

China's Developmental Peace in International Peacebuilding  
The Impacts of Chinese Approach in Post-conflict Countries of Asia

WONG Kwok Chung

January 16, 2023

A doctoral dissertation submitted to  
the Graduate School of International Culture and Communication Studies  
Waseda University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

## **Acknowledgements**

The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the constant support of my colleagues. Most importantly, I would like to credit my mentor and main supervisor, Professor Yuji Uesugi, for always giving constructive criticism and support of my university studies over the years. I would also like to thank my two deputy supervisors, Professors Paul Bacon and Cheung Mong, for their advice on how to progress. I would also like to thank the following scholars and experts for having accepted my interviews and given me strong inspiration for this dissertation: Professor Oliver Richmond, Professor Miwa Hirono, Dr. Shahid Hashmat, Dr. Zahid Ahmed, Dr. S.I. Keethaponcalan, and two experts on China and Afghanistan who prefer to remain anonymous. Many thanks to all of the above.

## Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .....	viii
List of Tables .....	xi
List of Figures.....	xii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1: Preliminary Background: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding .....	1
1.2: Definition of Terms .....	4
1.3: Research Question.....	6
1.4: Hypothesis .....	8
1.5: Methodology.....	10
1.5.1: Research Methods.....	10
1.5.2: Scope and Limitations.....	13
1.5.3: Structure of the Study .....	14
1.5.4: Significance of the Study .....	15
Chapter 2: Theories of Peacebuilding .....	17
2.1: Introduction .....	17
2.2: Liberal Peace .....	19
2.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace.....	19
2.2.2: Critique of Liberal Peace .....	20
2.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace .....	23
2.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace .....	24
2.3: Hybrid Peace .....	26
2.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace .....	26
2.3.2: Critique of Hybrid Peace .....	28
2.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace.....	30
2.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace .....	32

2.4: Developmental Peace .....	34
2.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace .....	34
2.4.2: Theory of China’s Developmental Peace.....	36
2.4.3: Critique of Developmental Peace .....	41
2.4.4: Practice of Developmental Peace.....	45
2.4.5: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace .....	46
2.5: Conclusion.....	47
Chapter 3: Motives of Chinese Peacebuilding .....	51
3.1: Introduction .....	51
3.2: Linkage Between Peacebuilding and the BRI.....	52
3.2.1: Economic Stability as Party Legitimacy.....	53
3.2.2: Food and Energy Securities .....	55
3.2.3: Preventing Western Intervention.....	57
3.3: Gaps in Current Literature.....	61
3.4: Conclusion.....	63
Chapter 4: Case Study of Pakistan .....	65
4.1: Introduction .....	65
4.1.1: Background History .....	66
4.2: Liberal Peace in Pakistan.....	70
4.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Pakistan .....	70
4.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Pakistan.....	72
4.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Pakistan.....	73
4.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Pakistan .....	77
4.3: Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan.....	83
4.3.1: Theory of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan.....	83
4.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan .....	84

4.3.3: Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan .....	84
4.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan.....	90
4.4: Developmental Peace in Pakistan.....	93
4.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Pakistan .....	93
4.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Pakistan.....	95
4.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Pakistan.....	95
4.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Pakistan.....	102
4.5: Conclusion.....	111
Chapter 5: Case Study of Afghanistan.....	114
5.1: Introduction .....	114
5.2: Liberal Peace in Afghanistan.....	115
5.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan .....	115
5.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan .....	115
5.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan.....	116
5.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan.....	119
5.3: Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan .....	129
5.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Afghanistan.....	129
5.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Afghanistan .....	130
5.3.3: Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan .....	130
5.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan .....	135
5.4: Developmental Peace in Afghanistan.....	140
5.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan.....	140
5.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan .....	140
5.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan .....	141
5.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan.....	150
5.5: Conclusion.....	156

Chapter 6: Case Study of Sri Lanka .....	159
6.1: Introduction .....	159
6.1.1: Background History .....	160
6.2: Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka .....	165
6.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka .....	165
6.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka.....	166
6.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka.....	167
6.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka .....	172
6.3: Hybrid Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka .....	180
6.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka .....	180
6.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka .....	181
6.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka.....	182
6.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka.....	192
6.4: Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka.....	195
6.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka .....	195
6.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka.....	196
6.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka.....	197
6.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka .....	205
6.5: Conclusion.....	213
Chapter 7: Case Study of Myanmar .....	215
7.1: Introduction .....	215
7.2: Liberal Peace in Myanmar.....	217
7.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Myanmar .....	217
7.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Myanmar .....	218
7.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Myanmar.....	219
7.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Myanmar .....	222

7.3: Hybrid Peace in Myanmar.....	227
7.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar .....	227
7.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar .....	228
7.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar.....	228
7.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar.....	246
7.4: Developmental Peace in Myanmar.....	256
7.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Myanmar .....	256
7.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Myanmar.....	256
7.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Myanmar.....	257
7.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Myanmar.....	262
7.5: Conclusion.....	269
 Chapter 8: Conclusion .....	 272
8.1: Summary of the Dissertation.....	272
8.2: Contributions to the Existing Literature .....	280
8.3: Limitations to Research.....	281
8.4: Future Recommendations .....	282
 Bibliography .....	 286

## **List of Abbreviations**

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ARSA	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
BBEP	Balochistan Basic Education Programme
BBS	Bodu Bala Sena
BCP	Burmese Communist Party
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BRACE	Balochistan Rural Development and Community Empowerment
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRIDGE	Bridging Rural Integrated Development and Grassroots Empowerment
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CGGC	China Gezhouba Group Corporation
CGTN	China Global Television Network
CITIC	China International Trust and Investment Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CLJ	Constitutional Loya Jirga
CMEC	China Myanmar Economic Corridor
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organisation
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ELJ	Emergency Loya Jirga
ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
G&B	Gilgit-Baltistan
GBESGO	Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order
GBLA	Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
GDP	Gross Domestic Product



GONGO	Government Owned Non-Governmental Organisation
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GSI	Global Security Initiative
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IBL	Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPKF	Indian Peacekeeping Forces
ISA	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KBC	Kachin Baptist Convention
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KIO	Kachin Independence Organisation
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KWAT	Kachin Women's Association of Thailand
LAO	Limited Access Order
LLRC	Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
LoC	Line of Control
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MCC	Metallurgical Group Corporation
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MITI	Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry
MNNA	Major Non-NATO Ally
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLD	National League for Democracy
OAD	Open Access Order
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P5	Permanent Member
PM	Prime Minister

PR	Proportional Representation
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDF	Saviya Development Foundation
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SHRF	Shan Human Rights Foundation
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SLPA	Sri Lanka Ports Authority
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SSD	Special Security Division
SWAN	Shan Women's Action Network
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIPOM	United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission
UNMOGIP	United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
UWSA	United Wa State Army
WB	World Bank
WHAM	Winning Hearts and Minds

## **List of Tables**

Table 1: Summary of Peacebuilding Models .....	48
Table 2: Analytical Framework.....	50
Table 3: Summary of Case Studies .....	277

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of the BRI.....	60
Figure 2: Routes of CPEC.....	105
Figure 3: The Durand Line and Pashtun Territory .....	128
Figure 4: Ethnic distribution of Sri Lanka .....	160
Figure 5: Map of CMEC .....	262

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1: Preliminary Background: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

China is an active player in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), in terms of both funding and troops contribution. Starting its contribution in the early 1990s, China's roles in PKOs are becoming clearer and growing in importance in conflict zones in the post-Cold War era, where conflicts are much more complex and protracted. According to official UN data, China is the ninth largest troop contributor to PKOs and the largest among the Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council, while still being the second largest funder of PKOs behind the US (UN Peacekeeping, 2021a, 2021b). However, China has not always been an active contributor to global peace-related activities in the past. In fact, before the 1980s, China was anything but an active player in peacekeeping, or in global affairs in general. When the People's Republic of China (Communist China) replaced the Republic of China (better known as Taiwan) as one of the P5 of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China repeatedly stressed the importance of state sovereignty and rejected UNPKOs as an intervention until this position was reversed in 1988 when Beijing first joined the UN Special Peacekeeping Committee (Hirono, 2019). Beijing's views of PKOs shifted from an unfavourable perspective that saw them as a tool of intervention that violated the principles of state sovereignty, to a more favourable view of PKOs being a necessary tool for China to project power. The UN is the most legitimate means to organise any international military intervention. China is more concerned about non-UN military initiatives, such as those that could be carried out by the US-led coalition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Back then in the 1990s, there were growing concerns among the political elites in Beijing about American unipolarity, prompting China to pursue 'traditional' peacekeeping practices that focus on consent, state sovereignty, and political and economic growth (Lanteigne & Hirono, 2012). This came at an age when 'traditional' styles of peacekeeping had been under more scrutiny from various actors, mainly in the West, as they call for a more humanitarian approach in PKOs. This also means that China's support for state sovereignty in its international peace activities is not a recent phenomenon. Beijing's favour of state sovereignty and non-intervention can be traced back as far as 1955 in the Bandung Conference, when China along, with India, introduced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or *Panchsheel*, to the international stage. These principles, which focus on norms such as state sovereignty and non-intervention, are the guiding principles for Chinese foreign policy, where many other Asian countries like India and Japan, as well as the Southeast Asian countries, all follow similar principles

regarding peacekeeping, and of course later peacebuilding.

China's growing economy has also allowed Beijing to become more sophisticated with its contributions to the PKO as time passes. One of the first peacekeeping missions in which China participated was to Cambodia. China went to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, but unlike its fellow Asian country Japan, which contributed greatly to the operation, China's contribution was less well-known at the time because it kept a low profile, not wanting to attract too much public attention (Hirono, 2011). Likewise, China was also a part of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004, but again, during this period, China only sent engineers, military observers, medical crew and police, but never directly sent combat troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The UK-based Royal United Services Institute (2006) states that considering the scale of the mission in Haiti, China's presence in MINUSTAH has largely gone unnoticed, and yet, in 2004, Beijing had already contributed more soldiers and police than any other P5 member of the UNSC. It was not until 2006, during the outbreak of the Darfur crisis in Sudan, that Chinese core interests were directly exposed and threatened by conflict. Back in the 1990s, many Chinese oil companies, such as the China National Petroleum Corporation and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, better known as Sinopec, went abroad and began investing and developing Sudan's oil sector, in which, at the time, China faced little international competition due to security concerns from the West.

The Darfur crisis displays some early signs of China's willingness to compromise on non-intervention when vital national interests are at stake. With the Darfur crisis, then Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir refused to accept UNPKOs into the country due to suspicion about Western troops as former African colonialists (McDoom, 2008). China, without the colonial hangover, was able to persuade al-Bashir to allow a hybrid mission with the African Union, later known as the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), to operate in conflict-affected Darfur. China demonstrated its role as a valuable asset when conflict later broke out between Sudan and South Sudan, showing its influence over both governments by bringing them to the negotiation table, yet maintaining the principles of non-intervention by not forcing outcomes.

While China may have received criticism for shielding former Sudanese president al-Bashir, who was wanted by the International Court of Justice for human rights violations in Darfur, Beijing offered al-Bashir no support when he was overthrown in 2019. This demonstrates the balanced approach that Beijing has with its developmental partners (Barber, 2020). Concerning South Sudan, China sent its 8<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion of

700 troops, which arrived in Juba in 2021 to perform a one-year peacekeeping mission in the area (Zang & Sun, 2021). As we can see, with every PKO in which China takes part, there is a gradual build-up of Chinese capabilities, from several engineers in 1992 in Cambodia to an entire infantry battalion by 2021 in South Sudan.

A notable turning point in history that may have induced this change was in 2011, when the Libyan civil war broke out. At the time, US-led NATO coalition forces unilaterally intervened against Muammar Gaddafi's forces in Libya for humanitarian concerns, and, according to Western sources, were highly critical of Gaddafi's brutally suppressed anti-government protests in Benghazi (BBC, 2011). NATO's armed intervention came in spite of a UN-enforced no-fly zone in which China reluctantly supported the Security Council's Resolution 1973 by abstaining and not vetoing. NATO's sudden intervention escalated the conflict, which forced China to rapidly pull its citizens out of the country, leaving assets that would be lost to the conflict. NATO intervention, as a result, led to the destruction of the Gaddafi regime, setting off a series of regime changes in Libya. Chinese scholars have lashed out at NATO's unilateral intervention, saying that UN-authorized humanitarian intervention should protect civilians and not facilitate regime change, and what NATO has done in Libya was not its responsibility to protect (R2P) but a pursuit of hegemony in the name of humanity (Ruan, 2012).

With all of the above being said, this dissertation is not about Chinese peacekeeping. Instead, it focuses on China's approach to peacebuilding, a step beyond peacekeeping, which has been relatively underexplored by the international scholarly community, as well as relatively under-experimented by the Chinese themselves. Chinese peacebuilding retains many traits already seen with peacekeeping, including its disdain for military intervention by Western nations. With the lessons learnt in Libya and China's expanding interests following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015 by Xi Jinping, China must proactively step up to protect its own economic and security interests, as well as its normative interests, by rejecting armed intervention on the grounds of human rights and security. This dissertation explores the 'developmental peace' employed by China as a means to achieve peace and stability in its periphery. By understanding the concrete impacts China is making on the ground, it is possible to shed light on whether or not developmental peace is capable of creating sustainable peace both for post-conflict societies desperately in need of tranquillity, and for China itself, to allow it to continue its economic activities through the BRI as a means to enhance its national security.

## **1.2: Definition of Terms**

Before going into more detail, there are some terms with ambiguous meanings that require clarification, so that they do not cause confusion later in the dissertation.

### *China*

The first important term is the very concept of ‘China’. In this dissertation, unless stated otherwise, China refers to the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and not to Taiwan or any Chinese diaspora communities around the world. The CCP is the sole legitimate party of China, and Xi Jinping along with the Standing Committee of the CCP is the highest decision-making body of the Party. There are no checks and balances against the Party, and no checks and balances within the party, as these have all been made powerless by Xi (Yu & Mitchell, 2021). The party has influence over every aspect of life in China: it does not allow different voices anywhere in the country, not on the Internet, not even within the Party itself (Yu & Mitchell, 2021). This is important to remember, as this dissertation will often refer to Chinese sources for China’s perspective on certain issues. However, since there is no freedom of speech or press, any articles published in an academic journal or on the Internet may not be independent and will reflect heavily on the position of the Party.

### *Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*

The BRI is an economic initiative that is not designed with peacebuilding in mind. Despite its political and strategic implications, the BRI itself is, at large, an economic initiative that bolsters China’s slumping economy. Therefore, any political and strategic implications, as well as peace- and security-related issues, have only increased since the proliferation of the initiative. For example, it became necessary to pay more attention to the peace and security dimensions of the BRI after China realised the danger of traversing politically unstable countries. The BRI in itself is not a peacebuilding initiative, but Chinese peacebuilding is undertaken mainly to protect this initiative.

### *Democracy*

Democratic countries are those that regularly conduct free and fair elections by all eligible citizens where the elected leaders of a country represent the interests of the people. Democratic countries are usually bipartisan or multi-party systems where the oppositions are allowed to express different opinions or disagree with the ruling party’s policies. Ruling parties in democracies fear losing power to the opposition, and therefore, they are more inclined to respond to the voices of the people.



Merely having free and fair elections, however, does not always constitute a liberal democracy. There are also illiberal democracies where elections exist but the people still suffer diminished civil liberties. In fact, most ‘democratising’ countries in the world are illiberal democracies which usually provides more political liberties to its population than civil liberties such as the freedom of speech and press (Zakaria, 1997). This point is relevant to our discussion because most of these illiberal democracies are found in China’s periphery. These countries, such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, deemed partly free by Freedom House, or flawed democracies and hybrid regimes by the EIU Democracy Index, uphold some liberal values such as democracy and freedom of speech yet perform poorly with regard to human rights.

### *Peace*

Peace is a simple term with different meanings. Simply implying that society is at peace does not necessarily mean that it is peaceful. Cases where peace only exists because there is an absence of war, when structural violence remains unaddressed, cannot be considered fully peaceful. This dissertation follows Galtung’s definition of positive and negative peace in analysing peacebuilding efforts on the ground. Negative peace is the situation where there is non-use of violence but there is also de-legitimation, while positive peace focuses on harmony and legitimation (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). This dissertation is particularly concerned with the establishment of negative peace in post-conflict societies because not all people living under certain structural violence can equally enjoy and reap the benefits of peace.

### *Peacebuilding*

According to the official UN definition, peacebuilding comprises the efforts to help post-conflict countries transition from war to peace to reduce the risks of relapsing back into conflict by strengthening their capacity for conflict management as the foundation of sustainable peace and development (United Nations, n.d.a). This dissertation follows the UN definition, but adds to it, as we must also bear in mind that peacebuilding by foreign actors is a form of intervention. Whether it is for humanitarian or economic purposes, the moment a foreign entity tries to influence the course of a third country’s policies, there is a certain degree of intervention involved. This is not to say that intervention should always be shunned. Deeply divided societies with powerful structural inequalities may find it difficult to ‘fix themselves’ and sometimes change must be induced by either powerful international actors or local people empowered by the international community.

Fixing deadly conflicts in deeply divided societies (like Sri Lanka) may take as

long as the conflict itself, and doing so would require careful consideration of local-national-transnational alliances, partnerships, and movement-to-movement and person-to-person relationships (Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Lederach's concept of *justpeace* focuses on the creation of social and economic justice as means of constructive change in the management of violence (Lederach & Appleby, 2010) *Justpeace* should not be the end goal of peacebuilding, but instead, peacebuilding should be about creating a sustainable version of *justpeace*, just as free and participatory governments must be consistently monitored after their creation (Lederach & Appleby, 2010). The end goal for peacebuilding in this dissertation would follow Lederach's *justpeace* as well as Galtung's positive and negative peace, where post-conflict peacebuilding should create sustainable *justpeace* and positive peace but avoid negative peace.

### *Local*

Locals, as the name suggests, are the local people of a society, whereas 'local grassroots' is a synonym. Local civil society organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are the domestic institutions in a country. Both CSOs and NGOs from the capital urban areas or remote rural areas are considered local organisations as long as they are domestically based institutions. Foreign institutions will be labelled as international NGOs (INGOs) instead. Initiatives from local, domestic actors in peacebuilding can be considered a form of local ownership, while initiatives from international actors should be seen as a form of intervention that may contribute to local ownership.

### *West*

The 'West' or Western countries in this dissertation indicates the collective entity of liberal democracies in North America (US and Canada), the UK and Europe, perhaps Western Europe more than Eastern Europe. Japan, although a close ally of the US and a member of the developed world, being an OECD country, should not be considered a part of the Western group. It should be considered as an Asian country that is more inclined to follow Asian values such as non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making rather than the promotion of liberal norms or robust intervention. That being said, many traits of Japan's peacebuilding efforts overlap with Western efforts, especially with hybrid peace, so Japan will often be seen to act in tandem with the West rather than at odds.

## **1.3: Research Question**

**What impacts are China's developmental peace having on Asian post-conflict societies compared to existing models of peacebuilding, and which peacebuilding model is more likely to create sustainable and positive peace in these post-conflict societies?**

This dissertation is a theory-driven dissertation which aims to analyse China's developmental peace through a comparative study with existing peacebuilding models such as liberal and hybrid peace. At the same time, peacebuilding theories should be created with the intention of being applied on actual conflicts in the real world. Researchers in peace and conflict studies should not be satisfied with merely formulating viable theories, but vigorous testing of theories through practice is also an important component of international peacebuilding. In addition to formulating the theory of China's developmental peace, which insofar its theoretical groundwork has not been properly laid out, this dissertation also aims to apply developmental peace to practice with regards to the post-conflict societies of Asia.

No peacebuilding model is perfect and there is no 'one-size-fits-all' model in international peacebuilding. Existing models must undergo constant scrutiny as well as be refined under trial and error in order to address the ever-changing dynamics of conflicts on the ground. Therefore, a comparative study of advantages and disadvantages on different models of peacebuilding embraced by different global actors is important to shed light on which aspects of which model is more or less capable of addressing a certain conflict, or a specific issue within a conflict. Ultimately this dissertation will aim at delivering a qualitative judgement based on observations made in the case studies of four post-conflict Asian societies on which existing peacebuilding model is more likely to result in sustainable and positive peace for these societies.

As China's developmental peace is one of the main models analysed in this dissertation, it naturally brings China to the centre of the discussion. This also means for there to be any meaningful comparison the cases selected for the case studies must all have the greatest amount of interplay between China's developmental peace with Western liberal peace as well as hybrid peace most often pursued by other Asian actors such as Japan and India, as well as Western actors that seek to go beyond liberal peace. South and Southeast Asia are hotly contested regions between China and the West, as well as between China, Japan and India and are the ideal regions that contain the most relevant post-conflict societies to use as case studies. The four cases of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar provides a good balance between post-conflict societies and latent conflicts which peacebuilding theories attempt to address, and these four countries will

be the focus of this dissertation.

In the process, this dissertation will also attempt to answer some related sub-questions. The first relates to China's motives for peacebuilding. A contingent question that has gotten mixed answers from both Western and Chinese scholars over the years is whether China is a revisionist or status quo power. This dissertation intends to answer this question from the international peacebuilding perspective by providing evidence suggesting that China is a revisionist power in terms of peacebuilding. Beijing is actively trying to promote an alternative model, and not keeping to their status quo of non-intervention on the international stage. The reasons to this will be elaborated in Chapter 3. A closely related question is on the limits of non-intervention under the context of peacebuilding. This is not limited to China's non-intervention, but rather the non-intervention approach taken by Asian actors in general including Japan and India. Throughout the case studies this dissertation will attempt to establish the point that although the non-intervention approach by Asian actors is effective at gaining the cooperation of countries such as Myanmar that have resisted Western liberal norms, it is less effective when it comes to gaining their cooperation for meaningful reforms towards democracy and human rights; values which are commonly associated with positive peace. A final sub-question comes down to the importance of political will of host country national elites to introduce meaningful reforms that contributes to sustainable positive peace. The case studies will attempt to show the significance of political will in peacebuilding as well as the consequences when political will is weak.

#### **1.4: Hypothesis**

The main reason why China is promoting an alternative model to peacebuilding in developmental peace is that Beijing wants a model to distinguish itself from the West. To this point, despite its narratives of non-intervention, China also wants to intervene in the domestic affairs of its neighbours, but it cannot do so through existing peacebuilding models such as liberal peace and hybrid peace, since they do not carry the liberal norms that these existing styles bring with them. China is not a democracy, and it does not have a good record of human rights, at least from the Western perspective. Narratives of non-intervention are more for preventing international intervention against China due to the very fact that it has often been condemned by the liberal West for performing poorly on human rights, rather than truly believing in the principles of sovereignty considering the amount of intervention China conducted against Myanmar. China is not the only country that does so, as the US uses the same narratives of protecting freedom and democracy to enable intervention in other countries, while in reality, Washington is heavily invested in

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in places like Afghanistan, rather than in the creation of a sustainable democracy for the Afghan people. The world's two largest powers are not very different in this regard.

However, China does have its advantages regarding peacebuilding, or intervention in general, as an Asian country that does not carry a colonial legacy like the European countries do. It is also known to be effective and efficient in building infrastructure. These traits make China an attractive option for developing countries of Asia and Africa, some of which have negative implications against the West for its colonial legacy, and also are underdeveloped, as many lack basic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, dams, and powerplants. Using this to its advantage, China promotes developmental peace along the paths of the BRI, where development is provided as an influence over developing countries, and peace is used as a means to maintain stability in conflict-prone areas.

Regarding 'why' China is trying to promote developmental peace, there are both normative and practical reasons for doing so. China under the Xi regime is not so much concerned with the classical argument of the rising East versus the declining West, but more with a clash of values and systems (Economy, 2022). While old sentiments about the decline of the West may exist, China is more interested in making the periphery safe, sometimes at the expense of democracy, as Beijing continues to flex the superiority of its system (Pepinsky & Weiss, 2021). For a long time, the Chinese scholarly community has been critical of the Western approach to conflict resolution in saying that the logic of using democracy to fix every type of conflict is fundamentally flawed, and that democratisation has led to little progress recently, so more attention should be placed on China's domestic experiences of achieving peace through development instead (Wang, 2017; Zhao, 2011).

As to the impacts that China's developmental peace is likely to make on the ground in its periphery, it is difficult to achieve sustainable peace if China solely focuses on the economic development of a post-conflict society. The reason for this is that often it is not the economic factor that is the root cause of conflict, as the conflicts seen in developing countries are often rooted in political, ethnic, or racial reasons. China, with its non-intervention approach, is either unwilling or incapable of addressing non-economic causes of conflict. It is incapable in the sense that many problems that plague developing countries, such as identity crises and ethnic division, are the same issues that remain unsolved by Beijing at home (Richmond & Tellidis, 2014). China's peripheries have no shortage of these problems, as seen in the deep ethnic division between the Sinhalese and Tamil in Sri Lanka, as well as the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, which is closely related

to the issue of citizenship and identity.

There are also common criticisms of Chinese conduct on the ground by local people, such as landgrabs and disregard for environmental laws, as well as the influx of Chinese workers and goods, pushing out local businesses. In the worst case, these criticisms can amount to discontent against the BRI and threaten Chinese national interests, and then Beijing may demand greater security from the host countries' local or national governments, which are sometimes illiberal, to take a heavy-handed approach against discontent. Whether or not these criticisms apply to countries around China is to be tested in the case studies later in this dissertation. If the 'peace' in developmental peace is to merely maintain stability along the path of the BRI, such an approach should suffice in protecting China's national interests. However, if China's intention is to create sustainable peace, developmental peace may fall short, as conflict is contained or fought elsewhere away from China's interests, while the root cause of conflict itself remains largely unaddressed.

## **1.5: Methodology**

### *1.5.1: Research Methods*

This dissertation uses the case study methodology. Case studies are useful for newer phenomena like developmental peace, whose framework has not been properly laid out by the Chinese government. Case studies' closeness to real-life situations is often an asset for researchers (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Researchers often look at individual cases not necessarily because they want to prove any facts, but mainly to fulfil the desire to learn about something (Eysenck, 1976). Case studies are also useful in times when the researcher cannot influence the behaviours of those in the study. In my position as an individual researcher, there is little means to influence a country's policy to either embrace or reject Chinese peacebuilding, so instead, I focus on the 'why' and 'how' aspects of a certain phenomenon (Baxter & Jack, 2008). For this dissertation, the 'how' aspect is given more emphasis, as I am interested in the impact of developmental peace on the peacebuilding processes on the ground. A collective of individual post-conflict cases that share a similar set of problems can shed light on the means that China employs for developmental peace to tackle protracted conflicts. Simply understanding the theory of developmental peace is inadequate, whereas case studies will apply what is known in theory to a real-world setting to see 'how' it operates in post-conflict societies around China's periphery.

Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) present a comprehensive review

of the case study methodology, including both its strengths and weaknesses, and most importantly, George claims that although large-N statistical studies are more common, due to the rhetoric that ‘bigger is better’, small-n studies like case studies aim to analyse a class of events that make up the phenomena of scientific interest. For example, the class of events in this dissertation are post-conflict societies, and specifically how various peacebuilding models interact with certain post-conflict societies in Asia, with particular focus on China’s developmental peace, which has not been given a detailed comparative analysis with other models in the existing literature. This dissertation is also a theory-driven comparative analysis between different models of peacebuilding in relation to four post-conflict societies in Asia. Peacebuilding is a phenomenon that cannot easily be quantified, especially when applied in practice, as conflict on the ground is an ever-changing dynamic process. King et al. (1994) stress the need for precise explanation in comparative studies, as detailed descriptions are fundamental to social sciences. Just like the example of world politics, used by King et al. (1994) to highlight the importance of descriptions, international peacebuilding is also a rapidly changing phenomenon. With peacebuilding, the situation is perhaps even more dynamic, as conflicts can transform instantly and often without warning in high intensity conflict zones such as Kashmir and Afghanistan. George and Bennett (2005) add that the case study method should encompass both single cases and comparisons of small cases, as the best way to understand trends shared between cases is to combine within-case analyses and cross-case comparisons. For the above reasons, the case study is the most applicable methodology for this dissertation, which tries both to establish the theory of China’s developmental peace and to establish a qualitative judgement as to which existing peacebuilding model is most likely to create sustainable and positive peace in post-conflict societies through evidence found in four Asian countries.

Case studies are, however, limited by the fact that one cannot easily generalise findings based on a few individual cases. For example, what applies to China’s Asian periphery may not necessarily apply in the same way to Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or Oceania. Asia is only one of the many regions covered by the BRI, as China’s developmental peace may operate completely differently in other parts of the world. If that is indeed the case, then developmental peace is truly adaptive, perhaps more so than liberal peace. George and Bennett (2005) list several potential trade-offs, limitations, and pitfalls of the case study methodology, and one of the most common criticisms against this methodology is case selection bias. While this is less of a problem in qualitative research as opposed to statistical research, often the researcher selects cases that are likely to produce a similar outcome (George & Bennett, 2005). To address this problem, I will

define the reasons for the selection of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar as the desired case studies for this dissertation, as opposed to alternatives such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Cambodia, or Laos.

One of the main traits of China's developmental peace is the pursuit of Sino-centrism – a concept that will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. The point here is that China is in active geopolitical competition against the West, as well as other major regional powers such as Japan and India in Asia. This means that the cases selected for this dissertation must contain significant interplay between Chinese, Japanese, Indian and also Western interests in relation to international peacebuilding theories. This makes the cases in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Myanmar in particular) important, as they represent a mixture of Chinese and Indian interests combined with Japanese and Western interests. Pakistan is useful to analyse the clash of Chinese and Indian interests, as well as the struggles of Western liberal peace to address illiberal democracies with active conflicts. Pakistan is also one of the few South Asian countries that align almost fully with China against India, while others in the region prefer a more balanced approach between China and India. Conflict in Afghanistan is interrelated to the problems faced by Pakistan, such that one cannot analyse one without understanding the other. Afghanistan is also an interesting case where liberal peace has clearly failed, which leads to the question of whether or not alternative models like hybrid peace and developmental peace are capable of supplementing for the shortcomings of liberal peace.

Sri Lanka is highly controversial for the role it has in the BRI, as the only country to have lost infrastructure to China due to the Sri Lankan government's inability to repay its debt. The scars left by the civil war in Sri Lankan society are also closely related to the discussion of post-conflict positive peace in this dissertation, making it more valuable as a third case to analyse. Finally, Myanmar is selected as the only Southeast Asian country for its proximity to India, as well as for the abundance of violent conflict in the country. Both Sri Lanka and Myanmar also display the limits of Asian non-intervention in creating sustainable positive peace in post-conflict societies, especially under Japan and India's hybrid peace approach and China's developmental peace.

Furthermore, there is also interviews of relevant scholars and experts familiar with the conflict and peacebuilding situation of each case, with the intention of learning more about China's role in each country's peace process. There have also been interviews with Chinese scholars to provide a Chinese perspective on the concept of developmental peace, though these scholars prefer to remain anonymous. These interviews provide supplementary data that cannot be found online or from books and journals. The scholars provide a better understanding of the situation on the ground with their experience in the



local context.

### *1.5.2: Scope and Limitations*

This dissertation reviews the impact of China's peacebuilding from the lens of existing international peacebuilding theories. As briefly outlined above, the main theories explored are liberal, hybrid and developmental peace, along with some subcategories of hybrid peace such as local, adaptive, and illiberal peace. These theories will then be applied to a country-specific context to make a qualitative judgement of how effective each model is in creating sustainable peace in post-conflict countries around China's periphery.

The reason why Asia is chosen as the main region of analysis is that China practices 'peripheral diplomacy' (Stokes, 2020). This is a term that was adopted by Xi shortly after his inauguration in 2012, where China deepens existing ties with its Asian neighbours, and this concept was once again emphasised at another high-level foreign policy meeting in 2014 (Stokes, 2020). This concept will be defined further in the following chapter in relation to China's definition of the periphery. For China, securing this periphery is still the highest priority. Beijing is likely to exert the most effort in trying to maintain peace and stability in its peripheral regions of Asia, especially in the conflict-prone South and parts of Southeast Asia. Therefore, focussing on Asia is more rewarding than other regions where China's interests are mostly limited to economics. Cases in Asia are also more contested, not only with the West, such as the US, the UK, and Europe, but also with other major regional powers like Japan and India, which have not enjoyed very good relations with Beijing for most of Xi's term. This also makes Asia a dynamic region that deserves the most attention regarding China's developmental peace and the impacts it brings.

This dissertation is theory-driven rather than issue-driven. Therefore, it will focus on establishing the theory of developmental peace rather than analysing the role that peacebuilding plays in Chinese foreign policy. This dissertation is not about trying to understand developmental peace as a foreign policy. Nor is it about analysing China's domestic policies. These factors are important and do deserve some explanation to have a better understanding of the theory and practice of developmental peace, but they are not the focus of this dissertation. The events most relevant to this dissertation are focused during Xi's term between late 2012 and 2022 (the time of writing). This is because of the strong implications that developmental peace has for China's BRI, and because the BRI only gained prevalence during Xi's term. Past events such as China's conflict resolution role in Cambodia, Haiti, Sudan, and Libya will be referred to but not discussed in detail.

Furthermore, as mentioned multiple times, the focus of this dissertation is on post-conflict countries around China's periphery in Asia. There will not be a detailed discussion of developmental peace concerning other regions like Africa.

One limitation of this dissertation is the lack of fieldwork, due to it mostly being written under lockdown due to COVID-19. Therefore, there were no face-to-face interviews with scholars or locals from the countries of concern. It was also difficult to obtain insider information such as BRI project documents on specific projects outside what is already published online. Since the BRI is often criticised for its lack of transparency, researchers from the outside must rely mainly on secondary sources to grasp a clearer picture of the project and its potential impacts. The same can be said for the full picture of China's foreign aid programme in general, as the CCP do not usually reveal how much has been spent where on what projects. Some existing research, such as Aid Data, shows that Chinese projects are distributed evenly across Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America, and are allocated based on Beijing's commercial and geopolitical needs (Dreher et al., 2017). More recent data may be difficult to obtain, though this dissertation is more concerned with the qualitative analysis of the impacts of China's developmental peace on the ground, and less with the quantitative analysis of the amount of Chinese foreign aid.

Finally, current advocates of developmental peace, such as He (2019) and Wang (2017), often associate China's model with peacekeeping rather than peacebuilding. The author would like to extend the application of developmental peace into peacebuilding. As seen in practice, China does not merely react to conflicts as they happen. Instead, it employs measures to prevent post-conflict societies from relapsing back to conflict through economic measures, which are commonly associated to peacebuilding. Whether or not China's development-focused approach is effective at creating sustainable peace will be up for further scrutiny. Furthermore, He (2019) also often draws the comparison between developmental peace and liberal peace – the dominant model of peacebuilding – suggesting that developmental peace supports liberal peace on the ground rather than opposing it.

### *1.5.3: Structure of the Study*

This dissertation will contain eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. After this chapter, which introduces the dissertation and its relevant concepts, Chapter 2 serves as an extension of the background knowledge as to 'why' China is interested in peacebuilding, as well as establishing the analytical framework to be used in the later parts of this dissertation. Chapter 3 will be specifically focused on the theories of

peacebuilding. It will explore the origins, *modus operandi*, and advantages and disadvantages of liberal, hybrid, local, adaptive, and illiberal peace, as well as developmental peace. This chapter will be the main literature review and will also explain in more detail the analytical framework that will be used in the following case studies.

Chapters 4 to 7 present case studies on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, to apply what was discovered in the previous two chapters, with particular reference to how different styles of peacebuilding pursued by various actors have influenced the peace processes of these countries on the ground. The above four are all post-conflict countries, with some of them still experiencing instability due to insurgency. Each country case has a sub-question to help it relate to the main research question. For Pakistan, I analyse whether economic development helps resolve small conflicts related to insurgency and terrorism. The Afghanistan case asks whether alternative measures like hybrid peace or developmental peace are capable of creating sustainable peace in a country where liberal peace has clearly failed in the past. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka does not have active armed conflicts, but it is a deeply divided society in need of reconciliation. Sri Lanka's case is interesting, as it asks an important question of whether or not international peacebuilders have the capacity to help the Sri Lankan people achieve ethnic reconciliation, considering that almost three decades of civil war have left deep scars in Sri Lankan society. This is also a useful case to see how developmental peace fares in deeply divided societies and whether or not economic development is the path to sustainable and positive peace, if it does attempt to not address reconciliation at all. Finally, while Myanmar is not geographically considered a South Asian country, its proximity and violent armed conflicts, often fought near the Chinese border, make it a country with strong political, security and economic implications for China. Here in Myanmar too, I analyse the role that international peacebuilding has in protracted ethnic conflicts and whether or not economic development is capable of making ethnic groups drop their arms and work together with the government for sustainable peace.

#### *1.5.4: Significance of the Study*

This dissertation shows the significance and impacts that China's developmental peace has brought to the ground of post-conflict countries around its periphery. China's contributions to peacebuilding are relatively understudied because it is a newcomer to the field. Being a newcomer in any field means relative lack of experience compared to existing actors whose peacebuilding models are refined after years of trial and error, successes and failures. There is also a lack of English literature on this rather recent phenomenon, which was only made clear after Xi came into office in late 2012. However,

it also means that roughly one decade has passed from Xi's first term, in which the BRI was launched, to the time of writing in 2022. Some of the impacts that China's model has been making on the ground, both positive and negative, are made clear. On the international stage, there is no way for Xi to realise his envisioned 'China Dream' of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation if Beijing relegates itself to non-intervention and relies on international peacebuilders to address the conflicts on China's doorstep. China must expand the definition of non-intervention to encompass greater areas of its periphery, ensuring that it is the main actor leading intervention at its periphery.

This study's findings will mainly benefit scholars in the field of peace and conflict studies, particularly those who are interested in the role that emerging donors play in peacebuilding. China is only one of the many newcomers to become active in the field of peacebuilding – an area that has been traditionally dominated by developed democracies in the West and Japan. In the near future, more and more non-Western emerging actors from every region in the world, such as India, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil, will all be expected to make their own contributions to the theory and practice of international peacebuilding.

The unipolar domination of Western actors in the field of peacebuilding will most definitely be subjected to scrutiny, as emerging donors will not always submit to Western liberal peace. China's developmental peace may be just one of the many emerging models of peacebuilding to come. This means that it is important to learn from the Chinese model to ensure that advantages are highlighted and mistakes are not repeated. This is especially important for countries that want to achieve a balance between liberal norms, such as democracy and human rights, and principles of non-intervention and economic development – an approach that non-Western democracies like Japan and India appear to be taking. The findings in the case studies are also helpful for researchers interested in the subject of peacebuilding, as recipients deserve just as much attention as the donors themselves. Many developing countries outside Asia are suffering from protracted and violent armed conflicts. The findings of this dissertation can serve as a reference point for recipients of peacebuilding on how to strike a balance between local efforts of peacebuilding and international efforts, especially on the issue of peacebuilding through intervention. Of course, China's developmental peace does not end in Asia, as its ever-expanding overseas interests will most definitely put Beijing in a situation where it has to proactively engage in conflicts located far away in the Middle East and Africa.

## **Chapter 2: Theories of Peacebuilding**

### **2.1: Introduction**

The main purpose of this chapter is to construct an analytical framework for the case studies based on reviews of current literature related to peacebuilding. It will do so by elaborating on the theory behind each peacebuilding model that is relevant to this dissertation, followed by a critique of that theory to indicate its shortcomings and potential remedies. Separating theory from practice, the practice of peacebuilding discussed in this chapter will be focused mainly on past achievements of that peacebuilding model, with a critique of the practice of failures. This will provide a general overview of what to expect from liberal, hybrid (local) and developmental peace when applied to China's periphery in Asia.

In post-conflict and post-war societies, a step beyond peacekeeping is usually needed to ensure that the negotiated peace and temporary stability created from peacekeeping are sustainable and that societies do not relapse to conflict. In other words, peacebuilding usually addresses the aftermath of violent conflict by focusing on mechanisms that remove causes of war and find alternatives to war when there is disagreement or conflict, where both of the above should be done by domestic actors without the need of foreign intervention (Galtung, 1976). Peacebuilding needs to be comprehensive to transform conflicts into sustainable and peaceful relationships so that peace becomes a social construct rather than a situational condition (Lederach, 1997). We often see post-conflict societies relapse into conflict after several years of peace due to underlying economic and political conditions, especially in cases where neither side of the conflicting party is able to completely defeat the other or reach mutually agreeable settlements (Walter, 2011).

In the case studies of this dissertation, most conflicts adhere to the above definition, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan where military victory over extremist groups is difficult, or in Myanmar where underlying political and economic issues are unresolved between ethnic minorities like the Kachin and the Myanmar government, so there is a relapse to conflict after nearly two decades of ceasefire. The only exception is in Sri Lanka, where the government achieved a decisive military victory against its adversaries, although the victor's peace in itself has created a whole new plethora of problems for Sri Lankan society, as deep-rooted ethnic grievances were not adequately resolved. Peacebuilding is necessary for these societies, even if these post-conflict countries are all largely stable at the state level, except for Afghanistan.

Amongst the existing models of peacebuilding, liberal peace has been the

dominant style of peacebuilding in international society, as world order was largely dictated by the liberal West after the Second World War and particularly at the end of the Cold War after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Mac Ginty (2008), liberal peace under the context of intra-state conflict seeks to maintain the status quo promoted by leading states and international and financial organisations through peace-related interventions. However, despite the perceived importance of local ‘indigenous’ methods of peacebuilding, there are cases like Afghanistan and East Timor where the peace process was almost entirely driven by international intervention (Mac Ginty, 2008).

The model of liberal peace has, however, encountered difficulties in countries like Afghanistan. This has led scholars of peacebuilding to explore alternative methods to better include the local population in the process of peacebuilding. There has been more focus on hybrid peace, where, in addition to the existing top-down initiatives that can be led by international society or the local government, there is also a focus on the ‘subaltern’ where local grassroots such as the local communities affected by conflict or domestic civil societies can work together from the bottom up and support government or international peace processes. These alternative approaches are locally driven and arise through subaltern agencies that pursue peaceful change and also attempt to ‘modernise’ local identities to work with both donors and international agencies like the UN (Richmond, 2013). The fact that local agencies are working directly with international actors does not mean that hybrid peace should bypass local authorities. The process of transforming existing oppressive power structures of the state requires a powerful agency because local civil societies are usually not powerful enough for this role, which means that international actors must also work with the state to help it in this transformation (Richmond, 2022).

The recent exposure of liberal peace’s shortcomings has not been ignored by China. It presents Beijing with the opportunity to argue against creating peace through liberal norms such as democracy, as Beijing demands greater international attention, especially among the developing world, to the China model, which has managed to maintain peace and stability in Japan through state-led economic development. In a personal interview, Miwa Hirono (2022) says that aid recipients in the developing world tend to find the China model attractive, even if not everyone agrees with the norms that come with Chinese aid. Nathan and Scobell (2012) claim that China is a dissatisfied country, as it often has to challenge the US and allies when Beijing wants to pursue its own interests. Interests, in this case, encompass greater Chinese influence in Asian regional affairs, which means less Western influence, less influence from Asian major powers like Japan and India, and less US projection of power (both economic and

military) in Asia concerning sensitive issues such as sovereignty over Taiwan, China's maritime disputes with Japan and Southeast Asia, and Beijing's human rights controversy in Xinjiang, as well as safe and stable trade routes for China to the Middle East and Africa in times of conflict.

## **2.2: Liberal Peace**

### *2.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace*

Liberal peace is the Kantian way in which Western democracies impose their forms of government onto illiberal states (Mac Ginty, 2008). Kant's (2003) *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* takes a populist approach in saying that societies that require people's consent to declare war are less likely to actually go to war because people do not want to bear the costs. The logic behind the Kantian republic is that public opinion has the power to sway elites of a state to not choose war as an option, and the people will not choose war because they do not want to bear the costs. There have been exceptions in the past that have proven Kant's populist approach wrong, however. For example, politicians of Britain and France narrowly avoided conflict during the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 when their respective masses called on the countries to go to war (Gat, 2005). Kant's iteration of the republic has given inspiration to modern advocates of democratic peace, such as Doyle (1983), who believes that wars are effectively eliminated if all countries are liberal democracies because democracies do not fight each other. This is because all liberal democracies share a similar set of norms and have liberal institutions that restrict the government's ability to wage war (Rosato, 2003). For Kant, peace can be sustained by the willingness of everyone in the system to adopt the liberal state model where there is respect for the rule of law, upholding human rights, separation of power, and multi-party checks and balances, as well as elections (Pugh, 2005). These liberal norms are what liberal peace, in theory, aims to achieve.

Liberal peace is not solely about the proliferation of democracy, as it has an economic side to it as well, in the form of the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus is a form of economic intervention, which the US wanted to become the standard for reforms that would help the debt-ridden economies of Latin America in the 1980s (Williamson, 1990). This would later be linked to liberal peace under the form of neo-liberalism, where American-led international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would revise the relationship between the individual, the market, and the state through international intervention in the 1980s and 1990s (Woodward, 2013). The WB and the IMF encouraged public sector

reforms that valued good governance, accountability, efficiency, and transparency (Williams, 2000). The US, armed with the narratives of proliferating democracy and neoliberalism, accelerated liberal peace in the 1990s, as seen by George Bush Sr. and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, who wanted to use the Gulf war to create a US-centric post-Cold War system where American intervention would lead to the transformation of the Middle East system (Bush & Scowcroft, 2011). Liberal peace usually begins as victor's peace – a hyper-conservative top-down approach through where peacebuilding is done through the coercive powers of a foreign hegemony (Richmond, 2016). This is because the West can still have an imperialist mentality that considers local laws and customs as *terra nullius*, free for intervention and subversion (Tully, 2008).

### 2.2.2: Critique of Liberal Peace

There is a plethora of critiques of the theories of liberal peace. The first problem of liberal peace pertains to the greater argument of the universality of liberal norms, such as democracy. Some scholars, including Amartya Sen (1999), argue that democracy needs to be seen as a universal value because most people around the world would agree that it is the most legitimate form of government, or simply due to the fact that most people consider democracy as valuable or instrumental to peace. Others may argue that democracy is universal and does not stop at borders because of both its capacity and its limitations in creating conditions and defending political equality more effectively than paternalist alternatives through appealing to the basic decision-making aspects of human nature (Beetham, 2009). In either case, it is generally assumed that liberal peace is acceptable to all for its combination of peace, democracy, and free markets (Richmond, 2006). Of course, this 'universality' of democracy and liberal peace has received criticism from multiple angles, such as ownership of neo-liberalist agendas or the potential incompatibility of post-conflict justice with stability or human rights, or in general, the grand argument that liberal peace is highly interventionary: it creates a whole new set of arguments around issues of hegemony, the relationship between the interveners and recipients of intervention, as well as the neutrality and conditionality of those that intervene (Richmond, 2006).

The second critique of liberal peace is regarding the linkage between democracy and peace. While the basic assumption is that the world would be a safer place if all countries were liberal democracies, as democracies do not fight wars against each other, Jack Snyder (2000) claims that violent domestic conflicts borne out of nationalistic sentiments are most likely to occur during the initial processes of democratisation. Nationalism is usually non-existent or weak before democratisation, but it can rapidly



surge in the early stages of democratisation as powerful domestic groups exploit popular sentiments in order to gain support for war or economic development efforts, while simultaneously denying democratic power for the average citizen (Snyder, 2000). In the cases most closely related to this dissertation, we see powerful Buddhist nationalistic sentiments in countries like Myanmar, which is struggling to transition to democracy, as well as strong Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, which is already a democracy with free and fair elections. Free and fair elections do not excuse the fact that said elections democratically placed highly nationalistic leaders such as Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa in power. In Myanmar, nationalism involves both monks and students chanting slogans about the Burmese as the ‘master race’, and at the heart of the Rohingya Crisis in the Rakhine state are nationalistic sentiments that have framed the Rohingyas as illegal immigrants (Gravers, 2019). Furthermore, Snyder (2000) adds that when people of different cultures both want independent states, giving these people a vote will inevitably put them at odds. This resonates with the issues that Pakistan is facing with Baloch nationalism in Balochistan, as well as the unresolved issue of Pashtunistan related to the Pakistani Taliban as well as the Afghan Taliban. These issues will all be explored in more detail in relation to peacebuilding in their respective case study chapters.

The third critique pertains to the concept of elections and their relationship with the twin concepts of limited access order (LAO) and open access order (OAO). North et al. (2012) distinguish the two depending on how violence is addressed. Political systems in LAOs create and allocate rents such as government contracts, land rights or monopolies on businesses to pay off actors with access to violence, as these actors understand that fighting will reduce their rents (North et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the state is the sole entity in OAOs that can exert violence, while all citizens have the right to form non-violent organisations where the open access order sustains economic and political competition as well as civil society participation (North et al., 2012). While elections are an essential component of the democracies that liberal peace aims to create, the actual impact of electoral results in LAOs is limited. In LAOs such as Myanmar, finding a consensus between relevant actors that reduces violence is the more efficient means to protect their interests and is more likely to lead to sustainable peace compared to delivering an electoral defeat against the Myanmar junta, where military elites feel that their interests are undermined, leading to the coup d’état in 2021 (Uesugi, 2022). This may hinder the effectiveness of liberal peace in LAOs such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and of course, Myanmar, though not Sri Lanka.

The final critique of liberal peace has not so much to do with the theory or universality of liberal norms, but more with how they are proliferated and advocated. A

problem arises when much of the debate on liberal peace is limited to scholars, policymakers, and students of the global North, while those from the global South are rarely heard in mainstream academic debate (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015). Another way to capture this mismatch is the distinction between West and non-West with regard to liberal peace, where the 'West' is the Eurocentric order that implies the necessity for Europe to involve itself in the wider world (Sabaratnam, 2013). In a more recent context, the US appears to have replaced Europe in this role, but the same critique still stands, as the West continues to wield considerable material and normative power in peacebuilding (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015).

The fact is that most ongoing conflicts, or post-conflict societies as products of recent conflicts, are part of the global South, yet it is such a contradiction to reality when the voices of Southern scholars, policymakers and students are largely neglected. As long as liberal peace cannot escape its liberal heritage, it cannot be critical (Chandler, 2010), especially when most existing criticisms of liberal peace explicitly avoid mentioning alternatives to liberal peace for conflict-affected areas (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015). However, to this point, Paris (2010) argues that more efforts should be made to improve the current liberal peace framework rather than trying to find alternatives. Paris's defence of liberal peace in itself has been criticised by others on the grounds that all peacebuilding strategies involve some type of neoliberal policy of open markets and privatisation, as well as capacity-building through state coercion, and that it would be more effective to take the political economy approach rather than applying the liberal norm to post-conflict societies (Cooper et al., 2011).

Perhaps most relevant to this dissertation's discussion of international peacebuilding is a criticism of the top-down model of liberal peace. Liberal peace has often been criticised for being 'too liberal' when it tries to intervene in non-liberal societies that lack capacities, and for the limited effect it has had in transforming post-conflict societies and failed states (Chandler, 2010). It is 'too liberal' in the sense that too much emphasis has been focused on dismantling existing power structures that are treated as illiberal, and replacing them with democratic institutions, as well as pursuing neoliberal economic policies when the post-conflict society is not in any shape or form to do so. Even the IMF has criticised the neoliberal model in liberal peace, saying that it has increased inequalities despite the positive effects of privatisation on lowering the burden on governments and global trade, lifting millions out of poverty (Ostry et al., 2016). The average citizen in a post-conflict society is often more concerned about their next meal, or whether there will be clean drinking water in their village, rather than which politician gets the support of international donors in the capital. More focus must be given to the

subaltern and their everyday basic needs and security issues (Richmond, 2017), so that there is greater local ownership of the peace process, as this would also prevent relapse into conflict.

Despite the above criticisms, liberal peace remains one of the dominant models of peacebuilding, mainly because it has been around for the longest. Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that liberal peace has not achieved anything noteworthy. The most important achievement of liberal peace is its creation of a framework where peacebuilders – both scholars and policymakers – can analyse the ever-changing forms of peace as part of a historical process of power rather than a single-case crisis reaction from the international community (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015). The state-building aspect of liberal peace is slightly more complicated, as it has been criticised as merely creating an empty shell of a democratic state but does not have the mechanism to bring together the state and its constituencies (Richmond, 2008). However, despite criticisms, the liberal norms proliferated in the process of liberal peace, while they may not be as universal as Western advocates claim, remain a strong element in the creation of sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. This will be more clearly seen with regard to the theory and practice of hybrid peace, where liberal norms retain their relevance in many post-conflict societies.

### *2.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace*

Liberal peace in practice is not just peacebuilding, as it embodies a large element of state-building as well. Some notable cases of the practice of liberal peace include peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, failures in Afghanistan and Iraq should be attributed to the shortcomings of the US approach on the ground, rather than the inherent weaknesses of the liberal peace framework in itself. Though the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq are at large, the failures of state-building by the main advocates of liberal peace in the US, rather than being attributed to the weaknesses of the theories of liberal peace in itself. The US has become more interested, or even obsessed, with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency rather than focusing on a sustainable peace process in the Middle East, causing liberal peace to stray from its original objectives.

In practice, Paris (2004) proposed the approach of ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ (IBL) – when liberal peace is applied to war-torn countries, these measures include waiting until conditions are ripe for elections, designing electoral systems that reward moderation, promoting good civil society, controlling hate speech, implementing conflict-reducing economic policies, and rebuilding effective state institutions. In post-conflict Sierra Leone, a war-torn former British colony, Paris’ IBL strategy based on

liberal peace has gained success when it transformed the socio-political, economic, and cultural aspects of the country to prevent it from relapsing into conflict (Bindi & Tufekci, 2018). The Sierra Leone case demonstrates that models such as Paris' IBL, a large proportion of which derived from liberal peace, do have the capacity for sustainable peace in post-conflict countries to create stable political landscapes and economic growth, but only if the political will is there (Bindi & Tufekci, 2018). Certain initiatives should be highlighted, such as the success of the Special Court, because it prosecuted figures that had the most responsibility for the war, though there appear to be problems such as exclusion, especially amongst youth groups that wanted to pursue engagement with post-conflict state-building experiences (Ikpe et al., 2021).

Liberal peace has also been applied to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is also, historically, the first case that will be subjected to foreign intervention based on liberal state-building (Talentino, 2005). The problem with trying to install democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, other than the fact that locals have largely been ignored, is that the international community did not understand the roles played by CSOs and identity in society (Richmond, 2011). Chandler (2009) has criticised Bosnia as a state reflecting on the interests of 'external agendas' rather than the interests of its local civilians. EU engagement in Bosnia comprises primarily consultations with local elites already in power, while largely ignoring voices that call for alternatives (Kappler & Richmond, 2011). The Bosnia case shows some serious shortcomings with liberal peace intending to embark on state-building.

Meanwhile, the case of Haiti, a poster-child for failed and ineffective states, demonstrates that the liberal peace model is much more effective in creating new governments rather than ensuring that the governments themselves are accountable to the citizens they represent (Donais & Knorr, 2013). To this point, the practice of liberal peace shows that liberal peace, usually led by the US and Western actors, is sometimes not as concerned about creating democratic institutions or free and fair elections as theory suggests, but provides the narrative that can enable the West to intervene in the domestic affairs of states that they deem necessary. This is also directly related to the critiques of the practice of liberal peace, when illiberal means are used in an attempt to create a liberal system. This leads us to the next point of Afghanistan and Iran.

#### *2.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace*

The most significant criticisms of the practice of liberal peace are probably those derived from the US handling of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these cases do not necessarily show a deficiency with the model of liberal peace itself, they are more about

the deficiencies and shortcomings of US policy in using liberal peace as a disguise for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives. Nonetheless, they share a common shortcoming of the lack of a bottom-up approach and the difficulties of state-building in post-conflict societies by a foreign entity.

Following an unprecedented attack on American soil on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2011 (later known as 9/11), Washington was certainly going to retaliate against Afghanistan, which harboured Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda terrorists who perpetrated the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The case of Afghanistan will be explored in further detail in Section 4. An important point to note here is that the US used its war on terror as a catalyst to transform problematic states in the system as a whole (Dodge, 2013). There was a clear intention from the US to pursue liberal state-building.

Afghanistan reflects the problem that key stakeholders may be excluded from post-conflict peace processes. Closely related to this point is the problem that the external intervener – in the case of Afghanistan, this is the US-led NATO coalition – has too much influence over which actors are allowed to participate at all in negotiations. To this point, key policymakers often gather in New York or London to decide what is to be done in a post-conflict country, without local representation, and most of the important decisions are made in the Western hemisphere by Northern rationalities (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2013). For example, what was damaging to the post-conflict peace process in Afghanistan was the exclusion of the Taliban, while former enemies of the Taliban such as the Northern Alliance took part in the Bonn Agreement, along with the US, their Western NATO counterparts, and the US-backed Afghan Interim Authority. The US and its allies had full control over who was allowed to attend the conference, which aimed to discuss post-conflict peace and security in Afghanistan (Krampe, 2013). A ‘big tent’ strategy was employed in post-conflict Afghanistan to include former warlords who fought against the Taliban, but this had less to do with the peace process being inclusive, based on the fact that the Taliban was excluded from peace talks, and more to do with US ambitions of counterinsurgency in future Afghanistan, where Washington must rely on local warlords to combat Taliban resurgence. Fully aware of the fact that warlordism and democratic values also do not coexist, Washington is trapped in a vicious cycle of constantly having to rely on warlords against the Taliban even if there is no evidence to suggest that these figures can be tamed after security is restored (Mac Ginty, 2010a). The need to reach into illiberal means in an attempt to combat the Taliban speaks clearly to the fact that the main advocate of liberal peace in the US was inconsistent with their own liberal peace agenda.

To the further detriment of liberal peace, US attention had to be turned to Iraq in 2003, when it had just begun its transition to a new government. Paul Bremer (2004), the

head of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran the US occupation of Iraq, wanted to hand power back to the Iraqis through a new constitution with free and fair elections to send a powerful message of democracy in the Arab world. Bremer also wanted to sever the ties that Saddam Hussein had established with the Iraqi military by disbanding the army and trying to build a new one from scratch. However, such a move would have been detrimental to the US, as Sunni commanders loyal to Saddam Hussein were stripped of power, which was given to more compliant Shi'ites, resulting in many of the former Sunni commanders finding a new home in the Islamic State (Thompson, 2015). Furthermore, Iraq is a society crippled by decades of US sanctions to the extent that neoliberalism cannot be adopted (Dodge, 2013).

The practice of liberal peace in Afghanistan and Iraq shows the problem with an overtly top-down focused approach, as well as the main advocates of liberal peace losing their liberal agenda. However, even with successful cases, there will always be the danger that foreign actors cannot always achieve full compliance even through coercive means of intervention (Mac Ginty, 2010b). Sierra Leone was relatively successful, mainly because there was a political will. The wider international community in general has not given enough consideration to local and national development strategies in post-war societies outside liberal peacebuilding at the time (Kurtenbach, 2010). There is also a problem with neoliberalism, as it does not always fit certain societies. Capitalist societies thrive on healthy political and economic competition, and encourage vibrant civil societies, but pluralist societies that do not have these mechanisms can become polarised, which creates undesirable conflict between communities (Paris, 1997). Furthermore, with specific regard to liberal peace in the Middle East, the existence of liberal actors such as the US fuels jihadist arguments of Western imperialism (Orakzai, 2015). The issue with the current hegemony or former European colonialists who undertook peacebuilding or state-building may carry negative sentiments, thus rendering it impossible to win the hearts and minds (WHAM) of local elites as well as the grassroots. The significance of WHAM as a practice of liberal peace will be further explored in the case studies.

## **2.3: Hybrid Peace**

### *2.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace*

Hybrid peace theories are a response to the perceived shortcomings of liberal peace. Hybrid peace is about focusing on the bottom-up process, putting more emphasis on the local grassroots in addition to the existing top-down initiatives that occur between governments. Peacebuilders – both scholars and policymakers – must 'trim back' on

liberal peacebuilding and give it a local turn while maintaining important core values such as good governance that contribute to sustainable peace (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2013). Liberal norms that pursue good governance are not at fault here for the shortcomings of liberal peace: rather, it is the policymakers who have failed to present these norms acceptably to the local population. Liberal peace did not fall short in Afghanistan because the Afghans were incompatible with Western norms: in fact, it was very much the opposite. Western media reports that the people of Afghanistan supported the legitimacy of the political regime when the head of the state is elected by free and fair elections (Ibrahim, 2020). Across 34 provinces of Afghanistan, 68% of respondents wanted the post-2001 political system rather than a Taliban Emirate (Ibrahim, 2020).

The main point of hybrid peace is not about rejecting liberal norms, but rather detaching ourselves from binary arguments such as modern versus traditional, West versus non-West and legal-rational versus ritualistic-irrational when explaining the social and political world (Mac Ginty, 2010b). Instead, the focus should be on the locals and how they can be given the power to pursue alternate methods of peace during liberal transitions (Mac Ginty, 2010b). This does not reject the necessity of liberal norms as components of stable society because there is little evidence to suggest that intervention without liberal norms would necessarily improve outcomes. Instead, effort should be made to find ways for local actors to retain power during a liberal peace transition (Mac Ginty, 2010b).

If liberal peace is a normative imposition of Western values with the assumption that these values are universal, many societies with local approaches that do not fit within the liberal Western framework can be left with undesirable post-conflict peace structures (Simons & Zanker, 2014). Hybrid peace is not just a unilateral imposition of the liberal norm, and as mentioned above, disconnects from such arguments as liberal versus non-liberal. It should be understood under real-world conditions or states of affairs under dynamic interactions between multiple stakeholders, including domestic elites, grassroots, and external interveners, as well as between norms and practices and institutions (Bargues-Pedreney & Randazzo, 2018). To this point, hybrid peace also lessens the chances of peace processes becoming almost entirely dominated by external forces: a problem made clear in Afghanistan.

Concerning the 'local', Richmond (2009) says hybrid peace needs to be based on everyday experiences rather than a system based on the blueprint of liberal peace. An important component of hybrid peace is that it seeks to help the local subaltern reject colonial experiences by transforming them from subjects of colonialism to political entities that can resist international hegemonic power structures (Bhabha, 1994).

Richmond (2014) also creates the concept of hybrid politics, which is a form of negative peace when local factions and international norms oppose each other unless they can accommodate each other with local and international legitimacy. To this point, hybridity does not always have the capacity of development, peacebuilding and state-building as expected, but the building of legitimacy should receive the same amount of emphasis as international norms, and local forms of legitimacy need to be put under pressure to modernise as well (Richmond, 2014).

Peacebuilding in general should focus on creating ‘relational platforms’ that encourage dialogue between different levels of society (Lederach, 2005). Concerning hybrid peace, it should focus on relationships between stakeholders in the conflict and take a realistic approach to peace based on their basic needs (Uesugi, 2020). With specific regard to peacebuilding in Asia, an observable trend with Asian conflicts is that peacebuilding initiatives are usually aimed directly at the national and elite level, while local sources of peacebuilding are mostly fragmented across the country, mainly relying on the resources of foreign donors (Keethaponcalan, 2020). This may be due to the non-interventionist nature of Asian affairs, where most regional actors are willing to uphold this norm. Therefore, regarding hybrid peace in Asia, identifying key stakeholders or mid-space actors may be an effective means to create sustainable peace.

Mid-space actors are people who have direct access to and influence on the grassroots communities (Uesugi, 2020), and these actors can move across different inter-communal gaps to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders and enhance peace processes (Uesugi & Kagawa, 2020). There are three inter-communal gaps: a horizontal gap exists between grassroot communities, a vertical gap between national elites and grassroots, and finally a diagonal gap between the international community and local actors (Uesugi & Kagawa, 2020). Mid-space actors act as gatekeepers across these cleavages, and these gatekeepers become bridge-builders that enable peace processes rather than spoilers that deny access to local communities, thus preventing or undermining peace (Uesugi & Kagawa, 2020).

### *2.3.2: Critique of Hybrid Peace*

As with liberal peace, hybrid peace is not without its shortcomings. The first criticism of hybrid peace is what Wallis et al. (2018) would call ‘romanticizing the local’ where the significance of social divisions on the ground, such as gender, age and ethnicity, is underestimated. If hybridity is used without sufficient knowledge of the local power dynamics and root causes of the conflict in question, peacebuilding efforts may simply reproduce existing imbalances in power relations, hierarchy, and domination (Wallis et



al., 2018). Hybrid peace is different from liberal peace, since state-building through the dismantling of 'illiberal' power structures does not happen. However, these perceived illiberal elements that remain can continue to destabilise the peace process, as the fundamental problems in society have not been fully addressed.

