considered the most trustworthy, such as family members, brothers and sisters, close relatives, neighbors, or good friends. The main reason for immigrating as a cohesive community instead of immigrating individually is that even if there is signature on the contract or assurance, everyone still can have a group of business partners who are always on call and can be fully

trusted so that they can meet each other's demand in the future and help the community in times of difficulty.

The last conjecture is based on the theory of national integration created by Deutsch (1953). My assumption is that new immigrants and old immigrants cannot be integrated. The core idea of national integration is that even people have different growth backgrounds, different nationalities, and different religions, but if they use the same language, in Deutsch's word, communicative facilities, it will be very helpful to complete national integration. In other words, if everyone can communicate in one language, then national integration will be accomplished. Let take a look from the history of Thailand, especially during the Cold War time, the Thai government strongly advocated Thai nationalism that the Thai government had once banned Chinese learning. I will introduce and discuss the significance of this historical period and the importance of using the same language for national integration in the following contents. So I speculate that due to the impact of the Thai nationalism, and nationalistic policy during the Cold War, many old immigrants may not have had any basic knowledge of Chinese learning and education when they were young, thus most of them may not able to listen, speak, read, and write Chinese. On the other hand, new immigrants are all native Chinese citizens, so they generally use Mandarin Chinese (also known as Beijing dialect) and their local dialects, such as Cantonese, Hainanese, Shanghainese or Hokkien. If there is no strong external force to promote the newcomers and old-timers to use the same language, it is impossible to complete national integration between these two groups. I believe that except to the theory of communicative facilities, there may be still many methods to complete the national integration, but this

research is based on the Deutsh's national integration theory to discuss and study the integration between newcomers and old-timers.

5. Research methodology

For the part of fieldwork, this study chiefly use the qualitative research as the methodology to conduct, which is text-based. Samples are classified as three main groups as the new Chinese immigrant, the ethnic Chinese, and the local people (nationally who might be native Thai, or Lao, Burmese, Cambodian, Philippines who are currently or permanently working, teaching, doing business in Phitsanulok Province; ethnically could be Meo, Hmong, or Hill tribes). Except the two main characters, which are old-timer Chinese and newcomers Chinese, other characters might or might not get involved into the process of integration of Chinese.

Figure A: Samplings of the research




Figure A: The samples are classified in multiple groups as the figure has shown. New Chinese immigrant and the local-ethnic Chinese are main focuses that marked in triangle. The blue circles are the hypothesis that might hinder the integration between old-timers and newcomers. The orange, brown, yellow and purple square indicate to the local people who might or might not get involved into the integration.

The main reason for the sampling in following paragraph is because the special trans-regional nature of Phitsanulok and the very diverse geographical and cultural environment. In Phitsanulok Province as we can see people of different religious beliefs, people from different countries who speak different languages, and people from the same country but with different ethnicities. Unlike Bangkok, Chiang Mai and other developed cities, the

Chinese are not the largest ethnic group in Phitsanulok in terms of population, so compared to the first two megacities, I assume that the integration of the old and new Chinese immigrants will be more difficult, different than traditional way of integration, and more interesting to observe. In terms of economic development, Bangkok and Chiang Mai are highly developed commercial cities, but the development degree of Phitsanulok is far behind Bangkok and Chiang Mai. In the area with less developed level, the social behaviors of new Chinese immigrants will be more unpredictable and unconventional. Most importantly, Chinese newcomers must live with local Thais and foreign immigrants (such as the immigrants from Philippine, Cambodia), and cooperate with people with different ethnicity, which is not like Bangkok and Chiang Mai, where almost all the social activities of Chinese people are carried out in the form of a single ethnic group. In the following chapters, I will introduce in more detail the diverse culture and distinctive characteristics of Phitsanulok, and how such diverse culture will whether help or bring more obstacles to the integration of Chinese newcomers and old-timers.

The research method used in this study is qualitative research. The specific methods are classified as in-depth interviews, follow-up investigations, observations, and participation, through a small amount of data, and then use the analytical description method and snowball method to derive the final research results. This article is basically text-based, and only a small amount of data is used. The reason is that the Phitsanulok area is an academically unknown area and the data that can be used is very limited. The second reason is because my Thai language ability is very limited and I was not able to collect statistics from past reports and articles written in Thai in a short period of time. Although I have

accepted local people’s help in translation during the fieldwork, but the my limited Thai language and the limited understanding to Thai culture are still the shortcoming and deficiency of this research. The data appearing in this paper comes from the Phitsanulok Province Statistics Report published by the Department of Digital Economy and Society of the National Statistic Office of Thailand in 2018, and the Department of Student Affairs of Naresuan University. Although the amount of data is small, but from these two fairly authoritative and highly credible departments are believed to be convincing to readers.

Table B Details in methodology and procedures of investigation in the fieldwork

Research purpose	Description	Samplings	Statistics
Find individual new Chinese immigrants or communities with Chinese culture as the first step in participatory research.	The Xingmin School, the Overseas Chinese Association, the Northern Thai Overseas Chinese Association and other Chinese Chambers of Commerce located in the center of Phitsanulok were used as the starting point for the	Past President of Overseas Chinese Association; Chinese teacher and volunteer of Xingmin School; cadre and representative of Chinese Chamber of Commerce.。	Conduct in-depth interviews and participatory surveys.

	investigation, to snowball to find more information providers and interviewees.		
Define the formation, function and role of the community.	The research objectives in the above column are centered on conducting more in-depth research, and at the same time, connect more information providers even for more in-depth interviews.	The interview targets are the Chinese students of Narvesuan University and the faculty group of the Confucius Institute.	Conduct in-depth interviews and participatory surveys, and coordinate research with government data and University data.
Analyze and compare the differences between newcomers and old-timers	Summarize the social behavior of new immigrants, combine with the prior research on old immigrants, and make comparisons and	No need	No need

	new academic discoveries.		
Analysis and discussion of research results.	Conclusion	No need	No need

In addition, I am really appreciated it that many scholars and people living in Phitsanulok as well as the students of Naresuan University have helped me with giving me suggestions and information during the three months fieldwork. They have helped me significantly in transportation, language translation during interviews, accommodation and food, and advice on daily life in Thailand. At the same time, I would also like to thank the members of the Phitsanulok Overseas Chinese Association and the chairman for their help, because they provided me with related materials about the history of Chinese language schools in the downtown of Phitsanulok.

I have actively participated into related symposiums and workshops and represented my researching result that I have obtained from the fieldwork. I was able to represent a part of my research on the APISA conference (Conference of the Asian Political and International Studies Association) organized by the CACS (Center of ASEAN Community Studies of faculty of Social Science of Naresuan University) in Bangkok on 24th and 25th, 2019, the conference title was *Asian Conference on Human Security, Multiculturalism and Democracy*, and my representation was called *The Integration Between New Chinese*

Immigrants and Indigenous Ethnic Chinese in Thailand – Observation, Comparison and Analysis of Local Ethnic Chinese and New Chinese Immigrants in Phitsanulok along the Multi-Ethnic Area. I have also learned more knowledge about the living situation of immigrants, not only the Chinese, but also the immigrants from Myanmar from visiting several refugee camps in the border area of Thailand and Myanmar through the two-week program, which was also organized by CACS. These two weeks not only broadened my horizons in the field of learning immigration culture, but also let me know the true portrayal of South-east Asian countries. I went to Cambodia, Myanmar, the border area between Thailand and Myanmar. In these places, I see the different life backgrounds of immigrants, although they come from different countries of different regions with different ethnicities, but they can develop and get along in one place in harmony. Nowadays, ethnic problems are everywhere, and policymakers, civilian organizations try to solve them in various and peaceful ways, but in the end they cannot get an optimal solution. However, in these less developed areas, immigrants can get along harmoniously that makes me very surprised.

6. Significance of the study

Zhou (1992) stated the arrivals have already displayed remarkable differences from their predecessors not only in mentality and aspirations, but also in socioeconomic characteristics and modes of adaption (Zhou, 1992, p. 69). From many aspects in which these differences seem to be a key area of interest for researchers who study Chinese immigrants. In his book, *The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy*, Wang (2000) wrote:

As the old sojourners have largely settled into their new homes and become foreign nationals of Chinese descent, the new sojourners, mainly from China and other Chinese territories, have taken place. What impact this will have, if any, on the settlers who have chosen to integrate themselves into their local societies is something that will be most interesting to see (p. 116).

Thus, besides the ethnic Chinese, new overseas Chinese community, the most diversity one that has ever appeared in overseas Chinese history, becomes a fashionable research object which should be put more effort to study. Not only because of population of it is getting bigger as more and more Chinese citizen chose to move out to foreign countries and replace their Chinese passport to local citizenship, but also their motherland——China, is growing more dominant than decades before in many aspects. The gap between old-timers and newcomers become more and more wide.

Therefore, when the old-timers encounter new immigrants, how will they react? Will the newcomers call the old-timers “Chinese”? Will the old-timers think the newcomers are foreign-Chinese? How will they approach each other? Even though they grew up in different cultures, but they share similar ethnic features and, somehow, their cultural roots still partly remain. Will this result in closer cooperation or greater conflict? Will the newcomers replace the old-timers as new charger of *huiguan*? Furthermore, there is the special culture that for Chinese community, which I think it is essential for this article, which is the “business culture” of Chinese. The word “*chek*¹,” a derogatory term for Chinese, connotes

¹ In Thai language.

cunning in commerce and uncouthness in manners (Montesano, 2001, p.138). If cooperation is chosen by the reason of gaining more on economic profit, as what this “merchant culture” interprets, who, or what, could be the bridge that mitigate the chasm between them? Those might be the questions for more and deeper scholarly conversations.

7. Research scope, and the Location and duration of fieldwork

The place I have done the fieldwork is called Phitsanulok Province, in northeastern Thailand. I was living in the Naresuan University at a student department. where nears to the downtown of Phitsanulok. The location of Naresuan University is three 3 hours away from the sharing borderline of Laos and Thailand, which in the place called Phitsanulok. Phitsanulok is a very diversified, multi-ethnic area for all the scholars who have been endeavoring to research multi-ethnic integration because Cambodians, Laos, and Myanmar’s Rohingya population has been living in this place and sharing the same space over the generations with their distinct culture and harmony.



Figure 1: This material shows the majority of Phitsanulok is Thai and Phu Thai. Laos, Cambodians and other ethnic group are living in this place in including new Chinese immigrants the researching object. The location of Phitsanulok. Near to the sharing boundary between Thailand and Laos, and it's the crosspoint of North-South and West-East economic corridor.

Additionally, multi-ethnic appearance is not the only particular feature for this place to research. Phitsanulok is also called the South-North economic corridor crossing from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region(GZAR) in China, through Nanning and Yunnan province, to Hanoi and Haiphong in Vietnam. Furthermore, as the city called a central economic cross-point, developing the East-South economic corridor, which starts from Danang in Vietnam to Myanmar, has also been well performed.

Bangkok, as a very typical and classic example of being an integrated-diversified city, there is a several multi-ethnic group living in this city with multi-mixed culture and unique livelihood which is a worthwhile location for every researcher. However, there are so many studies about geopolitics, international relations, and urban design had been done over the

last few decades which were about the city of Bangkok. Phitsanulok is an “academic-un-known” rural area where there is barely research on new migration could be found. This can be a new course to be brought on the stage of academic.

8. Originality

This paper is very original, and the paper contains a lot of content from the author's fieldwork and personal experience in Phitsanulok Province, Thailand, which makes this paper unique. Furthermore, Phitsanulok Province in Thailand is not as well-known as Bangkok or Chiang Mai. Only a few scholars have come here and have done research, so the survey objects and areas themselves are very unique. What is certain is that there are barely any traces of international scholars who have visited the site from academic online repositories and libraries. Of course, only one or two of them, and their articles have been used as documents by me. Therefore, it has certain reference value for scholars in future who study national integration and the religion, anthropology, geography of Thailand. Most important is that Japan has gradually become a big country for international immigrants, as we can see immigrants from China, Southeast Asia, Europe, North America, South America, anywhere in Tokyo. So I hope that my research on new Chinese immigrants can contribute to Japan's policy maker, and create a harmonious, unified, safe and peaceful society for immigrants as well as Japanese local residents, so that all people can live together peacefully in Japan.

Part 1

The Old-timers – The Formation and Development of the Overseas Chinese Society

Chapter 1

Literature Review

Chapter 1

Literature Review

1.1 International immigration: pulling and pushing factors

The theory of “pulling and pushing factors” is the most important and classic theories among when we study international immigration, and to learn immigration, we must be touched to this traditional and practical theory. Simply put, immigration is the process of changing to permanent or semi-permanent living conditions. In another saying, it can also be said a repositioning diffusion. The content of diffusion can include population, ideas and culture, inventions, social behaviors, or movement from place to place.

The pulling and pushing factor was created by the sociology professor who was teaching at the University of Georgia, Everett Spurgeon Lee (1966), he is also one of the pioneers of immigration research. This theory is not only called the “pulling and pushing theory”, but also named “Lee’s theory”. Lee divides the immigration process and immigration decision into the following 4 categories, factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the area of destination, intervening obstacles, and personal factors (Lee, 1966, p.50). However, Li also pointed out that even if the first two factors have been understood by the immigrants who made the immigration decision, the lack of understanding of the destination environment and the understanding of the place of residence at the same time would cause the immigrants to leave. “Intervening obstacles” refer to various factors

that are considered before immigration, such as the distance and traffic conditions during the trip of immigrants, and the local technology is developed or not, may all become the factors that affects the immigration plan. Of course, this factor has become less important than before especially in nowadays with many electronic and high-tech methods to check the conditions in another place of the world. The last personal factor refers to how to understand the first 3 factors from a personal perspective and whether it will affect the final immigration decision.

Lee's main statement is that whenever there is a population movement, there will be pushing and pulling factors. The pushing factor refers to the reason that prompted the original inhabitants to leave the local area, and the pulling factor refers to the attractiveness of the destination that can prompt immigrants to come. These 2 factors are about economy, politics, culture, and environment. In the traditional sense, the pushing factors are basically mandatory, or make immigrants reluctantly leave their hometowns, such as the slim chance of survival, poverty, underdeveloped economic conditions, and rapid population growth in a short period of time, poor resources, soil desertification, famine, droughts and floods, political persecution, bad medical environment and natural disasters can all become the pushing factors. The pulling factor is easy to understand, because it is completely opposite to the pushing factor. Refers to some factors that attract people to move here, such as better job opportunities and working conditions, better living conditions, simpler settlement conditions, a relaxed and free political and religious environment, and better educational opportunities and well-being, more convenient transportation and communication facilities, better health care system, less stressful working environment, and safer society.

1.2 Soft Power

Joseph S. Nye, Jr explains that the soft power is the second face of power, and soft power is different from hard power, which indicates that is more traditional, such as the power of military or nuclear weapons, while the second face of power is soft power that is relatively more dependent on culture and propaganda.

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preference of other (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Taking the individual as an example, soft power focuses on how to shape his or her own image in the minds of others, while at the same time enhancing and further establishing his or her own attraction in the hearts of others, thereby affecting how others perceive and process their own behavior. So we bring this theory into the relationship between countries, which is the same. If country A can establish sufficient attractiveness and friendly relations between country B and country C, country A can achieve its international goals very easily. Nye also mentioned that soft power is not as same as influence. These two terms are completely different and have no connection. Influence can be obtained through military power, including threats and payment. Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it (Nye, 2004, p.5). Of course, soft power and hard power also have the same thing, that is, they are all processes and means to achieve the same goal and influence the goal.

Table 1.2-1: The difference of soft power and hard power

	Hard (military)	Soft	Economic
Spectrum of Behaviors	command, coercion, inducement	agenda, setting, attraction, co-opt	inducement, coercion
Most likely Resources	force, payment, sanctions, bribes	institutions, values, culture, policies	payment, sanctions
Government policies	coercive, diplomacy, war, alliance	public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy	aid, bribes, sanctions

Source: based on Nye (2004)

Note: From the above table, we can see that hard power and soft power will achieve their goals through completely different mechanisms. Among all the application methods of soft power, the most effective and important core method is the attraction, but at the same time, attraction needs to be accomplished by properly exerting culture, policies, agendas, and various organizations. I will talk about Confucius Institutes in the following chapters as an organization and institution used to enhance soft power.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr (2004) stated that, the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.) (Nye, 2004, p.11). However, the author does not say that every resource will effectively achieve certain purpose. The degree of effectiveness depends on the ins and outs of the event and the context and process, which set a limitation

for soft power. All power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers (Nye, 2004, p. 16).

1.3 Imagined Community

As a very important definition and knowledge point of overseas Chinese communities, the imagined community has also played a decisive and critical help in the research of new immigrants. Anderson (1983) firstly pointed out that the nationalism or nation-ness are heavily influenced or based on culture. My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind (Anderson, 1983, p. 4). Anderson said, how to understand this point of view, we need to gradually dig from a historical perspective, and analyze from various turning points in history that why nationalism has evolved into what it is today. Once created, they became 'modular', capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations (Anderson, 1983, p. 4).

Anderson explained several paradoxes that exist in the definition of nation. The first paradox is that from the perspective of historians, the paradox between the objective modernity of nations; and from the perspective of nationalist, historians' subjective antiquity.

The second paradox is that nationality can become a universal concept and consciousness, just like people have sexes between men and women, everyone can have it and should have it. But another view is that nationality is a completely unique and remediate concept, because nationality is inherent and cannot be changed. Just like the Greek nationality is special and sui generis from other Europeans. The third paradox is that the political power of nationalism, and its barren philosophy and even incoherence. Therefore, Anderson thinks that in the perspective of anthropology, he propose the definition of the nation should be: it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently and sovereign (Anderson, 1983, p. 6).

It is imagined because other members of even the smallest nation will never know of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). The meaning of the word, nation, is to awaken the individual's personal consciousness, because nationalism only exists where nationalism does not exist. Anderson later used the Javanese village as an example. The people in the village always believed that they had connections with people they had never met. Anderson later used the Javanese village as an example. The people in the village always believed that they had connections with people they had never met. Therefore, communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). Finally, Anderson pointed out that this imagined community is a kind of sovereignty, deep and horizontal existence like a comradeship. In human history, especially in the past two centuries, many people died for this imagined comradeship.

Chapter 2

Chinatown – The Formation of Overseas Chinese Community

Chapter 2

Chinatown – The Formation of Overseas Chinese Community

2.1 Origin: Fujian groups – 10 century -14 century

The maritime activities of Chinese have begun in the Tang Dynasty, and later through the Northern Song, Southern Song, Yuan and Ming Dynasties, a trading circle for doing business on the sea was established. At that time, the overseas Chinese built relationships with other caravans and piers, based on collecting the beneficial intelligence in various business locations and their endeavor, and reached the peak in the 12th to 13th centuries and became a real business empire. Among all overseas Chinese, Hokkien are the best at using sailing for trade. The Fujianese tradition of sailing and trade is not only caused by geographical factors, but also because of the pedigree, customs and tradition of the Fujianese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 32).

At that time, there were many legendary maritime merchants, and Wang Yuanmao was one of them. When he was young, his family was very poor and he had no money to study. Later, by chance, he learned how to pronounce Chinese characters from monks in the temple. His linguistic abilities are very talented, he learned many Southeast Asian languages by himself, which later became an important tool for his business career in Southeast Asia. Later, he went to Champa (present a part of Vietnam) with the caravan and became the tutor of the King of Champa and married the King's daughter (Shiba, 1995, p. 26). Later he left Champa and returned to Quanzhou, where he

became the top businessman, and made himself as the celebrity in Hangzhou. In 1178, he led 38 senior crew members to visit Southeast Asia again. They imported agarwood, pearls, borneol, musk and other goods worth 1 million guan (currency in Song dynasty) from all over Southeast Asia, and returned to Guangdong in 1188 (Shiba, 1995, p. 26).

There are significant geographic differences between the South China Sea and North Seas (East Sea or Sea of Japan). According to Shiba's research, the reason why Chinese maritime merchants chose the South China Sea instead of the North Sea because of the reefs and undercurrents are particularly so many and frequent, and the population of coastal residents from North Korea and Japan are very large. In that time when international law or the law of the sea was lacking, it was very dangerous for maritime merchants to enter and exit the East Sea many times, so they avoided the activities there. However, the situation in the South China Sea is the opposite. The South China Sea shares the border with China since ancient times, and the sea people living along the South China Sea are also descendants of the Chinese (Shiba, 1995, p. 28). Therefore, comparing to the circumstances of the East Sea, most of the maritime merchant chose to trade in the South China Sea where is safer.

In the Tang Dynasty, China's overseas trade was mainly carried out by ships coming to China. Guangzhou was the most important trading port at that time. Until the end of the Tang Dynasty, Quanzhou was only an auxiliary port for foreign trade. In the heyday of the Tang Dynasty, Guangzhou gathered businessmen from all over the world, it is not rare to see that foreign businessmen marry a local. After the mid-Tang Dynasty,

Guangzhou, which was the center of China's maritime trade from the Han until Tang Dynasties, had moved most of its trade to Quanzhou because the taxation was relatively light (Hirth & Rockhill, 1911, p. 18). At that time, one unit of copper currency in China could buy ten times the goods in Southeast Asia. Therefore, many maritime merchants chose to merge capital. Residents of Fujian and Guangdong also invested their deposits in the maritime merchant through entrusted investment. At that time, the duration of a voyage was about ten years, and the free time at sea would be used to collect and distribute commodities at the distribution port, repair ships, and supplement food and water. Under normal circumstances, Chinese merchant ships have a displacement of 200 to 300 tons and can carry up to 200 people.

During the Song Dynasty, China's social and economic development entered a golden period. Not only was the developed commodity economy, but the population was also growing rapidly. By the time the Song dynasty is one of the most culturally and technologically developed country in the world. With the large-scale cultivation of crops such as tea and sugarcane, the large-scale production of handicraft products such as porcelain, cotton, silk, paper, and the prosperity of metallurgy, mining and ship-building, these industries have pushed the economic and cultural level of to the top stage. Therefore, the material foundation of Fujian became the basic for the prosperity of Quanzhou Port in later of Song Dynasty and the rise of Minnan (Fujianese) maritime groups.

In the Southern Song Dynasty, Quanzhou and Guangzhou, the two major trading ports in China, began to reverse their status, and the total trade volume in Quanzhou began to overtake Guangzhou. Two profound scholars, Zhuang & Liu (2009) gave the two main reasons to explain this phenomenon. The first reason was that the royal family of the Southern Song Dynasty moved to Hangzhou. This fact brought Fujian one step closer to the political center. Some imperial relatives and their kin moved to Quanzhou which made the imperial court paid more attention to Quanzhou's political and economic status. The second reason was that the Southern Song Dynasty began to develop trade with Northeast Asian region especially the Korean peninsula (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 33). Quanzhou served as a pivotal intersection cross the Northeast Asian to the South China Sea. In the late Shaoxing period of the Song Dynasty, the trade scale of Quanzhou Port was on par with Guangzhou.

Although Fujian, especially Quanzhou, was one of the world's largest ports at the time in terms of carry tremendous amount of export and import goods, but due to the lack of natural advantage, such as too many mountains and too few plains, particularly the arable land is seriously inadequate, but meanwhile, the development of commerce has gathered an endless flow of people, adding the burden of overpopulation to the entire area, showing a deformed regional situation with more people and less land. There is another reason for the overpopulation of Fujian, during the Huangchao rebellion (875-884) at the end of the Tang Dynasty, a large number of residents of North China immigrated to Fujian to avoid political turmoil. Having said that, Fujian still has a very key advantage which the rice is very cheap. The area in the delta of the lower

Yangtze River is called the “China’s Granary”. Although the area is densely populated, the supply of rice is still surplus, so it can supply and replenish extra rice to the north China and south China even Southeast Asia at the same time. Fujian is blessed because of this. Although Fujian has little arable land, rice merchants in Jiangsu and Zhejiang can sell extra rice to Fujian that they cannot consume (Shiba, 1995, p. 31).

Although like other ports in China, foreign merchants largely control overseas trade, especially the Arab caravans. There is a cemetery built for foreign merchants in Quanzhou, which can still be visited today. It is now called the "Islamic Cemetery" and is a very famous touristic location in Quanzhou. At the end of the Yuan Dynasty, Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims had a bloody clash at a place called Guannanmen in Quanzhou, resulting in thousands of casualties (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 34). At the same time it also promoted the rise of local maritime merchants in Fujian. The overseas Chinese business economic and trade network began in the Tang and Song Dynasties, and formed a certain scale by the beginning of the 15th century. It experienced expansion and development in the 17th and 18th centuries and reached its peak that formed an economic and trade network based on the Chinese market, covering coastal areas to Southeast Asia. From the perspective of trade scale, although Fujian has surpassed Guangzhou at the end of the Song Dynasty and the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty, but Guangzhou has a long history of maritime trade and a longer experience. Therefore, the influence of the maritime merchants in South Fujian was not as good as the Guangzhou’s maritime merchant until the beginning of the Song, Yuan and Ming Dynasties.

In the late Yuan and early Ming dynasties, Fujian maritime merchants and the Guangzhou maritime merchants could each occupy half of the domestic market.

In addition to geographical, historical and cultural reasons, Fujian has a local tradition which is also the reason why Fujianese people go to overseas for over generations—the nature and atmosphere of pursuing prosperity and richness. In the previous paragraph, I mentioned that Fujian has very little arable land, presenting a situation of more people and less land. Under such circumstances, it is inevitable that the competition for resources between people or between commercial groups, and there is even a social ethos of comparing property and excessively seeking wealth. There has been an proverb in China since ancient times, called "returning to the hometown with dressing brocade", this sentence has always been used not only in Fujian or coastal areas, but also the most famous proverb for all the Chinese. Returning home with brocade means to use one's own abilities and courage to win in other places, and after gaining huge wealth, return to hometown in clothes made of brocade, so that the fellows of the hometown can look at you differently. This instant satisfaction is the lifelong pursuit of many Chinese, especially Fujianese. Since ancient times, there has been a social tradition in Fujian that it is necessary to get to the top no matter what career you engage to, that is, there are basically only two endings in life, either being promoted (for all who engage in politic) and rich (for all who engage in business), or being unknown for the rest of life. In the Southern Song Dynasty, Fujian had the highest qualification rate of Jinshi in China (Shiba, 1995, p. 33).

Another point worth mentioning is the logbook of the early overseas Chinese. Although they are called logbooks, they are better called overseas travel manuals, experiences and guidance in short dairy, just like Lonely Planet today, people can use the travel experience of those predecessors as a reference to guide the direction. By reading the manual, people can be fully prepared before traveling to avoid making mistakes during the trip. In his book, Shiba (1995) mentioned 12 early voyage diaries written by overseas Chinese. These diaries are routinely published. From the Song Dynasty to the Yuan Dynasty, the Ming Dynasty, and the Qing Dynasty, people can buy these overseas travel editions of daily encyclopedias in bookstores. The size of a logbook is very small, just like a small portable notebooks today. It records travel knowledge, including local geographic knowledge, local business conditions, properties, and diplomatic conditions. These nautical diaries have detailed records of the local situation, including the port conditions, the duration and daily schedule of the voyage, the local topography, customs, race, beliefs, marriage customs, and tributary relations with China, religion, currency, the population of local overseas Chinese, business habits, etc. Because the record was comprehensive and practical, it was favored by many businessmen who frequently traveled overseas. The next paragraph is an example of the voyage diaries of early overseas Chinese:

In Cambodia, women are good at trade, and women will come to meet the Chinese whenever they come. From 8 o'clock in the morning to 12 o'clock noon, women will spread out the mats and set up stalls in the market. For small transactions, to trade rice and goods from China, and for larger transactions, it is settled with fabric gold

and silver. A long time ago, when few Chinese came, the locals would treat them honestly. As more and more Chinese came, there were more and more frauds among the locals. Because Cambodia is rich at gold and silver, the Chinese have very high demand for gold and silver. Five-color thin silk, tin-copper-tin-lead alloy produced in Zhenzhou, lacquerware produced in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, celadon ware brought from Quanzhou, mercury, vermilion, paper, sulfur, flame glass, white sandalwood, herb, dahurian angelica, Oil, comb, needle, are loved by the locals. The larger cargo is tatami mats produced in Mingzhou (Ningbo during the Ming Dynasty). Although the most popular fruits are beans and barley, but they were banned in the Yuan Dynasty. There is no need to wear clothes in this country, rice and women are very easy to get, household or utensils are also very easy to complete, and the business is also easy to do, so many Chinese come here and live (Shiba, 1995, p. 41).

In fact, this was not only the case in Cambodia, but also in Thailand and many other Southeast Asian countries. The tradition of women being good at business and translation originated from the customs of Guangdong and Fujian. During this period, many Chinese came to Cambodia to live in Cambodia for three or four years, some were permanent residents, and even intermarried with locals and were assimilated to give birth to mixed children.

This chapter tells the history of the early Chinese crossing the ocean from the 10th century to the 14th century, and some of the important historical figures laid a huge route foundation for the early Chinese immigration history. The Tang and Song

dynasties are the two most important dynasties in this chapter. Compared with the history of immigration, Fujian and Guangzhou are of great significance, which is why until now, when it comes to the history of Chinese immigration overseas, these two places must also be mentioned.

2.2 Outlaws and trade: 15 century – 17 century

Since the Ming Dynasty, Quanzhou Port has gradually declined. Geographically speaking, it is because Quanzhou Port was slowly silting up, making it very difficult for ships to access or exit. In addition, because the Ming Dynasty gradually implemented a maritime prohibition policy and did not allow private maritime transactions, so as to facilitate the concentration of overseas trade under the tributary trade organized by the imperial government, the maritime merchants that were active in the Tang, Song and Yuan dynasties gradually declined. The last reason is that due to political reasons, the imperial court in the early Ming Dynasty ordered the punishment of those who still supported the Yuan Dynasty, so the marine merchants and their families who became rich during the Yuan Dynasty fled the local area or lived in seclusion.

Due to the strict maritime ban in the Ming Dynasty, all the trading ports were sealed. The previous maritime merchants moved cargo distribution centers, trading sites, warehouses and supply bases to remote places and small coastal islands. From then on, a maritime smuggling network that spread from Zhejiang province to Guangdong until the Southeast Asian region started forming. Because Zhangzhou is far away from the political center of Quanzhou and Fujian, it is often ignored by the court. The economy and culture in Zhangzhou were being left behind, and it is also close to the East Guangdong region where smuggling was rampant. Therefore, Zhangzhou became the center of smuggling trade along the coast of China during the Jiajing Wanli period of Ming dynasty (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 37). The very strict maritime prohibition

policy lasted until the 1683 in Qing Dynasty. The purpose was to prevent the Zheng Chenggong Group's anti-Qing military actions. Zheng Chenggong is not only a famous historical figure, he also promoted the reorganization of overseas Chinese in terms of the native place. At the end of this chapter, I will briefly introduce Zheng Chenggong and how it promoted the maritime merchants of Quanzhou to gradually replace the maritime merchants of Zhangzhou.

There are also various patterns of smuggling, and the most common one is private trafficking. Maritime merchants usually purchase properties, build ships, and go overseas in different locations to avoid government supervision. On the other hand, the Ming court also acted mercilessly in crushing down the smuggling trade. Anyone found would be sentenced to death. Not only that, the Ming court often used force to destroy the smuggling trade, not only destroying smuggled ports but also forcibly blocking ports for going abroad, which fundamentally eradicated the base of smuggling trade and its commercial environments. However, such a policy will only give birth to more violent counter moves from smugglers. Slowly these quietly smuggling maritime merchants have turned into blatant pirate merchants. They often used armed forces to fight the court and looted coastal areas and the ships that carried goods of government as a counterattack (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 37).

Regarding the ban of maritime trade imposed by the Ming Dynasty, the purpose was to prevent the outflow of copper coins from the Song and Yuan dynasties. Emperor Hongwu already knew the fact that copper coins had bottomed out, so he later switched

to paper money, but the value of paper money began to depreciate quickly right after the policy was implemented. Since the opening of the canal from Shandong Peninsula to Beijing in 1415, the domestic economy began to recover, economic growth was accompanied by a strong demand for silver. At that time, there were no silver hills in mainland China, so the implementation of the maritime ban was also to prevent underground trading of silver. At that time, Japan was the only silver producing country in Asia (Shiba, 1995, p. 48). In the 16th century, China traded with Japan and exported large amounts of raw silk, silk, and ceramics to Japan in exchange for silver.

These armed groups of smuggling trade sometimes colluded with pirates and united to stand against the highhanded policies implemented by the Ming court. In the process of transforming from smugglers to armed maritime groups, large and small business groups, helmsmen, and sailors split into several groups due to the need for armed resistance (Zhuang & Liu, 2003, p. 38). Sometimes they work together, sometimes they fight each other, gradually their scales in terms of the amount of members and business became much larger, and they eventually evolved into huge pirate groups in the middle and late Ming Dynasty. Until the first year of Longqing period (1567), the Ming Dynasty implemented the policy of partially opening the sea ban. The place where the sea ban was lifted was Yuegang port of Zhangzhou, because it was far away from the political center of Fujian with developed trade environment. Yuegang port in Zhangzhou has become the center of smuggling trade, and there are pirate groups known as the "Twenty-Four Generals" (Zhuang & Liu, 2003, p. 38). The backbone of these groups is basically composed of Zhangzhou people.

The Ming dynasty government concentrated the ships at Yuegang port to manage ships in order to better supervise the trades and formulate tax regulation, and to effectively control private maritime trade. Every year, more than 200 ships sail from Yuegang port, at the beginning of the 17th century, the number of ships sailing from Yuegang port reached the peak of 300 ships (Zhuang & Liu, 2003, p. 38). These Chinese maritime merchant ships went to 47 countries in the east and west, including Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands where they also carried out indirect trade through their trade transshipment ports in Manila, Macau, Banten, West Java with Yuegang port. As many as 116 foreign commodities and a large number of Chinese handicraft products are imported and exported in Yuegang port. At the beginning of the 17th century, the trade network centered on Yuegang port was as far north as Japan and as far south as the Indonesian islands. When the southwest monsoon turned, the maritime merchants returned to Yuegang port with a full load to sell the tropical products as they brought back from Southeast Asia, and at the same time they brought back local travel information for future drawing of the guidance book, which would record overseas and local market information as well as the condition of the ship in order to prepare to sail again next year.

The prosperity in Yuegang port has promoted the trend of immigration towards overseas in southern Fujian. Early overseas immigrants were mainly merchants or sailors, serving overseas Chinese business networks. In the late Ming Dynasty, the most important destinations for overseas Chinese were Nagasaki, Manila and Batavia. There were a lot of South Fujian Chinese businessmen in Nagasaki. In 1708, among the 167

translators administered by the Japanese shogunate whose job was to supervise the Chinatown, 101 translators specialized in translating Hokkien language (Wang & Xu, 1994, p. 112). At the same time, there are nearly 30,000 Chinese living in Manila, most of whom are said to be from Zhangzhou. The Chinese living in Batavia are also mainly from southern Fujian. By the end of the Ming Dynasty, maritime merchants and sailors, mainly Zhangzhou people, became smugglers or pirates, some still maintained the status of legal merchants, and others chose to settle permanently overseas. Until the middle of the 19th century, the southern Fujian maritime merchants still played the leading role in China's overseas Chinese merchant network, while the Guangdong-born merchants and maritime groups fell under the status of the southern Fujian maritime merchants.

The maritime business group dominated by Zhangzhou maritime merchants declined rapidly in the early 17th century, and Quanzhou maritime merchants and groups replaced them. There are three reasons listed by Zhuang & Liu (2009). The first reason is that in 1603, the Spanish colonial government of the Philippines started a massacre on Chinese merchants in Manila, caused about 25,000 death of Chinese, 80% of the victims are Zhangzhou merchants. The massacre of the Chinese in Manila result in a significant reduction in the number of Zhangzhou maritime merchants. The second reason is the gradual blockage caused by natural reasons of Yuegang, in the late Ming Dynasty, intercepted the port as the trade center of Yuegang was replaced by Xiamen and Anhai ports (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 40). The last reason is Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong are from Quanzhou. The father and son use Quanzhou Anping as

their base to build a maritime business empire. The Fujian Ocean Merchant Group led by Zheng father and son used Quanzhou-born sailors and merchants as their backbone which is considered as a chief reason that makes Zhangzhou merchants declined and were later replaced by Quanzhou merchants.

While when admiral Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Zhilong were in constant battles with the Dutch fleet, the Portuguese fleet, and the Spanish fleet, as well as the military forces of the Qing Dynasty, the Zheng Group also built rigorous and solid trading networks domestically and internationally. There were five famous onshore business group and five maritime business group. The onshore named after the famous theory of five elements which are gold, wood, water, fire and. The maritime five business group named after benevolence, justice, courtesy, wisdom and trust, which picked from the Confucianism. The five onshore business groups on are based in Hangzhou and its nearby areas, after paying the advance capital to the local government office in feudal China, onshore groups started purchasing goods that can be trafficked to the sea, then deliver them to the five maritime business groups, and finally settle accounts with the local government office in feudal China. After the collapse of the Zheng Group, the members of the five onshore groups and five maritime groups settled in destination countries and became an important part and early ancestors of the overseas Chinese who later spread throughout the southeast coastal areas and Southeast Asia.