Hybrid peace can also fall into the trap of binaries like liberal peace, as it too may oversimplify concepts such as liberal and illiberal or West and non-West, and as a result, the conflict may be oversimplified (Peterson, 2012). Most importantly, due to its nature of being compared with liberal peace, this binary comparison, as well as elements of local versus international, can be an even bigger issue. While they help scholars and academics in recognising conflict, the practice of hybrid peace should not be reduced to such a simplified binary picture of two contesting concepts (Uesugi et al., 2021).

On the issue of intervention, Millar (2014) suggests that the literature on hybridity tends to be either 'prescriptive' or 'descriptive'. Descriptive literature mainly describes what hybridity constitutes or does not constitute, while prescriptive literature indicates approaches that can help to design hybridity into state building, peacebuilding and governance projects that may become means for external intervention (Millar, 2014). The point of external intervention will be a constantly contested concept throughout this dissertation. This is mainly due to the dismay shown by Asian countries towards the very concept of foreign intervention, and to the shifting narratives of the West beginning to embrace interventionism under the banner of humanitarianism. For the sake of argument, I do not attempt to deny the fact that peacebuilding, regardless of whether it involves liberal, hybrid, or developmental peace, is a tool of external intervention. True neutrality would indicate that foreign actors, despite violent conflicts, quite literally 'do nothing', as modern protracted conflicts usually occur in remote regions of the world not usually associated with the major interests of the P5 in the Security Council. Therefore, the point is not to disregard the importance of foreign intervention, even if state sovereignty should also be taken seriously in the process, but more about finding the means by which external intervention can help a post-conflict society to create a locally or domestically owned legitimate framework of sustainable peace that is acceptable to all levels of society.

At times, it is difficult to achieve hybridity: as we will see later in this dissertation, many conflicts remain protracted and unresolved due to the lack of political will from the state to resolve the conflict. In other words, the top-down initiative is missing from the peacebuilding initiatives, and this often leaves local communities to build peace amongst themselves with or without the support of foreign actors such as aid or humanitarian relief given through INGOs. Liberal and hybrid peace share this same problem of political will, but here the question is raised as to how societies and international actors should respond

when there is a deficiency of will from top actors in the state.

A response to such a problem is to pursue subcategories of hybrid peace through adaptive peace and local peace. Adaptive peace, or adaptive peacebuilding as de Coning (2018) calls it, is a process where peacebuilders and local communities come together to find a solution to conflict and create the prospects of sustainable peace through complexity, resilience, and local ownership. In fact, the shortcomings of liberal peace displayed in Afghanistan and Iraq show that peacebuilding should be understood as a political process, so in other words, peacebuilders should be aiming to resolve a political problem (de Coning, 2018).

Achieving local peace is another means when hybrid peace is difficult. Like adaptive peace, local peace focuses mainly on the local grassroots and the capacity of local communities to build peace among themselves. Both models focus on the bottom-up approach of hybrid peace – perhaps solely bottom-up, as the top-down aspect is lacking. The UN suggests that more financial support should be given to peacebuilding projects at the local level, especially in improving their capacity to generate greater income as well as to create partnerships between local governments and grassroots (United Nations, 2022). Local peace initiatives should also seek to expand the number of stakeholders beyond the national elites in the capital, promote local ownership, include ‘everyday peace’ indicators, and explore ways to make local-level efforts into a catalyst for structural transformation (United Nations, 2022). Local peace can be effective with disputes over natural resources, politics with elections and violence by local armed groups. In theory, it is effective in resolving intercommunal conflicts without the need for robust intervention from the state or the international community.

### *2.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace*

There are several examples of hybrid peace in practice. It is more commonly seen in Asian countries, but also in Africa. Concerning Asia specifically, as the focus of this dissertation, it is a region where liberal norms have seen mixed success. Some countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, East Timor, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, may be more receptive to liberal norms, while others, like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, Vietnam, Afghanistan, North Korea and most importantly, China, are not. There are also countries like Pakistan, Thailand, Maldives, Bhutan, and Singapore that have taken the middle ground with regard to liberal norms, embracing elements such as democracy while rejecting civil liberties.

On supporting liberal norms in hybrid peace, the case of East Timor has shown strong local support for democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism, where the people

wanted a state that could deliver these public goods (Wallis, 2017). The point of hybrid peace is to maintain the balance between top-down and bottom-up initiatives. Too much autonomy can create shallow and corrupt neoliberal governments instead of maintaining justice (Wallis, 2017). Furthermore, some communities manage to fuse non-liberal values such as kinship and clanship in government elites alongside democratic formulas, and peacebuilders should take care not to undermine these efforts of indigenous peace (Mac Ginty, 2010b). For a country that has been under Portuguese colonial rule for approximately 400 years and Indonesia's military occupation for nearly three decades, the initial top-down measures involving community mediation campaigns and programs aimed at improving education and employment clearly contributed to the reduction of communal conflict by 2009 (Scambary & Wassel, 2018). There is a need to improve local ownership, and this has been achieved through community-driven projects that regulated public behaviours to address the problem of lavish ceremonies, or when groups collaborated with the Catholic Church to conduct conflict resolution between informal security groups to prevent rumours leading to conflict (Scambary & Wassel, 2018).

An example of a gatekeeper's role in conflict can be seen in Bangsamoro, where the rebels performed the dual function of connecting top leaders with local grassroots, while also shielding grassroots communities from harm and exploitation (Kagawa, 2020). Kagawa adds that some rebel gatekeepers were successful in nurturing a transformative relationship by acknowledging the political positions and the suffering of others, which lowered the chances of groups developing extreme negativity or dehumanisation of the other side (Kagawa, 2020). Local community leaders, such as religious leaders, can also be central to peacebuilding as bridge-builders. For example, Buddhist monks in Cambodia built bridges across the horizontal gap to connect underrepresented groups, which until then had been suffering from poor standards of living, poor land management and human rights abuses, with the rest of the country (Lee, 2020). The religious legitimacy of monks, and their strong social networks, are strong assets to reduce misunderstanding of demands (Lee, 2020). Meanwhile, outsiders can contribute to peace processes by enhancing the capacity of gatekeepers to promote dialogue across all three inter-communal gaps, as well as leadership training for already legitimate figures, rather than trying to build unfamiliar social hierarchies from scratch (Deekeling & Simangan, 2021).

In terms of local peace, there have been cases in Sudan where local communities were able to resolve disputes over livestock and farmland, as well as over women, to prevent conflict from escalating, as well as in Burundi when local peace groups mobilised 'peace clubs' that reported electoral violence and notified the local security services and

civic leaders (Peace Direct, 2019). Faith-based organisations play an important role in both hybrid peace and local peace: for example, in Burundi, the Catholic Church trained and educated people on non-violent means of conflict resolution, and raised awareness of human rights, in combination with the greater local framework of releasing prisoners and demobilizing ex-combatants as well as repatriating returning refugees and establishing truth and reconciliation commissions (Leeuwen et al., 2020). Foreign entities have also helped locals in mobilising the youth as well opposition political parties to participate in peace committees (Leeuwen et al., 2020).

#### *2.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace*

During the practice of hybrid peace, one must be cautious to not create illiberal peace in the process. In an almost contradictory manner, illiberal means have been attempted during the practice of liberal peace. To some extent, the danger is even clearer with hybrid peace, which can sometimes be willing to forgo some liberal norms to favour local customs and traditions. Both peacebuilding scholars and policymakers must be aware of the rise of illiberal peace that creates authoritarian or crony capitalist regimes in post-conflict societies. Illiberal peace is usually created by non-Western domestic actors through clientelism instead of neoliberalism, as well as cronyism and corruption, valuing inequality over equality and liberty (Smith et al., 2020). Since many Asian countries are not fully democratic, or have flawed democracies by Freedom House terms, it would be reasonable to look at illiberal peace as a potential case to avoid if possible.

Illiberal peace can happen in any post-conflict society. Even the two largest democracies in Asia – India and Indonesia – are not exempt from illiberal peace, especially considering that they are among the more liberal countries in the region. Hybrid peace attempts to address the aftermath of violent ethnic and religious conflicts through the combined efforts of the state and locals, but often there is a persistence of patronage and the weak rule of law, where gatekeepers become spoilers to manipulate tensions and allow discrimination or injustice to continue to smaller forms of violence (Wilson, 2020). For example, the Assam Movement in India ended with elections, but there were no promises that newly elected leaders would respect the rights of other minorities in the region (Horowitz, 2003; Shneiderman & Tilin, 2015). Likewise, Indonesia saw similar instances of illiberal peace after the resignation of long-time president Suharto. Suharto ran Indonesia as a highly centralised state, but the interim government between his previous government and the next set of elections did not have time to prepare provincial and district governments for rapid decentralisation, resulting in many governance-related issues being passed down from the national to the local level (Wilson, 2020). Indonesia

also did not remove security forces from local political economies where the military used lethal force to protect these economic incentives from protestors (Wilson, 2020). These events undermined democracy and good governance in provinces such as Aceh and Papua, where illiberal means such as security forces were used to maintain stability (Wilson, 2020).

Overreliance or overemphasis on the 'local' can also be a detriment to the practice of hybrid peace, possibly leading to the emergence of illiberal peace as well. Richmond (2014) warns of negative hybrid peace when power and norms from the international level to the state or society have been outsourced, in contrast to positive hybrid peace, which addresses the broader political issues such as social injustices from both the local and the international level. Relying purely on local actors for peacebuilding can also mean that violence employed by local elites is overlooked (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). Too much autonomy without intervention from the state also destabilises the overall peace process. For example, in deeply divided societies like Kosovo, local elites provided health care disproportionately based on people's ethnicity and rejected transitional justice (Simangan, 2018). Even in East Timor, where hybrid peace was hailed as a success, governments that worked closely with locals have used their low budgets as an excuse to neglect certain rural communities as power was being transferred to local agencies (Wallis, 2016). Civil war must not be continued by peaceful means under hybrid peace (Mac Ginty & Williams, 2009).

Of course, there are limits to local peace as well, because local agencies like civil societies are usually not strong enough to induce serious change to oppressive power structures. Although local peace is an effective tool for conflict resolution between two local communities, it may be less effective if the conflict is between local communities and a potentially oppressive state. This is also where international actors can contribute as foreign donors and multilateral agencies do have the capacity to influence the national elites to a certain extent. Another criticism of local peace, other than its vagueness on the theoretical level, is the doubt as to whether it is even possible for local peace to flourish without addressing major inhibitors to peace, such as through national reconciliation (Piccolino, 2019). That said, the local turn in peacebuilding is still an important method for peacebuilders to consider as a means to break away from traditional unified approaches (such as liberal peace) because sustainable peace is only likely when complex social systems fix themselves (Luhmann, 1990).

Based on these criticisms of the local approach to hybrid peace, some serious doubts are already cast on the principles of non-intervention employed by some Asian countries like China. The question here is, how can it be ensured that an illiberal country

like Afghanistan or Myanmar will not continue its illiberal means of maintaining peace in the post-conflict context, especially considering that there will not be any external forces that would persuade, or even pressure, an illiberal government to revise existing oppressive power structures that inhibit sustainable peace? To this point, the Western liberal peace interventions may be necessary as a ‘stick’ that illiberal governments may exchange for the ‘carrot’ of economic concessions to improve civil liberties at home. Such a move, though, will most definitely be shunned by Asian countries like China in particular, as they often like to advocate aid without political strings attached.

## **2.4: Developmental Peace**

### *2.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace*

This section explains the conceptual aspects of developmental peace and how it operates in theory. It will also present additional traits to the China model, adding existing literature by other scholars of what we currently know about developmental peace. These traits can be tested in case studies to find evidence that would either support or reject the current theory of developmental peace, providing a clearer picture of what the China model is and is not. The *modus operandi* of developmental peace is based closely on China’s own domestic development strategy, mainly based on economic development, state sovereignty and internal stability. Chinese scholars claim that China’s contribution to international peace is to project its domestic peace experiences onto foreign countries (Wang, 2017), indicating a consciousness for developmental peace to become the latest model of alternative peacebuilding theories presented by an emerging actor.

Economically speaking, developmental peace tries to adopt China’s dual domestic approach of open-door market-oriented strategies and the East Asian model of the ‘developmental state’, which includes high domestic savings, construction of large infrastructure and heavy industry, central planning, and a strong central government with huge bureaucratic promotion of industrial policy (Baek, 2007). This policy also kept China relatively unaffected by the Asian Financial Crisis that hit Asian economies like South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines hard in 1997 (Baek, 2007). The link between economic development and peacebuilding is the presumption that the more states prioritise economic development, the more likely it is that they can manage or resolve conflicts regarding security interests (Wei, 2020). The necessity of economic development for sustainable peace is not necessarily exclusive to China or Asia, but is more of a mutually recognised fact between both developing and developed economies of the world. Asian countries are unique in the sense that most have a legacy

of decolonisation and industrialisation at the end of the Second World War, and this causes Asian countries to put more emphasis on independence and peaceful coexistence using economic development as a means to interact with each other (Wei, 2020). In other words, in the same way as the US, the UK and Europe associate themselves to share the same liberal norms in the West, Asian states tend to do so through state sovereignty, industrialisation and economic development.

Developmental peace is not exclusive to China, but is a shared model between most of the East and Southeast Asian states. Japan, South Korea and ASEAN have all pursued similar means in the past. These Asian countries had the capacity to implement reforms and the ability to keep their population under control, just like what was later known as the Yoshida Doctrine in Japan, within which the Japanese embraced defeat, but managed to retain sovereignty in exchange for allowing US military presence nearby, and did not actively fight in any war led by the US but instead made money from it (Tønnesson, 2017). Other Asian countries would then follow Japan in implementing developmental peace to different extents. South Korea's former dictator Park Chung-hee normalised relations with Japan for aid and sent troops to Vietnam in exchange for US aid, while in Indonesia, Suharto abandoned Sukarno's confrontational policy against Malaysia but also pursued rapprochement with Japan and the US, as well as being one of the five founding members of ASEAN, and Vietnam had to pursue Japan's Asian model and normalise relations with China and the US because it was clear that aid from the Soviet Union would end under Gorbachev (Tønnesson, 2017).

As seen above, the US factor was persistent among Asian countries at the time, and their decision to embrace developmental peace, to the point that US hegemony in Asia may not be as much of a 'myth' as Joseph Nye (2019) would argue it to be. Japan, South Korea, most ASEAN member states and even Taiwan, and most importantly China, have all made some sort of concession with the US, either by normalising relations or appeasing the US for aid, or both, to maintain a high degree of peace and stability in their respective countries. In what Tønnesson (2017) calls East Asian Peace, it is when the collective states of East and Southeast Asia all embrace a similar model, but do not intervene in each other's domestic affairs: we see a relatively peaceful region where no major wars have broken out between East and Southeast Asian countries since the brief Sino-Vietnam border war in 1979. Of course, peace and stability in Asia is not attributed solely to economic development, but to other factors as well. One of these factors is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or *Panchsheel*, proposed by China and India in 1954, and then incorporated as a part of the Ten Principles of International Peace and Cooperation in the 1955 Bandung Conference, which gathered 29 Afro-Asian countries,

(Government of India, 2004) – an impressive feat considering the bitter ideological struggle between the West and the Soviet Union at the time.

At the theoretical level, this is quite similar to liberal peace with the democratic peace theory, where conflicts are eliminated through liberal democracy, as opposed to conflicts being eliminated through mutual cooperation with each other on the economic front, while staying out of each other's political issues under non-intervention in Asia. Of course, this East Asian Peace should not be taken for granted, as exceptions do exist. For example, as a relic of the Cold War, the issue between North and South Korea has never been resolved over the years, and nor have the rampant intrastate conflicts seen in some parts of Myanmar, such as in the Kachin and Shan states, the ongoing Rohingya crisis in Rakhine, or the Moro conflict in Bangsamoro in the Philippines.

This leads to some unanswered questions concerning the viability of developmental peace. Firstly, developmental peace has mainly been applied in East and Southeast Asia and not in other parts of Asia such as South Asia. Secondly, developmental peace has mostly been successful in preventing interstate conflicts. In the post-Cold War world, interstate conflicts such as wars are much less common. Some may still exist, such as the conflict on the Korean peninsula, which has never been resolved, ongoing conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq back in the early 2000s, and more recently the Russo-Ukraine war in 2022. Conflicts have shifted from large-scale armed conflicts between two sovereign states to smaller-scale intrastate, non-traditional conflicts such as civil wars, ethnic armed groups, domestic insurgencies, and terrorism. Closely related to the core question of this dissertation is the question of whether China's iteration of developmental peace is capable of creating sustainable peace in post-conflict societies in Asia. The focus now for peacebuilding is the handful of conflicts in Southeast Asia, and especially in South Asia.

#### *2.4.2: Theory of China's Developmental Peace*

The version of developmental peace presented by China is important, considering the growing importance of China to other developing countries recently. Though this is due to China adopting measures similar to the Asian developmental state, it naturally raises the question of how China's iteration of developmental peace distinguishes itself from Japan's. Economically speaking, the two are nearly identical. The Japanese model involves having an elite bureaucracy, a political system where the legislative branch's power is restricted by the bureaucracy, state intervention in the economy, and an organisation like the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (MITI) (Johnson, 1982). China too has an elite bureaucracy, perhaps even more so than Japan, with a few



individuals in the Party's Standing Committee making the most important political and economic decisions. There are more reports suggesting that China is more prone to intervening in markets, especially in those that did not cooperate with Beijing's policies, leading to a rupture of faith in the Party when the Chinese stock market crashed in 2015 and 2016 (Best, 2022). While there is no exact equivalent to MITI in China, Beijing's highly centralised economic policies replicate the same praises and fears that surrounded MITI in the past (Ezrati, 2021).

Beyond economics, the difference lies in the path Japan took after the development state model, when a growing cluster of civil society began weakening bureaucratic forces at home and maturing companies no longer required government support (Pekkanen, 2004). Japan's civil society is well developed: it has an active group of NGOs owing to its policy of public private partnership that supports Tokyo's peacebuilding efforts from the top (Japan Platform, 2019). In contrast, civil societies have never taken a strong stand against China, and Chinese NGOs are subjected to strict regulations, fearing their role in jeopardising the national interest (Feldshuh, 2018). Chinese NGOs that do make it past regulations are often contradictory entities known as government-owned NGOs (GONGO). While GONGOs such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation have been successful in building 13 hospitals with a budget of 60 million RMB (\$9.7 million) in post-conflict South Sudan (Hsu et al., 2016), these groups are usually too small and underfunded compared to the Chinese SOEs or private companies that GONGOs are supposed to monitor.

Furthermore, in contrast to the fact that most Japanese companies are private companies, roughly 60% of Chinese companies are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Hissey, 2019), and many SOEs are active along the path of the BRI as well. In other words, unlike Japanese companies, which have mostly shifted away from the government, many Chinese companies remain firmly within the grasp of the Party in Beijing, but SOEs also represent the Chinese government abroad with their state-owned nature. Based on this comparison, China's developmental state advocates for much stronger state control of state affairs, replicating China's model of 'big state small society', in contrast to Japan's gradual weakening of its state control as the country developed. By this logic too, one can say that China's developmental peace, based on its version of the developmental state, will also advocate stronger state control of domestic affairs.

Focusing more on the theory of China's developmental peace, one of its main advocates, He Yin (2014), claims that it has two main pillars, namely economic development and state sovereignty. China's domestic stability is directly related to the stability of its neighbours, and Beijing has the means to create this stability through

helping developing countries with economic development. For example, Consul General Zhao Weiping (2014) emphasised the norms of sovereignty and their importance in helping post-conflict societies rebuild to restore stability to the region. He added that China is a developing country whose development and stability are dependent on international partners. Xi, at the Shanghai Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, said that development is the greatest form of security and should be the main way to settle regional conflicts (Cohen, 2014). Meanwhile, sovereignty mainly indicates aid without political strings attached. State-led economic development takes priority over political change under developmental peace (Abb, 2018), and unlike the West, economic concessions should not be made in exchange for political concessions such as shifting towards liberal democracy or improving human rights at home.

However, the extent of Chinese non-intervention is often up for scrutiny. In cases such as Myanmar, when the government has lost control of its grassroots people, such as the ethnic armed groups in the Kachin, Shan, and Wa states, China must often intervene to broker peace between the government and ethnic minorities, contrary to Beijing's narratives, as these would have been 'domestic affairs'. Therefore, the extent of Chinese non-intervention should not be taken for granted. It should be recognised as pragmatism to work with any government, authoritarian or democratic, without demanding changes to government in exchange for economic concessions.

In a later article, He (2021) adds that all rising powers promote some kind of zeitgeist, and like the US, which promoted freedom and democracy, China promotes peace and development. To this point, internal peace is the key to sustainable peace and stability must be maintained at any cost because a country can only exploit its resources in a peaceful political and social environment (He, 2021). The Chinese model employs strong institutions, economic development, and national development strategies to maintain political and social stability at home (He, 2019). Steven Kuo makes a similar remark on China's development-led peace, which he refers to as 'Chinese peace' that embraces the same traits. China's model seeks to create a cooperative, comprehensive, and sustainable model of security by connecting relationships between development and security, creating peace from development, and pursuing development in peace (Qin & Wei, 2018). There is also a 'development-driven security' approach that distinguishes itself from the West's export of democracy through military intervention, and it is this difference that has allowed China's BRI to avoid clashing with the US in the Middle East (Liu, 2018).

I would also like to add to the existing literature in identifying two additional traits of China's developmental peace. This is about creating a 'win-win' relationship

based on common development. ‘Win-win’, sustainable development and common development are concepts often associated with the BRI by Chinese officials and state media, such as CGTN’s report that claims that China promotes peace, social cohesion, and human rights along the BRI (Qin, 2018). At the root of this is Beijing’s mentality that China is still a developing country (which it is not), and that therefore the donor-recipient approach pursued by OECD countries and recipient developing countries should not apply to China. Another way to capture this mentality is that China working with the South-South cooperation framework, focusing on cooperation, common development, and non-intervention, and for this reason non-democratic and unstable countries are more prone to work under the South-South framework mainly because these countries find it difficult to secure aid from traditional donors (Pang, 2013). In other words, China approaches another developing country as a fellow developing country, where both actors seek to trade concessions from the other side. For example, China obtains Sudanese oil by offering the necessary infrastructure for Sudan to export oil, including drilling equipment, refineries, and even roads for shipping. In this process, it is possible to create jobs and improve the local economy, which services local economic development, which will contribute to the greater internal peace and stability of a developing country.

The second trait is a return to ‘Sino-centrism’. According to some analyses, Asia has never been a coherent region, mainly because Chinese culture has not spread far beyond its homeland despite exerting some tributary traditions with Japan, Vietnam and Korea (The Adelphi Papers, 1995). As a matter of fact, none of the five key players in Asia – China, Japan, India, Russia (the Soviet Union) or the US – has managed to manifest a balance of power model in Asia (The Adelphi Papers, 1995). The region is diverse, without a common ideology, yet with a shared culture of mostly post-colonial states sharing a common identity of non-intervention that maintains regional stability. Although Asia did not manage to achieve Balance of Power, the US is still a dominant force in the region, especially during the Cold War, when Washington became an important partner for the economic development of many Asian countries. China wants to replicate the US’s role in becoming the centre of Asian regional affairs to the extent that neighbouring countries must consider China’s interests while planning policies.

Beijing believes that regional peace is possible only if there is a dominant regional actor that dictates regional affairs. In Asia’s case, this should not be the US, Japan, or India, but China itself should assume this role. This view can be traced back to the mentality of ‘Sino-centrism’, which is hierarchical and non-egalitarian, just like Chinese society itself (Fairbank, 1968). Just as the US sought out allies in Asia to help contain Communists during the Cold War, China is interested in allies that would promote its

narrative on non-intervention and state sovereignty and reduce the necessity for intervention on humanitarian grounds, such as the application of R2P. In exchange, China would provide economic concessions to developing countries in need, such that peace can be sustained through economic development. Peace can be created in the process by giving conflict-prone countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar the incentive to improve their domestic stability to appease Beijing, showing that they are capable of keeping Chinese interests safe, and attracting further investment from Chinese companies. This incentive in itself should not be taken negatively, as it pushes national or local governments to resolve conflicts that would otherwise remain unaddressed without the Chinese presence in the region.

However, 'Sino-centrism' is hindered by the fact that Asia is dominated not solely by China, as the aforementioned US, Japanese and Indian influences are also strong in the region. China does have its advantages over the West when trying to assume a central position in regional affairs, however, since developmental peace is attractive to Asian and African countries that have long loathed Western interventionism in their domestic affairs under the name of promoting human security (Kim et al., 2009). China's advantages over Japan and India are mainly on the economic front: being a larger economic power means that Beijing can provide more infrastructure more efficiently, as these countries do not fully align with the West and prefer non-intervention regarding peacebuilding. In a sense, we may see a re-balancing of power, as China wants to become more relevant in regional affairs following its gain of relative economic, military, and political strength in the region. China wants bilateral competition with the US, and this would include allies like Japan, and strategic partners like India as the US-led coalition in Asia. However, it is unlikely that Beijing desires a complete eviction of US influence in the region, as US presence is still necessary for the stability of the Korean peninsula, and to prevent a potential military rise of Japan, which, in theory, should not happen as long as Tokyo is under Washington's protection.

Meanwhile, China's assumed role is different to that of the US on the economic front. The staggering growth of Asian economies should be credited to Asia's own domestic efforts, though it would not have been as smooth without the active involvement of the US. For example, although Japan might still have grown without American patronage, it might not have grown as fast without the high investment rates, the abundance of capital and a destination for its export-oriented growth that the US was willing to provide at a time when Washington was looking for anti-Communist allies (Beckley et al., 2018). South Korea actively sent soldiers to aid the US in the Vietnam War, in exchange for a massive injection of American wealth for South Korean companies

to jumpstart businesses – it is estimated that South Korea made approximately \$5 billion during the eight years for which it was involved in Vietnam (Stangarone, 2013). As with Japan, the US appreciated South Korea's presence as another anti-Communist ally in Asia. China, however, does not seek to replicate this role played by the US. In fact, it is very much the opposite. Emerging markets in developing countries are an opportunity for China to export its own goods, much as Japan did in the past. China does provide considerable concessional loans for BRI participants, though later we will see that these loans have become more of a curse or burden for countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which may struggle to repay them. As of 2022, 30% of Pakistan's foreign debt is owned by China, where the IMF reports that debt has increased by \$4.6 billion from the previous \$25.1 billion to approximately \$30 billion since February of the same year (Mangi, 2022)

In sum, China's developmental peace has the following traits that it can use, in theory, to create sustainable peace:

1. Economic development
2. Non-intervention in domestic affairs
3. Maintaining internal stability
4. South-South cooperation and win-win relationships
5. Sino-centrism

Whether these traits are reflected in the practice of developmental peace has to be tested in the case studies. That being said, there are already some existing examples on the ground that contradict some theories established above, particularly with non-intervention. For example, China's non-intervention principle in Sudan also contradicts itself through its involvement in Sudanese oil development (Large, 2008). However, since it is impossible to achieve total non-intervention, as any peacebuilding measure is a form of intervention. By comparing the impacts of developmental peace and existing models of liberal and hybrid peace, we can make a qualitative judgement as to whether developmental peace with the above traits actually creates sustainable peace.

#### *2.4.3: Critique of Developmental Peace*

There are four criticisms of developmental peace at the theoretical level. The first refers to the relationship between development and peace, especially concerning the security-development nexus in relation to China's win-win narrative. Secondly, there are questions as to the viability of sustainable peace from top-down models that lack bottom-up approaches. Thirdly, there is the question of the viability of developmental peace to create

sustainable peace without liberal norms, and human rights in particular. Finally, the question arises of whether developmental peace is a form of illiberal peace.

One critical element in developmental peace is the relationship between economic development and peace. Therefore, we must clarify this relationship with the security-development nexus. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004) used the term ‘inextricable’ to describe the connection between development and security. Chandler (2007) mentioned that since 9/11, the security-development nexus framework has become a means to form a consistent argument for national and international policymakers that favoured intervention in non-Western state. However, in reality, the security-development nexus never became a far-reaching intervention instrument, but instead became a process for political elites to take a moral high-ground without having to take the risk of making policies (Chandler, 2007). Additionally, problems remain, since the nexus never makes clear who is actually benefitting from security between the donor and recipient of development (O’Gorman, 2011). In the past, European colonialists conquered and exploited the less-developed world of Asia, Africa, and America the Westphalia system’s *laissez-faire* consolidated the relationship between wealth and politics so that development was directly connected to state-defined security (Hettne, 2010). This fact is rather ironic because China is a staunch defender of Westphalian sovereignty.

However, the purpose of this dissertation is not to argue about whether or not China is a neo-colonialist power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Based on the relative success of East Asian Peace, one can see a positive correlation between development and security if applied correctly. This also means that China’s assumption that economic development leads to sustainable peace is not fundamentally flawed. That being said, it would be helpful to keep in mind the potentially imbalanced relationship between the donor and recipient within the security-development nexus, especially with regard to the Chinese narrative of ‘win-win’ relationships. The question of who exactly is ‘winning’ will be up for more scrutiny in the case studies of this dissertation. This is especially important considering that China’s narrative of emphasising ‘win-win’ relationships is never made clear, just like the vagueness of many other Chinese narratives. One aspect that needs to be proven in case studies is whether all levels of society are beneficiaries of China’s developmental peace. ‘All levels’ means including grassroots, both majority and minority races, and not just the political elites in the urban capitals that are reaping the benefits of opportunities and profits from the BRI.

Closely related to the point of benefitting the grassroots, another potential criticism of developmental peace is that it is also a strictly top-down model. Much like

liberal peace, which is criticised for solely using democracy as a solution to every conflict (Butler & Wheeler, 2012), China tries to address conflicts through economic development, while other potential root causes are reduced to ‘domestic affairs’ upon which Beijing does not infringe. Like liberal peace, both models show a foreign government engaging with the national elites of a post-conflict society, rather than focussing on the subalterns, who bear the brunt of violence and conflict. The difference is that China is not usually interested in state-building, as it is constrained by principles of non-intervention. Even so, the way that developmental peace neglects the grassroots and leaves domestic affairs to local governments, sometimes illiberal actors, expecting the conflict to ‘fix itself’, is unlikely to create sustainable peace, in theory. The above statement can be verified in the following chapters with case studies.

The question is whether sustainable peace is possible via a model that does not advocate ‘universal’ liberal norms like democracy and, in particular, human rights. Once again, I do not intend to argue about the extent to which liberal norms should or should not be seen as universal, but Beijing has separated civil and political rights from economic, social, and cultural rights, stating that the former should not have priority over the latter (Zakaria, 1994). Chinese scholars who argue for the non-universality of Western liberal norms like human rights say that developing countries like China have different social backgrounds with different means to realise so-called ‘human rights’ (Yuan et al., 2016).

The official UN definition of human security is a framework focused on preventative responses to address the root causes of vulnerabilities by strengthening local capacities through early action, without leaving anyone behind, and creating multi-stakeholder solutions to conflicts that will promote social cohesion and the respect of human rights and dignity (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, n.d.). China’s version of human security is the right to development to ensure a ‘life of dignity’, for which state media Xinhua (2019) has praised Chinese efforts of vouching for the full realisation of the right to development on behalf of 139 states in the UN. China’s approach, using the right to development, only addresses the economic facet of human security.

The concept of human security is not given much attention in China, as it is only seldom mentioned by Chinese officials, such as in 2011 when vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai (2011) addressed the issue as a part of the Millennium Development Goals. Beijing is more concerned about how the concept of ‘human security’ can be used to override the security interests of another sovereign state (Ren, 2016), with China being predominantly a country that focuses more on state security. To this point, some Chinese scholars claim that human and state security are equally important, but since individuals are often helpless against foreign invasion without a state, national sovereignty should be

in the common interests of all nations (Shi, 2014). This is not to say that the West completely neglects the idea of state security and sovereignty, as this is a basic norm enshrined in multiple international organisations, such as the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (2009), which explicitly stated that state security is not to be replaced by human security. Richmond (2006) even criticised human security for becoming a tool that liberal peacebuilders use to create the empty shell of a state that never existed in the first place. The point here is that by working with China, countries may employ more robust interpretations of state security that justify questionable human security approaches taken by developing countries. Economic development should not be used as a pretext to neglect human development because development should not be focused on the benefiting of the donors or the state elites of recipients, as human rights should transcend these interests (Hamm, 2001).

Finally, since China is largely an illiberal actor on the international stage, it naturally points to the question of whether developmental peace should be regarded as a form of illiberal peace that weakens democracy in host countries. China is a pragmatic actor, meaning that it does not have a preference towards the type of government with which to work. There is no evidence to suggest that China has attempted to overthrow or destabilise any democratically elected government. Doing so would defeat the purpose of political stability to which developmental peace attributes itself. For example, Sri Lanka still retains a relatively democratic system even after Rajapaksa pursued a relatively authoritarian rule that ignored the West to align closely with China (Keethaponcalan, 2019). Domestically speaking, illiberal means have most definitely been employed by the Party to maintain stability. For example, harsh surveillance and crackdowns have been imposed on Uighur minorities in Xinjiang to prevent the large-scale Uighur uprisings that the region has seen since the 1980s. This includes the use of concentration camps (Abbas, 2020), which China calls re-education camps, for the prevention of religious extremism, as well as the separation of children from their families in 'boarding schools' (HRW, 2019), and forced abortion of Uighur women to limit the population of the race (BBC, 2020). However, these measures are reserved for China's domestic use rather than being projected to a neighbour.

Developmental peace does not involve projecting domestic experiences outside of economic factors to another country. Like any other Asian country that upholds non-intervention, China's neighbours are all capable of making their own decisions. Beijing will not reject a certain domestic policy simply for being 'illiberal', in contrast to the West, which might voice concerns. Whether or not a country becomes liberal or illiberal is up to its own government's decisions, rather than being dictated by a foreign intervener like



China.

#### *2.4.4: Practice of Developmental Peace*

Since there will be more detailed discussions on the practice of developmental peace in the following chapters, this section will briefly outline China's achievements in terms of conflict resolution to give an overview on how the Chinese approach violent armed conflicts.

The first such example is China's engagement with Sudan. Sudan occupies an important position in China's African policy as an oil producer and exporter. For most of China's time engaging with Sudan, Khartoum was also ruled by a brutal dictatorship under President Omar Al-Bashir. China's relationship with Sudan drew strong international criticism for Al-Bashir's role in human rights violations in Darfur in 2006. Western media denounced the 2008 Beijing Olympics as the 'Genocide Olympics' (Bristow, 2008) for China's inaction against Al-Bashir, despite Beijing's perceived influence over Sudan as one of its largest arms provider and trading partners. This reinforces the above point on China's pragmatism and principles of non-intervention, as China does not interfere in domestic affairs, such as Darfur, and works with authoritarian countries just as with any non-authoritarian countries. Initially, Beijing expected Al-Bashir to address the situation in Darfur (Shinn, 2009), but Sudan showed itself to be quite incapable of doing so, which prompted a greater role by Beijing, managing to persuade Al-Bashir to allow the hybrid peacekeeping force of UNAMID on the ground. The Darfur crisis was one of the early situations where China exerted influence over one of its development partners, casting a shadow over its principles of non-intervention. However, it was a necessary move to (1) protect the Chinese national interest (oil) from conflict on the ground, and (2) prevent further international criticism of China's support for the Al-Bashir regime. China has also become much more engagement-heavy in Sudan after the events of Darfur. In terms of economic development, not only has China helped Sudan to set up most of its oil industry, but it has also built basic infrastructure such as roads and dams for Khartoum, although whether infrastructure such as dams has benefitted local grassroots is up for scrutiny.

Another example of China's conflict resolution is once again seen in Sudan, but this time it is between Sudan and South Sudan. In line with developmental peace, China considers instability in South Sudan to be rooted in underdevelopment, as Beijing questions the viability of democracy in South Sudan when people do not even have enough food (International Crisis Group, 2017). China used its influence in Sudan to encourage it to take an active role in resolving conflict with South Sudan, while Beijing

sent foreign minister Wang Yi to attend a ‘special consultation meeting’ that set the table but did not force any outcomes despite calls from the West to take more responsibilities (International Crisis Group, 2017). While South Sudan is an important country for China regarding oil, economic interests do not solely explain the more active role it is playing in the region. Under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, state media claims that China will begin implementing nine projects with the aim of injecting impetus for economic and social development to benefit the people (Xinhua, 2022b). Some of these projects include phase II of the Juba Teaching Hospital, providing Junco production technology, as well as offering training for South Sudanese government officials (Xinhua, 2022b). China’s proactivity in regions as far away as South Sudan shows its proactivity and interest in being part of the global peace initiatives as a step to restore its role as a global multilateral actor (Verjee, 2016).

#### *2.4.5: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace*

The most obvious critique of the practice of developmental peace, related to the security-development nexus explained above, is the question of whom the beneficiaries of China’s developmental aid are. Beneficiaries can be either the Chinese state (the CCP), the host country’s government (national elites), or local residents (grassroots). China’s state media presents the narratives of ‘win-win’ and ‘benefits of the people’, suggesting that all of the above are beneficiaries. However, the reality is often disappointing for those on the ground expecting to reap the benefits of Chinese development. Even the terms ‘local’ and ‘the people’ are ambiguous, as different ethnic groups can be treated differently by the political elites, as well as given aid disproportionately based on ethnicity, such as development occurring in one province but not another, like the problem examined later in Pakistan. For the case of Pakistan, from the international eye, all ‘locals’ comprise a single group that one can collectively call ‘Pakistani’. However, among Pakistanis, there are different groups, like the dominant Punjabis, fairly well-represented groups like the Sindh and Pashtuns, and marginalised Balochis. The same is true in Sri Lanka, which has a Sinhalese majority and Tamil and Muslim minorities. Non-intervention in China’s developmental peace does not make this distinction, and this can cause tensions, as ethnic harmony is not a strong suit in many countries that embrace the BRI.

Another problem with the top-down, government-to-government engagement style of developmental peace is that governments, in both China and the host countries, and their political elites become the main beneficiaries of development, rather than the local grassroots. In fact, locals have more to lose at times of Chinese development. For example, the Merowe dam built by China in Sudan has been criticised for being an

attempt by the autocratic military government to privatise Sudanese energy, and it has been argued that the project should only continue after peace and democracy have been restored to the country (Askouri, 2004). The Merowe dam is just one of the many large infrastructures, including hydroelectric plants, railroads, oil refineries and pipelines, to support China's oil extraction activities in Sudan (McDonald et al., 2008). However, the dam has been built at the expense of local communities that were forced to move from their ancient lands without proper compensation from the government, causing landlessness and homelessness (Ahmed, 2019). All this happened under the watch of the Chinese Government, as the China International Water & Electric Corporation was one of the main contractors to the dam.

China's non-intervention in Sudan also contradicts itself for its involvement in Sudanese oil development (Large, 2008), especially when infrastructure such as the Merowe dam contributes to this cause. On the surface, China gaining resources from Sudan in exchange for providing Sudan with much needed infrastructure is a win-win for the Party, the Sudanese elite, and for locals who would benefit from this infrastructure. However, it is also a loss for some communities, especially the grassroots that must be displaced without compensation. Without the necessary civil societies to support China's government-to-government interaction, local communities can be left in the dark regarding incoming Chinese projects, which can cause discontent and grievances. This is problematic in authoritarian countries like Sudan, where it is difficult to hold the government accountable for their actions.

There will be many more cases in Asia concerning the problems that developmental peace is creating on the ground. The Sudan case, where Chinese projects have not benefitted the local grassroots as much as the state media likes to claim, is only one of the many cases that will become a trend for China's practice of developmental peace on the ground.

## **2.5: Conclusion**

This chapter elaborates on the theories of liberal, hybrid and developmental peace, along with subcategories such as adaptive, local, and illiberal peace. Much of what was discussed above suggests how these respective styles of peacebuilding should operate on a theoretical scale. For example, liberal peace is a top-down pursuit of liberal norms, usually created or imposed under victor's peace by the dominating hegemony. In other words, it is usually the US that is trying to transform post-conflict societies so that they align more closely to the liberal world order it dictates along with other Western countries. Liberal peacebuilding has not been able to create sustainable peace in Afghanistan or Iraq,

not because liberal norms are ineffective or irrelevant, but because they are not implemented in ways that are acceptable to local society, prompting scholars to search for better ways to include the local grassroots as stakeholders in peace. The bottom-up approach supports the top-down approach in hybrid peace, removing the problem of local discontent against foreign imposed ideas, improving local ownership of peace processes.

China's developmental peace is similar to liberal peace in the sense that they are both top-down state-led initiatives that focus on the top-level engagement between governments. This means that the grassroots are not often considered stakeholders, and the lack of local ownership seriously questions the longevity of post-conflict peace established under these models. Developmental peace has a strong emphasis on internal stability and aims to achieve it through economic development without interfering with a country's domestic affairs. This approach and shared understanding between East and Southeast Asian countries have had a great effect in preventing armed conflict in the region for many decades. Whether or not China's developmental peace, which focuses more on creating win-win relations and placing China itself at the centre of regional affairs, is capable of bringing sustainable peace to societies experiencing intrastate conflicts needs further investigation of evidence found in the case studies. A summary of this chapter's contents is provided in the following table:

Table 1: Summary of Peacebuilding Models  
(Made by the author, on following page)

	Direction	Main Agendas	Military Intervention?	What to do with post-conflict power structures?
Liberal peace	Top-down, state-led, government-to-government interaction.	Democracy, human rights/security, rule of law, economic development, state-building by turning illiberal actors to liberal.	Yes – remove the hostile illiberal regime, either by unilateral intervention or R2P.	Dismantle illiberal elements, establish liberal institutions.
Hybrid peace	Top-down + bottom-up, state supported by local actors.	Locally grounded peace, equal representation, democracy, human rights/security, rule of law, economic development, consider tradition of illiberal actors (both governmental and local).	No.	Maintain existing power structures to enhance local ownership of peace, but emphasise the importance of liberal norms.
Developmental peace	Top-down, state-led, government-to-government interaction.	Economic development, state security, state sovereignty, internal stability, pragmatic cooperation with both liberal and illiberal actors.	No.	Maintain existing power structure for state-led economic development. Non-intervention in domestic affairs.

The following table sets out the structure that this dissertation will use in subsequent case studies

:

	Description	Critique
Peacebuilding Theory	A	B
Peacebuilding Practice	C	D

Table 2: Analytical Framework (made by the author)

Separating theory from practice is important, as we cannot always expect peacebuilding to go according to the theory because of the dynamic situation on the ground. Separating theory and practice in such a manner can analyse what should have happened in theory with the conflict at hand, and what actually happened in practice on the ground when peacebuilders arrived at the site of the conflict. Peacebuilders, in this case, can mean any stakeholders relevant to the resolution of the conflict, whether it is the national elite of that country, domestic actors like CSOs, Western donors, Asian donors, or multilateral organisations like the UN. This will also make clear the conflicts that plague society and how each peacebuilding model intends to address these conflicts, with the critique comprising qualitative statements on whether or not these measures have been successful in establishing sustainable and positive peace. This will be done with each peacebuilding model of liberal, hybrid (or local, if hybridity cannot be achieved), and developmental peace.

## Chapter 3: Motives of Chinese Peacebuilding

### 3.1: Introduction

This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it provides further knowledge on China's motives towards peacebuilding, to clarify whether China intends to pursue peacebuilding at all. This is a question that has not yet been fully explored, especially regarding Beijing's intention to establish an alternative model. It will serve to explain some factors that compel China to pursue peacebuilding, mainly as a means to protect and maintain stability along the paths of the BRI. Secondly, it will also identify some gaps in current literature regarding Chinese peacebuilding as a means to establish the originality of this dissertation.

China is usually reluctant to promote new or alternative models, mainly because the Party does not want to be viewed as a revisionist power. Related to this point, a Chinese scholar (2022) who wishes to remain anonymous stated in a personal interview that China does not have the intention to promote alternative models because it does not want to be seen to be openly challenging the West. Alternative models like developmental peace may be seen as adversaries, or as an antithesis to the West's liberal peace, in the same way that the Beijing Consensus, which was not a concept proposed by China, became an antithesis to the Washington Consensus. For this reason, too, advocates of developmental peace, such as He Yin (2019), say that Chinese peacebuilding can coexist with Western liberal peace rather than confront it as an antithesis.

With that being said, there are signs that this attitude is changing during Xi's time in office. A recent signal was during the Boao Forum in April 2022, when Xi announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which offers China's solutions to modern problems concerning international security – a field that has been traditionally dominated by the US. The GSI, as it was put forward by Chinese state media, can be summed up by the following points: (1) committing to cooperation on sustainable security, (2) respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, (3) abiding by the principles of the UN while rejecting bloc confrontation or 'cold war' mentalities, (4) considering the legitimate concerns of all countries under the principle of 'indivisible security', (5) peaceful resolution of disputes between countries, and (6) security on both traditional and non-traditional domains (Xinhua, 2022a). Most of these principles are, in effect, reflections of recent Chinese policy.

The GSI is more focused on interstate international security and might not be directly related to this discussion were it not for the principle of 'indivisible security'. Like many laws and principles of China (and in a sense, Russia as well), they are intentionally kept vague so their interpretation can be later changed to apply to a wide

variety of specific cases. The GSI also has strong principles but offers only vague explanations as to how they may be implemented. The term ‘indivisible security’ was first used in détente between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and also later endorsed by China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but was given a new meaning by Russia when it invaded Ukraine in 2022, as the Kremlin claimed that it felt threatened by alleged NATO expansionism (Freeman & Stephenson, 2022). A purpose of the GSI is to show that the US is the problem and China is the solution, where the GSI would be used as a platform to build security relations (Freeman & Stephenson, 2022). China’s expanding overseas interests mean that indivisible security can be applied to almost any conflict on the BRI, and that China (not the West, as they are the problem) should lead peacebuilding initiatives, either bilaterally or with multilateral actors in these conflicts. This is a considerable departure from China’s previous timid approach when trying to promote alternative models. For example, in Africa, China has already made it clear that it intends to play a more important role in promoting peace and security in the two-day China–Horn of Africa Conference on Security, Governance and Development occurring in Addis Ababa (TRT World, 2022).

Much of China’s recent proactivity in promoting its own norms is what Yan Xuetong (2016) would call ‘moral realism’. Since Xi’s inauguration in 2013, Yan has called for China to undertake more international responsibilities, otherwise it will never be in a favourable international environment. Yan (2016) adds that dominant states must have both hard and normative power that they can use to stabilise international order. Against this backdrop, China is interested in offering an alternative model because the existing models of liberal and hybrid peace are incapable of creating sustainable peace, as they are promoted by Western actors that are part of the problem, according to Beijing’s arguments. The quality of peace created by China in these cases will be up for scrutiny in the forthcoming case studies. As China becomes more powerful on the international stage, both in terms of economic and military capabilities, as well as Xi’s departure from China’s previously conservative approach to international peace, there is no opportunity for China to present an alternative model as an emerging donor in the peacebuilding environment that has been largely dominated by the liberal West.

### **3.2: Linkage Between Peacebuilding and the BRI**

Discussion of the significance of the BRI for China’s internal stability will reveal what is at stake for Beijing that can force the Party to break its principles of non-intervention and take the initiative to maintain peace and stability around its periphery. China’s expanding definition of ‘periphery’ will also be discussed in this section.



### *3.2.1: Economic Stability as Party Legitimacy*

The BRI has been, since the beginning, and will always be an economic initiative launched by China. That is to say, the economy is one of the Party's main sources of legitimacy, and maintaining constant economic growth is directly connected to domestic stability, which is of highest importance to the CCP. This approach can be traced back to the 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China after Mao Zedong's death. Mao's disastrous reform policies left China economically and socially in ruins: the country was no longer in any condition to pursue Communist ideology; nor did it have the luxury of waiting for returns from long-term capital investments. What China needed at that time was an immediate overhaul of its economic system, which had seen little success in replicating the Soviet model. Deng managed to successfully deliver a pragmatic approach by introducing rural recovery, free marketing, autonomy in urban enterprise responsibility, expansion of light industries, and rational planning of heavy industries (Chang, 1988).

Deng's pragmatism later led to his famous quote: 'It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice' (News of the Communist Party of China, n.d.). The Chinese, or Chinese grassroots, were given a first-hand taste of making money and becoming rich. China has also achieved internal stability – an important trait of developmental peace – through economic development, industrialisation, and modernisation, when the country had been in turmoil for most of the 1960s and 1970s due to Mao's Great Leap Forward and his Cultural Revolution. Deng's pragmatism is still relevant in Chinese policy in more recent times, as the same theory can be applied to China's neighbours, like Myanmar, because as long as they can protect Chinese interests, it does not matter if their governments are democratic or despotic (Liao, 2009). Stable growth of the Chinese economy has brought great internal stability to the CCP, and the Party has done well in this regard to sustain China's growth as one of the fastest growing economies in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The CCP's defence of their legitimacy using economic growth was relatively easy during Deng's time. Back then, there was a need for Deng's cabinet of second-generation CCP leaders to distinguish themselves from Mao's first generation of revolutionaries who had founded the People's Republic of China. While Deng could not take credit for the Party's early successes in development and organisation in the 1950s (Hamrin, 1987), he could easily claim success over the modernisation and industrialisation of China. China's staggering double-digit growth in terms of GDP became a strong source of legitimacy for subsequent leaders like Jiang and Hu as well, as

it continued Deng's legacy of economic development. Therefore, at that time, it was relatively easy for Party leaders to claim credit and legitimacy over impressive GDP numbers. However, this was no longer the case when Xi Jinping took power in 2012. Over the years, the Party has constantly propped up the fact that only the CCP is capable of ensuring economic growth, social stability and defending China's national sovereignty nationalistic (Holbig & Gilley, 2010). While this continues to be true for Xi's fifth generation of leaders, numbers in reports and reality on the ground make it difficult for Xi to continue to claim economic superiority over his predecessors.

For example, China experienced the most significant GDP growth rate during the decade between the 1990s and the early 2000s. With the exception of a single slump of 7.7% growth in 1999, China managed to consistently maintain high levels of GDP growth throughout the decade, with its highest being 14.2% in 1992 and 2007 (World Bank, 2021). By 2012, China's GDP growth rate was at 7.8%, which was only slightly higher than that in 1999 during the Asian Financial Crisis. This means that Xi can no longer use economic growth as an attribute to his personal success in leading the Party, because China's GDP has fallen every year since Xi's inauguration.

Xi employed two measures to remedy this. Domestically, he continued to fan the flames of nationalism, creating the China Dream concept, which is a pessimistic interpretation of China's past national humiliation through the creation of an anti-Western and anti-Japanese Chinese identity (Callahan, 2015). Internationally, he sought to expand China's economic development strategy outwards to what was later known as the BRI. At the 2017 BRI forum, Xi (2017) announced that China intends to pursue new strategies and create new opportunities to steer the 'new normal'. New opportunities mean sending Chinese labour and companies abroad to tackle the issue of overcapacity at home. Back in 2013, Chinese industries had yet to realise their full potential, as steel, cement, plate glass and shipbuilding industries were experiencing overcapacity (Economic Times, 2014). These steel and cement companies that had traditionally served China's domestic economy were finding it harder to spend their resources (including workers) at home, and they needed to be directed to large-scale overseas infrastructure projects that put state-owned companies (SOEs) to work (China Power Team, 2017).

The BRI is China's latest attempt to claim CCP legitimacy through economic development, and it is one of Xi's personal projects to distinguish himself from his predecessors. There is much at stake regarding the Chinese economy, as economic freedom is one of the few remaining liberties allowed by the CCP under a system where political and civil liberties are either weak or barely existent. Due to its non-transparent nature, the full scale of the BRI is difficult to imagine, as estimates can range from

anything between \$1 and \$8 trillion (Hillman, 2018). The sheer scale of this number suggests that much is at stake for Xi and China with the BRI. For reference, it is estimated that Chinese companies lost a total of \$20 billion during the power transition in Libya (Sun, 2012). It would be unthinkable for China to risk an initiative worth trillions of dollars after already losing \$20 billion to instability, Western intervention and regime change in Libya. Beijing must proactively protect this economic initiative by considering the peace and security dimensions of the BRI through peacebuilding.

### *3.2.2: Food and Energy Securities*

While this dissertation is not aimed at discussing China's domestic policy in detail, a certain degree of understanding of the domestic situation in China is needed to understand the significance of the BRI to China, and the need to protect it through peacebuilding measures. At home, there are two main insecurities that are of major concern to the CCP regarding the country's internal stability, namely China's food and energy.

Food security is becoming a major concern for China. For a country with 1.4 billion people, domestic production of food is weakening annually due to the loss of arable land. In the decade between 2009 and 2019, China lost 6% of its arable land, bringing it down to 13% despite the Party's efforts to conserve farmland from urban encroachment over the years (Reuters, 2021a). Official data released by China's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (2022) indicates that in 2021, China's total agriculture trade totalled \$304.17 billion, with an increase of 23.2% since the previous year, where China imported \$219.82 billion (an increase of 28.6%) as opposed to exporting \$84.35 billion (an increase of 10.9%), resulting in a \$135.47 billion trade deficit that has grown by 42.9% since the previous year. In comparison, in the same year, the US had \$163.34 billion worth of exports and \$171.74 billion in imports: a deficit of \$8.3 billion (Economic Research Service, 2022). The point is that China is much more reliant on imported food than it likes to admit, especially because it has already lost so much arable land to urban encroachment in the past decade that could have contributed to its domestic production. The World Bank's 2019 data records that China's five biggest exporters of agriculture products are Brazil, the US, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada (WITS, 2020), a few of which can be at odds with China.

Meanwhile, energy security, and oil in particular, is another source of internal stability (or lack thereof) for the Party. China surpassed the US in 2017 to become the world's largest oil importer, importing 11.8 million barrels per day by 2019 (Reale et al., 2020). While the US is still the world's largest consumer of oil, using 20.5 million barrels a day, China is a close second at 14 million barrels (Reale et al., 2020). China imports

most of its oil from the Middle East, mostly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as from Angola in Africa, but recently, Russia has overtaken all these countries to become China's number one exporter of oil (Reale et al., 2020). Chinese columnist Zhang Wenmu (2021) mentioned that China's demand for energy had been relatively balanced by supply in the early 2000s, but in terms of energy security, this should be a red sign for the future when demand will be greater than supply. Here it is important to take note that the bulk of China's energy is generated by coal-fired powerplants, which provide roughly 70% of all domestically produced energy in the country (Zhang, 2021). China's reliance on coal has always been high, with its lowest point being 66% for a brief period in 2000 (Zhang, 2021). Although China is already by far the largest producer of coal, producing approximately 3.7 billion tonnes of coal per year (as of 2016), its consumption of coal exceeds 4 billion tonnes (Worldometer, 2016), meaning that a considerable amount still has to come from overseas.

The need to import most of its food and energy from abroad is a problem for China. In an age where China is becoming increasingly at odds with its neighbours – Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam – over territorial disputes, there is more pressure on Beijing to diversify its food and energy routes, fearing that a conflict with its neighbours in the East and South China Sea (or over Taiwan) will invite robust US military support for its Asian allies. The 'Malacca Dilemma', a term first coined by former President Hu Jintao, points at the narrow congestion point between Malaysia and Indonesia through which Chinese ships have to pass to reach the Middle East and Africa for oil and food. To make matters worse, these waters are guarded by major US allies like Singapore, as well as being in ASEAN territory. To avoid being shut off from the global food and energy market when a naval blockade is placed over the Malacca strait in times of conflict, China has put considerable effort into developing alternative routes to reach the Middle East and Africa through the Indian Ocean. China has also signed over 100 agricultural cooperation agreements with BRI countries as one of the many important channels to promote agriculture and food cooperation, so much so that some scholars call it the Chinese Food Silk Road under the BRI (Tortajada & Zhang, 2021).

China's reliance on imported coal is also often overlooked because of the difficulties in securing a stable supply when traditional sources such as Australia and Indonesia are beginning to sway. In 2020, China imposed an unofficial ban on Australian coal as a retaliatory measure against Canberra's call for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 (Turland, 2021). The loss of Australian coal, which accounted for 68% of Chinese supply, caused widespread blackouts across China at the time (Turland, 2021). In another blow to China's energy security, Indonesia announced in early 2022 that

it would ban coal exports due to fears of local shortages (Gunia, 2022). While coal routes are not directly affected by the Malacca dilemma, the diminishing supply of coal could incentivise China to become a more voracious consumer of alternatives such as oil, whose routes to the Middle East and Africa are affected by any potential blockade in the Malacca strait. The stakes for China to maintain peace and security on alternative energy routes on the BRI only become higher as Beijing tries addressing their energy security concerns.

China-built ports in BRI countries in South and Southeast Asia are the crux for this route diversification. As we will see later, China is heavily invested in the Gwadar and Hambantota ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, as well as the forthcoming Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar. These ports are situated in areas with poor security and still with local insurgencies in some cases. An anonymous Chinese scholar in a personal interview gave a possible answer to why China is forced to invest in conflict-prone areas. As a newcomer and emerging actor, China is often relegated to investing in countries or areas that have previously been avoided by traditional donors due to security concerns, but this is also a means to avoid competition. Peacebuilding is a measure to protect these Chinese assets that would serve as an important entry point for overseas imports that contribute to China's food and energy stability.

### *3.2.3: Preventing Western Intervention*

Not leaving conflicts unaddressed and preventing them from escalating is the main way to prevent Western armed intervention in China's periphery. This applies both to UNPKOs under the responsibility to protect (R2P) and to potential unilateral intervention by Western entities like NATO. The point is that China wants to keep foreign forces away from its periphery.

As China's economic and political influence expands, so do its national interests and definition of 'periphery'. China's internal stability is no longer solely dependent on domestic factors, but there are many overseas factors that can have profound impacts on the CCP's ability to maintain stability at home. This is evident in the BRI trying to sustain Party legitimacy through looking overseas for economic growth, as well as seeking to secure alternative routes to sustain China's food and energy supplies. The BRI is not just threatened by local armed conflicts and insurgencies in developing countries, but also by potential Western intervention, which China loathes so much. Protecting China's assets from a Libya-style armed intervention by the West is a strong incentive for China to proactively act in peacebuilding in the region. Military intervention has never been received positively by Beijing because it is concerned that US-led intervention aimed at regime change will one day will be used against China (Swaine, 2012).

China's resistance against Western intervention does not equate to a desire to completely push out Western influence. There is no evidence to suggest that China is interested in pushing Western democracy out and establishing an empire of authoritarian regimes: in fact, it is very much the opposite. China is pragmatic, and does not have a preference as to the type of government with which to work. This can be seen with Myanmar, as Beijing has maintained positive relations with both the civilian and the military government based on many high-profile meetings by Xi in Myanmar over the years.

The main element of Western influence that Beijing wants is the tendency for armed intervention based on humanitarian grounds. These ties with the Chinese are concerned with the fact that the UN is shifting away from traditional approaches of sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity to adopt a more humanitarian and human-security-focused approach with possible military intervention in cases of alleged crimes against humanity. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) report stated that even the most adamant defenders of state sovereignty should not allow other states to treat civilians with impunity, and that there should be clear rules and set criteria that allow intervention for humanitarian purposes (ICISS, 2001). Later, there were even claims that state sovereignty is a privilege for competent states that are capable of protecting civilians, and that those that fail to do so should request help from international society (Cohen & Deng, 2008). The proliferation of R2P in the early 2000s was daunting for non-Western countries like China, despite its positive reception in the West. Western countries like the US think that there is too little humanitarian intervention (Weiss, 2012), while the EU, despite never reaching a consensus on R2P, remains a strong supporter of the initiative: France and pre-Brexit Britain wanted stronger support for the concept, whereas Germany and the rest of the EU held a relatively more conservative view (Brockmeier et al., 2014).

China has never fully accepted the necessity of R2P. Yet, at the same time, it did not actively fight against it. China implied that R2P should not be used to undermine principles of sovereignty; it also wants R2P to be non-binding, stresses the importance of states still holding the primary responsibility of protecting civilians, and argues that the West must not use R2P as a means to facilitate regime change (Liu & Zhang, 2014). In the 1990s, former foreign minister Qian Qichen rejected the notion that peacekeeping should be allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of a third country (Fravel, 1996). China's defence of state security and state sovereignty goes against the trend of traditional principles of sovereignty that are slowly being relaxed to favour a non-traditional humanitarian approach. China and the US would eventually come to a consensus that R2P

should be case-specific, and that no country or institution should be obliged to intervene under international law (Foot, 2016). However, worries remain for R2P's potential to bypass state sovereignty and legitimise international intervention (Fung, 2016): even if China supports UN initiatives against violent conflicts, mass atrocities and grave human rights violations, on the other hand it also actively sabotages UN attempts to condemn states of violence against civilians or mandates that would weaken state authorities (Teitt, 2018).

The means to achieve balance between the two conflicting Chinese viewpoints on R2P, as well as to address the international community's shift away from state sovereignty to humanitarian approaches, involve Beijing taking the initiative in leading peacebuilding in its periphery. 'Doing nothing' is not an option because it has learnt the lesson of non-action from the losses Beijing suffered during the Libyan civil war. For China, its proliferation of economic development in peacebuilding is equivalent to the proliferation of liberal democracy in Western models. As explained above, China spreads economic development as a basic human right, as opposed to the West spreading democracy. We see China proactively lobbying against intervention around its periphery, especially when violent conflict like the Rohingya crisis break out. Approaching conflicts through the framework of developmental peace is also a means for China to sidestep its own narratives of non-intervention, to take matters into its own hands to work with regional and international actors before the UN decides that violent conflict has got out of hand and intervention under R2P must be authorised.

Trying to keep out Western influence is closely tied with the ever-expanding definition of the 'periphery'. With the expansion of the BRI, many of Beijing's national interests are no longer limited to China's domestic assets, but much more emphasis needs to be placed on means to protect its overseas assets. Below is a map that presents an overview of the routes taken by the BRI:




Figure 1: Map of the BRI (Cai, 2017)

The term ‘peripheral diplomacy’ was first used in 2013 in a foreign policy meeting attended by all top-level decision-makers in the CCP, including the politburo’s Standing Committee members (Cai, 2017). At the later Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference, Xi made explicit remarks on recognising the value that Chinese neighbours have for China, including the need to deepen economic and security ties with these neighbours, as well as to accelerate regional integration by constructing a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road (Xinhua, 2013a). Trying to secure China’s periphery, in fact, is nothing new, as back in 2004, then-President Hu launched a ‘new historic mission’ for the PLA to address the new challenges that follow China’s expanding global interests (Mulvenon, 2009). With creations such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), both shown in the map above, as well as planned oil pipelines and energy agreements with BRI partners, China’s ‘periphery’ now encompasses these foreign territories and resources as well (Swaine, 2014). Of course, it would not be reasonable to claim the entirety of the BRI as China’s periphery, especially considering that it reaches as far as Russia and Africa, and even into Europe. Therefore, to understand of China’s periphery, I refer to a personal interview with Professor Oliver Richmond in 2022, who says that both China and Russia still have the age-old mentality of spheres of influence. China’s periphery can be defined



by the bordering countries of South and Southeast Asia, as Central Asia is pushing the boundaries into Russia's sphere. The conflicts happening in South and Southeast Asia are priorities for China to address with developmental peace to protect their overseas interests, and more importantly, to prevent Western armed intervention when the humanitarian situation deteriorates greatly.

### **3.3: Gaps in Current Literature**

As explained in the Introduction of this dissertation, China's developmental peace is a relatively new phenomenon that is not getting the amount of attention it requires, particularly amongst Western academics. This dissertation aims to add to existing literature about developmental peace by establishing a theoretical groundwork for China's model of peacebuilding as well as making a clear connection between Chinese peacebuilding and overseas initiatives such as the BRI.