General Zheng He's voyages to Southeast Asia also resulted in the formation of early Chinese immigrant groups in Thailand. At that time, Thailand was the heyday of

the Ayutthaya dynasty. The kingdom was very large, extending from the Chao Phraya River to the middle of the Malay Peninsula. Starting from the Sukhothai dynasty which is the previous dynasty of Ayutthaya dynasty, the Chinese immigrants who reached the Gulf of Siam began to settle down on the Malay Peninsula and discovered the tin mines there. The Sukhothai dynasty sent envoys to visit China's Yuan dynasty twice, and the pottery products brought from Thailand are exactly the same as the Chinese-style Song Hulu pottery. In the 15th century, Ma Huan, Hong Bao, and Fei Xin, who were entouragees of General Zheng He, visited a city of Ayutthaya and accepted Thai women's hospitality. Huang Zhong also wrote about the scene of the original Chinatown in Thailand in his book called *Haiyu*:

There is a street in the city of Ayutthaya called Nai Street, which is the residential area of overseas Chinese. The overseas Chinese have been assimilated. Although they still used their old surnames at the beginning, after two generations they would abandon the Chinese surnames (Shiba, 1995, p. 49).

Nai in Thai language refers to the chief among foreigners, the administrative person whom the Thai king trusts very much, and those who can assist the Thai king by giving effort. At the same time, Chinatowns also appeared one after another in Kume Village in the Kingdom of Ryukyu, which was called Daming Street. Overseas Chinese who born in Quanzhou, Fujian mainly gathered in Daming Street. On the other hand in Indonesia, most of the overseas Chinese came from Guangdong live on the west side of Java Island and other archipelagoes. It is said that Chinese copper coins of all dynasties

can be used on Java Island, where many overseas Chinese in Guangdong and Zhangzhou live (Shiba, 1995, p. 51). The migration of these overseas Chinese community the consequence under the era when General Zheng He and his commercial group conducted commercial transactions in Southeast Asia. For example, two famous early Cantonese immigrants, Chen Zuyi and Liang Daoming, were the leaders of the Overseas Chinese Group under the time of General Zheng He.

This chapter describes the history of immigration in the Ming and Qing dynasties, as well as the various policies promulgated by the government to restrict immigration during these two dynasties, as well as the impact of these policies on immigration. Zheng He, Zheng Zhilong. are the main representatives of this chapter, and their maritime business empires made the route of China's early immigration to Southeast Asia more clear and specific.

2.3 Formation: migration and trade: 17century — 19 century

The reason why Chinese emigrate overseas is basically caused by two factors, one is natural disaster and the other is man-made disaster. Natural disasters refer to natural disasters. Man-made disasters are wars and rebellions. These two reasons have led to social unrest in Guangdong and Fujian. People's hearts are difficult to stabilize so that the economic development is difficult to achieve. As a result, a large number of Chinese emigrate overseas in pursuit of a more stable and prosperous life. With the increasing number of immigrants, commerce has gradually developed. People seek survival and greater development space in foreign countries, and then recruit relatives and friends to come to the foreign country after they settle down. After the 17th century, Europeans gradually expanded their trade networks and colonies in Southeast Asia, and the local colonial government also recruited Chinese to open up land for cultivation and develop industrial, agricultural, and commercial businesses. From then on, a wave of Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia gradually formed.

Until the middle of the 17th century, the number of overseas Chinese who living in foreign countries reached tens of thousands, mostly concentrated in various commercial ports and the surrounding areas. Almost 30,000 overseas Chinese settled in Manila, and the number in Nagasaki, Pattani, Batavia, Ayutthaya, Laukkai in Myanmar, and Java have reached tens of thousands (Zhuang, 2001, p. 164-168). In this period of time, in terms of numbers, Chinese from Fujian accounted for more than 70% of all overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, followed by overseas Chinese in Guangdong and Chinese

from Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The career pattern of overseas Chinese in this period were basically merchants, retailers, craftsmen, merchants who mainly engaged in trading Chinese goods in destination country. Craftsmen served as labor forces, because the trading ports of European colonies needed to build fortresses, trenches, houses, and various types of infrastructure, they needed a large number of overseas Chinese craftsmen to help with the construction.

After the Second Opium War, immigrants going abroad were mainly Chinese labor forces. During the Xianfeng and Tongzhi years, Xiamen, Shantou, Guangzhou, Macau, and Hong Kong became trade centers for recruiting coolies. Early Chinese workers were mostly trafficked to Cuba, Miró, Mauritius, Reunion, Australia, the United States, and the territories of Britain, France, West India. After the 1870s, Southeast Asia, South Africa, and the South Pacific Islands became the main destinations for Chinese laborers. Among all the destinations, Southeast Asia had the largest number of Chinese laborers, and Singapore and Penang have become the most popular places where secret societies gather and fought for plantations. These secret societies planted snakeheads in coastal areas of China, abducted and defrauded many Chinese workers to go to Southeast Asia as labor force. These snakeheads know very well about the recruiting and trafficking process in their hometowns. After the rise of the shipping industry, various colonies in Southeast Asia and Siam have opened regular cruise ships, cruise ships travel between ports in Southeast Asia and ports in Fujian and Guangdong. The number of Chinese workers exported is increasing day by day, following the scale of the

Chinese community in Southeast Asia has gradually expanded, and these people are the first wave of old immigrants from China.

At that time, the people who went to Siam were mainly Chiuchow people. Their business groups were strong and large in number. Most of the Chinese immigrants who went to Southeast Asia to open up mining areas were Hakkas from Shantou in eastern Guangdong, because the Hakka people have the patience to bear hardships and stand hard work and have strong team spirit who are able to endure the harsh living and working environment in the mining area, they are even better in the battle of scrambling the authority of owning the mine. The mining industries in various parts of Southeast Asia, such as the gold mines in Borneo, the silver and copper mines in northern Vietnam, and the tin mines in the Malay Peninsula and southern Siam, are basically controlled by the Hakka people (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 43). At that time, the risk of mining is very high. A slight security issue can lead to death, but it is also faster than other industries to get rich. Most of the Hakka people with strong adventurous spirit choose this industry. Therefore, although the number of Hakka people in Southeast Asia is far fewer than Fujian people and Chiuchow people, in the list of wealthy overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 20th century, Hakka businessmen can be compared with Fujian merchants, who has been rooted in Southeast Asia and engaged in business for hundreds of years.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the number of overseas Chinese living and working overseas had reached nearly 4 million. More than 90% of overseas Chinese

live in Southeast Asia. There are about 300,000 overseas Chinese in North America, Africa, Australia, Latin America and other places, and most of them worked as laborers. The number of overseas Chinese going to Siam was the largest, at the time, the total number of overseas Chinese going to Siam reached more than 1.5 million. Most of them came from the Chiuchow area, and the business industry in Siam was basically controlled by the Chiuchow and Fujianese. The number of overseas Chinese in the Netherlands and Indonesia is more than one million. In Dutch-Indonesia, almost all overseas Chinese work as servants in mines or plantations, and the rest are engaged in merchants, many people have made their fortunes. There are also millions of overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia as they are mostly engaged in miners, plantation workers, and merchants. There are about 600,000 overseas Chinese in French India, with the most from Guangdong. The number of overseas Chinese in British Burma is more than 100,000, most of whom are from Yunnan and are engaged in merchants. There are nearly 100,000 overseas Chinese in the Philippines as ninety percent of them are Fujian people, 50% of them are from Jinjiang, most of them traders.

The main research object of this paper is the Chinese in Siam, Siam refers to Thailand in present days. In the previous paragraphs and chapters, we have understood the reasons for the initial Chinese immigration. Since here, we will shift our focus to Thailand, which used to be called Siam. In this paragraph, I will focus on the Chinese in Siam by that time. Siam is located in the Indochina Peninsula. Compared to the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, Siam is regarded as the mainland region of Southeast Asia. Before the middle of the 19th century, although Britain occupied the

coastal part of Burma, fortunately, Siam was the only country in Southeast Asia that has not been colonized by the time. After weighing and negotiating with western politicians, the Siamese government can still effectively rule the country. On the other hand, the relationship between China and Siam has always been friendly, economic and trade exchanges are very close and frequent, and the Siamese royal family has also treated overseas Chinese well. Therefore, Chinese immigrants regard Siam as a blessed land in Southeast Asia.

As I mentioned in previous paragraph, the political and economic relationship between China and Siam is very close. The Siamese royal family re-uses Chinese businessmen who have played a key role in Siam's foreign economic development and trade. This is also can be considered as the main reason that why Chinese immigrants have been welcomed by the Siamese government and people in the past. It directly led to the continuous immigration from China to Siam from the 17th century to the beginning of the 20th century. Since the late Ming Dynasty, the Siamese royal family has granted Chinese businessmen the right to trade freely throughout Siam (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 52). At the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the Qing Dynasty, although China's coastal areas continued to suffer from wars, Chinese merchants were still willing to go to Siam for trade, and private business activities were very frequent. In the first decade of Narai's reign, private merchant from China were already trading in rather large numbers at Ayudhya, Bangkok (farther south and gateway to Ayudhya), Ligor, Songkla, and Chantaburi (Viraphol, 1977, p. 42). At the same time, Siam is also a safe haven for coastal residents to escape war and chaos. At that time, residents of

Guangdong were troubled by wars. Rather than waiting to die from hunger in the hometown, it is better to go to sea to seek more opportunities. To go over there and dig the gold up was the thirsty desire of the poor sufferers. "To be starved and to be buried in the sea are the same," said some young adventurers. "Why not plunge right into death rather than wait for death!" (Ling, 1912, p. 80). Chiuchow people generally flee to Chonburi, and most Fujian people go to Songkhla in the southern area.

According to Van Vliet, the commercial officer of the Dutch East India Company in Siam in the middle of the 17th century, there are many overseas Chinese living in Siam, they are respected by the king. They are considered to be the most capable agents, traders and shipowners. Many people have a high social status and be appointed as an official (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 52). Although the commercial base of overseas Chinese is in Thailand, overseas Chinese helmsmen and sailors with Chinese trademark sailing boats still enjoy various special conveniences at Chinese ports. Therefore, the royal family and nobles choose Chinese merchants to conduct national trade. Almost all the ship's captain, vice-captain and other crew members of the trading ships sent by the Siamese royal family to ports in Japan and other Southeast Asian countries are overseas Chinese.

Since the relationship between China and Siam was amicable from the 17th century to the 20th century, the Qing government, which regarded overseas Chinese as "abandoned people" or "traitorous people", only opened a side to overseas Chinese who were engaged in the trade between China and Siam. The law enforcement would not hold

them accountable, and would not detain them, and would not deliberately make things difficult for them. In 1721, a ship carrying 156 Fujian and Cantonese sailors was pardoned by the Qing Dynasty and released them back to Siam (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 55). Since then, the overseas Chinese who arrived in China from Siam with trading ships have not been punished. The loose political environment has further promoted the wave of immigration. After the opening of the sea ban, the commercial trade between China and Siam has become more prosperous, and the area of Chinatown has become larger and larger as the number of people continues to increase. In 1687, there were only 40 Chinese people living in Pattani. By 1869, it had increased to more than a hundred. Many Chinese married local wives after settled in Siam, they abandoned the customs of the Han people, and became the same as Siamese in food and clothing. The king of Siam will choose the smartest and most capable people among them, and let the elites engage in trade, taxation, taxation and missions to other countries (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 55). There is another historical turning point that promoted a bigger wave of Chinese immigrants to Siam, which was the severe rice famine that occurred on the southeast coast of China in the early 18th century. At that time, the Qing government ordered the purchase of rice from Siam to help the shortage of rice in China's inland. At that time, Emperor Kangxi ordered the 54,000,000 liters of rice that purchased from Siam to be distributed to Fujian, Guangdong and Ningbo and other places for disaster relief, and the purchased rice did not require tax deduction. Merchants in Guangdong and Fujian one after another went to Siam to buy rice and built their own ships in the local ship-building industry. At the same time, the human traffickers also took the opportunity to carry a large number of immigrants to stay in Siam. Many of them stopped returning

to mainland China. I will introduce in a later article what these human smugglers and criminals are. They are called snakeheads. The increase in the number of immigrants is inseparable from them. Snake heads are not unique in ancient times. Even today, we can still see snake heads in many news. I will introduce modern snake heads and their methods of human trafficking in the next article.

After the middle of the 18th century, the number of Chiuchow people who went to Siam gradually replaced Fujianese. Zheng Zhao, an overseas Chinese borne in Chiuchow, also known as Thaksin, became the king of Siam, which had a significant influence on the Chinese immigration to Siam in the 18th century. Thaksin strongly encouraged his fellow villagers to settle and develop business in Siam. The Chinese population expanded rapidly during this period. In the late 18th century, the head tax paid by the Siamese Chinese was 200,000 per year. Inferring from the amount of head tax paid by overseas Chinese whose age were over 20, The number assessed to this tax at Bangkok and its vicinity, was stated to me at 31,000 (Crawfurd, 1830, p. 221). If to add in their dependents and those who did not pay tax, the number of overseas Chinese should be even greater. The whole number would be 420,000, even as high as 750,000 (Crawfurd, 1830, p. 222).

The Rama dynasty in Bangkok was established in 1782. During the period from Rama I to Rama III (1782-1851), the Siamese government tried to strengthen the country through the development of commerce. The encouragement given to the Chinese traders and laborer, and the limited adventures of the king and some of the principal

men about him, had given them a foretaste of the advantages of commerce, which they were now very anxious to improve (Finlayson, 1988, p. 166). Each ship carrying immigrants from China can carry 1,200 people, and there are as many as 7,000 Chinese arriving in Siam in a year. At that time, Chinese were flooding Bangkok. Except for a few areas, the number of Chinese in most areas of Bangkok was even higher than the number of locals. In 1809, the Siamese government obtained permission from the Qing government to hire Chinese people. Since then, more Chinese businessmen have gone to Siam. Although the business environment of Siam has given the Chinese a lot of convenience, the journey to Siam is full of hardships and even risk of death. According to Skinner,

The junks which transport them [Chinese emigrants] in great numbers remind one of an African slaver. The deck is filled with them, and there the poor wretches are exposed to the inclemency of the weather and without any shelter, for the cargo fills the junk below. Their food consists of dry rice and allowance of water; but when the passage are very long, there is often a want of both, and many of them actually starve to death (Skinner, 1957, p. 64).

The route to Southeast Asia takes a long time and supplies are scarce. The famous scholar Chen Da described an oral description of an 84-year-old overseas Chinese who has come back to China mainland:

When I was young, I remember that there were eight red-headed boats in the village sailing to the north and south. The north heading boats to Tianjin and Shanghai,

and south heading boats to Bangkok. Ships which heading north are loaded with citrus from Chiuchow, while ships heading to south are loaded with beans, tea, silk and other goods. The largest ship can seat more than 200 people, sailing from Shantou, it takes almost a month to reach Siam. Ordinary passengers only bring a pitcher, two clothes, a straw hat, and a straw mat. After disembarking, their lives were resigned to fate.

Reported by Shiba, traffickers have planted agents at the starting place and destination where are Shantou and Bangkok. People who want to immigrate to Siam can contact the intermediary directly in their village, and poorer immigrants can pay after they reach the destination (Shiba, 1995, p. 142). The final determinant of the predominance of Teochius, Hakkas, and Hainanese in the Chinese immigration to Siam was the establishment of regularly scheduled and frequent passenger steamer traffic from Bangkok to Swatow in 1882 and to Haikou in 1886 (Skinner, 1957, p. 61). This liner has led to the larger expansion of the immigrants to Bangkok, which continues to grow by tens of thousands of people every year. At that time, there were nearly one million overseas Chinese in Siam. According to the official statistics of the Siamese government, from 1882 to 1892, the number of Chinese who migrated to Siam every year was 13,000 to 18,000, with an average of 16,100; the annual net migration was 5,000 to 8,000, with an average of 7,100 per year. From 1893 to 1905, the average annual immigration was 35,000, and the average annual net immigration was 14,900 (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 56).

During this period, while the number of Chinese population increased rapidly overseas, the Chinese culture was also taken overseas by immigrants and took root,

especially the culture of the same ethnic group in which Fujian and Cantonese were connected by blood and same hometown. They enshrine the genealogy of their ancestors in temples, which are called ancestral halls. Ancestral halls are generally built by fellow villagers, for example, Fujianese have Fujianese ancestral halls, Cantonese only build Cantonese ancestral halls. The ancestral hall is the public property of the clansman. Shiba stated that ancestor worship is one of the common characteristics of the Han people, through the worship, the behavior itself gives people strong confidence to stand against difficulties while competing on the front line of the society (Shiba, 1995, p. 65). Although the strength of the individual is weak, the worship can make oneself a certain connection with the powerful ancestors who once was strong and unbreakable, then enhance one's own competitiveness. Shiba also pointed out that the situation of overpopulation and insufficient resources in the hometown are also the reasons why people from the same hometown must unite in overseas. If infighting occurs when resources are scarce, it is no different from committing suicide. Therefore, from school to agriculture, industry and commerce, people in the village will select the most top-notch elites, and send elites abroad so that they can make money and transmit back to the village. These people who are sent out must not only be elites in terms of career, but more importantly, they must keep their promises. A individual cannot prove the credibility for himself or herself, by this moment, they must rely on family members or villagers who know them well to prove the credibility of the selected person (Shiba, 1995, p. 65). Marriage can also consolidate and strengthen the unity of clansman, but the method of marriage cannot expand contacts and further develop the range of network. Therefore, enforcing the ties with other unacquainted clansman through ancestral

hall can make the network of relationships broader, which cover up the weakness of marriage.

Since the Second Opium War, Fujian and Guangdong have completely become the bases for Chinese immigrants to flow overseas, especially in Southeast Asia. This chapter mainly focuses on Siam, which is now Thailand. The early immigrants to Siam came from Guangdong, Fujian, Chaozhou, Hakka, Hainan and other provinces. Immigrants from various provinces have their own areas of expertise. They have come to Siam after untold hardships, and finally settled down in their hard-working efforts.

2.4 Development: The formation of Chinese society: 19 century— 1950s century

The large number of overseas Chinese settled overseas after the 17th century. After they accumulated enough of savings, they married and had children. Because of the needs of daily life and business, the local overseas became more connected as finally formed a community, and that is Chinatown. On the one hand, Chinatowns are the result of overseas Chinese settled overseas, but they are also the result of local rulers deliberately delimited the residential areas for overseas Chinese. Chinatowns in all countries are basically established based on the two reasons shown above. According to Zhuang and Liu, the origin of Chinatown is generally a place where sailors or laborers can have a rest, there are two or three retail shops sell goods and food which is enough to meet the daily needs of sailors and laborers around. With more and more of retail shops have been built, life becomes easier than other area, and some people have gradually settled down around here. After a long time, due to the ancestor worship tradition of the Han people which was mentioned above, the temples were built one by one by overseas Chinese craftsmen, such as the Guan Gong Temple, the temple dedicated to the land god, and the Fujianese Mazu Temple. People found each other in ancestral halls by paying traditional worships, while worship they can be benefited by widening their local networks, finally the Chinatown has been established (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 56).

The Chinatown and overseas Chinese society in Siam were formed under the aboriginal regime. The rulers of Siam recruited overseas Chinese to prosper national

development and trade. At the same time, they also set up Chinese as the president or county head to manage the overseas Chinese society for maintaining the stability of the overseas Chinese community and economic prosperity. Zhuang and Liu reported that because the Siamese royal family does not impose restrictions on the immigration of overseas Chinese, and the Siamese royal family has always given preferential treatment to overseas Chinese, this has enabled the stable development of overseas Chinese society in Thailand (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 97).

In Siam, the state monopolizes national trade, especially the royal family and nobles control almost 100% of the country's trade, and it is extremely difficult for civilians to obtain any trading opportunities from it. The royal family is the largest merchant in Siam, with its own fleet and various chain stores. Regardless of whether it is external or internal trade, the royal family enjoys absolute possession. The Dominion and Revenue of the Crown is great, amounting yearly to many Millions, arising out of in-land Commodities, as Rice, Sappang², Tin, Lead, Salt-peter; as also the profit of the Sand and Mountain Gold, which are only sold by the Kings Factors to foreign merchant (Caron, Schouten, 1671, p. 99). But what is interesting is that the royal family and nobles themselves never participated in any trade affairs, but handed over those complicated trading affairs to overseas Chinese as trading agencies.

In the middle of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Siamese government implemented a policy called the "township system" to manage the overseas Chinese community. A

² A type of dyewood, also known as Sappan or Brazil.

proposition which could easily be drawn from these materials is that the ruling class within each town consisted of the members of a family, and that important in connection with town governors. (Rabibhadana, 1969, p. 161). Powerful and prestigious overseas Chinese can serve as the leader of the overseas Chinese community, and the leader must be approved by the King of Siam before he can start working. The overseas Chinese who helped to govern the whole country are called "Luang Rachasetti", which means the head of the Chinese Civil Affairs Secretary in Thai, this position is under the Ministry of Finance. The Chinese Civil Affairs Secretary has the right to manage the overseas Chinese county governors in various provinces in Siam (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 98). The Chinese Civil Affairs Secretary and Royal Warehouse Department, in Thai language called Phrakhlung, jointly manage the sailing trade practice. Royal Warehouse Department is divided into three departments, the most important one is Zuogang department, which is responsible for trade with China, Japan, and Vietnam. Almost all officials in the department are overseas Chinese. Not only that, almost all the owners of the royal family's overseas fleet are Chinese, especially the Fujianese. During the Ayutthaya dynasty, the royal family prohibited Siamese women from marrying Westerners and Indians, but overseas Chinese were not subject to this restriction, rather they could travel and move freely in Siam (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 98).

The Thaksin Dynasty was one of the most significant period for the Chinese immigration. Thaksin's real name was Zheng Zhao. His father Zheng Da was from Chiuchow (Shiba, 1995, p. 97). Shiba said that his father immigrated to Siam from mainland China during the Yongzheng period, Qing dynasty, and made his fortune in the gambling

industry and then entered the court of Siam. Zheng Zhao's father married a Siamese wife and gave birth to Zheng Zhao in 1734. After Zheng Zhao was 7 years old, he entered a very famous temple called Kosawat Temple College, where he studied Thai and Pali. After the death of Zheng Zhao's father, he was adopted by the Minister of Finance and named him "sin". In Thai language, "sin" means wealth. When Zheng Zhao was 13 years old, he was sent to the inner court by his stepfather and began to serve as Thai king's guard. Later he was promoted to the title and received the title of Thaksin. In 1767, the Burmese army captured the Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya of Siam. Thaksin led his soldiers to resist the Burmese invasion and performed bravely. Because of his contribution, he was promoted by the King of Siam in the following year, the Chinese generals and merchants who fought with him against the Burmese invasion also obtained important positions. After that, King Thaksin began to recruit a large number of overseas Chinese to Siam. Because Chiuchow people participated in a large number of important governmental positions, they were hailed as "Royal Chinese" (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 98).

Thaksin also paid attention to build relationship with Fujianese. The Wu family has been rooted in Songkhla of southern Thailand for nearly a hundred years and has also benefited from Thaksin's policies. Wu Rang is a Fujianese businessman. In the middle of the 18th century, he went to Songkhla to earn a living. He accumulated enough capitals from various industries such as planting, fishing, and commerce. In 1769, when Thaksin placed his army to the outskirts of Songkhla, Wu Rang provided 50 boxes of red cigarettes for Thaksin and his armies as gift. The purpose was to ask Thaksin to

give him the right to collect Cubillos from the Ko Si Ko Ha islands, and in addition to voluntarily pay 50 catties a year as tax. Thaksin agreed to this request and awarded Wu Rang a title of nobility. In 1775, Wu Rang came to the capital of Siam to contribute taxes and offerings. Because of this behavior, Thaksin believed that Wu Rang was a loyal and reliable person, so he named Wu Rang the lord of Songkhla. After Wu Rang died, his son Wu Wenhui continued to rule Songkhla. During the period when the Wu family ruled Songkhla, the Chinese frequently came to Songkhla to open up wasteland and prosper the commerce and trade here. The Wu family continued to rule Songkhla for hundreds of years, maintaining the title of nobility of until the eighth generation.

Because of the rapid increase of overseas Chinese population, the large population and dense communities have made management very difficult. Therefore, the Siamese government has added more numbers of officials to manage overseas Chinese. These officials are responsible for the population registration and tax collection of overseas Chinese (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 100). The method is that the Siamese government appoints local overseas Chinese leaders, overseas Chinese county governors, and overseas Chinese permanent secretary in various areas where overseas Chinese are concentrated. The overseas Chinese people are divided into communities according to their clan, for example, Fujian or Canton. The Overseas Chinese county governors and the permanent secretary are responsible for handling overseas Chinese affairs in the jurisdiction, their task is to register the overseas Chinese population, residence, and occupation into books, as well as mediate and decide legal disputes between overseas Chinese, and lead overseas Chinese to pay taxes. To prevent tax evasion from happening,

officials would tie a small sealing wax plaque on the wrist of the overseas Chinese who has already paid the tax as evidence of the accomplishment the tax payment (Shiba, 1995, p. 141).

The Chinese immigrants in the late 17th century were mainly engaged in trade, shipping, and craftsman. Most of the overseas Chinese in Ayutthaya, the capital of Siam, gather and live in China Row and North Avenue (Choisy, 1993, p. 142-143). The number of residents exceeds 4000 by the time. Thaksin established a new capital on the Chao Phraya River, overseas Chinese also chose to live where nears to the capital, because they know that the closer to the capital and the government, the more opportunities for making big money. In addition to the capital where overseas Chinese are relatively concentrated and Songkhla in southern Siam, the number of overseas Chinese is also increasing in central places such as Trat, Chanthaburi, Chonburi, Chachoengsao and Bangkok. Chiuchow people generally prefer to live in the capital or surrounding areas, while Fujian people prefer to live in Songkhla and other areas.

The population of Chinese immigrants has reach bigger in the 19th century. The gathering places of overseas Chinese are no longer in those places mentioned in last paragraph, rather slowly moved from south to north, from ports to the inland, and from towns to rural areas (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 101). More importantly, Hainanese have also joined the wave of immigrants. Hainanese are very brave, hardworking, and good at carpentry. According to Sinnker, the Hainanese special skills in fishing and boat-building drew them to the rivers, and their specialization in sawmilling lured them north

to the teak forests (Skinner, 1957, p.92). The Phitsanulok which I will introduce in later chapters has strong historical connection with Hainanese. According to my own research, Hainanese are the first Chinese immigrants to arrive in Phitsanulok province. Not only Hainanese, Chiuchow people, Hakkas, and Cantonese also joined the northward migration. In 1836, Chiuchow people had gathered in the countryside north of Chanthaburi, some villages were almost all Chaozhou people, they were mainly engaged in the cultivation of sugar cane, pepper, and tobacco (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 101). Chiuchow people and Hakkas flocked to Sukhothai, Uttaradit, Phichit, Phrae, Nan, and Phitsanulok in the northern part of Siam, their arrival led to the economic prosperity of this area. The settlements of overseas Chinese in the central and southern regions are also expanding. From Trat in the southeast to Saiburi in the south, there are settlements of overseas Chinese in every city along the Gulf of Siam. Even so, the place where the most overseas Chinese gather is Bangkok. The overseas Chinese living in Bangkok account for more than half of the total population of Bangkok. During the time of King Rama I, the Huaqiao Commercial Street was built in Bangkok's Sanapeng District. Later, King Rama IV ordered the construction of Shilongjun Road. Later, King Rama V also ordered the construction of Yaohuali Road, which was called "One Street Three Road" that is now the main streets of Bangkok Chinatown. According to Shiba, in the southeast of the palace, there is also Chinatown at the outer gate of the city. There are merchants, traders, workers, farmers, entertainment groups, and the royal family often calls entertainers to enter the palace for performances. Many traditional Chinese medicine doctors enter the palace as attendants (Shiba, 1995, p. 96).

The Chakri dynasty from 1782 found its own capability in the mode of "trade nation" and the royal monopoly was heavily controlled the national trade (Shiba, 1995, p. 141). However, since Siam and Britain signed the Pauling Treaty in 1855, this treaty broke the monopoly of trade of the royal family, high-ranking officials and nobilities, and brought the free market into Siam. The status of overseas Chinese in foreign trade has also been weakened. However, the arrival of the steam engine has also brought many other industries, allowing overseas Chinese to discover new business opportunities and change their careers to other commercial areas more economic gains, instead of focusing mainly on retails. Said by Shiba, After the 19th century, the arrival of steam engines and steamships greatly changed the economic structure and commercial environment in overseas Chinese society. At the same time, Hong Kong stepped on the stage of Chinese immigration history, because Hong Kong became a concentrated port for sending immigrants out of mainland China (Shiba, 1995, p. 98).

The first industry that the steam engine brought to Siam was the rice milling industry. In 1858, the United States established the first rice mill in Siam, there were only 200 employees (coolies) in the factory who were overseas Chinese (Manarungsan, 1989, p. 167). However, by 1879, the steam-powered rice mills owned by the Chinese had reach almost the same number that operated by the Westerners. In 1889, there were 17 rice mills operated by the Chinese, and in 1901 there were more than 50. At that time, the 37 rice mills in Bangkok employed a total of 7,400 overseas Chinese. In 1901, the 50 rice mills in Bangkok employed a total of 11,800 overseas Chinese (Manarungsan, 1989, p. 169).

But in places other than Bangkok, such as the northeastern part of Thailand, where steam engines have not been before, the main careers of the Chinese are still retail and handicrafts. The leaders of these retail and handicraft industries are still the Chiuchow people. With the exception of Bangkok, Chiuchow people have obvious advantages in other industries in terms of the numbers and. Generally speaking, merchants in Chiuchow have a huge advantage in taxation, contracting, import and export, rice milling, and pawnshops. Most of the dockworkers, railway construction workers and those who engaged in planting near the cities and towns are almost all the people from Chiuchow. Careers are divided very carefully due to different ancestral hometowns. For example, According to Zhuang and Liu, Hakka people mostly operate dried fruit shops, retail hawkers, silversmiths, leather workers, tailors, and barbers; Hainanese are mostly engaged in carpenters, planters, fishermen, servants, and waiters. Teahouse owners, coolies, miners and hawkers; Cantonese are good at craft machinery, technicians, engineers, and operate copper and iron metal shops, machinery shops, rice mills, sawmills, silk, construction, and hotels. Most of them live in In the town (Zhuang, Liu, 2009, p. 102). In contrast, the Hakka and Hainanese are the weakest among the dialect groups, mostly in the southern and inland areas of Siam. Only Fujianese have been responsible for the shipping industry and businessmen for hundreds of years of emigration, and settled in major business districts.

Although the southern part of Siam is relatively poor and backward compared to Bangkok, but many outstanding overseas Chinese merchants have established and succeeded their career there, and most of them are engaged in tin mining. For example, Wu

Fuxing and Wu Wanli finally got rich by mining tin mines in Pattani of southern Siam, folks far away in Fujian learned this and came to southern Siam to join the Wu family (Smyth, 1986, p. 316-320). There is also the legend of Xu Sizhang, a native of Fujianese from Longxi area. He participated to the uprising of the Dagger Society in Fujian. In 1882, he and his brother Xu Sifu came to Penang, British Malaysia, and the two brothers started from coolies. After accumulating a certain amount of capital, they went to Phangnga in Siam. Their commercial route runs from Penang in Malay to the south of Siam, finally they obtained the mining concession of Ranong in 1844, and since then the two brothers established their own mining business (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 103). In 1877, Xu Sizhang's son Xu Xinguang inherited the occupation of governor of Ranong, his second son Xu Xinqin served as the deputy chief, and his third son Xu Xinde became the chief officer of Langsuan. Since then, the Xu family has won the trust of the Siamese royal family and governed various prefectures and counties from Ranong to Trang (Cushman, 1991, p. 42-43). Their descendants have also been active in Siamese politics and business for a long time.

An obvious feature that the overseas Chinese society gradually exposed is that the Chinese began to gradually become Thai, especially from the 17th to the 20th century. Although the Siamese royal family put overseas Chinese in an important position, but the invisible assimilation process is gradually getting stronger. From the angle of overseas Chinese, they have tended to marry Siamese women to adopt this new environment easier. After marriage, the inherent characteristics and culture of the Chinese will transform into Siamese culture quickly and obviously. The religion of Siam is similar to that

of Fujian immigrants in Guangdong, and there is almost no difference in diet. After overseas Chinese marry a Siamese woman, most of their living habits are changed to the way of life of the Siamese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 103). The habits of Siamese are found among them being practiced chiefly by the enterprising and industrious Chinese settlers (Gutzlaff, 1834, p. 28). Therefore, boys born to the first generation of wealthy overseas Chinese can still grow up in Chinese customs and receive Chinese education and customs. They have their own temples, and carry on their worship of Buddha, not according to the usages of the priests of Siam, but following the customs and traditions of China. (Bowring, 1857, p. 86).

Most of the children from poor families are more likely integrated into Thai costume completely. After the second and third generations, regardless of whether the family situation is poor or rich, they became no different from Thais. Take the example of the Wu family in southern Siam. As the first generation of immigrants, Wu Rang and his son, the second generation, Wu Wenhui can still maintain Chinese customs. Although Chinese is their first language, but they can eventually become proficient in Thai after they have studied hard. However, the third generation only speaks a little Chinese, although they still use Wu as the surname, but their names are Thai. After death, their funeral would be carried out in Thai tradition. By the sixth generation, the Chinese surname was completely replaced by the territorial name Songkhla as the surname. By the beginning of the 20th century, the Wu family had passed down to the tenth generation, with thousands of descendants, but almost all of them were totally assimilated into Thai culture. They lived in Thai customs and were buried in Thai

etiquette, and their bodies were also buried in Thai graves. Therefore, although thousands of Chinese immigrants enter Thailand every year, after two or three generations, their offspring would be fully integrated into Thai society in terms of living style and daily habit.

According to the entry and exit statistics of the Siamese government, about 608,000 overseas Chinese lived in Siam in 1900, accounting for 8.3% of the country's 7.32 million population (Skinner, 1957, p. 87). According to Zhuang and Liu, Yang Shiqi, the minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce from China, came to Siam to investigate the conditions of people in 1908. Yang said that Siam has less than tens of millions of registered permanent residences, but there are 3 million overseas Chinese, and the number of overseas Chinese is larger than in Java (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 103). Why is there so much difference between the entry and exit statistics of Siamese government and Yang Shiqi's statement? Zhuang and Liu reported that Yang Shiqi may include the Chinese or Chinese descendants who look like Chinese but have already been integrated into Thai society and custom, but the statistics from Siamese government is just the number of Chinese immigrants entering and leaving China.

During this period, another very important phenomenon appeared in the Chinese community were the secret society and the Chinese association. Secret Society is an important point that must be discussed and mentioned when we talking about the origin of overseas Chinese associations. The prototype of overseas Chinese associations started from where the worship of local gods was conducted. The behavior of worship

was to let friends from the same clan get to know each other, then gradually developed into related secret society or speech groups, finally promoted to larger national clan associations or Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.

As early as 1695, there is a record of the Fujianese built the Qingshui Zushi Temple (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 104). From the 18th to the middle of the 19th century, overseas Chinese in Chaozhou, Hakka, Hainan, Fujian and other places built temples to worship local gods. Muslim Chinese from Yunnan also built a mosque in Chiang Mai in 1807 (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 103). In Bangkok alone, there are more than a dozen temples dedicated to Chinese gods. The land area of China is large, and the gods worshipped in different regions are also very different. For example, in northern China, there are no temples that for worshipping gods in the southern region, such as Mazu Temple and Shuiwei Shengniang Temple, Bentou Temple, also known as Zheng He Temple or Pun-tao . In the following chapters, I will focus on the relationship between the Chinese associations, temples and the composition of the Chinese society. In this chapter I will just briefly introduce the original appearance and formation of the associations and secret societies.

At the beginning of the 20th century, almost every overseas Chinese living in Siam belonged to a different secret society. The power of the secret society is very strong, and its network spread all over the Southeast Asia. The Hongmen Association in Phuket and the Hongmen Association in Penang, Malaysia have close ties. Hence the Ch'ao-chou and south Fukienese groups had a common name of Yi-hsing (Gee Hin), the

Cantonese the Yueh-tung and Pa-chiao, the Hakkas the Ming-shun and Ch'un-ying, and Hainanese were also known as the Yi-hsing (Viraphol, 1977, p. 221). Between 1892 and 1901, the Chinese railway workers in Siam were the members of secret societies. Literally, the associations are mutual aid organizations, but there were often in conflicts for recruiting workers, bargaining price, or competing for commercial territory. A very famous riot between associations was the one that took place in Bangkok in 1889. Two organizations, Yixinghui and Shouliju, used firearms on the streets of Bangkok for the monopoly of supplying coolies to three rice mills in Bangkok. At that time, the Siamese government mobilized the army and the police to crack down the riot. According to Skinner, about 900 gang members were sent to trail by court (Skinner, 1957, p. 141).

Before the 20th century, there were more local or regional overseas Chinese organizations, after the 20th century, these local organizations gradually evolved into national scale, and there were not as many conflicts as before. William Skinner gave a detailed introduction to the major overseas Chinese organizations after the 20th century, including the Tianhua Hospital in Bangkok, which is the most famous Chinese charity organization focusing on public medical care, social welfare and philanthropy. Similar charitable organizations can also be seen in Phitsanulok that I will introduce in later chapters. Their main functions are disaster relief, poverty relief, and giving back to the society. In 1910, in response to the call of the Qing government, the Chinese in Siam established the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. Members from various clans of Fujian and Guangdong joined the association together, with a total of 700 to

800 shops, which is the biggest chamber of commerce in the Chinese society of Thailand. They collectively brainstorm ideas for helping the Chinese, resolve commercial disputes, and play a leading role in the overseas Chinese society in Thailand.