Current literature on developmental peace, such as the works by main advocates such as He Yin (2014, 2019) and Wang Xuejun (2017), focuses on the relationship with and impact of Chinese development on peacekeeping, rather than peacebuilding. However, as explained already in this chapter, China is no longer a passive actor on the international stage that waits for a reaction from the UNSC in order to act through UNPKOs. Beijing is much more proactive in addressing the preventative and post-conflict aspects of conflicts, particularly the means to prevent a relapse into conflict that could invite Western intervention on humanitarian grounds. This proactivity serves to protect the BRI from potential instability in host countries, which are often unstable developing countries. Peace and security are inextricably linked to the BRI even if the initiative itself was not designed with peacebuilding in mind. Peacebuilding has effectively become a means for China to protect the BRI. Discussions around developmental peace and its relation to peacekeeping are important, but recent actions by China in the BRI require academics to take developmental peace beyond peacekeeping into peacebuilding. That being said, a more recent article by He (2021) suggests that developmental peace and its relation to peacebuilding is rapidly gaining the attention it needs. Abb (2021) also outlines the rising role of China in the field of peacebuilding by highlighting the trend that China is pursuing greater engagement with post-conflict societies.

One of the existing works linking China's peacebuilding with the BRI is a relatively recent article by Li Dongyan (2021). While Li (2021) does not explicitly use the term 'developmental peace', he shares the same viewpoint that the BRI is an economic initiative that is linked closely with peace and security. Li (2021) recommends that the

BRI become an inclusive platform to promote peacebuilding, emphasising the importance of stronger cooperation between China and the UN, as well as economic development cooperation for peace and enhancing the capacity for peace. Much has been discussed at the theoretical level about how the BRI can become a platform for China to coordinate peacebuilding efforts with the UN, although not much has been said about the practice of Chinese peacebuilding under the BRI. One of the objectives of this dissertation is to refine the theories of developmental peace by shedding light on the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese peacebuilding through analyses of its practice.

Meanwhile, Zhang Guihong (2021) also takes a similar approach in linking the BRI with peacebuilding, using the term ‘developmental peace’ specifically to describe Chinese peacebuilding. However, Zhang’s (2021) work is much more focused on developmental peace as a Chinese foreign policy through its linkage with Xi’s ‘community of shared future for mankind’ theory. Closely related to that is Mierzejewski et al.’s (2022) work on China’s vertical multilateralism in Eastern Europe and Africa, also referring to Xi’s community of shared future for mankind. Here, the authors focused on analysing whether Chinese multilateralism in developing countries is an export of its domestic model of governance, but enthusiasm to adopt the Chinese model is waning, particularly in Eastern Europe, due to a variety of factors such as US-China rivalry and Covid-19 (Mierzejewski et al., 2022). This dissertation is a theory-driven discussion on developmental peace in relation to other models of international peacebuilding, rather than developmental peace as Chinese foreign or domestic policy. This means that this dissertation will mainly focus on the theory and practice of developmental peace rather than the role of peacebuilding in Chinese foreign or domestic policies.

An observable trend in literature related to alternative models of peacebuilding in general is its comparison with the traditional model of liberal peace. Literature on developmental peace is no exception, especially considering that He’s (2019) work also attempts to compare developmental peace with liberal peace. More recently, Yuan (2022) claims that China is proactively contesting liberal peace, where Beijing is trying to replace liberal institution-building in peacebuilding programs with economic development. This dissertation also aims to address this issue by suggesting that liberal and developmental peace at the theoretical level are not much different, as they are both inflexible top-down models that use a single means – democracy in liberal peace, as opposed to economic development in developmental peace – to address a wide variety of conflicts. This also begs the necessity to compare developmental peace with alternate non-liberal peace models such as hybrid peace. Another objective of this dissertation is to discover the peacebuilding model that is most likely to create sustainable and positive peace in post-

conflict societies. To do so, this dissertation will provide a three-way comparison between the theory and practice of liberal, hybrid and developmental peace in order to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of each model. It is also important to pay attention to the critique of developmental peace, especially as it may be difficult for Chinese scholars to criticise the actions of the CCP.

In terms of practice, some research has been done with regard to Chinese peacebuilding. Main advocates such as Wang (2017) and Xue (2017) have focused on China's efforts in Africa. This dissertation turns to Asia instead. It does not, however, attempt to make a subjective judgement on whether Asia or Africa is more important to China, as they are both important for different reasons. As for existing literature on developmental peace in Asia, Wei (2021) provides an important piece of work that also lays out the theoretical framework of China's developmental peace. This dissertation adds additional traits to the existing framework laid out by previous academics, understanding that economic development is not limited to China but is a shared practice amongst Asian countries in general, as well as the pragmatism of Asian actors (as a part of non-intervention where the type of governance is not a hindrance to collaboration between Asian countries). Wei (2021) focuses on China's developmental peace in the Indo-Pacific with Southeast Asian countries, whereas this dissertation focuses on the conflict zones of South Asia, with a single Southeast Asian case (Myanmar) which shares a border with South Asia. On the practice of developmental peace in South Asia, Adhikari (2021) provides a comprehensive review of peacebuilding with 'Chinese characteristics' in Myanmar. This dissertation will also take that into consideration and conduct a cross-case comparison to discover trends of post-conflict societies in the region, which peacebuilders, both scholars, policymakers and peacebuilding practitioners must take into consideration regardless of which model of peacebuilding is used.

### **3.4: Conclusion**

Ever since the Beijing Consensus was wrongfully highlighted as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, China has shown a certain degree of hesitation towards promoting new and alternative models to avoid being viewed as a revisionist power. However, this is not the case under Xi Jinping, as his actions to push China to take a greater role in international peace and security suggest a major departure from the previous conservative policies of Xi's predecessors.

Xi's rule, however, is not void of problems. The economy inherited by Xi in 2012 was at one of its lowest points in terms of GDP growth, a statistic that the Party has traditionally used to justify the legitimacy of the CCP rule. Furthermore, Xi's assertive

stance in Asia puts China more at odds against its East, Southeast and South Asian neighbours. This also puts China at odds against the US, which back neighbours like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. This has caused more problems with the unresolved 'Malacca Dilemma', which has forced China to find alternative routes to the Middle East, Europe and Africa to prepare for a potential conflict with the US. These factors, along with an interest in preventing Western military intervention from destabilising the national interests of the BRI, have compelled Beijing to take the initiative to instigate peacebuilding, before any implications of R2P appear in the Security Council.

The aim of this dissertation is not to discuss Xi's domestic policies or China's foreign policies. The factors discussed above serve mainly to establish the fact that there is a clear consciousness for China to contribute more to international peace and security – a field that Beijing had not been active in shaping in the past, as narratives were mostly dominated by Western states. The shift in peacebuilding away from Western unipolarity to multipolarity with greater participation from emerging actors like China is, in reality, not so different from a shift away from the unipolarity of liberal peace to alternative models such as hybrid peace and developmental peace.

## Chapter 4: Case Study of Pakistan

### 4.1: Introduction

The following four chapters of this dissertation will be dedicated to country-specific case studies around China's periphery. These chapters will focus mainly on describing the practices of each peacebuilding model and providing critiques of those practices, with a brief introduction to the theories that relate to the conflict on the ground.

Pakistan is the first case to analyse, and it deserves to come first due to its close relationship with China and plethora of cases of both inter- and intrastate conflicts. However, the Pakistani state remains largely stable, as it embraces a partially democratic style of governance. The most recent Freedom House (2022a) report ranks Pakistan as a partly free country, though it is one of the worse-performing countries in its South Asian neighbourhood in terms of freedom and democracy. Nonetheless, despite the relative stability of the state, Pakistan suffers greatly from domestic instability.

There are three main conflicts that can cause instability in Pakistan, and these conflicts will be analysed through different models of peacebuilding. These conflicts are (1) Kashmir, (2) insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), and (3) Balochistan. To provide a brief introduction to the above conflicts, the conflict in Kashmir is a longstanding territorial dispute between Pakistan and India, since they became independent states from the British Raj. The British never made clear whether Kashmir should belong to India or Pakistan, or should be an independent state, leaving it as one of the few remaining interstate conflicts that have attracted attention from UNPKO over the years. Kashmir is currently split between India-administered Kashmir, also known as Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, known as Azad Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan (G&B). Meanwhile, the insurgency in the northern frontiers of KPK and FATA is due to the issue of Pashtun nationalism, which will be further explained later in this chapter and in Chapter 5, as well as the standoff between the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Taliban. Meanwhile, Balochistan has suffered from decades of insurgency due to the ethnic grievances of the local minority race, which condemns the Pakistani state for exploiting local resources without returning appropriate benefits. It is a prime case of conflict and radicalisation due to top-down marginalisation. All of the above issues are protracted conflicts that prevent Pakistan from being fully stable, and the country is most certainly in need of further peacebuilding initiatives in terms of both its territorial disputes with India and its domestic instability.

In each section of this chapter, there will be a description of how each model of peacebuilding – liberal, hybrid, and developmental peace – addresses conflicts in Kashmir, KPK and FATA, and Balochistan. This will be followed by a critique which will qualitatively judge whether that specific peacebuilding model is effective in tackling the conflict or not. However, it is important to keep in mind that the conflicts are protracted because no single model of peacebuilding has been particularly effective at creating sustainable peace. Therefore, much of the critique will be centred around how alternative models such as hybrid and developmental peace try to address the shortcomings of liberal peace. The focus at the end of this chapter is to see whether China's developmental peace offers anything different from existing models of liberal and hybrid peace in addressing conflicts in Pakistan.

#### *4.1.1: Background History*

Some background history of Pakistan's foreign relations is also required to better understand the conflicts it is currently facing. Being a relatively new nation that was founded in 1947 after the Second World War, Pakistan has had a difficult history with military rule. As a former part of the British Raj, Pakistan initially embraced democracy, but there have been numerous times throughout its history when military rule has prevailed over elected civilian governments. Benazir Bhutto's Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in the 1980s tried to reintroduce democracy and put the military under civilian control. After the successful election of Bhutto as PM, certain aspects of liberal values were restored in Pakistan, such as the lifting of bans on trade unions and student associations, removal of constraints on NGOs, and lifting the censorship imposed on the media by the previous military administrations (Suvorova, 2015). Bhutto's successful election placed the Pakistani government under civilian control once again, but the military remains a powerful institution within the country to this day, often with competing interests with the civilian government.

In terms of Pakistan's foreign relations, the most important relationship for Islamabad is not with China or the US, but with its neighbour and rival, India. Pakistan and India fought three wars over disputed territories in Kashmir, including two major conflicts in 1947 and 1965 and a limited war in 1999, and many skirmishes throughout history. The Kashmir issue has received considerable international attention over the years, with the UN mostly playing an advisory role with regard to the conflict. Shortly after India's and Pakistan's independence in 1948 under resolution 39, the UN established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan with the mandate to investigate and mediate any conflicts between the two. After the Karachi Agreement was signed in

1949, the UN used military observers to monitor the ceasefire, and these observers became the centre of the United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). UNMOGIP urged both sides to uphold the ceasefire in 1965 when hostilities broke out, and the UN increased the strength of UNMOGIP to 102 observers and established the United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), which persuaded fighting commanders to stop firing, but the mission itself has no authority to order a halt to the fighting (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). UNIPOM was terminated in 1966 when India and Pakistan both completed the withdrawal of troops under the UNSC resolution.

Over the years, various leaders from both India and Pakistan have attempted to improve relations with each other, but tensions remain high between the two nuclear neighbours of South Asia. Pakistan tried to learn from China and deepen economic cooperation with New Delhi by fostering better trade ties, developing a positive attitude towards building peace under the rule of the democratically elected Pakistan People's Party (Bhutto's party, also known as the PPP), whereas India also returned the favour by granting Pakistan MFN status in 1996 (Chakma, 2014). Pakistan, however, has yet to give MFN status to India, and despite efforts such as the 'Lahore Process' in 1999, which showed glimmers of hope of improving relations when then Indian PM Atal Behari Vajpayee met his Pakistani counterpart PM Nawaz Sharif, conflict broke out in Kashmir that same year, which became a three-month limited war, ending with Pakistan's withdrawal (Chakma, 2014).

Tensions in the disputed Kashmir territory are a point of contestation in Indo-Pakistani relations. It is a protracted conflict that has consistently soured the relationship between the two nations despite efforts to improve economic relations elsewhere. In 2014, then newly elected PM Narendra Modi invited PM Nawaz Sharif (in his third term) to attend his inauguration, but cancelled talks after finding that the Pakistani high commissioner in India had been meeting Kashmir separatist leaders (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). Meanwhile in 2019, Pakistan PM Imran Khan warned that Pakistan would retaliate if India took military action, after Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad claimed to be behind the suicide attack that killed more than 40 people in India's security forces (BBC, 2019a). India blames Pakistan for not properly investigating these militants and Khan for having failed to condemn these 'heinous acts', putting Khan in a difficult position, as he had intended to improve relations with India when taking office in the previous year (BBC, 2019a).

Disputes in Kashmir are violent and volatile, and this can easily undermine any efforts by both sides to improve relations. This also shows that the most important foreign

relationship for Pakistan is not with foreign superpowers like the US or China, but with its neighbour India. The role China plays in Indo-Pak relations is that Islamabad wants China to become a balance against India. This does not mean that Pakistan is willing to completely forgo the existing relationship with the US in favour of China, even if their relationship with America has not been good post 9/11. Pakistan is also heavily engaged with Afghanistan and the Taliban: this will be discussed further in the Afghanistan case.

Due to poor relations with New Delhi, Pakistan often has to look beyond its regional neighbourhood to establish relations with powerful actors to balance against India. Naturally, this points to China as one of Pakistan's strongest and closest allies. Formal relations between the two began in the 1950s, shortly after India's defeat in the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Frustrated by defeat, India rapidly expanded its military in the 1960s, prompting a reaction from Beijing to align closely with Islamabad to counteract any future aggressions from New Delhi, which, at the time, aligned itself as China's rival to the Soviet Union.

Relations between China and Pakistan, in general, have remained positive for most of Pakistan's history. Pakistan often supports Chinese narratives on sensitive issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong, while China especially appreciates Pakistan's support regarding democracy and human rights (Rahman, 2007). Chinese officials refer to Pakistan using terms such as *haopengyou*, *haohuoban*, *haolinju*, *hao xiongdi* (good friend, good partner, good neighbour, good brothers), with Xi Jinping (2015) using all of the above terms in a speech addressing the Parliament of Pakistan.

Under the BRI, Pakistan would move even closer to China while becoming increasingly at odds with India over Kashmir and maintaining a peculiar relationship with the US concerning Islamabad's commitment to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite US criticisms, such as Alice Wells' remark that the CPEC would largely benefit Chinese SOEs from the lack of transparency and 'predatory loans' rather than Pakistan (Siddiqui, 2020), Islamabad praises China for being Pakistan's 'all-weather friend', as well as CPEC being a project that fosters cooperation between two friends that will bridge the people of China and Pakistan towards progress (Akhtar, 2020).

Aligning itself with China against India does not mean that Pakistan disregards the importance of relations with the US. During the Cold War, Washington was looking for allies to contain Communism in South Asia, but they failed to convince India to take this role (Cohen, 2000). Instead, Washington provided large amounts of money and military supplies for Pakistan's allegiance to deter the Soviets (Ali, 2003). Pakistan joining the US capitalist bloc paved the way for it to also join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation and the Central Treaty Organisation, where it received between \$1.2 and



\$1.5 billion worth of desperately-needed military hardware (Sial, 2007).

However, Pak-US relations quickly deteriorated in the 1960s after Pakistan reconciled with China on border disputes, and poor relations continued until the late 1970s (Kux, 2001). The USIP calls the US relations with Pakistan a ‘rollercoaster’ because while the two collaborated in supporting the Mujahideen when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s, their relations took a deeper nose-dive when US sanctions were placed against Pakistan in 1990 for trying to develop nuclear weapons (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).

The most defining feature of Pak-US relations is Pakistan siding with the US on America’s ‘war on terror’ as a response to the September 11 attacks (better known as 9/11). By becoming Washington’s frontline to the war on terror, Pakistan obtained the status of major non-NATO US ally (MNNA) under President George W. Bush in 2004 (U.S. Department of State, 2021), and with this came the opportunity to mend strained relations after US inaction in Afghanistan when the Soviets retreated, leaving Pakistan to face the aftermath of the Afghan *jihad* alone (Zaidi & Ahmad, 2021). However, Pakistan has paid a heavy price by aligning with the US, especially when Washington conducts drone attacks that violate Pakistani sovereignty, the expanding US-Indian partnership and condemnation from Washington for finding Osama Bin Laden on Pakistani soil. China is slowly replacing the US, giving Pakistan the economic and military aid that Washington used to provide. Projects such as the Gwadar Port aim to transform Pakistan into a transit corridor for more than 64 countries (Esteban, 2016).

Finally, while not a foreign actor, Pakistan’s relationship with the Balochistan province also requires some explanation to understand the necessity of peacebuilding in the region. The conflict in Balochistan is deeply rooted in both historical and political factors. Although Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan in terms of landmass, it is also the poorest and most sparsely-populated province, with a long history of insurgency against the Federal government. Traditionally, the Balochis have not demanded representation in politics, but this changed after they became marginalised by the Punjabis (the main ethnic group of Pakistan) when Parvez Musharraf came into power under a military coup. Pakistan’s eventual transition to civilian government lowered the intensity of conflict in the province, but fundamental problems such as uneven distribution of resources and violation of human rights by the Pakistani army have done little to prevent the resurgence of conflict in the region (Noormal, n.d.).

The Balochi race spans Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, but has no significant representation in any of the above countries. The Underrepresented Nations & People’s Organisation, an international movement, mentions that the Balochis in Pakistan are well

aware of the way the central government in Islamabad exploits their resources for the benefit of the Punjabi and Sindh majorities, whereas international development projects have done little to develop the region (UNPO, 2016). During the British Raj, Balochis enjoyed special status with the British Indian government, but now, under the state of Pakistan, Balochis are afraid that their small population will begin to lose identity if they are not protected (Javaid, 2010). However, Balochistan is often neglected by the political elites in Islamabad – the government exploits local resources but the region itself does not receive much development from the state. This is a major source of tension between Balochistan and the Pakistani federal government, and the entry of CPEC potentially complicates the already difficult local situation.

One of the local insurgent groups was the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Although the BLA is designated an international terrorist group by the US Department of State (2019), portrayal of this group amongst locals varies. For example, English-language media such as the Dawn portray the BLA as a ruthless organisation that attacks civilians, but the BLA is rarely mentioned by Urdu-language media or by the local Baloch media (Ali & Paracha, 2019). However, Urdu media have used the term ‘terrorist’ to describe the BLA, while the Dawn calls the BLA ‘suspects’ (Ali & Paracha, 2019). This shows that both international society and the wider public of Pakistan recognise the threat of insurgency from the BLA, but despite clearly labelling them as terrorists, the local Baloch population does not antagonise the BLA as much.

Pakistan’s complex relations with its neighbours give Islamabad many tools to tackle the conflicts within its border, as well as with India over Kashmir. Although it is strongly aligned with China with regard to CPEC, this chapter will also demonstrate Pakistan’s flexibility in embracing different models of peacebuilding regarding domestic instability, insurgency, nationalism, and terrorism. The extent to which each model of peacebuilding is effective in establishing sustainable peace on the ground will be subjected to further debate from this point on.

## **4.2: Liberal Peace in Pakistan**

### *4.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Pakistan*

In theory, although not the most liberal country, Pakistan already embraces a democratic system of governance at home. Therefore, it may appear strange that there needs to be further external intervention to promote liberal norms like democracy. Though liberal norms are still important in Kashmir, this applies to both Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir and Indian-controlled J&K. The Kashmir issue is a conflict that must be

addressed jointly between Pakistan and India, but it is also a highly persistent conflict that has plagued Indo-Pak relations since 1947. Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan: a Line of Control (LoC) was agreed upon under the supervision of the United Nations Military Group in 1949 and this LoC became the *de facto* border that divides Kashmir today.

For India, the Kashmir issue is strictly an internal matter and there is no compromise for the unity and integrity that J&K is an Indian territory (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2004). This is based on the argument that the accession of the state of J&K was signed by former ruler Maharaja Hari Singh to the Union of India in 1947, and New Delhi blames Pakistan for misguiding the world regarding its involvement in Kashmir, condemning Islamabad for supporting terrorism and its illegal occupation of the region (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2004). From Pakistan's perspective, former President Mamnoon Hussain called Kashmir the 'jugular vein' of Pakistan and argued that the K in Pakistan stands for Kashmir, while former PM Nawaz Sharif claimed that the Kashmir issue is a question of UN goodwill and is not just an Indo-Pak border dispute (Ahmed, 2016), but left some room open for negotiations under UN mediation. Pakistan also disputes India's claim on Kashmir's accession, saying that the Hindu ruler, the Maharaja, was not sincere and suppressed popular uprising in Kashmir through the use of brute force, wanting to exterminate the Muslims (Pakistan Army, 2010). Azad Kashmir, therefore, became a product of people who took up arms to rebel against the Maharaja (Pakistan Army, 2010).

Liberal peace and democracy were options explored in the 1950s. Pakistan calls for autonomy in Kashmir, and therefore, in theory, a democratic referendum for locals to decide whether they want to join India or Pakistan would be a satisfactory resolution for both sides. Allowing healthy democratic competition to flourish in Kashmir and permitting the people of Kashmir to decide for themselves is a potential path to sustainable peace.

Similar to the Kashmir issue, democracy is a strong catalyst for sustainable peace. However, democracy in the Balochistan province has been severely undermined over the years, with good governance and human rights rapidly deteriorating due to policies from the federal government. Balochistan is a case of underdevelopment, with strong implications for the lack of democracy and representation of the local Balochi people. Since the lack of democracy is a major reason for the uprisings seen in Balochistan, restoring democracy and promoting liberal norms should in theory be a potential solution to local unrest that can drive the economic development of the region.

Another facet of liberal peace is its focus on WHAM. Both Pakistan's domestic

conflicts and the conflicts in Kashmir are related to insurgency, and WHAM is a means deployed by liberal actors to counteract insurgencies. This assumes that increasing the legitimacy of the ruling government and international actors in the eyes of locals will diminish the space that provides cover for insurgents (Egnell, 2010). For example, both India and Pakistan have tried WHAM-ing locals to side with their respective viewpoints on the Kashmir issue. India has focused on addressing the youth population and thinks that development is not a crucial component to sustainable peace because people are not poor and Kashmir is a resource-rich region (Hira, 2019). In Azad Kashmir, there are lent officers who establish religious and emotional ties with Pakistan so that people would consider Pakistan as their destination despite the difficulties (Zafar, 2022).

#### *4.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Pakistan*

One of the more obvious questions that should have been asked but is often neglected regarding the Kashmir issue is whether there is an option for local Kashmiris to choose independence without joining India or Pakistan. Without doing so, peace processes only become subjects of Pakistan and India rather than for the benefit of locals who live in the area, especially since both sides appear interested in continuing the conflict (Richmond & Tellidis, 2012). Based on the tight grip of the Indian military in the region to combat Pakistan-backed armed groups, perhaps a traditional approach to terrorism may be more viable than liberal peace, but doing so would risk putting power in the hands of elites, especially considering the reality that there are very few political entities within Kashmir that are considered legitimate by New Delhi or Islamabad (Richmond & Tellidis, 2012). 'Free and fair' on one side may not be recognised by the other party, making the conflict protracted and difficult to tackle.

On the approach of WHAM, as Western actors have already experienced, there is often not enough knowledge about what constitutes 'legitimate' in the eyes of locals (Egnell, 2010). International standards of legitimacy are sometimes vastly different from traditional sources based on identity and cultural affinity (Egnell, 2010). While Egnell (2010) mainly indicates the difficulty of WHAM in Afghanistan, this can also be applied to Pakistan, especially in the northern frontiers that share a border with Afghanistan, because most of them share a similar Pashtun culture. Based on these theoretical viewpoints, I will now look at how liberal peace has actually been applied on the ground.

### 4.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Pakistan

#### Kashmir

Liberal peace and the use of democracy with ‘free and fair’ elections as a means to bring stability to Kashmir were explored in the 1950s. However, the elections introduced in Kashmir in 1951 were, in fact, not ‘free and fair’, and the actual implementation of proper elections only began in 1977 (Habibullah, 2008). Previous elections in 1951, 1957 and 1962 were full of political intimidation, with rigged and tampered ballot boxes that made any opposition obsolete (Bazaz, 2005). In later elections, Bhat and Kaur (2019) claim that although the 1977 elections were well known to be rigged, and their contestants, mainly from the National Conference, Congress, the Muslim United Front, and the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), believed in democracy and democratic transformation, many of these contestants would later become militants or separatist leaders.

Democracy and liberal peace are compatible with the people of Kashmir. Different parties have explored ways to reconcile with each other through the construction of a liberal democracy. In fact, discontent among Kashmiris is due to the very fact that there is a lack of democracy in the region. Grassroots insurgency only became clear at the end of the 1980s, when people wanted basic democratic rights such as representation to express their own voice to determine the future of their homeland (Bose, 1997). Simultaneously, a large portion of the insurgency in Kashmir has also come from the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

The lack of opportunities and high unemployment mean that Muslim youth are easily influenced by Pakistan to become *jihadists*, as Islamabad actively supports these groups in the region to slowly force Kashmir’s break away from India (Gupta & Rao, 2003). Other analysts take a different approach and claim that militancy in Kashmir is in fact not due to poverty and unemployment but rooted in the despair of certain groups of youth that were trained to wield power but never given the chance to do so (Jha, 1996). There are also individual figures such as Yasin Malik who hoped that the insurgency would bring the Kashmir issue back into the international spotlight, as he wanted to establish a multireligious state of Kashmiriyat, shared between Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists (Blank, 1999). However, an independent state of Kashmir will probably never happen, as the UN will only allow Kashmir to choose between India and Pakistan, and neither of them would want to risk Kashmir becoming a breakaway state, fearing that this would set a precedent for other provinces such as Nagaland, Assam, Balochistan, or Sindh (Blank, 1999). This ties into the question above of whether there is a peace process where Kashmir can establish itself as an independent state without joining India or

Pakistan, and the answer is that neither side will allow that to happen.

### KPK and FATA

Liberal peace in KPK mostly involves the WHAM of the local population in the poorer provinces such as those in KPK, FATA and Balochistan. Foreign aid has been an essential component of WHAM, especially in KPK, as a means to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and Islamic extremism, although the proliferation of liberal norms in Pakistan and the use of liberal peacebuilding as a means to address Islamic extremism may prove to be difficult in this particular region.

KPK and FATA are the most northern provinces of Pakistan, sharing a border with Afghanistan. Years of insurgency, conflict and natural disasters have greatly hindered the development of Pakistan's northern territories. Instability can also happen from a spill-over of extremist elements across the Pak-Afghan border. After 9/11, the FATA region became a sanctuary for al-Qaeda fighters, and despite the Pakistani government's attempts to reach peace deals with these groups, none of them were sustainable (Ali, 2018). In 2004, Pakistan media reported that the army had cornered a 'high-value target', believed to be Ayman Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden's close lieutenant, based on the sheer number of 500 to 600 foreign militants present in combat (Khan, 2004). President Musharraf claimed that there were foreign elements such as Uzbek and Tajiks sheltered in this part of the country and encouraged locals to expel foreign suspects from the region (Dawn, 2004). Being one of the poorest regions of FATA, with over 60% of locals living under the poverty line, there is only one health care facility for every 4,200 people, one doctor for 7,800 people, the adult literacy rate is at a mere 28% (as of 2013) and young people do not feel comfortable living in the heavily traditional context of the region (Ali, 2018). As for KPK, other than the fact that the region is prone to disasters like monsoons, lockdown measures against COVID-19 may have increased poverty in Pakistan, where KPK was already at 49% overall poverty in 2015 compared to only 10% in other urban areas (Asian Development Bank, 2021).

Improving education in KPK and FATA is one way to resolve conflict, especially in FATA, because the adult literacy rate is so low. For example, in the Swat valley region, it is clear that Islamic extremism is unlikely to improve the lives of locals, who have seen the death and destruction that has been occurring in the region from the clashes between the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani army (Brook-Smith, 2014). Liberal education that promotes critical thinking and discourages indoctrination should be prioritised, as serious effort needs to be put into Pakistan's education sector, where literacy rates are only at around 60% around the country (Brook-Smith, 2014).

While the FATA region is traditionally dominated by the Taliban insurgency, which carries anti-Western and anti-West sentiments, there is also evidence that liberal norms do stand to a certain extent. By advocating the democratic notion that the military is subordinate to the people and advocating the accountability of violence, research shows that local leaders and Taliban leaders have become more receptive to former peacekeepers who will sit down with locals to discuss common interests (Feyyaz, 2016). Sitting down together in a *jirga* (assembly of leaders) is something that is rarely done by the Pakistani army (Feyyaz, 2016). Later, as a part of the hybrid peace, I will elaborate on the significance of the village council *jirga* in peacebuilding with the Pashtun tribe of Pakistan (and in Afghanistan in the following chapter). WHAM has been shown to be a capable mechanism for breaking social barriers between the intervener and local communities when there is sufficient knowledge of local legitimacy.

### Balochistan

The main problem faced by the Balochistan province is neglect by the federal government in Islamabad. This has also weakened democracy, democratic rule, accountability, and good governance, which is a problem that has become more significant over the years. Although a poorly informed public that is rife with tribalism, corruption, human rights violation, media censorship and incompetent candidates is a common sight all around Pakistan, Balochistan is unique in the sense that there was a low turnout in the last two elections following the sudden appearance of new political parties with candidates connected to local insurgencies that embrace tribal politics and romanticise nationalism (Suleman, 2018). Hassan Hamdam, the vice-president of the Baloch Human Rights Council, says that democracy has never existed in Balochistan and the province is ruled directly from Islamabad by the Pakistan army, where kidnapping and dumping of people is a daily occurrence (Deccan Chronicle, 2019). Claims made by the local media can be validated by seeing similar reports on the situation in Balochistan by the Western media. For example, British media Open Democracy claims that Balochis have the right to democracy, human rights, and self-determination, but the constant ongoing military operations and human rights abuses by the Pakistani army are severely limiting the peace process, where at least 3,000 people have been killed and 200,000 more displaced (Tatchell, 2010).

The lack of resources given to Balochistan has also led to underdevelopment in the province, as many people still lack basic amenities such as water and electricity. For example, even in 2022, large parts of Balochistan are not connected to Pakistan's national grid and rely on Iran for electricity, where load shedding can occur for 12 hours a day

(Fazal, 2022). The lack of clean water and electricity seriously hampers the productivity of local people and industries, and most importantly, education for the youth. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that around 60% to 70% of children are out of primary or secondary school because of the lack of basic facilities such as sanitation, water, and electricity (Shahryar, 2018). Without proper education, there will neither be competent leaders nor skilled workers to form the missing middle class of Balochistan.

Western actors have also tried to address the problem of underdevelopment in the region, as well as to improve the education and human capital of Balochistan. For example, UNICEF, funded by the EU, launched the Balochistan Basic Education Programme (BBEP) in collaboration with the Education Department of Balochistan, and the number of children attending school has almost doubled in the district of Sacchi after improvements in school infrastructure and quality of teaching (Shahryar, 2018). Building on the BBEP, the Balochistan Education Support is a €22 million (\$23 million USD) five-year education programme, with an additional €17.4 (approx. \$19 million) for Balochistan, and is an initiative where the government collaborates with UNICEF and the EU to address the lack of education in the province and prepare even the most marginalised youth for life, work, and citizenship (UNICEF, 2021).

Other than education, the EU has also funded the Balochistan Rural Development and Community Empowerment (BRACE) programme, which tackles the poverty and underdevelopment in the province, which has a large number of Afghan refugees. The BRACE project itself is still only at its halfway point at the time of writing and its full impact cannot yet be assessed; however, it aligns itself closely with the Sustainable Development Goals, as more than half of the SDGs are related to poverty alleviation and rural development (BRACE, 2020).

To address the problem of water shortage, the World Bank launched the PK-Balochistan Integrated Water Resources Management and Development Project, which aims to be complete by October 2022, but this \$200 m project was suspended for 30 days in 2019 when local experts blamed the government for its flaws and inability to keep up with the modern-day governance requirements of the World Bank (Khan, 2019a). Meanwhile, Japan has also attempted to solve Balochistan's electricity shortage problem by funding the Dadu-Khudzar Transmission System Project, which cost 7,302m yen (approx. \$58m), as well as helping to upgrade 200 primary schools to middle schools under the Balochistan Middle-Level Education Project (Daily Times, 2022).



#### 4.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Pakistan

##### Kashmir

One of the major barriers to democracy in Kashmir was the power struggle between the Hindus and Muslim elites in the state, which polarised communities. Since violent separatism is not predetermined, democracy in J&K may not have been as short-lived without this polarisation (Thomas, 2000; Wirsing, 1994). The problem is also when Pakistan plays a key role in supporting the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims by providing them with more guns and diplomatic, political, training, indoctrination, and cross-border movement support, while India sent more troops to counteract this (Wirsing, 1994).

If democracy did flourish in Jammu and Kashmir, not only would it fulfil the wishes of militants who pursued violent means because they were never given the opportunity to wield power despite being taught how to do so, but it could also fulfil Pakistan's wishes of realising a self-governing Kashmir. For example, when democracy functioned properly in Jammu and Kashmir, people no longer supported those who demanded political change, and politicians in the early 1980s were all preoccupied with competing within the democratic framework where religious differences did not take priority over politics during this period (Widmalm, 1997). By the same logic, extremist ideologies would also not be supported and incentives for youth to become *jihadists* would be reduced. Back in 2005, President Musharraf proposed to India the idea that Islamabad would be willing to reconsider claims on Kashmir if India agreed to a self-government plan for the disputed Himalayan region, and the two could jointly supervise the region (The Guardian, 2006), showing some prospects of collaboration.

The way in which India undertook liberal peace in J&K is also problematic and has had negative implications for Pakistan. India's Kashmir strategy can be traced back to a form of colonial intervention with "heavy handed security measures with the promotion of socio-economic development, state building, local participatory governance and decentralisation as well as support for civil society" (Pogodda & Huber, 2014: p. 449). This also means that liberal peace under India in J&K suffers from the same problems as in other places, such as being criticised for being too top-down, with little consideration of the grassroots. For example, while elections were 'free and fair', there have not been any attempts to make the framework meaningful for the needs of people emerging from violent conflicts, and this causes villages to lose faith in each other, and in the state as well (Pogodda & Huber, 2014). This echoes the claims that liberal peace does not always pay attention to the real-world problems that impact the 'everyday' and 'local turn' of people (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015). Foreign actors such as the US also see the

Kashmir issue as a domestic affair of India, albeit at the behest of New Delhi, and a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. Moreover, many countries in the West do not even see the Kashmiri people as party to the conflict (EurAsian Times Desk, 2020). Considering the ethnic nature of insurgency on the ground, it is difficult to have a sustainable peace process while neglecting local grassroots, yet little appears to be done to address this deficiency by either India or Pakistan, or by the international community, which is reluctant to intervene.

### KPK and FATA

With WHAM in KPK, we see a familiar criticism of the lack of knowledge of the local context, not just by foreign aid donors, but also by the political elites in Islamabad. The main criticism of the UN response to crisis in KPK is the lack of local ownership, because aid is tailored to the contractors in the government rather than to locals in need (Khan & Nyborg, 2013). For example, much of the aid given as a response to the 2010 floods that hit the region was in the form of short-term remedies that sidelined locals and did not improve people's capacities, such that eventually locals either began leaving their jobs to sit in tents to wait for food distribution, or entire families sold their stockpiles for money (Khan & Nyborg, 2013). Generally, there was simply not enough focus on improving the capacity for locals or returning internally displaced people (IDP), and the lack of attention and corruption of the government with related NGOs only made matters worse, especially when considering that the government only prepared for half a million displaced in Swat and Malakand, where in reality 3.2 million people were displaced, and crisis was averted only because 85% of the displaced found accommodation with friends and relatives (Khan & Nyborg, 2013).

This problem is clearer concerning residents of FATA, as many of these people have come under the influence of militancy from both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border and this has often resulted in certain communities or individuals being marginalised (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012). Poverty and marginalisation contribute to instability, as the lack of local economic institutions and industries forces locals to result in illegal activities such as drug trafficking (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012). Yet, FATA and its people have been largely ignored by the government in Islamabad since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. It was not until 2018 when FATA was incorporated as a part of KPK under a groundbreaking bill by the Federal government. In other words, international society can inject a new impetus of foreign aid to these regions, but aid is often not given directly to the communities in need. As respect to national sovereignty, aid should be provided through the Pakistani government, but even the federal government suffers a deficiency of

knowledge due to FATA being a semi-autonomous region still governed by the traditional local code of *Pashtunwali*, which until recently, has been neglected by every subsequent Pakistani government despite the need for change in the region (Khan, 2011).

There is also a problem with the proliferation of liberal norms. Although there have been positive developments in individual cases regarding peacebuilding with locals, including Taliban leaders, it cannot be overstated that insurgency and terrorism are still widespread in the region. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), better known as the Pakistani Taliban, runs rampant in killing secular party members. Hundreds of secular Awami National Party (ANP) officials have been killed in KPK in the last five years because they, as well as the Pakistan People's Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, are prime targets for Islamic extremists due to their secular beliefs (Shams, 2013). Many of them are now liberal figures.

The attempt to side with liberal norms has also caused considerable social and economic issues within Pakistan. While the choice to side with the US after 9/11 was probably made out of pragmatism rather than believing in Washington's proliferation of freedom and democracy, Pakistan has committed itself to siding with the liberal West by fighting against its neighbour Afghanistan. This has also caused a rise of insurgency in the northern part of the country, causing critics to worry about the costs of Pakistan fighting 'someone else's war on terror'. In 2009, Pakistan received just \$0.8 billion for an operation that would cost \$10 billion, while the IMF blames Islamabad's excessive spending on revenue as the main cause of the country's debt, when in fact, one of the biggest problems is its position as the frontline state in the developed nations' 'war on terror' (Wahab, 2010). Another report posted on Western media says that Pakistan's war on terror has cost nearly 50,000 lives since 9/11, as 24,000 civilians and troops have died in terrorist attacks and another 25,000 people have died because of military offensives against Taliban insurgents (Waterman, 2013). Not only are Pakistani lives being disrupted and lost for joining America's war on terror, but there is also considerable political and economic instability within the country because of terrorism and insurgence.

Despite the attempts of foreign actors such as the US and its Western partners to WHAM those that are under the influence of Islamic extremism through the UN and other international institutions (Bennett, 2011), experts have claimed that it is difficult for liberals to motivate the Pakistani public to fight against terror because the people are not convinced that there should be a war (Shams, 2013). Liberal norms may be difficult to proliferate in these Northern areas. To this point, more hybrid models that go beyond liberal norms, such as Pakistan's system of allowing different laws to coexist, may prove to be more effective. Sustainable peace in Pakistan largely depends on whether or not the

federal government in Islamabad can coexist with the various ethnic groups around the country. Later in this section, we will see that there are signs that Islamabad is willing to take a more relaxed approach for certain communities in FATA regarding the Sharia Law. However, one must always be cautious, since respecting tradition should not become an excuse to ignore basic human rights.

### Balochistan

Underrepresentation is usually solved through increasing representation through democratic mechanisms. In theory, Pakistan has the democratic mechanisms to address the lack of democracy in Balochistan. However, in reality, Pakistan's democracy has always been flawed in the sense that actual political and economic power is centralised by the federal government and does not go to regional or provincial representatives (Ahmed & Baloch, 2015). Balochistan is also a region with a strong tribal hierarchy, and unlike the rest of Pakistan, which has a vibrant middle class, Balochis are often divided between a handful of elite tribal chieftains and the other lower-class public-sector employees (Ahmed & Baloch, 2015). This also creates problems of underdevelopment because the middle class is too small to assertively pursue economic interests for the province (Ahmed & Baloch, 2015). Therefore, there are dual factors from both the Pakistan federal government side and the Balochi elite side that prevents greater representation of the people.

Another remedy for the lack of representation is to improve democracy through CSOs and NGOs. Balochistan has around 15,000 to 18,000 CSOs, and amongst them, many NGOs registered in its provincial capital (Changezi & Tareen, 2017). However, while abundant, many civil societies in Balochistan are still primitive and mainly focus on poverty eradication issues, and few have been particularly active in promoting human rights, peace, or democracy (Changezi & Tareen, 2017). Most INGOs in Pakistan are also mostly focused on human and economic development, as well as poverty alleviation, with few or none being focused on governance or democracy (Mohammad, 2020).

The solution to the underrepresentation of Balochis is often readily available under liberal peacebuilding methods, but there have not been commitments by the federal government in Islamabad or local Balochi elites towards better governance or democracy. Long-term poverty has also impeded the economic and human development of the province. Although over the years Pakistan has successfully reduced poverty in every province, including Balochistan, the latter is still the province with the highest percentage of poverty (40.7% as of 2019, compared to only 16.3% in Punjab – Haider, 2021). According to local media, Balochistan is also the smallest beneficiary of the Ehsaas

Kafaalat Programme, aimed at providing financial support to the poorest women across the country (Kakar & Saleem, 2021). With the population of Balochistan accounting for nearly 10% of Pakistan's total multidimensionally poor population, many of the local poor are not even registered in the understaffed and under-resourced databases, and thus, they miss out on the country's primary social safety programme (Kakar & Saleem, 2021). This shows that development in Balochistan is still not a priority for the Pakistani government, continuing a trend of neglect.

To make matters worse, Balochi locals often grieve about not having control over their resources. The reason for this is that for decades, Islamabad has suppressed Balochis using military strength, fearing a united Balochistan, and this oppression has infuriated locals (Mendez, 2020). Because of state oppression, Balochistan is usually not given enough seats in the National Assembly despite being the largest province in the country, and this means that Balochi positions on issues such as finance bills are negligible in the assembly (Raza, 2017). Balochistan also does not get the necessary resources from Islamabad, which in turn fuels resentment from locals against other ethnic groups, as they think that others, whether the majority Punjabis or foreigners like China, have come to exploit Balochistan's resources. For example, gas fields were discovered in the Sui region in 1952, but Balochistan did not receive any gas until 1984, and even then, it was restricted to the cantonment areas (Khosa, 2010). Even today, most of Balochistan is still not given this resource discovered in their own province (Khosa, 2010).

Not being given the resources for development has led to Balochistan consistently being the second least developed region in the country, only slightly better than FATA, which was recently incorporated into Pakistan in 2018, according to data from the Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, n.d.). As a matter of fact, most people in Balochistan still have no access to clean water or electricity. A report presented to the National Assembly of Pakistan shows that only 36% of Balochistan has electricity and the remaining 64% of the province is in the dark (ANI, 2021). Local experts claim that the government initially built tube wells instead of dams, and even though 22 smaller dams were eventually built, with 26 more near completion, they do not provide adequate supply to address the massive shortage of water in the province (Hali, 2018). The lack of clean water also forces people to drink from unsafe sources, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases, and water scarcity fuel instability when groups such as the Baloch Sun Nationalists start blaming the Pakistan army for deliberately orchestrating water shortages (Hali, 2018). In reality, locals have been taught water safety, as the army opened medical camps in drought-affected areas and assigned officers from their own areas to increase the confidence of locals (Hali, 2018).

The current amount of foreign aid shows that there is no lack of development opportunities in Balochistan, as many international actors have collaborated with the local government on addressing the three big problems of water, electricity, and education. However, many of the existing projects are long-term projects, the impact of which may take time to be felt. However, none of the above initiatives appear to adequately address the problem that Balochis are still unequally represented in the country. This leads to more local support for Balochi insurgents, which is not a problem that can be easily addressed by foreign actors. In a personal interview, Dr. Zahid Shahab Ahmed (2022) claimed that the Balochi insurgency has always been a problem and became especially complicated with alleged Indian involvement. Insurgency will continue to be a problem as long as people's grievances are not addressed in a way that will benefit the locals, giving them more opportunities for jobs, health, and education. Ahmed (2022) added that the current government is moving in the right direction with initiatives such as creating a special quarter for Balochi people to become officers in the Pakistan Army, but this will take many years before positive impacts can be felt.

Liberal peace has demonstrated some prospects for resolving conflict in Pakistan, as the lack of democracy is an inhibitor to sustainable peace, as seen in Kashmir and in Balochistan. Likewise, even in KPK and FATA, we see that liberal norms are not irrelevant. However, liberal efforts often fall short due to the lack of political will from the Pakistani federal government to allocate greater representation to Balochistan, or to address the Kashmir issue.

The issue of political will is closely related to the fact that Pakistan is an LAO where the two largest Pakistani political parties as well as large business groups rely on personal relationships built around families to maintain cohesion, to the extent that the transfer of power to outsiders may even dissolve the party itself (Kaplan, 2013). In this way, elites in power are usually in no rush to provide public goods or justice to grassroots that feel that the state is not working well, but at the same time it also limits the elites' exercise of force against the smallest possible groups (Kaplan, 2013). Understanding the nature of Pakistan's LAO is particularly important to tackle the Balochistan issue as well, since ordinary locals are not given access to the province's rich resources. Kaplan (2013) recommends that some sort of power-sharing agreement be made at provincial level to give Balochis more relevance in governance, as well as greater security guarantees. However, the difficulty in this goes back to the political will of the federal government, which has neglected Balochistan for decades, as well as the Pakistani army, which effectively runs half of the country while using violence to acquire key economic assets and silence opposition (Kaplan, 2013). Addressing the LAO nature of Pakistan must

happen in tandem with liberal mechanisms to address conflict in the country under the framework of liberal peace.

### **4.3: Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan**

#### *4.3.1: Theory of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan*

This section adds an explanation of local peace alongside hybrid peace, mainly because we see that in some cases, hybridity is difficult to achieve. Therefore, it is usually up to the locals to build peace across the horizontal intercommunal gap when the political will for a top-down initiative is lacking in the elites. Local peace is more relevant to Kashmir, but based on the observable trend from the previous section, it applies to almost all conflicts in Pakistan due to the tendency of Pakistani elites to neglect certain rural regions like KPK and FATA.

Richmond and Tellidis (2012) highlighted the need to produce hybrid forms of peace that can bridge the gaps between states, combatants, and terrorist actors in order for these three stakeholders to compromise on a framework of everyday peace benefitting the local population. Existing peace processes in Kashmir have often been weak and focused too much on the sovereignty and national prestige of Pakistan and India rather than the people, with some arguments saying that Kashmir is left intentionally underdeveloped because the Indian army keeps a close watch on the region (Richmond & Tellidis, 2012). Due to the existence of the LoC, there have been small steps towards local peacebuilding efforts to try to build peace across this line, facilitated by cross-border interaction and trade (Richmond & Tellidis, 2012). Further interactions between locals may have a positive effect on preventing the rise of insurgency if a transformative relationship can be constructed through positive relationships between cross-LoC locals.

A means to improve local ownership of peace processes in Kashmir is by utilising civil societies. However, the grassroots will require more training and education to be able to recognise their potential and organise into groups (Bali & Akhtar, 2017). There are also existing local civil society groups that have called for peace across the LoC, such as the Press for Peace Foundation and the Future Kashmir Forum, which have marched to voice their worries against the dangers of war (Iqbal, 2013).

Regarding Pakistan's domestic conflicts, such as in KPK and FATA, more interaction is needed between the federal government and locals who do not have a strong identity to the Pakistani state. This is mainly because the FATA region has only recently been incorporated as a part of Pakistan and locals in these areas may not be accustomed to the multi-ethnic nature of Pakistan. Whether or not this case is up for scrutiny.

#### *4.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan*

The issue of political will is a constant point that will be made concerning the conflict in Kashmir. The use of civil society to raise awareness of the situation may be helpful; however, it does not appear to have any impact on the will of political elites in New Delhi or Islamabad to deescalate the situation. In fact, democracy and elections alone do not motivate the political elites to undertake long-term projects such as peacebuilding if they do not benefit from them in the short term (Müller, 2007). This is important for politicians with term limits, such as those in India and Pakistan, where there is less interest in long-term solutions if their main goal is to hold onto power.

The aim of this dissertation is not to discuss how to motivate the political elites in India and Pakistan to address the situation in Kashmir. More focus needs to be put on local initiatives, as well as international initiatives, to establish sustainable peace when political will from the national elite is weak, although it is still important to include the state in the process of peacebuilding. The bottom-up approach in hybrid peace is not about neglecting the state but about supporting the existing top-down approaches by the state. This is important because local peace and foreign aid are only temporary measures that cannot replace the state's role in providing long-term public goods after international actors leave. Despite the lack of political will to address the issues in Kashmir, Islamabad appears to have more effective hybrid peace measures when addressing their domestic conflicts.

#### *4.3.3: Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan*

##### Kashmir

A notable attempt by New Delhi and Islamabad to facilitate dialogue between the local population in J&K and Azad Kashmir is the implementation of the first cross-LoC bus service, the Karwan-e-Aman (Caravan of Peace), to restore connectivity severed since 1947. This grassroots peacebuilding initiative provided people with the opportunity to interact with each other, reduce distrust and collaborate, but it was only a step towards reconciliation, as the people who used this service were those who had families across the LoC or local traders (Bali & Akhtar, 2017).

While the Karwan-e-Aman had some positive impact in restoring trade, breaking stereotypes, and re-humanising people from across the LoC, many thought that it would improve Indo-Pak relations, where Pakistan had fewer people than India who felt that social bonds and cultural linkages had been revived (Bali & Akhtar, 2017). In terms of



governance, slightly more than half of people from the Indian side believe that grassroots efforts can bring policy and political change only if they are organised and strengthened, but this sentiment is the opposite from the Pakistani side, where more than half believe that the grassroots will not bring change, since governments are strong and people are too weak to make a change (Bali & Akhtar, 2017). That being said, trade is an important element for maintaining the dialogue between different parties along the LoC. It also provides tangible economic benefits to both sides and contributes to sustainable peace, as it bridges people across cultural and physical divides (Conciliation Resources, 2015).

Other than initiatives such as the Karwan-e-Aman, there are also local NGOs such as the Press for Peace Foundation, where various working groups such as youth, women, minorities, and social activists in different spheres of human interest gather for people-to-people contact through seminars, conferences, walks and training sessions for community leaders (Ahmed, 2010). This organisation focuses on the empowerment of youth, women and other marginalised groups, with a particular focus on women, as they are the most deprived members of society and empowering women helps bring transformation to the social system as a whole. There have also been attempts such as the 'Athwaas' (handshakes) in Kashmir Valley, which is a joint attempt at reconciliation by Hindu, Muslim and Sikh women, but due to a lack of political support, this initiative was discontinued in 2008 (Pogodda & Huber, 2014). As a part of Indian peacebuilding, *Panchaya Raj* Institutions (PRIs) were established to allow greater autonomy for local villages to directly participate in the decision-making process when implementing welfare schemes, and this has been effective in some other parts of India, albeit less so in Jammu and Kashmir (Pogodda & Huber, 2014). 'Free and fair' elections were in fact neither free nor fair, as local political bodies did not have the resources to address people's economic concerns where the elected heads of village *sarpanches* (decision-makers) were accused of receiving money and not distributing it, creating new fault lines among communities (Pogodda & Huber, 2014). Pogodda and Huber (2014) concluded that for the advantages and expectations raised by empowering locals, political and economic resources must be provided to end marginalisation, or else old and new tensions will only keep reappearing.

### KPK and FATA

Political will to create sustainable peace within Pakistan's borders appears stronger regarding domestic conflicts. Since instability is contagious, conflict across the Afghan border will usually have some type of influence on the population on the Pakistan side of the border, such as people being under the constant threat of militancy, insurgency, and terrorism in KPK. Many domestic actors have stressed the importance of Afghanistan to

regional peace (National Defense University, 2015). Up until this point, most of the discussion on US-Pak relations has been more on the negative side, as in reality, relations between the two have not been good. Simultaneously, the US remains an important partner for Pakistan, especially regarding addressing conflicts in the northern frontier regions bordering Afghanistan. The top-down measures taken by Islamabad are to try to make peace with the locals of this extremely volatile region through various political and social means.

When the US hosted peace talks with the Taliban, Pakistan took this opportunity to use the situation to its own advantage. Recalling the manner in which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended, Islamabad is worried that Afghanistan will once again be left without support after the NATO presence fades away with American departure (S. Khan, 2018a). For Pakistan, one of the root causes of Islamabad's insecurity is the unstable nature of the Durand Line. A colonial legacy of the British Empire, the Durand Line is the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, drawn down the middle of the former Pashtun territory. The Duran Line is not recognised as an international border by Afghanistan (S. Khan, 2018a). Pakistan's dilemma with Pashtun nationalism at home will be explored in the following chapter, which elaborates more on its relationship with Afghanistan and the Taliban.

For Islamabad, ever since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan has been dealing with the issue of Afghan refugees. Experts roughly estimate that there are three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, both registered and unregistered (S. Khan, 2018a). Afghan refugees pose a unique challenge to Pakistan because they not only change local perceptions of peace, but also enable militancy to spill over borders. This is not just the Taliban, but also figures such as mujahedeen leader Hizb Islami, who have even built small cities with their own communities in KPK and FATA (S. Khan, 2018a.). In the past, the political elites in Islamabad were genuinely concerned about how the Afghan state would balance the Taliban once NATO retreats (Hasnat, 2009). There has often been the question of whether the current Afghan state will collapse under pressure from the Taliban without having a chance to negotiate peace after the Americans leave (S. Khan, 2018a). Before its collapse, Pakistan reached out to non-Pashtun Afghan political leaders in 2008 (S. Khan, 2018a), as well as dispatching foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar on a visit to Kabul in 2012 to suggest an 'Afghan-owned, Afghan-led' model of reconciliation (Tarar, 2021). As with non-state actors like the Taliban, Islamabad provided covert support to the Taliban to prevent US intervention on Pakistani soil, while simultaneously coordinating with the US in combating al-Qaeda (Yusuf, 2010). However, none of this was exceptionally helpful to tame the Taliban, as after their resurgence to

power in 2021, the formerly friendly Afghan Taliban openly defied Islamabad over the status of the Durand Line and provided a haven for the TTP (Mir, 2022).

With these problems in hand, we can see that it is not easy for Islamabad to act against the Taliban in Afghanistan, being fully aware of the risks of terrorism, since many fighters have already fully infiltrated Pakistani territory (Katzman & Thomas, 2017). Sustainable peace in this region depends largely on Islamabad's capacity to make peace with locals: many measures have been employed by the government as well as by the grassroots, such as respecting the use of traditional means of conflict resolution like the *jirga* and making concessions with local militants regarding Sharia law in exchange for their recognition of the Pakistani state.

Despite these difficulties, Pakistan still went ahead and employed the top-down measure of its landmark Federally Administered Tribal Areas Reforms Bill, passed earlier in 2018, which merged FATA with KPK, legally making five million people Pakistani citizens (Al Jazeera, 2018). Merging FATA with KPK provides basic health care and education to the previously deprived locals in the area, but it also empowers youth and women. This came in conjunction with the historic US-Taliban meetings, as then newly elected PM Imran Khan responded positively to President Trump's encouragement to support the peace process (Hansler, 2018).

Merging FATA and KPK also created new opportunities for cross-border linkages and allowed local ethnic groups to transform into provincial governments. Local economics facilitates trans-border trade with Afghanistan, as this brings an incentive to revitalise border economic strategies between Pakistan and Afghanistan (S. Khan, 2018a). Even after the Taliban takeover, trade did not stop, but instead soared as the long queues of trucks spoke clearly of the amount of economic activity between the two countries waiting for market reopening (Sajid, 2021). In fact, the return of the Taliban also brought some positive changes at the local level, since Pakistani trucks no longer had to pay the local Afghan police or armed forces upon returning from Afghanistan (Reuters, 2021b). The FATA-KPK merger has enabled top-down initiatives from the government to improve the situation in KPK – something that did not happen to Kashmir, as Azad Kashmir was never officially incorporated as a part of Pakistan. This shows that state-led initiatives and will are necessary components of sustainable peace and can be improved if greater local ownership is given to grassroots peacebuilding efforts.

However, in the case of Pakistan, the Pakistan army has also conducted military operations in the Swat Valley and FATA as hard power in trying to subjugate local extremists or terrorists. Military force is only a tool used in Pakistan's three-pronged approach of dialogue, development, and deterrence, used in the government's initiatives,

such as the Malakand Stabilisation Strategy, the KP Comprehensive Development Strategy and the umbrella Multi-Donor Trust Fund for KPK, FATA and Balochistan (Avis, 2016). In 2009, the government made concessions with the armed group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi to restore Sharia law in Malakand and withdraw Pakistani armed forces in exchange for their recognition of the Pakistani state, as well as surrendering heavy weapons, refraining from displaying light weapons in public, denouncing suicide attacks, and operating with local police (Kronstadt, 2010). This can be seen as an attempt or a compromise from the Pakistan government to provide greater local ownership and autonomy in regions dominated by certain groups. Despite these efforts, peace has still not been fully restored in Malakand, where the military remains central to the maintenance of law and order (Avis, 2016).

There are also bottom-up initiatives that have contributed to peacebuilding in KPK and FATA. One of these is the empowerment of women. Although there are still obstacles to full women's rights, such as the lack of economic and political mobility, lack of civilian law enforcement and justice, more women are bringing abuses and the tradition of *gag* (where men can forcibly claim women) to the public eye through complaints to officials or reporting them in the media to discourage such practices (International Crisis Group, 2022a). Women in the FATA region are also valuable assets in resisting Jihadist influence, through both peaceful means and hard power. Peaceful means involve shows of defiance, such as leaving the house to fetch water without the accompaniment of a male guardian, or girls pursuing education in their teachers' houses, as well as active NGO participation working in the health and other sectors (International Crisis Group, 2022a). Empowered women disprove the fears spread by the Jihadists in society, and if peaceful means fail, local women have picked up arms to fight to avenge their husbands, fathers, and sons (International Crisis Group, 2022a).

The federal government also supports local peace and means of conflict resolution through the promotion of the *jirga* in the north. The *jirga* is a council of leaders that settles disputes by the *Pashtunwali* social code, with strong emphasis on peace, justice, and reconciliation amongst Pashtun people (Oberson, 2002). Even today, the *jirga* is a strong binding force between rural and tribal Pashtuns, not just in the FATA region, but also in Balochistan, and in the past, they even mediated bilateral peace between the two states of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Yousaf & Furrukhzad, 2020).

Since extremist groups and religious extremism cannot be defeated by traditional military means, it is important to maintain channels of dialogue between governments, local authorities, and local grassroots. This is also an important step to ensure that local authorities and militants become bridge-builders rather than spoilers in the mid-space.

However, negotiations with extremist groups also raise the question of whether or not one should consider dialogue with terrorists at all. Richmond and Tellidis (2012) argue that excluding actors such as extremists due to their controversial ideologies prevents any attempts at negotiations over these ideologies, but peacebuilders must be cautious to compromise on demands over basic human rights or else the peace process is likely to create some form of negative or illiberal peace. For the case of KPK and FATA, some dialogue is often better than none, especially since groups like the TTP cannot be defeated by conventional military means.

### Balochistan

Hybrid peace in Balochistan is difficult, mainly due to the diminishing faith of people in Balochistan's local government, as well as the heavy presence of the Pakistani military. Like Kashmir, this is another case where the political will is lacking in Islamabad. Based on the comments by religious party chief Siraj ul Haq, the only way to peace in Balochistan is by WHAM of the local people, embracing them instead of pushing them away, as he criticised the military operations that deteriorate the situation by using force, urging the federal government to engage in open dialogue with local leaders (Balochistan Point, 2014). Balochistan is also a region rich in international aid and developmental projects. This section will examine how some non-Western actors have supported the development of the region while looking for evidence of whether economic development from actors other than China is capable of creating sustainable peace in the region.

Economic development is important, mainly because a large part of Balochistan's instability stems from underdevelopment due to neglect. Balochistan is a fragile state caught in the fragility trap where the Pakistani state governs through pacts with tribal and local political elites, and this results in the military option when these pacts break down, which causes a cycle of new grievances (Hasan, 2016). While local efforts such as the Balochistan Rural Support Programme and faith-based Islamic Research Institute exist, these civil societies are given limited opportunities to contribute to peacebuilding (Kakar, 2020).

As a top-down measure, the Pakistani government launched the Balochistan Peace Program in 2015, offering amnesty to surrendering nationalists and monetary assistance and rehabilitation into society. This has been relatively successful, as 2,600 separatists, including commanders, have surrendered, with only eight leaving the initiative (Nabeel, 2017). Another notable attempt by the government is to target the youth of Balochistan, as nationalists have been revealed to use child soldiers as young as 14 (Nabeel, 2017). To counteract this fact, the 'Youth Mobilisation Campaign' organises

tours for Balochistan students to visit other parts of the country, as well as for students from elsewhere to visit Balochistan to break stereotypes and exchange perceptions (Nabeel, 2017).

In terms of foreign aid, one of Pakistan's main non-Western aid partners is Japan, which is part of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan, through which the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been contributing to the development in many sectors. For example, 3.8 billion yen (\$30m USD) have been allocated to support the much-needed power sector, including the construction of the Ghazi-Barotha Hydropower Project co-funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Japan Official Development Assistance, 2007). Japan has also initiated the Karachi Water Supply Improvement project, which costs 6,725 million yen (approx. \$53m) and supplies 3m cubic metres of water a day (Mamiya, 2009). Japanese ODA targets the two sectors of water and electricity, which Pakistan needs the most, but outside that, there are also infrastructure projects, building Pakistan's first major tunnel with the Kohat Tunnel Construction Project (Japan Official Development Assistance, 2007), and in the health sector, there are local claims that Pakistan is grateful for the \$4.57 million grant of oral polio vaccines (Dawn, 2021).

That being said, due to the sheer scale of CPEC, much of the attention in recent times has been paid to Pakistan's relationship with China. As one of the two economic corridors of the BRI (the other being CMEC with Myanmar), CPEC is valued at \$62 billion and aims to enhance Pakistan's energy sector as well as transportation and infrastructure by 2030 (CPIC, n.d.). CPEC even eclipses traditional multilateral donors like the ADB, which provided \$4.4 billion in assistance between 2009 and 2012, as well as the World Bank, with 30 projects and a total commitment of \$5 billion (CGD, 2013). This is not to discredit developmental aid provided by other groups and countries, but they may have been overshadowed by the size of large-scale infrastructure development.

#### *4.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Pakistan*

##### Kashmir

While the intentions were good with the Karwan-e-Aman, it was discontinued due to the constant tensions between India and Pakistan. Local Kashmiri media report that the caravan 'faded into oblivion' after the Pulwama attack in 2019, as the bus between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad no longer operates because Pakistan did not open the gate after August 5<sup>th</sup> 2019 (Hassan, 2019). Based on respective media outlets from India and Pakistan, the two have been constantly blaming each other for consistent outbreaks of

violence in Kashmir. A report from the Hindustan Times (2017) claims that Pakistan talks about peace but its actions in Jammu and Kashmir do not reflect this, and accuses Pakistan of violating the ceasefire 449 times in 2016 and 405 times in 2015. Meanwhile, Pakistani media blame India for unprovoked shelling on the control line and 90 instances of ceasefire violation in 2016, as well as the summoning of the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in August 2017 to condemn 'deliberate' targeting of civilians (Daily Times, 2016, 2017).

The problem here is the lack of political will from the federal government level. India and Pakistan have shown themselves to be incapable of resolving the Kashmir issue, and this prolongs the conflict and brings more suffering to the grassroots (Snedden, 2012). There are recommendations that third parties are necessary to break the deadlock in Kashmir, but these third parties are not usually readily available. The US has been displaying an increasingly pro-Indian stance based on their strategic partnership, such as the 2+2 Dialogue and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, which would enhance the sharing of information between the US and India (Indian Express, 2020).

While this was a move mainly aimed at deterring China, further cooperation between the US and India is a disturbing sign for Pakistan. Contrary to the positive relations of US–India relations, US–Pakistan relations have been on a decline recently: Donald Trump reduced US aid to Pakistan, and there have been discussions within the US about revoking Pakistan's MNNA status for reasons such as harbouring Osama bin Laden, backing the Taliban, and overall, failure to effectively fight against terrorism (Dawn, 2017). Other third parties that could help India and Pakistan to break their deadlock include China, with its close relationship with Pakistan; however, later we will see that this is also unlikely to happen, as China's relationship with India is poor.

So far, with the initiatives seen in Kashmir, it appears that the local grassroots have the intention of tolerating and reconciling with each other, but their respective states, India and Pakistan, do not. There seems to be not enough of a top-down initiative in Kashmir due to the poor Indo-Pak relations, causing locals to be pessimistic about the potential to bring change from initiatives such as Karwan-e-Aman. As locals feared, Karwan-e-Aman did not make a significant impact, as it was discontinued after the constant violation of the ceasefire from both sides of India and Pakistan. Local peace in Kashmir cannot be sustainable without top-down government support. This is a similar situation to liberal peace, where there seems to be an unwillingness from both India and Pakistan to allow a self-governed Kashmir.