In the late 1920s, the limits of colonial expansion and the adjustment of territories ended some long-standing disputes, and the unstable borders of Southeast Asia were finally roughly fixed. The Southeast Asian continent has British Burma; France ruled Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; these three countries at that time were called Indochina. Thailand is the luckiest country in the Indochina region, because Thailand has not been colonized. After negotiating and dealing with Western powers, Thailand still remained its fragile independence. Thailand's monarchy ended in 1932, although The king has lost his real power, but the Thai leader in power still maintains the highest traditional respect for the royal family. During this period, a leader who has had a significant impact on the overseas Chinese world has stepped onto the political stage, he is Phibun Songkhram.

The social background during the period of Phibun is that there were three types of overseas Chinese who came to Thailand at that time: business-oriented overseas Chinese, labor-oriented overseas Chinese, and patriotic overseas Chinese (Shiba, 1995, p. 171). The period from 1910 to 1920 was the peak period for the inflow of overseas Chinese into Thailand. Skilled and unskilled labor, except agriculture, accounted for 60% to 70%, of which more than 90% were in business. From 1930 to 1933, the

sluggish rubber market and tin mining market led to low wages and the number of immigrants plummeted.

Luang Phibun served as the prime minister of Thailand at the time as a soldier. Since then, Thailand's political atmosphere has become more conservative. This atmosphere is not only reflected domestically but also internationally. Phibun not only praised Thailand's superiority over Western culture, he also worshipped Japanese militarism during World War II. Taking advantage of the continual defeat of France in the European battlefield, Phibun seized the opportunity to attack the French troops stationed in the Southeast Peninsula and gained control of the border between Cambodia and Laos (Osborne, 2017, p. 221). This victory inspired Thailand's nationalist pride. The overseas Chinese and their descendants have become victims of Thai nationalism.

Beginning in 1932, the new regime of the in Thailand came on the scene, the nationalization of agriculture has begun, and the occupation of overseas Chinese was further restricted. In 1936, the Commercial Registration Law stipulated that the business conditions of all personnel must be governed and managed by the government. For example, the signs of shops must be marked in Thai language and other compulsory measures. The Thai government implements the compulsory assimilation policies to the overseas Chinese, mainly focused on language education. These policies have greatly restricted Chinese language education, deprived their right to learn the mother tongue, and weakened the diversity of Thai society. These policies are completely different from the policies that encouraged the Chinese to develop in Thailand during the

Thaksin era. The status of the Chinese in Thailand during the Second World War was no longer as good as before. Next, let's look at some of the policies on Chinese language education in 1933:

1. *All schools in Thailand must implement compulsory Thai classes.*
2. *All Chinese students between the ages of 10 and 14 must receive Thai language education (In 1933, the minimum age for Thai language education dropped from 10 to 7 years old).*
3. *Each student must learn 25 hours of Thai language per week and can receive no more than 6 hours of Chinese education per week.*
4. *The Thai language test for Chinese teachers was upgraded from level 3 to level 4.*
5. *Make sure that Chinese is a foreign language, because all Chinese schools regarded Chinese as the main curriculum, and Thai was a foreign language.*
6. *To ensure that the Chinese-language school is consistent with the Thai national education system, all teaching materials used in the Chinese-language school must be approved by the Thai Ministry of Education before they can be used for teaching. (Chen 2016, p. 122)*

In the next few years, hundreds of Chinese schools were forced to shut down, and thousands of overseas Chinese were expelled. They were all victims of Thai nationalism and the Second World War. But coercive policies often bring unintended consequences, and the results was contrary to the original purpose of the politician. Due to the government's laissez-faire policies and China's new role as one of the Big Five

powers with diplomatic and consular offices in Thailand, the assimilation rate reached its all-time nadir in 1947 (Skinner, 1957, p. 246). The overseas Chinese have made great contributions to Thailand's economy in history, but the political oppressions during World War II made them victims. These incidents have caused historical trauma to the Chinese community and reduced the chance of integration of the Chinese into Thai society.

Overseas Chinese are valued and affirmed in Thailand, but in fact the story of overseas Chinese is almost a history of blood and tears composed of tragedies. The greatest tragedy for the immigrants in the early 19th century was to die away from home, but for later immigrants and their descendants, their tragedy was that they could not return to the hometown of their ancestors, but at the same time, they could not utterly become a local. The Chinese are in a kind of contradictory identity, they are in Thailand but they are Chinese, but once they return to China, they will be considered Thai. Even though the living habits and costume are almost the same as Thais, but in the eyes of locals, Chinese will always be Chinese. Especially when the war comes, these Chinese can easily become the target of the attack from local people. Especially during the Cold War, the policy stance adopted by the Thai government was anti-communist, so local overseas Chinese are very easy to be regarded as friendly to the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, found that they could not truly become a member of this country. Although the Chinese immigrants were very important to the economic transformation of Southeast Asia, but except for

Singapore, the Chinese immigrants did not eventually become the political leaders (Osborne, 2017, p. 126).

During this historical period, the Chinese began to work hard to start a family and business in Siam. They were good at communication, articulate, and had good relations with Thailand's royal family and political dignitaries in order to gain more wealth and power. Of course, the Thai government also knows how to use the Chinese to govern more newly arrived Chinese communities. The two sides win and benefit each other constantly, and achieve a state of mutual assistance and mutual use of each other. Of course, this mutual use is accompanied by political turmoil and unstable international situation. Sometimes it is safe and secure, and sometimes it puts the Chinese society in trouble.

2.5 Transformation and collective cognition of overseas Chinese: After 1950s

After the end of World War II, the Chinese gradually integrated and naturalized with the local society, overseas Chinese became one of the most important ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. Chinese people are gradually becoming aware of the issues of their ethnic identity. the Chinese have explored the political and cultural identity of themselves for the first time.

After the end of World War II, various countries in Southeast Asia became independent. At the same time, the Chinese government officially abandoned the dual citizenship policy and encouraged overseas Chinese to naturalize into local society. This policy made a fundamental change in the overseas Chinese society of Southeast Asian in terms of their identity. The policy encourage the overseas Chinese to realize that it is an inevitable trend that they must fully recognizes and naturalizes into the local society. Therefore, the overseas Chinese society (Kakyo shakai) begins to transform into the ethnic Chinese society (Kajin shakai) (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 232).

Overseas Chinese refers to the ethnic group of Chinese, not the Chinese nation. Ethnicity and nation are two completely different terms with different definitions. Reported by Yamada, from the angle of culture and population, although ethnic groups and nations have things in common, but nation refers more to the population that practices nationalism based on its territory or homeland. Ethnic groups can also claim territory, but they pay much more attention on social economy rather than political

requirements (Yamada, 2000, pp. 7–8). To put it simply, ethnicity is a very politically inclined vocabulary, but ethnicity has nothing to do with politics, which represents a community or collective that has a different ethnicity from the local majority. Therefore, in the process of transforming from overseas Chinese to ethnic Chinese, the political significance has been lost, and the feature of cultural diversity has increased.

One point I must report in here is that nation, nation-state, and ethnic group are very easy to be confused in Chinese language and Japanese language. So I think it is necessary to restate the definitions of these words here. Because in both Chinese and Japanese, nation can be translated equally into country and state, for example, when we talk about the U.S.A., we can call it (in Chinese language) a nation, state, the United States, or a country, and this is where it is easy to confuse. In English, overseas Chinese, ethnic Chinese and Chinese are all called Chinese, but neither overseas Chinese nor ethnic Chinese can be called as the Chinese nation, because only mainland China can be called a Chinese nation, but there are still many ethnic minorities living in mainland China, so it still cannot be called a Chinese nation.

The original source of this argument can be traced back to 1844, when the British advocated the protection of all Chinese immigrants in the Straits Settlements, and at the same time considered those born in the Straits Settlements as British subjects. But the Qing government did not agree. The Qing government's proposal was to at least call them “Chinese people” or “Businessmen” (Shiba, 1995, p. 164). “Overseas Chinese” was first used by Huang Zunxian who was working as Chinese ambassador in

Japan. Later, in 1885, Chinese people doing business in Vietnam were referred to as "immigrants" in the Tianjin Treaty; in the treaty proposed after the Japanese-Qing war in 1895-1896, they were also called "immigrant subjects" and "immigrant Chinese". Later referred to as "diaspora". It was not until the 1990s that "overseas Chinese" were widely used (Shiba, 1995, p. 165). It was not until later that the battles between China's constitutionalists and Sun Wen's revolutionists, meanwhile Sun Wen was also advocating the destruction of the Manchus and the Nation building of the Han nationality, and he began to emphasize the importance of overseas Chinese and the need to give them spiritual support as well. In addition, the success of Sun Yat-sen's revolution was also inseparable from the military and financial assistance provided by overseas Chinese. Sun Yat-sen is called the father of the revolution, and the overseas Chinese are called the mother of the revolution.

Although the Chinese is an ethnic group in Southeast Asia, but it is different from many ethnic groups in Southeast Asia such as Malay, Burmese, and Khmer, because the Chinese already had their own hometown and territory before immigrating, but the Malay, Burmese or Khmer is a nation in the process of being formed. In Leo's words, the nations in Southeast Asia are all nations in the process of forming. The social-nation is therefore defined itself by social ties and culture rather than common descent...Southeast Asian countries do not fit neatly into the above definitions of nations (Suryadinata, 1997, p. 1-2). Due to the historical reason, they are also called the peoples of not being governed. They have no concept of national borders, they wander between the borders of between countries and still live a nomadic and slash-and-burn life. Scott

called them as *Zomia*. *Zomia* is marginalized in every respect. It lies at a great distance from the main centers of economic activities and bestrides a contact zone between eight nation-states and several religious traditions and cosmologies (Scott, 2009, p. 14).

The Chinese nation was formally proposed only around the time of the Revolution of 1911, so there is still debates going on in academic area as to whether the term Chinese nation is convincing or not. Mainland China has experienced long history, the Mongolians in the Yuan Dynasty and the Manchus in the Qing Dynasty were the rulers of mainland China, they conquered the original Han people, and founded their own nation on the territory of the Han people. Also there are more than 50 ethnic minorities living in mainland China, none of them are Han, so it is a bit not accurate to say that all residents living in mainland China belong to the Chinese nation, but from the perspective of overseas Chinese, regardless of whether the definition of the Chinese nation is persuasive or not, they would still think that mainland China is their hometown and territory. Moreover, in English, both ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese are called Chinese, but Chinese who are born and raised in mainland China will also be called Chinese, so I think it is not far-fetched to define the mainland China as the “homeland” of the ethnic Chinese.

The ethnic Chinese identity in Southeast Asia probably appeared in the 30 years from the 1950s to the 1980s, and its sign is the comprehensive localization of the identity of the Chinese community. The identity of the Chinese presents three types of identity. The first is political identity, the second is Chinese cultural identity, and the third

is ethnic Chinese identity to the (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 233). One thing to clarify is that political identity does not refer to the identity with China's politics, but the identity of local politics (Thailand's politic). The identity of ethnic Chinese will be completed only after all the Chinese have completed these three identical transformations.

Political identification occurred in the mid-1950s. There are two main aspects that affect the shift of Chinese political identity. The first is that after the establishment of independent national governments in Southeast Asian countries, the local people have long been dissatisfied with overseas Chinese's superior economic status and overseas Chinese's loyalty with China, resulting in the local government and people generally maintaining a rejection, suspicion, and even discriminatory attitude towards overseas Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 233). Therefore, many governments in Southeast Asia have introduced the compulsory policies to encourage overseas Chinese to be loyal to the local country. The second point is because the government urgently needed diplomatic partners in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Based on the need to establish friendly diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's policy of cultivating the national consciousness of overseas Chinese was transformed into encouraging the naturalization of overseas Chinese and loyalty to the local people and government. This policy led to a rapid shift in terms of the political identity of overseas Chinese, that is, from loyalty to China to loyalty to the country in which they live. The fundamental mark is that to encourage overseas Chinese to become local citizens. However, the situation in Thailand is different from other Southeast Asian countries, because Thai-Chinese have long settled in Thailand and have

successfully integrated into Thai society. Therefore, naturalization and allegiance are not the main issues of Thai Chinese, which is different from the situation in Indonesia, Vietnam, Malay, Philippines. The Thai Chinese are culturally indistinguishable from the Thais only in customs, such as ancestor worship, and celebrating the traditional Chinese New Year or Mid-Autumn Festival. Between 1937 and 1980, the number of overseas Chinese in Thailand is estimated to have increased from about 3 million to more than 5 million, but the Thai government believes that the number of overseas Chinese is not the same. In 1937 it was only 524,000, in 1960 it was 409,000, and in 1992 It is 220,000 (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 234). I think the difference in the data may be due to the fact that the data from Zhuang & Liu data is the total number of overseas Chinese plus the total number of ethnic Chinese; however, the Thai government's statistics are only the number of ethnic Chinese who have become local citizen, not counting those who do not hold Thai nationality who are the overseas Chinese currently working in Thailand.

The establishment of cultural identity of the Chinese also occurred after the 1950s. Identity can be thought of as the sense of belonging of an individual or a group. Individuals or groups and other objects (including individuals, groups, ideas, ideals and things) have a psychological and emotional connection, and they subconsciously regard themselves as a part of the object and action (Cui, 2007, p. 1). Professor Wang Gung Wu, a well-known Southeast Asian Chinese scholar, classifies Southeast Asian Chinese identities into two categories, with a total of 7 identities; Political identity includes: Chinese nationalist identity, local national identity, Chinese communal identity, and

ethnic & racial identity with legal and political right; Cultural identity includes: Chinese historical identity, Chinese cultural identity, and ethnic cultural identity (Wang, 1988, p. 7).

At the aspect of political identity, the vast majority of overseas Chinese have joined the local nationality. Until the end of the 1970s, Southeast Asian Chinese had basically completed the transformation of national identity. The number of overseas Chinese who still hold Chinese passports is extremely small, and they have little influence in the Chinese society (Zhuang & Liu, 2009. p. 236).

The ethnic identity of the Chinese has two characteristics, the first is ethnic characteristics, and the second is ethnic culture. Ethnic characteristics refer to the body shape, skin color, and psychological quality brought by ethnic inheritance, which is defined by Wang (1991) as physical norms. Physical norms directly contributed to keen sense of Chinese ethnic identity and in some cases are the essential elements that define ethnic identity. (Wang, 1991, p. 210). Chen Da, a famous overseas Chinese scholar in modern times, also conducted statistics and analysis on the height of the Chinese ethnic group. According to Chen's observation, all immigrants from Fujian and eastern Guangdong to Southeast Asia tend to have darker skin than residents in their hometown. Some Chinese who were born and raised in Southeast Asia have mixed blood with the local residents, so their skin discoloration, but the tropical climate and temperature have also had a considerable impact on their skin color is deeper (Chen, 2017, p. 23). As early as before the Second World War, the number of ethnic Chinese

who borne in Thailand exceeded the number of immigrants from China. A considerable majority of Chinese and locals intermarried, forming a large group of mixed-blood (Thai) Chinese. In Thailand, they are called Luck Chin (Zhuang & Liu, 2009. p. 236). For those who have been to Thailand, it must not be difficult to find that although there are many Thais who look almost the same as the Chinese, but if you look closely, they still look different from the Chinese. This is because many old immigrants choose to intermarry with Thais to stay in Thailand, so their descendants are more or less with Thai descent. Therefore, it is no longer reliable to analyze the ethnic identity based solely on ethnic characteristics.

Table 2.5-1: Height data based on the hometown of overseas Chinese

	North China	Central China	South China	Fujian	Guangdong (Canton)
Male (cm)	169.2	165.1	163.0	167.6	164.6
Female (cm)	158.0	154.0	151.4	156.0	153.0

Source: based on Chen (2017), edited by author.

Table 2.5-2: Weight data based on the hometown of overseas Chinese

	North China	Central China	South China	Fujian	Guangdong (Canton)
Male (kg)	59.8	52.6	50.4	52.1	49.8

Female	50.2	47.2	46.0	49.0	45.3
(kg)					

Source: based on Chen (2017), edited by author.

Not only Thailand, but culture identity of ethnic Chinese plays the vital role in every Southeast Asian countries. This culture identity is the generalization of the characteristics of the behavior of ethnic group, also called Chineseness. The core culture of the Chinese in Southeast Asian Chinese is not merely the language, but the important view of values and customs. It is about the clusters of emphasized values and habits – often exhibited unconsciously by the individuals or groups themselves – that shape their daily lives. It is what Chinese migrants take with them as ‘cultural baggage’ (Pan, 1999, p. 114). The maintenance of Chineseness is not only the basis of ethnic identity, it is also the cultural boundary consciously made to differentiated from other ethnic groups. Therefore, ethnic Chinese in Thailand and in other Southeast Asian countries regard Chineseness as a sense of group belonging. They will define and evaluate themselves and other people in their own ethnic group according to the cultural standards, and typical of Chineseness. Individuals will also demand themselves according to what morality that they think the their ethnic group should have. Confucianism is a typical example, for example, in the verse of “do not do to others what you do not want to do”, which is a code of conduct that is often spoken by Chinese.

However, due to the changes in various external environments and the different ability of self-identification, the situation of adopting Chineseness shows great

differences across Southeast Asia. The situation in Thailand is relatively easy to observe, because the degree of assimilation of the Chinese to the locals is very high and deep. Although the Chinese in Thailand have been actively participating in social charities in the name of individuals and associations, but there are few social organization contacts and activities that attract the participation of the overall Chinese community (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 237).

The number of Chinese in Thailand has exceeded 10 million, accounting for 11% to 14% of the total population of Thailand. Thailand is the country contains the largest Chinese community around the world. Compared with other Southeast Asian countries, Thai Chinese have a high degree of integration into Thai society, both in terms of descent or culture. Skinner put forward the theory about Chinese assimilation into Thai society. There are three main types of Chinese assimilation into Thai society, intermarriage, education, and nationalism (Skinner, 1957, p. 126-230). Skinner also predicted that the degree of assimilation will become higher and higher, and the so-called Chinese after the third or the fourth generation will no longer exist, because they will be completely assimilated into Thai society and culture. But Skinner's research is too old, and his research is mainly for old immigrants before the founding of the People's Republic of China. There is no research on new immigrants in his works. After the 1970s, especially after Thailand officially established diplomatic relations with China while China began to implement the policy of reform and opening up, due to the growth of the economic strength of the Chinese, they were no longer eager to integrate into the Thai society through marriage with Thais, but intermarried with the Thai-Chinese while

seeking economic cooperation. This phenomenon has produced a group that remains Chinese cultural factors, instead of completely losing Chinese culture and integrating into Thai society (Qiu, 2000, p. 164).

Thai Chinese associations are often active in the field of charity and disaster relief in Thailand, because Thai Chinese have a solid foundation of economic strength, and they want to enhance the prestige of the Chinese in Thai society. Most Thai Chinese agree with Thai's values and religious views, and they are willing to accept and participate in various religious activities and social customs of Thais; But at the same time, they still maintain the etiquette of ancestor worship, celebrate the special festivals of the Chinese, can also speak the local dialects of Fujian or Guangdong, and actively participate in activities between Chinese communities. This behavior is called the "second ethnic identity" of the Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 243). This kind of Chinese consciousness helps maintaining the Chinese tradition and culture. In terms of political affairs, Chinese are not participating as a Chinese, but rather in the identity as a Thai. Therefore, the ethnic characteristics of the Chinese in political field are not obvious to observe.

The content of this chapter is more abstract and not as easy to understand as the previous chapters. The first few chapters are about history. The focus of this chapter is on how the Chinese community defines themselves. How should overseas Chinese define their own identity? Are they Chinese or foreigners? Do they belong to the Chinese nation? Until now, this controversy is still ongoing, and the problems of self-

recognition and self-positioning cannot be easily solved by Chinese people who have lived overseas for several generations, or new immigrants who have just arrived.

2.6 Newcomers: the new wave of migration – the 1980s ~ present

New Chinese immigrants basically refer to Chinese people who have immigrated from China from the destination country after China's reform and opening up policy. *Xin yimin*, which has now become a special concepts in China and refers to those who have emigrated from China since the 1970s (Zhuang, 2013, p. 37). In fact, up to this moment, the Chinese immigrants from mainland China to overseas are still in an endless stream, and they are all called the new Chinese immigrants or newcomers. We call the Chinese immigrants introduced in the previous chapters as old immigrants or old-timers.

In the 1970s, the United States was in an era of battling for civil rights and it evolved a new goal for multiculturalism. Words such as equality and human rights spread all over the world, and of course it also affected China and the first wave of newcomers to go abroad. For the old-timers, whether they are in Western countries or Southeast Asia, Chinese have always been in contact with other ethnic groups in conservative attitude, acting low-key has been considered as the code of conduct and the virtue of being the "outsiders". For new immigrants, they are pursuing a more equal, freer, more diverse, and multicultural world. The newcomers variously represented different sets of Chinese values that called for more self-awareness among earlier immigrants (Wang, 2000, p. 96). New immigrants do not seek to take root and have children in the destination country, rather they may be pursuing higher education, wealth and life value. The new

Chinese identity was built on the growing confidence that communities could succeed in modernizing themselves outside China (Wang, 2000, p. 97).

Due to the historical reasons we mentioned in the previous chapters, the vast majority of old-timers mostly came from Guangdong or Fujian province. But the newcomers came from almost all the provinces in China, such as Sichuan, Hunan, Shanghai in the south, Beijing, Liaoning, and Inner Mongolia in the north. Not only are the hometowns of newcomers more diverse than old-timers, but the division of career is also more diverse than the old-timers. Most of the old-timers are mainly working as woodworker, craftsmen, labor force, and retailer. Newcomers included numbers of engineers, scientists, mathematicians, professionals, and academics in a wide range of disciplines suggests that the impact will be even greater in the near future (Wang, 2000, p. 104).

Another very important political factor is also the cause of a large number of new immigrants, which is the reform of state-owned enterprises in China. After 1978, the former President of China, Deng Xiaoping, proposed a reform and opening up policy. Since then, China has opened up economically to the outside world and welcomes foreign investors to invest in mainland China. Since then, China's economic model has gradually changed from a planned economy to a semi-market economy. Under this political environment, a large number of private enterprises have emerged in an endless stream and have created substantial economic contribution. However, many state-owned enterprises that existed before did not conform to the reform and opening up

policy, because the income status of these state-owned enterprises was too bad and could barely make any economic benefit. So the Chinese government decided to rectify and partly ban these state-owned enterprises that could not generate economic income. This decision caused tens of millions of state-owned enterprise employees and workers to lose their jobs. In the ten years from 1990 to 2000, more than 21 million people were laid off, and this impact continues to today. These unemployed people are called as "floating population". It was estimated that there were some 2.5 million Chinese in the early 1990s who emigrated from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and most of them settled down in the developed countries (Zhuang, 2013, p. 37). The State Council's China Development and Reform Commission estimated that in 2006, 25 million people were competing for 11 million jobs in urban areas, indicating that 14 million people are unemployed (Siriphon, 2015, p. 151).

Therefore, for the floating population, to find a job in a economically saturated city like Beijing or Shanghai, where they have to pay expensive transportation and accommodation fees while facing fierce competition, it is better to go to work in many undeveloped and economically undersaturated cities in Southeast Asia. Life there the cost is much lower than living in China's megacities, and it is full of opportunities. On the other hand, providing jobs for tens of millions of unemployed people is extremely difficult for the state government. So almost in the same year that China's employment crisis occurred, the Chinese government introduced a new policy to ease domestic employment pressure. The Going Out Policy initiated in 1999 by the PRC to promote investment abroad has introduced much support to assist domestic companies in

developing a global strategy to exploit and utilize opportunities in the expanding local and international markets (Santasombat, 2019, p. 19). This policy encourages many companies, employees and private businessmen to go abroad for seeking economic opportunities. These policies are directly or indirectly causing the continuous emergence of new immigrants.

Researchers may be so obsessed with the study of the history of old immigrants and their history in Thailand and China that they have neglected the study of new immigrants, but I think that new immigrants are more worthy of doing more fieldwork than the study of old immigrants. China's national conditions can no longer be compared with the time of old immigrants, and new immigrants are the indispensable forces among the promoters of the world economy, regardless of their education level, personal capital level, and the construction of their network of relationships in mainland China. There are still many vacancies in the research on new Chinese immigrants, most studies on overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese in Thailand rely too much on Skinner's research. Scholars will unknowingly put Skinner's researches on newcomers, which is not proper I think. Most studies on the Chinese community in Thailand have relied on Skinner's work as a standard reference instead of exhaling the problem critically or developing new perspectives in the face of changing social conditions...we must move beyond Skinner's thesis (Burusatanaphand, 2001, p. 67). I personally think that the understanding of new Chinese immigrants equals to the understanding of the future direction of the global development.

Although this paper mainly studies the new immigrants in Thailand, before going deep into Thailand's case, I personally think that I need to make a general review of the situation of new Chinese immigrants globally, especially to browse the neighboring countries of Thailand, which are Myanmar and Cambodia, because it helps to understand the whole picture of Chinese newcomers and make comparison with Thailand easier.

Let us first take a look at the newcomers in Myanmar and the new Chinatown they have built and the capitals behind it. There is a town called Swe Koke ko (Myanmar: ရွှေကုက္ကို) near the border with Mae Sot (Thai: แม่สอด) area in Thailand. Political situation in Myanmar has been unstable since a long time ago, in exchange for the loyalty to Tatmadaw (armed force of Myanmar), the Kayin State Border Guard Force was allowed by junta government to develop its own economic interest. Therefore, this area has attracted a lot of foreign investment and foreign labor to improve local infrastructure and economic development. Of course, it is impossible for new immigrants and companies from China to miss this opportunity. The Swe Koke Ko project is a partnership between the BGF, led by Colonel Saw Chit Thu, and the Yatai International Holdings Group, which describes itself as being Bangkok-based and Hong Kong-registered (Han, 2019). The Yatai International Holding Groups invested \$US15 billion (462.6 billion Baht) in a project that would see the construction of a residential, commercial and industrial hub on more than 5,085 rai of land in Shwe Kokko (Pinitwong, 2019). New immigrants from mainland China mainly work as labor and employees in this newly built Chinatown, and the main sources of funds come from the overseas Chinese in Cambodia and Malaysia. On February 14, 2017, Myanmar Yatai International

Holding Group Co Ltd registered with the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration and the same month reportedly signed a partnership agreement with Chit Thu that was facilitated by the Beijing-based China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs (Han, 2019). Because this area is very close to Myawaddy, where is one of the most important economic corridors connecting Thailand and Myanmar, and plays a very vital role as an economic hub in the context of the One Belt One Road policy. When this new Chinatown was built, the investor's guarantee was to provide more job opportunities for locals, but since 2017, no job opportunities have been offered to locals, but only the newcomers from mainland China are constantly coming.

Figure 2.6-1: Chinese from Thailand waiting to enter Myanmar



Source: Photed by author

As shown in figure 2.6-1, this is a new Chinese immigrants waiting to enter Myanmar for working at the exit of Mae Sot area on the Thai border. From their accent, I can tell that the group of new immigrants in the picture are from Sichuan. Except for the

group leader, the new immigrants do not speak Burmese nor Thai, and they couldn't even speak the official Chinese language fluently, which is Mandarin. Each of them has a strong Sichuan accent. I'm a Chinese and they are all Chinese, but for me, I can't even tell what they were talking about. There were about three groups of newcomers waiting to enter Myanmar in the shape of groups, and they do not go to Myanmar alone, each group has a female leader. The leader is responsible for overseeing the entire group and ensuring that the number of people is correct. If someone falls behind or disappears, the entire team must stop entering the gate and wait for the leader to find the disappeared person. From this point, I can speculate that they may all come from the same hometown, because they seem to have known each other a long time ago when they talked and laughed. Not only that, I can also speculate that their main job after entering Myanmar is to be the labor forces, because everyone looks not only very young but also male. My speculation might be wrong, but it can be speculated from their conversation that each of them may not have a high level of education. Each new immigrant's passport is in the hands of the leader, not in their own hand. After entering the entry inspection office, the leader will hand over the passports of the entire team to the Myanmar prosecutor at one time. The prosecutors will check the passports one by one and check whether the photos on the passports match their looks. After the inspection is completed, the leader will retrieve the passports from the prosecutor and keep them, and finally all the personnel will enter the country together. Due to various other reasons on the day, I was unable to conduct any interviews with the newcomers and leaders, nor could follow the team to their destination in Myanmar, so the only thing that can be observed is their situation when they were waiting at check point. More and

more new immigrants from Sichuan and Chongqing have visited and may stayed in Myanmar and Cambodia in recent years.

The new Chinese immigrants in Cambodia are the most worth mentioning. They are not only large in number but also too concentrated in the two cities of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. There are nearly 300,000 overseas Chinese living or working in Cambodia, and 100,000 of them live in the two cities of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. When I was an exchange student at Naresuan University for 3 months, I met many international students from Cambodia. When the conversations came to Chinese, their first reaction are the online gambling, shootout among gangs, human trafficking, and Excelpolitan University (L,Y. personal communication, September 2019)³. The first sentence came out from a Cambodian student's mouth after meeting me was: Do you like online gambling? "Chinese behaving badly" has become a regular trope across Cambodian media, with a seemingly never-ending series of shootings, kidnappings and general lawlessness creating a strong backlash on social media, particularly among younger Cambodians (Murg, 2019).

Some Chinese who want to work in Southeast Asia have obtained some recruitment information through China's search engine Baidu, and then went to the designated interview location, but it is not the interviewer but the human trafficker who waits for them, this is how many people are kidnapped to go abroad. Some criminals defrauded the victim to go overseas, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, or the Philippines, and then

³ The interview was conducted on 23rd, October, 2019.

confiscated the victim's passport after leaving the customs, and the victim was dragged to the place of work. Some victims have experienced severe beatings and torture, they worked without paying, lived as if slaves.⁴ In January and May, there were over 100 Chinese nationals arrested by Cambodian policemen over the crime of VoIP scams (Voice over Internet Protocol scams) in Svay Rieng's Bavet city and Phnom Penh' Sen Sok district; in June, 68 Chinese nationals were arrested in Preah Sihanouk province, and the Cambodian government arrested 127 Chinese nationals on August 14th (Sokhean, 2019). Meanwhile, 12 men were accused of being gamblers and loan sharks working with the Chinese-owned casino in Poipet city, and 6 Chinese nationals suspected of kidnapping in Sihanoukville were also arrested after police raided a casino on September 8th (Sokhean, 2019). According to interviews with Cambodian students studying in Naresuan University, many Chinese who are working as labor force in Cambodia, were criminals with convictions on the mainland China. Later, they came out of prison or received an amnesty after serving their sentence.

The most impressive thing that I learned about new Chinese immigrants from Cambodian students is about the history of Excelpolitan University. Excelpolitan University officially opened its admissions in Phnom Penh on February 21, 2014.⁵ Excelpolitan University is a private university, which can apply for full English courses, and opens four majors for students: business management, mechanical engineering and quality

⁴ On this website: www.58cam.com. We can find many self-reports of victims and some hearsay stories. Although the facticity of certain information needs to be examined, but this website is the only one with the most authoritative and comprehensive information about overseas Chinese who are making a living in Cambodia. This website also has application for downloading on smart phones, as well as many recruitment's information in Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. Many Chinese have found jobs in different cities of Cambodia through this website.

⁵ Information from <https://opencorporates.com/companies/kh/00033105>

control, hospitality and tourism management, and application engineer for smart phone.⁶ According to the information on the university's homepage, the main technical support and institutional system are all borrowed from Malaysia. The university also has its own Facebook page, Instagram account and Twitter page, and has a completely autonomous teaching building, all of these made this university looks professional on the surface. But the fact is that the Excelpolitan University does not enroll students or teach students any knowledge, because this so-called university is just a camouflage, and its true face is an underground casino and the headquarters of online gambling. This notorious fact seems to be widely known by the locals. In Phnom Penh, as long as you mention this university to the locals, the locals will put on an expression that seems to know its true face, but the strange thing is that this place has never been banned by the government. These criminals were not punished until five years after the university opened to admission. At least 105 Chinese, 10 female, were arrested on Monday, 9 September for illegal settlement and online gambling, according to Vattanak Mongkul, head of Investigation Department of the General Department of Immigration. All the Chinese were arrested at the 9-storey building with the name “Excelpolitan University”, located in Phnom Penh's Sen Sok district (Pheakdey, 2019).

There is also a type of elite newcomers. Unlike the new immigrants mentioned in the previous paragraph, these elites will not engage in criminal activities and will not do human trafficking. Instead, they have large sums of money, and the purpose of coming to Cambodia is to invest the area and buy the lands that have not been developed.

⁶ Information about the admissions of Excelpolitan University and the majors that can be applied for can be found on the homepage of this university: www.excelpolitan.com

Koh Pich-Diamond Island is located in the most central location of Phnom Penh. The reason why it is called Diamond Island is because it is a man-made island on the Mekong River, facing the river on three sides, and the environment is very beautiful selling center. An infrastructure project carried out here is the most expensive and largest one on the island, worth as much as 700 million U.S. dollars and is jointly developed by Jixiang Investment Company and OCIC. This is a place tailored for those elite newcomers, any sales executive working here, whether he or she is a Cambodian or someone from another country, can speak very fluent Mandarin. Elite newcomers do not have to worry about any language and communication barriers, even many road signs on Diamond Island are written in Chinese. Everything here is designed according to Chinese custom. In a nod to Chinese superstition, which considers the number four to be unlucky, the buildings will not have 4th, 14th, 24th, or 34th floors (Siphath, 2019, p. 140).

Generally speaking, the types of occupations and classifications of new Chinese immigrants from Myanmar and Cambodia, which are the neighboring countries of Thailand, are very diverse. From investors holding hundreds of millions of dollars to criminals operating underground casinos, they all live here at the same time, and they are all called the newcomers. Different from the old immigrants is that the newcomers are not eager to stay here by intermarrying with locals, and they do not come to the destination country because they want to escape the war. Most of them aim to make money locally, but they are not eager to take root.

Chapter 3

The Policy Towards Overseas Chinese Affairs

From the Chinese Government

Chapter 3

The Policy Towards Overseas Chinese Affairs From the Chinese Government

3.1 The policy towards the overseas Chinese in the Qing Dynasty

3.1.1 The early and middle period of the Qing dynasty

In the early and middle period of the Qing Dynasty, the Qing government has strictly prevented Chinese residents from entering and leaving the country and was taking hostile attitude towards overseas Chinese. Penalties are imposed on people who cross provinces and borders without permission, or private businesses enter and exit other countries, or illegally shipping cross the strait, or migrate to islands without permission (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 153).

In the early Qing Dynasty, the overseas trade policy will directly affect the speed and quantity of immigration. We introduced the story of Zheng Chenggong and how he influenced the immigration trend in the previous chapter. In the early years of Shunzhi, the imperial court adopted easing policies on overseas trade. However, Zheng Chenggong controlled and monopolized the maritime trade in Southeast Asia and East Asia, and used huge trade profits to support his military expenditure to fight the Qing government. In order to cut off the ties between the anti-Qing forces at sea and the coastal areas of Southeast Asia, the Qing Dynasty enacted a maritime ban in 1656. Those who violate the maritime embargo order will be punished with felony and death

penalty. During the maritime embargo period, China's overseas trade value quickly shrank, and private businessmen could no longer do business abroad. It was not until the Qing army invaded Taiwan in 1683 that the embargo order was lifted in the following year.

Although overseas trade was reopened, the Qing court imposed strict restrictions on ships and people going abroad. The imperial court strictly controlled the scale and structure of sea-going ships, and did not allow civilians to build sea-going ships with more than two masts (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 153). When a ship goes offshore, the sailors will be inspected one by one, and the captain and deputy captain must draw and sign in court, and brand the hull with name before leaving the port. The ship's exit point and entry point must be the same, and offenders will be punished.

When the embargo was just lifted, many coastal residents once again went abroad to make a living. In the late Kangxi period, the court began to be alert to large-scale overseas immigrants far away from the court's control. Because Kangxi was a Manchu, he believed that it was difficult for the Han to be surrendered, and the Han was in a state of confrontation with the Qing court for a long time. Especially the large number of overseas Chinese gathered in Luzon and Jakarta became the annoyance of Emperor Kangxi. As a result, the Qing government again imposed the ban on navigation to Southeast Asia in 1717, stipulating that merchant ships in the mainland were not allowed to trade in Luzon and Jakarta, and the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia must also return to China within a certain period of time (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 153).

The goods are unavailable, and the lives of the people are becoming increasingly difficult. Talented people are useless, and those who want to travel far away are unable to sail. Only the boats built for four or five thousand golds are still tied between the broken ports and the deserted shores...coastal residents become poorer (Lan & Kuang, 1865). Therefore, after the death of Emperor Kangxi, local officials began to request the Qing court to lift the embargo. The content of their request is that the Fujian region is small but densely populated, and the local food supply is not enough for local people to eat. Only the lifting of the ban on seas can make its trade surplus.

In the middle of the Qing Dynasty, the vast majority of overseas Chinese who moved overseas were still not allowed to return to China. After Emperor Qianlong ascended the throne, he not only continued to implement the bans during the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods on the sea route, but also strictly guarded the immigrants on the border of Yunnan and Guangxi on the land route. In the early years of Qianlong, with the rapid increase in the number of Chinese crossing the border to Vietnam, the court was concerned about border security. In particular, some overseas Chinese served as political officials in Vietnam, or possessed private armed forces and participated in political battles in Vietnam, which made the King of Vietnam complaining to the Qing court many times. In 1744, the Qing government was in order to stabilize the border and comfort the King of Vietnam, so the Qing Dynasty and the Vietnamese regime joined forces to legislate to strictly manage border trade, and focused on cracking down on overseas Chinese who cross the border without permission to make a living (Zhongyangyanjiuyuanlishiyuyanyanjiusuo, 1960, p. 54). The Qing government severely

punished those who violated the prohibition of going abroad, and imposed extreme penalty on overseas Chinese who were repatriated from Vietnam. The situation at the China-Myanmar border is not so good either. Due to the outbreak of war between the Qing Dynasty and Burma in 1767, the court has since regarded overseas Chinese as worms on the border. It was not until 1790, after the end of the war, that the border was opened and merchants were allowed to enter and exit. However, people at the border were still strictly supervised. Anyone who smuggled or carried prohibited goods was immediately arrested (Zhongyangyanjiuyuanlishiyuyanyanjiusuo, 1960, p. 698).

In this chapter, although the Qing government has been strictly controlling the overseas Chinese to go abroad, but the results have been inefficient. The main reason was that after the middle of the Qing Dynasty, the government became increasingly corrupted, the promulgation of laws and regulations were also full of loopholes, and the officials were sloppy on implementing the law enforcement. In addition, the bribery was very rampant, criminal acts such as extortion among officials cannot be eradicated, making it difficult to enforce the imperial court's restrictions (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 156). Although the embargo has lasted for a long time, but the number of overseas Chinese has been increasing day by day.

3.1.2 The late period of Qing dynasty

After the Second Opium War, the Qing court signed the Beijing Treaty with Britain and France in 1860. Article 5 of the Beijing Treaty stipulates that Chinese workers

who want to go abroad to earn a living must not be prevented, especially those Chinese workers who have signed contracts with British companies in British territories. Although the Beijing Treaty allowed Chinese people to sail, but at the same time, the embargo that have been functioning for more than 200 years have not been abolished or amended. The embargo lasted until 1893, the paradox is that the Qing government allowed Chinese to go abroad but at the same time prohibited Chinese going abroa, since go broad privately is a serious crime, many people still fear to sail out. However, under the influence of the powerful Western forces, many Qing officials changed many national policies, and of course their policies against overseas Chinese have also changed.

The main changes in the major overseas Chinese affairs activities of the late Qing government are as follows:

The first move is to set up a consulate to protect and manage the overseas Chinese. During the Tongzhi and Guangxu period (1862-1908), the main change in the attitude of the government towards overseas Chinese was their recognition of the economic contribution that overseas Chinese could bring. In particular, the supporters of the Westernization Movement hoped to use the power of overseas Chinese to complete the strengthen the national power. Therefore, the original motivation of the Qing government to establish the consulates in Southeast Asian countries were used to maintain the nostalgic sentiments of overseas Chinese and obtain business intelligence, and also to protect the business. The establishment of a consulate also has a

political motivation that is to control the overseas Chinese society and obtain information about the overseas Chinese society, and to keep the loyalty of the overseas Chinese to the Qing government. By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the consulate became the command post of the reformers including Dr. Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries in exile. The number one person in the consulate is the consul, who is the main executor and decision maker of the overseas Chinese policy, and the consul is also responsible for attracting overseas Chinese economically, politically and emotionally. The first consulate established overseas by the Qing government was the consulate in Singapore. From the 1880s to the eve of the Xinhai Revolution, the late Qing government set up 46 consulates overseas (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 157).

The second is to mobilize and persuade overseas Chinese to donate and invest in the country. After the 1870s, the Qing government took the Chinatowns in Southeast Asia as its main target and continuously sent envoys to persuade the overseas Chinese to make contribution for Qing government. Whenever natural disasters occur in China, the Qing government always mobilized overseas Chinese to raise funds for disaster relief. The method of fundraising is that each province would send documents to overseas consulates, and then the consulates post the announcement in Chinatown, and also published in overseas Chinese newspapers. Sometimes officials will directly send special envoys to launch donations. Special envoys are usually stationed in the consulate, and together with the consul to organize fund-raising activities. In order to enable the Chinese to donate, the Qing government allowed the Chinese to

buy official titles through donations. Before the Revolution of 1911, more than 900 overseas Chinese bought official titles in Singapore. Wu purchased five different titles within eight years (1889-1896). He purchased titles higher and higher from Tzucheng (資政) to Fang-po (方伯), Tao-t'ai to Yen-yun-shih with feather in 1896 (Yen, 1970, p. 26).

The fourth is to develop overseas Chinese education. The overseas Chinese policy is not only economic and political, but also educationally attracting overseas Chinese to make them loyal to the Qing government. The Qing government adopted different methods to support overseas Chinese education and set up new-style Chinese language schools in Chinatowns in overseas. According to Zhuang and Liu (2009), The specific measures are as follows: (1) Dispatch envoys to Chinatown or send high-level officials to accompany them, approaching overseas Chinese towns to encourage the establishment of Chinese language schools. (2) Dispatch specialists. After 1906, the local governors of Fujian, Guangdong and other provinces sent personnel to Chinatown to supervise the progress of Chinese education and help solve difficulties. The specialists later stationed in Chinatown and became an overseas educational officer of the Qing government. The Central Ministry of Education also appoints commissioners and specialists to conduct overseas education. (3) Reward those who are capable of running overseas schools. Overseas Chinese who donate funds to run schools will obtain official posts and titles, and the threshold for obtaining them is very low. (4) Establish Jinan School. The Qing government established the Jinan Academy in Nanjing in 1906 to accept applications from overseas Chinese students

and strengthen ties with the overseas Chinese community (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 158).

The fifth is to prepare for the establishment of the Overseas Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the domestic overseas Chinese protection organization. Since long time ago, the overseas Chinese society has been deeply conflicting, and different dialect groups form their own gangs, the fighting and shootouts had long been usual among Chinese societies. After 1904, the Qing government successively sent envoys to visit Chinatown to urge and advise the unity of the Chinese and overseas Chinese society and strengthen the ties with domestic business. The members of the Qing government stationed abroad also frequently consulted with Chinese leaders about organizing the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. On the eve of the Revolution of 1911, the chambers of commerce in major Chinatowns had roughly been established. The establishment of the Chamber of Commerce marks the first time that the overseas Chinese society has unified beyond the barrier between dialect groups (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 159).

This chapter describes how the Qing government treated immigrants and the harsh policies it promulgated. In the late Qing Dynasty, the Chinese government changed from being hostile to overseas Chinese to protecting overseas Chinese. Since then, the relationship between the Qing government and the overseas Chinese society has been changed. But the problem is that the government of the late Qing government is extremely corrupted, and the consulates abroad are also the same, which makes many policies inefficient.

3.2 The policy towards the overseas Chinese in the government of the Republic of China

3.2.1 The Beiyang government

After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, Sun Yat-sen became the president of the Nanjing Provisional Government. In March of that year, President Sun Yat-sen promulgated three regulations which are all about protecting overseas Chinese and prohibiting human trafficking overseas. Although Sun Yat-sen stepped down as interim president in April, these policies were later adopted and developed by the Beiyang Government and the Nanjing National Government which have deeply influenced the later overseas Chinese affairs and policy makings.

After Yuan Shikai became president, the Provisional Parliament moved to Beijing and became the Beiyang government. Although the Beiyang government was far away from the two largest hometowns of overseas Chinese which are Guangdong and Fujian, but they did not ignore the importance of the overseas Chinese policy. In December 1912, Yuan Shikai issued the "Notice on the Protection of Overseas Chinese in Fujian, Guangdong and Other Provinces", which ordered the local government of Fujian and Guangdong to carefully protect the returning overseas Chinese.

In the National Assembly Organization Act of the Constitution of the Republic of China promulgated in August 1928, a total of 274 members of the Senate are required to be elected by the provincial and provincial assemblies, Mongolia, Tibet,

Qinghai Election Committee, Central Society and Overseas Chinese Election Committee, and stipulate that six seats in Senate were elected by overseas Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 177). This is the first time in Chinese history that overseas Chinese can participate in politics as stipulated by the national constitution. In November of the same year, the Beiyang government promulgated the Nationality Law, which used pedigree as the basis to determine whether the individual is a citizen of the Republic of China. After that, the Beiyang government, at the request of protecting the development and diplomatic needs of the overseas Chinese, established additional consulates abroad and issued a nationality certificate to the overseas Chinese. Since most overseas Chinese from Guangdong and Fujian have long been dissatisfied with the Beiyang government, many overseas Chinese policies and institutions have been unable to exert effectively.

The earliest overseas Chinese affairs agency established during the Republic of China was Fujian Jinan Bureau. In January 1912, the Senate Chamber of the Fujian Governor-general Office decided to set up the Jinan Bureau and approved the case on October 4. The bureau is responsible for the protection of returning overseas Chinese and accepting complaints from overseas Chinese, including planning and processing business travel documents. The general bureau is set up in Xiamen, and the branch is set up in Fuzhou. Through this institution, the Beiyang Government has a closer understanding of overseas Chinese. It is reported that the total number of overseas Chinese is no less than 7 million, and the total number of overseas remittance

funds returning to China is more than 30 million in various banks (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 179).

In February 1923, Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangzhou from Shanghai, rebuilt the army and navy base camp, organized the Southern Government, and led the army to confront the Beiyang government in the name of General Marshal. Sun Yat-sen also set up the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau under the Ministry of Interior of the Southern Government and issued many regulations for the protection, recruitment, and investment promotion of overseas Chinese. However, the Southern Government has internal and external troubles and has no strength to carry out more overseas Chinese affairs. Sun Yat-sen also established Overseas Departments within the Kuomintang. The function of Overseas Departments is mainly to attract the masses of overseas Chinese by joining the Kuomintang and actively agitating the revolutionary movement overseas. There are 14 branches in the Overseas Department, 88 branches under its jurisdiction, and the total number of party members reached 97,455 in October 1926 (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 179).

From the content above that can be seen is that both the Beiyang government and the southern government are working hard to win over overseas Chinese and attract investment and contributions from overseas Chinese. At this time, those who were in power had gradually realized that the strength of overseas Chinese should not be underestimated, and began to devote themselves to win over overseas Chinese and keep their loyalty.

3.2.2 The Nanjing government

In 1926, the Guangzhou National Government established the headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army and officially launched the Northern Expedition. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek formed the National Government in Nanjing, established the capital in Nanjing, and began to advance the work of overseas Chinese affairs. In January of the following year, the Nanjing National Government established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Executive Yuan to take charge of overseas Chinese affairs. In addition, the Overseas Chinese Education Committee is set up in the graduate school to manage the education of overseas Chinese, and the Kuomintang Overseas Work Committee is established within the Kuomintang, directly under the KMT Central Standing Committee. In September 1928, the Nanjing National Government officially resumed the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee during the Guangzhou National Government, and it was subordinate to the Executive Yuan. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Council has 5 standing committee members and 7 members. In February of the following year, the Kuomintang held its second Fourth Plenary Session to reorganize the Kuomintang Central Organization and Kuomintang Government. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee was changed to belong to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, called the Central Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee. This organization helped the Kuomintang strengthen its control of overseas Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 180).

In September 1933, with the approval of the Executive Yuan, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau at many port and to provide guidance, protection, acceptance of complaints, inspection and statistics. Between 1934 and 1937, local overseas Chinese affairs bureaus were gradually established. During World War II, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission moved to Hankou with the government, and then to Chongqing. In 1941, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was established in Fujian and Yunnan to guide the overseas Chinese affairs work at various ports. After World War II, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission returned to Nanjing with the government. In November 1948, the Taiwan Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau was established in Taipei, and the Taiwan Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau was merged into the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 181).

The Nanjing National Government has always put effort to the education of overseas Chinese. Jinan University is a result of the overseas Chinese affairs of the Nanjing government. In 1934, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Association set up a training course for teachers of overseas Chinese education in Nanjing, which lasted until the outbreak of the Pacific War. After 1932, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council successively established several dozen overseas Chinese-oriented reading materials, including the Overseas Chinese Weekly, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission Bulletin, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Monthly, and the Overseas Chinese Education Quarterly. The Central Radio Station has a half-hour weekly radio program for

overseas Chinese. The Kuomintang Overseas Department has also created a variety of newspapers and periodicals for overseas Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 181).

Attracting overseas Chinese to return to China for investment and developing national industry and commerce was one of the core policy of the Nanjing National Government's overseas Chinese affairs work before the outbreak of the Second World War. In October 1928, the Ministry of Agriculture and Mines of the Nanjing National Government took the lead to announce the incentive conditions for overseas Chinese to invest in domestic mining. In the mid-1930s, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Association organized the Nanyang Chinese Entrepreneurs and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce to return to China to inspect the investment environment and business environment and hold a domestic product exhibition. The Nanjing National Government announced in October 1938 that economic undertakings with overseas Chinese capital accounting for more than 60% would offer tax relief, reduced freight, capital interest, security guarantees, and relief applications (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 182).

The works of overseas Chinese affairs of the Nanjing National Government also includes domestic relief and resettlement of returned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese as refugees. In 1933, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council and other departments established the Relief Committee for the Unemployed Overseas Chinese to assist the overseas Chinese as refugees who returned to the country due to the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and anti-Chinese movements. In 1935, the Overseas

Chinese Association established the "Qiao Le Cun" to settle the overseas Chinese, and at the same time established the Returning Overseas Chinese Business Auxiliary Committee, and organized Emergency Rescue Overseas Chinese Committees in some southern provinces and established temporary shelters for returning overseas Chinese at relevant ports. According to incomplete statistics in 1943, as many as 1.35 million overseas Chinese requested relief in Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan, but only 10% of them received relief (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 182).

After the 918 incident in 1931, Japan occupied the northeast, and communication and mobilization of overseas Chinese resources to participate in the anti-Japanese war also became the focus of the Nanjing National Government. After the Lugou Bridge Incident in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek declared war against Japan, and the Sino-Japanese War broke out. On August 31 of that year, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council issued a letter carried by telegram called "Notice to the Overseas Chinese for the National War of Resistance", informing all Chinatowns that the motherland is facing a crisis of life and death, and mobilized overseas Chinese to export financial resources, contribute to the government, and prepare for the long-term resistance.

3.3 The policy towards the overseas Chinese in Thailand after 1950s

Affected by Thailand's internal political and economic development policies in the late 1950s and its diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the Thai government's policies towards the Chinese have shown a volatile attitude. Although since 1956, the Thai government's policies towards the Chinese have generally developed in a tolerant direction, and the social status of the Chinese in Thailand has also improved compared with during the WWII, but these policies are not stable and it is easy to find contradictions. The reason for these contradictions is because of the decades-long Cold War between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. Many innocent Chinese in Southeast Asia became victims of the Cold War, some were deprived of their political rights, and some were lost their lives. There were even massacres of Chinese in Indonesia. Because of the ideological war in the Cold War, the Chinese were regarded by the locals as spies sent by Communist China. However, after 1975, the Thai government's policy towards the Chinese became softer with the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Thailand. The focus of our research is the case in Thailand, so in this chapter we will look at the Thai government's policies and attitudes towards the Chinese from 1950 till the end of the Cold War.

Thailand's "Citizenship Act" promulgated in 1956 stipulates that all Thai citizens (including the ethnic Chinese and their descendants) have equal access to basic political, economic, and social rights. After the foreigners are naturalized as a Thai citizen, they must be changed to a Thai name. However, the 1969 legislation specifically

prohibited Thai Chinese from participating in elections and voting in the 1969 election, which is contrary to the provisions of the "Citizenship Act". In December 1973, the Thai Constitutional Committee passed a resolution allowing Chinese-born in Thailand whose parents are foreigners to enjoy the same political rights as Thais and can participate in elections for parliamentarians and vote for people's representatives. There is no need to receive Thai education or military service restrictions as before. However, the "New Constitution" promulgated at the end of 1974 still distinguished the first-generation Chinese from the second-generation Chinese. The first-generation Chinese enjoyed the right to vote for Thai citizens but not the right to be elected. Only the second-generation Chinese Talents are the same as real Thais, and they have the right to vote and be elected at the same time (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 275).

In addition, in Thailand, apart from Thais, only the second and third generations of Chinese descent can enter military academies and police academies. The first-generation Chinese only had the obligation to perform military service, but they could not enjoy the corresponding rights. The Thai government also stipulates that certain first-class military academies that train senior officers can only accept Thais who belong to the Thai ethnic group; if they are descendants of interracial marriages, they must be Thais and also born in Thailand after the third and second generations can register for admission; If the father of a first-generation Chinese citizen still retains Chinese nationality, even if the citizen is a staff member of the government and state agencies or public hospitals, he cannot be granted official ranks and military ranks according to his qualifications and abilities, unless his parents apply for naturalization as Thai

nationality, only then can be considered as granting them official ranks and military ranks which corresponding their abilities; If the first generation of Chinese people did not have a certificate of military service, they would not have the right to vote and be elected (Liao, 1995, p. 30).

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Thailand in 1975, the two sides formally announced their non-recognition of dual citizenship in the form of a joint communiqué, which resolved, from a political perspective, a problem that Thailand had long been worried about that the Chinese has not been loyalty to the Thai government. It also clarified the political relationship between Thailand, overseas Chinese and China. The improvement of Sino-Thai relations has had a certain impact on the gradual acquisition of equal civil rights of the Overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese. The State Council of Thailand decided at a meeting on September 16 of the same year that not only relax the conditions for naturalization of Chinese citizens, but also announced that Chinese citizens can still enjoy citizenship rights, including the right to vote and the right to be elected. In 1983, the Thai Parliament passed an amendment to the Electoral Law, stipulating that as long as he or she is the legal Thai citizen, including overseas Chinese who have transferred to Thai citizenship, have the right to vote and be elected as they enjoy the same political rights as local Thai citizens (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 275). In the late 1980s, the Thai government also solved the problem of some Thai Chinese who were forced to live in China. In June of 1989, the Thai government announced that it agreed to the verification and certification procedures submitted by the Chinese and Thai Chinese who had returned to mainland China before

1959 who was yearning for communism, and allowed them to return to Thailand to visit relatives and travel; In September of the same year, the Thai cabinet meeting formally passed a proposal put forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreeing that Chinese-Thais and their descents who were born in Thailand but now live in China can temporarily return to Thailand and allow them to live in Thailand and run business (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 275).

The Chinese in Thailand have made great economic contributions to their country, and many famous entrepreneurs and business people have been born. By the mid-1970s, most of the younger generation of Chinese were born in Thailand, they received Thai education and also identified with Thailand in terms of political identity. Although they still remain the traditional Chinese culture, custom and etiquette, but they also identify themselves with Thai culture. As mentioned above, the Thai government's regulations on Chinese citizens' rights have undergone an evolution from restrictions, gradual relaxation, and finally reaching equality.

Part 2

Newcomers – The Transition of Overseas Chinese Society

Chapter 4

The Policy of Overseas Chinese affairs after 1978

Chapter 4 The Policy of Overseas Chinese affairs after 1978

The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 and ended in 1976. For political reasons, China basically cut off ties with overseas and the overseas Chinese affairs department was also disbanded. This led to a complete stagnation and paralysis of overseas Chinese affairs during this ten years. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978, following the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, with reform and opening up as a national policy, the center of national work shifted to the economic field, and China's overseas Chinese policy has also undergone a fundamental change.

Even before the Cultural Revolution, from 1949 to 1977, mainland China had always used class struggle as its main program, and economic development had been paused and it becomes the victim for political struggle. Because the economies of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong developed rapidly during this period, they were called the Four Little Dragons of Asia. But at the same time, mainland China is still in a very poor state, and is still self-consumed by processing more political struggles. The Cultural Revolution did not advocate the possession of personal assets, banks and other institutions and goods belonging to the capitalist society. Many overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese live in capitalist countries and own their own property and businesses. Some Chinese capitalists even own their own trans-international companies. Therefore, overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese have always been regarded as typical "bourgeois" groups, and they will be regarded as groups that need to be

reformed and criticized in mainland China. Not only overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese, but during the Cultural Revolution, people with any "overseas relations" were stigmatized. The relatives of overseas Chinese are regarded as the typical examples of those with "overseas relations," and they have received many blows and rejections in China mainland.

After 1978, economic development has become the core direction of the Chinese government. However, how to develop the economy, especially how to start economic development, that is, to raise funds and sources of investment, have become the biggest problem not only for the central government but also for local governments. Therefore, the central government and local governments began to pay attention to the overseas Chinese community, which has been almost ignored for nearly 30 years. They noticed the improvement of overseas Chinese's local status and the reality of their strong economic strength, and believed that the overseas Chinese community may play an important role in China's social and economic development.

In fact, the governments of Guangdong and Fujian began mobilizing overseas Chinese to make economic contributions to their hometown as early as the 1970s, and such actions never stopped even during the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese government established four special economic zones in 1992. From a geographical perspective, the main reason for building up the special economic zones is to attract overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese as well as the overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao to come to invest. The four special economic zones are Shenzhen where nears to Hong Kong,

Zhuhai nears to Macau, Shantou, the hometown of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, and Xiamen, the hometown of Chinese in southern Fujian. Many Chinese leaders at the time mentioned the importance of attracting overseas Chinese and Chinese to invest in mainland China in some speeches. Therefore, the goal of the Chinese government at that time was to expand overseas influence and reconnect with the communities of overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese and establish friendly relations.

In early 1978, the Chinese government re-established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, which is in charge of overseas Chinese affairs agencies. Its function is basically the same as that of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee before the "Cultural Revolution", The difference is that one of the functions of this newly established organization in charge of overseas Chinese affairs is to assist the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in handling overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese affairs. The latter is not the subject of the work of the former Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee. In the work responsibilities of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the focus is the ethnic Chinese, not the overseas Chinese (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 251). Since 1978, apart from Tibet, almost all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities have established overseas Chinese affairs offices. The Central and Provincial People's Congresses and the People's Political Consultative Conference have also set up special committees to deal with overseas Chinese affairs. The purpose of these institutions is to maintain and establish good relations with overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese.

After 1978, the work center of overseas Chinese affairs has different focuses in different periods, and roughly 1984 is the dividing line. From the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council in 1978 to 1984, this was the initial adjustment period of China's overseas Chinese policy, because during this period, new policies, guidelines and work priorities for overseas Chinese affairs were initially laid down. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the policy on overseas Chinese affairs was implemented, many unjust cases and false cases that happened during the Cultural Revolution were resolved, and some historical problems were resolved as well. In 1983, the National People's Congress established a special Overseas Chinese Committee, its function is to study, deliberate and draft bills related to overseas Chinese affairs, and implement the supervision function of various overseas Chinese affairs regulations and administrative agencies. The first point emphasized by the policies at that time was to prevent the ethnic Chinese from being treated as overseas Chinese, and to pay attention to the boundary of nationality between overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese; The second is to treat the ethnic Chinese as foreigners merely, but be careful not to treat the ethnic Chinese as foreigners in general, and take care of the common national feelings and interests of the ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese and their close ties with China (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 251). It is worthy of our attention that separating the ethnic Chinese from the overseas Chinese is a very important point and a very core part of the overseas Chinese affairs of the People's Republic of China. I will focus on this in the later chapters about Phitsanulok Province, where I had spent three months for field-work, because the ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese are indeed divided very

carefully, but the core of the overseas Chinese affairs work is to connect two groups of people who seem to be strangers but have the same blood relationship. In fact, there are more and more overseas Chinese who have acquired foreign nationality and become the ethnic Chinese, the number of overseas Chinese is declining, and the ethnic Chinese are obviously better in the aspect of economy, so China focuses on cultivating relations with ethnic Chinese rather than overseas Chinese.

The Chinese government actively promotes the careers training, language skills training, and cultural development for the ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese; and has established a large number of Chinese-funded institutions overseas, which can provide special services to ethnic Chinese or overseas Chinese, for example, the establishment of Confucius Institutes is a representative institution of China to promote soft culture in overseas. At the same time, since 1986, China has also introduced many overseas Chinese affairs policies to attract Chinese in overseas to participate in China's economic construction and investment. Through official channels, Chinese government agencies often organize various recruitment activities for overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese, and will send a large number of delegations to overseas to attract the funds. Between 1993 and 1996, China's overseas Chinese affairs agencies have received about 1.5 million overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese, most of them came to China for business purposes. An old Chinese who worked in the Confucius Classroom in Phitsanulok Province had the same experience, I will talk about it in detail in the later chapters. Between 1993 and 1995, these activities for attracting ethnic Chinese and overseas Chinese to invest in China mainland became so illegally widespread that the

Chinese government issued several times to ban or cancel these activities (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 253).

A very important channel for contacting overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese is through social organizations or Chinese association. The associations of overseas Chinese are mostly organized in the form of uniting people from the same hometown. Therefore, for the overseas Chinese in the past, the associations that collude with the same clan have always played an important role. The fetters between the township parties have created a network of relationships for overseas Chinese to obtain intelligence, people, things, information sources and services (Shiba, 1995, p. 66). Especially in the hometowns of overseas Chinese, the local government in China often invites overseas Chinese or ethnic Chinese to return to the mainland for visit and investments through overseas associations, because the contact between the hometown of overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese associations is long-lasting and does not disappear easily. Put it in simple, find either party, find the other party by contacting. Because the association emphasizes the contact between individuals and their hometown and hometown people to obtain necessary economic benefits and assistance, this is also the essential purpose of traditional associations.. Traditional associations have not been promoted by the government, but the associations among new immigrants have received a certain degree of support and promotion from the government to a large extent, and their main functions have changed from the previous functions to the current new functions. In the chapters after the holiday, I will talk in detail about the fundamental changes that new immigrants have brought to the new patterns of association. But one thing remains the

same. The leaders of new association of Chinese are usually people with very high reputation in the hometown as well.

Starting in the 1990s, how to treat new Chinese immigrants has become the focus of China's overseas Chinese policy. In the 1980s, a large number of outstanding Chinese talents studied abroad and stayed abroad, and this phenomenon was criticized as “brain drain.” The disappearance of overseas Chinese talents has caused the loss of top talents, especially the scientific and technological talents who were going to North America are the new immigrants that China most want to keep. Since the 1990s, the policy of studying abroad has become more open, and the overseas Chinese affairs department has begun to focus on the policy of how to improve the procedures for studying abroad to attract these talents back to China. However, the form of work has changed. In the 1980s, overseas Chinese were actively mobilized to return to China. In the 1990s, the policy was to encourage overseas Chinese through academic visits, conducting academic lectures, and cooperating with domestic research (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 253).

One thing I want to claim is that because academic research on new immigrants in China is relatively small, although there are some, but they generally lack practical and innovative field research, interviews and explorations. Therefore, in the chapter on new immigrants, there are very few documents that can be used for reference. I mainly draw on the research results of new immigrants conducted by Zhuang & Liu (2009) to cover the introduction chapter of new immigrants.

The basic content of this chapter is the promulgation and improvement of the Chinese government's policy on overseas Chinese after the Second World War, and how the newly established Chinese government recruited talented overseas Chinese to contribute the investment and development in the People's Republic of China.

Chapter 5

The Patterns of New Chinese Immigrants

Chapter 5

The Patterns of New Chinese Immigrants

5.1 The definition, patterns, and population distribution of new Chinese immigrants

Since the 1970s, large-scale Chinese people have immigrated abroad, which has become an important part of the tide of international immigration. The revision of immigration policies in developed countries is a direct impetus for the formation of the international immigration wave. First of all, it is based on the changes in the US immigration policy that triggered a wave of international immigration that has swept the world. The emergence of the new immigration law in the United States has benefited from the rise of the American civil rights movement since the late 1950s. The American civil rights movement led by the African American leader Martin Luther King Jr, broke out in the United States after the early 1960s. The civil rights movement with anti-racism as its core content has received responses from people of all ethnic groups and classes. In 1964, the U.S. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act and signed it into force by President Johnson, officially declaring that all ethnic groups in the U.S. should enjoy equal rights regardless of their skin color. The U.S. federal government has the right to guarantee this equal right in the form of law. The racial equality principle of the Civil Rights Act is also reflected in the revision of the immigration law. The immigration quota stipulated by the immigration law enacted by the United States in 1924 is based

on the nationality ratio of the American population in 1890. The purpose is to maintain the proportion of American ethnicity, which is mainly of Northwestern European descent. The result is that 94% of immigration quota has granted to the Nordic and Western European countries. In 1965, the U.S. government promulgated a new immigration law, abolished the original immigration quota, and changed it to grant a quota of 20,000 immigrants from every country outside the Western Hemisphere, regardless of race and nationality. The immigration law stipulates two priority principles for immigrating to the United States: one is family reunification of American citizens; the other is professional talents that the United State's needs. Although the new US immigration law treats all countries equally, due to the prosperity of the European economy, not many people are willing to immigrate to the United States from Europe, so the main beneficiaries are Asian and Latin Americans, especially the Chinese.

The changes in the U.S. immigration law set a precedent for developed countries to accept immigrants from developing countries on a large scale after World War II, and also promoted the globalization process marked by labor mobility. Since then, developed regions and countries such as Europe, Australia, etc., in order to cover for the shortage of labor and attract professional talents, gradually weakened the racial and ideological concepts of the original immigration policies, and relaxed restrictions on the inflow of immigrants from developing countries, thus setting off a large-scale immigration from developing countries. Economic globalization has promoted the accelerated flow of capital, information, technology, and labor on a global scale, making international migration activities on an unprecedented speed. Although the mainstream

is that large numbers of people from developing countries have migrated to developed countries, but the flow of immigrants between developing countries is also increasing day by day. According to the International Migration Report 2018 published by the International Organization for Migration, it is currently estimated that the number of international migrants in the world in 2015 will be approximately 244 million, which is equivalent to 3.3% of the global population (McAuliffe & Ruhs, 2018, p. 2). It is worth noting that since the mid-1990s, the number of remittances has greatly exceeded the total amount of official development assistance (ODA) projects initiated by the government to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries (McAuliffe & Ruhs, 2018, p. 27).

Let's take a look at the features, patterns and distribution of new Chinese immigrants. When the policy of reform and opening up began, China opened its economy to the world, and many overseas capitals and foreigners came to China to seek business opportunities. At the same time, the Chinese government has gradually relaxed restrictions on Chinese citizens going abroad. Traveling abroad and studying abroad have become a folk fashion that is widely sought after by young people. To this day, people will also look at people who have lived abroad with an enviable eyesight. In mainland China, immigrants who went abroad after the reform and opening up were usually called the new immigrants or newcomers. In the wave of new Chinese immigrants, Southeast Asia is not the preferred destination for them. From the beginning of reform and opening up to the mid-1990s, developed countries were the main targets of new Chinese immigrants. With the increasingly stringent restrictions on foreign

immigration in developed countries and the rapid development of economic and trade relations between China and developing countries, more and more Chinese business people seek business opportunities in developing countries and settle down there.

Reported by Zhuang and Liu (2009), according to the purpose, channels and occupational structure of going abroad, the new immigrant groups in China can be roughly divided into 4 types as international students, unskilled labors, business immigrants, and labor exporters or labor forces.

The first type of new immigrants are international students. Taiwanese students have created a precedent from studying abroad to immigration. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, nearly 150,000 Taiwanese students went to the United States to study for graduate degrees. As of 2000, there were 529,000 Taiwanese immigrants in the United States. Among them, student immigrants accounted for 41.3%, and work immigrants accounted for 30%, family reunions and investment immigrants ranked third and fourth (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 374). China's large-scale dispatch of overseas students is later than Taiwan's, but the number is very large. As of 2006, the total number of overseas students in mainland China has exceeded one million, and the total number of mainland Chinese who have immigrated abroad (including their family members) through overseas study channels is more than 1 million. Studying abroad has become one of the main channels for Chinese people to immigrate abroad. Regardless of whether the mainland, Hong Kong or Taiwan, Chinese students studying abroad mainly go to developed countries, especially North America.

The second type of immigrants are unskilled labor. They mainly apply for settlement status on the grounds of family reunion, and a small number of people choose illegal channels to settle overseas. Unskilled labor immigrants also mainly go to developed countries, especially the United States. Applying for immigration VISA for relatives is not only to make full use of the priority family reunion visa principle that implemented by many developed countries, but also partly because the Chinese value on family and clan traditions, which is they are willing to take the responsibility of applying for immigration VISA for other family members. In the 1980s, 84.5% of Chinese Americans from the mainland applied for immigration to the United States for their parents, second only to 93.8% in India (Heinberg, Harris & York, 1989, p. 845). Once the parents come to the United States, they begin to apply for their other children to come to reunite. According to the U.S. immigration provisions, parents of immigrants who are approved to come to the U.S. can bring their children. After these children reach adulthood, they can use their marriage relationship to bring their spouse to the U.S., and then re-apply to immigrate to the U.S. for the spouse's parents. As a result of this family chain immigration, once an immigrant is approved to settle in the United States, a large number of relatives will come to settle in the United States in the next few years. According to the survey investigation from Zhuang and Liu (2009), in the Fuzhou area, usually an immigrant who settled in the United States in the late 1980s can eventually bring about 20 relatives and friends to immigrate to the United States. Most Chinese who settled in the United States in the 1970s were able to bring along 10 relatives together. The most one was Fuqing man who settled in the United States in 1968, and brought more than 100 relatives and friends to the United States (Zhuang &

Liu, 2009, p. 375). Chinese immigrants who go abroad through marriage also spread to most countries and some developing countries.

In addition, Chinese people who immigrate overseas informally are mainly from the mainland, they are all over the world and the number is unclear. Especially for Chinese immigrants who settled in Southeast Asia, a considerable number of people have not obtained legal immigration status.

The third category of immigrants is business immigrants, including investment immigration, business personnel stationed abroad and all kinds of vendors. Before the mid-1990s, Chinese investment immigrants to developed countries mainly came from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Among the nearly 600,000 Hong Kong overseas immigrants before 2000, 30% might immigrated through business. Taking Hong Kong people who formally immigrated to Canada from 1993 to 1994 as an example, there are about 26,000 Hong Kong people who entered Canada based on business immigration alone. Taiwan's business immigrants also account for at least 20% of the total number of Taiwanese immigrants (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 376). Since the late 1990s, the number of investment immigrants from mainland China to developing countries has increased rapidly. Because mainland China has gradually become the world's manufacturing center, Chinese manufactured products sell well in developing countries as well as developed countries. Especially the number of investment and engineering contracting in developing countries has increased sharply, thus a large number of mainland Chinese businessmen follow the trajectory of their commerce as traveled around the world.

Especially in Southeast Asia, operating Chinese goods and engaging in Chinese business-related industries have become the main businesses for new Chinese immigrants to earn a living.

The fourth type of immigrants are labor exporters or labor forces. Labor exporters are different from ordinary immigrants. Most of the laborers will return to the country after the contract expires, and only a few will stay there. The time limit for Chinese laborers going abroad is two years, and they have maintained a growth trend throughout the year. They can be regarded as a special group among other patterns of immigrants. According to statistics from the official website of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, from January to October 2006, there were 274,000 Chinese who worked overseas through labor export intermediary companies. So far, about 3.75 million Chinese worked abroad (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, 2007). Among them, there are about 200,000 legal Chinese laborers in Southeast Asia, and the number of illegal workers far exceeds that of legal laborers.

One of the reasons why China exports a large amount of labor to Southeast Asian countries is because China has many investment and assistance projects and contracted projects in Southeast Asia. Since China has contracted a large number of infrastructure and various engineering projects in Southeast Asia, many management and technical personnel have been introduced from China. According to statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce, from January to November 2007, China's foreign contracted projects completed a turnover of US\$33.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 34.6%; the

value of newly signed contracts was US\$62.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 13% (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 389). Skilled and unskilled labor in China is also relatively cheap. Although the cost of labor has increased in recent years, but contractor still think that the Chinese labors are easier to manage and communicate, so Chinese contractors still choose to hire a large number of Chinese. I think this may also be the cause of a large number of local unemployment, because Chinese contractors only choose to hire Chinese labors, which is more convenient for communication and management. The locals are different from the Chinese in customs, diet, values, and culture, so it is difficult to manage and communicate. These people are introduced by contracting companies or hire the Chinese who come to Southeast Asia on their own, especially in the construction industry.

Table 5.1-1: China's contracted projects in Southeast Asia (1995-2005)

Unit: one million U.S. dollars

Year	Singapore	Thailand	Malaysia	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam	Cambodia	Laos	Myanmar	Brunei
1995	87.36	83.39	158.42	53.46	25.74	17.55	3.46	34.60	20.61	10.52
1996	214.39	66.14	271.84	31.26	46.95	73.24	1.84	47.66	19.62	11.10
1997	480.18	106.52	242.96	22.54	117.44	89.42	6.04	46.33	111.82	5.30

1998	492.59	131.05	131.30	25.26	105.08	55.47	9.14	69.82	154.22	29.06
1999	530.85	108.65	87.93	22.40	55.58	65.34	15.01	83.21	192.69	16.73
2000	654.21	86.45	94.78	11.96	40.26	67.15	18.66	90.77	178.48	9.55
2001	511.04	114.99	70.59	27.04	68.09	94.91	35.27	100.68	249.09	2.20
2002	540.26	184.28	128.27	81.34	73.48	147.00	57.56	136.77	288.05	0.35
2003	499.33	114.11	233.08	144.14	100.82	161.48	35.42	101.89	370.74	-
2004	656.26	165.56	213.94	263.03	126.60	277.84	62.15	132.84	331.20	2.96
2005	767.58	300.99	226.47	523.63	179.25	275.30	123.12	169.53	286.72	9.34

Source: based on China foreign economic statistical yearbook (1994-2005)

Table 5.1-2: China's export of technicians and laborers to Southeast Asia

Year	Sin-gapore	Thai-land	Ma-lay-sia	In-do-nesia	Phil-ippine	Vi-etnam	Cam-bodia	Laos	My-an-mar	Bru-nei
1995	30863	1906	1883	1016	283	1372	563	2525	102	139

1996	45496	2264	4313	832	647	2035	1525	2890	343	343
1997	58583	2584	5239	1215	1058	3004	2466	2737	1204	267
1998	59705	2078	3452	1334	1140	2344	3521	2409	1893	175
1999	73229	1797	3228	1738	681	3692	5598	2598	2497	187
2000	87592	1843	3649	1890	841	4716	6898	3450	2554	428
2001	99680	3496	4026	2557	1018	6008	5885	2795	2132	76
2002	91220	2906	4498	3552	936	6737	6181	4188	3592	57
2003	81444	2678	5577	4819	1007	8678	5560	3419	4144	215
2004	73844	2963	3816	4713	820	8638	5075	3715	4872	472
2005	74682	2900	3937	2832	804	7943	4798	3094	8726	1263

Source: based on China foreign economic statistical yearbook (1994-2005)

As shown by two tables above, Southeast Asian countries have strict laws restricting foreign labor, the data in the tables are the official data of the Ministry of Labor. From Singapore's data, we can see that the larger the contracted project amount, the more Chinese labors will be needed. As can be seen from the above tables, after 1999, Myanmar became China's overseas contracted engineering market in Southeast Asia, second only to Singapore. Between 2000 and 2005, China's contracted projects in Myanmar reached more than US\$1.7 billion, and the growth rate was higher than that of other countries in Southeast Asia. At the same time, a large number of Chinese immigrants have also poured into Myanmar, which has a direct relationship with the growing numbers of China's contracted projects in Myanmar. Although the number of Chinese laborers in Thailand is not growing so fast, it is also showing an increasing trend in

general. The labor export period of Chinese laborers is usually one to two years, and many people still stay in the local area in various ways after the labor period expires. In fact, more Chinese workers enter Southeast Asia through other methods such as tourist visas, and then stay for overtime to work (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 389). As a result, most of the illegally stranded migrant workers have emerged.