There are also criticisms from the Indian side, saying that actual power in Azad Kashmir is with the PM of Pakistan rather than with the locals (Kartha, 2021). The PM

of Pakistan, with his ‘cronies’, also chairs the upper house of Azad Kashmir, effectively rendering the legislative assembly ‘toothless’ as Party leaders attend the assemblies and barely even mention Kashmir (Kartha, 2021). This ironically goes against Pakistan’s proposal for greater autonomy of Kashmiris and defeats the purpose of local peace efforts when there is excess intervention by Pakistan into local politics without officially incorporating Azad Kashmir as part of Pakistan.

### KPK and FATA

The application of hybrid peace in KPK and FATA is much more successful than that in Kashmir when the Pakistani government shows the political will to resolve some problems that cause internal instability. However, the *jirga* is not without its criticisms.

As we have explained in the previous chapter, hybrid peace is not about rejecting liberal norms entirely as democracy and human rights are necessary components of stable society. The problem with the *jirga*, while it enjoys widespread legitimacy in the eyes of the Pashtun locals, is a predominantly male group where women are not often given representation. While there have been experimental female-based *jirga* in the past, these have not received sufficient state and financial support to flourish (Zakaria, 2016).

Another problem with the *jirga* is that it is prone to corruption, where local leaders have been paid to side with the state and against the people (Yousaf & Furrukhzad, 2020), potentially defeating its purpose as a local means for peacebuilding. Despite its flaws, the *jirga* has withstood the test of time and remained relevant as a conflict resolution mechanism among the tribes in the KPK and FATA regions, and should be encouraged by the state as a means to increase local ownership of peace. In Balochistan, a recent meeting was attended by both a Pakistan army corps commander and *jirga* elders, who discussed collaborating on local security through mutual trust and respect (Dawn, 2022a). In the past, military leaders often did not attend *jirga*, so this is a welcome change, as it shows that the army too has the intention to engage in peace talks with locals for a more hybrid form of peace. *Jirga* have considerable influence over their local communities, and they should be seen as assets towards sustainable peace under the hybrid peacebuilding model; however, more effort is needed regarding including women in the process.

### Balochistan

The heavy presence of the Pakistan army is a sticking point for peace in Balochistan. The army is responsible for some questionable human rights violations. Western groups such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) have reported a surge of unlawful killings of suspected



militants and opposition in Balochistan, as well as the abduction of activists such as Hanif Balochi of the Baloch Students' Organisation, later found dead with bullet wounds (HRW, 2011a). Local media such as the Dawn (2022b) report that there is a fresh wave of forced disappearances that contradicts the federal government's promises to crack down and punish perpetrators of enforced disappearances. To make matters worse, with China's entry and CPEC, which requires greater protection from insurgency, the situation in Balochistan may only deteriorate, if the problem of human rights violation by the military is already bad.

While Japan's aid, and foreign aid in general, has been helpful in helping address the situation of underdevelopment in Balochistan, the economic approach does not address the root problem of underrepresentation. There is a cause-and-effect relationship with instability in Balochistan. Due to neglect and underrepresentation, locals in Balochistan are not given the opportunity to develop, and therefore many grassroots remain poor. As we have seen above, CSOs, NGOs and INGOs can do relatively little to address the problem of governance and democracy, while most of these groups in Pakistan are focused on poverty alleviation and development (Changezi & Tareen, 2017). Yet, while development is important, the lack of political will from the national elites is a problem. It is questionable how effective economic development, while much needed, will be in the long-term regarding sustainable peace. This is important to keep in mind while analysing China's developmental peace, its impacts, and its capability to create sustainable peace on the ground.

#### **4.4: Developmental Peace in Pakistan**

##### *4.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Pakistan*

Regarding developmental peace in Pakistan, it is necessary to question in which ways developmental peace is similar to or different from existing models, and if it is different, how much capacity it has to create sustainable peace when traditional actors have failed, insofar as we have seen that political will has been lacking regarding resolving the conflict in Kashmir and Balochistan. As we have already seen, China is not the sole actor that is providing Pakistan with foreign aid, although the sheer size of China's \$62 billion CPEC commitment and the controversy around this initiative, with debt and local ownership, have drawn attention to the China-led development in Pakistan.

Briefly, on CPEC and its objectives, other statements claim that the initiative only totals about \$50 billion, of which \$35 billion will be allocated for energy projects

and the remaining \$15 billion to infrastructure such as Gwadar development and industrial zones and transportation (Husain, 2018). Chinese state media the Global Times (2022) presents CPEC as a ‘win-win’ initiative, trying to set itself apart from the US, where Washington was fighting the war on terror in South Asia while China promoted the BRI. For a country that has suffered from a chronic lack of energy over the course of its history, China has helped Pakistan to diversify its energy supply and improve its infrastructure, with 19 CPEC energy projects worth \$17.7 billion spread across many energy generation projects, with existing projects already adding 10,000MW of energy to Pakistan within four years (Husain, 2018). Concerning the Gwadar port, linking the port to Kashgar in China through mass transit systems going through major cities will greatly reduce the cost of transportation of goods, which is currently done by a trucking fleet, and will also provide safe and affordable public transport for people going to Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, and Quetta (Husain, 2018). Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, Moin ul Haque, in Chinese state media, claims that the Gwadar ‘flagship project’ is currently going into Phase II, in which it also connects Gwadar to Afghanistan, promoting further integration and connectivity (Global Times, 2022b).

In theory, economic development has great potential to contribute to peace and stability in Pakistan, as many regions neglected by the government (parts of KPK, FATA, and Balochistan) suffer from underdevelopment and poverty, as well as lack of basic amenities such as water and electricity. The non-intervention nature of Chinese aid also gives Pakistan the autonomy to choose where and what to develop. Non-intervention in a country’s domestic affairs and aid without political strings attached are the principles that have sustained positive relations not just between China and Pakistan, but in the Asia region as a whole. In theory, economic development under CPEC maintains internal stability by improving local standards of living and livelihood, as well as generating employment opportunities for both local residents and Chinese workers who cannot find employment in China due to overcapacity. This is also related to the ‘win-win’ narrative, where CPEC is, on paper, beneficial for both the governments and people of China and Pakistan. Generating internal stability does not solely come from improved standards of living, but also gives an incentive for the host government to improve domestic security to assure international donors like China that their country is safe for investment. Pakistan has been successful in convincing China about this – better than the Taliban in Afghanistan, as discussed later. Of course, an unwritten benefit of the China-Pak cooperation is to deter India, a regional adversary to Pakistan, while giving China an advantage over New Delhi as the region’s leader in peace and development.

#### *4.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Pakistan*

Regarding China-led development projects, often the immediate question to ask is about local ownership. Local ownership in this case does not always mean whether or not the host country – in this case, Pakistan – owns the project. Later we will see evidence to suggest that the Pakistani state does indeed take the initiative over most of CPEC's development, suggesting that CPEC is indeed under Pakistan's local ownership. The more pressing problem here is whether or not local grassroots, such as residents of Gwadar, have any stakes in CPEC, as the initiative has taken their land for development. In a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan, where some ethnic groups such as the Balochis do not get along with the state, having the state (which some local groups despise) own a project is drastically different than having the local government or grassroots own the project.

Another problem relates to the question of whether economic development plays any direct role in influencing the conflicts seen in Pakistan. Domestic conflicts in KPK, FATA and Balochistan are rooted in Islamic extremism and nationalism, while the issue of Kashmir is an international dispute between Pakistan and India. Although these regions are generally underdeveloped, more evidence needs to be analysed to judge whether economic development is the solution to the above conflicts, as the theory of developmental peace suggests. With this being said, we return to the question of local ownership and the capacity of top-down models like liberal peace and developmental peace to address conflicts when local ownership in the peace process is at the whim of political elites and foreign actors rather than all stakeholders from top to bottom. All of these traits deserve attention in the following sections concerning the practice of developmental peace in Pakistan.

#### *4.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Pakistan*

For Pakistan, CPEC was the 'game-changer' that it needed, and the government has presented it in a way that would bring positive change to the country (Ahmed et al., 2021). It is promoted as an initiative that acts like a multiplier to Islamabad's own economic policies (Ahmed et al., 2021). For Pakistan, China and CPEC came at a time when it needed foreign assistance the most. Taking the US side on the war on terror has taken its toll on Pakistan's people and economy, where the Pakistani Ministry of Finance (2010) reports that over a span of 10 years between 2001 and 2010, Pakistan spent \$67.93 billion on both direct and indirect costs of war, not to mention the huge humanitarian and social costs paid by its people in order for Islamabad to align with the West. In addition to the humanitarian costs, Pakistan struggles to provide sufficient electricity to its population, and many households are still living without clean water. A significant economic

development was required to give people hope and maintain internal stability, and China came at the correct time to provide this economic development initiative.

China values CPEC highly. CPEC is not like the IMF – which, in the past, has blamed Islamabad’s poor economy for its excess spending of revenue – but instead, coming from China, has no political strings attached to it. Pakistan considers this an understanding of its internal challenges by the Chinese (Shah, 2018). In fact, Pakistan values CPEC so much that the army created a Special Security Division (SSD) comprised 15,000 troops dedicated to protecting CPEC projects and Chinese nationals (Dawn, 2016), trying to add to the internal stability but through military means. As a gesture of goodwill and friendship, Pakistan upholds China’s narratives on sensitive issues such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet by not reporting on negative news related to such issues in Pakistan (Ahmed et al., 2021). Ahmed (2022), in a personal interview, added that nobody wants to be seen as a traitor for reporting negatively on China. The India factor enables Pakistan to remain positive on the impact of CPEC and Gwadar in the country, to the extent that Shahid Hashmat (2022), in a personal interview, believes that debt with China is not a serious issue, probably due to the positive relations between both the governments and locals. While global perceptions of China have soured recently due to Beijing’s assertiveness and the outbreak of COVID-19, Pakistan remains one of China’s ‘best friends’, maintaining very positive ties between the two (Kironka & Garlick, 2022). The following sections will analyse how China’s developmental peace addresses the conflicts in Kashmir, KPK and FATA, as well as Balochistan.

### Kashmir

China pays considerable attention to the Kashmir issue and the interactions between Pakistan and India in this region. The main reason is the expansion of CPEC into G&B. Running through the disputed territory of Kashmir, G&B is an important entrance point for CPEC that connects China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan as CPEC aims to move from Kashgar to Gwadar. The problem with this is that unlike FATA, Pakistan effectively rules Azad Kashmir without officially integrating it as a part of Pakistani territory. The people of G&B are excluded from the decision-making level of CPEC despite the issuing of the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (GBESGO), which effectively made the region a ‘quasi-formal’ province of Pakistan (Wolf, 2016). Yet the GBESGO was criticised for only giving a false sense of liberal self-rule while in reality its main purpose was merely to suppress tensions (Wolf, 2016). For G&B specifically, local residents have resented the government of Pakistan over the years of neglect and mismanagement, and now the entry of CPEC adds a whole new list of problems for locals

to worry about, such as job losses, land grabs, and environmental problems.

In terms of China's position on the Kashmir issue, China has often taken Pakistan's side on Kashmir. In the 1960s, a joint communique made between China and Pakistan stated that Kashmir was an issue to be resolved by the consensus of the Kashmiri people (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1964). China reeled back on its pro-Pakistani position in the 1980s under Deng and took a neutral stance in attempting to balance Pakistan's and India's position. Officially, China maintains the narrative of neutrality, but among academics, Chinese scholars often express anti-Indian sentiments such as accusing India of using force in Kashmir despite claims of respecting international law over this issue (Wang, 2019). India's response to the 2019 border skirmish with Pakistan was an act of 'violating sovereignty' as academics called for caution towards China's own disputes with India (Wang, 2019). This has also led to anxiety from New Delhi as analysts wonder whether Kashmir would eventually be internationalised as CPEC becomes fully operational, especially since every other South Asian country and neighbours like Iran have expressed their interest in becoming part of the BRI as India loses out on economic benefits by refusing to join (Kashmir Observer, 2017).

The practice of developmental peace in G&B next to Azad Kashmir is important for protecting CPEC's entry point, and for deterring India. China has used the narrative of 'all-weather friendship' with Pakistan to consistently improve Islamabad's military, while Beijing uses the Kashmir issue as an influence over India to discourage 'anti-Chinese' policies, as well as to incentivise the US to work with Beijing for its influence over Islamabad (Garver, 2004). This is a top-level political move by China to encourage cooperation between rivals and discourage tensions on the ground in Kashmir, with Beijing largely dominating the process. However, from the Indian perspective, China arming Pakistan means that Islamabad has more funds, which can be used to challenge India's position in South Asia (Hussain & Jamali, 2019).

Due to poor China-India relations, India has often blamed China for secretly supporting the *jihadi* strategy used to engage half a million Indian troops stationed in Kashmir, while Islamabad also openly questions India's legal standing over J&K as a part of India (Singh, 2012). India undermining CPEC is also a means to weaken Pakistan, as it is a way to diminish the amount of resources Islamabad can muster against New Delhi. There is also the US factor, much to China's dismay, due to the close relationship Washington shares with New Delhi. China's support of Pakistan has in turn strengthened the Indo-US strategic partnership (Fani, 2019), as the US maintains influence in South Asia, eradicates extremism from Afghanistan, and contains China's rise in the region (Hussain & Jamali, 2019). US political and military influence cannot be expelled by force,

however, as Washington is determined to remain relevant in the region due to the tensions between India and Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan.

The importance of G&B to CPEC is profound: both China and Pakistan are determined to hang onto this region and make sure instability does not threaten the crucial starting-point of CPEC. In 2020, PM Imran Khan revealed the new political map of Pakistan, which has the entirety of India's Jammu and Kashmir, including G&B, coloured in as part of Pakistan, calling it 'Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir', with a note saying that the final status of the disputed territories is awaiting relevant UNSC resolutions (Dawn, 2020a). This announcement came almost one year after India's controversial revocation of Article 370, which grants Jammu and Kashmir special status, as New Delhi sent thousands of additional troops into disputed territories, imposed strict curfews and shut down telecommunication and the Internet, which led to more than 20 protests a day despite curfews (Al Jazeera, 2019). Analysts claim that this revocation will not only subject Kashmir to India's constitution but also fundamentally change the demographics from a Muslim to a Hindu majority, because until 2019, Indians were forbidden to purchase land and settle permanently in Kashmir (Bashir & Khan, 2021). However, Pakistan has also moved to acquire the disputed G&B by officially incorporating it as a province of Pakistan. Minister of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan Affairs Ali Amin Gandapur says that G&B will be given constitutional rights and representation in all bodies of Pakistan, including the National Assembly and the Senate, effectively ending the 73 years of deprivation in G&B (Hussein, 2020).

Regarding developmental peace at the local level, China's main objective in G&B is to ensure that peace and stability are sustained at the entry point of CPEC. This can be seen from the statement from China's state office that counterterrorism cooperation is the most important aspect of China–Pakistan relations, and that there is a need to further strengthen security around the border areas such as G&B (State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2016). Other than stronger counterterrorism measures, another means of maintaining stability is, as the theory of developmental peace suggests, through economic development. For the most part, expectations were generally high among locals when Chinese investment arrived. Some claim that the transformation of G&B under CPEC is taken in an optimistic way, as they believe that the region will become a hub of foreign investment and tourism once further infrastructure is complete, especially since G&B has an abundance of water resources that can generate large amounts of energy (Sajid, 2020). This is an important asset, as Pakistan has suffered from a chronic shortage of electricity in the past. For investors, the main drawback to G&B is the harsh winters that block off the region with heavy snow, and although the Karakoram

motorway, built together by China and Pakistan, is impressive, there are parts that have fallen into poor condition (Sajid, 2020).

### KPK and FATA

In the north, the local government of KPK has recently announced that they have completed feasibility studies and finalised 13 key projects for the 10<sup>th</sup> Pak–China Joint Cooperation Committee meeting (Malik, 2021a). Some of these projects include roads such as the Swat Expressway and the Peshawar–DI Khan Motorway, which will improve the transportation of people, as well as the creation of the Rasakai Special Economic Zone, which will boost industrial activities and create employment (Malik, 2021a). Generally, CPEC enjoys good support from the local communities in KPK, with more than 50% of respondents strongly agreeing that CPEC will strengthen the friendship between the two countries, and among these respondents, nearly 80% agree or strongly agree that working with China will also help to develop Pakistan’s economy (Ul-Islam, 2021). However, despite the general positive sentiment for CPEC, there are still concerns that urban centres and rural areas will receive unequal development and worries against the federal government for their route diversion away from the northern route (Ul-Islam, 2021). CPEC stands out in this regard, as it has improved basic infrastructure for Pakistanis, such as roads that connect smaller villages to big cities that can help rural residents access better education (Kanwal et al., 2020). Furthermore, local residents argue that KPK’s local government must resolve existing grievances with the federal government in Islamabad and this has nothing to do with the already positive relations between China and Pakistan (Kanwal et al., 2020).

One of the unintended consequences of the arrival of CPEC is that it has compelled the Pakistani government to crack down on terrorists like the TTP, which Pakistan has not been effective at addressing previously, as seen in their reluctance during the US war on terror, fearing retaliation in major cities. Terrorist attacks have been reduced from over 4,000 incidents in 2013, producing 2,700 civilian deaths, to only 319 incidents and 169 civilian casualties in 2020 (Afzal, 2020). That being said, there is still a certain degree of reluctance from the government and the military to employ harsher crackdowns on the TTP due to the issue of Pashtun nationalism. With China, Islamabad appears much more proactive in trying to solve its terrorist problem, not wanting to risk relations with Beijing and CPEC over occasional terrorist strikes. However, the roots of extremism remain unaddressed, as militant groups are still finding recruits in locals who sympathise with their actions (Afzal, 2020).

Based on these arguments, we can see that CPEC is capable of making positive

impacts on certain parts of the country when locals support the development initiatives. Developmental peace in KPK also shows the principles of non-intervention from China, giving Pakistan the initiative to make decisions on what to prioritise. However, the question remains as to whether or not non-intervention and neutrality contribute to resolving some prolonged issues of terrorism. China's current stance of distancing itself from the issue of expecting Pakistan to crack down on terrorists appears less effective in combating the TTP. Although CPEC is received positively in the north, contingent problems still prevent sustainable peace in the regions, which non-intervention is not helping to resolve.

### Balochistan

Perhaps the most controversial and most significant of the three major conflicts in Pakistan, China's practice of developmental peace in Balochistan has brought some serious concerns for the sustainability of peace despite showing positive signs outside the country. The most important CPEC project in Balochistan is the Gwadar port, which is portrayed as mutually beneficial for both Pakistan and China. Here, it is important to recall the 'win-win' narrative by questioning who is benefitting from this project and what types of people are neglected.

As strategic implications around the Indian Ocean increase for reasons such as security in the Middle East, enduring conflict in Afghanistan, tensions over Iran's nuclear programmes, and Indo-Pak regional disputes, the Gwadar port's importance will also grow as China increases its own presence in the region (Kalim, 2016). Pakistan must move its main shipping ports westwards towards Gwadar and away from Indian reach so that the Indian navy cannot bottle up Pakistan's coastlines as New Delhi did during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 with the Karachi port (Kalim, 2016). Maritime security for Pakistan is becoming ever more important since India's announcement that it intends to pursue a blue-water navy (Indian Navy, 2009).

Despite military implications, both China and Pakistan have denied that the Gwadar port will be used as a military naval base for the Chinese. China's foreign ministry spokesperson, Lu Gang, stated that it has no plans to construct military bases in Pakistan and that CPEC is in the common interest of countries along the route (Tribune, 2018), while Pakistani National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf said that Pakistan has not offered any bases to China in Balochistan, and that Pakistan only has economic bases that are open to anyone who wants to invest (Arab News, 2021). Although both China and Pakistan have left some room for ambiguity regarding the commercial nature of Gwadar, the state media Global Times says that after the Gwadar port becomes fully operational,



it may, like any other commercial port, eventually receive ships of different navies (Liu & Guo, 2021). Even without the military implications, the Gwadar port serves China's economic stability as well as food and energy stability through avoidance of the Malacca strait.

With specific regard to Gwadar, it is proposed as a 'win-win' initiative that would benefit both China and Pakistan. The previous government of Nawaz Sharif proposed 29 industrial parks and 21 mineral zones under CPEC, a handful of which were located in Balochistan (The News, 2015). The expectations for CPEC were that Chinese projects would create jobs and opportunities for local people. Pakistani media report that CPEC would create as many as 700,000 new jobs in Pakistan by 2030, and based on documents provided by the Chinese embassy, 75,000 new jobs have been created so far (Tribune, 2019).

China appears aware that improving local ownership is an essential step towards peace and stability. There are several CPEC projects around the country that resemble the quick impact projects empowering local grassroots. According to the official list of CPEC projects concerning social and economic development, several vocational and training projects have already been completed, showing priority in providing training and education to locals to enable them to obtain the necessary skills to work with CPEC, or poverty alleviation in general (CPEC Authority, n.d.). There are still multiple on-going projects, such as maintenance and renovation for 50 schools in newly merged districts, overseas student scholarships, and specifically to Balochistan, the Gwadar vocational and technical project (CPEC Authority, n.d.). In addition to education, there are several health-related projects, such the completed provision of vaccine storage and transportation equipment, which is of growing importance in the age of COVID-19, but also the ongoing Gwadar hospital project, 'Brightness Journey', and further planned medical centres in Balochistan as well (CPEC Authority, n.d.).

China's 'Brightness Journey' project, where Chinese doctors help foreign patients in developing countries of Asia and Africa with cataracts, often goes hand-in-hand with the medical ship 'Peace Ark', according to state media (Global Times, 2021c). The Peace Ark and Brightness Journey serve as another extension of Chinese soft power but also as an attempt to WHAM in the local population and improve the national image of China, which at times can be poor due to the negative implications of CPEC. China, under developmental peace, needs to be more considerate of the local population. For evidence all around Pakistan, we can see a trend that developmental peace indeed lacks the local turn in some of its efforts.

#### *4.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Pakistan*

##### Kashmir

China, in trying to develop Pakistan's side of Azad Kashmir, has met some doubts about its viability as well as a common criticism on who is benefitting from the initiative. Western analysts such as Yoana Barakova from the European Foundation for South Asian Studies appear less optimistic about CPEC's role in G&B. Contrary to Pakistan's claims to grant G&B representation in the National Assembly, Barakova claims that the people of G&B will have no say in CPEC projects and Pakistan has basically sold them out to China in exchange for infrastructure development, especially when the region is almost completely deprived of the high-profit projects seen in other parts of the country (ANI, 2019). CPEC projects will also inflict environmental and ecological damage as well as leave thousands jobless (ANI, 2019).

Nawaz Khan Naji, the sole nationalist leader in the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA), says that nobody intends to oppose CPEC, as they know G&B will become the centre of trade and tourism once the roads are connected, but others, such as the head of the Senate's special committee on CPEC, Taj Haider, question why not a single dollar has yet been spent on G&B if the region is truly indispensable for CPEC (Khan, 2019). Meanwhile, local scholar Aziz Ali Dad claims that G&B, like any other province, is only trying to get what it can from CPEC, which is merely a portion of the greater BRI. Locals have high expectations, but in reality, G&B's role in CPEC is actually rather small (Khan, 2019).

Based on local reactions, there are mixed opinions on the ground concerning CPEC in G&B. Some may be more optimistic than others, while others repeat common criticisms heard elsewhere in Pakistan that Chinese workers are taking jobs away from locals. For example, G&B has the highest literacy rate compared to anywhere in Pakistan, but local youths are pessimistic about Islamabad's promise of 1.8 million employment opportunities with CPEC because many of the smaller local manufacturers, and shop owners are already losing their jobs due to the flood of Chinese goods and mining areas being handed over to the Chinese rather than local miners (S. Khan, 2018b). G&B youths are struggling to find employment, as China has brought in 400,000 of its own workers, not to mention land grabs, environmental issues, and demographic shifts (S. Khan, 2018b). Another problem is an influx of work from neighbouring Punjab and KPK, which will rupture the delicate local Sunni-Shiite balance (International Crisis Group, 2018), as most G&B are Shi'ites, while the rest of Pakistan is predominantly Sunni. Despite such a shortcoming, CPEC has planned to construct various projects, mainly focussing on dams

and power stations, as seen in other parts of Pakistan. Many of these projects, such as the 100 MW Gilgit KIU Hydropower and the 80 MW Phandar Hydropower Station, are still under review by experts from both sides, but projects also include roads like the Raikot-Thakot Bypass and the Gilgit-Chitral-Shandur Expressway, built to improve connectivity in order to promote greater investment and tourism in the region (Tribune, 2021).

The expansion of CPEC also reveals some of China's troubling human rights records. Due to the proximity of G&B to Xinjiang, many businesspersons from G&B have Chinese wives across the border. The GBLA, under a unanimous resolution, has called for the federal government in Islamabad to urge China to release 50 Chinese wives of G&B men who were detained in detention centres across the border under Beijing's controversial Xinjiang policy (Dawn, 2018b). The persecution of Uighurs abroad by the CCP will only become more of a problem as China expands the BRI and more and more countries become subjugated by Beijing's controversial policies to crackdown on dissidents abroad. Taming the G&B region through economic development is also a means for China to combat the 'three evils' as part of a secure periphery. Through developmental peace, China will gain more sway and influence over its neighbours to respect China's position on controversial issues like human rights violations against Uighurs.

Similar cases can be observed in Afghanistan, to which we will return in more detail in Chapter 5. We will find that developmental peace in G&B resembles the problem elsewhere. For example, locals still worry about losing their livelihoods to an influx of Chinese goods, or not being able to compete fairly for job opportunities because Chinese companies bring their own workers. Even with the optimism that G&B will become a major trade and tourist hub, there is no evidence to suggest that the same problems plaguing other parts of Pakistan will not be repeated in G&B.

In contrast to the Chinese initiatives, other international actors are providing their share of foreign aid in G&B. These actors are much more local-focused, with tangible short- and long-term benefits. For example, the Japanese government has trained G&B farmers in marketing techniques to increase their income and reduce waste, and this has been beneficial for the locals, who previously lacked good marketing, packaging, and value-addition facilities to support their production (UNPO, 2015). Meanwhile, the US, under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), initiated the Pakistan Reading Project Gilgit-Baltistan 2013–2017 to improve 1.3 million public and private primary school students' reading (USAID, 2022a). USAID also provided aid for the agriculture sector, such as constructing 15,500 acres of irrigation systems and providing water and hygiene innovations for local communities (Karakoram International

University, 2018). Empowered farmer families produce higher yields and gain better income, and their children also have better opportunities to go to schools and aspire to become teachers, lawyers, and doctors (Karakoram International University, 2018).

While China's main objective is peace and stability, Beijing must ensure that China's initiative and CPEC have an edge over regional rivals like Japan. Developmental peace needs more effective ways to WHAM of the locals if the objective is to create peace and stability. Simply providing infrastructure without considering local consent is not the way to create sustainable peace. It may even defeat China's purpose of maintaining inner stability on CPEC if locals turn against CPEC from discontent, as we will see in KPK and Balochistan.

### KPK and FATA

The sudden route diversion of CPEC caused the most controversy amongst locals of KPK and FATA. Initially, locals supported the plan, in which the western route would be developed first, as this route provides much-needed infrastructure to the northern provinces. The western route connects Kashgar in China's Xinjiang province to Gwadar through less developed provinces of KPK and Balochistan. Starting CPEC along the western route appeared to be the perfect opportunity for Pakistan to address the regional inequality, inherited from Britain, between the Punjab and Sindh regions and KPK and Balochistan, but the government has done very little to address the concerns of smaller provinces (Mengal, 2016). Pakistan and China prioritised the eastern route as a means to save time and cost, while the western route traverses unstable territories that can also be politically divisive due to issues such as land acquisition (Chief Minister's Policy Reform Unit, 2015).

The sudden diversion to the eastern route created much discontent among the locals. One possible reason for the sudden change is feasibility, as communication and roads are already built, and the route between Lahore and Karachi, two of Pakistan's largest cities, has better security (Akhtar et al., 2021). There have been questions as to how much control Pakistan actually has over the routes of CPEC, but a statement by China's EXIM bank claims that the money to construct routes from Gwadar to Xinjiang comprises concessional loans with an interest rate of 1.6%, and therefore the choice of routes was given to Pakistan to decide (Mengal, 2016). What Islamabad did not mention was that although the western route is less likely to be attacked by insurgents, it is also prone to natural disasters that can destroy infrastructure, as well as fog, which makes it difficult for lorry drivers (Mengal, 2016). Below is a map of CPEC, which shows the two routes:




Figure 2: Routes of CPEC (China Story, n.d.)

In either case, the opaque nature of CPEC is an inherited weakness of the initiative, especially when last-minute decisions like route diversions are made, although many locals had high anticipation of progress and development in their region. Some residents in KPK even felt great injustice for not receiving development after living for many years under insurgency and terrorism (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). The lack of transparency in CPEC has, for a long time, been a target of criticism from the West (Dollar, 2020), as this has also been one of the largest impediments preventing Western companies from joining the initiative. Former senator of KPK Afrasiab Khattak said he felt ‘cheated’ by the sudden change of routes, as the Punjab gets trade and industry but KPK is left with *jihadist* training grounds and *madradas* (International Crisis Group, 2018). In general, CPEC is received positively in the region, but the lack of interaction with the grassroots and bottom-up initiative can jeopardise this positivity when locals find that development will not come to their region, or that it will benefit elites rather than the everyday lives of grassroots.

Non-intervention also does not necessarily resolve the issue of terrorism in the

north. This is becoming clearer as Chinese projects become targeted by terrorist groups like the TTP, as Beijing expects Islamabad to address the issue. For example, in 2021, a bus blast killed at least 13, including nine Chinese workers and four Pakistanis on their way to the Dasu hydropower project in KPK. Pakistani officials claimed that this was due to a mechanical failure, while China clearly said it was an attack (BBC, 2021a). As a response to this incident, the China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) announced that it would terminate contracts with Pakistani workers on the Dasu hydropower project, but subsequently retracted the announcement, calling it useless after not getting approval from authorities (Malik, 2021b). According to local media in Pakistan, the Minister for Interior Sheikh Rashid Ahmed said that ‘cowardly’ acts would not affect China's friendship with Pakistan (Malik, 2021b).

However, local Chinese media claim that although Pakistan has the SSD, dedicated to protecting Chinese nationals, there are still loopholes in its counterterrorist initiatives, such as its inability to sweep out the Taliban who reside in the north (Tengxun, 2021). Meanwhile, reporters from the Global Times claim that the locals of Kohistan, where the Dasu project occurs, vow that the people of Kohistan will never allow illegal elements to operate in their area, the Dasu hydropower dam is a major initiative for the local energy sector that will bring prosperity to the region, and they will not allow enemies of the China–Pakistan’s friendship to destroy this project (Global Times, 2021b). Pakistan also blames India and Afghanistan, as well as the TTP, for smuggling and backing terrorists: India says these accusations are unfounded (Agrawal, 2022), although PM Imran Khan did approve \$11.6 million, half the amount demanded by Beijing, as compensation to the families of Chinese workers killed in the attack (Agrawal, 2022).

The Dasu Project is funded by the World Bank and constructed by a Chinese company: therefore, strictly speaking, it is not a CPEC project. Even so, local discontent against China has painted a target on Chinese-led projects regardless of whether they are CPEC or funded by other sources. Pakistan did provide a certain degree of compensation to show that Islamabad is not willing to let terrorism strain relations with China. Incidents like this also suggest that Pakistan would be likely to increase its commitments to protect CPEC projects as well as ‘soft targets’ such as Chinese institutes (PTI, 2022). China and Pakistan’s ‘all-weather friendship’ aims to deter India, giving Beijing strong incentives to maintain positive ties with Islamabad and not be discouraged by terrorist attacks. That being said, Pakistan has been making progress under hybrid peace to WHAM the locals in the north and reduce the number of terrorist attacks by groups like the TTP.

### Balochistan

One of the main points of contestation around the Gwadar port is how many jobs are actually given to the locals. 'Locals' here does not mean local Pakistanis who have migrated from the neighbouring Punjab or Sindh provinces in search of employment, but Balochi locals, who are the most marginalised group in the country. The opaqueness of CPEC means that very little information is released on what types of people are employed under which projects. Occasional announcements on Chinese state media may say that 55,000 jobs are created for locals in the Bostan special economic zone (M.S. Malik, 2019). 'Locals' may also indicate members of the Pakistani army, such as the SSD overseeing the security of CPEC. The author does not have the connections with Chinese companies to confirm whether local Balochis are being hired, or how many are being hired, but there are signs to suggest that Balochis are not getting as much as they had hoped for.

Another reason for the lack of Balochi employment is education. The Minister of State for Petroleum and Natural Resources, Jam Kamal Khan, says that the provincial government is given administrative control over Balochistan's mineral resources after the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment and urges local youth to get professional training and take advantage of all job opportunities created by CPEC (Associated Press of Pakistan, 2016). However, as of 2019, there is an acute lack of skilled Balochi workers in every department, causing the need to import experts and technical staff from other provinces and further fuelling discontent among locals and unemployed youth (F.H. Malik, 2019). As explained in the previous section on liberal peace, education in Balochistan is largely reliant on aid by foreign actors such as UNICEF, the EU, or Japan. In other words, the opportunity is definitely created by CPEC, but there are not enough Balochi skilled workers to harness this opportunity. This can happen when the federal government neglects education in Balochistan, with the local media asking whether it is possible for Balochis to remain competitive in the modern world when the local literacy rate is merely at 41% (Umrani, 2019). However, research shows that CPEC is perceived in a positive light among some Balochis, such as small traders, who think there is potential for CEPC to address the rampant unemployment in the province (Shafiq et al., 2018).

The development of the Gwadar port was supposed to create employment and opportunities for prosperity, but instead, the lack of access for locals only created fear and uncertainty about whether development is a disguise to, once again, exploit Balochistan's resources (Daily Times, 2021). Baboo Gulab, the former Nazim (local government chief) of Gwadar, says the government must give local leaders more say over CPEC and that projects would be a lot smoother if they included the local population more, especially when people have no say about what will happen to their land, as the government makes no attempt to present CPEC in a way that is acceptable to locals (Daily Times, 2021).

Jobs created by CPEC in Gwadar are not even given to the Balochis. A former senior official of Balochistan claims that Balochis are considered uneducated, and therefore, nobody wants to invest in them (International Crisis Group, 2018). Unskilled and semi-skilled locals who are not being given the promised opportunities of CPEC will instead be recruited by insurgencies (International Crisis Group, 2018).

To make matters worse, the Gwadar Port has been depriving the livelihoods of the local fishermen in Gwadar. A report by Al Jazeera reveals that many local fishermen in Gwadar still rely on primitive fishing techniques and are struggling to make catches (Hyder, 2017). These people are also being relocated to make way for the construction of the Gwadar port, often without sufficient compensation from the government (Hyder, 2017). The government also began to fence parts of Gwadar, adding checkpoints for security reasons, creating more hurdles for locals, who cannot even walk in their own cities anymore (International Crisis Groups, 2018).

As a matter of fact, the Gwadar port has always been a point of concern from the locals, who have had no say in the decision-making process of the port since 2004. Any profits will diffuse into other provinces, while Balochis will be displaced by ‘foreigners’ coming from all around the country seeking employment (Haider, 2005). The general perception of the Pakistan public on CPEC is positive, but this is often due to the influence of positive viewpoints presented by the media (Huang et al., 2016). Positive perceptions may change with time as education improves around the country and people begin to view CPEC in a more objective manner (Huang et al., 2016). To this point, the non-transparent nature of many CPEC projects has caused locals, especially in the smaller provinces, to worry about job opportunities and route diversion, so it is important for Pakistan and China to involve more locals and disclose more information on projects as a means to give people an assurance of coming projects (Akhtar et al., 2021). This has not happened to the Gwadar port, as life is becoming harder for locals in Balochistan – a group of people who have been neglected by the state ever since the creation of Pakistan. A counter-argument against this, as Zahid Ahmed (2022) stated in a personal interview, is that there will never be enough Balochis to occupy all the job vacancies created by CPEC due to their small population, and incoming workers from around the country and China are inevitable when new opportunities are created by CPEC.

China’s non-intervention policy around CPEC, and developmental peace in general, does not put Beijing in a position to respond to local grievances. Instead, Beijing prefers to turn a blind eye and ignore problems, such as when foreign ministry representative Zhao Lijian told state media the Global Times (2021a) that the Gwadar fishermen’s protests were ‘fake news’ when in reality, locals had been protesting for over



a month and only stopped because the government gave in to their demands. These demands included the removal of check posts in several districts, including Gwadar, and a crackdown on illegal fishing, as the Balochistan officials promised the locals (Jamal, 2021). Protest leader Maulana Hidayat-ur-Rehman blamed the Pakistan government for being 'hand-in-glove' with Chinese trawlers doing illegal fishing off the coast, and he demanded jobs along with the removal of check posts that were hindering thousands of Balochis from conducting business (WION News Team, 2021). Non-interventionist China does not respond to the local grievances, as Beijing expects Pakistan to solve problems like protests.

Despite its shortcomings, the framework for sustainable development for Balochistan definitely exists in CPEC. This is because a decent portion of current tensions between Balochis and the Pakistani state is economic, where locals are frustrated by the lack of opportunities and development due to neglect by Islamabad. China and CPEC provide the economic opportunity that Pakistan cannot, but the way in which it is being implemented by Beijing and Islamabad is doing more harm than good, further alienating the already marginalised local Balochis.

The Gwadar port at the time of its construction was intended to be used as a major hub of regional trade to attract investments into the incredibly underdeveloped Balochistan (Haider, 2005). By linking with Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan can cultivate the untapped natural resources in Balochistan and elevate locals out of poverty through development (Haider, 2005). Pakistan's first official report on multidimensional poverty, compiled with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), shows that more than 70% of people in Balochistan live in multidimensional poverty, making it the second poorest province in the country after the FATA regions (UNDP Pakistan, 2016).

However, as we have seen above, Balochistan is often neglected by Islamabad and is not given its fair share of resources, despite being a resource-rich region. The arrival of CPEC and energy projects around the country under CPEC can lessen the reliance on Balochistan's resources and play a role in preventing further exploitation of local resources as well (UNDP Pakistan, 2016). In 2018, Pakistan announced that it would provide 20,000 jobs to Balochi youths and give land ownership of the Gwadar shipyard to the local government in Balochistan, and created plans to end unemployment (Dawn, 2018a). However, protests in 2020 demanding an end to illegal Chinese fishing and removal of check posts show that after two years, little had improved in terms of local ownership of the project, as locals still had little control over their homeland.

Western-based analysts claim that Pakistani leaders have misread Gwadar's geographical advantages, since connecting two underdeveloped regions does not

necessarily lead to growth, and starting projects without consulting locals only raises expectations but leads to greater disappointment (Grare, 2022). Economic activity around Gwadar generally benefits Chinese workers and firms, leading to considerable hostility by locals towards Beijing, while Gwadar has not become the economic haven promised by Islamabad, as people still lack basic amenities such as clean drinking water and basic health facilities (Shah, 2022).

While China may be able to address some of these problems and try to improve China's and CPEC's image through public diplomacy, it has not pursued policies beyond existing peripheral diplomacy in most BRI countries (Tang & Zhang, 2016). The reasons for this are that BRI countries are all incredibly diverse, with different needs, development levels, languages, and ethnic groups; that there is no single model of public diplomacy for each country; and that China has not trained enough workers proficient in local languages for public diplomacy to happen as yet (Tang & Zhang, 2016).

As an attempt at WHAM with the locals, signs that China is practicing cultural diplomacy can be clearly felt on the ground. Following China's introduction of Mandarin courses in Pakistan, Mandarin is slowly beginning to become the new English for the Pakistani youth for future education and employment (Chaudhury, 2021). The Pakistani media are also being mobilised to urge people to become accustomed to the Chinese presence in the country, where Mandarin courses are implemented in public schools, colleges, and universities, and 47 institutes and 23 districts in Punjab have already implemented the Technical Educational and Vocational Training Authority (Chaudhury, 2021). As for Balochistan specifically, the University of Balochistan recently set up its first Chinese Study Centre in 2019, which the university wants to eventually transform it into a full-fledged Confucius Institute (Khan, 2019b).

However, one should be cautious not to overstate the impact of Chinese cultural diplomacy, and China's role in Pakistan is still under non-intervention. Even Chinese sources admit that Balochis are not given representation at the decision-making level of CPEC, but also cite the lack of transparency from Islamabad regarding the lack of explanation as to why water and electricity projects are happening in neighbouring Punjab province and not Balochistan (Zhang, 2016). The Gwadar port has not helped Balochis to integrate into Pakistani society, but instead has caused more resentment, alienation and hostilities towards Islamabad and Beijing. Therefore, as long as Pakistan chooses to neglect Balochistan, there is no need for China to go out of its way to improve its image in the province, as long as the security of CPEC is guaranteed by the SSD.

That being said, security in itself is not always guaranteed. For example, in 2018, the BLA attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi, killing at least four people, claiming

that China is an oppressor along with Pakistani forces (BBC, 2018). Attacks by the BLA on CPEC have increased in intensity recently, such as the 2021 car bombing in Gwadar that killed several people, including a Chinese national (Janjua, 2021). A political analysis from Quetta claims that nationalists demand freedom from Pakistan, as the governments in Islamabad and China are a source of poverty and oppression (Janjua, 2021). The BLA has also put the Pakistan army on high alert by claiming that it killed 195 paramilitaries (while the government claims only nine) on two military outposts in Balochistan, undermining PM Imran Khan's efforts to establish better ties with China (Aamir, 2022).

#### Local Turn in CPEC

China and Pakistan could employ some solutions to make CPEC more beneficial to locals. Firstly, CPEC must create strong redistributive policies for southern Balochistan to address local fears of resource exploitation, and especially with regard to Gwadar, locals need to be given privileged status – like Gulf Arabs in the Middle East – to address concerns about being outnumbered (Rafiq, 2016). Secondly, more consideration should be given to the actual advantages of Gwadar, such as making it a hub for green energy to lessen the country's reliance on imported energy or promote Gwadar as a destination for local tourism (Rafiq, 2016). Thirdly, education in Balochistan should be improved, and the recent opening of the Chinese Study Group is an important first step. This creates a dual effect of providing much-needed education in Balochistan and opportunities for Balochis to gain the skills (like language skills) required to benefit from Chinese projects in CPEC, as there has been an acute lack of skilled Balochi workers. Due to the India factor, China is in Pakistan to stay. The India factor and the perceived economic stability and energy security mean that China's definition of 'periphery' is firmly ingrained into Gwadar, and it puts high priority on peace and security in Gwadar and the Balochistan region in general. Trying to drive China out through insurgency will invite an even heavier-handed military reaction from Islamabad to appease Beijing with 'security'. Instead, local Balochis should try to harness the opportunities given by CPEC.

#### **4.5: Conclusion**

Throughout this chapter, we have seen how different models of peacebuilding have tried to address the conflicts in Pakistan. While the Pakistani state is mostly stable, there are still conflicts, insurgencies and terrorists that plague the country, especially in more remote areas. The conflict with India over Kashmir is also a major hurdle for sustainable peace. Based on this, one can say that Pakistan has its fair share of conflicts that require peacebuilding.

Liberal peace has been used in both Pakistan and in Kashmir to address the instability. Inside the country, liberal peace mainly takes the form of foreign aid and economic development as well as WHAM to reduce the available space for insurgents. Improving liberal norms such as democracy and enhancing the representation of minority groups in Balochis is a step towards sustainable peace, as some groups in Balochistan have developed considerable discontent against the Pakistani government due to decades of neglect while local resources are exploited by the state.

Kashmir has also experimented with liberal peace, mainly undertaken by India in the form of free and fair elections, but these were not properly delivered, much to the dismay of locals. A problem with the Kashmir issue is that the locals are never given the opportunity to choose independence, as accession to India or Pakistan remains the only available option. Elsewhere in Pakistan, such as KPK and FATA, liberal peace came in the form of WHAM, but due to the lack of local knowledge by the Pakistani government, international contractors merely tailored their aid programmes to the needs of the government, while the government did not fully understand the needs of the grassroots on the ground. International aid is still very much needed and appreciated by Pakistanis, as Western actors and Japan, under the collaboration of the UN, have tried to address major problems such as lack of education, the poor quality of education, and water problems around the country.

Regarding hybrid peace, Islamabad has been effective in combining its top-down policies with bottom-up initiatives from the locals in places such as KPK and the recently integrated FATA region. Islamabad has allowed local models of conflict resolution such as the *jirga*, as well as areas that wish to establish Sharia law, to flourish, in exchange for these regions recognising the Pakistani state and cooperating in incorporating top-down policies such as the Malakand Stabilisation Strategy in KPK. Although respecting tradition and autonomy is an important step towards sustainable peace, one must also be cautious that basic human rights, such as women's rights in the *jirga*, are not undermined or sacrificed in the name of respecting tradition. Meanwhile, in Kashmir, there have also been attempts at local peacebuilding and reconciliation between the separated groups of Jammu and Kashmir as well as Azad Kashmir. Though the Kashmir issue is protracted, it appears that there is not enough political will in the political elites of India and Pakistan to resolve the conflict. With a missing top-down initiative, peacebuilding efforts cannot achieve hybridity and local actors struggle to sustain existing initiatives, such as the Karwan-e-Aman, on their own.

In terms of developmental peace, CPEC is making a positive impact, as Pakistan was highly reliant on IMF loans in the past. CPEC was a much-welcomed change for

Pakistan to diversify its foreign investment options. However, there also some claims that CPEC will not improve the bleak economic future of the country due to macroeconomic crisis, political instability, over-bureaucratisation of CPEC and federal-provincial mistrust in Pakistan (Hassan, 2020). However, as we have seen with the conflicts in Kashmir and Balochistan, there is often not the political will from the federal government in Pakistan to address these conflicts. Developmental peace that advocates a non-intervention style of engagement is unlikely to help solve the problem in this sense. Even if CPEC is making a positive impact in terms of economic development, and this impact is received positively by some locals in KPK in particular, there are still issues such as terrorism that Pakistan is struggling to resolve. Under non-intervention, it is unlikely that China will directly intervene in Pakistan's domestic affairs

Developmental peace has not, as yet, managed to create sustainable peace in places like Balochistan. In fact, no models are particularly effective in helping Islamabad to address this problem. China is unlikely to go beyond non-intervention, as Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to protect CPEC through an SSD comprising 15,000 troops. However, there is a downside to this approach, as a heavy-handed military approach to Balochistan only adds to the existing grievances of locals against Islamabad. The impact that Chinese development has been making on the ground in Balochistan, and Gwadar in particular, has not been good. Although there has been some progress in education as well as the use of Pakistani labour for projects, there is little evidence to suggest that there is much local ownership of CPEC projects, which have set off massive protests in Gwadar by locals against the government concerning the port.

In sum, developmental peace merely contains the conflict. Tangible benefits for local people exist, but may be provided disproportionately based on the preferences of the federal government in Islamabad. Therefore, as long as the government neglects certain groups, it is unlikely that these groups will benefit from CPEC or any other developmental projects initiated by foreign actors. It is not in China's interest to tell Pakistan what to do, as their friendship is based on a common adversary – India – and on mutual non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs. Such an approach is unlikely to improve the situation in places like Balochistan. Neglecting a racial minority that already has a track record of violent insurgency is just a latent conflict in the making. Yet China does not seem to be too concerned with this problem as long as its national interests are protected by Pakistan, with lethal force if necessary.

## Chapter 5: Case Study of Afghanistan

### 5.1: Introduction

Being the only non-BRI member state discussed in this dissertation, the Afghanistan case is useful to our discussion because of its close relationship to Pakistan. This means that conflicts in one country cannot be eliminated without addressing the other. Some conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially concerning the issue of Pashtun nationalism, are closely related. The Afghanistan case is also important because it is a case where liberal peace, specifically liberal state-building, did not lead to sustainable peace where the Taliban returned to overthrow the US-backed Afghanistan government two decades after being ousted from power by Washington's post-9/11 invasion. While liberal peace offers some solutions to the conflicts in the other three case studies, this is not the case with Afghanistan. Therefore, greater attention must be paid to alternative models of peacebuilding to see whether hybrid, local, or developmental peace can mitigate the weaknesses of the traditional model of liberal peace that has failed.

China and the role of developmental peace are particularly important here, as Beijing is likely to be the next major power that will fill the vacuum after the West withdraws. However, while there are opportunities to bolster the BRI, thanks to Afghanistan's important geographic location being at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, as well as an estimated one to three trillion dollars' worth of untapped minerals (Reuters, 2010), an unstable Afghanistan is also a significant security risk to China's own internal stability at home as well as to the BRI. This chapter intends to shed light on the dangers of illiberal peace and negative peace when two illiberal actors – China and the Taliban – get together. This is also a means to show that a certain degree of liberal norms is still required for sustainable peace in post-conflict societies.

This chapter intends to present liberal peace as a failure of liberal state-building. To this point, it will list the existing problems with the liberal peace framework in Afghanistan. The issue of political will is a consistent problem across the cases in this dissertation. We will see that despite US narratives of liberal peace, Washington, over its years in Afghanistan, strayed away from its original intentions and became obsessed with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. This also means that the Afghan government, with all its existing problems at the time of its establishment, was left alone with little support. At the end of this chapter, I intend to find an answer as to whether or not alternative models like hybrid (local) or developmental peace can create sustainable peace in post-conflict societies after the failure of liberal peace.

## 5.2: Liberal Peace in Afghanistan

### 5.2.1: *Theory of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan*

In theory, Afghanistan was to become the catalyst that the US would use to transform the entire system in the region. Back then, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, as the most influential neo-conservative member of the government, did not want US commitment to end with removing several individuals from Al-Qaeda, but instead wanted the entire system to change (Dodge, 2013). The US wanted to use the decisive victory it had achieved in 2001 as an opportunity to create liberal institutions in Afghanistan and expand liberal norms in the region using the liberal peace framework. In other words, the US, as the main advocate of liberal peace at the time, pursued state-building endeavours in post-war Afghanistan.

Modern Afghan history is one of wars, conflicts, turmoil, and instability. The conflict did not begin with the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but dates as far back as the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union first invaded. Since then, Afghanistan has always been a post-conflict society that has rarely, if ever, enjoyed internal stability when foreign invasion has followed civil wars. Against this backdrop, there is popular demand on the ground for stability, accountability, and a desire for the Afghan government to negotiate with the Taliban (Larson, 2021). There were also arguments before the collapse of the Afghan government that democracy is the best defence against the Taliban because of the principles of inclusiveness, and that the best way to improve the inclusiveness of previously neglected groups, such as women, is through democracy, because past evidence shows that an inclusive peace process with the participation of all members of society is much less likely to fail (Worden & Ahmadi, 2021). This means that government accountability through democracy is also important, though later, in practice, we will see that there are many problems with accountability in the Afghan government, and that some of these problems were catalysts for the Taliban's resurgence.

### 5.2.2: *Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan*

The problem with post-war peacebuilding in Afghanistan is that it became almost indistinguishable from post-war state-building. This, however, cannot be fully blamed on the US, as it was the norm at the time to pursue some sort of state-building mechanism in post-conflict societies. For example, 29 of 49 UNPKO mandates between 1989 and 2011 contained some type of state-building commitment (Berdal & Zaum, 2013). State-building in itself should not be the problem, as the state in countries such as Afghanistan has never been particularly strong, and a strong, stable state must provide public goods

for civilians, and this is not a role that can be easily replaced by local grassroots. After the invasion, there was a need to help war-torn Afghanistan to create a strong, competent state under a liberal peace framework.

However, Afghanistan is a case that shows the limits of the compliance powers of liberal peace. Trying to ‘install democracy at gunpoint’ will only achieve limited effects, even if liberal peace is not solely about democracy but also about finding means for the nation to adopt a competent market system and integrate the post-war society back into the international financial system (Mac Ginty, 2006). Foreign actors who are not familiar with the local situation may find it difficult to create a legitimate state for locals who are expecting some type of change, especially in Afghanistan, as many locals have been living under conflict and turmoil for decades, since the Soviet Union first invaded.

State-building is further complicated by the issue of political will from interveners, such as, for example, the US, which strayed from its initial objective of liberal peace to a series of counterinsurgency measures. This is ironic considering the fact that the US continued to focus on removing individuals of Al-Qaeda rather than supporting the new Afghan government in tackling problems such as corruption and drug proliferation – issues that would undermine democracy and liberal norms in the country. The following sections will analyse the specific means taken by the US to try to achieve liberal peace and in what ways it fell short of doing so.

### *5.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan*

#### Liberal State-building

The Afghanistan case shows the shortcomings of liberal peace and liberal state-building. While the US was the main actor behind liberal peace in Afghanistan, this section is interested in the approach and shortcomings of the liberal peace model, rather than the shortcomings perpetrated by US practice.

One major reason that makes liberal peace, or in general any type of intervention, difficult in Afghanistan is its geography: it is a landlocked country where peace is largely dependent on its neighbour, Pakistan. South Asia is also a volatile region with many factors that can undermine the peace process in Afghanistan, which are often beyond the control of Kabul or international actors like the US, mainly due to the local rivalry between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pak tensions can be so bad at times that peace is never a priority for any of Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially when Pakistan fears a pro-India Kabul, where Islamabad actively plays spoiler to undermine liberal peace through supporting the Taliban (Price, 2021). Despite its difficulties, Washington was adamant in



its endeavours to transform Afghanistan into a liberal society using then National Security Council staff Zalmay Khalilzad's Accelerating Success strategy. Little did they know that this attempt would cost the US two decades of time and \$2.3 trillion (Brown University, 2022) of resources just for the Taliban to resurge to power. It is ironic that George Bush explicitly mentioned in 2001 that he was not interested in state-building at that time (Woodward, 2002). The National Security Council planned to withdraw as soon as the Taliban was overthrown and Al-Qaeda defeated (Jones, 2009), which only took two months to achieve. From there, they faced a choice to either leave it at victor's peace and withdraw, as initially planned, or commit to state-building under liberal peace. By 2002, state-building became the choice for Washington's post-war strategy in Afghanistan, which would continue until its final withdrawal in 2021.

Elections and electoral processes are an important aspect in any democratic society, and the newly established Afghan state was no exception. One of the main topics of the Karzai-appointed nine-member committee was to offer a new electoral system. They were given the choice of using the British first-past-the-post system or the proportional representation (PR) system used by most post-conflict countries since 1989 (Nahzat, 2020). The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system was adopted as a response to the shortcomings of the PR system due to the complex nature of Afghanistan's multiparty politics, though the SNTV appears to be lesser of two evils compared to PR, especially given that Karzai adopted this system without actually understanding its consequences (Nahzat, 2020).

Another initiative is related to WHAM. The aim was that by WHAM, the grassroots people of Afghanistan could be turned into stakeholders who could hold governments accountable, which in turn would weaken support for the insurgency and indirectly improve policies (Weidmann & Callen, 2013). Considering Afghanistan's history of war and instability, locals are likely to support any government that can provide stability, but this also means that they are less concerned with matters such as legitimacy or whether or not elections are transparent (Coburn, 2009). This does not necessarily mean that elections have no meaning, as some locals have expressed that their rights have been deprived for so long that simply being a part of political participation contributes to helping them restore their lost identity (Coburn, 2009).

Regarding Karzai, despite his later criticisms, he was successful in reducing inter-ethnic tensions by including different ethnic groups into his cabinet, to the extent that some of the support that he gained was purely due to the fear of instability if he did not win (Coburn & Larson, 2009). Karzai's political career was riddled with corruption allegations, and most significantly, the 2009 election fraud, though most experts did not

believe other candidates would have managed to legitimately get more votes than Karzai anyway (Coburn & Larson, 2009). However, although Karzai did manage to create stability, it is important to not overstate this stability, as this does not necessarily mean that it translated into sustainable peace.

Based on the above analysis, one can say that liberal peace led by the US was successful at creating the bare minimum framework of liberal democracy in Afghanistan for locals to familiarise themselves with elections and representation. The problem then became ‘when’ should the US withdraw from Afghanistan? US withdrawal became difficult after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent fights against the Islamic State in Syria in 2014, causing mission creep in the region. In fact, by 2003, Afghanistan was no longer a top agenda for Washington, after it had become bogged down in Iraq in the same year.

### Economic Development

Foreign aid has created much more tangible benefits for the ordinary citizens in Afghanistan. Many international actors and agencies were involved in the economic development of the country over the years when it was occupied by the US-led NATO coalition.

The most significant sector that benefitted from foreign aid was education, as there was both bilateral aid from the West, like the US, and multilateral aid from organisations such as UNICEF to support the new Afghan state. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, education in Afghanistan has received substantial development, with the number of children in primary school education rising from 0.9 million to 9.2 million, and girls’ enrolment increasing from zero to 39% (Akhtar & Ranjan, 2021). There was also a substantial increase in higher education, especially the number of female students enrolled in universities, which went from almost zero in 2001 to over 54,861 by 2019 (Akhtar & Ranjan, 2021). Under the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund of USAID, the US made education more accessible by improving infrastructure, rebuilding schools, and empowering community education in rural areas across 17 provinces, as well as paying considerable attention to the need for female teachers (USAID, 2021). Female education is a strong step towards sustainable democracy, as we have already seen that women’s involvement prolongs the longevity of peace processes (Worden & Ahmadi, 2021), but girls need to be educated first before they can become productive members of society. Therefore, the focus on female education serves the purpose of liberal peace.

Other than education, international aid has also made positive impacts on the country’s health sector. Life expectancy has shown a steady increase in Afghanistan since

2001, growing from 56 years in 2001 to 64 years by 2019 (World Bank, 2019). The World Health Organisation (n.d.) reports that a total of 3,135 health facilities were functional in 2018 and health care can be accessed by 87% of the population within two hours, though issues such as poverty discourage the usage of health facilities, access distance remains a problem, and a shortage of female health care providers remains unaddressed.

In terms of infrastructure, the US and its allies have built roads, hydroelectric dams, and solar plants for the country (M.Q. Shah, 2021). For example, collaboration between the Afghan government and Japan paved roads that radically benefitted the locals, and there is a total of 8,000 to 10,000 miles of paved roads in the country, compared to the mere 50 miles back in 2001 (Peter, 2015). However, Japanese efforts at paving roads have been less efficient due to poor security, which causes delays. That being said, many more roads still need to be paved across the country, as well as those that fall into disrepair and must be maintained. Nonetheless, roads play an important role in improving connectivity between cities and facilitating commerce (Peter, 2015).

#### *5.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Afghanistan*

##### Election trouble

One problem with the top-down approach of liberal peace is the lack of coordination between international and local initiatives. As a matter of fact, very little was done about the lack of institutions on the ground, and instead it all came down to the decisions of President Karzai alone (International Crisis Group, 2005). This problem was made clearer when Karzai adopted the SNTV because it really did not fit with the local realities of Afghanistan. The SNTV electoral system introduced in Afghanistan is problematic because voters only cast one vote and the candidate with the most votes occupies the seat. The problem with this is that the SNTV works against new political parties that have yet to work out an effective strategy that turns the support received into victories in elections (International Crisis Group, 2005). Elections thus become appeals to ethnic interests rather than broader national interests, adding to the fear of future instability (International Crisis Group, 2005). In the end, SNTV only prevented the creation of collective party interests and prevented voters from connecting to their elected representatives (Dodge, 2021).

Fragmentation in Afghan society makes the SNTV as ineffective as it appears on paper. ‘Democracy’ is a foreign concept, and while ordinary Afghans may not be familiar with this concept, it is a welcomed change to Afghan society, which has gone from monarchy to civil war, to authoritarian rule, and back to war when the Soviet Union

invaded, and finally to Taliban rule in the 1990s until they were ousted in 2001. For most of their lives, local Afghans have lived under either occupation or chronic instability of war, where the threat of violence is a daily occurrence, and this instability greatly diminishes the legitimacy of governments (Ghadiri, 2010). The fragmentation of Afghan society means that central authority rarely leaves Kabul, and this can mean that local warlords exercise power in their areas of influence with impunity (Riphenburg, 2007). Even after the US occupation, some warlords needed to be removed from governmental positions for their illicit activities related to drug trafficking and plundering (Riphenburg, 2007). Interestingly, central authority was the most widespread during the first Taliban rule, especially in southern Afghanistan, which bolstered the Taliban shadow government's authorities in the south and helped the proliferation of local Taliban peace.

Introducing elections in Afghanistan is also difficult because like Pakistan, Afghanistan is an LAO. In fact, Afghanistan takes this a step further, being a fragile LAO where the state is weak and there is no monopoly over armed violence where powerholders, such as the Taliban, contest the government's army over territories (Byrd, 2014). Conducting elections in such an environment can cause instability, as demonstrated by the 2014 elections when main opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah accused later president Ashraf Ghani of alleged electoral fraud, which quickly invited US and UN intervention, seeing the threat of agitated Abdullah supporters (Byrd, 2014). In fragmented and fragile societies like Afghanistan, elections that clearly produce a winner and a loser invite instability, as legitimate votes are not sufficient to convince the losing side not threaten to use force in the hope of altering the results of elections, as there is too much to lose from electoral defeat (Byrd, 2014).

### Exit Strategy Trouble

Another problem with liberal peace in Afghanistan is that an exit strategy did not exist until 2018. According to Richmond (2006), liberal peace created by victor's peace eventually has to move towards emancipatory forms of peace as interveners withdraw. The problem with Afghanistan is that Washington's exit strategy came too late. Over its years of involvement in Afghanistan, the US has never managed to back up its promises to withdraw through credible action. Although plans have been repeatedly announced over the years, not only was this not carried out, but Washington also contradicted itself: for example, in 2010, it told Europe to increase troops despite a pledge to withdraw (Connah, 2020).

For cases like Afghanistan where a foreign entity like the US tries to do state-building, the peace process is often at the whim of the intervenor's political will. For

example, during the Obama administration, Washington learned from its experiences in Iraq, and went back to strategies to identify, target, kill or capture ‘high value targets’ (Karlsrud, 2019), rather than attempting to transform the system that the Accelerating Success strategy had initially tried to accomplish. Obama in 2015 pushed for more commitment to PKOs through greater contribution of troops from Western states, mainly hoping to use the UN as a proxy to share the burden (Karlsrud, 2019). The problem is that as Washington’s political will diminishes, it slides back to focusing on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Alternative models like hybrid and developmental peace do not have this problem, as these models do not attempt state-building because they are much more local, bottom-up, or economic development focused.

### Economics

Despite some positive achievements of foreign aid, the inability of foreign actors to integrate Afghanistan back into the international financial system became another blow to the liberal peace agenda. The problem with the many years of foreign aid is that Afghanistan became 97% dependent on foreign aid and its economy faced a severe depression when the troops withdrew (Bijlert, 2011). This means that it has very little to offer that will allow the country’s economy to stand on its own when foreign donors withdraw aid.

Between 2002 and 2018, Afghanistan received approximately \$70 billion, mainly from the US, in the form of military aid, and \$73 from international donors in the form of ODA, but foreign aid was mainly given through off-budget funding mechanisms where donors spent 79% (\$113 billion) of aid while the Afghan government only received a mere 21% (\$31 billion) of aid (Karimi, 2020). The main reason for such an aid model is that Afghanistan’s public financial management system is deemed weak and corrupt, being incapable of exploiting project budgets, but it is also in the donors’ interest to separate projects from the government’s agenda to WHAM the Afghans (Karimi, 2020). The projects that USAID did hand over to the private contractors were then forgotten about, with no one monitoring how the money was being used. The US, fully aware that Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt nations in the world, paid little attention to how its aid was being used, and companies continued projects of their own accord because of the lack of skilled and full-time contracting officers’ representatives who should have overseen the use of funds (Brinkley, 2013). This raises the question of whether or not Asian actors with their development-based approaches are more effective at helping Afghanistan to create a sustainable peace through economic development. More attention needs to be paid to hybrid and developmental peace models in this sense.