As we mentioned earlier, whether the new Chinese immigrants who go to developed countries or developing countries, their motivation of going abroad, education level, economic ability, occupational structure and settlement status are very different from those of old immigrants. Most of the old Chinese immigrants before 1950 came from the coastal areas of Fujian and Guangdong. Their overall level of education is very low, and they have no technical skills. Even after they arrive in a foreign country, they can't speak the local language, only the dialect of their hometown. In other words, the old immigrants are mostly forced to make a living in overseas. Due to their low level of education and weak economic ability, old immigrants usually settle where they first arrived, and then find fellow villagers from the same hometown as quickly as possible, and spend the rest of their lives under each other's help.

Compared with old immigrants, new immigrants generally have higher academic qualifications, have a certain degree of economic capacity, are more mobile and come from all over the China. Many new immigrants are already elites in their society before they immigrate overseas, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, many of them have completed higher education before immigrating. Their motivation for emigrating

is not to make a living, but to pursue long-term development and pursue their personal dreams. Especially the investment immigrants among the new immigrants are more outstanding, they already have strong economic ability before immigrating. For example, the capital of investment immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong, the United States or Canada is amazing, because these three places need at least 5 million yuan to invest in local stocks, bonds or business districts to get permanent residence, which is the green card. The purpose of these investment immigrants must not be to make a living, but to pursue a more advanced and comfortable quality of life, and most importantly, a safer social environment than mainland China. The purpose of investment immigrants is to hope that their offspring can be the citizens of developed countries and have a higher international status. Another purpose of their immigration is usually to seek business development and capital growth in foreign countries. The traders among the new immigrants are also people with strong economic foundation, and their purpose of immigration is to accumulate greater capital in overseas. Even unskilled labor from rural areas is usually not from the poorest families, because immigration abroad requires a certain amount of expenses, networks, courage and insight. Generally speaking, the conditions of new immigrants are much better than those of old immigrants, and their immigration motives are different from those of old immigrants, not for making a living but for a better life.

Since the vast majority of new immigrants go abroad to pursue more development opportunities and space, they often change their place of living and go to countries with more developing opportunities. In particular, professional talents with a skill and

expertise are widely accepted by the environment of developed countries, thus, traveling between different countries has become one of the norms for new Chinese immigrants. Some of them have permanent residency rights or passports in multiple countries, and they can travel freely in the world. Take me as an example, when I was studying in the United States, I was attracted by Hong Kong's study abroad policy. Later, I went to Hong Kong to study for master degree. Later, I was attracted by Japanese culture and applied to study in Japan with my mainland China passport. There are not a few new immigrants traveling internationally, and their purpose is to pursue higher development. According to Zhuang and Liu's survey, traders of new immigrants in Southeast Asia are more mobile. Many of the new immigrants entering Myanmar for going to Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to settle, or move between several countries to do business. Among the new Chinese immigrants from Southeast Asia, those with high academic qualifications are generally concentrated in Singapore, but they have gradually moved to Malaysia, Thailand and other places in recent years (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 377).

The vast majority of old immigrants are from Guangdong and Fujian, especially the Pearl River Delta, Chaoshan and Southern Fujian regions, which have their own dialects. New immigrants come from all provinces, cities and regions in China, and they all speak fluent Mandarin. Except Hong Kong and Taiwan, the largest export destinations for new immigrants from the mainland are Fuzhou in Fujian, Wenzhou in Zhejiang, Liaoning and Yunnan. Most of the new immigrants from Fuzhou go to the United States, followed by Japan, Indonesia and Europe. New immigrants from

Wenzhou mainly go to Europe, but Wenzhou businessmen are also active in all over the world, and many people have gone to the United States in the past ten years. The early new immigrants from Liaoning mainly went to the United States, and in recent years, a large number of new immigrants go to Europe. Due to the geographical location, the new immigrants from Yunnan are mainly distributed in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 377).

With the rising cost of living in developed countries, new Chinese immigrants are more inclined to flow to developing countries in recent years. The management of entry and residence in developing countries is much looser than that in developed countries, and the local people have a more friendly attitude towards Chinese immigrants. Southeast Asia is a close neighbor of China and has more convenient transportation. The most important thing is that the cost of immigration is very low. After the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, the economic and trade relations between the two sides have also promoted personnel exchanges, and economic environments are more conducive to immigration. There are also Chinese communities, temples, ancestral halls and places where old-timers lived widely throughout Southeast Asia that make new immigrants feel more cordial and friendly than other regions in the world. Moreover, Southeast Asia is a place with very uneven economic and social development. The developed countries include Singapore, the medium-developed countries include Thailand and Malaysia, and there are also very undeveloped places inside of Cambodia and Laos, and even Myanmar, where is undergoing “civil war”. But this also creates a platform for new immigrants to engage in different jobs, with more careers occupations

and opportunities than in developed countries. After 1990, there were about 20 million Chinese in Southeast Asia, including about 5.46 million in Indonesia, about 5.25 million in Malaysia, about 4.81 million in Thailand, about 2.52 million in Singapore, about 1 million in Vietnam, about 850,000 in the Philippines, and about 500,000 in Cambodia and Myanmar each (Suryadinata, 19, p. 7).

The variety of new immigrants is particularly diverse, and the occupational variety is also very large. The immigrant population also reach the peak in the 1980s and 2000s.

5.2 The “pushing factors” of newcomers

The increase or decrease in the number of new immigrants must be changed with China's national policy. For example, from Deng Xiaoping's era of "let some get rich first", to the current "new era" claimed by president Xi Jinping, "going out" and "One Belt, One Road", such policies could be the leading key of newcomers, the general context of immigration policy is a key factor driving immigration overseas.

The growing surplus labor force and the lack of opportunities to get rich are the basic driving forces to promote overseas immigration. In addition, China's relaxation of restrictions on immigration abroad is also the basic condition for immigration abroad. Due to the increasingly expensive immigration costs in developed countries, Southeast Asia has gradually become a favorite place for new Chinese immigrants.

As we said in the previous chapter, the emergence of a large number of floating populations has led to the emergence of new immigrants. China's transition from a

planned economy to a market economy in 1978 put huge pressure on state-owned enterprises, under the fierce competition between foreign-funded enterprises and private enterprises, many state-owned enterprises went bankrupt. At the same time, the layoffs of workers have led to a sharp increase in the number of unemployed people in the city. The development of the market economy has also led to the commercialization of agricultural products and the intensification of production, which has resulted in a large amount of surplus labor in rural areas, who are called “migrant workers.” These migrant workers have also flown into the cities, making the already unemployed and overpopulated cities more crowded. Although China's economic growth rate has been maintained at a high speed since the reform and opening up, but thousands of surplus labor still cannot be digested by economic growth. Especially the people in the economically backward areas, the economic environment made them having to seek their aspirations in overseas. Southeast Asia is located on the periphery of China, compares with Western country, the cost of travel is relatively low, which provides opportunities for new immigrants who came the families that with low income.

Since the reform and opening up, the Chinese government has gradually relaxed restrictions on citizens going abroad. After the 1980s, the government encouraged studying abroad. A large number of publicly-funded students and self-financed students became the first batch of citizens to receive passports, and they immediately went to developed countries to study. Their families can also go abroad with them in the name of accompanying students. Most of the Chinese students and their families from the 1980s to the 1990s stayed abroad and became the first batch of new immigrants. After

the mid-1990s, in most provinces of China, citizens can also obtain passports and go abroad if they join a tour group that organized by a government-approved travel agency (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 394). At the beginning, the validity of the passport was 5 years. Since 2007, the validity of the passport has been changed to 10 years, and the validity period can be extended twice. After 2005, as long as there is no criminal record, any Chinese citizen can apply for a passport without joining a tour group or obtaining an invitation from abroad. Since then, there have been no restrictions for Chinese citizens to legally enter Southeast Asia.

In many areas where new immigrants are frequently exported, such as Fujian, the basic-level governments often encourage citizens to emigrate overseas, and some places even acquiesce in using irregular channels for immigration (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 394). In these areas, overseas immigration has become a fashion. There is a proverb saying that “a man goes out, to bring back a wealthy family; ten men go out, bring back a wealthy village”. Therefore, the local government often provides convenience to people who want to immigrate. Some departments even provide new immigrants with printed information brochures, which record the current situation and contact methods of the fellows from the same hometown, so that they can get in touch with the same clan people after they arrive at their destinations. The overseas connections between the new and old overseas Chinese have also created conditions for the continuous production of new immigrants, because the Chinese pay more attention to ties with their hometowns and families, and the Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia have always maintained important ties with their hometowns in mainland China.

After the reform and opening up, the first batch of new immigrants to Southeast Asia had two hometowns, the first is the Jinjiang area of Fujian, and the second is the Chaozhou area of Guangdong. Most of the overseas Chinese in Jinjiang went to the Philippines, while the overseas Chinese in Chaozhou settled in Thailand (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 394). These new immigrants did not go to a completely unfamiliar place, but under the help of local relatives and friends, they quickly integrated into the local Chinese community in Thailand and Philippine. Therefore, for the first batch of newcomers, it is not entirely correct to use the term “foreign country” to describe when they went, because long before they set off, they had received invitation letters from Chinese associations in Thailand and the Philippines with guarantee letter, and subsidized travel expenses. Local relatives and friends also helped them with providing accommodation and food, introduction and arrange jobs, and help them obtain ID cards and passports to settle in the local area through adoption, intermarriage, inheritance of property, and other methods. The Chinese community in Southeast Asia has always had a tradition of assisting newcomers in their hometowns to earn a living. In a moral sense, seniors have the responsibility and obligation to take care of the juniors, especially those from the same hometown or clan. Once the new immigrants have their own financial capacity after settling down, they are also obliged to help the latest newcomers. This tradition is one of the purposes of Southeast Asian Chinese associations, which has a history of hundreds of years and continues to this day.

The successful Chinese businessman in Southeast Asia usually keep in touch with a certain association, and the members of the association are obliged to donate money

or assist in the work of the Chinese communities and local society. The position of the leader of the association usually depends on the amount of donations and the reputation of the individual in the Chinese community and local society. Thousands of Chinese associations throughout Southeast Asia received and helped the first batch of new immigrants to Southeast Asia after the reform and opening up. After the 1990s, although many new immigrants went to Southeast Asia did not come from traditional hometowns of overseas Chinese, such as Fujian and Guangdong. Rather, most of the new immigrants come from Yunnan, Hunan, Hubei and even northern China, such as Northeast China, Beijing and Shandong. However, because Southeast Asian Chinese and new immigrants share the same culture and language, which makes the communication easier.

New immigrants are also working hard to create and develop their own associations. In February 2000, the first relatively influential Chinese new immigrant community in Southeast Asia was called the Singapore Tianfu Association (STA). This new immigrant association was established in Singapore, its purpose is to promote the communication and mutual assistance between the new immigrants from Sichuan province. According to statistics and estimates when the Association was established, new immigrants from Sichuan have reached 3,000, and most of them have arrived in Singapore within the past 10 years (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 395). In May of the same year, the Hua Yuan Association (SHY) was also founded in Singapore. This organization is known as the largest Chinese new immigrant society, with 2300 members reportedly. The purpose of Huayuan Association is to welcome new immigrants from all provinces

in China regardless of their place of birth or blood relationship (Hua Yuan Association, 2019). In 1st of July, 2001, the Young Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand was established in Bangkok. The initiator is a very successful businessman as well as a newcomer. The main members of this association are also new immigrants who have settled in Thailand (Young Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, 2013). The purpose of the Thai Chinese Youth Chamber of Commerce is to help new immigrants adapt and integrate into Thai society. In February 2006, another Thai association based on overseas students was also established, called the Thai-Chinese Student Association (TCSA). Several major leaders of the Thai Chinese Association were also invited to serve as the honorary chairman of the association (Tang, 2006).

In this chapter, the increasing number of new immigrants and the number of associations in China reflects the growth of scale of new immigrants and the reality of settling in the local area. It also shows that the intentions that new immigrants are making a different voice from traditional Chinese associations, representing themselves in another formation, which made The community gradually felt the challenge from young immigrants.

5.3 The “pulling factors” of newcomers

In the previous chapter, I reported that the first batch of new Chinese immigrants settled in two countries in Southeast Asia: Philippines and Thailand. The reason why a large number of new immigrants went to Thailand is mainly because the relationship

between Thailand and China has improved earlier than other Southeast Asian countries. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Thailand, Thailand took the lead in relaxing the restrictions on the entry of Chinese mainlanders, and then also opened the entry of Chinese family visitors, business personnel, and tourists. From a historical point of view, Thailand is relatively tolerant and friendly to the Chinese, also the social relations between the local Chinese and Thais are relatively harmonious, which is different from the situation in Indonesia where a large-scale anti-China activities was happened.

A large number of people from Chaozhou and Shantou went to Thailand in the late 1980s. At the beginning of reform and opening up, the economy of Chaozhou and Shantou area were relatively backward, especially in rural areas, where the income of farmers was much lower than the income of Chinese in Thailand. Before Thailand opened up Chinese tourists to visit Thailand in 1998, many people from Chaozhou and Shantou had already traveled to Thailand in the name of being invited to visit relatives with the help of relatives and friends who settled in Thailand. After the Thai government opened up Chinese tourist visas, immigration to Thailand quickly became an industry in the Chaozhou and Shantou area, and the main operator was a local travel agency (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 397). As the Thai government strictly regulates the issuance of residence visas, the possibility of officially applying for a residence visa and immigrating to Thailand is extremely small. Therefore, most immigrants from Chaozhou and Shantou entered Thailand in the name of traveling and visiting relatives, and will not return to China until the visa expires. Due to the Chinese society that more

than millions of Chinese living in Thailand, it is easier for new immigrants to settle down. Moreover, newcomers often get help from the local ethnic Chinese including relatives and friends, so it is not difficult to earn a living locally and obtain permanent residency in Thailand.

The Thai police disclosed in 1994 the way that how new Chinese immigrants obtained settled status: among illegal immigrants in Thailand, the Chinese are at the forefront. They bribed the police to illegally buy fake citizenship certificates at a price of between 2,000 and 4,000 US dollars each; Some Chinese have obtained legal status by marrying Thai women or making false investments. There are more than 100,000 illegal immigrants in China. Most of the new immigrants from Chaozhou and Shantou believe that Thai society and the police are more tolerant of Chinese immigrants. If new immigrants are found to have no formal residency status, they usually resolve the problem through mediation by the leaders of the Chinese association or tipping the police. According to a field survey conducted by Zhuang and Liu (2009) in Bangkok in the summer of 1995, the leaders of the Chaozhou and Shantou Chinese associations estimated that the number of new immigrants at that time might be close to 200,000 (p. 397).

There is another reason why Thailand has become a major concentration of new immigrants. Thailand has become a transit point for new immigrants from all over the provinces of China, especially for those who eager to go to developed countries. At the same time, the technology of fabricating the fake passport in Thailand is astonishing,

Thailand has become the world's fake passport production center. Domestic and international human trafficking organizations guided smugglers to cross the China-Myanmar border or the China-Laos border before sneaking into Thailand, waiting for the opportunity to travel to developed countries. It is said that there are international human traffic groups in Thailand that has set up special hotels for new immigrants to the United States. The number of newcomers waiting to go to the United States in each hotel ranges from 10 to more than 100 people (Zhuang & Liu, 2009, p. 397). In 1994, a large number of human trafficking had previously caught the attention of Thai immigration officials. Officials in Thailand fear that their nation is being used as a major regional transit center, as shown by approximately 100,000 Chinese hiding out there at any one time (Smith, 1994). In the late 1990s, Thailand opened up entry to Chinese tourists which provided a opportunities for those who have long been waiting to travel to developed countries in the past to transfer to Thailand. Many people went to Thailand as tourists and then hid under the arrangement of human traffickers and waited for the opportunity to enter developed countries. Because entering as a tourist requires a deposit and other guarantees, although entry along the land route is more difficult and the environment is harsher, but the cost is very low.

Whether it is Chaozhou and Shantou people immigrating to Thailand, or Chinese people from other provinces using Thailand as a transit point to Western countries, such activities continue to this day. As the economic development level of China's coastal areas has been improved in recent years, and the income level of people has increased

significantly compared with before, the hot trend of immigrating to Thailand has cooled down.

5.4 The newcomers in Thailand

In recent years, although there are still new immigrants who go to Thailand, but the number is far low than the previous number. Since 2000, the bilateral trade between China and Thailand has grown rapidly, and a large amount of Chinese goods have poured into certain areas, followed by large waves of Chinese businessmen. Driven by the Chinese government's policy of encouraging foreign investment, Thailand has become one of the hot spots for Chinese entrepreneurs to invest abroad. Due to the good relationship between China and Thailand, it is very easy to apply for a tourist visa, so the northern part of Thailand has also become one of the distribution centers for new Chinese immigrants. Whether it is in Bangkok in central Thailand, or in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, almost all of them are flooded with tourists from China. In 2017, a total of 9,805,753 Chinese visited Thailand with the average expenditure estimated at 52,882 Baht per person per trip, or a total revenue of 520 billion Baht. From January to October 2018, the number of Chinese arrivals to Thailand totaled 9 million generating revenue of 495 billion Baht⁷ (TAT Newsroom, 2018).

⁷ However, there has no information on how long they had been staying in Thailand or what kind of business they were doing. Thus, to complete the classification new Chinese immigrants, especially for a very particular place like Phitsanulok, which has a different historical background and situation than a typical city like Bangkok, various forms of qualitative research and interviews from locals needed to be done.

Table 5.4-1: Arrival and Immigration Act Offenses of Chinese People

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Arrivals	1,147,338	1,753,793	2,842,243	4,685,216	4,720,738
Tourist visa	1,068,282	1,666,347	2,709,885	4,349,517	4,469,762
Non-imm	62,121	68,296	76,134	58,211	64,956
Others	16,935	18,791	56,224	277,488	186,020
Departure	1,067,977	1,767,497	2,846,793	4,733,544	4,703,395
Immigration Act Offense	4,222	5,528	6,500	8,393	7,656

Source: Based on Lertpusit (2018)

There are specific figures about new immigrants from Table 5.4-1. This table has been classified according to different visa types. But these are only the records of the tourism department and cannot represent all newcomers, because we cannot call them new immigrants who come to Thailand for a vacation trip. Moreover, Thailand's entry and exit bureau records are not perfect. For example, in the entry and exit bureau of Phitsanulok province, I could not find any records of Chinese immigration specifically. Phitsanulok Province's annual statistical report did not record any data about new Chinese immigrants. The most important thing is that among the new immigrants entering Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries, a large part of them did not come here through legitimate immigration procedures, under the chaotic management of the immigration department, I really could not get the exact data. Although Thailand is one

of the countries with the highest concentration of new Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, due to the high mobility of new immigrants entering Thailand, relevant statistics are also lacking. The following table is based on the estimation of Zhuang & Liu (2009), the total number of new immigrants in Thailand is between 350,000 and 400,000, and the overall number of new immigrants in Southeast Asia is between 2.53 million and 3.83 million.

Table 5.4-2: Estimated number, distribution and occupational composition of Chinese new immigrants to Southeast Asia from 2007 to 2008

Country	Number of People(ten thousand)	Occupation	Remark
Myanmar	100-110	Vendors, management and technical personnel, laborers, farmers	A considerable proportion of migrants, a considerable proportion of undocumented immigrants
Thailand	35-40	Vendors, management and technical personnel, freelancers, company employees	A considerable proportion of migrants, a considerable proportion of undocumented immigrants

Singapore	35	International students and professionals, staff, businessmen and laborers	
Philippine	20	Vendors, staff	A considerable proportion of undocumented immigrants
Malaysia	10-15	Vendors, workers, students and retirees	A considerable proportion of migrants
Vietnam	10-15	Vendors, investors, management and technical staff	A certain proportion of migrant workers, a considerable proportion of Taiwanese businessmen and their relatives
Indonesia	10	Investment and management personnel, vendors,	A considerable proportion of Taiwanese

		technical personnel	businessmen and their relatives
Laos	13	Vendors, management and technical personnel, laborers, farmers	A considerable proportion of migrants
Cambodia	20-30	Vendors, management and technical personnel, labor	A considerable proportion of migrants
Total	253-283	Engaged in all professional fields except politics; Vendors are the most	A considerable proportion of migrants

Source: based on Zhuang and Liu (2009, p. 407)

This chapter shows the main gathering places of new immigrants are still in large and medium-sized cities such as Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Hat Yai. Among them, Bangkok has the most newcomers. Fujianese newcomers mainly live in southern Thailand.

5.5 The newcomers and the role of Chinese Association

Although the Chinese Association is a product of the age of old immigrants, but the time did not overwhelm this thing that are so important to the overseas Chinese. Chinese Associations are still preserved until the emergence of new immigrants and continued to be used by new immigrants. But the method of using is very different from before, and the function of the Association has also undergone essential changes with the arrival of new immigrants. Personally I think that if we want to study new immigrants, we must not miss their direct contact with the Association, and most importantly, the commercial ties created through the Association.

Skinner, one of the most famous scholars of Chinese in Thailand, defines the Association like this: These clubs, formally registered as “friendship societies,” provided opportunities for legalized gambling and were also places where leading Chinese merchants could congregate, read newspapers, listen to music, and discuss business and community problems (Skinner, 1957, p. 283). According to Skinner's explanation, this place sounds like a leisure club, just like what we see on a street in Chinatown: some old men gather to play chess, tease birds, and chat with the radio. But in fact, this is not the original appearance of Association. In the early 20th century, the notorious secret society became popular in the Chinese community. The secret society and the Association has been keeping close connection.

Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang (2014) reported a total of 7 types of Associations. The Associations connects overseas Chinese through geography, bloodline, folk religion, occupational division, charity, religion, culture and education (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 25). The definition given by Shi (2013) is almost the same, Shi also classified the Kungsi as a kind of Association, Kungsi is a mixture of secret society and business associations. Regardless of the classification, the three most important Associations for the Chinese are those based on geography, bloodline and folk religion. Overseas Chinese first associate with one another based on the their same geo-relationships, second the bloodline relations, and third the industrial relations (Wu, 1975, p. 2). Although Skinner's (1958) classification is different, it is roughly the same: speech group associations (Hainanese Association, Hakka Association, classified by dialects), school boards, medical, benevolence, religion, business Association, chamber of Commerce, political Association, and social clubs. The largest among them is the Association classified by dialects. Generally, Chinese leaders born in Thailand are more inclined to start from the position as school directors, but this is not the case for overseas Chinese who immigrated to Thailand after being born in China. Skinner also made statistics on the proportion of leaders of different dialect groups in the Association. The majority of leaders from all non-Chaozhou groups first held office in speech-group associations and affiliated schools: 90% of Cantonese leaders, 77% of Hakka leaders, 67% of Hainanese leaders, and 78% of all other non-Chaozhou leaders (Skinner, 1958, p. 117).

The oldest type of Association was organized by geographical tie, this type of Association helped overseas Chinese to find the fellows came from the same hometown,

same village, same city, even same province. This kind of Association was originally from the Han Dynasty. Senior officials from Beijing and central China bought a lot of real estate to solve “home-stay meals” issues (Shi, 2013, p. 17). There are other scholars who believe that the earliest geopolitical Association was established in Hangzhou during the Song Dynasty. The Association with the most complete function in history is the Lingnan Association, which was built in Suzhou during the Wanli period of the Ming Dynasty (Xu & Fang, 1995, p. 3).

The bloodline Association is based on the same family, the same surname, or the same clan. Industrial Association are built on the basis of the same profession or career, so as to find a good job for fellows from the same hometown. Industrial Association is usually closely related to Chamber of Commerce. Among them, the literary Association is the most interesting one, which provides a place for overseas Chinese with the same hobby to communicate and entertain jointly, where they can appreciate each other’s art, including handcraft, poetry, martial arts performances, music, lion dance, literary works. Literary Association are usually divided into cultural and alumni Associations (Shi, 2013, p. 80).

Folk religion and religious Associations are also a very large category among all types of Chinese Associations. In addition to the world’s three major religions: Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, there are many folk religions in China, especially in Guangdong and Fujian in the southern China. These folk religions are the fusion and branch of Taoism and Confucianism. Just like Hinduism, there are hundreds of gods in

China's folk religions that can be worshipped by believers. Chinese popular religion absorbs deities from many sources, including the “canonization” of historical persons, personification of natural phenomenon, figures in Buddhist and Daoist narratives, and so on (Hill, 2001, p. 301). In the early Chinese society, people from the same hometown liked to gather in the ancestral hall or mausoleum to hold meetings and discuss major decisions. Some ancestral halls are also the birthplaces of secret societies (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 25). Shi (2013) introduced nine different religious Associations, even if an immigrant are not from the same hometown, but he or she believes in the same religion, which means he or she can join. However, Zhuang and Chen (2014) believes that folk religious Association are actually just a branch of geographical Association, because if the factor of the same geography is excluded, the same folk religion will not be existed. Therefore, the folk religious Association were actually created after the geopolitical Association (Zhuang & Chen, 2014, p. 25).

Among them, several folk religious Associations are the largest and the most influential in the world. Xian Tian Dao (Chinese: 先天道) started in Malaysia in 1860; San Yi Jiao (Chinese: 三一教) is a very complicated folk religion, which combined the factors from Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, but it is the closest to Taoism. During the Ming Dynasty, in the 19th century, it was introduced into Malaysia from mainland China; Zhen Kong Jiao (Chinese: 真空教) advocated that to return to the basics. It is different from Taoism that there is no gods to worship, and there are no rules and exquisiteness of Fengshui or geomancy. At the same time, it is different from Buddhism that its teaching does not require killing cattle or sacrifice anything to please

gods for blessing. Because Zhen Kong Jiao's teaching was spread to Malaysia during the Opium War, religious leaders called on these Chinese to drink more tea, give up alcohol and opium, do more meditation, and pray more to obtain God's blessing. Ci Jiao (Chinese: 慈教) is one of the most popular folk religions in the Chinese society in Southeast Asia. However, many scholars criticized Ci Jiao for being too superficial, because of the Sun Wukong, who became the fighting warrior at the end of Journey to the West, turned out to be the most important god in Ci Jiao. De Jiao (Chinese: 德教) is also one of the most popular folk religions in the Chinese community in Southeast Asia. Guan Yu, a historical figure in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, is the most important deity in De Jiao. Guan Yu led five prophets of other religions: Shakyamuni, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Laozi, and Confucius. According to the teaching of De Jiao, the five prophets should be worshiped together because they were all born in the same place. Another purpose of De Jiao is to discourage believers from participating in politics. Yi Guan Dao (Chinese: 一贯道) was carried forward by Taiwanese immigrants in the 1970s, and later became the most popular folk religion among Chinese society in Malaysia. There are also Fo Guang Shan (Chinese: 佛光山) and Ci Ji Gong De Hui (Chinese: 慈济功德会). These two folk religions evolved from Buddhism. They advocated more charitable activities, actively participated in local and international disaster relief activities, advocated more donations, and provided basic medical care and education; At the same time they oppose drug addiction, pornography, robbery, violence, gambling, crime and intemperance.

There are also two Japanese folk religions, but they are also popular among the Chinese societies in Southeast Asia, and they have become an important part of the religions among the overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese. The first is the Nichiren (Chinese: 日蓮宗), and the second is the Soka Gakkai (Chinese: 创价学会). The Nichiren was introduced to Malaysia from Hong Kong and Thailand in 1964 (Shi, 2013, p. 110). In 1972, the Soka Gakkai in Singapore was officially registered as a folk religion Association.

According to my field research in Phitsanulok, the Hakka people are a unique group in terms of Chinese Association's culture. The reason why Hakka people are called unique is that they do not believe in any traditional Chinese folk religions, but Catholicism in Christianity. According to my field research, the Hakka Association in Phitsanulok was also built near the St. Nicholas Church, this means that Catholicism plays a very important role in the Hakka community. According to my later studies on the Hakka people, I found that the reason why they did not believe in any traditional Chinese folk religion but converted to Christianity has allusions and origins. The Hakka originated from Henan Province in the north of China, they set off from Henan Province all the way to the south and settled in Guangdong Province. They have always been regarded as "foreigners" or "national minority" by the majority Han in Guangdong. Hakka in Chinese refers to "guest people", this name is also enough to prove that they have been treated as foreigners by the Han people. Because the ethnicity of Han is the largest ethnic group in China, the Hakka people are often scorned in Guangdong province. The Hakka people's long-term dissatisfaction with the Han people finally broke

out during the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement. Especially after the Taiping Rebellion, the resulting unwillingness of the Hakka to accommodate commonly-accepted Chinese religious practices led to their being labeled foreign and non-Chinese (Johnson, 1995). The Hakka people believe that only Christianity can represent their unique identity and ethnic history.

There is also a very unique group, the Hainanese. Hainanese have their own gods and temples built for worshipping gods. The name of their most respected god is Shuiwei Shengniang (Thai: ุ้ย้วยเนี้ย; Chinese: 水尾圣娘). Shuiwei Shengniang has been the most important god of Hainanese since ancient times. Because Hainanese have lived on fisheries since ancient times, fishing at sea is their daily work. Shuiwei Shengniang is regarded by Hainanese as the patron saint, amulet or talisman in the storm, and can bless them to return safely from the sea. The oldest Chinese temples in Paknampho, and everywhere north and east of that communication center, are dedicated to Shuiwei Niang (the same as Shuiwei Shengniang), the Hainanese deity par excellence (Skinner, 1957, p. 91). In addition, Hainanese also worship 5 other gods: Guan Yu (As I mentioned before, the gods who lead the five prophets in De Jiao), Star God-Deity (Chinese: 太岁爷 Thai: ไท้ต๋วยเอี้ย), and Li Ye (Chinese: 李爷; Thai: ไล้ยา), Pun Thao Kung (Chinese: 本头公; Thai: ปูนเต้าก้ง) and Xuan Wu (Chinese: 玄武 Thai: เข้าพ้อเสื่อ). Among these 5 gods, the Pun Thao Kung is the most popular and the most widely known one in Thailand. The original name of Pun Thao Kung is also called San Bao Gong, and his prototype is Zheng He. Zheng He was deified in Siam perhaps as really as the 17th century, and his name is more often written as “Three Treasures” than as “Three Protections” (Skinner, 1957, p. 129)

Like Hainanese, Fujianese also have their own gods. As most Fujianese are either merchants or sailors, most Hokkien (same as Fujianese) temples in Thailand are dedicated to T'ien-hou Sheng-mu (Chinese: 天后圣母; Thai: แม่จ้อไฉ่), the Holy Mother and Empress of Heaven, who is the patron deity of sailors (Skinner, 1957, p. 91).

These folk religions and its Associations have also experienced suppression from the local government in colonial period. For example, in the Philippines during the Spanish colonization and Indonesia during the Dutch colonization, many Chinese folk religious Association were demolished, and everything related to religion was destroyed, because the Spanish government requires the subjects of the colonies must be Christian. During the early colonial period in Batavia, which is now Jakarta, the Chinese folk religion and Islam were also suppressed by the Dutch colonial government. This was a serious blow to the Chinese community at that time, because early immigrants were unable to find their fellow and villagers through the Associations and could not get any help. At the same time, they lost their faith. The only possible way to find fellow from same hometown and get help was to join a secret society. (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 27).

The secret society is the most mysterious, dramatic and violent Chinese Association among all the Chinese societies in Southeast Asia. The secret club is also known as “the triad” (Chinese: 三合会). All secret societies in Southeast Asia originated from the Tiandihui (Chinese: 天地会). Anyone who wants to join must perform blood-swearing ritual, which is a special method of being allied (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 28). The secret society started at the end of Ming Dynasty and the beginning

of Qing Dynasty. They advocated the anti-Qing resurrection and initiated many resisting activities to overthrow the ruling of Qing Dynasty. From many Hong Kong martial art movies, we can see some tracks of secret society. The secret society puts the safety of property of the organization first, and must maintain absolute loyalty to the organization. The early secret society of overseas Chinese was usually full of blood and violence, which made Chinatowns became the bloody place. The hierarchical classification of secret societies is very clear. They were organized on the vertical principle of complementary membership from the “elder brother” at the top to the “coolie” and professional criminal at the bottom (Skinner, 1957, p. 137).

The prosperity of the secret society lasted until the middle of the 19th century. After years of disputes and divisions, the scale of secret society has begun to shrink, and the local government has also begun to implement plans to ban Chinese secret societies. The disputes among different secret societies mainly come from the recruitment of labor forces, cost of employment, and the disputes for commercial territories (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 31). In Bangkok in 1889, there was a very fierce fight between two Chinese secret societies, the reason was due to the competition for the employment rights of the coolies of the three largest rice mills in Bangkok. This incident marked one of the turning events for the Thai government started to legalize the Chinese Associations. In the Straits Settlements in 1890, the local British government filed "Dangerous Society Suppression Decree" to dismantle the secret Chinese society. The local government banned many secret societies and destroyed most of their documents, rosters, troupes, and mortuary tablets. Since then, the establishment of a Association

requires formal and legal registration before it can be established (Shimizu, Pan & Zhuang, 2014, p. 32).

Maybe the conflicts between Chinese Associations were not accidental, Skinner made his explanation and analysis for these conflicts. Membership was almost exclusively based on speech-group lines (dialects), and in several cases rival societies from the same speech group fought for supremacy (Skinner, 1957, p. 139). Skinner believed that there are two very important factors that have caused the turmoil in Chinese societies, and even conflicts between members from the same Association. The first reason is the social structure of the Chinese community from a cultural perspective. There is a Chinese proverb says that a soldier who does not want to be a general is not a good soldier. This sentence is deeply imprinted in the heart of every Chinese, so it becomes the goal of inspiring everyone. As a result, the entire society has become very competitive, even overseas Chinese societies are no exception. Just as what Skinner said: Horizontal class solidarity is largely absent from Chinese society because almost everyone was striving to achieve a higher status (Skinner, 1957, p. 136). The second reason is the psychological contradiction between the new immigrants and the old immigrants. The new immigrants in this sentence refer not to the immigrants who came overseas after China's reform and opening up, but the immigrants who had just arrived overseas in the early colonial period. It has been observed in many heterogenous societies that individuals forming a new group identification overcompensate for their background by stressing the values and prejudices of the new group most sharply distinguished from those of the old (Skinner, 1957, p. 227). Precisely because of their origin, a display of complete identification is advantageous (Skinner, 1957, p. 226). Skinner gave some

examples of minorities in other countries especially in Europe to prove his statement, for example, during the period of Nazi Germany, many high-ranking German officials were Jewish descent. They were more hostile to Jews and had stronger anti-Semitic attitude than ordinary high-ranking German officials. Not only that, from a religious point of view, Jews who have just converted to Catholicism have a higher tolerance for the Jewish community than Jews who have believed in Catholicism since long time ago. Thus, let us return to the example of Chinese in Thailand. During the Second World War, high-ranking Chinese officials in the Thai government often adopted very anti-China policies. Once first-generation immigrants broke through their original identification of seeing other ethnicities as “uncivilized,” it was more reasonable for them to later reverse the stereotyped impressions of the people they had previously despised (Zhao, 2021). Especially for the Chinese elites in Thailand, they often only have a little awareness of Chinese culture or Confucian knowledge. If they want to continue to climb up in the political circles of Thailand, they must get rid of the identity of the Chinese, and at the same time. Strengthen their Thai identity.

During the transition from old immigrants to new immigrants, the function of the Association has also undergone the fundamental change. At first, the Association was a regional symbol with folk religious meaning. With the arrival of new immigrants, it became a transit point of politics and business. The original function of the Association is to help fellow villagers to establish local kinship relationships, so that they can find relatives and friends from the same hometown in order to build more communications, religious ceremonies, entertainment activities, and commerce.

After China implemented the reform and opening policy, a large number of new immigrants came to Thailand after 1978. With the arrival of more and more new immigrants and new capital, these new things have changed many local things. As the number of population of old immigrants decreases year by year, the original function of the Association is gradually degraded, and more and more new immigrants are involved in the management and renewal of the Association. Thus, the Association is no longer a place with religious characteristics and connects the friendship between fellow villagers. It has gradually become a place with more and more political color. Its new functions are often linked with Confucius Institutes to promote China's soft power in overseas. An interviewee who worked in the Overseas Chinese Association in Phitsanulok once told me that every Chinese Association here (including the Overseas Chinese Association, Hakka Association, Hainan Association, etc, Associations created based on various dialects) maintains very close ties with the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Chiang Mai. Once the Overseas Chinese Association has anything that needs to help in terms of national affairs, the Chiang Mai Embassy is the first contact party that they will consider to connect.

The Chinese Associations have not only maintained close ties with the Chiang Mai Embassy for a long time, but also has the same pace with the Chiang Mai Embassy in terms of political issues. To give an example, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential re-election in Taiwan in 2004. For mainland China, Chen Shui-bian's winning of re-election was a dangerous signal that Taiwan is moving towards independence. On March 14, 2005, the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law by a

unanimous vote. Then on March 19 of the same year, a total of 27 Chinese Associations in Phitsanulok also jointly issued a statement supporting the passage of the anti-secession law. All Associations believe that the introduction of the anti-secession law is very timely and very necessary, and it has stopped "dangerous Taiwan independence" and other separatist activities in a timely manner (Newssina, 2005). 27 Associations including the most influential ones: Overseas Chinese Associations, Seventh Overseas Chinese Federations of Phitsanulok, the Thai-Chinese Development Cooperation Association of Phitsanulok, and the Hainan Association of Northern Thailand. China proposed the One Belt One Road policy in 2013, and the Overseas Chinese Association of Phitsanulok also responded with support and gratitude. According to an interviewee who used to work at the Overseas Chinese Association, the Zhejiang delegation of the One Belt One Road had visited the Overseas Chinese Association of Phitsanulok for two meetings. Although many initiatives and plans were published on the conferences, but there was no further movement, also clear instructions and specific investment goals have not been heard in the past five years.⁸

It is certainly not difficult to speculate why the pace of so many overseas Chinese Associations and embassy are in keeping with each other. Opposing Taiwan independence and supporting the Belt and Road Initiative are the most important domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese government today, a public statement of support for these two policies is the best and appreciated way to maintain the best relationship with mainland China. At the same time, the support of the public statement has won more

⁸ The interview was conducted on October 20th, 2019.

opportunities for Phitsanulok to receive investment from the mainland China. Phitsanulok is the economic crossroad connecting many countries in the Indochina region with China, and China is the closest country that exporting capital and manpower to Thailand. Phitsanulok will of course inevitably make every effort to welcome the investment brought by the Belt and Road Initiative as well as the investment opportunities from any other country. Associations have also played a significant role in bridging business networks among ethnic Chinese business people in Thailand, as well as in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the world (Siphat, 2019, p. 126).

The purpose of establishing the Association is to cultivate “*guanxi*” with the fellows from same hometown, which in Chinese means network for or connection. “*Guanxi*” is a ubiquitous factor in the Chinese-speaking society, whether it is the overseas Chinese community or in China. As the network is established, the Chinese will gradually establish their own business empire, called family business. Many successful overseas Chinese or ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs first find *guanxi* through the Associations, and then establish a family business through the *guanxi*, so there is an inseparable connection between the Association and the family business. Redding (1995) listed ten features that most of the Chinese family business has: The first feature is the relatively small scale of the family business and the relatively simple organizational structure. The second feature is that the family business only focuses on the sale of one kind of product, and only sells it in the same market. The third characteristic is that policy decisions are very concentrated, and there is often only one very important policy decision maker and executor. The fourth point is family control and ownership. The fifth

feature is the paternalistic organization climate. The sixth characteristic is that family business relies heavily on the relationship between individuals, especially the relationship with purchasers, customers, and sponsors. The seventh characteristic is that it has a very strong cost awareness and pays great attention to financial efficiency. The eighth characteristic is that family business has weak sense of business expansion, only few company seriously build their own business brands. As a result, the business scope is usually only concentrated in the local area and rarely expanded to international level. The ninth characteristic is that family business is often trapped by growth restrictions and organizational complexity as well as the employment environment of professional managers. However, this point does not apply to all family businesses, and there are many exceptions. The last feature is that it has a high degree of applicability for decision-making, because the decision-maker occupies the dominant position of the entire enterprise (Redding, 1995, p. 64).

Trustworthiness and creditworthiness in the Chinese community have been effective in reducing transaction costs, and have performed a similar role to price signals in the market in adjusting demand and supply (Ueda, 2001, p. 167). Viewing from the characteristics of the above family businesses, I think the most important feature is that almost all of the company's decision-making power is in the hands of one executive, and almost every Chinese family business has a paternalistic organization climate. Moreover, the relationship between the company and the company is very dependent on the emotional relationship between individuals. For example, if a company's manager and sponsor have had a dinner together, the experience of this dinner time is very

likely to help the company obtain investment. Compared with those company's managers who have not had dinner with sponsors, the possibility of obtaining investment is mostly impossible. If the relationship between the company's manager and the sponsor is better than as being friend, rather the blood relationship or as old acquaintance who has known each other for many years, the probability of obtaining investment is almost for sure, and the remaining competitors would hardly be sponsored no matter how good their rhetoric are, they would not be included within the range of consideration. Moreover, the internal hierarchy of the company is also very clear, which can be said to be completely paternalistic. This is also the inheritance of the rules and traditions that have been kept from the Chinese Associations and secret societies since the 19th century. Everyone, from the eldest brothers down to the tenth-degree recruits, were all sworn to blood brotherhood and secrecy (Skinner, 1957, p. 138). Whether is inside of a family business, a Association or a secret society, the paternalistic environment gives leaders the absolute right to speak and rule. The authority of the leaders of the family business and the elders of the Associations allows them to often play the role of mediators in the disputes among staff or other family members. In other words, the functions and powers of leadership are almost omnipotent. Even the personal affairs between employees are sometimes reconciled or resolved by the head of the Association and the head of the family business. In the process of reconciliation, the leader strengthened his position and drew closer the relationship with his subordinates, and his subordinates also regarded the leader as a closer, more trustworthy, and reliable person. And usually there is a blood relationship between the highest-ranking subordinates and the leaders. In the process of constantly solving problems, the relationship will continue to deepen and

they will trust each other more. Their business always start with little capital and are run by either the husband, wife, a father-and-son team, siblings-turned-partner, or relatives working for relatives (Siphat, 2019, p. 130). Therefore, whether it is a Chinese Association or a Chinese family business, everything revolves around “relationships”, which is *guanxi*. It is the “relationship” that created the establishment of every Association, it was also the “relationship” that allowed the Chinese to find people of the same clan and hometown in the foreign land, it was also the “relationship” that gave the Chinese enough capital to build their own brand and business, thereby create the family business. At the same time, because of the internal operation of the “relationship” inside of the family business that allows it to grow and expand its capital. Without these, nothing can happen in China (Siphat, 2019, p. 63).

Of course, with the expansion of capital and family business and with the rapid progress of globalization, the relationship will also develop from the level of individual to individual to the level of country and country. The first official foreign investor to come in through China’s open door was a Thai-Chinese agribusiness company, the Charoen Pokphand (CP) Group, which received Foreign Investment Certificate N9: 0001 in the Shantou and Shenzhen Special Economic Zones (Sng & Bisalputra, 2005, p. 405). The founder of CP Group is a descendant of Chaozhou immigrants, his name is Dhanin Chearavanont. By the mid-1990s, the overall turnover for the CP Group was estimated at US\$7 billion and growing at 10-15% annually (Handley, 2006, p. 113). Since the successful investment under China's reform and opening up policy, CP group has gradually shifted the focus of business from Thailand to China, and the scope of

business has become wider and wider, including automobile and motorcycle manufacturing, real estate, retail, entertainment industry and the refining industry. In the early 1990s, CP group also sponsored a TV show in China. The expansion of the business field and the scope of business has pushed CP group to an unprecedented height, which makes it more and more like a double-sided political and business broker between Bangkok and Beijing. Gradually, some behaviors of the CB group have received attention. Consequently, the CP Group's endless foundation of capital and its significant influence on the Thai economy generated suspicion that it was a front organization of the PRC government (Handley, 2006, p. 113)

CP Group is also actively participating in the construction of the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand. The Eastern Economic Corridor is a very core and important link in the "Thailand 4.0" national strategy. The goal of this national policy is to make Thailand leap from the list of developing countries to the ranks of developed countries by 2030. At the same time, China also regards CP group as one of the most important partners in the Belt and Road Initiative (Yoshino, 2020, p. 149). CP group proposes to establish an industrial park in Rayong Province to open a smoother path for Chinese companies to come to Thailand, which can also cooperate with the data center established by Huawei in Chonburi. Although CP group can make profits in huge multinational business *guanxi*, however, its huge ambitions and possible other purposes have also been questioned. The old specter of the divided loyalties of overseas Chinese again reared its head, and the primary loyalties of the Chinese began to be questioned by their host government (Sng & Bisalputra, 2005, p. 414).

Another family business empire built by *guanxi* is the Thai Beverage PLC, the founder is Chaoroen Sirivadhanabhakdi. The Chinese name of founder is Sou Hiog-meng, the story of his fortune and wealth is a model of typical overseas Chinese dream. He dropped out of school in the fourth grade of elementary school and started doing business. With the help of “relationship”, Charoen's father sought the first job for Charoen of his life from a relative, he became an apprentice in a brewing company named by Sura-Mahakhun. Under his business operations, Chaoroen successfully obtained most of the company's shareholder rights and merged the two originally opposed companies. After 2000, the Thai government liberalized the companies, and Chaoroen made a lot of profits from it. Later on he founded the Thai Beverage Company in 2003 and was listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2006. Chaoroen is a typical successful example of Chinese businessmen, it can be said that all successful models in the chronicle of Chinese businessmen have the same characteristics as Chaoroen: Charismatic, humble, and always being supportive for his family and wife. Chaoroen has his own partners and friends in the military, business and political circles, he has also established his own *guanxi* in the process of being succeeded. Chaoroen used his own *guanxi* to remove many obstacles in business for his wife's father. The father of Chaoroen's wife named by Jiu Rungsen, is Charoen's solid financial backing while he was fighting in the commercial battlefield, and also taught him Chinese culture. The Most importantly, Charoen later regarded Chinese culture as the most important core value in his life. The wisdom that Jiu imparted to Chaoroen was embodied in four traditional Chinese attributes: ren, or patience and endurance; rang, knowing how to bend; jing, being calm; and le, being content and enjoying life (Sng & Bisalputra, 2005, p. 412)

Just like the examples of the CP group and Charoen, there are many successful Chinese businessmen like them in the history of Thailand. Even now on, the Chinese is still a very important ethnic group in Thailand, with a large population and a huge economic contribution. The Chinese account for nearly 14% of the total population of Thailand, and there are nearly 9 million Chinese living in Thailand. In Thailand's history, the Chinese have made great contributions to Thailand both economically and politically. All of the top-ten richest Thais on the 2014 Forbes 500 list were families of Chinese descent, namely Chirathivat (Hainan), Chearavanont (Chaozhou), Sirivadhanabhakdi (Chaozhou), Yoovidhya (Hainan), Ratanarak (Chaozhou), Chaiyawan (Chaozhou), Bhirombhakdi (Fujian), Prasartong-Osoth (Chaozhou), and Shinawatra (Hakka) (Sng & Bisalputra, 2005, p. 409). This is also what many scholars call “immigrant values” (Pongsapich, 2001, p. 101).

Guanxi is the most important social factor in Chinese families and Chinese society, the reason why the Chinese Association exist is to maybe pave for the relationship that has been created upon the *guanxi*. Holding high positions in local business association also helps members to become acquainted with those in positions of responsibility not only in Thailand but overseas (Ueda, 2001, p. 174). However, as I mentioned in the previous article, after the Associations transitioned from the old Chinese to the new immigrants, the function of it has also undergone a fundamental change. This change has expanded from the local level to the international level, from a mere commercial point of view to having a certain relationship and influence with politics. But one thing has not been changed is that the *guanxi* is a constant factor, no matter how the function

and role of the Association and the administrator in charge of it have changed, the Association is still an organization that for opening up and connecting the *guanxi*. Thus, it is very interesting to observe how new immigrants use the Association to expand their capital power.

I also mentioned the definition of new immigrants in the previous chapter. New immigrants or newcomers refer to Chinese people who went abroad to work or settled there after the implementation of China's reform and opening up policy in 1978. On the other hand, old immigrants or old-timers refer to those who left China before 1949 to work or settle in other countries (Yoshino, 2020, p. 147). In addition, Irish Chang mentioned a conjecture about why the first batch of new immigrants went abroad to make a living. Chang modulated the timeline of defining new immigrants from 1978 onwards to 1960, and took the Great Leap Forward Movement in 1958 as a very important turning point for the emergence of new immigrants. The Great Leap Forward Movement is a very extreme communist movement. The focus of the Great Leap Forward Movement is to increase the national total industrial production and force the people to carry out socialist transformation. At that time, in order to increase the total output of steel, many farmers lost their land and property, including steel bowls and pots, which were used for steelmaking. Not long after the movement, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party stopped the movement because it caused too many famines and caused millions of deaths. Later, in order to relieve the population pressure caused by the famine, some high-ranking officials suddenly allowed thousands of Chinese people to go overseas to earn a living. (Chang, 2003, p. 351).

Back to the focus of this chapter, that is, the Chinese Association and *guanxi* in the hands of newcomers. Let's look at an example of a new immigrant living in Cambodia. Similar to the situation in Thailand, the Chinese community in Cambodia is very large. Generally, Chinese-Cambodian often have close relationship with senior officials of the Cambodian government or Royal family. Cambodia is a relatively poor developing country, especially in the capital Phnom Penh, where the gap between rich and poor is very large. In the previous chapter, we also mentioned the new immigrants located on the Diamond Island in Phnom Penh. Lots of the newcomers have huge assets and transnational companies, but meanwhile, many local Cambodians are so poor that some of them even live in the sewers because of their houses were confiscated by the government and real estate companies for development reasons. Cambodia is very dependent on foreign investment, and foreign investors can own 100% of the shares here. Under such circumstances, the transnationality and diplomatic feature of the Chinese have become their advantages. They can act as intermediaries between the two countries and attract foreign investment to Cambodia for investment. Acting as an international contact and connecting organization has become a new function of the Association. Take an example of the Chinese Association. The Lim Association is led by a business tycoon, Okhna Lim, who organized the 10th anniversary of the Lim Association of Cambodia and 13th Regional Lim Association Convention at the Diamond Island Convention Center, Phnom Penh, in November 2010 (Siphath, 2019, p. 126). At present, the wife of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Bun Rany Hun Sen, was invited as an honorary guest to attend the anniversary dining of the Lim Association. Also invited as honorary guests were 52 members from more than 12 countries, more than 50 of them

The members are all from the Lim Association of different countries. Similarly, the Huang Association of Cambodia with Huang Association of the World gathered more than 1600 members from around the world at Diamond Island in Phnom Penh in 2012 (Siphat, 2019, p. 126).

Not only in Cambodia, but all over the world, the Chinese Associations in Malaysia have undergone functional changes after the arrival of new immigrants. With the rapid development of globalization and the continuous transfer of global capital, the Chinese Association is also playing a transnational role. In 2018, Malaysia attracted US\$15.9 billion of investment from China, including more than 17 infrastructure projects. Behind these investment and contract projects, the Chinese Association is actually acting as an intermediary. The Chinese ethnic group accounts for 23% of the total population in Malaysia, and Chinese language and Chinese culture can be seen everywhere in Malaysia. These are also important factors in attracting new immigrants and new capital from mainland China and the Chinese community in any other country in the world. In the business world of Chinese multinational capital, the positioning of the border has become less important. Here is another example of this transnational *guanxi*, reported by Ken and Zhang (2019), Chery Automobile Co. Ltd., is a company based in Wuhan province, which is a cooperation that mainly produces auto parts and auto assembly. In the beginning of 1997, Chery company was a state-owned enterprise (SOE) established by the Chinese government. Chery was the first company to produce and export cars after the Chinese government implemented the reform and opening up policy, and successfully entered the Malaysian market in 2005. After the ten ASEAN countries and

China established trade treaties and special tariff preferential policies, Geely established its own auto parts factory and assembly plant in Malaysia, and then began to export cars and auto parts to other ASEAN countries. Chery's journey to ASEAN began in 2008 with a joint venture with Alado Corporation Sendirian Berhad, a private firm owned by the prominent ethnic Malaysian-Chinese businessman, Tan Sri Cam Soh Thiam Hong (Ken & Zhang, 2019, p. 157). Cam Soh is a very successful businessman, he is the descendant of the third generation of Chinese immigrants who settled in Kuala Lumpur. His grandfather is from Anxi City, Fujian Province.

To undertake manufacturing and assembly, Chery-Alado Malaysia entered into a business deal with Oriental Assembler Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian vehicle manufacturer and assembler, owned and managed by another ethnic Chinese family (Loh) (Ken & Zhang, 2019, p. 158). Later, Chery-Alado started its rapid growth and began to establish business alliances with more Chinese companies and businessmen. At the same time, it also established business alliances and exchanges with Malay-based companies (Bumi) and companies related to the Malaysian government. The *guanxi* of Chery-Alado has gradually developed from local to international, especially between China and Malaysia. As the Malaysian government is realizing the importance of Chinese investment, it is not impossible for the political elite to directly enter dialogue and engage with Chinese SOEs by bypassing the ethnic Chinese business community (Ken & Zhang, 2019, p. 160).

From the above three examples in Thailand, Cambodia, and Malaysia, the reasonable use of the Associations and the construction of their own network are the rules of

the game that Chinese businessmen must abide by and establish. If there is no *guanxi* to pave the way for their business, they will achieve nothing, as well as the business would not expand to overseas.

Chapter 6

A Fieldwork Study of New Chinese Immigrants at Phitsanulok Province in Northeast Thailand

Chapter 6

A Fieldwork Study of New Chinese Immigrants at Phitsanulok Province in Northeast Thailand

6.1 Background and basic information of Phitsanulok Province


6.1.1 History and basic social information about Phitsanulok Province

The field investigation of this paper was conducted in Phitsanulok, and the total length of time was 3 months. During this period, many professional interviews, follow-up interviews and in-depth interviews were conducted. The geographical location of Phitsanulok is relatively special compared to Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Except for the locals in Thailand, few foreigners know this place. Even locals in Thailand, when I was asked why Phitsanulok was chosen as the location for fieldwork, they would be a little surprised and puzzled, because in the eyes of most people, there is not much value worth investigating here. But this is not the case, I will explain in the next paragraph why it is worth doing fieldwork here.

Before the 11th century, Phitsanulok was originally named Song Khwae, which was an outpost during the war between the Kingdom of Siam and other neighboring kingdoms. During the Singhanavati Kingdom period, Nakhon Thai was the capital of the Kingdom of Siam at that time, and Phitsanulok was near the capital of the kingdom.

After the Siam Dynasty entered the Sukhothai period, Phitsanulok was regarded as a very essential city and received a lot of development resources. Later, the Siam Dynasty entered the Ayutthaya period, and Phitsanulok finally became the capital of Siam. The most brave warrior in Thailand's history, King Naresuan the Great was born in Phitsanulok in 1555. We can find that many temples in Phitsanulok have enshrined the statue of King Naresuan the Great, and there is an endless stream of people who come to worship. The bridge on the Nan River is decorated with golden statues of gamecocks. This is to commemorate the King Naresuan the Great, because his favorite entertainment during his lifetime was cockfighting. The reason why King Naresuan the Great was admired by the Thais was that when the Siam Dynasty was about to be annexed by the Burmese army, he led his army to fight back and saved Siam. After that, the Siamese army not only repelled the Burmese invasion, but instead, began to expand its territory. During the reign of King Naresuan the Great, Siam's land area reached the largest period in history, and a large parts of it came from today's Myanmar and Cambodia. The story of King Naresuan the Great defending Siam has become a popular story. When this story is mentioned, almost everyone living in Phitsanulok expresses the proud look.

Figure 6.1.1-1: King Naresuan the Great



Source: photo taken by author

Phitsanulok Province is located in the central part of Thailand but to the northeast. It takes 3 hours to drive northeast from Phitsanulok to the border of Laos and Thailand. If go in the opposite direction, which is the west, takes for 5 hours to reach Thailand and Myanmar border. Phitsanulok shares borders with other 6 provinces: it borders Uttaradit and Sukhothai in the north, it borders Phetchabun and Loei in the east, and it borders Phichit and Kamphaeng in the south. The name of Phitsanulok has a certain religious meaning. Although the religion of Thailand as a whole is Buddhism, due to historical factors, Thailand itself has been deeply influenced by Hinduism. *Phitsanulok* (Thai:พิษณุโลก) refers to “Vishnu Heaven” in literate, Vishnu is a important god in Hinduism. *Phitsanu* indicates to god’s name in cogenetic way which is Vishnu, *Lok* (Thai:โลก) refers to world. The city center of Phitsanulok was built around the Nan River, which is a very important geographic landmark in Thailand's history. In the ancient Kingdom of Siam, Nan River was a natural resource to provide rich nutrients and water to the

soil beside the river that made Phitsanulok has been rich in agriculture since ancient times. Nan River is called a gift from God by the people of Phitsanulok. In modern Thailand, Phitsanulok is still a very important agricultural center, it has a nickname called "Thailand's Bread Basket." The rice produced from Phitsanulok has a delicate taste and has a long and thin shape. Like other agricultural products, it is one of Phitsanulok's specialties and has been exported to all parts of Thailand and even the world.

Phitsanulok province contains 9 districts (Amphoes, in Thai: อำเภอ): those are Mueang Phitsanulok, Nakhon Thai, Chat Trakan, Bang Rakam, Bang Krathum, Phrom Phiram, Wat Bot, Wang Thong, Noen Maprang; and 24 subdistrict municipalities (*thetsaban*, in Thai: เทศบาล), 76 subdistrict administration organizations (*ong kan borihan suan tambon*, in Thai: องค์การบริหารส่วนตำบล), 93 subdistricts (*tambon*, in Thai: ตำบล), and 1,048 villages (*muban*, in Thai: หมู่บ้าน).

Compared with Bangkok or Chiang Mai, the overall development of Phitsanulok is relatively backward, but it has maintained an astonishing diversity in the past. Because here is the intersection of the Indochina region, laborers and immigrants from neighboring countries are living here, including Cambodians, Laos, Burmese, Vietnamese and so on. At Naresuan University, I often meet international students from Myanmar and Cambodia. The group of Burmese students is around 20 to 30, and the group of Cambodians is around 10 people. Immigrants from the Philippines are a huge group, although the exact number is unknown, I have found groups of Filipino immigrants in many places. In Naresuan University, there are totally about 30 students from mainland

China, most of whom come from southern part of China, such as Hunan, Hubei, Guangxi, Yunnan and other provinces. Privately funded international students account for the majority, while publicly-sponsored students account for only about 1% of the total number. Students of different ethnicities and countries basically use English to make conversation, but there is a lot of Thai, Burmese, and even Cambodian words were added in the English conversation. When talking about entertaining topics, some Korean words and Japanese words will be mentioned. Korean pop culture, especially Korean drama and Korean pop music, has become the main topic among younger generations. Korean language classes, restaurants with Korean characters, and K-Pop dance classes can be seen in lots of places. Although Japanese animation is also well-known, but its influence among young people is far less than that of Korean culture. China's soft culture is mainly reflected in TV programs. Many local TV channels will broadcast some Chinese costume dramas or urban romance dramas during evening programs, the ratings are unknown.

Table 6.1.1-1: Statistic of Chinese Students in Naresuan University

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total in 6 years
Current	—	1	—	2	11	6	20
Graduated	9	3	2	—	—	—	14
Dropped out	2	—	—	2	1	—	5

Source: This information comes from the School Information Management Center of Naresuan University, Phitsanulok Province. Edited by author

Note: According to interviews and surveys conducted by author among Chinese international student groups, in 2019, the number of Chinese international students should be around 30, which is different from the official data from Naresuan University.

The number of statistical surveys of immigrants from various countries living in Phitsanulok is very limited, because this is an undeveloped land for academia. The only way to obtain information is through research conducted by Takahashi Katsuyuki (Japanese: 高橋勝幸) and provincial survey statistics published by the local government annually. Although the provincial statistical report are being officially published and have a certain degree of authority, but if to compare it with my own fieldworks, some omissions are obvious. For example, the number of mosques in Phitsanulok province should be two, but the result in provincial statistical report says that there is only one Islamic mosque. Moreover, we cannot find out the number of immigrants from China in the provincial statistical report, nor can we find out what kind of occupation they are engaged while they are living in Phitsanulok Province. The statistical data in Takahashi's report in 2013 was also obtained from a Japanese company, Yazaki (Japanese: 矢崎). But I don't know the specific method of obtaining it, so I can only update the known information by observing and continuously interviewing different interviewees to obtain more oral information. However, due to the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019, most of the international flights were terminated. Even I can

return to the field survey site, which is Phitsanulok Province, but I must be quarantined for at least half a month. Therefore, I could not be able to return to Thailand for further field surveys and to update my database until present. This is also the limitation and shortcoming of this paper.

Table 6.1.1-2: Population of Foreigners in Phitsanulok 1947 – 2010

	Burmese	Laos	Vietnamese	Japanese
1947	-	-	-	0
1980	-	513	-	-
1990	-	68	5	80
2000	35	53	15	30
2010	4,480	1,647	21	234

Source: based on Takahashi (2013), edited by author

Note: The group of new immigrants from China is the key research object of this article, but I did not list it in this table. I will separately list the Chinese-speaking population and the number of Chinese population in Phitsanulok in the following tables.

In Phitsanulok, up to 95% of the population are Buddhists. Based on Phitsanulok Provincial Statistical Report (2018), Phitsanulok has 318 Buddhist temples, 4704 monks; 31 Christian churches and a Muslim mosque. According to Mit, one of the leaders of the Pakistani mosque located in the center of Phitsanulok, there is also a mosque to the west of Phitsanulok, but for some reason it was not included in the official provincial data report. Therefore, Phitsanulok should have two mosques. Muslims

are the minority religious group, and their usual activities are mainly concentrated in a radius of about 2 kilometers centered from Pakistani mosques. There is a street to the west of the Pakistani mosque. There are halal restaurants along the street, and Muslim ladies in turbans can also be seen on the road. At the place where the largest university in Phitsanulok is called Naresuan University, the food square in the center of the school also has halal food trucks selling food.

Figure 6.1.1-2: Pakistan Mosque located in the west of the center of Phitsanulok Province




Source: photo taken by author

Due to historical reasons, many Muslims living in Phitsanulok are Pakistani Thais. From their looks, it is obvious that their ethnicity is not Thai, but they speak Thai fluently, and they put their palms together when saying hello, just like Thais who believe in Buddhism, while wearing black robe and turban. Although Muslim is a very small group in terms of numbers, but they live in harmony with Thais or the believers of other

religions. Most importantly, the Muslim group living in Phitsanulok has not being treated as a sensitive group like in many other countries. The local government also allows Muslims to learn Arabic and the Quran. The Pakistani mosque is not only a place for worship, but also an Arabic language school. After the service on Sundays, the second and third floors of the mosque will open courses for learning Arabic language and Arabic versions of the Quran. Courses are literally open to people of all ages, but the main group of students is basically elementary school students. The content of the course is basic Arabic spelling and how to recite the Quran in Arabic. The right half of each chapter of the textbook has Thai language for explanation and guidance.

Figure 6.1.1-3: Arabic textbooks used in Pakistan mosques in Phitsanulok Province



Source: photo taken by author

In the four provinces of southern Thailand, Pattani, Songkhla, Yala, and Narathiwat, also known as the deep south, Muslims are a very sensitive word and a group of people. In people's eyes, Muslims are often associated with terrorist attacks or terrorist organizations. In neighboring Myanmar, Rohingya who are Muslims are also discriminated against by most Buddhists and even driven out and expelled by force. Even in France, a developed country, the unfair treatment of Muslim groups has been obvious. Authorities in several French towns have implemented bans on the burkini, which covers the body and head, citing concerns about religious clothing in the wake of recent terrorist killings in the country (Quinn, 2016). In Christchurch, New Zealand, a developed country, people are still frightened by the terrorist attack in March 2019, and the purpose of that terrorist attack was precisely because of religious conflict. The shooting was New Zealand's worst terrorist attack and killed 51 people (BBC News, 2021). But the situation in Phitsanulok is very different. During my three months of observation, I found that the Buddhist group that composed of most local people and the Pakistani Muslim minority get along harmoniously. At least I didn't get any words of conflict with other religious groups or discrimination against Buddhists in the conversations with Muslims. According to the words of Pakistani mosque leader, Mit, said that the Muslims in Phitsanulok get along very friendly with local Buddhists and another minority group, Christians. More importantly, since the establishment of the mosque, there has never been any war or conflict with any other groups in terms of ethnicity and religion. The nearest Christian church is one street away from the Pakistani mosque, but the two religious groups get along very friendly. I personally feel that Phitsanulok is very similar to a reduced version of Jerusalem, not a large place but full of diversity.

In today's society where ethnic and religious issues are conflicting, it is amazing to have such a place where different religious groups and ethnic groups are able to live in harmony. I sometimes think about the reasons why Phitsanulok has such a high degree of national integration.

According to official statistics from Phitsanulok Province, there are 31 Christian churches in Phitsanulok. There are two patterns of Christian churches in Phitsanulok: one is a local church that uses Thai for missions, and the other is international church that uses English for missions. Local churches that use Thai for preaching are generally relatively large, with a very large number of believers, and the churches have a large construction area. Since the Pakistan Mosque is located in the most central area of Phitsanulok, so I will use the Pakistan Mosque as the starting point when I introduce the directions of any other places. The largest Thai-speaking Christian church is located in the north of the Pakistani mosque called Kristkunanugul Church. The church building is a dome-shaped structure, divided into two floors, and can accommodate a total of about 200 people. Phitsanulok Church is also located in the city center and is the closest Christian church to Pakistani mosques. The particularity of this church is that this church is specially set up for Chinese descent. Although Chinese languages (Mandarin and Cantonese) are not used for missionary work, the particularity of ethnicity of the church can be known from the faces of the believers. This information was also learned from the believers of the Thai-speaking church. There are many Chinese Christians in Thailand. From a historical point of view, although the process of Chinese integration into Thai society was very successful, but there are still more or less cultural

and customs differences between ethnic Chinese and Thais. Some Chinese cannot fully convert to Buddhism and integrate into the Buddhist culture, thus, Christianity become their best choice to find a home. Some new immigrant groups and their second-generation children achieve “structural assimilation” in their socioeconomic life but resist “cultural assimilation” in their private life — religion and the family (Yang, 1999, p. 26). Because Christianity in Thailand can represent the particularity of the ethnic Chinese, converting to Christianity can maintain the unique of the Chinese without being completely assimilated by the Buddhist culture. Whether it is a church preaching in Thai or a church preaching in English, there is a close connection between them. Although I don't know if funds will be shared between churches although the missions were conducted in different languages, but through one church can easily find another nearby church no matter is English-speaking or Thai-speaking church.

Figure 6.1.1-4: A Thai-speaking Christian church located around the center of Phitsanulok



Source: photo taken by author

Note: The facilities and sanitary conditions of Christian churches that use Thai for missions are generally much better than those of international churches conducted in English.

Many of the believers in the Thai-speaking churches are ethnic Chinese. The most surprising thing is that their education is relatively high. Many of them graduated with Ph.D. degree in Science and Engineering and Medicine Department from Naresuan University. One Chinese Christian believer, who was also one of my interviewees, Poon, graduated from the Education University of Hong Kong and she can speak fluent Cantonese. Her husband is a Chinese Buddhist. Poon takes his son to the church activities every Sunday. Poon named her son as David, and David is one of the very important characters in the Old Testament of the Bible. Obviously, David is not a Thai name, I asked Poon if a boy named David in Thailand would be considered a very strange thing by others. But according to Poon, people usually call her son David at school and any other places, and Poon said people would not be surprised if people call him for a long time. Both Poon and his son can speak fluent English, The mother and son are practicing oral English expression and memorizing new English words every day. Poon said that her first contact with English language came from the Bible. The old woman in the International Church who can speak fluent Chinese also revealed that she was enlightened by the Bible in learning English.

The only international church in Phitsanulok's city center that uses English for missions is called the Great Commission International Church. There should be other

international churches in Phitsanulok, but due to the limited time and funds for fieldwork, I cannot obtain more information in a short period of three months. During the three months of fieldwork, I didn't have any transportation tools such as cars or motorcycles. If there is one, I can go farther to do more survey. Until the end of my investigation, Phitsanulok has not opened any public transportation system such as subway or city bus. Compared with Thai-speaking churches, the scale of international churches is much smaller and the facilities are not very completed. From the outside, the church looks like nothing than a street shop. If it hadn't been a small cross stands in front of the door, no one would think that here is a church. The church's land should be leased, because the church and other shops are on the same street, and the other shops are leased. The more expensive facilities in the church include a computer with Windows 97 system, a projector, a microphone, an electronic piano, and an acoustic guitar. After every Sunday church activity is over, the bishop will announce the weekly funding source of the church and the amount of how much donations have been received, and report the church budget for the next week. The budget contains detailed information on the amount of food spent on food prepared for Sunday's church activities, the amount of electricity and water used by the church, and the amount of money spent on maintaining the public facilities of the church, such as the maintenance of drinking fountains and the maintenance of electric heaters.

On Sundays, the International Church will broadcast live missions on Facebook and also have its own Facebook homepage. 95% of all believers are Filipinos, and the remaining 5% are composed of Ghanaians, Germans, Americans, Indonesians, and

Chinese-Thais. All Filipinos are serving as English teachers in local elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and even universities. According to students from the Department of Social Sciences of Naresuan University, the reason why Filipinos are hired as English teachers instead of Europeans or Americans is that because the salary of Filipinos is relatively low. Although hiring Europeans and Americans can improve the quality of English teaching, but the cost will be 4 to 5 times higher than hiring Filipinos. In elementary and junior high schools where the difficulty of English is not that high, hiring Filipinos to teach English is actually the same as hiring Europeans and Americans to teach English. The bishop of international church is a Ghanaian. He is a doctoral student in the Faculty of Medicine at Naresuan University. In the first half of 2021, I learned from the information on Facebook that the bishop has transferred to Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok to continue his doctorate of medicine. The Germans were classmates and roommates of the bishop of the church at the time. The American is a person who came to Thailand after retiring and stayed here for the elderly. He married a local, but he never brought his Thai wife to the church. Indonesians used to work in Japan and lived near Takadanobaba while living in Japan. He can speak fluent Japanese and can also play piano and guitar. He is an indispensable music players in the church. The old Chinese Thai woman can speak fluent Mandarin and Fujian dialect. After hearing that the I am a Chinese came from mainland China, she took out the booklet she carried with her and gave it to me. The content in the booklet is about the Qing Dynasty Emperor Kangxi's conversion from an atheist to a Christian. It contains a portrait of Emperor Kangxi and his verses sung for Jesus Christ. The size of the

booklet is similar to a small notebook, with a small number of pages, and is written in both Thai and Chinese, and the publisher, author, and publication date are unwritten.

The diversity of Phitsanulok is not only the three major religions coexists together where believers can live in harmony, but there are also many temples of folk religions from China. In the previous chapter about the Chinese Association, I also introduced a lot of folk religions in Chinese society in Phitsanulok. On a hill at the outskirts of Phitsanulok, driving for about an hour will arrive at a mountain with Taoist temples. Many gods from Chinese folk religions are enshrined here, For example, Taibai Xingjun, Jade Emperor, Nezha, Bodhi Patriarch, Earth Lord, and of course also the Zheng He I mentioned earlier same as Pun Tao Kung, Guan Yu, Monkey King, Tota Li Tianwang, Li Jing, Big Dipper, God of Wealth, Queen Mother (Mazu), Guanyin Bodhisattva, Good Wealth Boy, Yaochi Golden Mother, and Prince of Thousands Years. Passersby who come to worship in here can enjoy a free lunch inside of the temple's dine hall. There are more than a dozen dishes for lunch, and the staple food is rice or noodles. People who have enjoyed the free lunch usually donate money later to the donation box in the temple, but they can also choose not to pay any money, completely based on their personal wishes.

At the entrance of the temple, it is not hard find the full name of the temple written in Chinese characters. The full name of the temple on the mountain is called *Xitian* Buddha Hall. *Xitian* refers to India, the birthplace of Sakyamuni, who is the founder of Buddhism, also the destination of Tang monks in the traditional Chinese fiction:

Journey to the West. From the Chinese characters in front of exit, I was able to assume that this Buddhist temple was built by Chinese fund-raising. Most of Chinese believe in the local gods of their hometown, for example, Mazu temples, which worshipped by Hainanese that people can only see it locally. To the temple. According to my own speculation, in order to better and smoothly integrate into the local Thai community that established on the basis of Buddhist culture, the Chinese are not only constantly raising funds for disaster relief activities after the natural disasters, helping the poor and distributing medicines, but also integrates the culture of Buddhism into Taoist culture. Although the temple enshrines the gods of Taoism, but the Chinese character of “Buddha” is written at the front door, indicating that the Chinese have integrated Thai Buddhism with the Taoism that they brought from their hometown. This would not only enable the Chinese community to maintain the traditions of Taoist culture, but also demonstrate an attitude of not rejecting Buddhism while actively accept and welcome Buddhism. From my personal point of view, the purpose of the establishment of this ancestral hall on the hill is that the Chinese community is conveying to the entire Thai society an attitude of welcoming and accepting national integration, meanwhile maintaining their own traditions.