### Drug Issue

Closely related to the economy is the problem of drugs and narcotics in the Afghan economy. For many ordinary Afghans, opium and poppy cultivation is an essential part of their livelihoods, with Afghanistan being the largest producer of opium in the world. While an effective opium ban was enforced by the previous Taliban administration, followed by forced eradication of crops in cases of non-compliance, international actors have been increasingly incapable of addressing the post-Taliban Afghan drug issue. To make matters worse, the Karzai government also did not show particular interest in the problem because it was too preoccupied with counterterrorism and political consolidation (Goodhand, 2008). Karzai was not the only actor uninterested in tackling the drug problem, but when given a choice between the war on terror, defeating the Taliban, counter-narcotics and reinventing NATO, the US failed to prioritise any of their objectives, which led to half-hearted hybrid solutions (Goodhand, 2008).

The lack of political will from the intervener creates situations like the US's half-hearted attempt to address the drug problem in Afghanistan, which has caused confusion and inconsistency in its liberal peace agenda. Washington recognised the inseparable connection between drugs and the Taliban, and Bush showed willingness to adopt swift and aggressive counter-narcotic measures, as seen in Colombia, not wanting to risk American lives on a 'narco-state' (Risen, 2007). However, simply cracking down on illicit drugs was insufficient to sever the connection between drugs and the Taliban, and if anything, made the issue worse. For example, former governor of Helmand province Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, who was sacked after the discovery of nine tonnes of opium in his cellar in 2005, later admitted that he sent 3,000 people to the Taliban because the Taliban began paying his supporters when the government stopped (Indian Express, 2009). Despite the US Embassy and State Department offering rewards to local governors who were successful in eliminating poppy cultivation and promoting alternative livelihoods, opium production in Afghanistan continued to increase under the US occupation (Coyne et al., 2016). This is mainly because locals were too uncertain about the future of US occupiers and the international-backed government in Kabul to try to diverge away from opium (Coyne et al., 2016).

In Kabul, Karzai's 'big tent' approach, which focused on stability rather than reforms, created spoilers in the government that undermined any attempt to improve transparency and accountability because these measures threatened the interests of certain people in the central or provincial government (Goodhand, 2008). That being said, although the Afghan government was corrupt at all levels, corruption alone does not

account for the collapse of the state and peace. In fact, ‘successful’ corruption can be useful in maintaining order when informal networks are embedded in central authority of states through patronage, where rulers can either use coercion to deny private actors access to lootable resources or reward them to encourage sharing or investment (Goodhand, 2008).

The UK was another Western actor that tried to lead counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan but was also met with limited success. Under PM Tony Blair, Britain was convinced that combating drugs in Afghanistan was a realistic goal and that doing so would greatly bolster the UK’s international prestige, and also curb the flow of Afghan heroin into the UK (Berry, 2018). The problem with British efforts was that the British military was at odds with the American military, and they would often work against each other in terms of counternarcotics because there was also a mismatch between civilian and military interests where the US military did not participate in joint counter-narcotics programmes even if the president wanted to commit to them (Berry, 2018).

Furthermore, drugs like opium were simply more profitable for the average Afghan than any other crop available. The lack of profitable alternatives caused farmers to consistently go back to the poppy fields as long as demand existed within the state apparatus that benefitted from illegal trade (Price, 2021). To tackle this problem, the US government launched an ‘alternative livelihoods’ approach in 2009, and this has continued until the present. As a part of WHAM, the US hoped that the eradication of drugs would foster better connection between the new Afghan government and local grassroots, but this approach backfired, as the seizure and eradication of poppies increased the value of the remaining stock, along with the confusing and contradictory position Washington has taken on its war on drugs (Coyne et al., 2016). For example, siding with local warlords empowered those who were deeply involved with Afghanistan’s drug economy, but Washington also heavily financed the government’s drug-eradication campaign by embracing the national ban, without being directly embroiled in the drug war itself (Coyne et al., 2016). This curious and contradictory position under the Obama administration seriously undermined their efforts, as local warlords began offering protection for opium traders using US funds (Coyne et al., 2016).

Because the Afghan economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid, foreign actors have done surprisingly little in terms of providing profitable alternatives to local Afghans. Alternatives such as cotton do not cover the cost of production, as local farmers claim opium is ten times more profitable than other plants, and years of foreign advice against opium plantation have mostly failed to persuade farmers to stay away from drugs (Loyn, 2013). Moreover, counternarcotics officials cannot arrest too many people due to the fear

of angering someone higher up in the government (Loyn, 2013). As a source of instability, the elimination of drugs from local livelihoods is an important step towards sustainable peace, but liberal peace and US liberal state-building do not appear to have an effective answer to this issue, leading to the necessity to explore alternate means of peacebuilding concerning Afghanistan's drug issue. The lack of political will to address problems in Afghanistan is not limited to Karzai's approach to the drug problem. Even in the army, there are claims that Karzai's successor, President Ashraf Ghani, never had any interest in Afghanistan or its people (Magnay, 2021).

### Corruption and Military Weakness

From the military side, although the US has trained and funded the Afghan army over the years, the army itself was almost completely incapable of fighting on its own. Western media reports that many Afghan soldiers are illiterate, and although basic literacy courses were provided, they were short and brief, and those who did learn quickly simply quit the army for better jobs, leading to a very high turnover rate (BBC, 2014). Without literate soldiers, there is no prospect of Afghanistan having a competent modern army.

Another problem in the military is a top-down mismatch between international donors like the US and the local realities on the ground. The fact that Afghanistan has never been a homogenous state is a critical problem: issues that are core interests for one group may not be the same for another. Liberal peace intends to win the hearts and minds of people, but the question is, which group did the West want to win over? Former US ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry (2013) says that the narrative of Afghan security and foreign forces 'protecting the population' for good governance and rule of law is a good start, but the question is, from whom and against what are the people being protected? One answer is to protect civilians from the Taliban insurgency, but not much is being done about drug dealers, corrupt local police or predatory government officials. Moreover, ethnic violence has almost always been a problem in Afghanistan that leaves young people without employment opportunities, and it is these people who end up in extremist organisations (Eikenberry, 2013). The US and the West perhaps never fully understood what rural Afghans, who formed the bulk of the Afghan army, really thought. Rural residents, unlike their urban counterparts, saw little benefit in the Westernisation of Afghanistan because they were more conservative on issues such as female education, less concerned about government corruption, and in general did not want to risk their lives or their families even if they were well paid as soldiers (Wilsey, 2021).

Corruption is a major problem that plagues the US-backed Afghan government, especially given that the Taliban promote their own iteration of local peace that contrasts



with the corrupt Afghan government. Corruption also undermines the accountability of the government, which liberal peace was supposed to help construct in the state-building process. A World Bank report says that corruption in Afghanistan is because of patronage politics, where a merit-based appointment process happens at all levels of society, including the president's office, Parliament, army commanders, and influential political figures (Goodman & Sutton, 2015). The average Afghans would rather prioritise their own tribes, clans, or ethnicities, where commanders surrendered to the Taliban for amnesty, which the Taliban honoured (Kazmin et al., 2021). US President Joe Biden said that Afghan leaders must come together to fight their nation (Macias, 2021). This only shows that at the end of two decades of American commitment, Washington still does not understand the fact that there is usually no 'Afghan nation' for the ordinary people. However, Afghans can be united when facing an external threat, like the Soviet Union, and it appears that the US and NATO have fallen to the status of being this external threat after occupying the country for nearly two decades. However, ordinary Afghans are more interested in their tribes and families rather than in the imaginary 'Afghan state' that the West hoped to create.

Looking to a neighbour, General Raymond Odierno in Iraq claimed that perhaps the US never understood the societal devastation that had already been seen in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, long before the Americans came (Spears, 2012). By this logic, perhaps Washington made existing problems worse because Afghan society was already battered by years of civil war, then war with the Soviet Union and then the Taliban, before the US invasion. It may be difficult to win the hearts and minds of people tired of constant warfare when the NATO coalition themselves come to the country with arms.

### Trouble with Pakistan

The final element that weakened liberal peace is the external factor of Pakistan and how Washington could not get Islamabad to fully cooperate on the Afghan issue. Contrary to the popular belief, Afghanistan is not the 'graveyard of empires' because Afghan fighters, while fierce, directly toppled empires like Britain or the Soviet Union. Afghanistan is difficult to conquer because of its geography, where occupiers mainly hold onto towns and roads but leave the rest of the country relatively untouched because it is simply too costly to hold onto land that will never produce enough to cover the cost (Rubin, 2020). The only way to make up for such costs is to link the country to international markets through its neighbours (Rubin, 2020), such as Pakistan. Therefore, to achieve sustainable peace in Afghanistan is to ensure that Pakistan does not become a spoiler. This is important to show that not all regional stakeholders will be fully on board with liberal

state-building. Liberal peace can cause scepticism for neighbours, in contrast to peacebuilding models that do not do so (hybrid and developmental peace).

To the detriment of liberal peace, the US and Pakistan have not been on good terms since 2001, as shown in the previous chapter. US-Pak relations were already on a downward turn when former President Trump's decision in 2018 to suspend \$300 million in aid to Pakistan on the basis that Islamabad was not taking decisive action against militants was another serious blow to their already poor relations (Stewart and Ali, 2018). This came in spite of newly elected Imran Khan being approached by Trump to support US-Taliban peace talks in 2018. In the letter that Trump sent to Khan, the US expressed the belief that Pakistan could have denied sanctuary to the Taliban, and while Khan welcomed the US initiative for peace in Afghanistan, he clearly showed resentment against the US when Trump accused Pakistan of doing 'nothing' with American money while providing sanctuary to Bin Laden in Pakistan (Hansler, 2018). Although it is widely believed in America that high-ranking Pakistani officials definitely knew Bin Laden was hiding in their country, later evidence recovered from Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad suggests that no Pakistani officials were in contact with Bin Laden and US intelligence even admits that these officials genuinely did not know he was there (Bergen, 2021).

Pakistan was interested in becoming a stakeholder in the US war on terror in Afghanistan mainly due to the Indian factor. For a long time, Pakistan has been afraid of a potential pro-Indian government in Kabul, as Islamabad has tried to destabilise Afghanistan by providing intelligence, weapons, and protection to the Taliban to prevent this (Brown, 2018). The Taliban is one of the few groups in Afghanistan that is friendly towards Pakistan, and Islamabad hoped that the Taliban would someday rise to political power and gain access to Afghanistan's security apparatus, suspected to be friendly to India, which has tried to destabilise Pakistan through Pashtun and Balochi nationalists (A. Shah, 2021).

In fact, Pakistan was so concerned about India exploiting the situation in Afghanistan to label Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism that Islamabad needed to turn its back against the Taliban and join America's war on terror (Akhtar, 2008). Despite Trump's accusations of Pakistan having done 'nothing' for the US, in reality, Pakistan's denial of sanctuary to Taliban and al-Qaeda members fleeing from Afghanistan was instrumental in helping the US to take out hundreds of these al-Qaeda members along the rough mountainous terrain of the Afghan-Pak border in 2002 (Akhtar, 2008). However, the coalition was unable to completely 'defeat' al-Qaeda because many more members went into hiding in major cities such as Karachi (Akhtar, 2008). Khan's frustration at the

insensitivity from a US president was clearly seen in his counterargument against Trump, saying that Pakistan's tribal areas were devastated, with millions of people displaced during the war on terror, and denouncing US attempts to make Pakistan a 'scapegoat' (Hansler, 2018).

This leads to another point with the Pashtun problem that was not fully explained in the previous chapter. This is a problem that has troubled Islamabad since the early 1970s. The Pashtunistan movement, popular in the early 1970s, was a nationalist movement that no longer exists in Pakistan today. While the movement itself is long gone, Pashtun nationalism is an issue of existential threat to Pakistan that is much more pressing than Kashmir (Sareen, 2021). Unlike the Balochis, who lack representation, the Pashtuns are well represented in Pakistan, with their presence being felt in almost every sector of the country, yet this has not discouraged Pashtun nationalism because Pashtuns think their lives are cheap in Pakistan (Sareen, 2021).

Furthermore, the Durand Line, established between former British India and the Emirate of Afghanistan, cuts through Pashtun tribal territory, and causes considerable instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pashtun militants, who form the Pakistani Taliban, have alleged close ties with the Afghan Taliban, and for many years the Pakistani Taliban have fought against Islamabad in the hope of creating an independent 'Pashtunistan' (Miller, 2021). The US occupation of Afghanistan caused much anxiety among Pashtuns, especially those that live in KPK (or Frontier, as it was then called) and FATA near Afghanistan. Pakistan fears that taking decisive action against the Taliban would cause retaliation in Pakistan's Punjabi heartlands, as most of the Afghan Taliban are Pashtun tribesmen (Brown, 2018). Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa and Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed claim that the Taliban and the TTP are 'two faces of the same coin' and warned that the country should prepare for blowback if the army cracks down on the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan (Radio Mashaal, 2021). However, Western figures such as former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan Chris Alexanders argue that insurgency in Afghanistan would not have lasted if the Taliban had not found support in Pakistan (Spears, 2012). From Pakistan's perspective, cracking down on the Afghan Taliban on behalf of the West, which could intensify TTP attacks on Pakistan, is not a risk that Islamabad is likely to take. Below is a map of the Durand Line, showing the large swathes of Pashtun land it cuts through:




Figure 3: The Durand Line and Pashtun Territory (Schons, 2022)

All of the above raises the question of whether or not Pakistan is a spoiler to peacebuilding in Afghanistan. It would be inaccurate to label Pakistan as a spoiler to peace just because it has never taken decisive measures against the Taliban in ways that the West wants to see, due to legitimate concerns for its own national security. Islamabad is in a difficult position of how to approach the Taliban in relation to their interactions with the West. Pakistan has a ‘love/hate relationship’ with the Taliban because on the one hand the Afghan Taliban is friendly towards Pakistan against India, but on the other hand the Taliban also collaborates closely with the TTP and conducts terrorist attacks against Pakistani civilians. The Afghan Taliban is simultaneously friendly to both of Pakistan’s biggest enemies, and this makes it very difficult for Islamabad to deal with. Pakistan’s willingness to lobby for wider recognition of the Taliban after its violent takeover, not just because the two share friendly relations, but more because of the geo-economic and geopolitical interests that Pakistan alone can no longer pay for the economic and humanitarian costs from an unstable Kabul (Ahmed, 2022).

The US can also be at fault for unrealistic expectations towards Islamabad. The US and its allies are prone to collaborate and aid any country that would become a partner to Washington’s global war on terror, even if this means ignoring human rights violations (Karlsrud, 2019). Pakistan has turned out to be one of these countries, as the US may not have considered the fact that Pashtun nationalism would eventually become the biggest

obstacle to getting Islamabad to fight the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Without addressing the insurgency problem, the Taliban can repeatedly undermine the US's nation-building effort and break the fragile liberal peace in Afghanistan while seeking haven in Pakistan. Awareness of local realities on the ground has never been a strong point in Washington's history of nation-building in Afghanistan. However, this attitude has slowly changed over the years as Washington has begun to adopt the 'moderate Taliban' approach that Pakistan has been advocating since the beginning of the war, much to Indian dismay.

For India, another major stakeholder in the South Asia region, Washington's 'moderate' approach is dangerous because looking for 'moderates' among Taliban fundamentalists is too difficult, fundamentalists cannot and should not be appeased, and the US policy of trying to do so shows little regard for democracy, human rights and women's rights (Mohanty & Mahanty, 2022). Then again, Washington aligning with warlords in Afghanistan, despite knowing that warlordism, democracy and human rights do not coexist, and trying to find the 'moderate' Taliban, only speaks to the irony that illiberal means are used to promote liberal values as existing power-holders are appeased but little is being done for emancipatory peace (Mac Ginty, 2006).

Washington has eventually realised that the peace process in Afghanistan is impossible without the support of Pakistan, and Pakistan too wants to support the US-Taliban peace deal, Washington could have promoted Pakistan as a bridge-builder due to its close relations with the Taliban, creating the potential for direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, backed by the US and Pakistan, respectively.

### **5.3: Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan**

#### *5.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Afghanistan*

It is important to find means to increase local ownership in Afghanistan, as it is a fragmented society where tribalism can be stronger than the central state, particularly further away from the capital. Hybrid peace advocates an additional bottom-up approach to supplement the existing efforts by the government and their international donors. The issue at hand for Afghanistan is finding the means to balance liberal norms from international expectations with local, potentially illiberal means of peacebuilding, as not all elements of culture and tradition can be deemed 'liberal' by Western standards.

Even if liberal peace has failed, liberal norms should not become irrelevant. Development, peacebuilding and state-building do not always succeed as planned, but even so, these decisions should be made as inclusively and democratically as possible

(Richmond, 2014). In fact, issues such as self-determination, local legitimacy and local ownership are widely accepted by international agencies like the UN, the IMF, and the WB, while these institutions still leave room for the indigenous to contribute to existing international political, legal, and economic architecture (Richmond, 2014).

The hybrid peace scenario in Afghanistan shows that instead of liberal elements and local tradition being combined, they operate in a contrasting fashion. This is mainly due to the Taliban starting to compete with the government in terms of governance, rather than fighting on the battlefield. The Taliban shadow government operates parallel to the Afghan government in Kabul.

### *5.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Afghanistan*

Often, in post-war societies, liberal and illiberal actors and elements balance each other on a thin line and neither side has full ownership of the peace process on the ground (Jarstad & Olsson, 2012). The problem is made more complex when intervention is involved as well, especially when it is the intervenor who draws the connection that ‘locally owned’ equates to state-owned even if the state is extremely weak, or outright failed (Jarstad & Olsson, 2012), as in the case of Afghanistan.

Hybridity is often the mixed usage of both formal and informal, as well as legal and illegal means to gain influence (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012). This stands true for both local and international actors, as we have already seen with the collaboration between the US army and local warlords to combat the Taliban. A critique of hybrid peace governance is that it may serve patriarchal, feudal, sexist, and violent political systems, especially when illiberal states (China) are involved with the process (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012). However, the international community appears fully aware of the potential dangers of locally owned peace processes creating illiberal or authoritarian outcomes, and for this reason, no robust forms of local ownership are allowed to flourish yet (Collins & Thiessen, 2020).

### *5.3.3 Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan*

#### State-building: The Loya Jirga

The Afghan peace process originally had considerable local ownership (except for the fact that the Taliban was outright excluded) and Karzai was locally elected leader by the collective will of the *jirga*. The overthrow of the Taliban effectively made Afghanistan a government-less state that needed a transitional period under an interim government until a permanent government could be elected. The Bonn Agreement decided to follow

tradition to hold the first Emergency *Loya Jirga* (ELJ) in 2002 and a second Constitutional *Loya Jirga* (CLJ) in late December 2003 to 2004, which gathered tribal elders around the nation and diasporas (Wardak & Hamidzada, 2012). Based on indirect and popular legitimacy, the ELJ elected Karzai as president to create the foundation of democracy and a reference for future leaders (Saikal, 2002). This was followed by the first constitution of Afghanistan, jointly created by the CLJ and the UN, whose outcomes were open to political debate (Rubin, 2004).

The ELJ that occurred before the official launch of ‘Accelerating Success’ suggests that both the EIL and CLJ were the closest Afghanistan moved towards a hybrid model where top-down international initiatives were met with bottom-up local initiatives and there was a good balance between international expectations of democracy and the rule of law and local Pashtun traditions with the *loya jirga*. The fact that the CLJ and Accelerating Success occurred simultaneously shows that liberal peace can coexist with local traditional models of conflict resolution and decision-making for hybrid models of governance where formal democratic practices are combined with informal ethnic and traditional rule (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012). There are, however, drawbacks to this coexistence when states try to prioritise stability in the process of promoting peace through liberal norms, causing them to work with illiberal actors, reinforce illiberal values, and engage with illiberal institutions (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012). The coexistence between the CLJ and Accelerating Success became less viable as time passed, and the US wanted to pursue its original objective to ‘root out terrorism’, causing Washington to work with Afghan militias rather than maintain democratic authority (Wardak & Hamidzada, 2012).

### Taliban’s Local Peace

The lack of interaction between the Taliban and the government in Kabul suggests that, at most, any prospect of peace created under the Taliban at the time of its resurgence is local peace rather than hybrid peace. It is questionable whether any liberal elements exist at all in the Taliban’s local peace. Being ousted from power in 2001 by the US invasion and excluded from the Bonn Agreement did not mean that the Taliban had given up on its resurgence to power. In fact, the opposite was true, as the Taliban’s shadow government has operated largely in parallel with the official government in Kabul, creating a form of local indigenous peace that is effective yet illiberal: most definitely a form of negative peace.

In Taliban-ruled provinces, shadow governors are appointed by the leadership *shura* that rotate annually, with some exceptions, while the Taliban also have a quasi-professional core of experts that serve in different provinces for different years (Jackson,

2018a). District governors are usually the first people whom locals approach for conflict resolution or smaller disputes, while village elders play an important role in acting on behalf of grassroots Afghans by connecting to Taliban officials (Jackson, 2018a). Village elders are the gatekeepers who maintain the connection between their community and the Taliban, while the Taliban act as a quasi-state that provides public goods such as security, health care, education and even justice. Even in government-controlled cities such as Kunduz, evidence has been found in the receipts for the Taliban's tax payments (Jackson, 2018a).

On providing justice, the Taliban's methods of conflict resolution are most effective in areas that are neglected by the government or international actors, even if coercion forces have been used to back up conflict resolution measures, as long as their judgements were fair (Giustozzi, 2012). While initially the Taliban was unable to provide much beyond dispute resolution, this has slowly been changing over the years so that a certain degree of education and health care is provided as well. Taliban judges are both feared and respected for their tough decisions on justice, while locals are often not too concerned about switching to the Taliban's curriculum for education if this means that attacks on schools would stop (Giustozzi, 2012).

Based on evidence on the ground, coercion through military might appears to be the main tool that the Taliban uses to maintain stability in its controlled areas. This is not surprising because it is still a military organisation at heart. Simultaneously, the Taliban's shadow government and its justice system still carry considerable momentum in rural areas, where it is quick, fair, and free of bribery (Johnson, 2013). This is in contrast to the Karzai government, which is becoming known for corruption and inefficiency, much to the joy of the Taliban as they distinguish themselves from Kabul. For example, official courts may take years and significant bribes to resolve disputes related to land and water, whereas the Taliban court can resolve such disputes in a few hours under Sharia law (Johnson, 2013).

Other than justice, the Taliban has also pushed for better health care access, in which it does not excessively interfere after local health *shuaras* have been set up. At times, the Afghan government is the target of discontent for being an obstacle to the delivery of health care due to corruption at the top (Jackson, 2018a). Taliban health care has been met with mixed opinions, as some argue that the Taliban merely want better health care for their fighters and not for civilians, while others claim that the group's push for better health is for a little of both (Jackson, 2018a).

Through the Taliban's shadow government, the group is no longer just a violent band of insurgents. It has definitely employed traditional means of conflict resolution and



gained the support of the local population, especially in rural areas that government support does not often reach. Of course, the same argument must address the extent to which the Taliban is here to create stability or sustainable peace, as many of the critical elements in liberal norms are missing from Taliban rule.

#### Local Approaches to Drug Problem

The previous sections have outlined that although the US has provided large amounts of economic aid to help with post-war development in Afghanistan, the country became excessively dependent and did not re-integrate back into the international financial system. To make matters worse, many farmers have returned to poppy cultivation, which was banned under the Taliban, and this has created instability around the country that very much resembles the conditions that propelled the Taliban to power in the past. Finding an alternative to poppy cultivation is the main agenda for the economic development of Afghanistan.

The problem with the liberal approach to the Afghan drug problem is Washington's refusal to become directly embroiled in the problem in the first place. Thus, this is another case of lacking political will. The US pursued a contradictory strategy of relying on warlords, who were already heavily involved in Afghanistan's drug economy, to root out the Taliban without providing a profitable alternative to drugs. The US allies such as the EU have also tried to tackle the problem of drugs. For example, in Nangahar, a southern province where Taliban influence is weak, the EU would supplement US efforts to support farmers in planting legal crops in exchange for development concessions such as roads and health care (Goodhand & Mansfield, 2010). However, development with strings attached and a widespread ban on poppy growth did not create sustainable peace, but only more sources of economic instability.

Alternatively, the Taliban had a local approach that had been successful in the past. The role of the village elders, known as Maliks, was critical to the success of banning poppy cultivation in Nangarhar, and the Taliban also relied on these people before they were overthrown in 2001 (Mansfield, 2005). Maliks would tell the people that the government would no longer tolerate poppy cultivation, and Maliks themselves who refused to cultivate poppies would set an example to others that opium farmers were risking their crops being destroyed in poorer or politically neglected provinces (Mansfield, 2008).

#### Economic Development: Aid from Non-Western Actors

Over the years of recovery, many non-Western actors have tried to provide aid to

Afghanistan. Although not as engaged politically compared to the West, Asian countries like India, Japan, and later China have all attempted to contribute to Afghanistan's post-war recovery efforts through various forms of economic and social aid. Asian countries provide an important source of foreign aid without political strings attached, injecting a strong impetus to local ownership in terms of economic and social development.

Local major power and Pakistan's rival India has put considerable effort into foreign aid towards Afghanistan, perhaps much to Pakistan's dismay. As a non-Western emerging donor, New Delhi is not bound by narratives of liberal peace, even if India itself is a democracy. Much like China, India does not consider itself as a donor, but as a development partner, which does not interfere in a country's internal affairs, but expresses interest in partnerships and learning from each other (Sinha, 2017). Despite this official narrative, India is a key player in South Asia that tends to intervene in neighbouring conflicts, such as in Sri Lanka during its civil war, and of course, in Afghanistan as well.

Being an actor undiscouraged by insecurity, New Delhi provides local Afghan communities with crucial infrastructure, and it is successful in the WHAM of local residents. The Salma Dam in the Herat province is a project that benefits locals greatly: it irrigates nearly 10,000 acres and provides water to 40,000 families, which is extremely important for local Afghans, the majority of whom are farmers, while also contributing to drinking water and public hygiene (Javaid, 2021). The dam was later renamed the Afghan-India Friendship Dam in recognition of its popularity.

Indian aid does not end at the local grassroots level, as there is also considerable cooperation between the governments as a top-down mechanism. A recent example of this is the new parliament building gifted by India to the Afghan government under Ashraf Ghani. Indian PM Narendra Modi inaugurated Afghanistan's new parliament and it was situated between historic landmarks such as the King's Palace Darul Aman and the Queen's Palace, both destroyed by war, as a means to show New Delhi's position on Afghanistan and Modi's desire to present India as a major stakeholder in the region (Sharma & Chaudhury, 2015).

Another Asian actor that has provided aid to a local source was Japan. Japan's advantage over India in Afghanistan is that it does not agitate Pakistan with its presence. Like India, although Japan is a democracy and ideologically aligns with the West, it is also an Asian country that emphasises the importance of infrastructure construction, economic development, and non-intervention. To this point, Japan's aid comes from its own experiences in adopting and fusing Western systems with domestic systems and using itself as a successful example of exploiting intervention for its own advantage and prosperity (Uesugi & Deekeling, 2020).

Japanese aid to Afghanistan has been almost entirely non-military in nature, focused on the reconstruction of infrastructure and agricultural development (Ashizawa, 2014). Japan's community-focused approach to reconstruction also contrasts with US and European assistance, as 70% of American aid was focused on security-related programmes and only an insignificant portion (3%) was focused on governance. Europe was more balanced, with 45% of aid being focused on governance and rule-of-law-related projects and another 35%–40% on rural development projects (Ashizawa, 2014). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015), Japan has completed a total of 700 km in length of roads, including the Kabul-Jalalabad section of the ring road bound for Pakistan through the Asian Development Bank, as well as the terminal of Kabul International Airport, for which former President Karzai has expressed his gratitude. Other than roads, Japan also paid considerable attention to developing the agriculture sector, undertaken mainly by JICA, such as rice farming in Nangarhar, wheat breeding suitable for local environments, strengthening irrigation and productivity by collaborating with the FAO, as well as water management capacity building with *mirabs* (community-level water managers) (Ashizawa, 2014).

In addition to infrastructure, Japan is known to practice disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan. Japan was the most active player in Afghanistan's DDR process and shortly after the war it disarmed 63,380 ex-combatants by 2006. Its success comes from using skilled and highly motivated personnel for the job and smooth reintegration of ex-combatants back into society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2006). Ashizawa (2006) referred to Japan's DDR as a niche in security improvement through initiatives such as Tokyo's decision to pay the salaries of the Afghan National Police for 6 months a year as well as Japan's strong coordination to lead DDR along with the UN, which set up the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme for disarmament of former anti-Taliban militias.

#### *5.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid and Local Peace in Afghanistan*

##### State-building: The *Loya Jirga*

While it had initial signs of hybridity, the Bonn Agreement itself was heavily undermined by Washington's war on terror, in which the US and NATO wanted to maintain ties with local warlords, who provided intelligence to the West, and guarantee security to their military forces. As a result, any of President Karzai's requests to improve governance could not be implemented because he was concerned about antagonising or straining ties with local strongmen such as warlords (Vendrell, 2012).

There was also considerable disagreement between Washington and its NATO allies, as the US wanted to single out terrorists in Afghanistan. This effectively became spoilers against the Afghan government, which the US was supposed to back, as Washington worked to prevent the establishment of a strong peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan beyond the lightly armed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The US opposed the expansion of the ISAF beyond Kabul, as it wanted the US-led Enduring Freedom Coalition to be able to roam freely around the country, and this attitude also denied the opportunity for European countries to contribute to the ISAF at a time when Europe was keen to participate in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (Vendrell, 2012). There might have been a signalling effect on warlords and the general population in Afghanistan if peacekeeping presence was expanded in the country, but the US Central Intelligence Agency kept funding local warlords to act as proxies against the Taliban, which, as a result, reinvigorated the problematic drug economy (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010).

Concerning the Taliban, their exclusion from the Bonn Agreement – in other words, from Afghanistan’s state-building – caused resentment and renewed determination to overthrow the US ‘puppet’ government in Kabul as part of the expulsion of intervenors. After being ousted in 2001, the Taliban continues to regard themselves as the legitimate government of Afghanistan: they argue that they have been overthrown by the US where foreign forces continue to occupy the country, whereas the government in Kabul is a mere puppet regime with no real power (Khan, 2019).

Not being given a chance as stakeholders at the Bonn Agreement in 2001 probably caused this resentment. Therefore, in some ways, the moment when the Taliban was excluded from the Bonn Agreement paved the way for the relapse of conflict along with the resurgence of Taliban around the country. In fact, the Taliban refuses to even talk to the government in Kabul, which has been a major sticking point against peace talks for many years, as the Taliban is only interested in talking to Washington about US withdrawal, even if Kabul has expressed that it will review the constitution to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate political party (Khan, 2019).

During the time when the Taliban was ousted by the US, there was considerable change within the organisation, such that it appears that the Taliban too was embarking on a campaign to WHAM local populations. On the one hand, it continued to cause terror amongst the local population by means such as attacking schools around the country. A report by shows that between 2006 and 2008, there were 1,153 attacks on education facilities in Afghanistan in which students, teachers and other staff were killed; between January and June 2009 123 schools were targeted by insurgents; and the Taliban

specifically attacked 26 schools on election day in August 2009 (UNESCO, 2010). However, the group is also trying to change from its widely unpopular warrior *mullah* image, which terrorised the population until 2001, to a more benevolent one that has the capacity to function as a legitimate government of Afghanistan.

While this change of attitude began as early as 2003, it was most clear after 2014, when large numbers of foreign troops (seen by the Taliban as occupying forces) were withdrawn from Afghanistan. The succession of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as leader in 2015 fundamentally transformed the Taliban from a group of insurgents into a semi-legitimate shadow state that is contesting the role of Kabul in rural areas, in which the Taliban wants to show that it can provide everything the government can, and better (Jackson, 2018b). A personal interview with an anonymous expert reveals that the Taliban has changed considerably over the years, and is much more benevolent towards other ethnic groups, trying to accommodate their demands as well.

#### Taliban Local Peace

As benevolent as the Taliban may have become, there are still many problems with life under them. Firstly, while the Taliban and its shadow courts definitely employ traditional means of conflict resolution, this type of local peace does not escape the scope of illiberal peace, especially when legitimacy is often maintained through fear and coercion. Even with the change of attitude and recognising the importance of political power, Western analysts agree that there have not been signs that the Taliban is any more or less conservative than it was in the past, and has merely changed its tactics, but not its ideology (Parliament UK, 2020).

This leads to the second point – that traditional methods such as Sharia law or the *jirga* are not known to respect women's rights by the standards of the West, as women and girls are heavily oppressed under the Taliban by Western perspectives, even if their rights are protected under Islamic law or Pashtun ways. This once again puts international society at odds with local indigenous forms of peace, and there does not appear to be a compromise on this point. An example of this lack of compromise is the US freezing Afghan assets after the Taliban's violent takeover in 2021, which shows that at least the US is unconvinced that the Taliban has changed much since 2001. Although the Taliban wanted to show the international community that their new government is inclusive by including non-Pashtun representatives such as Hazara, Uzbek and Tajik into the cabinet, still no women are seen in the government. International groups claim that the Taliban only pretends to respect women's rights, while in reality, they are still under a regime of repression, which leaves many women who had previously enjoyed a different lifestyle

during the time when the Taliban was ousted fearful for their futures (Khan, 2021).

Thirdly, a Taliban government that behaves in such a way is unlikely to gain widespread recognition from the West, or even worse, will lead Afghanistan into conflict against the West, pushing it towards alternatives like China and Russia that have a different understanding of human rights. The current US-imposed sanctions and asset freezes on Afghanistan are creating a humanitarian crisis: the UNDP (2021) claims that 97% of Afghans are living in poverty. Although the Taliban is no longer on the US list of foreign terror groups, international actors and the UN have called on the Taliban to uphold its promises on issues such as women's rights and act responsibly to save the country from crisis (UNSC, 2022). Even without the terrorist label, Washington and the Taliban are still at odds, making it difficult for ordinary Afghans to enjoy stability. In this sense, both the US, which froze over \$9 billion of Afghan assets, and the Taliban, which has been reversing positive signs of development in Afghanistan, are spoilers to peace and stability.

The reliance on local power structures for the bottom-up initiative in Afghanistan has not produced sustainable peace. This type of illiberal local peace is also related to what Richmond and Mac Ginty (2010) call 'negative hybrid peace', which rests too much on localised power structures (*jirgas, shuras*) and hierarchies (Maliks), as opposed to positive hybrid peace, which is empathetic and emancipatory, constructed by the subaltern instead of international actors or local elites. Based on the Taliban's harsh, or even brutal enforcement of Sharia Law, it is highly unlikely that the new Taliban government will be able to create positive sustainable peace, and especially not for women.

The Taliban is still a military organisation at heart, and is most familiar with imposing its rule through fear and threats. Even if it has been more benevolent over the years, such as being more inclusive of other ethnic groups, the exclusion of women from the workforce and decision-making, thus neglecting half the population of the country, cannot be called positive peace. Additionally, there are still many problems in Afghanistan, such as chronic poverty, lack of infrastructure, and drug proliferation, that remain unresolved.

#### Economic Development: Aid from Non-Western Actors

Developmental aid provided by non-Western actors has the potential to create sustainable peace from economic development. The local turn employed by India has correctly pinpointed what grassroots need the most through the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, as well as maintaining good top-down relations with the standing government. As the intervenor, India did not attach political strings to its economic aid, but merely sought a

positive relationship with Kabul to deter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. However, the geopolitical confrontation with Pakistan in itself is a problem, especially if Afghanistan is to be used as a staging ground for Indo-Pak competition.

No intervenor is truly altruistic, as they all expect to gain some benefits from becoming stakeholders in Afghanistan. Aiming for political or economic benefits in Afghanistan is only to be expected. However, the nature of competition between India and Pakistan is particularly damaging to sustainable peace in Afghanistan in spite of positive economic development. New Delhi's support of the Afghan government is a source of particular dismay in Pakistan, mainly because Islamabad is friendly towards the Taliban, putting India at odds against the Taliban. Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen said that although Taliban hardliners are only opposed to Indian aid towards the Afghan 'puppet' government and urged India to complete its current projects that benefited the people, and as for the Parliament building, it may be used for people or Islamic *shura* (News18, 2021). Even before the Taliban resurgence, Pakistan tried to limit India's role in Afghanistan, where Indian workers were kidnapped or killed by the Taliban insurgency, as well as the suicide attack in 2008 on the Indian Embassy in Kabul that killed four Indians and over 50 Afghans (Sood, 2021).

Meanwhile, Japanese DDR efforts are also absolutely not perfect. Japan struggled to achieve the 'R' aspect, as many militants found it difficult to return to society, while the waning political interest in Afghanistan among politicians in Tokyo made continued Japanese aid to Afghanistan difficult (Ashizawa, 2006). Japanese aid is also highly dependent on a secure environment due to the limits of Japanese 'hard power'. In cases like Afghanistan, riddled with warlordism and drug issues, Japan has to find ways to protect its own interests when conducting economic and social aid programmes (Tanaka, 2011).

Furthermore, like India, Japan has also provided a considerable 'people-centred' approach for locals, as it collaborates with the government for an effective hybrid approach in which top-down meets bottom-up. However, with the Taliban takeover, Japan has hesitated as to whether or not to continue its engagement with Afghanistan. Some experts argue that international assistance towards Afghanistan is people-oriented and should continue whether or not the Taliban is recognised as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (Miyahara, 2021). Both Japan and India must reconsider their relationship with the Taliban and decide whether to continue humanitarian aid in the form of economic and social development or disengage from the illiberal governance employed by the Taliban, as most of the West has done. However, such disengagement would lead to opportunity for further illiberal elements from countries like China to be at the helm of

Afghanistan's peace process.

## **5.4: Developmental Peace in Afghanistan**

### *5.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan*

Developmental peace, like any other cases, assumes that economic development is the solution to Afghanistan's problems, and that these problems are rooted in poverty and underdevelopment. Economically, China's interest in Afghanistan rests on the fact that Afghanistan is mineral-rich, and China welcomes more resources to feed its growing economy. Politically, and perhaps more importantly, there is a security interest to crack down on a shadowy group of insurgents known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) operating in Afghanistan (and Syria). It also serves as a means for maintaining internal stability within China.

China's interest in Afghanistan should be seen as a pragmatic move because China has no other choice but to cooperate. Beijing's positive attitude towards the Taliban during its resurgence in 2021 came as a surprise to people, especially since Beijing has constantly emphasised the threat of Islamic extremism, their role in attacks on the Han Chinese in Xinjiang, and their alleged relations with the Taliban. By 2021, the Chinese public widely associated Afghanistan with militarism, terrorism, and Islamism (Lau, 2021). The objective of developmental peace is not to let Afghan girls go to school or establish any democratic system of governance under a liberal peace agenda, but China has narrowly defined goals of security and economic interests (Chaguan, 2021). Chinese scholars claim that China and Afghanistan have always been friendly neighbours, linked by rivers and mountains since ancient times; economic and trade cooperation are gestures of friendly relations, and a stable Afghanistan is important in preventing ETIM from recruiting new fighters with which to attack China (Wang, 2022). In either case, there is a consensus that security is an important element that compels China to become a stakeholder in Afghanistan, and Beijing addresses it through economic development.

### *5.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan*

As we have already seen above, poverty and underdevelopment are major inhibitors to peace and stability, especially the fact that conflict and instability are fuelled by the drug issue around the country that remains unaddressed by the West. The question here is whether China has any alternative methods, whether by BRI or China's strong infrastructure construction ability, to resolve some of the contingent problems that plague post-war Afghanistan.



In theory, putting all the problems in Afghanistan under the banner of underdevelopment is unlikely to lead to sustainable peace, if any peace at all. As an advocate of state sovereignty, one would not expect China to have any incentives or implications for state-building, as the West has been struggling to do so. Interestingly, developmental peace advocates a strong state, whereas this does not exist in a fragmented society like Afghanistan. If anything, China is more likely to work with the Taliban and strengthen illiberal means of governance to keep the shell of a state functioning. Instability is to be addressed by economic development, but development is limited by the amount of security and China's interest in sustaining it, causing a negative cycle of having to rely on Taliban coercion to maintain stability. Whether this theory is true or not is to be tested in the following section.

#### *5.4.3 Practice of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan*

##### Economic Development

China is still one of the largest sources of foreign direct investment in Afghanistan. Beijing invested a total of \$400 million by 2017, as bilateral trade between the two reached \$690 million in 2018, seeing a 27% increase from the previous year (Liu, 2019). China mainly exports manufactured goods such as electronics, transportation, machinery, and textiles, and imports agricultural goods from Afghanistan (Zhang, 2018). Although instability has often weakened trade between the two, the Chinese remain positive that a stable Afghanistan can become an 'economic silk road' that links East, South, and Central Asia with the Middle East and Europe (Zhang, 2018). After the US withdrawal of troops in 2021, China pledged a further \$31 million in humanitarian aid in the form of food and COVID-19 vaccines, but also upheld its criticisms of the US for 'wreaking havoc' in Afghanistan (BBC, 2021b).

Simply providing humanitarian aid does not necessarily mean that China is keen to take a proactive role in Afghanistan until stability is restored. Although Beijing wants to appease the new Taliban government for future economic cooperation, it is still very worried about the fragile security situation in Afghanistan, and any further cooperation must come in the context that the Taliban proves that it is capable of protecting Chinese nationals and properties in Afghanistan.

The biggest inhibitor to economic development in Afghanistan is the lack of basic infrastructure such as roads and railways to transport Afghan commodities such as minerals to the country's landlocked borders. This means that before mining minerals or drilling for oil, China must begin its investments in Afghanistan with roads. A recent

report by state media the Global Times claims that the most pressing concern at the moment is to restore broken roads and repair damaged infrastructure that is causing widespread power shortages across the country (GT Staff Reporters, 2021). Other than the usual attack on America for its inability to induce positive change during its occupation, the Global Times has also expressed China's interest in promoting connectivity in Afghanistan through CPEC with existing projects such as the Peshawar-to-Karachi Motorway (GT Staff Reporters, 2021). Since the Chinese state media are often geared towards the negative aspects of America's occupation of Afghanistan, no mention is made of the fact that most of the roads in Afghanistan today were built as a means of WHAM of local Afghans (The Economist, 2021). That being said, roads have been a source of local dissatisfaction, as uprisings against the government and foreigners have happened in the past due to their preference to focus only on city centres (The Economist, 2021).

If China is to invest in Afghanistan, then it cannot avoid the duty of road construction, at which Chinese companies excel. The Taliban has also expressed interest in road construction around the country, but they do not have the necessary funds to undertake such large-scale projects (The Economist, 2021). The question here is, how can Beijing avoid criticism of Western-built roads that only connect city centres? Based on the route diversion problem seen with CPEC, it is much more likely that China will focus on maintaining and extending existing roads that connect large cities. This does not mean that China has no intentions to connect the rest of the country, but rather that the rural villages will have to remain disconnected, at least in the short term, as the city centres get priority.

Alternatively, the prospect of physically connecting China to Afghanistan has also been considered through the Wakhjir Pass, the sole navigable 76 km border between the two countries. There are considerable difficulties in developing the Wakhjir Pass due to feasibility and security concerns. No permanent roads exist between China and Afghanistan as yet due to the high altitude and harsh winters of the Wakhjir Pass, which prevent the building of infrastructure in the area (Ellis, 2021). Instead, linking Afghanistan to Pakistan is much more feasible through the existing road between Kabul and Peshawar, with Pakistan already linked to China through CEPC (Ellis, 2021). Linking China and Afghanistan would be a great boost to the landlocked Afghan economy – a problem that prevents China from pursuing greater connectivity with its neighbour. The problem with permanently connecting China with Afghanistan is that it may allow the proliferation of separatism and drugs across the border, as well as 'foreign forces' that may try to destabilise China, according to the Chinese perspective (Wangyi, 2021).

That being said, since 2017 there have been signs from Beijing of wanting to develop the Wakhjir Pass. Western analysts believe that this may benefit both China and Afghanistan economically, but it also destabilises the overall geopolitics in Central Asia, especially if China decides to expand its military footprint through roads under the name of ‘counterterrorism’, intensify its crackdown against Xinjiang dissidents in other countries, meet up with Russia in Central Asia, and shore up regional rivalry with India by pulling Afghanistan closer to Beijing (Foster, 2019).

In terms of specific projects led by China in Afghanistan, the Mes Aynak copper mines and Amu Darya oil project are the first to come to mind. In 2008, Chinese corporations won a \$3 billion contract to develop the Mes Aynak copper mine, and another company won the right to develop oil fields in Amu Darya. The problem is that neither of these contracts has received significant attention and development from Beijing over the course of the decade (Sacks, 2021). While there are no signs to suggest that the Taliban want to discontinue these projects, as they have publicly offered to safeguard all national developmental projects (Al Jazeera, 2016), the passive stance that China displayed towards the development of Afghanistan casts some serious doubt on the degree of commitment that Beijing is willing to make.

The Mes Aynak copper mine contract was won in 2008 by the Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Company Limited, two Chinese SOEs, to jointly develop the area under a consortium called the MCC-JCL Aynak Minerals. However, after more than a decade, no significant development has taken place in Mes Aynak, leaving analysts to look for reasons why China has not begun construction despite promises to undertake development. From a security perspective, it may be reasonable to blame instability for the reluctance of Chinese companies to begin construction. However, security around Mes Aynak has been comparatively better than in other parts of the country, where only two major attacks have happened in the area over nine years, and neither of them suggests that insurgents were deliberately targeting the Mes Aynak camps before 2017 (Amin, 2017). The region was hit by insecurity when intensified fighting broke out between the Taliban and Afghan security forces at the end of the Ghani administration and eight security force members were killed at a checkpoint near Mes Aynak in 2020 (Reuters, 2020). Another speculation about the delay was that it was about protecting a Buddhist archaeological site that could be demolished if the project were to start, but it was later revealed that almost all ancient relics had been moved to a safer location and that the archaeological site only occupies 1.5% of the total mining site, suggesting that this is not a reason to halt the development of the mine (Reuters, 2020).

In reality, the lack of development can be traced back to contract difficulties, as

the Chinese SOEs no longer want to abide by the original contract because the situation has changed considerably over the years. Factors such as falling copper prices, China's slowing economy and deterioration of the security in Afghanistan all contribute to China wanting to renegotiate the contract terms in Mes Aynak signed in 2007, which include facilities such as a railway, a coal-fired power plant, and a 19.5% royalty payment to Kabul (O'Donnell, 2014). One important factor to remember is the motive for China's peacebuilding, in that developmental peace serves to protect the BRI by bringing in important resources such as coal, oil and food without relying on passing through the Malacca Strait. Copper is not one of these vital resources for China, resulting in considerable lowering of Chinese interest in sustaining the development at Mes Aynak.

The Taliban, however, has expressed an interest in China continuing its development of the Mes Aynak copper mines despite some reluctance from Beijing. Shortly after seizing Kabul, the Taliban appointed Minister of Mining and Petroleum Shahabuddin Dilawar and urged re-engagement with the Chinese. Ziad Rashidi, the ministry's director of foreign affairs, wanted China to return to the terms signed in 2008 but allowed them to negotiate on slashing the 19.5% royalty (Kullab, 2022). Rashidi saw the lack of international competitors as a strong incentive for China to resume the development of the Mes Aynak mines (Kullab, 2022). However a MCC official blames the Taliban for preventing progress in Mes Aynak in the first place, when it sabotaged roads in its fight against government and NATO forces (Kullab, 2022), showing the uneasy relationship between the two regarding security around the project site.

The other major project that China signed with the previous government is to develop the oil and gas fields along the Amu Darya River, located in north Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 2012, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) gained development rights in Afghanistan's Amu Darya basin, where the government would obtain 70% of the profit from this project. However, the progress of development has not been ideal due to security concerns, government corruption, and in the Mes Aynak case, local resistance (Sun, 2021). Unlike Mes Aynak, however, China appears to have no intention of continuing operations in Amu Darya due to security concerns after the Taliban takeover.

In fact, security and viability concerns have always been a problem with the Amu Darya project for China since its time of acquisition. Chinese analysts claim that although Afghanistan may not have the most oil reserves, China should use this opportunity to gain an advantage in the local politics of Afghanistan, since taming Afghanistan has great implications for China's energy security towards the Middle East (He, 2012). To do so, China must be aware of the fact that local villages around the Amu Darya basin have their

own systems of governance, as well as local warlords beyond the influence of the central government in Kabul (He, 2012). In other words, in addition to permission from Kabul, companies must acquire concessions from locals to develop their land, paying particular attention to the role of village elders as mediators in case anyone gets kidnapped (He, 2012).

Based on this, one can say that at least on the academic level, there is an understanding of the local situation of Afghanistan and recognition of the importance for the government or SOEs to respect the local traditions and be aware that Afghanistan is a fragmented society where central authority does not usually penetrate rural areas. In fact, development in the Amu Darya basin was a lot smoother than in the Mes Aynak copper mines in its early stages. In 2013, the Chinese in Amu Darya expressed confidence that North Afghanistan could be connected to existing Chinese pipelines in Central Asia and that Chinese investments were already attracting other investments, such as an American chemical company and Afghan diasporas, which planned to build refineries with CNPC (Petersen, 2013). This optimism did not last long, however, as Chinese workers were shortly attacked by Uzbek warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum and CNPC did not acknowledge that this would become a problem that would delay the entire project (Dotani, 2013). Forwarding to the Taliban takeover in 2021, CNPC is determined to pull out of Afghanistan, unlike the MCC, which still intends to stay in Mes Aynak. CNPC sees the Afghanistan investment as a failure, and it was also not a big investment to begin with (Reuters, 2021c).

### Drug Issue

The drug issue is a contingent problem in Afghanistan and a major inhibitor to peace and stability. Since China's developmental peace is inclined to resolve economic problems, such as potentially providing profitable alternatives to poppy cultivation, one would have to question whether China can help Afghanistan tackle its drug problem.

Historically, the CCP does not take lightly the use of drugs, and especially not opium. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, opium trade from the British Empire corroded the economic and social relations of Chinese society at every level, earning the Qing Dynasty the nickname the 'sick man of Asia' (Hevia, 2003). The failure of the Qing court to prevent the proliferation of opium across the country and the defeat of the Qing army at the hands of the British Empire created a series of downfalls for the once *de facto* 'hegemony' of Asia. Chinese nationalists would later use the First Opium War in 1839 to mark the beginning of the 'century of humiliation' (Gries, 2005), which CCP leaders may still refer to today. Under the CCP, drug addiction has become a political problem, which

the Party has mobilised throughout the entire country, as China has been mostly successful in replacing poppy fields with alternatives (Lowinger, 2009). Against this backdrop, it is in Beijing's interest to support the Taliban's ban on opium and provide alternatives to locals, mainly due to the fear of illicit drug spillovers from the border. Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2021) took the Taliban's vow to eliminate drugs as a positive sign and expressed that China should help Afghan farmers to find alternatives to eliminate drugs together in the region.

One specific product that China may promote in Afghanistan as an alternative to opium is cotton. China hosted the Third Foreign Ministers' Meeting Amongst the Neighbouring Countries of Afghanistan in 2022 and expressed its desire to deepen cooperation between China and Afghanistan under the framework of the BRI (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2022). During the conference, there were particular mentions of supporting the plantation of cotton, chili peppers and sunflower seeds that China wishes to import, for which China is willing to provide Afghanistan with the necessary seeds, fertilisers and agriculture machinery (*Dangdai nengyuan*, 2022). China's support of the cotton industry abroad may be a move to lessen its burden by diversifying its increasingly controversial domestic cotton industry in Xinjiang. Xinjiang produces 85% of China's cotton, but it has recently faced allegations of using forced labour of detained Uighurs, and many foreign companies have banned importing cotton cultivated in Xinjiang (Dou, 2021). The CCP has put great effort into trying to convince the world through propaganda in the state media and popular culture that Xinjiang cotton is not cultivated by forced labour, while international companies such as H&M, Nike and Uniqlo remain unconvinced (Business & Human Rights Resources Centre, 2021). China has increased its push for cotton in Central Asia, providing expertise and technology acquired from Xinjiang, according to state media (Zhao, 2021).

China can also invest more in Afghan agriculture, which can also serve as a remedy to the food security problem at home. Between 2013 and 2021, China invested a total of \$7.45 billion in the agriculture sector of its BRI partners, and a total of \$74.4 billion total around the world (China Global Investment Tracker, 2022). China has invested considerably in Pakistan's agriculture sector under CPEC and in Kazakhstan, which is regarded as 'ground zero' for China's agriculture ambitions abroad (GRAIN, 2019). State media also claim that China is looking for the opportunities to provide expertise for Afghanistan and help with irrigation, seed development, pest control, and personnel training, as well as fruit tree grafting and provision of agriculture machinery (Yin, 2021).

As the West retreats, China and other regional actors can collaborate with each

other to fill in the vacuum, especially regarding development. In fact, China has been calling for a multilateral approach between Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, and the US to jointly engage the Taliban (Zhou, 2022). Even without directly recognising the Taliban, China has resumed the import of pine nuts, which is a major source of income for Afghan farmers (Zhou, 2022).

### Addressing Security Concerns

Security has never been a strong suit of Afghanistan, and for any economic development to happen, basic security must be first secured. Chinese scholars have a consensus that terrorism and warlordism are the biggest obstacles for investors trying to enter Afghanistan (Fu, 2019; He, 2017; Liu, 2019). Contrary to Beijing's narrative of non-intervention, China is actually interested in intervening in Afghanistan, at least for security concerns. Whether or not this contributes to sustainable peace is a different question; however, it does serve China's effort to maintain internal stability at home.

Focussing on Afghan security serves a dual purpose for Beijing. On the one hand, and more obviously, it serves to protect Chinese interests in the country, and on the other hand, it is a means to prevent terrorism under the 'three evils', such as those from the Islamic State from entering China through Afghanistan (Liu, 2019). Therefore, showing support to the Taliban was an unusual but not illogical move by Beijing. China's reengagement with the Taliban also started at roughly the time of the US-Taliban talks in 2018, when Chinese officials hosted the Taliban in China for a secret meeting (Bokhari et al., 2018). This is a significant change from China's original role as a mediator between the US and the Taliban into a stakeholder directly negotiating for peace (Bokhari et al., 2018). Subsequently, China continues to welcome Taliban officials and host meetings with them in China, urging peace talks, and foreign minister Wang Yi has criticised NATO's hasty withdrawal and called the Taliban a significant military and political power (State Council of People's Republic of China, 2021).

Despite riding on the opportunity of US-Taliban talks, China likes to blame the US for the proliferation of terrorism in Afghanistan. For example, Trump's America First policy resulted in a hasty withdrawal of Western forces, leaving the issue of terrorism unattended such that China must face challenges posed by ETIM together regional partners like Pakistan, Iran, and Russia (Fu, 2017). More recently, China's UN ambassador Zhang Jun (2022) criticised that foreign models and democracy failed to win the hearts and minds of people and demanded that the 'countries concerned' reflect on their mistakes. This critical attitude is important considering the GSI, elaborated in Chapter 2, and the concept of 'indivisible security' in which China presents the West

(mainly the US) as the source of instability and China as the solution. The Afghanistan case is useful in disputing this claim.

From a security perspective, China is most concerned about the alleged existence of the ETIM in Afghanistan. As the US began to wage its war on terror after the attacks on 9/11, China also waged its own version of the war on terror against the ETIM. According to Beijing, the ETIM is a separatist group that has allegedly been receiving funds and training from al-Qaeda to establish an independent state of East Turkestan (Chung, 2002). Chinese state media claim that the ETIM has a symbiotic relationship with Bin Laden's al-Qaeda, their fighters are supported by Bin Laden and the Taliban, they receive funding and training in Afghanistan, and *jihadists* return to China in Xinjiang as terrorists (Sina, 2003). The ETIM was designated as an international terrorist group by the UN in 2002, as well as by the US in the same year. However, Washington has recently removed this group from its list of terrorists, stating that there is no credible evidence for its existence, and blames China for using the ETIM to justify 20 years of 'state terror' against Uighurs (AFP, 2020). There is a history of separatist attacks in China, such as when 31 passengers were stabbed to death in 2014 at a railway station in Kunming (AFP, 2020); however, there is no evidence to indicate that these incidents are part of an organised separatist group like the ETIM. Much to China's dismay, Beijing accused Washington of double standards and claims that such action would only embolden the ETIM to conduct attacks on China (Zhen, 2020).

Peace and security can be created indirectly through incentivizing the Taliban to act against alleged terrorist groups within their borders. To prevent the spillover of violent extremism across the Chinese border, Beijing expects the Taliban to crack down on potential ETIM fighters residing in Afghanistan. There has been some evidence that a Uighur armed group has been relocated from Badakhshan, near the border with China, to Baghlan and Takhar province in central Afghanistan, for the ease of monitoring these groups, which shows that the Taliban is complying to a certain extent; however, no evidence suggests that any members have been extradited or handed over to Beijing (Murtazashvili, 2022). Until Afghanistan demonstrates that it is a reliable partner to China, by supporting Beijing's narratives that the ETIM are terrorists, handing over alleged fighters and demonstrating the Taliban's ability to control domestic violence, there will be no serious economic commitments by China (Murtazashvili, 2022). Peace and stability can be created as long as the Taliban can control all elements of violence within its borders, but this is proven to be difficult considering the ongoing struggle against the Islamic State – Khorasan (IS-K).



### Collaboration with Pakistan

In contrast to the US's difficulties in working with to address the Afghanistan issue, China works very well with Pakistan, and this positive relationship can be seen with both the civilian government and the Pakistani army, which are deemed to have competing interests with the government. Due to the difficulty and reluctance of establishing a direct path between China and Afghanistan, any prospect of Afghanistan joining the BRI would have to be through Pakistan. To this point, Pakistan, and especially the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of its military, is a gatekeeper to sustainable peace in Afghanistan, and the US has struggled to transform Pakistan from a gatekeeper to a bridge-builder that will allow greater access to Afghanistan without Pakistan playing spoiler and destabilising the process.

Despite the perceived friendship between China and Pakistan, Afghanistan is actually one of the few issues on which the two cannot come to a consensus. This is because, while Pakistan views the Taliban as an ally, China for a long time saw the Taliban and the Haqqani Network as terrorist organisations. Nonetheless, China-Pak relations have never been strained over disagreements on the Afghanistan issue. There is a compromise between the two where China does not question Pakistan's support of the Taliban, while Pakistan ensures that any support given does not upset the Chinese (Ali, 2020). Interestingly, despite the constant criticism of foreign troops undermining Afghan peace, China has not mentioned much about Pakistan's role in empowering the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, which is the reason why NATO troops had to stay in Afghanistan in the first place (Singh, 2010). That being said, China was one of the largest beneficiaries of stability since the US maintained its presence in Afghanistan, as seen in UN ambassador Zhang Jun's (2021) warning that security will deteriorate, peace talks will be reversed, and humanitarian and economic conditions are worsening day by day after withdrawal. Following the US withdrawal, China should find partners to address the Afghan issue, but there is no other Asian actor better than China regarding working together with Pakistan.

Pakistan is an asset for China due to its willingness to share experiences and deep understanding of the Afghan issue (Ali, 2020). At the moment, this experience is shared mainly with China, but Pakistan worked extensively with the US in the 1980s and in 2001, for which Islamabad was rewarded with military and economic assistance, such as the \$33 billion in aid given after 9/11 (Rizvi, 2020). China and Pakistan both have significant leverages over Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban in the case of Pakistan. In a personal interview, an anonymous expert on Afghanistan (2022) claimed that China's biggest advantage is that it does not have a colonial hangover in Afghanistan. Beijing has only interacted with Afghans through trade, and supported the Mujahedeen indirectly through

the US or Pakistani proxies, rather than the direct support from the former two (Dodge & Redman, 2011). China also kept the lowest profile amongst major powers when the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 (Zhao, 2013).

China also did not advocate Western-style liberal peace, advocated the ‘Afghan-led, Afghan-owned’ principle, and highlighted the importance of bringing the Taliban back to the political mainstream (Wang, 2021). It also did not condemn the Karzai government for corruption, cronyism, and electoral fraud (Zhao, 2013). This type of Chinese neutrality is credible in the eyes of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as shown when Maulana Sami ul Haq, a Pakistani cleric regarded as the Father of the Taliban, wanted China to stay, take a larger role in the region, and not leave the US alone there (Ali, 2020).

Pakistan’s influence not only comes from its role of providing Afghanistan with access to sea routes, but also its ability to enable Afghanistan’s entry into the CPEC, giving a much-needed boost to its impoverished economy. After the Taliban takeover, Pakistan initiated talks with its Afghan counterparts to extend CPEC for greater connectivity between South Asia and Central Asia (Greenfield, 2021). Afghanistan also reached a historical achievement when its first ever shipment of fertilisers arrived at Gwadar in 2020, and this was also the first time the Gwadar port was used by the Afghan government, which may open future jobs and allow the transport sector to flourish (Dawn, 2020b). Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban, specifically, comes from the ISI. The role of the ISI is so significant that it is regarded as the ‘sun in the sky’ by Taliban commanders (Waldman, 2010), and the ISI has arrested pro-peace Taliban leaders in the past, including prominent figures such as co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Baradar was arrested in 2010 for attempting ‘unauthorised talks’ with former President Karzai, and through this arrest, the Pakistan army sent a strong warning to the Taliban to not engage in talks without them (Chaudhuri & Shende, 2020). China enjoys both good relations with the civilian government and deep military cooperation with the army, meaning that Beijing can gain support from both sides in Pakistan regarding jointly addressing the Afghan problem. The West does not possess this type of influence due to the lack of trust between Pakistan and the US.

#### *5.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Afghanistan*

##### Economic Development

Because China and the Taliban both express a mutual interest in working together, there are more opportunities to empower the grassroots through economic development, which

is important for post-war societies like Afghanistan, where many locals still lack the most basic infrastructure and facilities. However, in practice, there are several problems related to insecurity that have prevented a more proactive investment from China, as seen in other parts of Asia. Additionally, due to the lack of basic infrastructure, several existing projects are deemed unprofitable, which lessens the appetite of Chinese companies for investment. Moreover, even with investment, there is no evidence to suggest that Chinese-led development does not repeat some of its shortcomings of not always benefitting the local grassroots.

In terms of China's two main development projects in Afghanistan, Mes Aynak was simply not a good investment due to falling copper prices, its royalties, and worries about the security of the area. Conditions such as the 19.5% royalties and promised railway construction were set up in order for the MCC to win the contract, but actually fulfilling them would be unprofitable or even impossible (Byrd, 2017). Experts such as Andrew Small suspect that Mes Aynak is no longer a priority for Beijing because copper does not play a significant role in the BRI, where unrealistic promises are made purely to deny the competition and occupy the site rather than to develop it (Marty, 2018).

According to a local Chinese media report, Beijing has made clear its position that China is interested in investing, particularly in the copper mines of Mes Aynak, but the Taliban must guarantee the safety of Chinese workers, with representative Mujahid claiming that they are ready to provide this safety (China Press, 2021). It is unclear how exactly the Taliban plans to provide safety for Chinese nationals, although based on how they enforced their rule in rural Afghanistan, it is likely that any stability may be through coercion and fear under heavy-handed military tactics. Seeing that China is satisfied with the Pakistan army's efforts to create the SSD, dedicated to security in Gwadar, it is likely that China's pragmatism will allow the Taliban to employ similar means. This means that stability will be created under fear and coercion as well as potential human rights violations.

To make matters worse, China has encountered a familiar problem with angry villagers who reside near Mes Aynak. These people were ordered to leave and promised compensation for their houses and livelihoods, but the government has not provided such compensation: the Ministry of Mines only gave these people excuses, as the Chinese no longer attend meetings, creating a bleak future for locals residing in the area (Marty, 2018). Relocating villages in war-torn Afghanistan is much more complicated than in other parts of the world, as social networks are of vital importance to the survival of locals. It is very difficult to rebuild lost connections and relationships in a new neighbourhood, especially in patriarchal societies headed by Maliks and Khans where women usually do not meet

or are not allowed to meet anyone beyond their close relatives or trusted others (Dastgir et al., 2017).

Another familiar criticism is the false promise of job creation. The town of Ashab Baba, roughly eight kilometres away from the mine, was originally built to relocate villagers and to accommodate people employed for the mines, as allegedly up to 5000 jobs would be created. However, later findings revealed that there were few, if any, established mechanisms of consultation about resettlement with anyone at all regarding this project (Rickard, 2020). Seventy-year-old village elder Mullah Mera Jan is still awaiting funds promised for the village after being relocated and hopes that the mines can become operational, as men from his village are waiting for jobs (Kullab, 2022). The Taliban has a better track record of embracing local (negative) peace, so it is likely that they will be more receptive to local demands compared to the previous government. However, based on China's tradition of bringing its own workers to projects abroad, rather than hiring locals, it is questionable whether the Mes Aynak mines will actually deliver the number of promised jobs to local Afghans. Returning to the problem of women's rights, the Taliban is unlikely to address the problems brought forth by women after relocation.