Figure 6.1.1-5: Entrance sign of Xitian Buddhist Hall



Source: photo taken by author

Note: The entrance of the temple on the hill has the full name written in Chinese in front of exit, and the Chinese character of the “Buddha”, but inside of the ancestral hall is full of Taoist gods, which is expressing the attitude that Chinese society intends to integrate with Thai society.

Beginning in 2003, the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) of the United Nations began to use the Human Achievement Index (HAI) to track the progress of regional development. The scope of the human development index can be narrow down to the evaluation index of each province. With the numbers and rankings, we can see the gaps and deficiencies between provinces. The Human Development Index has 8 evaluation criteria, health index, education index, employment index, income index, housing and living environment index, family and community life index, transportation and communication index, and participation index. In the 2014 Thailand Human

Development Report, Phitsanulok was ranked 48th in the overall ranking of 76 provinces, at the middle and lower level.

Table 6.1.1-3: HAI ranking of Phitsanulok Province in Thailand

HAI Indices	Rankings (out of 76 provinces)
Health	60
Education	14
Employment	50
Income	57
Housing and living environment	11
Family and community life	62
Transport and communication	26
Participation	60

Source: based on UNDP (2014), edited by author

Note: Phitsanulok has low indexes especially in health, employment, income, family and community life, and participation.

In 1998, the Eighth GMS Ministerial Meeting held in Manila launched the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) as one of the flagship initiatives of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (ADB 2010). The goal of this project of Asian Development Bank is to improve the technical cooperation and education level of technological development in Southeast Asia, especially the Indochina region, and to make rational use of the rich natural resources of the Indochina region to improve the overall global

competitiveness for the region. Phitsanulok has played a very important role in this plan. Since the start of the development project of the Asian Development Bank in 1998, Phitsanulok has turned from an obscure historical place and agricultural city to the crossroads and economic hub of Indochina. As the intersection of the East-West Economic Corridor and the North-South Economic Corridor, Phitsanulok serves as an economic channel connecting four countries except Thailand. There are two economic corridors in the Indochina region, one is from north to south, from Kunming in China, extending through the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and finally connecting to the Bangkok; There is also an east-west economic corridor from Hanoi and Haiphong in Vietnam, through Savannakhet in Laos, then to Mae Sot in Thailand, and finally to Mawlamyine in Myanmar. The central point of these two economic corridors is Phitsanulok.

Although Phitsanulok is known as the crossroads of Indochina, the real Phitsanulok may not be worthy of this title for the time being. Takahashi Katsuyuki wrote an article in 2013 with a chapter called “The Real Image of Indochina Crossroads”. The article pointed out the deficiencies in the development of Phitsanulok Province and the areas that need further improvement. I will not repeat the content of Takahashi’s article here, rather I will use my own experience to show some factual evidence for readers to judge. In the introduction paragraph at the beginning of the article, I mentioned the deficiencies that was pointed out by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in terms of the development of Phitsanulok. Although Phitsanulok has been called the crossroads of Indochina since 1995, however, its development has not been as good as expected in the

nearly 30 years. The main reasons are the lack of master plan, investment, human resources, financial support, and infrastructure. Moreover, the only public transportations between Phitsanulok and Bangkok, which is Thailand's largest city, is by taking plane or train, the plane takes one hour, and the train takes six hours. I saw the viaduct under construction on the train from Bangkok to Phitsanulok, which looked like it was built for the construction of a high-speed railway. However, the construction speed was very slow and the amount of work was relatively low. As soon as the train left Bangkok, the construction section of the viaduct disappeared. According to my prediction, if the construction site I see was the high-speed railway line from Bangkok to Phitsanulok, the construction volume can be said to be less than 1% that has been completed. The transportation in Phitsanulok is also very limited. Except for private motorcycles and cars, I can only use taxis to go to various locations for researches and interviews. There is only one way to get from Naresuan University to Phitsanulok's downtown, which is to take the "school bus". Although it is called the bus, but it is actually just a type of truck. The back of the driver's and co-pilot's seats are for students who want to take the bus and go to downtown. There are only 3 rows of chairs for sitting, each row of chairs can hold up to 4 people. There are no safety measures such as seat belts, airbags, and escape hammers inside the truck. Before going to Phitsanulok Province, I searched a lot of information about traveling in Southeast Asia, especially in the field of transportation, because I considered that I would heavily rely on the local public transportation system to do field research. Grab is a smart phone application for calling taxis that has been very popular in Southeast Asia and other places. It has services in Bangkok and other places, but there is no service in Phitsanulok Province.

Overall, Phitsanulok is a very investigative and scholarly place, and I saw a lot of diverse societies that I had never seen before. Whether in religion, humanities, ethnic groups, and lifestyles, Phitsanulok's diversity makes the focus of this paper: national unity, more interesting and worthy of further exploration.

6.1.2 China and Phitsanulok Province

The relationship between the two countries often determines the frequency of exchanges and the number of immigrants. The relationship between Phitsanulok and China is also worth noting. China's Zhejiang Province and Phitsanulok Province began to cooperate in 1999. According to Takahashi (2013), Phitsanulok has established a friendly relationship with Zhejiang Province as a “sister cities”, and they had many cooperation in terms of culture, tourism, education, agriculture, and industry. The first point is that attracting investment and various resources are key conditions for Phitsanulok as a crossroads in Indochina. Investment from China can help Phitsanulok achieve better business preparation and environmental construction. The second point is that because Zhejiang's income level and per capita consumption level are among the best in all provinces in China, many investors are willing to make Phitsanulok as a tourist attraction and earning benefit from it. In addition, Phitsanulok can be used as a tourist transit point connecting Ningbo Port in Zhejiang Province to Da Nang in Vietnam.

In 2007, capitals from China officially entered Phitsanulok Province. The first project is to build a parking lot for cargo trucks, covering an area of 50 rai⁹, with a total

⁹ A unit that has been using only in Thailand. Rai is usually used to measure the locations with large area, such as farmland or forest. 1 rai is approximately equal to 1600 square meters.

value of 200 million Thai Bahts. The purpose of this parking lot is to activate the North-South Economic Corridor and make it easier for transporting goods from Kunming in Yunnan to reach Phitsanulok Province. Kunming has been working hard to increase freight speed and economic efficiency through Bangkok's port and the North-South Economic Corridor. However, after this project, commercial investment from China suddenly stopped, and what was left was only a few and scattered grocers and exhibitions of some agricultural products, and large-scale infrastructure projects have not been seen again.

According to a research from Takahashi (2013), from September 9th to September 18th, 2011, under the leadership of the local prefectural government, Phitsanulok hosted an international commodity exhibition, products from China, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia were exhibited in Phitsanulok and sold on the spot. Another retail commodity exhibition was called "Indochina Commodity Exhibition 2013", which was held from June 1st to 10th in 2013. The exhibition exhibited agricultural products from the four neighboring provinces of Phitsanulok, and there were more than 1,000 stores from China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia.

The lack of investment potential and commercial potential have become the most criticized shortcoming of Phitsanulok Province, which is why foreign funds stopped entering Phitsanulok since ten years ago. Immigrants always flow with capital and they are seeking opportunities. The reason why immigrants become immigrants is because of pulling factors and pushing factors. Now we can only see pushing factors but not

pulling factors, putting simple words, Phitsanulok lacks the charm that can attract immigrants to work here and earn money here. Immigrants will not go where there is no benefit to earn. However, there are still new immigrants from China in Phitsanulok, but the purpose is different from the old immigrants. The latest batch of new immigrants are not here to make money, they are burdened with other tasks, which I will introduce in later chapters. According to Mr. Chen Zhan Yang, the former president of the Overseas Chinese Association in Phitsanulok: New immigrants often go to Bangkok or Chiang Mai because they can at least find business and opportunities there. The ethnic Chinese (old-timers) have stayed in Phitsanulok or other places, because the ethnic Chinese have always supported the business and economy here. In the streets of Phitsanulok, there are many shops selling gold bars and silver jewelry. Such shops generally have Chinese-labeled brands, I think maybe their customers are usually only ethnic Chinese or overseas Chinese.

Generally speaking, the relationship between China and Phitsanulok has been established at a relatively early stage, although the follow-up is weak. But in general, Chinese investment has left a more or less the footprint of developmental in Phitsanulok.

Table 6.1.2-1: Numbers of overseas Chinese in different provinces

	1937*	1947	1947**	1960	1970	1980***	1990***	2000	2010
Chiang Mai	2,971	1,832	2,874	3,004	4,927	3,594	4,843	12,245	8,239

Phitsa nulok	4,217	3,617	64,75	3,146	2,472	1,267	861	300	2,185
Na- khon Sawan	884	8,281	14,155	6,934	5,645	3,378	1,460	4,476	482
Ubon	2,854	2,066	4,174	2,016	1,491	1,186	796	356	333
Rayon g	1,315	1,503	2,724	2,301	5,293	1,279	714	442	372

*Population over 10 years old **Pedigree ***Birthplace

Source: based on Takahashi (2013), edited by author

Note: From Table, we can see the number of overseas Chinese in Phitsanulok.

Two years after the end of World War II in 1947, the population of overseas Chinese reached the highest in history, with 6,475 people. After that, it gradually decreased and reached a minimum of 300 people in 2000. After 2010, it reached 2185 people, which is a middle-level number in history.

Table 6.1.2-2: The number of population whose family language is Chinese

	2000	2010
Chiang Mai	16,484	19,244
Phitsanulok	96	885
Nakhon Sawan	345	386
Ubon	472	241
Rayong	162	374

Source: based on Takahashi (2013), edited by author

Note: Although not many people use Chinese in family language, but Phitsanulok has been the largest number of neighboring provinces and is still less than in Chiang Mai. So far, I have not found any information about Bangkok, but I guess there will be more people using Chinese as family language in Bangkok.

6.1.3 Chinese Associations in Phitsanulok Province

Phitsanulok now has 29 Chinese Associations. 7 associations based on the Phitsanulok Foundation¹⁰, 5 local clubs, 17 family clubs. Most of them are no longer operational, the only thing left is the image and memories that the Chinese had been here before (P.G. personal communication, August 2019). The seven associations are Phitsanulok Overseas Chinese Association, Hainan Association of Northern Thailand, Chong-cheng-shan Hall (Prasat Bun Sathan Foundation), Xingmin Alumni Association, Peng-hua-guo Chinese Music Association, Hakka Phitsanulok Association, Thai-Chinese Development Cooperation Association of Phitsanulok Branch; the five local clubs are Siam-Jieyang Association Phitsanulok Branch, Fengshun Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Puning Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Chenghai Liaison Phitsanulok Club,

¹⁰ According to the information provided by former lecturer of Naresuan University, Miss. Piyarat. Phitsanulok Foundation neither has relation with Phitsanulok provincial government nor a governmental foundation. Foundation was established by the ethnic Chinese and it was officially registered under the governmental system. The finance of Phitsanulok foundation is being upheld by the “membership-fee” which collected from the members of different speech association either annually or via the charity event. The other two types, local clubs and family clubs, are informal units as to gather the ethnic Chinese who came from the same hometown. Local clubs and family clubs have not been registered under the provincial government, and these two have the same capital rising system as Phitsanulok foundation.

Chaoan Phitsanulok Liaison Club; the 17 family clubs¹¹ are Chen-Family Association Phitsanulok Branch, Huang-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Xu-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Lin-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Liu-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Tse-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Zhang-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Wong-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Lo-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Zou-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Xiao-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Lee-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Xu-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Ng-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Zeng-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch, Gao-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch and Qiu-Family Phitsanulok Branch.

Table 6.1.3-1: List of all the Chinese Associations in Phitsanulok Province (until 2019)

	Hometown	Year of Establishment	Thai name	Chinese name (traditional writing)	Attribute

¹¹ Family club is a type of association to be established that mainly based on same family name rather than same hometown. Member's hometown could be anywhere.

				for- mat)	
Phitsanulok Overseas Chinese Association	Mixed	1948	สมาคมจีนพิษณุโลก	彭世 洛華 僑協 會	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิษณุโลก)
Hainan Association of Northern Thailand	Hainan ¹²	1945	สมาคมไหหลำภาคเหนือแห่งประเทศไทย	泰北 海南 同鄉 會	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิษณุโลก)
Chong-cheng-shan Hall (Prasat Bun Sathan	Mixed	1910	มูลนิธิประสาตบุญสถาน	崇成 善堂	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิษณุโลก)

¹² Although the population of Hainan wasn't the largest, and their advantages were later assumed by Teochius (潮州) and Hakkas (客家), their local status remained very high as they were the pioneer of the upcountry region of Thailand that includes Phitsanulok. The Hainanese have their own association building, except that the Hakka, Fujianese and Teochius still don't have their own building for associational meetings. Based on G. William Skinner, Hainanese people were the first speech group that arrived in Phitsanulok. The interviewee P.G. has confirmed that the Hainanese were dominating the pork market in Phitsanulok around 1970s. See *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*, pp. 91, 93, 95.

Founda- tion)					
Xingmin Alumni Associa- tion	Mixed	1910	สมาคมนักเรียนเก่าสิ้นหมิ่น	醒民 學校 校友 會	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิชญโลก)
Peng- hua-guo Chinese Music Associa- tion	Mixed	1966	สมาคมดนตรีจีนแผ่ฮั่ว	彭華 國樂 社	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิชญโลก)
Hakka Phitsanu- lok Asso- ciation	Hakka	1976 ¹³	สมาคมฮากกา พิชญโลก	彭世 洛府 客屬 會館	Phitsanulok Founda- tion(มูลนิธิพิชญโลก)
Thai- Chinese Develop- ment	Mixed	1976 ¹⁴	สมาคมมิตรภาพไทย-จีน สาขาพิชญโลก	泰中 友好 協會	Phitsanulok Foundation (มูลนิธิพิชญโลก)

¹³ The Hakka Phitsanulok Association was originally established in the year of 1958, but it became a legal association in 1976.

¹⁴ Thai-Chinese Development Cooperation Association is a national cooperation community established on the part of both China and Thailand in 1976, the year that Thailand and China formed diplomatic relations.

Cooperation Association of Phitsnulok Branch				彭世洛分会	
Siam-Jieyang Association Phitsnulok Branch	Jieyang city (Canton Province)	1965	สมาคมเก๊กเฮีย ๗ สาขาพิชญ์โลก	暹罗揭阳会馆 彭世洛分会	Local Club (สมาคม ¹⁵)
Fengshun Liaison Phitsnulok Branch	Fengshun or Hong Soon county (Canton province)	1963	สมาคมสงตุน สาขาพิชญ์โลก	泰国丰顺同乡会 彭世洛联络处	Local Club (สมาคม)

¹⁵ Special appreciation to Miss. Jay Patt Tangsinmunkong for translating the name of “Local Club” of the ethnic Chinese.

Puning Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Puning county (Jieyang city, Canton province)	1963-1973 ^{16?}	สมาคมโพวเล้งฯ สาขาพิษณุโลก	泰国 普宁 同乡 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Local Club (สมาคม)
Chenghai Liaison Phitsanulok Club	Chenghai district (Shantou city, Canton province)	1967	ชมรมเฉิงไฮ้ พิษณุโลก	泰国 澄海 同乡 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Local Club (สมาคม)
Chaoan Phitsanulok Liaison Club	Chaoan district (Guangzhou city, Canton province)	1945	ชมรมเตี้ยอันพิษณุโลก	泰国 潮安 同乡 会彭 世洛	Local Club(สมาคม)

¹⁶ The Puning Association in Thailand in Bangkok was established in 1947. Typically, the association branch located in another province was established later than the headquarters in Bangkok.

				联络 处	
Chen- Family Associa- tion Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed (based on Chiuchow city)	1962	สมาคมตั้งตระกูลสาขาพิชญโลก	泰国 陈氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 分会	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Huang- Family Liaison Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed (based on Chenghai district)	1962	สมาคมตระกูลอิงสาขาพิชญโลก	泰国 黄氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Xu-Fam- ily Liai- son Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลซ้อ พิชญโลก	泰国 徐氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)

				联络 处	
Lin-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed (Xilong village, Chenghai district, Canton province)		ชมรมตระกูลลิม พิษณุโลก	泰国 林氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Liu-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลเล่า พิษณุโลก	泰国 刘氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Tse-Family Liaison	Mixed	1996	ชมรมตระกูลเจี่ย พิษณุโลก	泰国 谢 氏 宗亲	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)

Phitsanu- lok Branch				会彭 世洛 联络 处	
Zhang- Family Liaison Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลเตี้ย พิษณุโลก	泰国 张氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๗)
Wong- Family Liaison Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลเฮ้ง พิษณุโลก	泰国 王氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๗)

Lo-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลลี้ พิษณุโลก	泰国 罗氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Zou-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลโจว พิษณุโลก	泰国 邹氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Xiao-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลเซียว พิษณุโลก	泰国 萧氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)

				联络 处	
Lee-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลลี พิชณุโลก	泰国 李氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๆ)
Xu-Family Liaison Phitsanulok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลโค้ว พิชณุโลก	泰国 许氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๆ)
Ng-Family Liaison	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลโง้ว พิชณุโลก	泰国 吴氏 宗亲 会彭	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๆ)

Phitsanu- lok Branch				世洛 联络 处	
Zeng- Family Liaison Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลจ้ง พิษณุโลก	泰国 曾氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Gao- Family Liaison Phitsanu- lok Branch	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลโก พิษณุโลก	泰国 高氏 宗亲 会彭 世洛 联络 处	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)
Qiu- Family Liaison	Mixed		ชมรมตระกูลกู พิษณุโลก	泰国 丘氏 宗亲	Family Club (ชมรมตระกูลแซ่ต่าง ๑)

Phitsanu- lok Branch				会彭 世洛 联络 处	
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Source: edited by author. Most of the information came from Miss. Piyarat's personal communication through Facebook.

Although Chinese Associations appear to be numerous on the surface, but the influence of the Chinese Associations have much been weaker than before, and the addresses of some Associations have been demolished or transferred to other shops. Especially the Hakka Associations, the front door is deserted like an abandoned building. Whether in terms of number or influence, the power of Chinese Association is declining day by day. The younger generations of ethnic Chinese have almost completely assimilated into the Thai society. The role of the Association for them has been minimal, it can also be said that they no longer need the Associations as intermediary or medium to establish interpersonal relationships and cultivate their own network. When I went to the Hainan Association of Northern Thailand for an interview and investigation, the lobby and office corridors were empty. Outsiders can enter and leave the Association at will, and the only janitor staying behind would not investigate and record the names and contact information of visitors. The only people who still supporting the operation of the Associations are almost the older generations of ethnic Chinese, and it is rare to see young people working in Associations.

6.2 The comparison between the ethnic Chinese (old-timers) and new Chinese Immigrants (newcomers)

6.2.1 The newcomers (new Chinese immigrants) in Phitsanulok

As we have mentioned in the previous article, new immigrants from China hardly want to go to areas with low development potential like Phitsanulok, they rather go to metropolises such as Bangkok or Chiang Mai that where are full of investment and business opportunities. Moreover, there are larger Chinese communities with more opportunities to speak Chinese in Bangkok and Chiang Mai, which make everything much more convenient for the new immigrants who are not proficient in Thai language. According to Chen Zhanyang, the former president of the Overseas Chinese Association in Phitsanulok, Phitsanulok and its Chamber of Commerce has not received any investment from Chinese investors in the past 20 years.

Therefore, the new immigrants who can come to live and work in Phitsanulok have a different purpose from most of the new immigrants that we mentioned in previous chapters as we cannot simply divide and define them based on the general definition of Chinese new immigrants. Because there is no pulling factor for new Chinese immigrants in Phitsanulok, there is only a pushing factor for them. However, to figure out what motivated them to come to a city with almost no commercial value is very interesting work for field investigation.

The number of new immigrants is relatively small compared to the old immigrants, and the division of careers is very simple. According to my own 3-month field survey, except for self-funded and publicly funded overseas Chinese students, the new Chinese immigrants who came to Phitsanulok were all Chinese language volunteers. Their mission in Phitsanulok was to teach the local Thai children with Chinese listening, speaking, reading and writing. Although they are called volunteers, the overall number is relatively large, their tasks are also very arduous, and their staying in overseas is also limited. In the next chapters, I will focus on introducing and analyzing their work and the institutions and methods through which they came to Phitsanulok, also they play the most important role in the process of “borderless integration”.

6.2.2 The old-timers (ethnic Chinese) in Phitsanulok

The old immigrant group in Phitsanulok is also dominated by immigrants from Guangdong and Fujian, all of whom are from the south of China. The main careers of the old immigrant group in Phitsanulok were labor and retail industry. Although Guangdong and Fujian had the largest number of immigrants, but the first immigrants to settle in Phitsanulok came from Hainan Province. With the spirit of adventure, Hainanese who are good at reclaiming wasteland and logging wood first came to Phitsanulok and took root here.

According to Skinner (1957), with a large number of immigrants from Chaozhou heading north from Bangkok to Phitsanulok, the number of immigrants from Hainan was surpassed by Chaozhou immigrants. In 1917, among all Chinese immigrants in

Phitsanulok, immigrants from Chaozhou accounted for nearly 40%. Subsequently, a large number of immigrants from Guangdong and Hakka also headed northward to Phitsanulok as well as nearby Provinces. In 1928, Hainanese established the first Chinese language school in Phitsanulok (Skinner, 1957, p. 214). This school had been teaching in Hainan dialect until 1930, after which it switched to Mandarin.

According to China's provinces, cities and regions, the number of immigrants from Chaozhou is the largest, followed by Hakka, Hainan in third, and Fujian in fourth. There are nearly 400,000 ethnic Chinese living in Phitsanulok and the surrounding areas and Provinces of Phitsanulok, the total number of ethnic Chinese in these areas accounts for about 4% of all Chinese in Thailand.

6.2.3 The different between old-timers and newcomers

6.2.3-1 Religion and moral standard

The reason why I put religion first is because Thailand is a religious country. Unlike many atheist countries, almost every Thai citizen here attaches great importance to religious culture and religious activities. Many Thais even regard religion as above all else. The main religion in Thailand is Theravada Buddhism, which is different from Mahayana Buddhism, and both are the branches of Buddhism. In Thai's Buddhism, there is a basic concept of the "Three Treasures," which refers to the three essentials of the faith: the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Priesthood (Skinner, 1957, p. 128). In

addition to Thailand, Theravada Buddhism has also been the main religion in Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Laos. On the contrary, Mahayana Buddhism is more common in East Asia, such as China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

“Both Chinese and Thai people believe in Buddha, but they make different wishes in front of the Buddha (H, Y. Y. personal communication, August 2019). Chinese people often wish to make more money” (Y, F. T, personal communication, August 2019). This private interview coincides with the theory that Skinner put forward 70 years ago. The Chinese profess Buddhism and political allegiance only for the advantage they get out of it, in fact they are neither loyal nor Buddhism (Skinner, 1957, p. 158). Why don't the Thais believe that the Chinese will completely convert to Buddhism? The reason for this question starts from a part of Chinese history.

Since 1978, China's former leader Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy was implemented in China, and China's economic strength has undergone drastic changes in just a few years that made it become the world's second largest economy. In 1992 the late Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese former leader and father of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, said: “Let a part of the population get rich first.” (Hilton, 2012). Deng Xiaoping also said another sentence, and the meaning is almost the same as the previous sentence: no matter the black cat or the white cat, as long as the cat catches the mouse, it is a good cat. The significance of these two sentences is to encourage the people of China to shift their focus to economic development and jump out of the vortex of political struggle in the Cultural Revolution as soon as possible.

Although China's GDP and economic contribution have made an unprecedented achievements, at the same time, the void in people's hearts is gradually expanding. Under the background of ultra-high-speed economic development, communism and Marxism were replaced by economic development, and previous beliefs were shattered, many people lost their spiritual support during this period. People at that time yearned for spiritual sustenance. Thus, people began to create something that can be trusted and relied, such as *qigong*. Throughout the 1980s, “qigong” became a legitimized outlet for the resurgence, reconfiguration and “modernization” of sectarian beliefs and practices (Palmer, 2012, p. 86). The followers of Qigong have attracted the attention and warnings of the Chinese government authorities due to several reasons, and finally *qigong* was convicted as a heresy. Disillusionment with the failed promises of a Marxist ideology worn out by widespread corruption and growing social disparities, found expression in the moral fundamentalism of *qigong* (Palmer, 2012, p. 103). There are many well-known movie stars in mainland China that are also related to *qigong*. Many people used this chance to pretend to be a master of *qigong* exercise to defraud money and contacts, including many movie stars who are also involved in the crime of *qigong*. Since then, the Chinese authorities have controlled cult organizations like *qigong*.

However, Buddhism is different from *qigong*. Buddhism in China would not violate any political corrections or illegal areas, and Buddhism was spread to China since long time ago and has been widely accepted. Since the Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism), and Buddhism were the major traditions, accompanied by a great variety of popular religions or cultic practices developed in relations to these three traditions (Yang, 1999,

p. 43). The most important thing is that the gist and content of Buddhism do not conflict with the ideology of socialism, and Buddhism is not a religion from Western countries like Christianity, nor is it possible to involve terrorism like Islam, nor has been considered as heresy like *qigong*, so like the old immigrants, many new immigrants have already learned about Mahayana Buddhism before going to Thailand, because some of their family members are Buddhists in Mahayana Buddhism. The Mahayana form of which most Chinese immigrants were already familiar with before they left China (Skinner, 1957, p. 129).

Many new immigrants (including Chinese language teachers and privately funded students) in Phitsanulok said that they really want to have a rich and colorful religious life and religious activities like Thais. A language teacher said that seeing Thai people wearing heavy makeup and singing and dancing because of religious activities made her very envious. She wants to know why Thais can work hard to dress up for religious activities. The pious attitude of Thai people when worshiping Buddha also made her have a keen interest in learning more about Buddhism. Almost every new immigrant aspires to have a rich and colorful religious life like Thais, and they are also working hard to learn and integrate into the Buddhist culture. All Chinese language teachers working in Phitsanulok are women. For them, Thailand is a strange and unknown place, and there are some Chinese language teachers who do not even speak Thai or recognize Thai writings. New immigrants feel uneasy and fearful in a foreign country, but Buddhism will provide them with spiritual comfort and support at this time, especially for single women who are far away from their homes and families.

However, Thais still do not think that new Chinese immigrants can truly believe in Buddhism. Chinese have a persistent addiction and belief in business and money, and I don't think we can deliver everything to the Buddha even in times of trouble, and the Buddha would not really accept us. (G,P. Personal communication, August 2019). Said in Chinese proverbs, such as "money can do all things," "wealth begets wealth," "money makes possible communion with Gods," "with money, you can get the devil himself to push your cart." For Thais, such sayings represent the crassest materialism (Skinner, 1957, p. 100). Although Skinner's research was nearly a hundred years ago, but it is still not outdated even on today. According to my interviews and investigations, it has been confirmed that Thais still have no good feelings about the obsession with money and do not believe that the Chinese can truly believe in Buddha. A Chinese language teacher from Yunnan Province told me that she saw Chinese people (maybe tourists or new immigrants living there, but because almost no Chinese tourists will come to Phitsanulok, so it is very likely that they are new immigrants) went to Wat Phra Thart Pha Kaew to worship Buddha, in Thai temples, there will be the five-headed dragon sculptures, which is covered with Thai baht that visitors put upon, to pray for peace and the blessing of the Buddha. Thais don't show off how much money they have hanging up, but just silently worship Buddha. But the Chinese will take photos and post them to social networking sites and show off that they have spent a lot of money in the temple. The larger the amount of money hanging, the more you can show your loyalty to Buddhism, and you must let everyone know it (G,P. Personal communication, August 2019).

From the above examples, we can see that the values, cultural views, and world views of newcomers and old-timers are still very different. They are almost completely different except for their facial appearance.

6.2.3-2 Leisure time and entertainment

Obtaining more business benefits and pocket money seems to be the immutable goal of new immigrants, no matter what their main occupation is. Even in places like Phitsanulok where there is only a few development opportunity, new immigrants can rack their brains to make some extra profits for themselves in their free time or on weekends. Thinking about new ways to invest in order to get interest has dominated the free time of almost every new immigrants. Especially the buying and selling of foreign currencies on the Internet, or investing via social medias are the activities that almost every new immigrant has been doing, including privately funded international students. The old-timers have little understanding of these things. The main reason is that the old-timers are relatively aged populations and have very few opportunities and time to access the Internet. But the new immigrants are generally younger, the youngest is 18-year-old freshman, and the rest are generally college students or within 5 years of graduating from college. As far as I know, the oldest language teacher is 42 years old, and even this is much younger than most of the old-timers. The average age gap between old-timers and newcomers is around 50 years old. Knowledge and understanding

of the Internet and how to use smartphones including smartphone applications are the biggest and most essential differences in the lives of old-timers and newcomers.

The internet And smart phone applications have shortened the distance between countries and made national boundaries gradually blurred. With a smart phone, people can do anything at anywhere via the Internet. People will exchange information with each other in social media, or invite friends into social media groups. In certain groups, people will also pass on investment information to each other. There will be a person responsible for collecting all electronic transfers and subsequent distribution of profits. Even if the user is in Thailand, it will not affect accepting the investment in China. Y is a I language volunteer who came to work in Thailand through the recruitment of the *Qiaoban*¹⁷ (Overseas I Affairs Office). Y often comes to Phitsanulok to see her good friends, and Y works in a place near Phitsanulok called Sukhothai. Before coming to Thailand, Y's friends invited her to cooperate with her to make some small private investments to earn some pocket money, but Y did not agree at the time for other reasons. After coming to Thailand, time has become much more abundant than in China, so Y decided to give it a try. Therefore, Y invested RMB 4,000 in a company that a friend introduced to her is said to be an electric vehicle charging pile manufacturing company in Guangdong Province. Since the investment, Y can receive 150 yuan as daily profits from her friends. Each month Y can get 3% of the total investment cost as a return. Y also invited some of his friends to invest together. These investors are also new immigrants who teach I in the surrounding areas of Phitsanulok. When I asked

¹⁷ I will introduce the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in Chapter 2.4.1.


Y about the name and financial status of this company in Guangdong that manufactures charging piles for electric vehicles, Y didn't know anything and did not sign any investment contracts or any agreements. All Y knows is that the friend who transfers the money to her on the social media website and Y can earn interest through online transaction.

According to Y's description, many new immigrants living in Thailand are investing in social media. They set up chat groups with each other to exchange investment information. In my personal opinion, these investments look very similar to pyramid scams, and can also be called micro-business scams. Companies and individuals who engage in the schemes are called Weishang, and for a mere 100 Yuan (\$15.19) anyone can join the community to become one (Nakamura 2016). *Wei* means small, and *Shang* means business. Small-scale business transactions conducted on the Internet, and according to the characteristics of a pyramid scam, are called Weishang. As shown in Figure 6.2.3-2-1, Weishang usually invites the closest people around you and the most trustworthy populations, such as close friends, relatives, or even family members. The initiator will invite them to join the social media group, and then send an website link in the group. Any member of the group can open the link to 240 products via online shopping. After purchasing items in the website, the buyer will become the next Weishang, and at the same time, this Weishang has to promise to spread the online shopping website to more people and create more social media groups to let more buyers become the next Weishang. As more people enter this trap, the structure of the pyramid scheme becomes more complete. Many important social networking sites

provide transnational services, and you can transfer money and pay bills in any other country or place as long as there is the Internet. Online cross-border purchases made in China are expected to reach \$111 billion in 2017, up 30 percent from last year, according to United State researcher eMarketer Inc (Pandey & Xu 2017).

Figure 6.2.3-2-1: Pyramid scheme in the context of Weishang

China's smartphone-based SNS pyramid scheme




Source: from Nakamura (2016)

Another daily task for new immigrants is to log in to a special smartphone application and earn points. The name of the smartphone application is *xuexiqiangguo*. It means to strengthen the country's strength through learning. This software requires the registered person to provide the real name and mobile phone number. Language teachers who come to Thailand to teach through the Overseas I Affairs Office or Hanban, and every publicly-sponsored international student need to use this application every

day and earn points in the application to ensure the connection between themselves and domestic institutions. There are many ways to earn the so called studying points. Users can earn studying points through video learning, reading news and information, and cooperative testing. It takes at least one hour to two hours a day to reach the target that has been set by the institution that the newcomers domestically belong to. “Study points” are earned by users who log in to the app, read articles, make comments every day, and take multiple-choice tests about the party’s policies (Huang 2019). Although there is no limit to the upper limit of points, but an interviewer said that just enough is enough. Because everyone’s points are being public in the application, especially their colleagues and bosses can see it. If I earn more studying points than my boss, then he may find trouble with me, because no boss wants to see an employee’s car is more expensive than his own car (Z.Y.W. personal communication, August 2019).

Newcomers and old-timers have completely different values, so this leads to very different leisure activities. Newcomers’ activities are particularly complex, even elusive, and it takes a certain amount of time to research and interview to understand.

Figure 6.2.3-2-2: The smartphone application called “Xuexiqiangguo”



Source: Techinasia (2019)

6.2.4 The sameness between old-timers and newcomers

6.2.4-1 Work

The Confucius Classroom in Xingmin School at the center of Phitsanulok is the only place where old-timers and newcomers have face to face contact and communicational exchanges. According to Lertpusit, until 2013, the largest number of extended visas approved by the Thai government was the visa for Chinese language teachers. In February 2016, there were 3,488 Chinese staff in the academic field (Lertpusit, 2018, p. 80). According to my own interviews and investigations, in 2019, there were 124 Chinese language teachers in six other provinces near Phitsanulok (including

Phitsanulok). Except for Phitsanulok, the other provinces are Sukhothai, Uttaradit, Phichit, Kamphaeng-Phet, Loei, and Phetchabun.

Almost all Chinese teachers came to Thailand to work through the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was absorbed into the United Front Work Department, as an internal bureau, according to the document dated March 19 (Zhou 2018). This a consequence of the United Front serving as a way for the CCP to control and influence social groups outside the Party — the key distinction is not between domestic and overseas activities, but rather between the Party and everyone else (Joske 2019). OCAO focuses on 8 goals:

- 1. Responsibility for making policies and plans relating to overseas Chinese.*
- 2. Investigating and researching the situation of overseas Chinese, and providing information about the affairs of overseas Chinese to the central government and the State Council.*
- 3. Assisting the Premier of the State Council in handling the affairs of overseas Chinese.*
- 4. Guiding the work of returned overseas Chinese and their family members.*
- 5. Contacting relevant associations and representatives in Hong Kong and Macau and overseas.*
- 6. Guiding and promoting the economic, scientific and technological cooperation of overseas Chinese .*

7. *Instructing and directing the propaganda, Chinese language education, and communication that is relevant to overseas Chinese.*
8. *Dealing with other matters assigned by the State Council.*¹⁸

All recruited language teachers must pass two trainings, the first one is called induction training that held in February of every year. The main purpose of this training is to let all language teachers understand the basic situation of Thailand, including some basic language, basic listening, speaking, reading, and writing, as well as Thailand's background, history, and political situation. The second training is on-the-job training, which lasts from May to July each year. The purpose of on-the-job training is to let all volunteers understand each other. I learned from an interview with a language teacher that a grand banquet will be held on the first day of on-the-job training. At the banquet, language teachers played ice-breaking games with each other to get know to each other, and then they exchanged contact information, including contact information on social media. At the end of the banquet, everyone will sing a song together. This song is very unique. The name is *Han Yu Zhi Hua Sheng Kai*. *Han Yu* literally means the vast universe, but at the same time it has the homonym of Chinese language, so it means that Chinese is blooming in the entire universe as a flower.


¹⁸ These eight duties for Qiao Ban can be found in the website of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. <http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node22/node23/index.html>. Another type of volunteer is sent by Han Ban, also known as the Office of Chinese Language Council International, also known as the Confucius Institute Headquarters. CI focuses on the propaganda of the Chinese language and Chinese language education on a global level. In Phitsanulok, the CI was found in Xingmin School, in Japanese called in November 9th, 2009, called Confucius Classroom at Xingmin School Phitsanulok. On August 22nd of 2016, a group of delegates from Kunming University went to Naresuan University for a discussion regarding to the establishment of Confucius Institute at NU. On October 27th of 2016, members of Kunming University came to NU again and discussed the establishment of CI at the Faculty of Humanities. On May 25th, 2017, members from Kunming University made another trip to NU to hear the progress report about CI. All sources come from <http://old.nu.ac.th/en/index.php>.

The reason why Chinese language volunteers or language teachers can come to Phitsanulok or other parts of Thailand to teach Chinese is not because the salary here is very high, because basically all language teachers earn about the same salary as they did in China. However, the comfortable living conditions, lower-stress lifestyle and open-minded people are the key factors influencing the decision (Lertpusit, 2018, p. 80). T is an interviewee I met in Phitsanulok, and she is also a Chinese language volunteer. Before coming to Thailand, he is already an experienced teacher in the Tengchong area of Yunnan Province. T said that she was very lucky among many Chinese volunteers because he was assigned to Thailand. According to T, many volunteers were assigned to Vietnam and Myanmar, and many volunteers expressed dissatisfaction and felt disappointed with the result of the arrangement, because they think that Vietnam has very serious anti-Chinese tendency, and Myanmar's political situation is turbulent, and the level of social security is very poor. T hopes that his colleagues far away in Vietnam or Myanmar will be doing well and safe, and hope that he can stay in Thailand forever.