If Mes Aynak became unattractive for China because copper is not an important resource for the BRI, then it is strange that the Amu Darya oil basin project did not receive more attention from Beijing. For this project, there is very little published information on the Chinese side, including on the specifics of CNPC's decision to retreat from Afghanistan. What is understood, based on the statement made by chief executive Ben Cleary of the Tribeca Investment Partners, is that investments in Afghanistan under the 'lawless' Taliban are generally not recommended, and the one country, China, that invests regardless will only encounter more hurdles as more environmental, social and governance lenses are applied over the mining sector (Mishra, 2021). The costs of trying to maintain security near Amu Darya while avoiding international controversy outweigh the benefits, as Afghanistan is unlikely to produce more oil than traditional sellers for China like Saudi Arabia, Russia, or Angola.

Both cases of Amu Darya and Mes Aynak show that China has considerable understanding of the situation of Afghanistan, such as the limitations of central authority and the importance of local governance. The prospects of developmental peace creating sustainable peace are only as effective as the amount of top-down authority held by the central government of that country. Every economic development-related initiative from China must begin from the assumption that the Taliban is willing to provide Beijing with security, and so far, with CNPC pulling out of Amu Darya and the reluctance of the MCC

to resume operations in Mes Aynak, it appears that that Taliban security guarantees are unreliable. That being said, allowing the Taliban to provide security serves as a means to extend authority across the country, and thus to strengthen the state in a fragmented country like Afghanistan.

The Taliban should focus greater effort on maintaining stability and security to attract investors – not just from China, but any foreign investors in general. China, as one of the early actors to engage with the new Taliban government, has a positive effect that will make the Taliban feel compelled to improve peace and security, much like the case in Pakistan, where Islamabad became active in cracking down on alleged terrorists. However, the question remains as to what type of peace – whether it is negative hybrid peace, illiberal local peace, or potentially positive emancipatory peace – will be created by the Taliban. In any case, it is not China's position to dwell on state-building, as Beijing's economic incentives are only as strong as the contributions that Afghanistan will make to the BRI.

### Drug Issue

China supporting legal crop plantation through imports, investing in agriculture, and transferring technology for cotton plantations are all useful methods for reducing local farmers' reliance on poppy cultivation. However, like any other BRI project or overseas investment, it is not without controversy, especially because there has been considerable backlash against the BRI in terms of threats to sovereignty, land grabbing, displacement, and human rights abuses, as well as outcompeting locals and not providing the number of jobs that benefit local communities as promised by China (GRAIN, 2019). Therefore, Chinese commitment to Afghanistan's agriculture industry should be viewed with scepticism, as BRI projects elsewhere have been met with considerable local resistance.

China is also likely to turn a blind eye to the illiberal means that the Taliban employs to eradicate poppy fields. The Taliban was largely successful in kerbing opium production through threats and punishment during its previous reign. However, because the Taliban tax opium farmers and this tax becomes a large source of revenue for the group, it is questionable how effective in practice the Taliban would be in eradicating drugs. Chinese experts are pessimistic about the Taliban's capacity to stamp out illegal drugs, especially considering the withdrawal of international aid and the potential likelihood of sanctions (A. Wang, 2021). While it is in China's interest to help Afghanistan solve its drug problem, the likelihood that the Taliban would give up one of its few sources of revenue is another question.

### Addressing Security Concerns

Security under China's developmental peace is built on negative peace, in the sense that it does not condemn any method employed by the Taliban to maintain peace, stability and security, but only focuses on the fact that security is guaranteed to protect China's (or any other country's) economic interests on the ground. In fact, Beijing does not appear to be too concerned about other security issues, as it is far more interested in tracking and cracking down on Uighur fighters who have traversed through Afghanistan and made it as far as Syria to learn how to fight and seek revenge against Beijing (Shih, 2017).

This is also a human rights concern, as there are many second-generation Uighurs whose parents fled China to Afghanistan. These people now fear that they will be deported by the Taliban if Beijing decides to use economic leverage over the government (Gunter, 2021). There is no way to know for sure whether an individual is an extremist or not, just like the fact that anyone can be labelled 'terrorist' or 'separatist' at the Party's convenience. This type of ambiguity can be exploited by Beijing to give it the power to crackdown on dissidents beyond the Chinese border, further boosting illiberal peace, pushing Afghanistan away from the West to more illiberal actors such as China. This is one of the side effects of working with China, as governments must endorse the Chinese narrative on certain issues such as the Xinjiang problem. Aid without strings attached may be an overstatement in describing developmental peace.

Although the Taliban has expressed that it will not allow Afghan soil to be used by militants (Gannon, 2021), which would include the ETIM, nobody knows for sure whether the Taliban intends to keep this promise. The Taliban also openly announced that it intends to rely on Chinese funding for development, saying that China is its most important development partner in helping to rebuild the country, and especially important in helping Afghanistan to open up new trade routes (Al Jazeera, 2021a). Based on these arguments, there is an uneasy alliance between Beijing and the Taliban where the former has economic influence while the latter has influence over the extent to which it is willing to crack down on Uighur fighters in Afghan territory. However, both cases show that to a large extent, they are containing conflict rather than having the incentive to permanently resolve the issue at hand.

Other than terrorism, there are many other factors to consider, such as the imbalanced trade relationship between China and Afghanistan, the Afghan monoculture, and the lack of diversity of Chinese investments in Afghanistan, which are preventing deeper relations between China and Afghanistan (He, 2017). Moreover, considering the amount of attention China devotes to controlling the narrative to its Xinjiang problem, the issue of alleged Uighur fighters and the ETIM will become the sticking point in

China–Taliban relations, much like how China keeps a certain amount of influence over ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and over the Myanmar government, as we will see later.

### Collaboration with Pakistan

Being on good terms with Pakistan, a major gatekeeper to Afghanistan, is the biggest advantage China has over the West regarding Afghanistan. Despite having such an advantage, there should still be questions regarding the prospects of sustainable peace, and especially regarding the quality of peace created by the coalition of Asian states when not all of them are liberal actors.

The first concern is India's reaction to a larger Chinese role in supporting Pakistan in Afghanistan. Although New Delhi is only observing the situation unfold with the Taliban at the moment of writing, it paid close attention to ISI chief Lt. General Faiz Hameed's recent visit to Kabul and the influence it may have on the Haqqani, staying vigilant for a China–Pakistan alliance (Times of India, 2021). However, Indian anxiety was clearly seen when it hosted talks with Russia, Iran and five other Central Asian countries on Afghanistan without inviting Afghan officials, while China and Pakistan refused to attend (Al Jazeera, 2021). India fears that the Taliban's rise will give Pakistan an edge in the Kashmir issue, and New Delhi wants to use this meeting as a means to let regional stakeholders know that India has a stake in Afghanistan as well (Al Jazeera, 2021).

In the past, Pakistan has accused India of trying to hamper CPEC through Afghanistan, where China wants India to 'not worry' about Afghanistan joining CPEC (Business Standard, 2017). The reason for Indian unease regarding CPEC, other than the fact that it runs through the disputed territories of Kashmir, is that it clashes with the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan on the Chabahar port, which is also intended to provide Afghanistan with access to sea routes (Manish & Kaushik, 2019). What is about to unfold may be a new series of geopolitical competitions between China and Pakistan with India in South Asia via Afghanistan. Although this means that Afghanistan can benefit from economic initiatives from both sides, it must also be aware of the dangers of being caught in the middle of a potentially violent geopolitical battle between India and Pakistan.

The second concern is that China extending its influence into Central Asia through Afghanistan may not be well received by Russia. China and Russia, despite friendly relations on the surface, have never fully aligned with each other due to the lack of trust, as seen in the fact that there is no mutual defence treaty between the two. Here, we recall a point mentioned in Richmond's (2022) interview that both China and Russia

still turn to the 19<sup>th</sup> century concept of spheres of influence, so China expanding into Central Asia, which has traditionally been Russia's sphere of influence, may not be taken lightly by the Kremlin. However, with Afghanistan at the crossroads of South and Central Asia, it should be in the common interest of all regional actors, including Russia, to see peace and stability manifest in the region. Therefore, there are more opportunities for collaboration rather than confrontation between China and Russia, as seen in the meeting between foreign ministers Wang Yi and Sergei Lavrov in Anhui, China to discuss issues related to the international backlash from the Taliban U-turning on commitments to girls' education as well as the unfolding humanitarian crisis on the ground (Reuters, 2022a).

The coalition between actors like China and Russia leads to a third concern regarding the quality of peace created in the region, and on the ground in Afghanistan. Liberal peace may have disappeared from Afghanistan along with Western withdrawal, but this does not necessarily mean that regional actors are immediately keen to fill the vacuum. Some analysts use the term "New Great Game", saying that various actors in the region, including China, Russia, India, and Pakistan, will jockey for influence, and deter each other in the region, as former Soviet republics in Central Asia look more towards China as an economic replacement for the former Soviet Union (Fingar, 2016). Despite large-scale regional geopolitics, it would be difficult to see how any actor would prioritise democracy and human rights in this case.

For the Taliban in Afghanistan, no countries had officially recognised their new Islamic Emirates at the time of writing in 2022. China will not be the first to do so, and even if it did, it is likely to be in coalition with Pakistan, Russia and Iran, if they reach a consensus (Yew, 2022). A coalition of illiberal and hybrid states recognising an illiberal Taliban regime will seriously undermine liberal norms in the region. Without liberal norms as components of stable society in Afghanistan, it is questionable how much peace can be sustained by the Taliban. Furthermore, a greater role by China would also mean more application of developmental peace, where economic development from Beijing can supplement for the lack of Western investment while China shields the Taliban from any prospects of R2P and armed intervention on the international stage, as the Taliban become emboldened to continue with oppressive means of maintaining 'peace' and stability. Peace, in this case, is very much leaning towards negative peace.

## **5.5: Conclusion**

At the beginning of this chapter, I asked the question of whether it is possible for alternative models of hybrid, local and developmental peace to supplement the failures of liberal peace in post-conflict societies. Over the course of two decades and the



involvement of various international and domestic actors in the Afghan peace process, none of these actors have been particularly successful in maintaining the fragile peace and stability. Afghanistan is a country that has never been peaceful since the 1980s, when the Soviet Union first invaded.

Liberal peace fell short, mainly due to the main advocate, the US, straying from its original objective to pursue counterinsurgency measures. In a sense, this is also related to the lack of political will at the top level, both in the US and in the Afghan government, to address some of the grassroots issues, such as corruption and drugs, on the ground. Half-hearted hybrid attempts to address these problems did not improve the situation on the ground, Western investments have made progress in education and health, but did not fully win the hearts and minds of local people. In all honesty, the US overstayed its welcome in Afghanistan because a viable exit strategy had never been developed until 2018, nearly two decades since Washington's initial invasion in 2001.

Alternative models such as hybrid peace are only partially effective as well. Indian infrastructure is popular among local Afghans, while New Delhi maintains positive relations with the Afghan government in Kabul. However, India also has difficulties working with the Taliban, as well as the danger of confronting Pakistan. Meanwhile, Japan is another Asian actor that has paid considerable attention to peacebuilding in Afghanistan. The fact that Japan has not played a significant role in the geopolitical struggle between India and Pakistan is an asset, as this allows the Japanese to focus on infrastructure development such as building roads, improving agriculture, and water management at the local level. Japan has also put considerable effort into DDR and has been successful in disarming over 30,000 ex-combatants. However, the Japanese have not been able to fully realise the reintegration of former anti-Taliban militants. This, combined with the instability on the ground hampering economic development efforts, as well as a waning in interest in Afghanistan from Tokyo, has caused Japanese peacebuilding to lose effectiveness over the years.

This chapter also shows that, despite the failures of liberal peace and liberal state-building, liberal norms like human rights and the rule of law are still essential for sustainable and positive peace. The Taliban working with China, and other illiberal and hybrid regimes in the region under models like developmental peace, will not be likely to create sustainable peace on the ground. While there may be stability, the 'win-win' relationship between states meets its limitations when girls are denied education, women are denied employment, or when civilians are being arbitrarily detained and tortured. The Taliban, working with China, is unlikely to change its existing attitudes, and Afghanistan's regional neighbours do not appear interested in inducing a change. For

China in particular, while its relations with the Taliban have improved, Beijing is still reluctant to commit to development before security is guaranteed. The illiberal means required for this stability is, however, not something about which Beijing is particularly concerned.

## Chapter 6: Case Study of Sri Lanka

### 6.1: Introduction

In this chapter, we temporarily detach ourselves from previous discussions of CPEC and focus on Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is an interesting case due to the fact that it is the only case in this dissertation that does not currently have any active armed conflicts. It is also the only country discussed that does not share a border with China, being an island nation. However, its proximity and proactiveness in taking part in the BRI make it an equally important case in understanding the impacts of developmental peace on the ground – perhaps even more so than other cases, as it questions China’s ability to resolve deep-rooted post-war ethnic grievances with economic development.

Peace in Sri Lanka is a relatively recent phenomenon, as a bloody civil war was fought between the Sinhalese in the south and the Tamils in the north for 26 years. The war ended officially in 2009, which means that Sri Lanka has only enjoyed a little more than a decade of peace in recent history. After the war, Sri Lanka appears stable, without violent conflicts or large-scale insurgencies, but underneath the façade of harmony, deep ethnic grievances remain between the Sinhalese and Tamils that have not been fully resolved, as well as a new latent conflict between the Sinhalese and Muslims. In some ways, Sri Lanka is a textbook definition of Johan Galtung’s negative peace (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Negative peace, as defined by Galtung, is an in-between point between violence and positive peace, with mutual isolation, passive coexistence, and a ceasefire that ended violence, but this does not necessarily increase the passion or trust each group has for the other (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). In Sri Lanka’s case, it was military victory that ended the war and not a ceasefire.

As Sri Lanka has no active armed conflicts, this chapter’s main objective is to determine whether each model of peacebuilding has the capacity to turn Sri Lanka from a situation of negative peace with some latent conflicts to one of positive sustainable peace. The reconciliation between the Sinhalese and Tamils is the main issue at hand, and is an issue that goes beyond the top-down approach of liberal peace. Therefore, it is necessary to look at potential bottom-up approaches promoted by hybrid peace and local forms of reconciliation efforts and their capacity to move Sri Lanka towards a society with positive peace. Another question to ask is whether or not economic development is likely to be a solution to issues of ethnic grievances concerning developmental peace. The following is a map showing the ethnic distribution of Sri Lanka:




Figure 4: Ethnic distribution of Sri Lanka (South Asian Blog, 2014)

### 6.1.1: Background History

Some background context regarding the history of the Sri Lankan civil war is necessary to understand the current ethnic discord in Sri Lanka. The civil war fought between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a military organisation formed by the Tamil minority in the north of the country, lasted between 1983 and 2009. Both sides have been accused of systematic violations of human rights, especially towards the end of the war, while various international actors and organisations have sought to end the conflict through negotiations. Nobody knows for sure how many people, both military combatants and civilians, died in the civil war, which lasted for more than two decades. The UN estimates that between 80,000 and 100,000 people may have died (Nebehay & Pal, 2021), whereas others such as the Human Rights Data Analysis Group estimate that around 500 people under army custody may have disappeared in just the last three days of the war between 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> of May 2009 (Ball & Harrison, 2018). Furthermore, due to the widespread allegations of war crimes committed by both sides during the war, Sri Lanka's post-war recovery was anything but smooth, with many of its Western counterparts having disengaged due to its human rights

violations. However, there was also a small handful of foreign actors, such as China, Japan, India, and the US, that stayed.

Understanding the reason for negative peace in Sri Lanka today requires a deeper understanding of why a civil war broke out at all. Ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils existed much earlier, when the Parliament of Ceylon passed the Official Language Act No. 33 in 1956, more commonly known as the Sinhala Only Act. This act established Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon), replacing English but excluding Tamil (Sri Lanka Consolidated Acts, 1956). The controversial act made the situation worse for Tamils, who were already being increasingly marginalised at the time. With Sinhala as the official language, many urban middle-class Tamils from Jaffna (a city on the northern tip of Sri Lanka) found themselves unable to find jobs in the professional or public service sector, on which they relied for employment, whereas the majority Sinhalese community used the ethnic imbalance in the country to actively distribute jobs to members of their own community to develop their own regions (Shastri, 1990). When the British left, there was already a massive gap between postcolonial English-educated political elites and the rest of the population, and this group of elites used the emerging Sinhala nationalism, purified Buddhism, 'racial authenticity' and local sentiments of 'sons of the soil' exploited by colonialism to justify their actions (Spencer, 2010).

The 1950s saw several anti-Tamil pogroms, such as the Gal Oya riots in 1956, and the 58 riots in 1958. The 58 riots were particularly disturbing, as estimates suggest that between 300 and 1,500 Tamils were murdered in a span of several days after a Hindu priest was burnt alive in Colombo. It took five days for the government to declare an emergency, as mobs went around the streets asking people whether they could read Sinhala, and those that could not were beaten or killed (Tamil Guardian, 2020a). Not only did this incident completely shatter the already diminishing trust between the Sinhalese and Tamils, but it also had a profound impact on a schoolboy named Velupillai Prabhakaran, who would grow up to become the leader of the LTTE, the main Tamil armed group that would later fight against the Sri Lankan government. Prabhakaran remembered the 58 riots as a racial holocaust against his people and became determined that an armed struggle would be the only way to redeem the Tamils against the Sinhalese-dominated state (Tamil Guardian, 2020a). Anti-Tamil pogroms continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1981, the Jaffna Public Library was burnt down by a mob of Sinhalese, and this became another attack on Tamil culture, where, according to eyewitness, Sinhalese police were seen collaborating with gang members to set fire to the library (Knuth, 2006).

The reason for the discrimination against the Tamils is that for many decades the GoSL has been dominated by a chauvinist view that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist state of the Sinhalese people, and that everyone else, like Tamils, is second-class (Peris, 2001). Interestingly, when the Taliban destroyed Buddhist statues at Bamiyan, Sri Lankan media remained silent against the cultural vandalism displayed by the Taliban due to the striking similarities to the fire that destroyed the Jaffna Public Library in 1981 (Peris, 2001). There is also a certain degree of economic nationalism, which criticised foreigners who extracted wealth from the country, while Indian Tamil plantation labourers and merchants were labelled the *parayo* – the low and vile foreign enemies (Roberts, 1989). The Sinhalese are the majority group, accounting for more than 70% of the Sri Lankan population, while the Tamils comprise only 10-15%. The actions of the Prabhakaran and LTTE to take arms and rise against the Sinhalese majority and their discriminatory measures were not completely unprovoked, as the Tamils were facing an existential crisis. However, the violent measures that both sides pursued during the war only created deeper divisions between the two ethnic groups of Sri Lanka many years after the end of the civil war.

Velupillai Prabhakaran, at the age of 17, founded the Tamil New Tigers in 1972. Tamil militancy has always existed due to the oppression from the Sinhalese, even before the fire at the Jaffna Public Library. The group gained notoriety after assassinating Jaffna's Mayor Alfred Duriappah in 1975, for which they claimed responsibility three years later in 1978. Duriappah himself was a popular political figure who greeted people on the roads and asked about their lives, but this has been denied by Tamil nationalists (Jain Commission Report, 1997). The Tamil New Tigers later rebranded themselves as the better known LTTE in 1976 and carried out violent campaigns against the Sri Lankan state. Prabhakaran realised that there needed to be action outside parliamentary politics as he sought support from the Tamils through the violent elimination of all other options. This made the LTTE also target moderate and older Tamil political leaders who tried initiating dialogue with the government, forcing them to side with the LTTE, and left large-scale ethnic conflict as the only option remaining for the Tamils (Biziouras, 2014). The LTTE also actively provoked the GoSL, forcing the Sinhalese to also take violent measures against the Tamils.

The trigger to the civil war began when Prabhakaran led his group of Tamil 'boys' and ambushed the Four Four Bravo army patrol of the Sri Lankan army, killing thirteen Sinhalese soldiers, and the backlash from this attack came in the form of the worst anti-Tamil riots in history, leaving 400 to 2000 (depending on whether figures are provided by the government or by Tamil groups) Tamils dead and numerous Tamil homes and

businesses destroyed (Hashim, 2013). The riots in 1983 led to the outbreak of the first Eelam War, and although there has been temporary peace over the course of the entire Sri Lankan civil war, this marked the beginning of a 26-year-long struggle between the Sinhalese and Tamils where the LTTE wanted to establish an independent Tamil state in the north.

Various international actors have sought to intervene in the civil war over the years, whether it is to mediate for ceasefire or to support different sides of Sri Lanka. India was one of the first foreign powers that tried to intervene and supported the Tamils due to their shared culture, being the intervenor that was most embroiled in the civil war. New Delhi eventually switched sides to support GoSL after the LTTE assassinated PM Rajiv Gandhi, however. Indian intervention had profound effects, as many Sri Lankans agree that the LTTE's rise was only possible because India's foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided training to multiple Tamil militant groups, with the LTTE being their favourite (Ramachandran, 2004). Yet, in reality, RAW's relationship with the LTTE was less harmonious than it appeared, since it was the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation that RAW favoured the most, not the LTTE (Ramachandran, 2004). However, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation was defeated by the LTTE in the summer of 1986, while RAW did little to prevent that, seeking to keep the movement divided so that India could remain in control of the situation (Ramachandran, 2004).

Indian intervention and support for the Tamils intensified when they defied GoSL and air-dropped 25 tons of food and medicine to the besieged Tamil rebels: an act that enraged the Sri Lankan government, bringing the matter to the UN (Weisman, 1987). This was the first time that India had directly intervened in the domestic affairs of its neighbours since 1971 with the creation of Bangladesh in former East Pakistan (Weisman, 1987). The turning point for Indian support for the LTTE was Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in 1991. Supreme court Justice K. Thomas (1998) claimed that Gandhi was assassinated by female suicide bombers groomed by Prabhakaran to retaliate against atrocities committed by the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). Under Gandhi, India deployed the IPKF with the aim of disarming all militant groups, including the LTTE; however, it often had to use force in order to enforce peace. The LTTE blamed the IPKF for their disarmament, which led to the deaths of 17 LTTE people who had been incarcerated at the hands of the Sinhalese (Senadhira, 1989). The assassination of Gandhi led India's central government to exert pressure on regional Tamil parties in Tamil Nadu to silence their support for the LTTE, as New Delhi had adopted a hands-off policy in Sri Lanka since 1991 (Destradi, 2012). By 2007, India had silently supported GoSL thanks

to Sri Lanka's deft diplomacy for greater military cooperation with New Delhi, in an age where the confrontation between India and China is becoming more and more clear (Destradi, 2012).

Meanwhile, China also made its presence known in Sri Lanka at the end of the war. Unlike India, which has been a part of the civil war for most of its duration, China did not play a significant role until around 2006 when it began supporting GoSL. While China's material support took the form of military assistance to GoSL and humanitarian support to the civilians, the most significant support that Beijing offered to GoSL came in the form of diplomatic support in the UN, defending Sri Lanka from alleged human rights violations and war crimes in the Security Council, the Human Rights Council, and other 'western dominated' forums (Balasooriya, 2012). At that time, UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon intended to order an inquiry into war crimes committed during the civil war but failed to do so due to lack of support from the Security Council, as China and Russia would likely veto any probe into the civil war (Channel 4, 2011). The Economic Times also criticised China's support of GoSL for aggressively pursuing strategic interests without regard for its consequences, as China happily filled in for other actors, such as India, which refused to sell offensive weapons to Sri Lanka, at a time when then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa was desperate for foreign military aid (Chellaney, 2009).

However, the Chinese veto at the UNSC was not mentioned in any Chinese news media outlets, whereas state media the Global Times (Xinhua, 2013b), a few years after the end of the war, reported that Sri Lanka was supported by China and was flourishing at the end of the war, and that everyone only criticised Sri Lanka for war crimes, but nobody asked how many lives had been saved at the end of the war. Western analysts such as Mark Malloch Brown claimed that China and Russia were increasingly at odds with Western liberal democracies under a 'new cold war of ideas' specifically on human rights (Channel 4, 2011), and that they could not solely be blamed for the lack of international action at the end of the war.

Although Mahinda Rajapaksa became exceedingly close to Beijing at the end of the civil war, India and the US, and later the UK, also played a role in proliferating war crimes in Sri Lanka. Washington's designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation not only removed any prospects of a political solution to the war, but also told GoSL not to negotiate with the LTTE, and even encouraged GoSL to continue the decimation of the LTTE (Jones, 2009). Even without direct provision of military hardware aid from the West, Washington and its allies provided intelligence and 'non-lethal' weapons such as radars, as the US also pressured its allies such as Canada and the EU to halt financial



support for Tamil refugees (Jones, 2009). India was also put in a difficult position at the end of the war, but ultimately supported the GoSL against the LTTE. India was not supportive of an independent Tamil *Eelam* (state) because it feared Tamil Nadu's independence from India. Another reason is that there will always be the danger of the Tamil *Eelam* becoming friendly to adversaries of New Delhi such as China (Vijaykumar, 2020). India at the time also applied political pressure against the international community with the US to label the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, defended GoSL in the UN Human Rights Council, and provided Sri Lanka with military hardware and intelligence (Vijaykumar, 2020).

Asian actors such as China and India played an important role in supporting the GoSL in achieving military victory over the LTTE, as did the terrorist label from the US, which effectively cut off international support for the Tamils. The following section will provide a more detailed analysis of foreign intervention in the civil war under the frameworks of liberal peace, as well as the role played by small and medium powers such as Norway and Japan in attempting to establish a ceasefire in Sri Lanka. It is useful to remember here that liberal peace in Sri Lanka came as a part of Washington's global war on terror in the early 2000s, which does not coexist with non-state actors like the LTTE that chose to use terrorism as a tactic of war, and the moment 'liberal peacebuilders' like the US labels them as terrorists, there will be little prospect left for negotiations other than towards victor's peace.

## **6.2: Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka**

### *6.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka*

Like Pakistan, Sri Lanka is already a democracy, and according to the latest reports by Freedom House (2022b), it is considerably freer than Pakistan. Therefore, the focus of liberal peace in Sri Lanka, rather than constructing democracy, is to strengthen liberal norms like democracy as well as human rights. While it does better on freedoms compared to Pakistan, there are still many issues with Sri Lankan democracy, such as the problem with majoritarian politics, which needs to be addressed and improved upon.

Liberal peace is also potentially helpful as a tool for foreign actors to engage with both sides of the civil war. For most of the civil war, India was the only major power that clearly took a side, although towards the end, most of the international community supported GoSL. Until then, foreign actors mostly played a mediatory rather than an interventionary role, trying to find a political solution between the LTTE and GoSL. One of the root causes of the war was the under-representation of Tamils, which caused

widespread discontent against the majority Sinhalese. Increasing the representation of opposition is a means to create more checks and balances, and this is useful to prevent too much power being taken by the majority during power transition (Joshi et al., 2014). Therefore, in theory, international mediation that advocates such an approach, by strengthening the position of Tamils, is a means to bring a political solution to the civil war and ensure that peace in Sri Lanka is sustainable. This is possible with the presumption that a democratic governance framework is already in place in Sri Lanka. However, later we will see that various factors – such as the shortcomings of third-party mediation, the US war on terror, and the brutal tactics employed by the LTTE, making it difficult to take their side – have all undermined a potential political solution to the civil war.

### *6.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka*

As we can see, conflict in Sri Lanka did not end with the civil war, as the military victory of GoSL brought forward a series of new latent conflicts. The analysis of liberal peace can be separated by looking at how peacebuilding was done before and after the end of the civil war. The problem with trying to mediate the conflict through a liberal peace framework is that by doing so, liberal peace effectively reduces the complex underlying issues to the civil war as a simple conflict between the state (GoSL) and insurgency (LTTE) without considering issues with identity politics and nationalism in Sri Lanka (Akebo & Bastian, 2021).

Besides, the issue of third-party intervention inhibits even neutral international actors from finding a political solution to the civil war. The inclusion of major global powers such as the US and the EU immediately escalated the Sri Lankan civil war from a local insurgency to an international crisis and the agenda of the international community (Sonia, 2022). Once again, this calls for local ownership of the peace process, as the involvement of major global powers may again hijack the process and steer it towards the agenda of these major powers, like the US and its war on terror in the early 2000s, which conveniently contradicted the terrorist-like tactics of war employed by LTTE, causing further complications.

Another issue with liberal peace is its ability to address post-war social relations and reconciliation. In fact, the liberal peace framework focuses strongly on post-war liberal institution-building and economic development under the guidance of international actors (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007). Liberal peace is much better at quantifying aspects of post-war societies, such as the number of ex-combatants rehabilitated or houses reconstructed, rather than affective dimensions of peace such as

trust and reconciliation (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2007). This is important because this was exactly what happened to Sri Lanka under Mahinda's post-war recovery vision, which focused heavily on reconstruction and economic development, with little effort to address the pressing problem of ethnic grievances. For this reason, it appears that liberal peace may only have a limited effect on transforming the negative peace to more positive forms of peace in Sri Lanka.

### *6.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka*

#### At the End of the Civil War

Liberal peace at the end of the civil war came in the form of foreign actors, mainly Western actors, mediating for peace between GoSL and the LTTE. One of the more notable attempts among these efforts was to broker peace with Norway. Norway has been engaged in the peace process of Sri Lanka since 1999 and they arrived at a time when the GoSL and LTTE had been deadlocked in a stalemate where neither side could make significant gains against their adversaries. This is a case of a mutually hurting stalemate, which can sometimes give incentives for the warring parties to negotiate peace, but there is often the danger of mediation during this time failing because one or both sides still believe they can escalate the conflict out of stalemate and turn it into a decisive military victory (Zartman, 2001), and history has shown us that the latter stands true. By the time Norway took the mantle of peace broker, the civil war had already raged on for nearly two decades. In other words, an entire generation of Sri Lankan children had grown up to become young adults under the unstable circumstances created by civil war. The mutual lack of trust between the GoSL and LTTE, and between the Sinhalese and Tamils, also made it difficult to sustain ceasefires between the two.

The advantage of Norway as a mediator is that Norway is not a colonial power, and not even a 'great power', but it is well respected as a country that is willing to uphold world peace with an approach of tolerance and accommodation (Alparone, 2021). This made Norway the perfect 'weak mediator' that was attractive to both sides of the conflict, as the LTTE wanted international recognition from Norway's legitimacy, while the GoSL did not want too much attention from the international community by escalating the issue to the UNSC, and of course the Norwegians themselves were aware of both these facts (Alparone, 2021). Meanwhile, for Norway, with peace-making and reconciliation as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, mediating the civil war also gives it important access to global institutions such as the WB and large powers like the US (Höglund & Svensson, 2009).

The main role that Norway played in the peace process was facilitating dialogue between the two parties, which led to the drafting of a ceasefire agreement between GoSL and the LTTE in 2002, and then, based on this ceasefire, to the establishment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) (Relief Web, 2005). There is also a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), endorsed by the LTTE members, that grants privileges and immunity to SLMM members (Relief Web, 2005). Although Norway made some progress, such as trying the federal option where Tamils can be given autonomy over their occupied areas (Groeneveld-Ssavaisaar & Vuković, 2011), talks began to break down after Norway's introduction of new co-chairs, namely the US, the EU and Japan. The involvement of great powers like the US and the EU was only a matter of time. Weak mediators like Norway are good at bringing parties to the negotiation table, but they often need the support of great powers like the US as 'mediators with muscle' that can exert both coercive and rewarding powers through carrots and sticks against the negotiating parties (Alparone, 2021).

Along with Norway, another actor that tried to broker peace was Japan. Japanese peacebuilding and diplomacy can be categorised as a 'middle power' approach that mainly focuses on human security (Soeya, 2005). Due to constitutional constraints, Japan simply cannot pursue means outside foreign aid and human security. Tokyo often takes a passive stance in international affairs, but much of this is due to its inability to use force in international conflicts, the pacifist nature of the Japanese public, the paranoia of their East Asia neighbours about the rise of Japanese militarism, and the need to coordinate foreign relations as Washington's 'junior power' (Lam, 2004). Japan's role in the Sri Lanka conflict is important for liberal peace because it is an Asian country upholding the norm of human security. Human rights were consistently violated by both sides of the civil war, and other Asian powers such as China are either unconcerned with human rights at all, or in India's case, do not want to be too deeply involved in Sri Lanka after Ghandi's assassination.

Japan played a significant role in achieving the ceasefire agreement in 2002, as well as providing foreign aid to Sri Lanka under ODA. Between 1999 and 2002, \$25 million in Japanese aid was delivered to the north and east of Sri Lanka, impacted by the war, and Japan has given a total of \$1.15 billion during this time (Fazil, 2010). In 2002, the Japanese government appointed Yasushi Akashi to contribute to the peacebuilding, reconciliation, and reconstruction of Sri Lanka. Akashi made more than 19 visits, trying to urge the conflicting parties to talk constructively about peace, because he thought that Japan must be involved in the action instead of just writing out cheques (Fazil, 2010). However, Japanese efforts too were impeded by the fact that the LTTE is a terrorist

organisation by the US definition and was thus barred from entering Washington, where the preparatory meeting for the Tokyo Donors Conference on Reconstruction was taking place (Fazil, 2010). The exclusion of the LTTE led to constant violations of the ceasefire and the eventual departure of the SLMM from the island. On another note, Japan's and Norway's involvement in the civil war has most definitely brought Sri Lanka into the international spotlight.

With Japan's human rights approach, five Japanese international human rights organisations issued a joint letter to then-foreign minister Katsuya Okada on the serious violations of human rights committed by both sides during the civil war and urged Okada to use Japan's influence as Sri Lanka's biggest provider of aid to save civilians and uphold international justice (HRW, 2009). The provision of foreign aid is a powerful influence that Japan could have used over Sri Lanka in terms of protecting human rights and upholding human security. These are important liberal norms that sustain peace in post-war societies. This human-security-oriented approach is clearer when the Japan Bank for International Development reports that protracted war has created a 25-30 year gap between the north and east of the country compared to the rest, and therefore it is important to help the Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East, which consists of four members from the LTTE and four from GoSL, two of whom are Muslims, in identifying humanitarian needs and implement priorities (JBIC, 2003). The positive relations Japan constructed with Sri Lanka gave Tokyo considerable influence to bring together the LTTE and GoSL, which otherwise would not have been possible due to their mutual distrust.

#### After the End of the Civil War

The impact of liberal peace on post-war Sri Lanka is actually quite limited. The end of the civil war did not necessarily resolve the existing grievances between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Post-war Sri Lanka enjoyed relatively sustainable peace mainly because the civil war ended with GoSL's military victory and the inability for Tamils to reorganise into armed groups like the LTTE. However, unresolved ethnic grievances created negative peace that has plagued Sri Lankan society until today, only made more complicated by the Sinhalese turning against Muslims in the country as well. Recognising the need for post-war reconciliation, many actors have tried to address the issue through the liberal peace framework, hoping to transform negative peace into positive peace.

Sri Lanka is a democracy, so in theory, liberal systems guarantee people equal representation regardless of whether they are Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, or any other ethnicity. They should equally enjoy the benefits of post-war economic development,

where the ordinary civilians are given the opportunity to improve their livelihoods through economic development while having faith in the government regardless of their ethnicity. However, reality shows that this is not the case, as much of Sri Lanka's post-war development comes at the cost of Tamils and Muslims, and only a small portion of Sri Lankans, mainly the Sinhalese living in the Colombo capital area, are enjoying post-war recovery, while the rest of the country is at large underdeveloped, and minorities remain marginalised. Moreover, Sri Lanka's democracy has received some serious setbacks under Mahinda Rajapaksa, who came to office at the end of the civil war.

Concerning Sri Lankan democracy, post-war Sri Lanka has seen three distinctive sets of government. According to Keethaponcalan (2019), there is no system in the world that is absolutely authoritarian or democratic: therefore, the government headed by President Rajapaksa and the unity government headed by President Maithripala Sirisena are relatively democratic. However, Keethaponcalan (2019) also discovered that government type actually has little impact on reconciliation and the will for former enemies to come together. Democracy does not necessarily lead to reconciliation: if the satisfaction of communities is low, the chance of reconciliation is also going to be low, as is the will to coexist with each other (Keethaponcalan, 2019). The same can be said about the third government, run by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, and Mahinda as prime minister: none of these post-war governments have shown particularly strong political will to push for reconciliation.

Reconciliation is an important step towards sustainable positive peace because the former power structures of domination need to be revised to relieve people from existing injustices, oppression, and deprivation through the promotion of self-determination and autonomy (Richmond, 2022). Meanwhile, for Sri Lanka, the main factor holding back reconciliation and satisfaction is the Buddhist nationalism exhibited by the Sinhalese majority population. Although Buddhism is usually known for its benevolence and non-violence-oriented ideologies, based on harmonious existence, Sri Lanka's Sinhalese Buddhism is unique to its residents. The Sinhalese believe in the myth of *Mahavamsa*, also known as the Great Chronicle, where Buddha wanted Vijaya to promote his teachings after death, creating the notions of *sinhadipa* (island of the Sinhalese) and *dhammadipa* (island for preserving and spreading Buddhism) (DeVotta, 2021a). The notions of *sinhadipa* and *dhammadipa* are so influential in Sinhalese society that even ethno-religious-tolerant Buddhist monks can support Buddhist nationalism (DeVotta, 2021a).

The military victory of GoSL over the LTTE emboldened these notions amongst Sinhalese communities, especially among some of the more nationalistic hardline groups

such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Prominent figures in the government and the military, such as General Sarath Fonseka, claimed that Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese, and therefore, Tamils should not demand 'undue' things (Tran & Gabbatt, 2010). Fonseka was also the general who led the operations leading to the defeat of the LTTE. Sinhalese Buddhist supremacy did not begin after the civil war: it started with the Sinhala Only act that led to the civil war in the first place (DeVotta, 2021a). Nationalism only got worse after the war. For example, Sri Lanka has still not set up a transitional justice mechanism because there is little incentive to hold those in GoSL who committed war crimes accountable, especially when many of them continue to serve in the government and the military after the war (Gupta, 2021). Prominent political figures like Gotabaya and Mahinda Rajapaksa also used Buddhist nationalism to justify some of their questionable policies and as an example of successful resistance to Western 'imperialism' (Gupta, 2021).

Post-war Sri Lanka development was largely dominated by narratives on large-scale infrastructure development such as ports, fisheries and irrigation laid out in the *Mahinda Chinthana*, a ten-year economic development plan for post-war Sri Lanka announced during Mahinda's sixth presidential election campaign. Under Mahinda, some efforts were put into a rehabilitation programme where former Borelli boys were reintegrated into the community, as well as considerable efforts towards the resettlement of IDPs, where 225,476 families have been resettled in the North and East (Kanagarathnam, 2019). Resettlement schemes continued under Maithripala Sirisena, where Sirisena jointly with the Security Forces of Jaffna handed 701 land certificates to the locals as 700 civilian households were given back land that was formerly held by the military, with considerable efforts to eliminate landmines in public areas such as schools through funding from Japan, China, India, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Kanagarathnam, 2019).

While these are important, they are also efforts that address the quantifiable aspects of post-war community. Although the relatively democratic Sirisena regime restored the rule of law and improve democracy, which was seriously undermined during Mahinda's time in office, these efforts mostly attracted praise from the international community, rather than domestic forces that are awaiting more robust efforts on reconciliation. For example, shortly after Sirisena came into power, there was a steady stream of top-level US official visits to the island, such as Secretary of State John Kerry's visit (Economic Times, 2015). While the US praised Sri Lanka for its reconciliation efforts and promised foreign aid to less developed regions, in reality little has been done, and reconciliation efforts were outright ineffective in many cases on the ground.

#### *6.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Sri Lanka*

##### Before the End of the Civil war

Despite some successes of Norway's and Japan's mediation, there are some factors that have prevented a political solution to the civil war in Sri Lanka. The involvement of the US, which designated the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, became an inhibitor to peace. The early 2000s were the height of America's 'war on terror'. The LTTE were pioneers in using suicide bombing as a tactic of war and a core strategy for the LTTE's war of independence (Pape, 2009). The LTTE is also one of the few organisations that have used suicide bombing to assassinate not just one, but two heads of state, namely Rajiv Gandhi and former Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa. The liberal peace discourse that dominated international narratives at the time made the terrorist label damaging to the LTTE's efforts to obtain support from the international community. George W. Bush thought terrorism was a threat to global freedom and all terrorists needed heavy-handed treatment, so it was unthinkable at the time for the US to support an independent Tamil state even if the American public showed an understanding for the grievances of the Tamils (Nissen, 2018).

The US may have become a spoiler to the peace process, or at the very least impeded a potential end to war through negotiations, as liberal norms do not coexist with groups such as the LTTE due to the tactics they use. Likewise, the LTTE was also deeply 'upset' that Norway decided to allow the US to host talks in Washington when legal issues prevented the LTTE leadership from attending the 2003 Washington conference (Alparone, 2021). Norway did not have the influence and diplomatic 'muscle' of the great powers, and thus had to involve the US for its financial and political support (Nissen, 2018), but this move backfired, as the ceasefire was consistently violated by an upset LTTE in the subsequent years of the war.

The problem with the LTTE is that there is often ambiguity as to whether it should be considered a group fighting for an independent state or a terrorist group that glorifies the use of suicide attacks. The US appears to have captured the LTTE under the light of the latter, exemplifying Richmond and Tellidis's (2012) point that peacebuilders must approach extremists to negotiate over extremist ideologies, but not compromise or settle for negative forms of illiberal peace. As mentioned above, the US suggested that GoSL do not negotiate with 'terrorists' like the LTTE, and instead, Washington played a criminal role in helping GoSL to achieve victor's peace. Regardless of whether the US's role was 'criminal' or not, it cannot be understated that US refusal to even negotiate with the LTTE because of the 'war on terror' due to the liberal peace framework seriously



weakened the longevity of the ceasefire mediated by Norway and Japan.

However, the cruel means pursued by the LTTE in its war of independence also undermined its own international legitimacy (DeVotta, 2009). Many analysts who thought that the LTTE could not be defeated militarily perhaps underestimated GoSL's determination to completely wipe it out (DeVotta, 2009). Yet, on the international stage, few would sympathise with the LTTE due to their brutality. Neighbours like India did not show much sympathy after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, and neither did China, which heavily supported GoSL (Ganguly, 2018). Even amongst Tamils, the LTTE is a controversial topic because of the tactics it employed to achieve the Tamil *Eelam*. The entire LTTE state is coercive and not welfarist, and it depended on violence inflicted by the Sinhalese state to justify the need for Tamil independence (Thiranagama, 2013). Furthermore, the LTTE used civilians as human shields and actively employed child soldiers in combat, whereas GoSL bombed civilian areas in the north and used rape as a tactic of war, as well as forced disappearance and arbitrary detention of Tamils. War crimes committed by both sides of the conflict left deep scars in Sri Lanka and only increased the distrust between the Sinhalese and Tamils before and after the end of the civil war.

The mediation efforts pursued by Norway and Japan are also not without criticism. The main problem with Norway's mediation was inconsistency in its initial role as 'facilitator', but it also became a mediator after proactively framing and phrasing documents as well as exerting diplomatic pressure against negotiating parties, flip-flopping between the roles of facilitator and mediator (Norad, 2011). The 'ownership' approach also did not help, as the Sri Lankan president was sidelined, and without a basic road map for peace, 'ownership' became more of a burden to the owners rather than a benefit (Norad, 2011). Likewise, for Japan, some would see that Japanese efforts at mediation reached a deadlock in 2003, following the blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement by the LTTE; yet Japan was not willing to use foreign aid as a tool to apply pressure on Sri Lanka and many Japanese development projects in war-affected areas of the country continued regardless (Fazil, 2010).

While it may be an overstatement to say that the international mediation between GoSL and the LTTE was set up to fail, the US refusal to commit to negotiated peace with 'terrorists' like the LTTE and difficulties for mediators in enforcing the ceasefire severely weakened the peace process. Moreover, victor's peace under GoSL in itself is a problem for post-war Sri Lanka, as ethnic grievances run deep between the Sinhalese and Tamils. A decade after the war ended, Sri Lankan society still has not moved beyond the notion of victor's peace, and liberal peacebuilding, which is closely related to victor's peace, is

not offering much for Sri Lankans in terms of reconciliation. To make matters worse, the GoSL, spearheaded by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, resorted to the use of ‘terrorism’ to defeat ‘terrorism’, and he pursued various questionable methods to ensure that the LTTE could never reorganise (DeVotta, 2009). This also raises the question of whether liberal peace can be created through illiberal means.

### After the Civil War

Liberal peace, whether it is via Sri Lankan democracy or pressure from international liberal actors, really has not done much to address the lack of reconciliation after the civil war, as the country became preoccupied with economic development. There appear to be no mechanisms with liberal peace that will compel Sri Lankan political elites to pursue reconciliation, as long as they are satisfied with political and economic progress in reconstruction. Seeing the competitive nature of Sri Lankan democracy with the shift between Mahinda and Sirisena, and to Gotabaya and his resignation after widespread protest, there are no signs that liberal norms have been seriously undermined, and this should even deserve praise for a post-war community.

Shortly after the end of the civil war, Mahinda and his brothers used emergency anti-terrorism laws to justify the oppression of media and political opponents, removed presidential term limits, and allowed the president’s power to dominate over the solicitor general, the judiciary, and other ‘independent’ commissions (International Crisis Group, 2018). Mahinda still had to address international criticism, however, which he did with the eventual establishment of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), but Western analysts discovered that the LLRC never had the independence, mandate and witness protection capacity to persecute many of the alleged war crimes committed during the war (International Crisis Group, 2018).

Even in Sri Lanka, the LLRC was widely regarded as a ‘farce’ for reasons such as lack of impartiality, the fact that there was only one Tamil and one Muslim in the commission, a single Tamil woman, and allowing hours of testimony from witnesses in Colombo but only approximately 15 minutes from Tamil and Muslim areas (Thiranagama, 2013). The lack of female representatives in the LLRC is a major problem, as the Tamil population have suffered immensely from sexual and gender-based violence during the war, but little attention has been paid to their grievances; likewise, little has been done to bring perpetrators to justice. In the post-war context, displaced women are often exposed to gender-based violence, as Tamil areas in the north are still highly militarised, so much that some analysts consider it a second ‘silent war’ based on the inequality and economic marginalisation seen in the north (Davies & True, 2017).

The LLRC's failure on reconciliation is due to the lack of top-down political will to promote competent reconciliatory measures. Mahinda's narrative of anti-terrorism, riding on the trend of the war against terror in the 2000s, has seriously undermined not only domestic reconciliation but also democracy in Sri Lanka. The problem in following the 'war on terror' trend is that counterterrorism narratives can become indistinguishable from the 'security state' that militarises society, creates inter-ethnic divisions, and weakens democracy (Jackson, 2005), and this is exactly what happened to post-war Sri Lanka. However, affective elements of peace, such as peace and reconciliation, are not something that can be pressed by international expectations for Sri Lanka to address these problems. If anything, it might have the opposite effect, as nationalist politicians like Mahinda, and later Gotabaya, can mobilise popular support against liberal peace and accuse international community of 'external peacebuilding' (Lewis, 2010). While Mahinda's political defeat at the hands of Sirisena in 2015 is a welcome change in restoring liberal norms such as transparency and accountability of the government, the more liberal Sirisena government has also done surprisingly little regarding reconciliation.

Even with the more democratic Sirisena regime, Sri Lanka often came under fire from the international community for its lack of progress on reforms and reconciliation. Sirisena addressed the UNGA, saying he was 'satisfied' with Sri Lanka's reconciliation progress back in 2018, while he also rejected foreign influence in Sri Lanka and wanted the country to be left alone to address its own problems (Tamil Guardian, 2018a). According to Western media, Sri Lanka has a history of failed promises in establishing commissions for human rights violations, whereby the government hesitates to prosecute its own security forces, because when Sirisena speaks of 'Sri Lankans', he implies that the majority Sinhalese community is easily convinced by populist and nationalist narratives (Arulthas, 2018).

Sirisena's national unity government was definitely successful in restoring democratic values, such as reinstating the impeached Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake (only for him to resign 24 hours after his reappointment), restoring Fonseka's four-star general status and appointing him as Minister of Regional Development, lifting the ban on online media and allowing some exiled journalists to return (Keethaponcalan, 2019). Online Tamil media outlets such as tamilnet.com and the Colombo Telegraph also became accessible again under the national unity government (Keethaponcalan, 2019). All of this shows that restoring democracy and increasing freedom in the country is a step towards stability, but this does not necessarily mean that reconciliation is properly addressed, especially when human rights violations by security forces are still a common sight in the north and east, where Tamil traditional lands are

occupied illegally with cases of torture, sexual violence, disappearance, and the detention of Tamil political actors who have been incarcerated (PEARL, 2016). Sri Lanka still lacks the mechanisms to hold the military accountable, as well as not properly undertaking demilitarisation. However, instead of addressing these shortcomings, Sirisena decided to continue with policies under the Rajapaksa regime.

Meanwhile, state violence against Tamils also did not end with the war, and violence against Muslims has been increasing as well. There has been systematic state-endorsed violence against the Rajapaksa regime and regular harassment and intimidation of Muslim butchers and extraordinary attacks on Muslim traders around the country (Ruwanpura, 2016). Sri Lanka's running under a more democratic regime did not necessarily improve the Tamils' willingness to reconcile with the Sinhalese, and Buddhist nationalism has not weakened under Sirisena. Although in 2016, Sirisena proposed a new constitution to decentralise power, Buddhist hardliners blasted it as an attempt to appease Western nations, as extremist groups, such as the BBS, saw it as an attempt to suppress Sinhalese Buddhists (World Watch Monitor, 2016). Buddhist hardliners eventually stopped speaking out against this change; however, attacks on religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians continue, albeit less frequently (World Watch Monitor, 2016).

Efforts for reconciliation under Sirisena were visible but insufficient, and Sirisena's presidency came to an end when he was defeated by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Mahinda's younger brother. Mahinda himself became Prime Minister after the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna party won the most seats in the parliament. The return of the Rajapaksa dynasty is terrifying for the Tamil community, as it was Gotabaya who commanded the intelligence corps, ordering torture, rape, and abduction of Tamils during the war (Frayer, 2019). The Sinhalese often associate Gotabaya as a strong figure who will eradicate his enemies, and Sri Lanka needed a strong leader like Gotabaya, as Sri Lanka became a target of religious extremism with the Easter bombing incident in 2019 that killed 250 people (Frayer, 2019). On the international stage, Gotabaya also addressed the UN, stating that he was willing to engage in reconciliation with the Tamil community through domestic institutions, but he also mentioned that his country had already suffered too much in a 30-year war against separatist terrorists (PTI The Hindu, 2021).

The problem with Sri Lankan democracy is that it is based on majoritarian politics, with Sinhalese making up over 70% of the population. High turn-out rates do not necessarily ensure good governance, liberal democracy, or human rights. Gotabaya was elected through free and fair elections, and two-thirds of the Parliament wanted the Rajapaksa dynasty back in power due to majoritarianism through the ballot box, and this shows that nothing in the country can stop Sri Lanka's shift towards ethnocratic despotism

(DeVotta, 2021b). It is important to remember that the attitude displayed by Gotabaya during his campaign of looking towards the future was very much a ploy to sway the public away from reconciliation, without adequately addressing the needs of truth and justice on crimes committed against both Tamils and Sinhalese during the war.

Tamil grievances are easy to identify for their marginalisation by the government after the war, but Sinhalese grievances for the atrocities committed by the LTTE receive less attention. Due to the partiality of the LLRC, Sinhalese witnesses are given more opportunities to testify to atrocities. The problem is that many LTTE leaders who switched sides to GoSL during the war continue to serve in the Sri Lankan government today and are not brought to justice, as they are protected by the state (Finnigan, 2019). For example, former LTTE commander Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, better known as Colonel Karuna Amman, whose split from the LTTE led to the downfall of the group, was never investigated for his war crimes, as he continues to serve in the government. HRW claims that Karuna was responsible for executing hundreds of police officers in June 1990 after they had surrendered, as well as executing 75 Muslim travellers and killing more than 200 civilians in the Batticaloa district (Ganguly, 2020). Karuna's controversy has only increased recently when he boasted that he had killed more Sri Lankans than Covid, but with Gotabaya as president, it is unlikely that Karuna would be persecuted and brought to justice for war crimes (Ganguly, 2020).

The failure of Sri Lanka's post-war government – either the relatively authoritarian Mahinda regime or the relatively democratic Sirisena regime – to investigate alleged war criminals badly hampers its ability to conduct reconciliation processes. The Sri Lankan state is shown to be capable of liberal democracy, and the liberal peace framework is overwhelmingly geared towards establishing democracy and economic development rather than addressing issues related to reconciliation. The issue of whether or not Sri Lanka is a democracy also does not improve the chances for reconciliation.

### Illiberal Peace

With the liberal peace framework unable to cover the issue of reconciliation, some questions arise as to the prospects of illiberal peace being established in Sri Lanka depending on the political elites in office. In 2010, Sri Lankan civilians went to protest against the unusual opponent of the UN. This was a reaction against the UN panel of experts in justice mechanisms created by then-Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as a means to hold those who committed war crimes accountable, disregarding the Sri Lankan government's strong protest against it (HRW, 2010a). Western analysts cite these anti-UN protests as open hostility against the investigation of war crimes, despite Mahinda's

promises to ban such hostility at the end of the war, as the West accuses Sri Lankans of doing nothing towards justice to war crimes (HRW, 2010a). The Sri Lankan issue is difficult to bring to the Security Council, as the P-5 members are often split in their opinions: the West prefers greater accountability and social justice for victims of war crime, while China and Russia that did not want to be involved became key allies of Sri Lanka that helps to block UN action as well as providing political support in the Human Rights Council (Hogg, 2011).

After the war, Sri Lanka has revised some of its past discriminatory measures. For example, Sinhala is no longer the sole official language, with Tamil being added and English serving as a link between the two. The problem is that Tamils continue to receive government communications in Sinhala only, whereas former northern Tamil territories are given Sinhalese names, and at times road signs are written only in Sinhala (Höglund & Orjuela, 2012). On the ground, one can see that the language issue, which was such a root cause for the civil war, has not been fully addressed in post-war Sri Lanka, and these are all factors that will only add to the grievance and dissatisfaction of the other race. Another mismatch between the Sinhalese and Tamils is the amount of international influence in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese believe that post-war reconstruction should be a strictly domestic affair and want the international community to respect the sovereignty of Sri Lanka, while the Tamils believe that there needs to be intervention by foreign powers to support and protect Tamil society (Höglund & Orjuela, 2012).

A reason that can lead to illiberal peace in post-war Sri Lanka is that Mahinda, even during the war, moved away from the West and opened new relations with mostly illiberal actors of China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran (Walton & Thiyagaraja, 2020). While Sri Lanka explored alternative options, it never moved away from its traditional Asian donors in Japan and India, as well as continuing to be engaged with international organisations for multilateral aid. According to the 2021 disbursement data from Sri Lanka's Department of External Resources (2021), the three largest bilateral donors to Sri Lanka are China (\$138.9 million), Japan (\$134.6 million) and India (\$86.5), with France being the highest Western donor, providing \$42.2 million, while the UK provided only \$7.5 million. In terms of multilateral aid, the WB provided \$436.5 million and the ADB with \$614.8 million (Department of External Resources, 2021). Interestingly, US aid was not listed in the 2021 data, and a large amount of foreign aid (\$809.1 million) came in the form of market borrowing from the China Development Bank. Data from the US suggests that Washington provided \$35 million in 2021, but this number was higher in the previous years (Foreign Assistance, 2022).

The numbers show that there was no shortage of foreign aid streaming into Sri

Lanka after the war. Based on the above data, the fact that so much of Sri Lanka's foreign aid comes from Asian partners, and especially China, has emboldened Mahinda to pursue economic development rather than appease the West with social justice and accountability in terms of ethnic reconciliation. The weakening of Western influence meant that peacebuilding in Sri Lanka was almost entirely led by state actors (top-down) that focused on post-war economic factors rather than on the social and political issues that had led to the war in the first place (Subedi, 2022). When Ranil Wickremesinghe signed the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Norway in 2002, Sri Lanka still had considerable support from the West. However, international influence immediately decreased when Mahinda took power from Wickremesinghe when both the United People's Freedom Alliance and the LTTE recognised that excess international influence and an internationalised peace process back in 2002 and 2004 were not in their interests (Goodhand & Walton, 2009). Mahinda's term meant that Sri Lanka was isolated from the West and post-war reconciliation was returned to domestic control instead of to the hands of foreign actors. Therefore, to some extent, Sri Lanka has restored local ownership of the post-war peace process, but with it, Mahinda also brought the illiberal elements of peace into Sri Lanka, such as containing conflict through economic development that mainly targets the Rajapaksa regime's political power base in the south.

There is also a lack of long-term solutions to sustainable peace due to the war having ended with a military victory, creating an illiberal 'war trap' where large parts of GoSL's legitimacy are based on successes during and after the civil war, which should still satisfy its nationalist powerbase (Goodhand & Walton, 2009). This has also resulted in Muslims replacing Tamils in the post-war period as a new target of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism – an important issue that will be elaborated in a later section. In sum, Sri Lanka was successful in its aim of terminating civil war through 'thick' illiberal peacebuilding as opposed to the 'thin' illiberal peacebuilding that seeks to reduce or contain violence and maintain state order without fully resolving conflicts (Smith, 2020). This approach is unlikely to lead to positive peace, however, as Sri Lanka has merely achieved stability in the absence of war rather than sustainable peace where ethnic groups are satisfied with each other's presence in the country.

Sri Lanka can be either a relatively liberal country under liberal figures like Sirisena, or relatively authoritarian leaders like Mahinda or Gotabaya. Therefore, simply labelling Sri Lanka as an illiberal society trying to build illiberal peace is incorrect, as political leaders can change: the extent of liberalism displayed in Sri Lanka depends mostly on who leads the country. What does not change is the majoritarian politics in the country, and this is quite the detriment to reconciliation, as Gotabaya's victory in 2019

shows that in extreme cases, only Sinhalese votes matter. ‘War victors’ returning to power also means that there is a return of leader-centric populist discourse in the government, and this is especially concerning because Gotabaya managed to win purely by majoritarian Sinhalese votes, which has never before happened in Sri Lankan history (Subedi, 2022). In other words, Gotabaya became president through ‘free and fair’ elections purely from the support of the Sinhalese, and this also means that there is little need to satisfy the concerns of any other groups in the country because Tamil and Muslim votes would not have made a difference anyway. Nationalistic leaders such as Gotabaya raise alarm for Western analysts, who worry about the future of democracy in South Asia, as a pattern is emerging with India as well, as Narendra Modi is also a nationalist who is moving India away from liberalism (Crabtree, 2019).

Finally, the end of the war did not end the constant military presence in the north, where relations with the Tamils are maintained by the military presence of the Sri Lankan army (Akebo & Bastian, 2021). The politicisation of socio-economic issues in the Sinhalese community for their nationalist agendas are also problems that remain even in the absence of war (Akebo & Bastian, 2021). In the case of Sri Lanka, populism and nationalism can sometimes dominate the post-war narrative, bringing illiberal elements to peacebuilding and avoiding reconciliation by focussing on the economic factors in the country. Under the circumstances of strong Buddhist nationalism running through the veins of political elites, it is difficult to detect any prospects of reconciliation between Sinhalese and Tamils if Sri Lanka is left alone. Therefore, the country needs alternate grassroots approaches of reconciliation supported by foreign actors that are interested in seeing more emancipatory forms of peace occurring in Sri Lanka and helping the government to improve on peacebuilding.

### **6.3: Hybrid Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka**

#### *6.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka*

The following sections focus on hybrid and local models of peacebuilding that have emerged in Sri Lanka after the civil war. As the political will from top elites is not always present regarding reconciliation, domestic CSOs and NGOs as well as their international donors must often pursue local forms of peace across the horizontal inter-communal gap. While these actors may not have the power to fundamentally influence the dominant power structures of the Sri Lankan state, which overwhelmingly favours the majority Sinhalese, local peacebuilding is still useful to address communities where the government’s efforts are inadequate or ineffective.



Here it is also useful to explain the differences between CSOs and NGOs, as these terms are often used interchangeably but they are fundamentally different. According to the official UN definition, both CSOs and NGOs are task-oriented organisations that serve the interest of the people through initiatives such as humanitarian means, bring civilian concerns to the government, and encourage community-level political participation (United Nations, n.d. b). It adds that NGOs should be understood as a subset of CSOs, often without clear boundaries, where organisations such as trade unions and professional associates are CSOs rather than NGOs (UNDP, n.d.). In other words, CSOs should be considered an extension of society that supports the notion of good governance with limited governmental intervention, and NGOs are the operational extension of CSOs.

As hybrid (and local) peace is much more bottom-up focused, there are more prospects of addressing issues such as reconciliation that have previously not been addressed by the liberal peace framework. Positive hybrid peace can be created through a focus on local agencies, where its intersubjective mediation nature makes it easier to address issues such as reconciliation, emancipation, and social justice (Wallis & Richmond, 2017).

### *6.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka*

One issue that requires caution regarding reconciliation supported by foreign actors is the nature of illiberal politics in Sri Lanka. These illiberal measures are justified to resist foreign intervention, as peacebuilding efforts, from the outside, can be seen by Sri Lankan leaders, not to serve liberal means but rather to be driven by self-interests of power (Höglund & Orjuela, 2012). This has happened with liberal peace and will probably also happen to hybrid peace. Moreover, concerning foreign funding, there have been past cases where international peacebuilders have funded reconciliation efforts, such as in the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, but cash payments were used as incentives by combatants to prolong conflict (Wallis & Richmond, 2017).

Reconciliation, while an important step towards a sustainable positive peace, should not be the end goal. Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus did not end with reconciliation or entry into the EU, but there has also been a process of reconsidering existing communal identities, the role of the state, and territorial sovereignty (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2016). For the case of Sri Lanka, reconciliation is also not the end goal of positive peace, but is an important step for the country to reconsider the problematic nature of majoritarian politics in the country, through recognising that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic country where minority races are often not given the representation they need.

However, later we will see some justifications for the need for Sinhalese to dominate most of the country.

### *6.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka*

#### Reconciliation Through Peace Education

There needs to be greater interplay between the government and local grassroots in eliminating cultural barriers and promoting ethnic harmony and tolerance for other groups, so that there can be the potential to influence the top-level decision-makers and have them pay greater attention to the needs of people's reconciliation. Foreign actors such as INGOs are important components in helping Sri Lankan society to achieve this, but international actors need to be cautious to not dominate the process, as INGOs are comparatively more powerful in Sri Lanka than elsewhere because domestic NGOs were weakened considerably by the war, and by the crackdown by Mahinda's regime after the war.

Peace education as a top-down measure is useful to promote reconciliation by not dehumanising the other ethnic groups through the elimination of stereotypes and existing discriminatory viewpoints. This is particularly important for a young nation like Sri Lanka. According to the UNDP, Sri Lanka has immense potential with its 4.64 million youth, who account for 23.3% of the country's total population, but they are often not given enough opportunities to voice their opinions (Markar, 2016). It is important to groom the youth population correctly. The radicalisation of youths can happen in any country with any race, especially in an era when the boundary between online and offline lives becomes more blurred (UNESCO, 2016).

During the war, Sri Lankans became clearly polarised in understanding the distinctions between ethnic groups as other people who speak different languages, receive different education, receive different but equally biased media, and know little about each other's religions, and both will self-glorify their own group at the expense of the other (Orjuela, 2003). This polarised viewpoint of the 'other' must be changed in order for there to be tangible progress towards ethnic reconciliation, and the government's peace education programme was introduced as a solution to this reality. However, in practice, it struggles to address ethnic polarisation and bring different groups together. Regarding peace education, there is often debate about whether the standing government or grassroots NGOs should bear the mantle of promoting it. Most of the time, it is the government that takes the role, as it is an opportunity to increase its legitimacy and show the goodwill of the ruling party (Wagner, 2019). However, this role sometimes falls on civil societies or state-sponsored agencies in cases where trust in the government is low

(Wagner, 2019).