T said that the threshold for recruiting to teach in Thailand is not very high. Any volunteer who comes to teach can apply for a two-year working visa, and does not need to provide any English test certificates and results. Most importantly, the cost of living in Thailand is very low, T can eat and drink here without spending too much savings and live a comfortable and slow-paced life. Every Chinese volunteer in Thailand only needs to teach 12 lessons per week, and there are two full days of vacation. Although the salary is similar to that in China, teaching in China will face a lot of external

pressure and more courses per week. In China, almost 24 classes are taught every week, which is as much as twice the workload in Thailand. Every month, T can earn 9,000 yuan, which is about 40,000 Bahts in total. In addition, there is a living allowance of 6,000 Bahts. According to Phitsanulok's 2018 provincial statistics report, the per capita income of Phitsanulok was 7348.2 Bahts in 2017. Compared with T's salary income, the personal salary of Phitsanulok per capita income is only 1/6 of T's. In statistic, the average Chinese employee spends 44.7 hours a week at work, according to the 2017 China Labour Dynamics Survey, published by Sun Yat Sen University in Guangzhou, covering 21,086 people nationwide (Wang & Hancock 2019). Long working hours and huge workload may also be the pushing factor for immigration. There are not a few people like T. They go to Southeast Asian countries to find a more comfortable and relaxed working environment. From the chart in Figure 2.3.2.3.2-2, we can see that the numbers of immigrants from China have been rising instead of falling. There are many reasons for the outflow of immigrants.

Figure 6.2.4-1-1: 2017 UN Global Migration Report



Source: United Nations (2017)

Note: In the nearly 20 years from 2000 to 2017, China is a major exporter of immigrants in the world. In 2000, 5.8 million people immigrated to other countries, and in 2017, 10 million people immigrated to other countries..

In the workplace where Chinese language is taught, new immigrants and old immigrants share the same space and have the same tasks to complete. Take Phitsanulok’s Confucius Classroom as an example. The Confucius Classroom is located inside of the campus of Xingmin School. The Chinese teacher of Xingmin School and the Chinese teacher of Confucius Classroom almost share the same office. Even newcomer and old-timer teachers don’t sit in the same office, the communication is very frequent, at least

according to my observations. However, apart from work matters, there is almost no communication in spare time and leisure time. The communication between the two parties is only based on the meaning and goal of achieving the goals during work. The Chinese teachers at Xingmin School are basically all old-timers, around over 60 years old. There are also some young Chinese, but they are basically engaged in teaching affairs or teaching assistants, and almost all can speak Chinese proficiently. But the Confucius classroom is different. All Chinese teachers are Chinese volunteers recruited through the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Almost none of them speak Thai. One of the five volunteers is able to communicate in basic Thai language. They All came from Yunnan, Hubei or the southern part of mainland China.

In general, because of the different working institutions, the new immigrants and the old Chinese are completely separated in two different offices, but they have almost the same teaching tasks and share almost the same working space. This is their The only way to communicate with each other. But in their free time, they don't go out to play or eat together, just communicate during work. The job of the new immigrants is to teach the Chinese language. The workload is much simpler than the previous work in China, and the working hours are less. Chinese volunteers have their own work system, which is different from the old immigrant groups at Xingmin School.

6.2.4-2 Investment and business

New immigrants need local resources and intelligence to create their network, and the resources and intelligence often come from older immigrants who can speak the

same language. For new immigrants from China, they will first find old-timers who can speak Chinese to seek help. Having a common business goal is that besides the work goal I mentioned in the previous paragraph, which is the second factor can motivate both old Chinese and new immigrants that caused mutual cooperation.

In Phitsanulok, successive generations of Chinese created the Chamber of Commerce here. Even today, the top leaders working in the Chamber of Commerce are all Chinese, at least in Phitsanulok and Bangkok as far as I know. I was fortunate and honored to visit Phitsanulok and the Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok and Phitsanulok with the help and guidance of professor Takahashi Katsuyuki, professor Paul Chambers, and Dean Napisa Waitoolkiat who work in the Faculty of Social Sciences of Naresuan University and did relevant interviews. The senior leaders of Phitsanulok and the Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok are almost all Chinese, and almost all of them can speak and hear Chinese language proficiently. According to an employee, 95% of the members of the Chamber of Commerce in Phitsanulok are ethnic Chinese and can speak Mandarin, and some can speak even Hokkien, Cantonese, or Hakka dialects. The latest project between the Chamber of Commerce of Phitsanulok and mainland China is an agricultural project of about 200 rai and about 80 hectares, the main purpose of which is to revitalize the local agriculture in Phitsanulok. These two commercial chambers often assist and develop local commerce and small-scale retail, and at the same time bring local related products to the international level for sales.

In addition to most of the new immigrants who are foreign students and Chinese language teachers, there are a very small number of new immigrants who are

agricultural workers. They came to Phitsanulok to participate in local agricultural and commercial development. Some rented a piece of land from the locals and then began to grow vegetables and fruits, and finally sold the products to larger markets such as in Bangkok or Chiang Mai. J.Z, is one of my interviewees. He left Teng Chong County in Yunnan Province alone and came to Phitsanulok since the 1980s by the time of after China's reform and opening up. He made efforts in the cultivation of agricultural vegetables in Phitsanulok, and transports the agricultural products to Chiang Mai and sells them there from March to May each year. J.Z revealed that there are still many new immigrants from southern China in Chiang Mai, but only a few of them stay in Phitsanulok, even J.Z has his own place of residence in Chiang Mai. When I interviewed him, I just accidentally met him in doing some additional retail business in the suburban of Phitsanulok. There are many new immigrants who work in the same way as J.Z did, they come to Phitsanulok from March to May every year to harvest the agricultural products, fruits and vegetables that sown the year before, and then transport them to the Chiang Mai area for sale in higher price. If it is a bad harvest year, they will come to Phitsanulok to buy a large amount of fruits, vegetables and other agricultural products at low prices, then transport them to Chiang Mai and sell them at high prices.

Since 2016, J.Z has leased a mountain area of about 100 square meters. J.Z runs a tourism business on the mountain, and at the same time runs a stall of fried chestnuts with his children and wife. J.Z also rented two sightseeing and amusement spots. One is a viewing platform suitable for taking pictures. Any tourist can board the viewing platform for taking pictures by paying some Bahts. The second tourist attraction is a

mini sky wheel similar to a waterwheel in size. The entire sky wheel is more than four meters high. The overall structure is made of wooden materials. In fact, it does not seem to be that safe, and it is only suitable for children. JZ said that this tour is not recommended for people who are overweight.

Figure 6.2.4-2-1: One of J.Z's business: chargeable viewpoint



Source: photo taken by author

Figure 6.2.4-2-2 : Another J.Z's business: chargeable mini sky wheel



Source: photo taken by author

The geographic location where J. Z does business is located in the Khek Noi sub-district (Thai: เข็กน้อย) of Khao Kho district (Thai: อำเภอเขาค้อ), it is two locations in Phetchabun Province by car to Phetchabun Province. To reach the city center of Phitsanulok takes less than an hour's driving. Khek Noi is also world-famous for being the largest Hmong community in Thailand. According to J. Z, most of the people who do business with him in this area are of the Hmong ethnic group, and a part of the Hmong ethnic group come from mainland China. Almost every one of the Hmong people who runs business here can speak Thai. If it weren't for the mention of ethnicity, it would be hard to tell whether they are Thai or Mon. J. Z said that the Hmong people are very easy to get along with. Everyone comes here because of business and making money. They understand each other's hardships in life, so they have long forgotten the relationship between ethnicities, and they often get along in business and help each other often. When J. Z started his business, he was helped by the Hmong ethnic community. They are all Thai nationals, and they speak Thai fluently. The differences in ethnic groups can no longer divide their friendship, said by J. Z. Although they are both businessmen and have a certain degree of competition, but there are not many tourists in northern Thailand except Chiang Mai, and everyone's income is quite similar, there is no sudden high or zero income. Therefore, although the new Chinese immigrants and the Hmong people maintain a relationship of commercial competition, the normal and almost equal income prevents them from turning commercial interests into contradictions. Another reason why the new Chinese immigrants and the Hmong people cannot become commercial enemies is that newcomers like J. Z are engaged in fruit, retail food and tourism, and Hmong people usually work in the clothing industry, because

Hmong people are good at sewing ethnic clothing with rich colors and beautiful craftsmanship. The business division between the new Chinese immigrants and the Hmong ethnic groups is very clear, and the two sides do not violate each other's business interests.

Figure 6.2.4-2-3 : Tailoring shops owned by ethnic Hmong people



Source: photo taken by author

Note: the tailoring shops are selling ethnic cultural products of the Hmong in the Khek Noi sub-district; Most of the products were clothes, decorations, talisman, and toys. Every retailer in this area, including J.Z., has their own location to do business.

Buyers are not so many by the time.

In general, the overseas Chinese have a special social and cultural structure, which leads to the inability of the Chinese community to unite. In the words of a Chinese proverb, “soldiers who don’t want to be generals are not good soldiers.” According to Skinner (1957), horizontal class solidarity was largely absent from Chinese society,

because almost everyone was striving to achieve a higher status (Skinner, 1957, p. 136). Thus this might offer the reason why the theory of Deutsch (1953) about national integration hasn't worked very well among the Chinese. As Deutsch stated, the communicative facilities of a society include a socially standardized system of symbols which is a language, and any number of auxiliary codes, such as alphabets, systems of writing, painting, calculating, etc. (Deutsch, 1953, p. 70). At this point, author is simply trying to explain and present this interesting relationship among older immigrants and newcomers instead trying to deny the theory of national integration.

Chapter 7

The “Borderless Integration” between Newcomers and Old-timers

Chapter 7

The “Borderless Integration” between Newcomers and Old-timers

7.1 The definition of “borderless integration”

To expand China’s soft power overseas, the unity of new immigrants and old Chinese has become more important than ever. Soft power can not only improve the image of a country abroad, but also to have an extra bargaining chip to negotiate and compete with other countries. How to connect the hearts of new immigrants and old Chinese? This has become the chief learning course for China’s police makers. The 'sinicization' doctrine and policy are part and parcel of Xi Jinping's vision for a 'New Era' (Vermander, 2019, p. 1). Sinicization means to bring Chinese, Chinese culture, education, ideology, and ethics to non-Chinese areas and to enable local people to gradually understand everything that China has.

However, in the previous article, we have mentioned countless times that the difference and gap between new immigrants and old Chinese is still very big. In addition to language differences, many behavior patterns and ethical standards are also very different. Therefore, if the two parties need to be united, a strong external force is needed. In the previous article, we also mentioned that since the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese government has begun to implement various overseas Chinese policies, and actively win over overseas Chinese to help China’s domestic construction until today. In this chapter, I will use Phitsanulok as the center of my investigation to analyze and

observe some of China's overseas Chinese policies, and how these policies have closely linked the two groups to enhance the soft power. In addition, in the past three months of investigation, I also explored some very interesting findings, which is how the old Chinese take their neutral stance to maximize their interests while facing borderless integration, but at the same time it will not violate the interests of all parties and cause unhappiness.

The vocabulary of “borderless integration” was created by myself. The creation of this vocabulary was inspired by the definition of national integration. Borderless integration is the separation of the “national” and the “integration” in the national integration. The concept of integration is not only restricted by the nationals, but may extend to people outside the nationals. The “borderless” was inspired by the flexible citizenship. Ong (2006) used the word “flexible citizenship” to describe the Chinese newcomers use their transnational identity as an advantage which is able to shut down political border to earn higher international status and gaining more economic benefit. While mobility and flexibility have long been part of the repertoire of human behavior, under transnationality the new link between flexibility and the logics of displacement, on the one hand, and capital accumulation, on the other, have given new valence to such strategies of maneuvering and positioning (Ong, 2006, p. 19). The second point of the composition of the concept of borderless is based on imagined communities, The third point of the composition of the concept of borderless is based on the country's purpose of enhancing soft power. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives

up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.) (Nye, 2004, p. 11)

In general, borderless integration means breaking the politically divided borders and national borders (from a personal perspective, nationality). On the basis of the borderlessness, based on the central principle of enhancing the country's soft power, the integration of the same ethnic groups globally will be carried out.

7.2 Constructing the “borderless integration” in three pillars

7.2.1 Pillar 1: culture building

For Chinese or Chinese society, the most basic core element is Confucianism. Although Confucianism is a bit outdated, and no one anymore would often use the word in it especially the younger generations, but Confucianism is full of any society or community that composed of Chinese or ethnic Chinese. Confucianism is not only one of the core and basic elements of Chinese society, it also sets a standard level for Chinese morality, worldview, values, and views of good and evil. Of course, Confucianism is also used to promote China's national image overseas, such as the Confucius Institutes that have been established in well-known universities around the world.

In recent years, Confucianism has been promoted by the Chinese government. Held in September 2014, the International Conference on Confucianism, the current

President of China, reiterated the importance of traditional Chinese thinking at the conference. The President spoke of China's traditional culture, underlining Confucianism as an important—but not the most important—building block (Kallio, 2015, p. 523). Of course, Marxism and socialist values are still the most important social thoughts for China, but these must be based on traditional Chinese values and Confucianism. From 2006, the Core Socialist Value was claimed, and in 2012, the Core Value was said as "prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity, friendship," which combined with foreign value, however, the rest was basically according to Confucianism.

One of an interviewee, named T, has been sent by a junior high school in Yunnan province where she was working and living. She joined the program that launched by Qiao Ban, which is known as The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO). OCAO has two non-profit institutions that are functioning as information centers, which concentrate on making connections with overseas Chinese individuals, called as All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC or Qiao Lian). Since 1980, the Qiao Ban and the foreign affairs ministry have issued directives to strengthen new migrant work (Nyiri, 2001, p. 636). In 2018, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was absorbed into the United Front Work Department, as an internal bureau, according to the document dated March 19 (Zhou, 2018). Based on the information post on the website of The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, OCAO concentrate on eight goals:

1. Responsibility for making policies and plans relating to overseas Chinese individuals.
2. Investigating and researching the situation of overseas Chinese individuals and providing information about the affairs of overseas Chinese individuals to the central government and the State Council.
3. Assisting the Premier of the State Council in handling the affairs of overseas Chinese individuals.
4. Guiding the work of returned overseas Chinese individuals and their family members.
5. Contacting relevant associations and representatives in Hong Kong and Macau, and overseas.
6. Guiding and promoting the economic, scientific, and technological cooperation of overseas Chinese individuals.
7. Instructing and directing the propaganda, Chinese language education, and communication that is relevant to overseas Chinese individuals.
8. Dealing with other matters assigned by the State Council.¹⁹

Another recruitment organization, called the Office of Chinese Language Council International, also widely known in another name, the Confucius Institute Headquarters. CI concentrates on the propaganda of the Chinese language and language education on world level. In Phitsanulok province, the Confucius Classroom was found in Xingmin

¹⁹ Eight tasks for Qiao Ban was found on the main page of Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. <http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node22/node23//index.html>

School. On November 9th, 2009, the Confucius Classroom at Xingmin School Phitsanulok was officially established. On August 22nd, 2016, a group of delegates of Kunming University came to Naresuan University for holding a conference regarding the official establishment of the Confucius Institute at Naresuan University. On October 27th, 2016, a groups of Kunming University (not sure it was the same group as the first time they came) came to Naresuan University again for another round of discussion for the establishment of Confucius Institute at the Faculty of Humanities, Naresuan University. On May 25th, 2017, a group of members from Kunming University made another visit to Naresuan University to listen the progress report about the establishment and plan for Confucius Institute.²⁰

7.2.2 Pillar 2: social media

The social media functioning within smartphones, have become one of the most dominant communication tools, especially for the younger generation who have already given up radios, television and any other traditional media for collecting information. In particular, young people in China spend a lot more time on smartphone applications than in many countries. From the beginning of 2019 to the end of last November, each user spent an average of 6.2 hours of the day—or 1.8 full day a week—online on mobile devices (Zhang, 2020).

Sun (2013) used the term “Chinese transnationalism” to display that how Chinese domestic media spreads its state’s idea to every overseas Chinese individual, including the

²⁰ Sources come from the website of Naresuan University. <http://old.nu.ac.th/en/index.php>.

Chinese old-timers and Chinese newcomers, to influence the community of newcomers as well as to redraw the border for the old-timers by remodeling the definition of “motherland.” Nyiri (2001) claimed that the function of Chinese media has been taking part of the aim that is to redraw the image of “Chineseness” or “standard Chinese” for any media consumers in overseas especially to Chinese newcomers and old-timers, because most of them are able to listen and understand Chinese language. Nyiri also said that its propaganda which was politically oriented designed by the state is not the only purpose, but to make more international or transnational Chinese patriots in bid to eventually reach out the greatest return according to economic gain. Chinese consulates all over the world make systematic effort to reach out to these students and migrants alike, including providing free cultural events and participating in various diasporic Chinese gatherings during Chinese festivals (Sun, 2013, p. 438).

What worth to mention in the article written by Sun (2013) is that China seems to be unwilling of expressing its growing soft power. Those Chinese-language radio stations, newspapers, television channel are not totally state-owned, ran by who is said of using their flexible citizenship. They are holding another country’s permanent residential card or passport, meanwhile profiting from their media companies based in overseas. Due to the ease of transnational movement by the formal PRC nationals and de-territorialized modes of production, it is increasingly possible for migrant individuals with Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, American and European passport to be based in China yet running their Chinese language media business in the host countries (Sun, 2013, p. 439). Also, courtesy of the Chinese-language media outlets, many of which are owned and operated by PRC

migrants, Chinese government bodies, and embassies and consulates, have found an effect-cultural construction, because this is more in line with the results of my investigation in Phitsanulok. Networking is a phenomenon that can be seen everywhere in Chinese society, and it is also one of the most important core values of Chinese society, so there is not much need to mention it alone. However, cultural construction is a very important aspect of China's strengthening of soft power overseas, and the Confucius Institutes that can be seen everywhere have proven this. In addition, I changed Sun's proposal to Chinese-language media and replaced it with a social network or social media, because for the very young generation of newcomers, TV, newspapers, and radio have been already given up. Instead, they use smartphones. Social media and smartphone applications has replaced the traditional media among younger generations. Therefore, for studying new immigrants, studying how and why they use social software becomes much more important.

In the previous chapter, I have introduced the social media used by new immigrants, called the *xuexiqiangguo*. The condition for becoming a registered user is that the people who registers must be a party member in his or her working place, and the person must use the real name to register. This smartphone application requires each user to accumulate studying points, and the studying points are completely open publicly among for user's boss and colleagues. For example, my boss can see that I earned 5 studying points today, and my total studying points are 15 points, and my subordinates and coworkers can also see it. Users need to complete quizzes and exams to accumulate studying points by learning certain knowledge and ideology. According to my interview and observation, every new immigrant needs to spend about one hour to one and a half hours a day to complete daily

courses and quizzes. Although the newcomers are contemporarily working at overseas, but the borderless internet had developed and extended the whole process that keeps reminding them the reason that they had been sent to overseas—serving not only as a language teacher but also to represents as a “development gift” on behalf of the diplomatic level to strengthen the relationship between Thailand and China. Concomitantly, as a result, the Chinese volunteers, entrepreneurs, and other Chinese migrants who leave mainland China for developing countries view themselves as agents of Chinese development, helping the poor in the name of the nation (Siriphon, 2015, p. 157).

In the context of globalization and information age, even a person is far abroad, but he or she can still get in touch with anyone, anywhere, anytime. And it's no longer like TV and tape recorders in the media age, which can only accept messages sent by the other party, but in this era when social media is so popular, people can not only receive messages but also reply to information to keep in touch with certain party.

7.2.3 Pillar 3: language education

Language is a very important part of national integration, and it can be said that it is the most important communication tool. No matter how different the ethnic backgrounds are, as long as they speak the same language, the success and possibility of integration will be extremely great.

Language is very important for a nation to maintain its nature. In the previous chapter, we have introduced that Thailand implemented a nationalistic policy to strengthen the

awareness of Thais during World War II. In Skinner's (1957) words, in spite of the popular myth about the "unchanging Chinese," the descendants of Chinese immigrants have been assimilating to Thai society since the beginnings of Chinese settlement in Siam (Skinner, 1957, p. 237). During the Cold War, all Chinese books and schools teaching Chinese were suppressed by the government. Since the October 1976 coup, Chinese secondary schools have been closed down, and Chinese primary education has been shortened from six to four years (Suryadinata, 2013, p. 283). These past historical lessons all prove that language plays a vital role in maintaining a nation's unique nature.

Since Thailand and China resumed diplomacy in 1975, various policies that had restricted the Chinese language have been lifted. The exchange of personnel between the two countries has gradually become warmer. Since 2013, the largest number of visa extensions approved by the Thailand Immigration Authority are Chinese language teachers engaged in the education industry. In February 2016, there was 3,488 Chinese staff in the academic field (Lertpusit, 2018, p. 80). As of 2019, there are as many as 124 Chinese language teachers in Phitsanulok and the six surrounding provinces. As I have introduced in the previous chapters, Chinese language teachers assigned to Thailand only need a very low threshold to apply. After entering the job, you need to receive two kinds of training, one is called induction training, and the other is called on-the-job training. Teachers can choose to live in the staff dormitory inside Xingmin School, or can choose to rent a house outside by themselves. The accommodation fee for the staff dormitory is provided by Hanban. Xingmin School provides Chinese newspapers, reading materials, as well as various ingredients and cooking utensils imported from mainland China. Volunteers who is living in the staff

dormitory can also watch TV channels of mainland China. Inside of Xingmin School just looks like a small China town, with Chinese characters everywhere. Even if a Chinese language teacher can't speak any Thai or write any Thai, it doesn't matter, because signs written in Chinese are everywhere.

During Chinese traditional festivals such as the New Year or Mid-Autumn Festival, various celebrations are also held here. Wherever they are, they can participate in the New Year's ritual of a major overseas Chinese organization, take photos with officials, hearing and making the same speeches in the national language, watch folklore dances, and have their donations noted in newspapers (Nyiri, 2001, p. 648). Whenever these special festive moments come, officials from the embassy in Chiang Mai will also come to the Xingmin School to participate in activities and celebrate the festival with teachers and students. Some Chinese teachers with the most outstanding performance will be invited to speak on stage, and they will receive some medals and commendation certificates from the Chiang Mai ambassador.

According to the words from a interviewee, the Chinese language volunteers believe that it is not only their job to come to Thailand to teach Chinese to local schoolchildren, but also to let the locals know about the “new faces” of the younger generation of China and the demonstration of their teaching ability. Chinese teachers generally believe that they cannot leave any bad impression to the locals or in any Thai classrooms at where they work together, because they feel that they are representing their own country and will be looked down upon if they leave some bad impression. An interviewee felt that Thailand is a place

with a low level of civilization. The purpose of teaching Chinese to local people is to bring more advanced and more civilized ideas to the relatively backward places such as Thailand. On the other hand, a Thai teacher said that she did not understand why China attaches so much importance to Confucianism. Confucianism is not a religion and cannot be compared with Buddhism. He also said that the locals did not understand the essence of Confucianism, nor did they understand why the classrooms and venues for teaching Chinese were called Confucius Classrooms. No matter how good looking the propaganda was designed, the idea of Confucianism is far more different from a religion, such as Buddhism. Therefore, it is difficult for exerting it to persuade the people from other culture to trust you by jointly acknowledging your tradition as a universal value (W.J.H. personal communication, 2019).

The faculty office of Xingmin School is next to the faculty office of Confucius Classroom. It is interesting to find that all employees in the office of Xingmin School are descendants of old-timers or ethnic Chinese, while the office of Confucius Classroom is all new immigrants from mainland China. Everyone in the two offices can speak fluent Chinese. The only difference is not their faces and ethnicity, but their growth background, mindsets of value and worldviews. Although the people in the two offices have communication, they are only limited to communication at work. In private, they have not had any activity and motivation to strengthen or connect with each other. The new immigrants do not speak Thai, and most of the communication with the old Chinese are conducted in Chinese Mandarin. Because the language used is also Chinese, and the working environment is full of Chinese, and the food and housing are also imported from China, including

newspapers, reading materials and magazines. At the same time, when new immigrants live in a foreign place, they will constantly and unconsciously move closer to the local cultures, which can be said that they are to be gradually assimilated. However, these things around them offset their assimilation process, allowing them to continue to maintain the identity and characteristics that they carried from mainland China.

7.3 Finding the balancing point: Xingmin school, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

Xingmin Chinese school has been a public primary school which found in 1922, the establishing fund was supported by Seven Overseas Chinese Associations Joint Agency²¹, which was initially called as Phitsanulok Foundation. According to my fieldwork, the original purpose of Xingmin School was not only to teach Chinese, but also to be a local disaster relief agency in Phitsanulok even northern Thailand. Whenever a natural disaster occurs in Phitsanulok, Xingmin School and other overseas Chinese associations and organizations would raise donations for disaster relief and assistance. This chapter is not to describe the contribution that Xingmin School has made to Phitsanulok, but is about some new discoveries I have explored during the fieldwork. As the central institution and base of the old-timers, Xingmin School, in the face of borderless integration and the advent of new immigrants, especially when dealing with certain sensitive political issues, how to be independent and neutral became the challenge for old-timers. I found it in the


²¹ Totally 300-400 students were enrolled in Xingmin school in 1922. In 1939, the Chinese language education not only in Phitsanulok but in whole Thailand were strictly limited or even canceled, the name of Xingmin school was changed to "Anleiwei school" by former government, then everything was recovered until 1945 as well as the Chinese language curriculum.

introduction book of Xingmin School that the mission of Xingmin School and the core value is to unite all overseas Chinese in the world. However, this core value has also been challenged by the arrival of new immigrants.

In the previous chapter, we introduced the dynamics and situation of new immigrants in Phitsanulok. The new immigrants to Phitsanulok seem to have broken the traditional theory of international immigration, that is, pulling factors and pushing factors. For the new immigrants here, there is no pulling factor but a simple driving factor. Because Phitsanulok's economic development situation is not enough to create any pulling factors, but the pushing factors are very obvious and have a clear purpose: every new immigrant comes here with a mission. These missions are to teach local people the Chinese language, which is Mandarin, and carry forward Confucianism and strengthen China's soft power in many ways. In their own words, they will bring true Confucian civilization to Thailand and show the vitality and outlook of the new generation of China. Of course, these are closely related to the national policies. However, in fact, this conflicts with the purpose of Xingmin School and old-timers. On the side of the old Chinese and Xingmin School, it is to unite all Chinese at home and abroad, but on the side of new immigrants, it is the borderless integration. Both seem to have the same purpose, but it is quite different. Also if it is related to politics, it is inevitable that some sensitive topics such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the relationship with the mainland will be unavoidable. Put in simple words, one side is to unite all Chinese at home and abroad, but on the other side, is to achieve borderless integration. The result seems to be the same, which is to achieve a somehow unification, but the process and method even the result are completely different.

It may be that Xingmin School and the old Chinese have already expected that there will be a day to “choose a side”, so they have written a precept in the school rules in advance: helping members within appropriate range and context, except for those who concerned with politics. This rule shows that Chinese with certain political ambitions will definitely be excluded by Xingmin School and other Chinese Associations. Because politics is a very sensitive topic, especially for Chinese in Thailand. The older generation of Chinese have suffered hardships and learned the lessons, knowing how to cooperate with the Thai government to avoid being victimized by politics. Today, a new round of challenge is coming along with the arrival of newcomers. Of course, maintaining political neutrality is not easy, because neutrals need not to favor any party, and meanwhile, do not harm any party. While maintaining a long-term and short-term cooperative relationship with either party, they should not arouse the unhappiness and jealousy of the other party. This is very difficult for anyone, any community, any organization, and even any country.

Figure 7.3-1: Phitsanulok Xingmin School Alumni Association Regulations



Source: photo taken by author

Note: The Chinese version of the school regulation clearly stipulates that anyone who is concerned about politics will not be accepted. The contents of the school regulation is all from local interviews and books introduced by the school. Because the books published by the school do not indicate any publisher and publication time, it is impossible to trace the author and source.

Maintaining political neutrality is not an easy task. In the history of Xingmin School, I discovered their actions to maintain political neutrality. In 1996, on the eve of the Hong Kong regime's return to China from the British colony, the Overseas Chinese Association and Xingmin School held a celebration party at the Tanning Hotel. This celebration dinner invited Liu Yongxing, who was the Chinese ambassador to the Consulate in Chiang

Mai, to participate in the dinner, and the organizer also invited some other members of the consulate. Two years later, in 1998, mainland China was hit by floods, and some areas were severely destroyed. The Overseas Chinese Association and Xingmin School organized a fundraising event, and finally raised 610,500 baht to donate to the disaster-stricken areas in mainland China through the Chiang Mai Embassy. In 1999, in the same place where the banquet to celebrate the return of Hong Kong was held in 1996, Tanning Hotel, the Overseas Chinese Association and Xingmin School held a banquet for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, which also coincided with the Thai King's birthday. But it is very interesting that at the same time that day, the Overseas Chinese Association also raised 200,000 baht and donated it to Taiwan for disaster relief, because Taiwan had a huge earthquake that year.

From the above examples, we can see that the Overseas Chinese Association maintains a neutral position in politics and strives to help mainland China and Taiwan to maintain a neutral position without hurting the feelings of either party.

Subsequently, a Confucius classroom was established in Xingmin School, and a large number of staff from the mainland moved into Xingmin School and the Overseas Chinese Association, and some of the school's policies and slogans were also changed. The embassy stationed in Chiang Mai has also become the supervisor or leader of all overseas Chinese associations in Phitsanulok. It seems that the Overseas Chinese Association and Xingmin School established by the old Chinese can no longer maintain a politically neutral stance, but I still found a very interesting place, that is, the school badge. The school badge

of Xingmin School was born after World War II and has never changed. The color and content of this school badge are sufficient to show that the Xingmin school must and will be always maintain the neutral political position. In the school introduction manual of Xingmin School, I found an introduction about the school badge. The school badge consists of 3 colors, blue, red, and white. Blue represents the blue sky, red represents the color of the national flower of the Republic of China, and the white background is used to set off the overseas flowers. The design of the school badge is almost the same as that of the Taiwanese flag, especially the colors are exactly the same in three colors. The school's introduction manual says that white represents purity and friendship, and red represents the sense of responsibility to dare to assume obligations.

Figure 7.3-2: Xingmin 学校校友会会徽



Source: photo taken by author

Note: The emblem of the Alumni Association of Xingmin School and the school emblem are composed of three colors of red, white and blue and marked with the national flower of the Republic of China.

There is also a historical factor that has led to a very friendly relationship between Phitsanulok and Taiwan. Since most of the older generations of Chinese came from Fuzhou, Guangdong, or Taiwan and other regions, their descendants are also very closely connected with these 3 regions and regard these 3 regions as their hometowns. Many descendants of Chinese in Phitsanulok have graduated from Xingmin School, and many descendants of Chinese have later become important members of the local business and political circles. These business and political figures later wanted to give back to their alma mater, so they formed the “Xingmin Graduate Basketball Team”. After that, this basketball team became the iconic team in the sports and political circles in Northern Thailand. From 1956 to 1958, the basketball team of Xingmin graduates was invited to Taiwan to participate in the birthday celebrations of then President Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan, and received gifts and award certificates from president Chiang Kai-shek himself. When the basketball team returned to Phitsanulok from Taiwan, their reputation spread throughout northern Thailand. It is said that Chiang Kai-shek himself had visited northern Thailand and built good relations with the Chinese community, but due to the long time, it is not suitable to be used as a reference for the study of new immigrants.

Xingmin School also maintains a good relationship with mainland China. Since Thailand established diplomatic relations with China in 1975, in the same year mainland

China also sent its first volunteer to teach Chinese at Xingmin School. According to an interviewee, the only one in the entire office was from mainland China at that time, and all the remaining employees were from Thailand. Since the beginning of the 21st century, mainland China has begun to send people to the Xingmin School and engage in related work. The most interesting discovery is that the old Chinese employees of Xingmin School can travel to mainland China for free. According to the current principal of Xingmin School, Huang, he has visited Shanghai and Beijing many times, and all the expenses for food and accommodation are provided by the Chinese side. Principal Huang himself went to Beijing three times from 2000 to 2005. His personal impression of Beijing was not very good. The first is because she was once annoyed by a Beijing traffic police because she could not understand Chinese and the traffic rules on the road. The second reason is that the weather in Beijing is too cold. Principal Huang, who lives in warm Thailand all the year round, cannot get used to Beijing's climate.

Generally speaking, the old Chinese are in a dilemma with the Xingmin school and various Chinese clubs they represent. The purpose of Xingmin School is to unite Chinese people all over the world, but due to many political factors, however, this goal seems to be still very far away. Political neutrality and not provoking any party are the efforts that Xingmin School and the old Chinese have made all the time, but at the same time they must do their best to help all parties, especially when natural disasters such as earthquakes strike.

Final Chapter

Throughout this essay, I reviewed the history of Chinese immigration in Thailand through its history, which began with the earliest 10th century, the Tang and Song dynasties. Immigrants from Guangdong and Fujian provinces first set out from southern China and arrived in Siam in Southeast Asia by boat or land, where they settled down, and make their families. In the later Ming Dynasty, the maritime commerce and arms empires of Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong opened up a sea route for the early Chinese immigrants on the sea. Later, during the Qing government, because the massive increase in the amount of immigration caused the Qing government's anxiety and fear, it severely suppressed and restricted immigration. Later, during the period of the Republic of China, immigrants not only possessed huge economic assets but also had extensive overseas contacts, which greatly attracted the government of the Republic of China, which was still at the period of its infancy in terms of its international status and power. Therefore, the government of the Republic of China did its best to promulgate policies to attract overseas immigrants to return to mainland China and serve the new government of the Republic of China. Later, after the founding of New China, until now, various policies have been implemented to attract Chinese children and descendants to return to China for business, investment and politics.

Borderless integration, As an original vocabulary created by author, it may not be so easy to understand. Because borderless integration is my own vocabulary, it is very hard to explain a self-created vocabulary to the audience without duplicating the knowledge of previous research. This is why I keep repeating the explanation of borderless integration in

my articles, especially in the fieldwork part of Phitsanulok Province. In almost every chapter, I repeatedly propose and consolidate the meaning of borderless integration and why this new definition comes into being, and its reason for existence. So I take this opportunity to repeat the cause and effect of this vocabulary. First, the word integration is derived from national integration. The term National integration was originally created by Karl. W. Deutsch. Deutsch pointed out that several factors must be needed if national integration is to be achieved. The most important factor is the communicative tool, which is the same language. Later, many scholars did research and practice on the basis of Deutsch. In other words, even if people are of different races, skin colors, and cultural backgrounds, but if they all speak the same language, they can be united therefore form a harmonious community. Phitsanulok Province is one such environment. Burmese, Cambodian, Thai, Chinese, and a small amount of Westerners, but also different ethnic groups, such as the Mong community. These people also have different beliefs, so it should be difficult, or almost impossible, to achieve national integration in such an area. But it is incredible that Phitsanulok Province has managed to bring all these groups together with almost no flaws in terms of national integration. The reason for this, which I also mentioned in the paper, is the same language. The focus of my research is on the integration between new and old Chinese immigrants, which is very different from the traditional definition of national integration. The integration between new and old Chinese immigrants is kind of a semi-mandatory integration that based on national interests, and based on economic and political interests, and also based on China's foreign policy and strategy towards Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, I can fully understand why professor feel that the traditional meaning of national integration and the borderless integration are in conflict with

each other or cannot be related. What I want to emphasize is the word, “borderless”. The integration between new and old immigrants is inherently estranged, and actually in conflict with each other, because their languages do not communicate with each other. But several political and diplomatic factors have led the two groups to communicate and help each other in full speed. There were originally divided boundaries that limited the occurrence of integration, but these boundaries have disappeared between old-timers and newcomers. As I wrote in my thesis, there are three pillars that make boundaries blurred or even non-existent, such as the Internet.

3-month fieldwork time is too limited. I search for interviewees almost every day, and I try my best to use local resources and manpower to find people who can help with the survey. Finally, under the help of professors Takahashi, Dean Napisa, and Professor Paul, I finally found some people who were helpful in my investigation. Among those interviewees, they are the former president of Phitsanulok Overseas Chinese Association, Dr. Huang, a member of Phitsanulok Commerce of Chambers, and Lisa from Yunnan University. In fact, I still can find more resources and interview objects, but three months is obviously too short, and then the corona virus pandemic showed a worldwide outbreak at the end of 2019, that I could not return to Thailand again to continue the investigation. The search for information can only continue through a limited number of friends on Facebook. One of the five-pages table in my dissertation was actually based on an online interview on Facebook. The interviewee was a former lecturer at Naresuan University.

As the purpose of this research. I think that Phitsanulok is a place with potential for development. It has the conditions to connect the four countries in Southeast Asia as well as China, and it is a rare political and economic treasure land. So we cannot underestimate

its future value just from its current and present levels. Although the Human Development Report 2016 issued by the United Nations also pointed out that although Phitsanulok has unique geographical advantages, it is still seriously lacking in capital, human resources, and infrastructure. The absence of these factors means Phitsanulok cannot develop, which leading to further materialistic starvation. However, none of this can change its name as the “crossroads of Southeast Asia”. Therefore, I believe that China's foreign policy will not give up this place. These volunteers are very worthwhile to study. First, they represent new immigrants with advanced education level, which is fundamentally different from traditional Chinese old immigrants. Second, their careers in Thailand directly depend on China's foreign policy. If you want to learn more about China's foreign policy, studying these volunteers is one of the best choices, because they are the number one representative group of China's foreign policy. Third, Japan has gradually become a big country for international immigrants, as we can see immigrants from China, Southeast Asia, Europe, North America, South America, anywhere in Tokyo. So I hope that my research on new Chinese immigrants can contribute to Japan's policy maker, and create a harmonious, unified, safe and peaceful society for immigrants as well as Japanese local residents, so that all people can live together peacefully in Japan.

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