Sri Lanka is an example of the former case where the government has the capacity to provide adequate education to its youth. To this point, the government has correctly eliminated discriminatory content from learning materials and tried to develop a curriculum where students are introduced to the concept of peace, tolerance, and citizenship (Sorensen, 2008). Sri Lanka's Ministry of Education has also been promoting civic education since 2008. The original objective was to promote social cohesion and peace education through the establishment of a social justice system that can nurture deep and abiding concern for each other (Sri Lankan Ministry of Education, 2008).

That being said, some local organisations have attempted to improve education by addressing the lack of a secular-based approach to values, where the concept of 'values' in Sri Lanka is often associated with spiritual well-being and religious affiliation (Cramer, 2021). In close coordination with religious and community leaders, the Sri Lankan division of the Asia Foundation has created the Values 4 All programme, which brings common values such as active listening, peace, respect, tolerance, compassion, honesty, sincerity, and cooperation to communities in multiple languages: Sinhala, Tamil and English (Asia Foundation, 2012). According to a survey by the Asia Foundation, since youth are easily influenced by the internet and social media, a large majority of the respondents believed that peace education needs to be included in school curricula to promote important values such as open-mindedness and coexistence among young people from different ethnic backgrounds (Cramer, 2021).

International actors such as the WB have also supported Sri Lankan youth-led reconciliation by emphasising the necessity of seeing young people as development partners rather than mere beneficiaries (Peiris, 2011). Secretary General Ban also highlighted the role of young Sri Lankans in building peace and sustainable development and urged the country to emerge from suspicion and divisiveness, especially given that many young people have grown up under the terror of the civil war (UN News, 2016). Peace education is a potential remedy to counteract the nationalistic remarks that can come out of the majoritarian politics of Sri Lanka. Humanizing other ethnic groups of the country is an important step towards reconciliation, and international society has been putting considerable effort into helping Sri Lankan grassroots in achieving this by supporting government-led initiatives. Outside youth education, and with the more recent impact of COVID-19, the UNDP has also helped local governments in Sri Lanka to set up and strengthen their digital infrastructure, as physical training was no longer possible due to Covid lockdowns. With the support of the UNDP, the Commissioner of Local Government could organise virtual meetings to educate local governments on setting up

and operating technology, enabling better communication and the ability to provide services in a time where the traditional mail system was paralysed under Covid (Vijayakumar, 2021).

### Peacebuilding by Local CSOs

Domestic CSOs and NGOs in Sri Lanka have always played an important role in promoting peace and reconciliation. These groups are the bridge-builders that coordinate between the local grassroots and the government, connecting bottom-up efforts with top-down government initiatives.

However, operationalisation has not always been smooth and easy for Sri Lankan CSOs, as they have often been targeted by the government, both during and after the civil war, for their role as a space of civil dissent against the illiberal means employed by Mahinda Rajapaksa, as well as by Gotabaya. For example, activists who supported the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2012 had to consistently face hate speech and death threats after being labelled as ‘dogs’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘traitors’ by government-sponsored media (Premaratna, 2012). CSOs during the civil war were even attacked and denounced by the government for their close coordination with foreign actors, especially during the highly politicised 2004 tsunami. Despite the hate against Sri Lankan civil societies by the government, CSO workers have not been discouraged from speaking out against illiberal peace and calling for reconciliation. Civil wars start when individuals begin to realise that police, soldiers, or politicians no longer speak for and support them (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000).

CSOs in Sri Lanka date back many years, to the time when it was still called Ceylon in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although their roles became clearer in the 1990s and early 2000s. Due to the alleged human rights violations by both sides of the conflict, many international actors have redefined their approaches towards Sri Lanka. CSOs became the bridge between the increasingly isolated island and international society by channelling much-needed foreign aid into the country. For example, Canada eventually stopped providing foreign aid directly to GoSL and only did so indirectly through CSOs and their local NGO counterparts (Orjuela, 2005a). These groups also became channels that enabled international actors such as Sweden and Norway, as well as Japan, to enter Sri Lanka during the war, as well as multilateral actors such as the Asian Development Bank and the WB, which provided Sri Lanka with foreign aid on the condition that humanitarian conducts must improve (Orjuela, 2005a).

The importance of Sri Lankan NGOs became clearer with the 2004 tsunami, as the government struggled with recovery efforts despite a natural disaster that killed nearly

40,000 people. NGOs during this time continued to undertake the role of a bridge that would connect foreign actors and local recovery efforts by channelling humanitarian aid into the country (ADB, 2013). However, this was not all well-received by the Sri Lankan government, especially when a surge of INGOs entered the country. NGOs have been criticised by the government for snatching money that would otherwise be given to the state, and have been accused of being conspirators to promote Western interests (Fernando & Hilhorst, 2006). The influx of INGOs also created problems such as lower standards of implementation and transparency, where several cases of corruption were exposed among NGOs (Telford et al., 2006). Therefore, the government's worries that NGOs were occupying too much of the important funding that would have been given to the state are not completely baseless.

CSOs and NGOs also struggled to operate for most of the civil war because Mahinda kept them weak, for fear of being exposed by CSOs operating in war zones of the government's alleged war crimes and human rights abuses (Walton & Saravanamuttu, 2011). It was also a means to prevent the LTTE from gaining resources through CSOs (Walton & Saravanamuttu, 2011). The very concept of civil society has in the past been criticised as a product of Western culture imposed onto the rest of the world (Orjuela, 2005b). According to HRW (2010b) at the time, the Sri Lankan government was accused of conducting precise hunts aimed at critics against the government, after evidence was found from a leaked surveillance list of more than 30 journalists and activists. Even after the end of the war, Sri Lanka seems to struggle to rid itself of its habits of repression (Orjuela, 2005b). Attacks on journalists and activists, along with a clampdown on NGOs during Mahinda's term, represent just one of many illiberal means employed by this regime to prolong the tradition of repression.

NGOs under Sirisena were given much more freedom, as he pledged to prevent Sri Lanka's drift towards authoritarianism; however, this change took time to diffuse out of the capital area. According to prominent human rights activist Ruki Fernando, there are still activists in the north hiding from the fear of state retaliation, but he admits that NGO work in the north could be eased as soon as local activists begin to engage with the new government (IRIN, 2015). This shows that Sri Lankan NGOs are resilient enough to withstand oppressive regimes, even if many of them are quite weak due to years of war and oppression.

In sum, most civil societies operating in Sri Lanka are one of the four types: (1) INGOs in humanitarian and post-conflict activities, (2) INGOs and CSOs in advocacy, (3) domestic NGOs working on poverty alleviation along with government programs, and (4) local NGOs working on grassroots development (Asian Development Bank, 2013).

Based on this categorisation, we can see that domestic or local NGOs and civil societies are more focused on post-war economic development and poverty alleviation, while humanitarian and probably post-war reconciliation efforts are usually led by or conducted in collaboration with INGOs. Collaboration with the government may be easier in some areas, such as poverty alleviation and economic development, than in others, such as ethnic reconciliation.

One of these grassroots NGOs is the Sarvodaya Movement. Founded by A.T. Ariyaratne, Sarvodaya has combined the ideas of Buddhism and Gandhian thought to create a network of more than 15,000 villages and mobilised 100,000 youth for peace, with their biggest achievement in the ‘mediation for peace’ under the Spiritual Gathering for Universal Peace programme (Peace Insight, 2016a). Sarvodaya’s collaboration with the government dates as far back as the 1970s, but their relationship has not been smooth, as the organisation faced many restrictions and pressures imposed by a conservative government, especially in the 1980s and 1990s (Rajkopal, 2019). Despite restrictions, Sarvodaya has often been on the frontlines, such as to address the massive displacement of people in the north at the end of the war, and plays a vital role in providing basic services such as water and sanitation for IDPs while being supported by foreign donors such as Oxfam and UNICEF (Peace Insight, 2016a).

The Sarvodaya movement has clear plans on how to handle issues such as ethnic reconciliation, as well as tackle major disasters like the 2004 tsunami, during which the movement became a vital component in coordinating disaster management policies that the government did not have at the time (Ariyaratne, 2015). Sarvodaya helped to educate the public and coordinate with the government over a course of five years to rebuild 12 districts affected by the tsunami, and this elevated Sarvodaya’s fame nationally and internationally (Ariyaratne, 2015). With a particular focus on the reconstruction efforts coordinated with the government, the movement also used it as a means to promote reconciliation and build peace between ethnic groups in the villages it rebuilt (Rajkopal, 2019). For example, the movement was successful in bringing communities together through the construction of Damniyamgama, Sri Lanka’s first ecovillage, in collaboration with the Global Ecovillage Network (Rajkopal, 2019). Meanwhile, the village of Addapalam was purchased privately by the Sarvodaya Movement after the government struggled to acquire land in Nintavur, a predominantly Muslim area (Cassini et al., 2008). Addapalam was predominantly Tamil, and the movement had to relocate Muslim communities into a Tamil area – it successfully brought together 78 displaced Muslim families and 22 Tamil families (Rajkopal, 2019).

For followers of the Sarvodaya movement, a shared sense of traditions and

beliefs are just as important as basic human needs such as food and water, and while Sarvodaya conducts basic developmental projects such as building roads, wells, and schools and bringing computer technology to rural areas, it also emphasises the ‘spiritual’ element for people to awaken their full potential (Johnson, 2010). Since the government is becoming more capable of providing basic needs such as food, water, sanitation, housing, and education, which the movement previously helped to provide, Sarvodaya became more governance-focused after the war. As local authorities were given more resources by the government, the movement began to teach local communities with necessary skills and knowledge to tap into government resources and hold authorities accountable (Ariyaratne, 2015). Such initiatives are a departure from the traditional top-down donor–recipient relations under liberal peace, especially since much of the aid upon which locals relied came from foreign donors during the war. By educating the grassroots on how to tap into local resources provided by the government, the chances of creating dependence on international aid are lessened.

Another notable NGO is the Saviya Development Foundation (SDF), which works on supporting war-affected communities and other CSOs in the field. Founded in Galle in 1990s, the SDF started as an organisation working for economically marginalised communities but eventually realised that the situation for these communities can only improve if all communities regardless of ethnicity work together to promote peace and harmony (Peace Insight, 2016b). The SDF is approved by the Sri Lankan government as a charitable organisation and it was given the national award for disabled and rehabilitation activities, thanks to its achievements in the Galle district, which has a high number of disabled soldiers (Peace Insight, 2016b). The SDF also has international recognition through working with several UN projects in the past, as well as working with the UN in promoting inclusive democracy for good governance, including the empowerment of women, in addition to reducing corruption and human rights abuses against women and other vulnerable communities (Ramesh, 2011). The SDF has also set up 47 Information Centres in three districts of the southern provinces through collaboration with the government, at each of which there are leaflets and simple information in Sinhalese and Tamil on issues such as democracy, governance, and human rights (Ramesh, 2011). The SDF can also play a bridging role between the international community and the government of Sri Lanka due to their 20 years of experience working with senior politicians, and this is a great asset for smooth implementation of UN initiatives in the country (Ramesh, 2011).

Another home-grown peacebuilding initiative is the theatre group Janakaraliya, which eliminates cultural barriers through traditional theatre techniques from both Tamil-

Koottu and Sinhala, hoping to promote peace, reconciliation, and ethnic harmony in Sri Lanka (Peace Insight, 2016c). Language is an important sticking point for Sri Lankans, as in the past, the Sinhala Only Act has created rifts between ethnic groups due to the language issue. The Janakaraliya has been successful in the past, such as when it performed in Vanni at the height of tensions between GoSL and the LTTE, and its success can be mostly attributed to the way that the group provides a common performance space for different ethnic groups of Sri Lanka without the language and cultural barriers (Peace Insight, 2016c).

However, the Janakaraliya is not so much an NGO as a grassroots initiative for peace, and therefore should be seen as grassroots local peace more than hybrid peace, which requires closer coordination with the government. This is important to note, since Sri Lanka is not a country well known for arts and theatre and those working in the arts industry rarely receive support from the state or from non-state actors (PGIE, 2019). The Janakaraliya was able to appeal to large sections of Sri Lanka's demography because its actors do not speak in their native language, and many of its performances are related to real-world political problems as well, in addition to the workshops it hosts in economically marginalised rural areas of the country (Hargreaves et al., n.d.). However, even such an inclusive initiative struggles to make an impact beyond the individual level, as hostilities continue at the top government levels (Hargreaves et al., n.d.). The weakness of being a purely grassroots organisation is that it is unlikely to influence the top-level political elites to change their course towards the ethnic reconciliation that the group wants to promote. Although the Janakaraliya is popular in using theatre as a means of peacebuilding and bringing its performances even into peripheral rural areas, it has not been able to educate its audiences sufficiently about other cultures (De Mel, 2021).

The above are only a small portion of Sri Lankan civil societies operating to promote peace and reconciliation. Sri Lankan civil societies continue to coordinate closely with the government to ensure that local grassroots are able to access the resources allocated by the top-down elites. In cases where it is difficult to coordinate with the government, NGOs such as the Sarvodaya movement have sought to empower local communities by holding authorities accountable in a bottom-up process. This two-way relationship is important in creating a sustainable reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. After the war, CSOs became much more active in bringing communities together to resolve ethnic differences and eliminate cultural barriers, under the approval and coordination of the government. This is much more effective and acceptable in the eyes of both the government and locals of Sri Lanka than operating just through the channels of foreign aid.



### Role of International Actors

The above discussion demonstrates that the government and grassroots CSOs, working together, have made some progress in post-war Sri Lanka. There is more progress in areas of economic development than in ethnic reconciliation, however. International actors can support the reconciliation progress on both the government and local actors' efforts for hybrid models of peace. Although Mahinda's government has a track record of trying to reduce foreign influence, the consistent stream of foreign aid coming to Sri Lanka did not stop at the end of the war, especially regarding aid in improving human rights and reconciliation processes. Both Western and Asian actors have made considerable contributions to improving Sri Lanka's capacity through aid support for the government and local CSOs.

A process led by Germany, co-funded by the EU and executed by Sri Lanka's Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Legal Reforms focused on shared remembrance and commemoration, providing for victims' psychological needs, promoting art and culture to bond communities for reconciliation, and removing language barriers to public services (GIZ, 2018). This process has produced some positive results: for example, 8,315 people took part in a discussion of films on reconciliation, 18,000 people visited a mobile museum that shows multifaceted events of Sri Lanka's post-independence history and 881 state and non-state actors have received psychosocial service training to benefit more than 2,700 people (GIZ, 2018).

Meanwhile, former colonial master Britain has helped post-war Sri Lanka to clear 533,922 square kilometres of minefields and educated 40,000 people on mine risks, while also resettling nearly 2000 IDPs, as well as tackling corruption and strengthening security sector reforms (Curtis et al., 2021). On British commitments, it is also important to remember the potential role of spoilers that foreign actors can play: Britain, in the core group that led the UN Resolutions on Sri Lanka, has repeatedly failed to take meaningful measures to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable. Analysts claim that Britain's colonial history in Sri Lanka highlights similarities between the LTTE and the Irish Republican Army in counterterrorism measures and caused the UK to provide military support to GoSL by selling arms, training Sri Lankan security forces, and even destroying documents that indicate that the UK plays a role in perpetrating war crimes in Sri Lanka (Selvakumar, 2021).

The US, through USAID, also delivered a comprehensive programme aimed at empowering every facet of Sri Lankan society, including economic growth and trade, energy and the environment, governance, and humanitarian assistance. In particular, regarding aid towards governance, USAID's Increase Demand Engagement for

Accountability project focuses on strengthening CSOs to address issues such as gender inclusion, women's empowerment, human rights violations, and the need for increased transparency and autonomy within civil societies (USAID, 2022b). Meanwhile, USAID also tries to help promote a shared identity in Sri Lanka by increasing people's participation in local governments, reducing socio-economic disparities, and empowering Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim women and girls through civic education and capacity-building to prepare them for jobs in public and private institutions (USAID, 2022c).

Meanwhile, Asian actors have also been proactive in helping Sri Lanka to recover from post-war trauma. For example, former Japanese ambassador Nobuhito inaugurated a centre for psycho-social and mental health services to provide counselling in Kilinochchi, one of the hardest hit towns during the civil war, with many former LTTE members and other affected communities in need of counselling (IOM, 2012). The initiative comes in collaboration with the Family Rehabilitation Centre, which offers similar services elsewhere in the country under the International Organisation for Migration Sri Lankan branch (IOM, 2012). Shortly after the war, Japanese NGOs, such as the Japan Platform, also focused on delivering humanitarian aid to IDPs in the north, such as providing 4,440 families with shelter, digging 1,554 wells, providing 1,787 toilets, giving livelihood assistance to 5,719 families, and constructing six school buildings (Japan Platform, 2012). The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also announced that it would provide up to \$4 million in emergency grant aid for IDPs, helping those who were used as human shields by the LTTE and providing the necessary funds to supply IDPs with tents, emergency rations and drinking water (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009).

Japanese Buddhist organisations have also reached out to offer their support to Sri Lanka by providing large quantities of medical supplies, mainly to Ahangama, a small town in the Galle district, where Japanese monks coordinate closely with local authorities and the government, and locals widely support the initiative because it is coming from fellow Buddhist monks (Dhammaudaya-viharaya, n.d.). Japanese Buddhist organisations have been a part of foreign aid in Sri Lanka even during the war and have consistently continued to aid local communities through initiatives such as education aid for young monks since 2007 and the provision of scholarship grants since 2016 (Dhammaudaya-viharaya, n.d.).

Japanese aid towards Sri Lanka never stopped, even in the immediate post-war period. In 2017, Japan also gave Sri Lanka foreign aid worth 12,957 million yen (\$100 million USD) under ODA, focussing on the reconstruction of infrastructure for the war-affected northern provinces, such as construction and rehabilitation of roads, irrigation

facilities and portable water supply facilities, as well as providing consulting services to local construction workers (JICA, 2017). Mental support and reconciliation are of course important, but at the same time, Sri Lanka also has great demand for the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, especially in the Tamil areas that were destroyed by war. More recently, the Japanese Embassy (2021) also claims to have contributed to a plethora of infrastructure projects, such as building the Bandaranyake International Airport and the Upper Kotmale Hydro Power Project, investing in solar electric power generation, improving hospitals in Jaffna, manual de-mining of the north, and promoting coastal areas as tourist destinations. Japan remains one of the largest donors to Sri Lanka, although it has recently been surpassed by China. Tokyo is deft at managing relations between Buddhists in the south and providing quality aid to Tamils in the north, showing a good understanding of the cultural context of the country.

Finally, local superpower India is also an important actor for Sri Lanka. As an emerging donor, New Delhi is more inclined to see Sri Lanka as a development partner rather than the donor-recipient relations of traditional foreign aid. Not only is India the third largest bilateral donor for Sri Lanka after China and Japan, but there is also kinship between the Indian Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan Tamils, so New Delhi cannot ignore the events happening in Sri Lanka after the war, even if the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi forced India to refrain from being embedded in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. India also has the problem of taking in large numbers of Tamil refugees, as many of them refuse to return due to anti-Tamil sentiments from the Sinhalese, so there are no signs of repatriation of these people (Mayilvaganan, 2012). That being said, there are also geopolitical interests for India to remain engaged with Sri Lanka due to the latter's good relations with some of New Delhi's adversaries through the military aid given by China and Pakistan to end the war (Mayilvaganan, 2012). Therefore, India has strong interests in post-war Sri Lanka in terms of peace and reconciliation, but also geopolitics. In 2012, India launched a council estate that cost Rs 1,300 crore (approx. \$167 million USD) to build new homes for 43,000 Tamils displaced by civil war in three districts – Mannar, Mullaitivu and Jaffna – approved by then-Economic Development Minister Basil Rajapaksa, adding to New Delhi's commitment of 50,000 houses when Mahinda visited India in 2010 (Economic Times, 2012).

Although India's post-war economic aid concentrated in the North, India's most crucial support given to the GoSL after the war was the diplomatic support when Sri Lanka came under fire by the UN for alleged war crimes and human rights violations. India supported Resolution S-11 (2009), drafted by Sri Lanka, to appeal to sovereignty and territorial integrity to combat terrorism. New Delhi had to get on the good side of Sri

Lanka to counteract the strong relations formed between Sri Lanka, China, and Pakistan. However, Indian–Sri Lankan relations took a downturn in 2012 and 2013 when New Delhi supported UN Human Rights Council resolutions against Sri Lanka, which brought widespread criticism of India by Sri Lankan politicians (Thalpawila, 2014), while at the same time there was also pressure at home from the Tamil Nadu in addressing violence against Tamils by the Sinhalese state. India, however, amended the resolution to impede international involvement to investigate alleged war crimes (Thalpawila, 2014).

New Delhi must balance its relations between the Sinhalese majority government in Colombo and Tamils in the north who share kinship with Tamil Nadu at home, calling for greater accountability. However, true to India's status as an emerging donor, there is often little sign of direct intervention into Sri Lanka's ethnic reconciliation issue. This does not necessarily mean that India is not concerned with the issue of reconciliation, as in the past there have been several attempts from New Delhi to urge Sri Lanka to be more proactive with reconciliation. More recently, PM Modi, in a state visit to Sri Lanka, met with Mahinda and urged Sri Lanka to continue the reconciliation process with the Tamils: a promise which Mahinda made but which remains unfulfilled. India also offered a \$400 million credit line for Sri Lanka to develop its infrastructure and economy and a \$50 million credit line to help victims of the 2019 Easter Bombing that killed more than 250 people (Francis & Hussain, 2020). To help Sri Lanka tackle the recent economic crisis that hit in 2022, India has stepped up its economic assistance, with a \$200 million short-term loan from its Exim Bank to save Sri Lanka from bankruptcy after Sri Lanka's foreign reserves dipped lower than \$50 million (Chaudhury, 2022).

#### *6.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace in Sri Lanka*

##### Reconciliation Through Peace Education

While attempts to promote the notion of equal citizenship and ethnic tolerance in textbooks are helpful, the unequal access to education due to Sri Lankan politics prioritising the Sinhalese defeats the purpose of promoting these values in the first place (Chaudhury, 2022). Local NGOs also find it difficult to address the problem of quality of education, as they mainly supplement government efforts through improving the physical infrastructure of schools, while issues such as the lack of quality teachers must be addressed by the government (Chaudhury, 2022).

Government efforts to promote local education also have not had a significant impact on the existing problems with the education system in Sri Lanka, which is riddled with regional inequalities, such that students are often only taught in their own circles,

and are rarely exposed to other communities, languages and cultures, which does not contribute to inter-ethnic understanding (Cardozo, 2006). Furthermore, there is also a lack of sustainability, follow-up training and promotion of peace education for the longer term, especially at the provincial level, as each district has its own models of teaching and locals generally do not appreciate the kind of peace education promoted by the government (Cardozo, 2006).

The general lack of coordination between the government, local communities and international communities is also hampering the delivery of effective peace education in Sri Lanka. Peace education in itself is useful to help eliminate previous discriminatory viewpoints between groups, especially among youth, by humanizing other groups through notions of equality and ethnic tolerance. At the moment, actors at each level are trying to promote peace education on their own, without coordinating their efforts. In other words, although both top-down and bottom-up efforts exist regarding peace education, the two do not interact with each other enough for there to be any solid and coordinated response when delivering education programmes to the grassroots youth. There needs to be greater political will from the government to promote and coordinate with local education agencies on peace education.

Peace education alone cannot create sustainable peace unless negative educational practices that create hostilities are addressed (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). The government has already taken the first step in revising previously discriminatory and polarising aspects of Sri Lankan education, and likewise the grassroots have displayed some progress in breaking boundaries and reconciling with each other. However, once again, the priorities of Sri Lanka are focused too much on economic development rather than on promoting greater connectivity between people. Even if the government does launch a people-centred approach, it tends to lean towards prioritising the Sinhalese and their needs rather than marginalised minorities.

#### Peacebuilding by Local CSOs

While CSOs may have played an important role in channelling much-needed foreign aid, this is not without its weaknesses. As mentioned above, INGOs that operate in Sri Lanka are much stronger than INGOs in other parts of the world, and this contrasts with the fact that local NGOs are considerably weaker in Sri Lanka due to government regulations. This mismatch creates a situation where INGOs have begun to dominate the peace process by bypassing local authorities and directly collaborating with local grassroots.

While Sri Lanka was hit by a massive tsunami in the midst of a civil war and definitely needed international support, INGOs bypassing the government with narratives

such as human rights violations will not foster trust between Sri Lanka and the rest of international society. Instead of contributing to peace and stability through foreign aid and humanitarian aid, this approach caused Sri Lankan elites to turn against the international community. Part of hybrid peace is the ability of local communities to resist liberal peacebuilding and to bring their own alternatives to liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2006). One can say that Sri Lankan NGOs never left the framework of liberal peace, as they were heavily supported by Western liberal actors, and at times, this was at the expense of GoSL. Without trust between GoSL and international society, as well as the government and local NGOs, it is difficult for positive peace to flourish. After the war, this issue has been addressed, as many international actors began to re-establish relations with Sri Lanka, and local NGOs became much more closely coordinated with the government.

Regarding specific NGOs, groups like the Sarvodaya movement have also encountered some difficulties, particularly in the reconciliation aspects. Due to the majoritarian nature of Sri Lankan society, a good majority of the staff who run the Sarvodaya headquarters are also Sinhalese, and this has impacted projects on the ground (Johnson, 2010). For example, Tamil local leaders may be consulted during the project-planning phase, but the final decision-making authority must still come from the Sinhalese-dominated headquarters (Johnson, 2010). Although the movement has been one of the first organisations to give leadership to women, Sri Lanka has one of the lowest numbers of women in parliament compared with other South Asian countries (Ariyaratne, 2015). That being said, these are not issues that can be addressed by grassroots actors alone. Despite some of its operational flaws, Sarvodaya has been one of the more successful NGOs in bringing different ethnicities of the country together, through close coordination with the government, and is often one step ahead of the government in providing local grassroots with the necessary material needs and skills to empower their position vis-à-vis the government.

Likewise, the SDF also encounters the problems such as having trouble balancing between Sinhalese and Tamil politicians working with the SDF. Also, it appears that the SDF mainly operates in the south as well as in Sinhalese majority areas. While promoting ethnic harmony is important everywhere in the country, reconciliation cannot be achieved by only raising awareness in one group. However, credit must be given to the SDF for garnering close support from the government, giving legitimacy to its grassroots-focused activities in Sri Lanka, where local groups are often weakened by the government.

### Role of International Actors

Sri Lanka is often supported by a handful of foreign donors in addition to its own home-grown efforts to achieve post-war reconstruction, peace, and reconciliation. While economic development has been progressing at a steady pace, reconciliation has still been sluggish, and this is unlikely to be an aspect that can be addressed by foreign aid or international pressure by the UN trying to look into alleged human rights violations. Foreign actors may help the reconciliation process to a certain extent, but ultimately the effort must come from a consensus between the people of Sri Lanka, including the Sinhalese-dominated government, and the rest of the minority communities, such as Tamils and Muslims. To date, there is no clear evidence that this is happening, despite some positive developments at the local level to promote connectivity between ethnicities together with the government. Sri Lanka has not moved beyond the notion of state security, even a decade after the end of the war.

Another problem is that the ‘terrorist’ label has fallen from the Tamils but is now being attached to the country’s Muslim community. Even here, there are signs of blowback from liberal peacebuilding because much of the former leadership of the LTTE has been killed, so there will probably never be a process of negotiation between the Sinhalese and Tamils over the controversial means pursued by both sides during the war. The failure to do so created what Richmond and Tellidis (2012) identify as illiberal peace under Mahinda’s regime and a potential security state apparatus under Gotabaya.

To this point, Sri Lanka enjoys a much smoother relationship with its Asian partners, whether they are liberal actors like Japan or India, or illiberal actors like China. This is because Asian actors are less concerned about whether Sri Lanka is liberal or not, instead mainly focussing on economic development, while only seldom mentioning the issue of reconciliation, as it is a domestic affair.

## **6.4: Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka**

### *6.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka*

China developed close relations with the Sri Lankan government during the final few years of the civil war. Despite Beijing’s consistent claims of non-intervention and the respect of sovereignty in a country’s domestic affairs, China has consistently sided with GoSL, as Mahinda developed close ties with both Hu Jintao during the war and Xi Jinping after the war. GoSL needed the most support at the end of the war when Sri Lanka as a whole was under heavy pressure from the UN and the West for alleged war crimes, and GoSL found military support in China, as well as Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.

Sri Lanka appreciates the principles of non-intervention brought forth by its Asian partners. After the war, Sri Lanka's then foreign secretary Palitha Kohona said that traditional Western donors had all retreated, but neighbours from the East were replacing them, and that Asian countries are rich and do things differently, and do not tell others how to behave beyond a quiet chat (De Alwis, 2010). While relations with the West suffered a series of setbacks due to human rights violations by both sides during the civil war, Sri Lanka looked towards Asian donors as a source of economic development. In theory, tangible progress through economic development is used for Sri Lanka to maintain internal stability.

For China, working with Sri Lanka has given it the opportunity to help construct the Hambantota port, as one of the many ports that will give China access to the Indian Ocean. Due to Sri Lanka's proximity to India, it is also a means for Beijing to deter New Delhi by pulling Sri Lanka towards China. Interestingly, as a means to maintain internal stability from the Chinese side, Mahinda announced a joint press communique with Hu during a state visit to China in 2007 with a renewed resolve to fight against the 'three evil forces' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism (USC, 2007). This is a significant step for Sri Lanka and China working under the framework of state security to guard against threats of 'extremism'. In some ways, Sri Lanka has found companionship with China due to the similarities of their problems, as they are both fighting a bitter war against terrorism, for which they are willing to sacrifice human rights despite combating 'terrorists'. For Sri Lanka it is the LTTE, and for China it is the ETIM.

Military cooperation between the two began to rise, so much that on Sri Lanka's victory day parade, the bulk of the military hardware displayed by the Sri Lankan army was made in China, much of this coming from the \$37.6 million deal signed in 2007 (Gardner, 2009). All this points to the fact that China became a major contributor to GoSL's military victory over the LTTE because Beijing wants to be on the good side of the Rajapaksa regime, positioning itself as a major development partner in post-war Sri Lanka. After all, Sri Lanka has much to offer to China as well. Allowing China access to Sri Lanka's strategic position in the Indian Ocean has become a big concern for India towards Chinese influence in its periphery.

#### *6.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka*

None of what was said above suggests that the more pressing issue of reconciliation will be addressed under the framework of developmental peace. While reconciliation is an important element in maintaining internal stability, this is an issue that falls under domestic affairs, as not only China, but other Asian actors are unlikely to press Sri Lanka



over the West.

That being said, economic development can also be impartial where donors like China are less concerned with the local ethnicity in each area and invest equally. This is important considering that post-war Sri Lanka has not received much development outside the capital area in the South, as Tamil areas in the North and East are still relatively underdeveloped. Whether or not this impartiality helps to make Sri Lankans want to reconcile with each other needs further discussion in the practice section.

#### *6.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka*

##### Hambantota Port

One cannot talk about modern China–Sri Lanka relationship without mentioning the Hambantota Port and the controversy behind it. The Hambantota port is part of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy, which also includes Gwadar port in Pakistan, Chittagong port in Bangladesh, and Kyaukphyu port in Myanmar (Marantidou, 2014). China’s Exim bank funded the initial phase of the port’s construction in 2008 with the assistance of the China Harbour Engineering Company and Sino Hydro Corporation, both state-owned Chinese companies, with a total of approximately \$400 million (Marantidou, 2014).

Under Xi Jinping, the Hambantota project became a part of the BRI, but this in turn has created considerable controversy about the ownership of the port and China’s real intentions behind this allegedly ‘commercial’ port. In Sri Lanka, there have also been voices of concern about Mahinda’s government becoming too close to China and perhaps too much in debt to the Chinese as well. The handover of the Hambantota port to China was a massive warning sign for other BRI partners as well, especially those with Chinese-built ports such as Pakistan and Myanmar.

Simultaneously, Sri Lanka’s bloating debt problem cannot be solely blamed on China. Western analysts claim that Sri Lanka did not default on its debt even after the bloody civil war, where foreign investors such as China and Japan own roughly one-fifth of its \$35 billion debt (King, 2022). Sri Lanka, however, defaulted for the first time in history in 2019, merely 30 months after Gotabaya was elected president. Sri Lanka’s debt problem stems from mismanagement since 2009. Despite being rich in resources, post-war Sri Lanka produced for domestic markets rather than for export markets, which made it heavily reliant on imports without having the means to secure much-needed foreign currency reserves (King, 2022). In other words, post-war Sri Lanka took the opposite path to the Asian developmental state and did not become an export-oriented economy. Sri Lanka was already heavily in debt, but undertook the Hambantota project anyway, despite

feasibility studies showing that the port would not work, since it only attracted 34 ships in 2012 from one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world (Habib, 2018).

Mahinda will not be in office to see the third phase of the Hambantota port, as he suffered political defeat in 2015, and along with that, the Sirisena government inherited the massive amounts of debt left behind. After a series of negotiations in 2017, Sri Lanka's cabinet ministers signed a concessional agreement with China's state-owned CM Ports and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) as a Private Public Partnership where CM ports will be leased a 70% stake of Hambantota, while SLPA retains the remaining 30% for 99 years (Moramudali, 2020). This effectively gave China control over the operations in the Hambantota port, and although it was portrayed as a massive win for the Chinese in China's domestic media, it drew massive criticism of the Sirisena government by domestic actors in Sri Lanka. There are also concerns on the encroachment of sovereignty through BRI projects, such as claims that Beijing makes its partners accept certain investments that do not profit and eventually uses accumulated debts to acquire the projects as along with political influence in that country (Ganeshalingam, 2016). The term 'debt diplomacy' or 'debt-trap diplomacy' also surfaced around this time, and was used by then-US vice president Mike Pence (2018) in his remarks towards China, although this is something that the Chinese have continuously denied over the years (CGTN, 2022).

Whether China offered to undertake the Hambantota project knowing that Sri Lanka would struggle to repay its debts, we may never know for sure. Instead, we should accept the reality that the port has been leased to China and consider whether this project will be beneficial to locals or whether it is simply another white elephant project, like many other projects authorised for Chinese construction under the Rajapaksa regime. It is possible that as in the case of the Mes Aynak copper mines in Afghanistan, which have seen no development for a decade after Chinese companies won their contracts, China is much more interested in occupying land in Hambantota for its strategic placement in the Indian Ocean so that others cannot use it, rather than developing and profiting from it. The geopolitical gain from Hambantota in itself is a profit for Beijing.

There is no direct evidence to suggest that Hambantota will be used as a military port, as PM Wickremesinghe said that China has already been informed that the Hambantota port cannot be used for military purposes and its security will be under the control of the Sri Lankan navy (Reuters, 2018a). There have been past cases of Chinese submarines docking in the Colombo port, which caused serious security concerns to India. According to the Indian media, Sri Lanka allowing a Chinese submarine to dock is a sign that Mahinda is emboldened by the fact that India's strategic clout is being weakened by Chinese strategic pressure in the north (Parashar, 2014). To this point, controversy around

the Hambantota port, or any port in Sri Lanka that receives Chinese military vessels, may destabilise regional security around the Indian Ocean, and Sri Lanka must be cautious about how to balance Chinese and Indian interests.

Outside the port, there have also been considerable efforts in the economic development of the Hambantota district itself, especially because it is the home district of the Rajapaksa family. Weeraketiya is Mahinda Rajapaksa's hometown, and this means that a significant amount of his political support comes from the Hambantota district. Therefore, one can expect his administration to focus serious efforts into the economic development of this district, as it was also one of the hardest hit districts by the 2004 tsunami. However, reality has shown that despite the hype around Chinese investment and Hambantota being designated as a pillar of the *Mahinda Chinthana* (Carrai, 2019), it is still little more than a sleepy rural district, with slightly more Chinese-built roads and buildings. Major investments have taken place, but Hambantota remains one of the poorest districts in the country.

In a personal interview, S.I. Keethaponcalan (2022) expressed the belief that there is a debt trap in working with China, and Sri Lanka is caught at the end of it. A reason for the economic crisis that hit Sri Lanka in 2022 was that China refused to restructure the loans borrowed for all mega-projects, and this also damaged the previously good relations shared between the two governments. People took to the streets to protest against the government for the rising food prices and unaffordable living costs, forcing Mahinda to resign as prime minister, as well as other members of his family, such as Chamal and Basil Rajapaksa, who held prominent positions in the government (Perera, 2022). Gotabaya initially expressed that he had no intention to resign, but Sri Lanka has effectively run dry on foreign reserves, and this is detrimental to a country that relies heavily on imported food and fuel. In May 2022, Sri Lanka's finance minister Ali Sabry told the parliament that the country's foreign exchange reserves had dropped below \$50 million, the IMF was not Aladdin's magic lamp, and that Sri Lanka was on the verge of bankruptcy and was working with India and China on talks about aid (Srinivasan, 2022). Gotabaya's government previously blamed Covid and the Easter 2019 attacks, which discouraged tourism, one of Sri Lanka's largest sources of foreign reserves (Perera, 2022). The tourism sector had seen a steady rise at the end of the civil war in 2009 and peaked in 2018 at a value of \$5.61 billion, but it fell for the first time in a decade in 2019 to \$4.66 billion and fell again sharply to a mere \$1.08 billion in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). While data support Gotabaya's claims, the president did not mention that China's role as Sri Lanka's biggest lender has had a significant impact on Sri Lanka's current economic crisis. Critics in the past have warned against Sri Lanka borrowing from China to spend on

unnecessary facilities with low returns, and now Sri Lanka is forced to take extreme measures such as using a barter system to pay off its \$251 million oil import debt to Iran with \$5 million worth of tea each month (BBC, 2022).

Loans for projects like the Hambantota port may merely be the tip of the iceberg for the amount of debt from Sri Lanka's unprofitable projects. Like Gwadar, the port itself is a target of discontent by locals. A large part of Sri Lanka's current problems can be traced back to mismanagement by the Rajapaksa regime, especially when feasibility studies in the past have proven that the Hambantota is simply not viable. Despite this, Mahinda wanted China to fund its construction even when Sri Lanka was already heavily in debt to its existing donors like the West, India, and Japan. Borrowing from China only worsened its problems. Staying true to China's policy of sovereignty, Beijing does not tell Sri Lanka where or what to invest. The initial proposal for a port in Hambantota came from Sri Lanka, and China took the opportunity to expand its alternatives to the Indian Ocean. The following section will look at how China behaves elsewhere in the country, with a specific focus on whether developmental peace helps with Sri Lanka's biggest problem and obstacle to emancipatory peace: ethnic reconciliation.

#### Working with Underrepresented Groups, Locals and Reconciliation

This section looks at whether the situation with reconciliation will change for the better or worse between China and the BRI. As we have already seen above, Sri Lanka did not focus adequate efforts on ethnic reconciliation between the Sinhalese and Tamils after the war. While some measures led by the government in collaboration with various domestic CSOs, supported by foreign INGOs, have been effective to a certain extent, the satisfaction between the Sinhalese and Tamils appears to have shown no significant improvements over the years. This can be seen in the Tamils' terror when Gotabaya was elected president (Stratford, 2022).

There is also a problem with former LTTE commanders serving in the government, such as Karuna Amman. The senior solicitor to the International Criminal Court Anura Meddegoda stated that Karuna has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that the Sri Lankan government must make a complaint to the International Criminal Court (Fernando, 2020). Instead of accusing him of war crimes, GoSL rewarded Karuna with a seat in the parliament and appointed him as the non-Cabinet Minister of National Integration. While one must admit that the surrender of Karuna's forces was crucial in ending the civil war, it has made later reconciliation difficult, as satisfaction from both the Sinhalese and Tamils remains low because they are unable to get justice against former war criminals from both sides that continue to serve in the government,

not to mention that the Muslim minorities in the country are being subjected to increased marginalisation after the war, shifting the target of Buddhist nationalism from Tamils to Muslims.

In the same interview, Keethaponcalan (2022) also said in that Tamils and Muslims do not hold the Chinese in high regard, and this is because they know that China aided GoSL during the war. While Sri Lanka has been under fire at the UN for its lack of progress on reconciliation, China has praised and defended the government, showing that it was clearly on the side of the government at the end of the war. Ambassador Chen Xu (2021), at the 48<sup>th</sup> session of the UN Human Rights Council, commended the Sri Lankan government for protecting human rights, promoting reconciliation, and combating terrorism, and China is against any interference in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs using human rights as an excuse. From the Sri Lankan side, foreign minister Dinesh Gunawardena denounced the council's resolution on human rights, accountability, and reconciliation as a political move against Sri Lanka, where China's foreign ministry representative Wang Wenbin claims that China is against politicizing human rights affairs in Sri Lanka and wants international society to respect the sovereignty of other countries (NDTV, 2021). Sri Lanka also announced that it will withdraw from UN commitments to reconciliation and achieve sustainable peace through its own national efforts: a move which some analysts have criticised because Sri Lanka's reconciliation needs an international mechanism that can be trusted and effective, especially since it has repeatedly failed to make visible progress and people who have experienced human rights abuse are deeply disappointed after waiting years for justice that would not manifest (Ruwanpathirana, 2020).

An argument supporting China's BRI in Sri Lanka is that the Chinese do not have a preference as to which area to invest in. Therefore, we are more likely to see economic development branching out from the capital into less developed areas around the country. Sri Lanka's BRI director Maya Majueran says China's 'green silk road' is a major improvement to the environmental sustainability of the BRI. Until five years ago, Sri Lankans knew little of the BRI, compared to now, when the initiative has made tangible progress and benefitted many people (Xiao, 2021). Yasiru Ranaraja, another expert on the BRI in Sri Lanka, also claims that initiatives such as the Colombo-Katunayaka Expressway have brought immense convenience to Sri Lankans, especially given that the south is a popular tourist spot but tourists formerly had to spend an entire day reaching their holiday destination as opposed to a one-hour drive on roads built by China (Xiao, 2021). Most Chinese sources focus on the BRI's achievements in the south, including the controversial Hambantota port, but there has also been considerable

development in the North, mainly focused on improving connectivity through roads.

China has constructed a total of 72 roads covering 172 km between Jaffna and Vavuniya. These roads were difficult to construct, not only because they were narrow but also because progress had to be slow, since they were the only roads in the area to many villages and care had to be taken to avoid disturbing the daily lives of locals (Ministry of Commerce, 2021). A local shopkeeper told the Chinese reporters that he was thankful to the Chinese, as roads brought better business, and the state-owned China State Construction Engineering also created jobs by using local labour in the area (Ministry of Commerce, 2021). The China State Construction Engineering Corporation was also awarded a contract to construct a 28km irrigation tunnel, the largest in South Asia, to deliver water into the northern dry zones, which will solve the drinking water problem for 100,000 families (Tractebel, 2021).

While efforts have been put into developing the less developed North and East, the bulk of Chinese investments are still in the capital area. The Colombo International Financial City, formerly known as the Colombo Port City, is by far the biggest FDI project in the country, with the second phase costing \$13 billion, and Beijing claims that it has created more than 80,000 jobs (Wijayasiri & Senaratne, 2018). Other notable projects include the Colombo Port expansion, which modernised Sri Lanka's primary hub due to capacity concerns in the past, as well as the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, located in Hambantota, but this is a proven white elephant project (Wijayasiri & Senaratne, 2018). Furthermore, China has also been actively involved in the provision of housing for Tamils in the north, a role that was traditionally undertaken by India, but this has been met with limited success for Beijing.

A comparison between China's BRI and Japan's ODA is useful in determining the different ways in which locals can benefit (or do not benefit) from foreign aid. Chinese infrastructures are generally much larger in scale and focus on benefitting large regions of the country, while Japanese ones are more tailored and community-focused for specific areas. For example, JICA's (2011) rehabilitation project in Jaffna had the primary objective of helping locals to rebuild their livelihoods through the development of local agriculture organisations, fishery, and women's community to promote economic growth. The focus on agriculture and fishery was because local manufacturing and tourism were weak and underdeveloped, and the focus on women's organisations was due to the fact that the civil war caused 17% of Jaffna households to be headed by women who had no work experience but had to become their families' breadwinners while raising children (JICA, 2011). As seen above with Chinese-built roads and ports, Chinese projects are more generalised, while Japanese projects are more specific, and the two Asian donors do have

a certain degree of synergy, even without direct cases of cooperation.

However, considering the geopolitical rivalry between China and Japan, as well as India, there are more cases of rivalry than synergy in Sri Lanka. India and Japan, to counteract the growing Chinese economic clout in the south, agreed to undertake Colombo's new port project along the country's eastern coastline with the East Container Terminal, but this project was terminated, with Sri Lanka allocating a different West Container Project, much to the dismay of Tokyo and New Delhi (Haidar & Srinivasan, 2021). In theory, collaboration in Sri Lanka between Asian actors would be ideal for the rehabilitation and accelerated development of the impoverished areas of Sri Lanka, though in reality, China, Japan, and India – three of Sri Lanka's biggest donors – are regional rivals and are more interested in competing against each other rather than working together.

Meanwhile, China has also been trying to compete with India in terms of providing housing for Tamils in the north, and this has exposed some of the weaknesses of developmental peace to its lack of knowledge of the local context. Tamil media claim that China prefers to focus on the south upon requests from Mahinda to invest in politically important areas to strengthen the Rajapaksa clan, since China is so good at building infrastructure without asking questions on human rights (Tamil Guardian, 2020b). In a surprising move in 2021, China warmed up to the Tamils in the north when ambassador Qi Zhenhong toured the northern districts of the country (Subramanian, 2021). This came shortly after a Chinese solar company decided to suspend operations in Jaffna and move to the Maldives due to security concerns of a 'third party', but some suspected that this was retaliation against the government's cancellation of fertiliser imports that did not pass local tests (Subramanian, 2021). Although Chinese investments have become visible outside the capital area, such a degree of close engagement with the Tamil society still came as a surprise, as this is the first time a Chinese ambassador had stayed overnight in the north, engaging in rare but significant public diplomacy by talking with local CSO representatives and improving China's image in the eyes of Tamils (Subramanian, 2021). With that being said, China's council estate for Tamils has encountered significant hurdles regarding actual contributions.

### Issue with Islamophobia

Sri Lanka has in recent years faced a growing problem of Islamophobia following a series of marginalisation against Muslims after the civil war. Muslims have effectively replaced Tamils since the civil war as the target of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism.

Muslims are a minority group that make up roughly 10% of the population in Sri

Lanka. During the war, Muslims were not as oppressed, as GoSL was preoccupied with fighting against the LTTE. However, this changed after 2009 when the BBS, a Buddhist nationalist organisation, designated Muslims as a new threat to the economic, social, and cultural interests of the Sinhala Buddhists (Silva, 2016). Muslims were identified as villains for their prevalent urban presence in trade and commerce, as well as their clannish behaviours (Silva, 2016). This has led to a plethora of often baseless anti-Muslim propaganda deployed by the BBS in both public rallies and social media, creating ethnic hatred and social tensions between Sinhalese and Muslims, and to make matters worse, the BBS is not alone in their endeavours, as they merely represent a smaller proportion of the more extreme manifestation of ethnic and religious polarisation in post-war Sri Lanka (Silva, 2016).

Anti-Muslim sentiment further increased in 2019 after the infamous Easter Bombing, when eight suicide bombers from the Islamic State detonated bombs at churches and hotels where foreigners stayed, which Sri Lankan media used as a chance to further attack local Muslims, without mentioning that existing anti-Muslim propaganda had played a major role in radicalizing people, as political leaders neglected the problem despite having intelligence of a probable attack (Haniffa, 2021). Interestingly, Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks on members of the 'US-led coalition and Christians in Sri Lanka' (BBC, 2019b). This event led to further Islamophobia, as Sri Lankans rallied to elect strongman Gotabaya as president, and key terms on the internet begin associating Islam and Muslims with terms such as 'death' and 'destruction' (Carnerero, 2019). Yet, Sri Lankan Muslims are wrongfully accused by Buddhist groups, as it would be strange to target churches rather than Buddhist temples if this were truly an attack on the Sinhalese.

In reality, the Easter Bombings were the events that groups like the BBS needed to justify their nationalistic remarks, and Buddhist nationalism has persisted in Sri Lanka even after the war. Buddhist nationalism is rooted in the reality that the Sinhalese are a lonely race that fear isolation. Sinhalese may be the majority in Sri Lanka, but they are a minority on the international stage. Unlike Tamils, who can find kinship in India, and Muslims, who can appeal to the larger Islamic community around the world, the Sinhalese have only had Sri Lanka. The fear of isolation, coupled with notions of *sinhadipa* and *dhammadipa*, have created an entitlement to rule by the majority, as Sri Lanka is the only Sinhala Buddhist country in the world, and they will have nowhere to live if the island is ruled by any other races (Senanayake, 2021).

China's entry into Sri Lanka has the potential to make Islamophobia much worse as a side effect of embracing China's developmental peace. The entire BRI and Port City



project entered Sri Lanka under an exclusive government policy to attract high net-worth individuals looking for investment and residence at the expense of neglecting the everyday needs of ordinary Sri Lankans as well as sustaining violence against Muslims communities (Ruwanpura et al., 2020). Like Sri Lanka, China is also a majoritarian country where the Han majority dominates domestic policies. China and Sri Lanka have come together previously to combat the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism – a concept that Beijing uses to justify its persecution of Uighur Muslims at home. In other words, China endorses the type of anti-Muslim behaviour expressed by a small group in Sri Lanka, which has serious implications for the proliferation of human rights in Asia. Sri Lankan local media reveal that the Chinese Embassy in Colombo spearheaded and funded one of the government’s anti-Muslim propagandas, shortly after President Gotabaya was revealed speaking in racial slurs against Muslims on television during a break in Wadapitiya, a political talk show (Colombo Telegraph, 2020). Endorsing discrimination against religious minorities is not something that will create sustainable emancipatory peace, and if anything, it has sown the seeds of future conflicts by cornering people and forcing them to resort to violence to be heard.

#### *6.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Sri Lanka*

##### Hambantota Port and the Debt Trap

A familiar question to be asked about the Hambantota Port is whether the locals in the areas are benefitting from the economic development brought by the port. In practice, while not on the scale of Gwadar, locals are feeling the pressure, as the port is beginning to strangle their livelihoods. Fishermen near the port, in particular, feel that there are increased restrictions to their movements, but remain somewhat optimistic that the situation will improve in the coming years (Muller, 2019). Many of these locals are strong supporters of the Rajapaksa family, giving Gotabaya 66% of the votes during the 2019 presidential campaign and sending three Rajapaksa, namely Mahinda’s son Namal, brother Chamal and nephew Ajith, to parliament (Subramanian, 2022). However, some people are regretting this after the surge in prices for basic necessities in the recent financial crisis, while opposition candidate Milani Hareem recalls Mahinda’s past promises of building a city ‘no less than Colombo’ in Hambantota that did not come to fruition (Subramanian, 2022). No city on the scale of Colombo can be seen in Hambantota, or, in fact, anywhere outside the capital area. Connectivity has improved in Hambantota, as Chinese loans have helped to construct some much-needed roads and highways, which

have improved the overall accessibility of the district, but other facilities remain mostly empty and underused, such as the Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium and the Shangri La luxury hotel 10 km away from the port (Muller, 2019). Considering the amount spent in Hambantota on unprofitable projects, it is not difficult to see the reasons for Sri Lanka's debt crisis.

Furthermore, protests broke out in Hambantota during the initial announcement by the Sirisena government that the port would be leased to China for 99 years. In 2017, a violent clash between local Buddhist monks and pro-government supporters forced the police to disperse the crowd with water cannons and tear gas, resulting in more than ten people being hospitalised (Shepard, 2017). When the government initially announced the Hambantota project, locals were already sceptical about where the government would acquire 15,000 acres of land, and only later determined that land and farms from their villages would be taken by the government for a project over which Sri Lanka would have no control (Shepard, 2017). The non-transparent nature of the BRI is well documented in other countries, and this can seriously harm the accountability of host country governments if they are equally non-transparent, creating rifts between the political elites and local grassroots. To make matters worse, the handover of the Hambantota port has widespread implications that have even agitated the Tamil diaspora community in Tamil Nadu of India. In 2021, Tamil Nadu police were on high alert over possible protests by pro-LTTE ultranationalist groups. Gotabaya's government passed the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill to give China complete control of Hambantota port: a move that may agitate Tamil nationalists to stage protests in India (IANS, 2021).

What is happening in Sri Lanka resembles the case of Pakistan, in that locals can never know what to expect from BRI projects. Projects under developmental peace are often at the request of the government rather than local demand, which contrasts with alternate donors such as the EU and Japan, which are much more focused on local needs. For example, the EU has projects such as providing aid to uprooted people, contributing €50 m (\$53m USD) to the owner-driven reconstruction of 20,000 houses for returning IDPs, and €60 m (\$64m USD) on socio-economic development, poverty reduction, basic infrastructure for vulnerable communities and strengthening local governance in line with the strategy set out by the government under *Mahinda Chinthana* (European Union, 2016).

Japan, under JICA, has also launched a 222-million-yen (approx. \$1.6m USD) project in the northern district of Trincomalee where locals are encouraged to participate in the improvement of the agriculture sector of the region, targeting 1,500 households and 30 frontline government officers to improve community-based organisation, community-managed rehabilitation of rural infrastructures, and technology for agriculture and

livestock (JICA, 2008). However, Japanese ODA in the past has been criticised for being too focused on the hardware (infrastructure) of development without addressing software issues (governance and institutions) (Menocal et al., 2011). Since the 1990s, Tokyo has sought to address these shortcomings while preserving the unique traits of Japanese ODA, trying to involve a larger number of stakeholders both within and outside the country to boost the recognition of Japanese ODA on the national and international levels (Menocal et al., 2011).

As a fellow Asian actor, China's BRI is like Japanese ODA, but Beijing is repeating the same problems that Japan experienced in the past with the lack of local input and too much focus on hard infrastructure without addressing governance. China's developmental peace appears to not address governance at all, though, as BRI projects are usually large-scale infrastructure that are government-to-government top-down initiatives that do not require the inputs of local residents. In such cases, projects that do not live up to the expectations of locals, such as the land grabs in Hambantota, will weaken the faith between political elites and local grassroots, and therefore lessen the chances of reconciliation.

Another criticism of the Hambantota port's handover to China pertains to the issue of colonialism. Leases were a common tactic used by Western powers in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries to secure infrastructure development, create boundaries in Africa, and construct military bases, where more recently, Russia has done the same to sovereign countries of the Soviet Union (Carrai, 2019). Ironically, China during the Qing dynasty was one of the loudest voices speaking against lease agreements, as European powers used this tactic to open Chinese markets, and eventually leases became a cession of territory and encroachment on Chinese sovereignty (Carrai, 2019). More recently, Gotabaya has tried to defend the Hambantota port project by proving that it is not a debt trap. He claimed that in the 13 times he toured China before becoming president, he saw significant development in China's rural areas, and thought that Sri Lanka should also aim for the same rural development to raise people's living conditions (Adaderana, 2020). A reason why the Hambantota port has not been able to attract the desired amount of maritime traffic, in contrast to the Colombo port that is still Sri Lanka's main economic port, is because Hambantota is a relatively isolated district without an industrial hub around it. China has tried to address this deficiency by buying 15,000 acres of land to build factories and offices around the port complex (Wibisono, 2019), but this enraged locals because the land for the port came at the expense of local villages and farms.

By now, a trend should be evident between the two ports of Hambantota and Gwadar in Pakistan, where there is a lack of understanding of local realities on the ground.

BRI projects are negotiated directly between governments, without much local input, and this will cause the hostilities seen in Hambantota (Heiduk & Sakaki, 2019). Another possible explanation for China's negligence of local concerns is that officials in Beijing believe that any problems created by the BRI will eventually be solved by it (Rolland, 2017). This may be a plausible explanation, as it relates to China's own experience of using economic development to maintain internal stability, but reality shows that Hambantota is not getting the economic development it needs for the port to flourish in the first place. This leads to the conclusion that China is more interested in occupying the area for geopolitical rather than economic aims. The Hambantota port shows that there is a false promise of developmental peace given by China, using economic development disguise as geopolitical aims. This does not necessarily mean that China will militarise the port, as Sri Lanka has expressed that it will not allow Hambantota to be used for military purposes. However, India is deeply concerned with the recent docking of a Chinese military survey ship, the Yuan Wang 5 designed to monitor satellites and rocket launches, which Beijing claims is there for research activities (Jayasinghe, 2022). Sri Lanka defended their actions, saying that China is only given the same treatment as similar ships from India and the US that have docked before (Jayasinghe, 2022). Unlike Pakistan, which clearly opposes India, Sri Lanka prefers to adopt a balanced approach between China and India. The problem with Sri Lanka accumulating Chinese debt is that debt can be used as political leverage for Beijing to pull Sri Lanka away from New Delhi, weakening India's position in South Asia.

#### Working with Underrepresented Groups, Locals and Reconciliation

Due to Beijing's lack of understanding of the local context, as opposed to India, which has been working on Tamil housing for many years, China has encountered considerable difficulties in working with Tamils in the north. In 2018, China offered to build houses and roads in the rural areas, as well as to rebuild the Palaly airport and Kankesanthurai Harbour, which were destroyed during the civil war, at a much lower price than any of its competitors, but local Tamils demanded traditional brick housing instead of the concrete housing planned by Chinese firms (Aneez, 2018).

The Chinese council estate in the north and east has caused some concerns for India. India and the Tamil National Alliance told PM Wickremesinghe that India objects to the way that Sri Lanka abandoned the tendering process and suddenly handed the project over to a Chinese company, but more importantly, India has prior experience of the 'contractor-driven' model for war refugees causing trouble, as residents did not get along with their contractors, so instead India pursued an 'owner-driven model' where the

Indian government constructed 45,000 houses using local labour, boosting the local economy in the process (Global Tamil News, 2018). India's owner-driven system was more successful than existing contractor-driven models because it ensured transparency in decision-making, resource allocation, disbursement, and utilisation (George & Gunaweera, 2018). Houses built by contractor-driven models, such as those built by the Sri Lankan army and other agencies, were built without consultation with locals and, in general, used lower quality building materials, with residents having concerns about the capacity of their contractors due to their lack of transparency and accountability (George & Gunaweera, 2018). Interestingly, prior housing schemes clearly demonstrated that the Tamils wanted brick housing, and yet China still offered to build with concrete. This shows that Beijing is making the same mistakes as previous contractors, while India has opted to shift towards greater local ownership. In fact, the concrete material proposed by China is also a concern, as houses built with fly ash from the Norocholai coal fire power plant are an environmental hazard, and Chinese-built single door housing is not fit for Tamils, since traditional Tamil houses need two doors because there are items that Tamils do not take out from the front door (Global Tamil News, 2018).

Finally, in contrast to India exploiting local labour and giving a boost to the local economy, the time-frame to complete 40,000 houses before the elections on 8<sup>th</sup> January 2020 was impossible and would require China to bring in large numbers of Chinese workers and thus deprive locals of participation, and of course, India is concerned about potential security threats posed by an influx of Chinese nationals into the north (Global Tamil News, 2018). Local protests demanding brick buildings ultimately came to fruition, as Sri Lanka reversed its decision to award China a \$300 m housing deal and PM Wickremesinghe announced that construction would instead be completed by two Sri Lankan companies in collaboration with Indian firm ND Enterprises (Tamil Guardian, 2018b). India is more successful than China in providing housing for Tamils due to its familiarity with Tamil culture and experience of working with Tamils in the past, which is not something a newcomer like China can learn in the short term.

Regarding working with locals and exploiting local labour, there is some criticism that to deliver large-scale infrastructure in time, Chinese companies need to bring their own workers, leading to criticism that China only uses its own workers instead of hiring locals. In the case of Sri Lanka, these claims are not true, as BRI projects are large in scale and require a diverse labour force. Chinese firms must bring their own workers to Sri Lanka because many local workers have already migrated in search of better pay and those who remain do not usually work in the unskilled labour market. According to a report by the International Labour Organisation, there are significant skill

gaps in the labour market of Sri Lanka, and this has been a problem since the early 1970s, with high rates of unemployed educated youth (ILO, 2016). The problem persists today due to significant gaps in people's proficiency in English and computer science (ILO, 2016).

One can also expect that Sri Lankans will have difficulty finding employment with Chinese companies when there is a language barrier, but Sri Lankans are trying to change this reality by putting more effort into learning Mandarin, even if some people feel dissatisfied because too many jobs are being given to the Chinese (BBC, 2017). Research shows that although many Sri Lanka students are enthusiastic about learning the Chinese language, many of them still have difficulties communicating in Chinese due to the lack of understanding of Chinese culture, which creates misunderstandings and confusion when communicating with native Chinese (Kandambi, 2020). These are long-term issues that can be resolved through classroom and curriculum reforms. The study of Chinese by Sri Lankans is a positive sign towards potentially greater local ownership of projects, as those with language proficiency can be given managerial positions in BRI projects that are currently mostly dominated by the Chinese due to the lack of expertise around the country.

However, language is a sensitive issue in Sri Lanka. China's entry and introduction of Chinese as a popular business language has raised some concerns among Tamil groups in the country. China's awareness of issues such as language and ethnicity is not particularly high. According to an Indian media outlet, Sri Lankans have been in major debate after two back-to-back instances where Mandarin was written on signboards while Tamil was not, sparking worries about whether there is a Chinese 'cultural hegemony' going on in the country (Swarajya, 2021). Going against Sri Lanka's trilingual policy of Sinhala, Tamil and English, the BRI project Colombo Port City had signs replacing Tamil with Mandarin, news of which went viral on Sri Lankan social media and Tamil groups (Swarajya, 2021). Local authorities defended this as temporary signage addressing local Sinhala and Chinese workers, but the fact that Tamil was not even included on the signs was worrying, given that many Tamils are actually employed in the BRI. This is not to say that China disregards the importance of the Tamils.

According to a Chinese report on the future of the BRI, China should train more workers proficient in minority languages used in South Asia, such as Tamil, as this will WHAM the locals more effectively than speaking English (Li, 2016). In a sense, China is treating the Sinhalese and Tamils as two separate entities with different needs and development priorities. While this is a logical approach, considering that the north and east are heavily underdeveloped compared to the Colombo capital area, it is not

necessarily helping the people of Sri Lanka to come together. China does not have a preference as to which area to invest in, due to the principle of non-intervention and neutrality. While China is not neutral regarding political issues regarding Sri Lanka on the international stage, the BRI remains mostly neutral in its treatment of Sinhalese and Tamils.

On another note, it is possible that Beijing deliberately uses ethnic discord to maintain influence. According to the Tamil media, whether China intends to promote local economic development, counter India across the shore, or pursue neo-colonialism, Beijing will need political allies in Sri Lanka, and these allies have become harder to find in the country recently (Tamil Guardian, 2021). On the ground, no amount of economic development is likely to woo Tamils away from the need for justice and accountability for former war crimes (Tamil Guardian, 2021). Ethnic discord may have been intentionally used by Beijing to maintain a certain degree of influence over the Sri Lankan government. China has already pursued similar means in Myanmar by opening dialogue with both the civilian government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military government, led by General Min Aung Hlaing.

Recognising alternate forces in a partner country – Tamils, in the case of Sri Lanka – is a sign that Beijing has learned over the years to not ‘put all its eggs in one basket’, as in this way the Party not only creates a favourable environment for Chinese nationals and assets abroad, but also keeps a certain degree of influence over the standing government (Hirono et al., 2019). This approach is made possible because Beijing always has a convenient retreat with narratives of ‘sovereignty and non-intervention’, when in fact, it is already deeply embroiled in the domestic politics of a country in the process of creating economic leverage through the BRI, or even political leverage through engaging with alternate stakeholders. However, by treating Sinhalese and Tamils as separate entities, China is unlikely to be capable of tackling the issue of reconciliation between the two groups as they go their separate ways of development. While stability is maintained in the name of economic development, it is still run by negative peace, as there is no evidence to suggest that Sinhalese and Tamils are more likely to reconcile with economic development.

#### Issues with Islamic Extremism

Working with China is unlikely to improve the position of Sri Lankan Muslims because Beijing is just as likely to oppress Muslims as the Party does at home. One can even say that Beijing works well with Sri Lanka because they both have a common interest in cracking down against Muslim minorities, which are sometimes deemed as extremists.

Of course, crackdown on Muslims abroad is not something that can be done in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it is possible in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, as Muslims are minorities in these countries, much like in China.

China promoting Sri Lanka's anti-Muslim propaganda and keeping latent conflict is another sign that Beijing enjoys controlled instability to keep its development partners locked into relying on China. There are suspects that Sri Lanka's recent deradicalisation regulations are following China's footsteps (Sri Lanka Task Force, 2021). Between how closely Sri Lanka coordinates its domestic policies with China under Gotabaya and the fact that anti-Islam propaganda has been spotted from the Chinese embassy, it would be reasonable to suspect that Beijing has some sort of influence in Sri Lanka's decision to further ramp up its 'deradicalisation' campaigns, echoing the 're-education camps', as China calls them, in Xinjiang. As a matter of fact, critics believe that deradicalisation regulations under the Prevention of Terrorism Act PTA, previously used against the LTTE and now Muslims after the Easter Bombings, will create even more radicalisation because repressive measures against Muslims only stoke but do not solve the root cause of Islamic extremism (Satkunanathan, 2021)

Working with China is counterproductive for countries that have problems with Islamic extremism. There is little to no evidence to suggest that China is playing a major role in promoting reconciliation, unlike Western donors and foreign NGOs, which take reconciliation seriously. Even Japan and India – fellow Asian countries that are more sovereignty-focused – have urged the Sri Lankan government to undertake reconciliation. For Sri Lanka, China is simply a convenient development partner that focuses on economic development without raising the issue of human rights violations or reconciliation. After all, providing greater social justice and accountability to people who have experienced war does not necessarily contribute to Beijing's national interests in Sri Lanka, as long as instability does not threaten local Chinese investments such as the port cities. It is important to provide a certain degree of stability to Sri Lanka to protect Chinese interests, but without moving it more towards positive peace, as reconciliation is largely ignored. If anything, China is maintaining the status quo on negative peace, rather than trying to break the ice and move towards more positive forms of peace.

On a more positive note, Sri Lanka is still a functioning democracy, and ethnic division can be overcome by the people, as seen in recent protests where Sri Lankans, regardless of ethnicity, united to call for Gotabaya's resignation (Nazeer, 2022). This came after people realised that the government was to blame for Sri Lankans turning on each other for being of different races (Nazeer, 2022). Historically, the Sinhalese and Muslims coexisted peacefully and only a few nationalists like the BBS have taken



extreme measures to try to preserve the Sinhala-Buddhist nation through anti-Halal movements, attacks on Islamic clothing, and hate speech towards Islam (Sarjoo et al., 2016). At the local level, ordinary citizens usually have no problems with one another. However, the real problem is that there are too few national mechanisms and no CSOs that support individuals to speak out against discrimination, while the government silently endorses the nationalistic remarks on individual groups (Sarjoo et al., 2016). The initial peace process brokered by Norway during the war also tried to call for greater autonomy for minorities like the Muslims, but this became an opportunity for the government to mobilise the masses and advance their anti-minority agenda (Rajesh, 2010). People's realisation of the government's problems with Islamophobia shows that at the local level, people have not yet fully endorsed nationalistic remarks, which is a positive sign.

### **6.5: Conclusion**

The impact of China's developmental peace is profound in Sri Lanka. While development in Sri Lanka is progressing at a steady pace, none of the existing peacebuilding efforts by the West, Asian actors or China seems to be particularly successful in taking Sri Lanka off the path of negative peace towards reconciliation for positive peace. To make matters worse, China's presence may even divide Sri Lankans even further, whether Beijing is consciously doing so or not, with each ethnic group being treated as separate entities rather than nationals of one country who need more dialogue with each other.

The civil war that ravaged the nation for 26 years has left deep scars in Sri Lankan society today. Although it has been over a decade since the war ended, reconciliation between the Sinhalese and Tamils has been inadequate, with the matter being made even more complicated because Buddhist nationalists merely shifted their target towards Sri Lankan Muslims after the war. Buddhist nationalism is rooted in the fear of isolationism, as the Sinhalese feel no real kinship with the rest of the global community, and therefore, they feel the need to defend their homeland and the teachings of Buddha under the notions of *sinhadipa* and *dhammadipa*.

After the civil war, there have been considerable attempts by both the government and domestic CSOs, in collaboration with international actors, to address the issue of post-war reconciliation. A handful of foreign actors, such as the US, the EU, Britain, Japan, India, and China, have supported Sri Lanka's post-war recovery efforts, but these actors have not supported reconciliation in the same way. China, as a newcomer in Sri Lanka, plays an important role in supporting its post-war economic development. However, this does not make Sri Lankans more likely to reconcile, because peace facilitated by economic development is only a means to contain discontent and ethnic

grievances. No amount of economic development can dissuade Tamils from looking for accountability and justice for past war crimes, but greater justice also does not serve Beijing's national interests. For Sri Lanka, China is a convenient development partner that does not ask the question of human rights.

Working with China under the framework of developmental peace has brought tangible economic progress, and not just in the capital areas: the north and east, which were previously somewhat neglected by the government, are also beginning to attract investment from China. Lives of local residents have become much more convenient thanks to roads built by Chinese loans, and such infrastructure is improving around the country, as China is a skilled builder of large infrastructure. However, projects such as the Hambantota port have created considerable controversy, with the government allowing China to buy land that would have belonged to local villages and farms, just to build a port that would be handed to the Chinese, which locals criticise as being a 'Chinese colony'. This has caused more chaos and confusion.

Sri Lanka lacks an active armed conflict, but that does not mean that it is fully peaceful. Many latent conflicts remain between the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as between Sinhalese and Muslims. Foreign actors can only offer recommendations on the issue, and whether Sri Lanka takes decisive measures on reconciliation is up to the Sri Lankans themselves. However, assuming that economic development would be a solution to issues like reconciliation is not true, as evidence has shown that these are separate problems, albeit not completely unrelated, and that simply having development does not quell latent conflict.

## Chapter 7: Case Study of Myanmar

### 7.1: Introduction

The final case study of this dissertation is Myanmar. This chapter consolidates what has been learnt on the practice of developmental peace, and the extent to which the practice follows the theory. By drawing connections with previous cases, this chapter establishes some observable trends in the practice of developmental peace and proves that some traits of Chinese peacebuilding are not country-specific but applicable on a larger regional scale.

Geographically, Myanmar is considered a part of Southeast Asia, which is different from the three South Asian cases already discussed in the previous chapters. In practice, Myanmar shares many of the same traits as the previously analysed South Asian countries, especially in its interaction and relationship with China. Like Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Myanmar is a part of China's 'string of pearls' strategy, according to Western analysts. Pakistan's Gwadar, Sri Lanka's Hambantota, and Myanmar's Kyaukphyu port in southern Rakhine state are all access points for Beijing to reach the Indian Ocean while avoiding the disputed waters in the South China Sea. Likewise, Myanmar also shares a direct border with China, which is similar to Afghanistan in the sense that Beijing is constantly worried about the refugee problem, especially concerning the Rohingya crisis, which could have implications for Xinjiang even if the Rakhine state itself does not share a border with China.

Historically speaking, Myanmar has not been a peaceful country, as it has been riddled with civil war between various ethnic groups since its independence from Britain in 1948. Like many former colonies of the British Raj, Myanmar started as a parliamentary democracy after independence, but civilian rule did not last long, as the country fell to a military junta, which continues to rule today.

Myanmar's junta began in 1962, when General Ne Win led a military coup that seized power, and he ruled the country for the next 26 years. For comparison, Ne Win's rule was as long as the civil war in Sri Lanka. During his rule, there were massive human rights violations and a visible history of economic regression, moving the country towards socialism at the height of the Cold War. For example, in 1974, Ne Win issued a new constitution and pursued an isolationist foreign policy. He nationalised Myanmar's (still called Burma at the time) major enterprises and undertook a socialist economic programme, which led to the economy deteriorating rapidly, along with a rise of black markets around the country (Maizland, 2022). While pursuing his socialist economic policy, Ne Win also joined the non-aligned movement, along with Myanmar's neighbours such as India and China, who chose to distance themselves from both the Soviet Union

and the US (Tzang, 1990). As a part being non-aligned, Ne Win maintained good relations with China, only for relations to break down between 1967 and 1971 due to the spill-over from China's Cultural Revolution into Myanmar, when the Chinese embassy in Rangoon (now Yangon) encouraged local Chinese to conduct cultural revolution activities in Burma, leading to a massive anti-Chinese riot (Global Security, n.d.). After a Chinese aid official was killed by Burmese mobs, both countries recalled their ambassadors and China suspended aid to Burma to support the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) insurgent movement in the north-eastern area (Global Security, n.d.). The relationship was restored in 1971, but Beijing continued to support the BCP, much to the dismay of the Burmese government (Global Security, n.d.).

After this incident, Ne Win took measures to restore bilateral relations with China by not questioning Chinese aid to the BCP during his visit to China in 1971, and he also met top CCP officials such as Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong himself (Maung, 2011). Since then, Myanmar has learnt to understand this type of 'two-pronged' policy that China pursues of maintaining official relations with the government while at the same time actively supporting insurgencies such as the BCP (Maung, 2011). This is important, as such a policy is still relevant to this day regarding Chinese relations with Myanmar. In fact, there is a three-pronged policy with China, where Beijing attempts to strike a balance between the military junta and the civilian government of Myanmar, while delivering support to local militias against the government to create some degree of instability around the country, so neither side is capable of defeating the other.

Ne Win would continue to be the *de facto* leader of Burma until 1988, when thousands of people rose up to protest against food shortages, demanding an end to military rule and a road towards democracy. Ne Win responded to these protests with a military crackdown that killed thousands of protestors as the army opened fire against civilians, but the people also took up arms to fight back with Molotov cocktails, swords, and even poison darts (HRW, 2013). This incident was never properly resolved, as Western organisations such as HRW urged the Myanmar government to establish independent inquiries into human rights violations, as well as to pursue a decisive end to its military rule of the country (HRW, 2013). Aung San Suu Kyi was one of the many figures who spoke out against the military rule of Burma, but her rise to prominence also created a certain degree of paranoia in the next generation of military leaders after Ne Win's resignation. Draconian martial law would be issued in the country after Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, banning gatherings of more than five people, with many more thousands detained and jailed. However, the end of Ne Win's rule also brought significant changes to Burma. The country would be renamed to Myanmar, a

more inclusive name, to signal the end of colonialism, and would no longer adhere to socialism, but instead wanted to be a ‘right-wing pro-American dictatorship’, which did not bring democracy to the country. Myanmar became a Buddhist country with ethno-nationalist vibes, and little attention was paid when illegal immigrants from Bangladesh flooded northern Arakan, undermining any remaining Muslims there after a 1992 operation against the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation insurgency caused 200,000 to flee the area (Thant, 2019).

As seen above, Myanmar’s post-colonial history has not been particularly peaceful, with many conflicts between the military junta and civilians. Therefore, Myanmar is definitely in need of peacebuilding, as many of its past conflicts have not been fully resolved, with lingering impacts on the country’s stability today. Also, as with all other case studies already discussed in this dissertation, there is no shortage of peacebuilding efforts from various actors trying to create a safe and stable Myanmar. Other than China, Myanmar also has close relations with other Asian countries like India and Japan, but also has considerable cooperation with the West, despite being seen by Western agencies like Freedom House (2022c) as having one of the world’s lowest ratings for democracy and human rights.

## **7.2: Liberal Peace in Myanmar**

### *7.2.1: Theory of Liberal Peace in Myanmar*

Since Myanmar has been under the rule of a military junta for such a long time, a means to sustainable peace is transferring power from the military to a civilian government under a democratic form of government. In theory, liberal peace presents a solution to the problems in Myanmar.

Prospects of democratic peace in Asia have been explored in the past. While Asia as a region is not nearly as democratically united as Western Europe or North America, there is still a strong correlation between democracy and the reduced number of conflicts, even when not all countries in the region are liberal democracies, since many of them, like Myanmar, have enjoyed at least one decade of joint-democratic dyads with democracies like India (Goldsmith, 2007). Increasing the number of democracies in Asia is one means of improving regional peace. Having an accountable democratic government in Myanmar can also, in theory, improve the confidence of ethnic minorities, as ethnic armed groups are a major source of instability around the country. This is the same theory as improving the representation and accountability of Balochis in Pakistan. However, the transition towards democracy and achieving liberal peace in Myanmar is not an easy feat.

### *7.2.2: Critique of the Theory of Liberal Peace in Myanmar*

Myanmar has been on a rough road towards democracy over the years. A major reason for the protracted conflicts in Myanmar is the ethnic groups' desire for self-determination and political representation, and their opposition to a majoritarian and militarised state (Stokke et al., 2021). The mismatch is mainly between military state-building and armed resistance led by ethnic armed groups around the country (Stokke et al., 2021). There is also the problem of illiberal peace as opposed to liberal peace, where some argue that outright military victory under the illiberal framework is a more effective end to civil wars than the negotiated resolutions under the liberal framework (Smith, 2020). This was seen with Sri Lanka and the complete victory of GoSL over the LTTE, and no subsequent civil wars have broken out in Sri Lanka at the time of writing. Myanmar is a slightly more difficult case, as neither side is capable of clutching military victory over each other: fragile ceasefires can only prevent violence for several years until disagreements between ethnic groups and the government lead back to fighting.

Against this backdrop, there needs to be some fundamental change in the government in terms of satisfying the ethnic groups' demands, such as self-determination and equal representation. However, in practice, we will see two important aspects that make this difficult. The first is the question of whether or not democracy is possible at all considering the current political context of Myanmar. For a country like Myanmar, which has been under military rule for almost all of its post-independence history, with not even a decade of civilian rule experience, it is difficult to establish prolonged civilian rule even with 'free and fair' elections. As explained in Chapter 2, Myanmar is a LAO where the junta has the ability to override any electoral results, and since the junta's interests are protected by emerging donors like China and India, it also means that unlike Than Shwe, the figure who oversaw Myanmar's economic liberation in the 2000s and gave in to Western pressure, there is little incentive for the current junta to appease the West for economic aid (Uesugi, 2022). The result of LAO in Myanmar was witnessed in 2021, when a landslide electoral victory by the NLD was easily overturned by a military coup. As discussed later, despite Western criticisms, Asian partners like China and India did not seem particularly concerned about this coup.

The second problem is more closely related to an existing point already elaborated in the Sri Lankan case. Conflicts in Myanmar are not simple binary conflicts between democracy and militarism, but within this mismatch, at the national level, there are many more protracted conflicts related to ethnicity and majoritarian politics. This can happen between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organisations (EAO) demanding

autonomy and self-determination or the larger issue at hand between the Burmese majority and ethnic minorities around the country. Simply having a civilian democratic government does not necessarily ensure that these issues are addressed adequately.

### *7.2.3: Practice of Liberal Peace in Myanmar*

#### Transfer to Civilian Government

The practice of liberal peace involves using liberal norms such as democracy to resolve conflict. Therefore, it is reasonable to review the trajectory that Myanmar has taken to achieve a democratic form of governance. Despite a long struggle for democracy and being under a military junta since the 1960s, Myanmar has had some achievements with democracy since 2015 for roughly six years after the civilian government was ousted by the military.

When talking about democracy in Myanmar, one cannot avoid discussing the iconic figurehead Aung San Suu Kyi, the general secretary of opposition party the National League for Democracy (NLD). As of 2010, Suu Kyi had been arrested 15 times in 21 years, and these arrests were for the most bizarre reasons, such as in 2009, when her house arrest was extended to 2010 after the military junta caught an American man swimming to her house (HRW, 2010c). Her release in 2010 meant little for her party, as the NLD had been barred from running for the elections that same year, and the military government also created draconian electoral laws that prevented parties with members who had served prison terms (HRW, 2010c). Despite Suu Kyi's spending many years under house arrest, her party, the NLD, has maintained its high popularity and has garnered considerable social support from the Myanmar public over the years.

The NLD's landslide victory in 2015 is not solely attributed to Suu Kyi's popularity as the daughter of Myanmar's national hero General Aung San, but is also thanks to the NLD's strong campaign efforts after its first victory in 2012 despite experiencing prolonged crackdowns by the military government over the years (Nakanishi & Osada, 2016). The weakness from the military government's Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) also contributed to the NLD's victory, as the USDA did not enjoy a strong social support base and inherited the negative impressions of the Myanmar military when many of its members, including then-President Thein Sein, moved into the party's leadership posts (Nakanishi & Osada, 2016). Civilian rule of Myanmar did not last long, as a coup launched by Myanmar's military, the Tatmadaw, ousted the democratically elected government, President Win Myint and State counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained and arrested for charges of breaching

COVID-19 measures, and Suu Kyi was accused of being in possession of banned walkie-talkies, according to local media (Min & Myat, 2021).

The ousting of the NLD triggered nationwide protests, but this shows that Myanmar has a troubling record of establishing sustainable democracy. In the wake of the 2021 coup, Myanmar became one of the three least democratic countries in the world, along with Afghanistan and North Korea, and according to the 2021 democracy index, it was ranked 166<sup>th</sup> out of 167, scoring even lower than North Korea (EIU, 2021). As explained above, even with 'free and fair' elections leading to the NLD victory, the results can be overturned at the whim of the military government, which operates as an LAO, where the military holds the power to override electoral victories (Uesugi, 2022). In other words, democracy may be difficult to establish in Myanmar without some type of support from liberal actors outside the country, and in a sense, foreign intervention.

India is one of these actors that has shown itself to be capable of supporting the process of democratisation in Myanmar, but New Delhi's efforts were met only with limited success over the years. Due to its proximity, India is interested in the stability of Myanmar just as much as it is in the stability of other South Asian countries. During the Cold War, India almost entirely rejected the military junta in Myanmar, but the bilateral relationship improved significantly afterwards, as a peaceful democratic periphery is in India's national interest, which means that it must engage with troubled neighbours like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan (Pradhan, 2008). Therefore, although there was initial support for Aung San Suu Kyi's NDL and the democratisation of Myanmar, India eventually took a more pragmatic turn, as New Delhi established relations with the military government and the Generals as well, fearing that isolating Myanmar too much would leave a political vacuum that could be exploited by China (Egreteau, 2011). India's turn was later lamented by Suu Kyi herself, as she was 'saddened' by India's decision and hoped that New Delhi would be behind her democracy movement (Allana, 2010). India's shift towards a realist approach is a departure from the previous idealist approach pursued by the Jawaharlal Nehru (Pradhan, 2008). India wanted to counter Chinese influence by making the military government adopt a balanced approach between India and China, as the rest of the world favoured a hands-off policy when dealing with Myanmar (Pradhan, 2008). This is especially important considering the growing Chinese investment that has been arriving in Myanmar, and understandably, India would feel threatened by the expansion of Chinese economic influence into its neighbourhood.

Even with a more pragmatic and realist approach, the Indian government has still made considerable efforts to support the democratisation process of Myanmar. This is because the original assumption by Indian diplomats is that economic development in



Myanmar leads to greater democratisation in the same way that other Asian countries like South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan became democracies in the 1980s (Egreteau, 2011). In other words, the assumption is that development comes first, and then democracy will follow, which is in some ways similar to developmental peace. Because India is also an emerging donor with a peacebuilding style that is different from traditional Western liberal peacebuilding, it still commits itself to achieving the end goal of stability through non-violent means (Miklian, 2014), and in the case of Myanmar, the end goal is to establish sustainable democracy. In this sense, India wants to share its experiences that balance democracy and pluralism without interfering with the internal politics and social dynamics of the host country, and it also does not make the distinction that traditional actors do between development and peacebuilding (Singh, 2017).

Another Asian actor that can support Myanmar's transition to democracy is Japan. Unlike India, which does not have the luxury of pursuing a Myanmar policy purely about liberal peace (Pant, 2021), Japan has more liberty to work with both the civilian and military governments, as the Chinese presence in Myanmar does not pose a serious national threat to Japan in the way it does to India. That being said, Japanese peacebuilding also does not fully fit into the liberal peace framework of Western standards, Tokyo is not always constrained by the notion of 'universal' norms defined by the West (Uesugi, 2020). In the case of Myanmar, Japan had previously expressed its official position of willingness to promote democracy and human rights, and urged transition to a civilian government without trying to isolate Myanmar from international society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997). Tokyo's support for democracy in Myanmar has been consistent over the years in the 2000s and played a significant role between 2011 and 2012 in helping Myanmar to conduct reforms when the NDL won the elections.

Japan occupies an interesting role concerning Myanmar. On the one hand, it is the only country with the means to negotiate with both the military government and the NLD, but on the other hand, Japan has been criticised by human rights activists for providing economic aid towards the military junta, and Tokyo has also been under fire by Japanese businesses for freezing yen loans since 1988 as a means to keep ODA low (Nemoto, 2007). Japanese ODA replaced war reparations of the Second World War and has been effective in supporting Ne Win's stagnating economy since 1968, and NA until Ne Win's resignation in 1988, Myanmar had received a total of 511.7 billion yen (approx. \$3 billion USD) from Japan. This massive amount of ODA is justified by the 'special relationship' between the two based on their history, as Imperial Japan had caused massive inconveniences to Myanmar in the past (Nemoto, 2007).

As for the case of Western support for Myanmar's democracy, the EU in

particular has tried to foster a positive relationship with Myanmar over the years, especially regarding promoting Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD. Unlike Asian actors, which consider democracy an end goal of economic development, the EU wanted democracy to occur in tandem with economic development in Myanmar. Labelling itself as a 'partner in transition', the EU responded to political changes in Myanmar through strong democratic and economic reforms, starting with the lifting of sanctions (except an arms embargo) in 2012 (Commissione Europea, 2016). The EU also regularly engages in human rights dialogue, trying to foster democratic transition and human rights in the country, with peace processes to help with police reforms (Commissione Europea, 2016).

The EU has allocated €688 million (approx. \$700m) in projects covering rural, agriculture and food security, as well as education, governance, rule of law, state-building capacity and peacebuilding support (Commissione Europea, 2016). Based on these claims, it appears that Europe puts much more focus on democracy and its economic development projects are towards rural livelihoods rather than the hard infrastructure presented by Asian countries like Japan, and of course China. In reality, there is relatively little that foreign actors can do to help Myanmar transform into a more democratic form of governance. We will see in the following section that most of the foreign attempts to create democracy, whether through economic development or politically by supporting Aung San Suu Kyi, have ended in failure due to several shortcomings.

#### *7.2.4: Critique of the Practice of Liberal Peace in Myanmar*

##### Transfer to Civilian Government

Several problems arise when trying to transfer Myanmar to a civilian government. Asian actors are constrained by non-intervention or, in the case of the EU, held back by the fact that they were too optimistic about Suu Kyi's capacity to induce a change in the military junta.

Firstly, in India, despite the support shown by New Delhi for Myanmar's democratisation, it took a more pragmatic approach to open dialogue with the military government and maintain influence on Myanmar to counter China, rather than pressing the issue of democracy further. Evidence of this pragmatism is more clearly seen in India's recent attendance of Myanmar's military parade after the 2021 coup. Critics argue that what should have been done in the wake of the 2021 protests, when the Tatmadaw was gunning down unarmed civilians as the military parade went on, was for India to mobilise international support for democracy, impose economic sanctions on businesses owned by the military regime, put in place an arms embargo, raise the issue to the UNSC, UNGA

and UN Human Rights Council, and send delegations to other countries to make them aware of the true nature of Myanmar's military regime (Suryanarayan, 2021). Then again, the above recommendations are not something that would find popularity among Indian politicians, as they are not in line with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, upon which India also puts great focus. Further implementation of liberal peacebuilding is unlikely to come from New Delhi.

Secondly, although Japan also has the capacity, Tokyo is cautious when actually trying to support the democratic process in Myanmar. While Japan is a liberal democracy itself, it is not bound to Western universal norms, as seen in the statement made by JICA's Myanmar office that the Asian timeframe is different from the West and that Myanmar needs a patient approach regarding political reforms (Ichihara et al., 2016). The way JICA takes the lead in Japan's Myanmar engagement means that Japan too takes the economic path in trying to foster economic development and political stability rather than pursuing a 'dogmatic' democracy-first policy (Ichihara et al., 2016). However, since JICA is a development-oriented organisation, it is unable to give military or political assistance, but can only foster political reform indirectly, such as giving scholarships for former Burmese military officers to study in Japan (Ichihara et al., 2016).

Japan's passive yet pragmatic approach has not been effective in establishing democracy in Myanmar. Independent media in Myanmar revealed that JICA has connections to many military-owned businesses in Myanmar, such as the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which had a contract to supply steel to the Yangon-Thanyin bridge under JICA, and the Thilawa special economic zone, supported by JICA, where Japanese activists, as well as the Myanmar diaspora in Japan, have been pressuring Tokyo to suspend ODA to Myanmar as a response to the February military coup in 2021 that overthrew the democratically elected NDL (Myanmar-Now, 2021). This passive approach has been criticised for its inability to address the hurdles towards reforms in Myanmar, with some considering that Japanese support for Myanmar's democracy is faltering (Ichihara, 2015). Originally Japan rewarded Myanmar with economic development for meaningful progress towards liberalisation. Tokyo, along with other ASEAN countries and Australia, also refused to apply sanctions against the regime, arguing that sanctions are ineffective and only create poverty and instability (Ichihara, 2015). JICA claims that Myanmar's goals of rule of law, democracy and sustainable economic growth are all closely related to economic reform, and that it is putting considerable efforts into helping Myanmar SOEs to reform in the legal sector (JICA, 2021). Simultaneously, a reason for Japan's reluctance to criticise the military government's undoing of democratic progress recently comes from Tokyo's competition with China in Myanmar.

The China factor in Myanmar is a major concern for both India and Japan. Myanmar itself tries to balance its economic relations between China, India, Japan, ASEAN, and the West, even if China is by far its largest trading partner, accounting for one-third of Myanmar's imports and exports, followed by Thailand, Japan, and the US (WITS, 2020). Japanese aid in information technology and communication, as well as practical training in network technology, are means that can bolster Myanmar's economy, and in general, Japan is seen as less obtrusive than China (Maini & Sachdeva, 2017). However, as Myanmar opens itself up to investment, the competition between China and Japan is becoming clearer.

In contrast to China's BRI, Japan works under the slogan of 'partnership for quality infrastructure', as Tokyo directly confronts Beijing in the infrastructure sector in Myanmar. Some scholars think Japan is more interested in competing with China and supporting ASEAN, as well as reaping the benefits of long-term engagement with Myanmar since its independence (Shepard, 2018). Democracy is important for Japan, as it is for India; however, there is a limit to how much they are willing to impose democracy in a fellow Asian country when the region has mostly maintained peace and stability when all regional powers respect each other's sovereignty.

Trying to support Myanmar's democratic transformation through economic development also presents another problem of putting India and Japan on a collision course with China's BRI, which is also promoting development, but not democracy as an end goal. With economic interests and national security at stake, it is more likely that Japan and India would be interested in the material gains from competing with China rather than the 'idealistic' gains from promoting democracy in Myanmar. Since no country is truly altruistic, one cannot fault Japan, India, or any other actors for prioritising national interests over a Western imported ideology of democracy in its competition against China. One can only say that Asian countries are not in a good position to help Myanmar with democracy under liberal peace, largely due to their non-intervention approach, especially when Asia is such a geopolitically intensive region.

Asian actors are constrained by non-intervention regarding helping Myanmar with democracy, although Western actors like the EU, which are less constrained by these factors, also struggle for different reasons. Despite the EU support that was given to the NLD, some critics consider that Europe did not consider the Tatmadaw's praetorian world view, which was not interested in becoming a democracy, as well as over-estimating the capacity of the NLD, thinking Aung San Suu Kyi was a 'Burmese Nelson Mandela' (du Rocher & Heiduk, 2021). Some may even argue that the EU's approach to the whole of Southeast Asia has been inflexible and stubborn. Opinions within the Union are mixed,

as some member states, like Italy, Denmark, Spain, Austria, and Germany, are in favour of lifting economic sanctions, while France and Britain (while it was still in the EU) demanded more reforms beforehand (du Rocher, 2012). There is a need for the EU to take a more creative approach: instead of sanctions, they should use the considerable political awareness cultivated in the Myanmar public over the years and expand these grassroots networks rather than focusing on the NLD or sanctions that are ineffective because China can easily help to circumvent them (du Rocher & Heiduk, 2021). According to Richmond et al. (2011), while European peacebuilding in theory aims to create just and durable peace, there is actually no significant difference between the European model and existing UN practices of liberal peace and state-building. While it has more potential through its integrationalist logic for peace in related regions, such as the promise of economic aid and EU membership (Diez et al., 2006), it is also fragmented, and this integrationalist approach is less powerful outside Europe (Richmond et al., 2011), as economic concessions can be covered by emerging actors like China and India, lessening Myanmar's incentives to follow the EU.

#### Limits of International Influence

The limits of international influence, or external state-building, are quite obvious in the case of Myanmar. However, this does not necessarily mean that Myanmar has no mechanisms for establishing a sustainable democracy: in fact, it is very much the opposite. For example, while Aung San Suu Kyi may not have sufficient capacity to induce significant changes to democracy, she is still an exceedingly popular figure in the eyes of the Myanmar public.

According to the BBC, 'the Lady' Suu Kyi is still widely popular in Myanmar, with a 79% trust rate as of 2020, despite international backlash for her and Myanmar's handling of the Rohingya crisis, though this is partially due to the lack of empathy that the Buddhist majority in general shows for the Rohingyas (BBC, 2021c). While Suu Kyi may have mishandled issues like the Rohingya crisis, which created rifts between her government and international society, her popularity amongst the Myanmar public shows that there is still a desire from the grassroots to support the country's transformation towards democracy. Any government led by Suu Kyi is highly legitimate in the eyes of the public, even if the resulting peace may not be 'just' from the eyes of the West. Yet this is another case of 'free and fair' elections not necessarily leading to positive peace for all members of society, as the Sri Lankan case has demonstrated that majoritarian politics can be dangerous in a multi-ethnic society where the majority race does not enjoy good relations with minorities.

An event that demonstrates the limits of international influence in Myanmar is the Saffron Revolution of 2007. The early stages of the revolution began as a set of protests led by a small body of protestors against the cutting of fuel subsidies, which put further pressure on the already poor population. Western media such as the BBC blamed it on chronic mismanagement by the military government, which had nationalised private companies since the 1960s, when Ne Win still ruled the country, leading to the backwardness of increasing poverty in Myanmar when most of its South and Southeast Asian neighbours were slowly coming out of poverty (BBC, 2007). Amongst these protestors were Myanmar pro-democracy activists, to whom the military responded with violence and arrests.

The situation escalated when Buddhist monks joined the peaceful protests from the town of Pakkoku, but the military exercised violence against them, with three monks being tied to a lamppost and beaten (Mann, 2013). Buddhist monks demanded an official apology from the military government, but the government did not respond (Mann, 2013). Such blatant attack on the country's Buddhist clergy agitated many monks around the country and they threatened to boycott the regime as a means to directly attack the legitimacy of the military government as a Buddhist armed force (Steinberg, 2006). As with many protests in Myanmar in the past, the military government had no issues with using violence to crack down on protestors, as the military opened fire on unarmed civilians in Yangon, with hundreds of monks being arrested in September 2007, and many more fleeing to neighbouring countries (Ellgee, 2010).

Unlike the democracy protests of 1988, which went by largely unknown by the international community due to the lack of reporting inside Myanmar, the Saffron Revolution was different in the sense that protestors had learnt to use technology to inform the outside world of violent crackdowns of the Tatmadaw, hoping to draw more attention to the situation in Myanmar (Selth, 2008). Although the protestors were successful in attracting foreign media and international attention to the protests, they failed to motivate foreign actors to take concrete action against the military government. Western governments such as the US, the UK and Europe condemned the situation; Japan cancelled \$4.7 million in aid; some governments wanted China and India to use their influence to encourage reconciliation between the military and its opposition; and even ASEAN issued a rare statement expressing 'revulsion' against the violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors (Selth, 2008). However, none of these actors were keen to act beyond verbal condemnations, and even with US commitments to spread democracy around the world, no actors have been particularly successful in trying to persuade Myanmar generals to be more aware of the international outcry against their actions as long as China, India

and Russia continue to support the regime (Selth, 2008).

The Saffron Revolution not only shows the limits of foreign powers in influencing Myanmar's military government, but also demonstrates that top-down imposition of liberal norms through liberal peace is ineffective, as decades of military rule consolidated the junta's political power to the extent that they could overthrow any civilian governments. Asian countries are unwilling to violate the principles of non-intervention and to induce change on the ground, while Western governments are unable to induce change because decades of military rule have created an obsession with a military regime with national sovereignty and total autonomy from international influence (International Crisis Group, 2001). That being said, democracy under liberal peace is not the sole way of establishing sustainable peace and is also not the sole means to resolve some of the problems that are plaguing Myanmar at the moment. In the following section, I will discuss some alternative means of peacebuilding and their effectiveness in establishing sustainable peace.

### **7.3: Hybrid Peace in Myanmar**

#### *7.3.1: Theory of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar*

This section focuses on attempts to establish hybrid peace and local peace and their capacity to tackle some of Myanmar's conflicts. There are two types of conflict in Myanmar: the first is a shared conflict between all ethnic groups of society concerning democracy at the national level, and the second is a conflict between ethnic groups at the local level. These are conflicts between EAOs against the predominantly Burmese Myanmar government (usually the junta) and the Myanmar military, better known as the Tatmadaw. These conflicts require a stronger local and bottom-up approach, as many of these EOAs demand ethnic self-determination and want the Myanmar government to commit to federalism as a solution to years of armed conflict (South, 2018).

CSOs are central to hybrid and local peace in Myanmar. Hybrid peace, or hybrid peace governance, usually involves a formal liberal government running alongside patron-client networks, corruption, and criminal networks, while the formal economy develops alongside illegal economic practices and civil societies (Belloni, 2012). While Myanmar is not so much a liberal government, it does run patron-client networks with the military government, and a considerable number of CSOs run alongside the government, albeit under strict regulations. Belloni (2012) argues that CSOs are not usually a component of liberal peace, as they can be singled out for informality and clientelism, which can lead to corruption.

### *7.3.2: Critique of the Theory of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar*

One criticism of CSOs in general is that it is difficult to tell whether these organisations are truly locally rooted and have legitimacy in the eyes of local people or whether they are merely externally supported organisations (Poppelwell, 2019). Since foreign actors not often given access to the ground in Myanmar, most CSOs and the NGOs under them are more likely to be locally rooted and function as strong bridge-builders between the local authorities and the grassroots.

There is another problem concerning civil societies, or specifically uncivil societies. As opposed to civil societies, which have the potential to foster the growth of democracy through producing feelings of solidarity amongst groups (Putnam, 2000), uncivil societies do the opposite, which is usually associated with violence, anti-democracy and xenophobic groups (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). While many groups have become active in Myanmar after the events of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, many of Myanmar's local CSOs are still led by local elites, which can create the same inequalities among ethnic groups (Asian Development Bank, 2015). Also, scholars argue that Myanmar's political transformation should not be viewed as a path towards democratisation because reforms are often planned and executed by the Tatmadaw, creating a hybrid civil-military form of authoritarian rule supported by a group of uncivil societies that aims for identity politics fuelled by sectarian violence (Brenner & Schulman, 2019). This point is important to keep in mind, as although there was a steady rise of CSOs in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis, not all of these groups contributed to positive peace. In the interest of this dissertation, I have singled out civil societies that have had a positive contribution to Myanmar's ethnic conflicts. Because CSOs usually have limited political power that can induce change, it would be more reasonable to look for bridge-building potentials that link the local authorities to the government, as well as links between local government and grassroots civilians in their respective areas, such as the Kachin or Shan states, which are most relevant to this dissertation.

### *7.3.3: Practice of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar*

#### Role of CSOs

CSOs have been a part of Myanmar society ever since independence from the British Raj, but were under strict regulations when the junta took over in 1962, as Ne Win only allowed organisations that advanced the regime's interests (International Crisis Group, 2001b). Despite bans and regulations, a series of events prompted the rise of Myanmar



CSOs, such as the 1988 nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations (International Crisis Group, 2001b). CSOs gained further momentum, albeit unintentionally, when Myanmar announced its Roadmap to Democracy in 2003. This was a seven-step process announced by General Khin Nyunt, which adopted measures such as drafting a new constitution, adopting it through a national referendum, and holding free and fair elections (Kyi, 2003). Even this was criticised as a ‘rigged’ roadmap and just another attempt by the junta to redesign the country’s political process (H. Aung, 2007).

The event that truly brought Myanmar’s CSOs to prominence was Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which became an opportunity for CSOs to engage in humanitarian work when the government responded poorly (HRW, 2010). CSOs are central to hybrid and local peace in Myanmar, just as they were central to Sri Lanka, as they both gained significant momentum after natural disasters, namely Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka. We will later see that because of the rising CSOs, there are also NGOs that are central to providing a strong local approach to the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar.

The advantage held by CSOs in Myanmar is that they do not often engage with political activities due to regulations by the junta, and this makes them much more geared towards tackling local problems for certain communities (Lorch, 2006), although this approach changed considerably after the Saffron Revolution and Cyclone Nargis. Especially with Cyclone Nargis, the junta’s response was heavily criticised by international actors and especially by Western-based groups like HRW (2010d), saying that the government had a callous response in banning foreign helicopters and boats trying to deliver aid and relief and obstructing the travel of aid agencies to affected areas. Comedian and activist Zargana, before he was arrested, said that the military government only wanted to tell the world that everything was under control but was not actually interested in helping people (HRW, 2010d). It was civil societies that stepped up to address the lack of response by the government, where people raised money, collected supplies to help those in affected areas, and support international actors to deliver aid and relief supplies to affected areas (HRW, 2010d). After the cyclone, monks in Yangon helped to clear debris, undertook emergency repairs, and provided shelter for people, while celebrities, local businesses and churches banded together to delivery aid offered by international organisations (Petrie and South, 2014).

Many CSOs in urban Burman areas rose to prominence after Cyclone Nargis and would later become well-established organisations, active on the political stage. During the years when the NLD held power, 75 civil CSOs joined together for the first time in a People’s Forum to present a list of recommendations to the central government on issues

such as democratisation, political reforms, the peace process, human rights and economic development for the first time in Mon state, where the national government is more receptive to CSO recommendations regarding policy-making (Asian Development Bank, 2015).

The rise of CSOs, and subsequently NGOs, has given the Myanmar society some capacity to address the problem of ethnic inequality. For example, some NGOs have offered informal channels of information as well as civic and voter education programmes in both urban and rural areas, because the state's voter education programme was offered only in Burmese and not in other languages (Lidauer, 2012). The Myanmar Egress is also one of the first groups whose leadership and managerial staff bring foreign knowledge back to Myanmar and educate freshly graduated local students on business and entrepreneurship, aiming for capacity-building before democracy (Lidauer, 2012). Also, NGOs began reading the constitution from 'ethnic eyes' to understand and amend it, since so many people are dissatisfied with the current constitution (Lidauer, 2012). In terms of creating democracy and transition from authoritarian rule, some CSOs have gone beyond foreign influence into what some individuals call a 'home-grown commitment' towards political activism, where some groups in Yangon have established NGOs that use hotlines and social media to conduct parallel vote tabulation, while those groups involved in rural civic education also gathered 803 observers to cover 75 polling stations to show how minority groups see the election process (Lidauer, 2012). Other than supporting democracy, CSOs in Myanmar also play the role of supporting grassroots organisations and locals in ethnic minority areas, and it is in these areas that CSOs, and their NGO counterparts, demonstrate the strongest capacity to create local or even hybrid peace when the political will exists from the Myanmar government.

#### Hybrid and Local Peace in Kachin

This section will analyse the hybrid peacebuilding measures taken by local actors, as well as international actors, in addressing ethnic conflicts around the country. In the interest of this dissertation, I will focus on the conflicts in the Kachin and Shan states, both of which share a border with China, and the Rakhine state due to the highly controversial Rohingya crisis, which will be helpful in a comparative analysis in the later section of this chapter when the discussion comes to developmental peace. There are many more ethnic conflicts in Myanmar that will not be covered in this section, but this only exemplifies the need for peacebuilding in this country.

The first internal ethnic conflict to look at is the Kachin conflict. Kachin is the most northern state of Myanmar that shares a border with China and has one of the longest

running insurgencies in the world, where Kachin insurgents have been fighting against the Tatmadaw ever since 1961. The conflicting parties managed to reach a ceasefire in 1994, which lasted 17 years, until 2001; however, this ceasefire was never meant to be a peace agreement but more of a truce between the insurgents and the government. Hostilities between the two resumed and remain unresolved today, and there are approximately 130,000 IDPs in the region as of 2021 (Trócaire, 2021).

The reason for the conflict in Kachin is not complicated. Many ethnic minorities demanded independence and self-determination when Burma gained independence from Britain, and Kachin was no exception. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was formed in 1961 because of dissidence in the 1960s, with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) established as its military. The 1962 military coup by Ne Win lost the faith of ethnic minorities around the country, though some may claim that the coup was due to the fear that there might be a collapse of the Union of Burma under U Nu's civilian government when two minority groups, the Shan and Kayah, claimed national determination and wanted to withdraw from the union, claiming rights from the 1947 Constitution (Taylor, 2015). Another reason for dissidence is not necessarily attributed to Ne Win's coup, but more to U Nu's attempt to make Buddhism the state religion of Burma (Trager, 1963). Kachin is a predominantly Christian region, and locals feared that they would lose their fundamental rights if Burma were to become a Buddhist state (Trager, 1963). In 1994, the KIO ended its insurgency by signing a ceasefire with the government, agreeing to cooperate in the development of the Kachin region, and this also unlocked the region for foreign journalists and tourists, which had formerly been out of bounds, while the regional capital, Myitkyina, was chosen to host Burma's annual student sports festival (Underrepresented Groups at Risk Project, 2004).

The ceasefire would last 17 years, until 2011, when it was broken due to an attack by the Tatmadaw on the KIA. According to local media, the violation of the ceasefire and outbreak of violence was because the Naypyidaw wanted to control KIA territories in the Kachin and neighbouring Shan state to secure the areas with energy projects backed by China (DVB, 2011). The resumption of armed conflict was a popular idea among young Kachins, who were frustrated with the ceasefire, which did not bring development but instead only more exploitation of resources (Tønnesson et al., 2019).

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have attempted to reconcile with ethnic armed groups, but despite their initial success in signing a ceasefire with eight other rebel groups in 2015, the KIA refuses to comply, as their villages were still bombed by the Tatmadaw (Hogan, 2018). Ja Seng Hkawn Maran of the Kachin parliament says that the Kachin people are merely trying to survive and protect their land, wanting to share human rights

together, whereas foreign human rights expert David Baulk condemns Myanmar's peace process coming from the barrel of a gun that violently pacified ethnic minorities (Hogan, 2018).

As opposed to military coups or the Rohingya crisis, which are broadcast and well-known outside of Myanmar, most ethnic conflicts, like the Kachin conflict, are hidden from the eyes of the international population and rarely attract the attention of the global community. This means that peacebuilding in the Kachin conflict must also come from the grassroots, as international actors often have difficulty gaining access to remote areas of Myanmar where conflicts often occur. Still groups like Bridging Rural Integrated Development and Grassroots Empowerment (BRIDGE), the Kachin Baptist Convention, the Kachin Development Networking Group, the Kachin Women's Association Thailand, Karuna Myanmar Social Services (KMSS) and the Wunpawng Ninghtoi are engaged in local peacebuilding in Kachin, and they occupy an important role of engaging locals in an area that is largely excluded from international organisations (Ivanov, 2014).

Non-faith-based groups like BRIDGE mainly operate near the Chinese border of the Kachin state and actually teach locals to resist narratives of development, especially when locals have been deceived in the past by Chinese businessmen, being promised electricity in exchange for forest resources, but the forest has been cut down and electricity has yet to be delivered (Green & Ward, 2019). BRIDGE promotes greater local ownership of their own resources, as well as women's leadership, and creates space for democracy in KIO-occupied areas, where they write regulations for forest management go to the KIO for recognition (Green & Ward, 2019). Locals are much more familiar with their own resources compared to outsiders like the Forest Department in the government, and BRIDGE's apolitical stance has prevented them from being targeted by both sides of the conflict (Green & Ward, 2019). BRIDGE is a good example of local groups promoting local peace that empowers the subaltern, especially as the Myanmar government and local elites from the KIO do not always have the capacity to provide for these people. Due to its apolitical stance, BRIDGE, as its name suggests, can bridge the locals with both the KIO local elites and the national government of Myanmar, establishing positive relations with both sides of the conflict. However, distrust between the KIO and the government makes it difficult to establish cooperation on even apolitical issues such as local development and resource management, although the work of BRIDGE is still important as a means to create local capacity and resilience in the region and as a means of self-help for local residents when the top-down initiative is lacking.

However, faith-based organisations like the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) are equally important regarding hybrid peace in Kachin, as they demonstrate the unique

ability to build bridges between grassroots and local elites, as well as between local elites and national elites. The KBC, as its name suggests, is a Christian CSO dedicated to promoting Christianity and bringing the Myanmar people together under religion (KBC Kachin, 2019). Its role is not limited to religious activities, as the KBC also helps IDPs scattered around the Kachin state as well as the neighbouring Shan state because of the fighting between the KIA and Tatmadaw (KBC Kachin, 2019). The KBC helps IDPs not just by improving their living conditions, but also by developing useful skills and providing education for displaced children so that these people have the means to become productive when the war is over and they are allowed to return to their homelands (KBC Kachin, 2019).

As a faith-based CSO on Christianity, the KBC can be much more relatable to international actors, and the organisation itself, unlike BRIDGE, is vocal in condemning human rights violations in Kachin, such as when a man, Brang Shawn, from the Jamai Kawang IDP camp was detained for demanding investigations on the death of his daughter, as well as the rape and murder of two female Kachin teachers in 2015, while KBC president Hkalam Samson has also come under a lawsuit from the military government for meeting Donald Trump in the Oval Office and saying that there was no religious freedom in Myanmar, but charges against him were later dropped (Ye, 2019).

Since the Kachin conflict is not well-known to the global community, it is important to have local voices that condemn military brutality not just in Kachin, but around the country. The KBC plays a role in local peacebuilding by supporting the growing numbers of IDPs because of conflict and preventing the already bad situation from becoming worse by looking after displaced people. However, unlike the development-based BRIDGE, which prefers to be apolitical, faith-based organisations like the KBC bolster and actively engage with local elites and with the government. For example, the KBC is a source of legitimacy for local elites in the KIO in times of peace. The KIO leadership has been losing credibility in the eyes of locals for being swayed by doing business with the government during the ceasefire, to the extent that the KIO has made changes in their leadership to be more receptive to civil society advice, where critical decisions are made together with the church and community leaders (Jagger, 2018).

With the government, the KBC was one of the driving forces behind the 1994 ceasefire between the KIA and the government, along with the founder of Metta (another community-based NGO helping IDPs), Saboi Jum, who was the chairman of the KBC and an advisor to the KIO leadership (Jagger, 2018). Moreover, the Tatmadaw likes to restrict access to conflict-affected areas to international organisations like the UN, but

local organisations are not affected by these restrictions, and they can also traverse China to reach conflict-affected areas, which are also off-limits for most UN agencies (Jagger, 2018). The mediatory role that KBC can play is instrumental in the Kachin conflict, as is the case in China's engagement in this conflict, as shown later, as the distrust between the KIA and the Tatmadaw is too deep after decades of conflict for the two to agree without a third-party mediator. KBC occupies an important role as bridge-builder between the grassroots and local KIO elites, as well as between the local KIO government and the national government. This is a useful case of mid-space intermediaries that broker the relationship between local grassroots and local authorities and connect the bottom level to the national top level (Uesugi, 2020). Although the ceasefire was unsustainable, KBC has proven itself capable of becoming a bridge-builder in hybrid peace by bringing communities together with their local elites, as well as channelling international aid to help IDPs in need and working with the government to establish peace.

There is also a third sub-category of grassroots movements in Myanmar, active in Kachin, which is slightly different from the development-based BRIDGE and the faith-based KBC. Groups such as the Kachin Women's Association of Thailand (KWAT) also contribute to hybrid peace through the empowerment of women. KWAT is particularly interesting, as it is based in Thailand but operates in Kachin, aiming to provide humanitarian support to Kachin communities in Myanmar and to empower women, especially because female refugees outnumber males in Thailand (Kachin Women's Association of Thailand, n.d.). Women are usually subjected to sexual violence in prolonged and intensive military conflicts like the one seen in Kachin. However, women are not merely victims of gender-based violence but also assets to peacebuilding, and empowering women has an important implication for the overall peace process of the Kachin conflict. One member of the KIO claims that despite existing gender imbalances, women may play a more important role than men regarding relationship-building, exposing the struggle of the Kachin people to the international community, and they also plan the future of the Kachin people as a whole (Hedström & Olivius, 2021).

Groups like KWAT work well with the local elites of the KIO regarding empowering local women's rights. For example, KWAT could successfully influence the KIA in seeking justice for the two Kachin female teachers who were raped and murdered in 2015, and while this may only be a single case, it sheds light on the more widespread problem of gender-based violence inflicted by the Tatmadaw against civilians all over Myanmar (Pepper, 2018). Ethnic women's organisations in general have been successful in going through local elites like the KIO to advocate greater inclusion of women in peace processes, while women's work in the grassroots also gives them authority to participate

in peace processes, but much more needs to be done, as simply having more seats for female representatives does not always mean more influence from women in peace processes themselves (Pepper, 2018). Women's organisations such as KWAT contribute to peacebuilding by empowering women, offering them internships to learn about issues such as politics and human rights, as well as working with the media as a means of capacity-building (Peace Insight, 2018a).

This is important because in Myanmar, women can be barred from participating in politics at all by the ethnic armed forces, citing women's lack of knowledge and experience, whereas some women argue that they should practice because they were not brought up in the same environment as boys but are not allowed to practice at all (Pepper, 2018). It is too early to claim that women play an instrumental role in influencing the peace process at the national level. However, groups such as KWAT are actively promoting the role of female peacebuilders at the local level, which at times has successfully influenced local elites like the KIO and KIA to tackle gender-based violence. This too can be considered a facet of local peacebuilding, with the potential to gain hybridity if more empowered women are given roles in local or national politics.

#### Hybrid and Local Peace in Shan

Shifting the focus to a neighbouring area, the Shan state has also been locked in a series of conflicts with the Myanmar government, the Tatmadaw, but also with other ethnic groups in the area. In 1947, General Aung San signed the Panglong Agreement with the Shan, Kachin and Chin, and these frontier states were given full autonomy in their internal affairs and financial autonomy, in principle (Ethnic National Council of Burma, 1947). However, these states have not been fully allowed this autonomy after Aung San's assassination and some groups have chosen violence as the means to achieve autonomy. Unlike the Kachin state, where fighting is primarily between its local militia the KIA and the Tatmadaw, conflict in Shan is much more complex with multiple ethnic armed groups fighting against each other, as well as the Tatmadaw. The Shan state has also experienced some of the most violent fighting seen in the last decade, but the region is stable overall in the sense that there is no dramatic alteration of the status quo (International Crisis Group, 2022). The largest of the armed groups, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), enjoys full autonomy over its administered region, whereas other groups, such as the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Progress Party, and the Restoration Council of Shan State fight each other over central and northern Shan, while the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is locked in heavy fighting against the Tatmadaw (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Due to the many years of fighting, the ethnic groups in Shan have developed a legacy of mistrust against the Myanmar government. This has little to do with whether the government in Naypyidaw is ruled by the army or by civilians, because the NLD did little to rein in the power of the Tatmadaw and its ability to wage war against minorities, as the Myanmar government is run by the Burmese majority (International Crisis Group, 2022). Residents of Shan think that the 2010 elections and the introduction of democracy have done little for them and there are still too few mechanisms to protect people from army abuses, while there is constant fear of Tatmadaw expansion in the Shan state (Mizzima, 2012). To these points, having a democratic government does not necessarily resolve the problems in the Shan state. Alternative measures of hybrid peace may be effective in finding ways to maintain peaceful interactions between the Shan and the government so that the Shan state can be allowed to have autonomy while continuing to be a part of Myanmar, to the interest of the government.

However, the intensive fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups in the Shan state makes hybrid peace difficult as well, since there is a lack of enthusiasm from the top local and national elites to negotiate. This can be seen from criticisms directed at the government, as generals usually perceive negotiation as a sign of weakness, and this is intolerable for generals who try to maintain their strongman image (Ye, 2022). Some civil society actors have exposed army atrocities while calling for international help, as well as urging the government (mainly the NLD) to rein in the power of the military and consider the harsh conditions of IDPs, but there is little evidence of collaboration between local CSOs and the government, or with local elites in ethnic armed groups. Therefore, peacebuilding in the Shan case should be considered as local grassroots peacebuilding in collaboration with CSOs that are allowed to operate there. This does not mean that peacebuilding efforts have been futile, as there are still some accomplishments towards improving the human rights situation in the Shan state, thanks to the works of local CSOs.

Like many other parts of Myanmar, there have been few, if any, active civil societies working in the frontier states of the country. This has changed recently, and one group that operates on the Myanmar–Thai border is the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF). Another notable group is the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), which focuses on women’s rights. The SHRF regularly monitors the humanitarian situation in the Shan state and publishes reports to be sent to relevant local and international organisations and the media on the situation in Burma (SHRF, n.d.).

The most notable accomplishment of the SHRF is a joint report published with SWAN named ‘Licence to Rape’, detailing around 173 cases of sexual violence inflicted



by the army in Shan against civilians, and due to the sensitivity of gender-based conflict, in reality, there are many more cases that will never be reported (Peace Women, 2002). The impact of this report is profound, as it reveals that there is systematic use of rape by the Tatmadaw in Shan as a form of anti-insurgency measure (Peace Women, 2002), and this report attracted the attention of foreign donors and multilateral agencies to ramp up humanitarian aid for the Shan state, which was, until then, relatively hidden from the eyes of the international community. For example, little was known about the 1996 exodus of Shan refugees to Thailand, which meant that there was no provision of aid to these people, but the SHRF report was helpful in channelling international aid to reach IDPs when 300,000 people were displaced in 2011 after the collapsed ceasefire between the Shan State Army North and the Tatmadaw (Peace Insight, 2018b). As of the 2017 SHRF report on IDPs in Shan, there are six camps along the Shan-Thai border housing 6,200 refugees, many of whom are women and children. IDP camps have been around for the last 18 years and the SHRF urges international donors to not cut off international aid just because there are peace processes in Myanmar, because many of these people cannot return to their villages, as new projects announced by the government without local consent threaten to wipe out more villages (SHRF, 2017).

### The Rohingya Crisis

The Rohingya crisis is another important internal conflict that stands out from the rest of the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar to the extent that it has been reported on international media. As a group of Muslim minorities in the predominantly Buddhist country of Myanmar, the Rohingyas for many decades have been the subject of discriminatory laws and citizenship under the state.

However, the Rohingyas were not always subjected to such discrimination, as in the 1950s and 1960s, they were allowed to vote under Nu's democratic government and were given citizenship identity cards; they even had a Rohingya-language radio programme that went on air three times a week, and in a public speech in 1959, U Nu clearly declared that the Rohingya had equal status with the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan (Ullah & Chatteraj, 2018). The stance of acceptance from Burma has rapidly become a stance of rejection and discrimination under Ne Win since the 1970s. Rohingyas were declared illegal immigrants under the 1982 Citizenship Act, which tried to strip them of their citizenship; checkpoints were built to restrict their movements; forced labour and sexual assault by the Tatmadaw were common; and 'insurgent' attacks on security sites in 2017 compelled the Tatmadaw to conduct brutal military crackdowns against civilians (Ullah & Chatteraj, 2018).

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched an attack in 2017 that killed nine border guards in Maungdaw of Rakhine state. An ARSA spokesperson claimed that they were not jihadists, but were just like any other ethnic armed group in Myanmar demanding that the Rohingyas be recognised as an ethnic group (Winchester, 2017). Myanmar's state counsellor's office labelled ARSA as a terrorist organisation and accused them of targeting civilians, as thousands of Muslims, Hindus and Buddhist had fled the area (T.T. Aung, 2017). In retaliation against the attacks, the Tatmadaw allegedly opened fire on fleeing civilians and planted land mines to prevent the Rohingya from fleeing into Bangladesh, with an estimate of 6,700 Rohingyas killed in the first month of the crackdown (Albert & Maizland, 2020). Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD has denied international allegations of ethnic cleansing and rejected claims of genocide at the ICJ, but the UN fact-finding panel in 2019 claimed that the situation had not improved after two years (Albert & Maizland, 2020).

The Rohingya crisis is related to a previous point made by the Shan residents about the NLD. The civilian government has done little to reduce the power of the Tatmadaw, as they can still act with impunity in frontier states like Shan and Rakhine. Once again, it means that democracy is not necessarily the solution to the Rohingya crisis, though part of the demands of ARSA is the restoration of recognition of the Rohingya ethnic group. Except for the short amount of peace enjoyed by the Rohingyas shortly after Myanmar's independence, there has been a steady stream of Rohingya refugees, mostly aiming for neighbouring Bangladesh and taking refuge in Cox's Bazar following government persecutions.

The earliest of these persecutions was in 1978 under Operation Dragon King with the purpose of identifying citizens in North Arakan and expelling 'foreigners' (Elahi, 1987). There were multiple instances of major persecutions in the 1990s and in 2012, whereas the ARSA insurgency only launched the latest wave of Rohingya exodus in 2017. As this conflict has spilled over the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border, it is important for CSOs and NGOs of both countries to work with their respective governments to resolve the problem. However, as international organisations like the UN mentioned above, there has been little improvement to the situation in Myanmar for two years and it is unlikely that there will be any drastic breakthrough towards the resolution of this conflict in the near future. Once again, there seems to be a lack of political will from the government of Myanmar to help the Rohingyas, and this is the reason why the Rohingyas are fleeing their homeland in the first place.

The reasons for the lack of political will from the Myanmar government to even make the Rohingya issue a problem is because the government is part of the problem.

There have been decades of anti-Rohingya propaganda perpetrated by the Myanmar government, labelling Rohingyas as ‘illegal Bengalis’, and this is not limited to the government but has also been perpetrated by non-governmental entities (Sohel, 2017). This is also related to the issue of uncivil societies in Myanmar that amplify ultranationalist and racist elements promoted by the state, and for this reason too, Suu Kyi was relatively silent against the persecution of Rohingyas, seeing the strong anti-Muslim sentiments among the Myanmar public (Brenner & Schulman, 2019). Both Myanmar’s state and non-state media play a significant role in promoting hate speech against Rohingyas under the narrative that Buddhism is under threat from Islam (Lee, 2019). Popular social media networks like Facebook are also exploited by nationalists to disseminate hate amongst the Myanmar community and negative sentiments in the public that go hand-in-hand with violence against Rohingyas (Lee, 2019). For the reasons above, there is no political will from the government to solve the Rohingya crisis, as the Myanmar public buys into discriminatory narratives perpetrated by ultranationalists both within and outside the government, as in uncivil societies. Even under a civilian government, the NLD has done little, and perhaps has little capacity to change the existing narratives that have already been ingrained in the minds of the grassroots.

The lack of political will from the Myanmar side even to make the Rohingya crisis an issue leaves the international community to address the problem. Bangladesh, being the country that houses the most refugees, is an important actor in the hybrid and local peace process of the Rohingya crisis. The initial response from the Bangladeshi community towards the latest stream of Rohingya refugees in 2017 was mostly uncoordinated people-to-people efforts to meet the basic needs of refugees, such as food and shelter (Lewis, 2020). Local citizens have helped refugees out of genuine goodwill, but this is eventually met by shortcomings, as refugees often fight for the limited supplies of food (Lewis, 2020). While individual efforts continue, the Bangladeshi government and local NGOs are coordinating efforts for larger scale humanitarian aid, such as the Cox’s Bazar’s local government’s District Commissioner’s Office accepting donations and distributing resources, while local organisations and NGOs such as the Coast Trust, Ladder of Dreams and Playroom also played a role in fundraising and distributing relief goods, while the national government brought together international agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organisation for Migration, and Save the Children (Lewis, 2020). Bangladesh is adept at responding to refugee crises due to its own history of being vulnerable to tropical disasters and flooding (Lewis, 2020).

Local women in Bangladesh make an important contribution to peacebuilding,

as well as the abovementioned social cohesion issue. For example, local activists in Cox's Bazar are making efforts to improve the literacy rate of Rohingya women and girls to make them aware of their rights and enable them to live safely as equals, because women need to be treated as equals before there is a chance for peaceful society (UN Women, 2021). In the past, there have been some positive signs of interaction between local Bangladeshis and Rohingyas in the form of marriage and religious ceremonies, but even with the understanding that Rohingyas are trapped people with a miserable life ahead, some Rohingyas have been involved in drug smuggling, robbery, and piracy, as well as reacting violently when locals come to evacuate them from their land (Ahmed & Elahi, 2016).

#### Hybrid Peace promoted by International Actors

While the local approach to Myanmar's ethnic conflicts has shown some prospects towards sustainable peace, local capacity is still limited, and it is difficult for local groups to work with governments alone to create sustainable peace, especially when the political will from the top is often lacking. This section will look at how international society and actors may supplement local efforts and even discuss whether there are chances that international actors can press the government to be more aware of local realities on the ground for more hybrid forms of peace.

As of 2017, INGOs in Myanmar have employed 10,000 local employees and 22,000 volunteers; 75% of their activities are focused on development, while 25% are given to humanitarian emergencies, and in principle, INGOs should emphasise supporting the Myanmar government's development agenda, mutual capacity-building, direct delivery of aid to communities, and partnership with local CSOs and private companies (MIMU, 2017). The role of INGOs in Myanmar is similar to that of Pakistan, where most foreign actors are dedicated to supporting economic development rather than humanitarian aid.

International actors and their INGOs, as well as UN agencies, have shown positive signs of supporting local actors and their capacity to deliver aid, but there are also signs of a common criticism of Western aid, as seen in other cases as well. Overall, Western aid in Myanmar's ethnic conflicts has produced mixed results, but still constitutes a necessary component for peacebuilding in Myanmar because Myanmar's local organisations often do not have the capacity to fully provide aid to displaced people, while the government remains indifferent to the situation. For example, despite the provision of considerable aid to IDPs in Kachin by the KIO and the 'Light of Kachin', these groups usually have limited resources (HRW, 2011b). As a result, they must

negotiate with the government to allow access for international organisations, where some bodies like the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the UN Children's Fund have granted access in the past (HRW, 2011b). The problem is that the bridge-building potential of local organisations between the government and international society is not always consistent. Even under its transition to democracy in 2016, local aid agencies have reported that the Myanmar government continues to block aid to the Kachin state, accusing the government of politicizing humanitarian access (DVB, 2016).

INGOs that did make it into Kachin have created both positive and negative impacts. International actors provide locals with much-needed expertise, funding and material assistance, and locals have been seen to adapt to international standards presented by foreign actors (Ho, 2018). However, there are some cases where locals find it difficult to meet the international standards of their foreign donors. For example, a local faith-based organisation once used funds intended for food to repair a road that would help food delivery, but this local staff has been denounced by peers who argued that such an act would endanger the funding prospects of the entire organisation because international funding is strict (Ho, 2018).

In terms of what type of aid has been given to Kachin locals, the UK worked with local faith-based organisation Karuna Myanmar Social Services through the Trocaire NGO to deliver basic food rations to 15,997 people, cash grants worth £4.68 per adult per month for 21,479 people, intended for cooked meals and basic hygiene items, and shelter for 1,284 people; it also created safe areas for 800 children, provided 5,000 people with psychological support, and provided training to 120 local staff to enable them to provide humanitarian aid by international standards (Gov.uk, 2012). The downside to INGO aid is the common criticism that it does not always provide what the locals actually need. For example, INGOs in Kachin do not usually speak to IDPs about their needs, and most of the UN staff are Burmese, so local minorities do not feel comfortable working with them, with some locals even questioning the efficiency of international models designed for situations drastically different from the local realities in Kachin (Ho, 2018). It is important for INGOs, and international actors in general, to familiarise themselves with the situation on the ground. As shown in the KPK case in Pakistan, the lack of local knowledge has created unwanted dependencies when foreign donors lacked local knowledge and yet did not consult with local leaders who were familiar with the situation and needs of their people.

The Shan state, as elaborated above, is much more difficult to access for international actors. In fact, all humanitarian actors face a common challenge when working in Myanmar, in that they must obtain a travel permit from the Myanmar

government, which has the sole authority to decide whether to grant them access or not (The Asia Foundation, 2018). Situations have arisen such as in the Northern Shan state, where there are still many cases of aid being blocked or denied, or in Rakhine in 2016, when the government suspended all humanitarian organisations in the region following the attack on the Myanmar police in Maungdaw (The Asia Foundation, 2018). The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is one of the aid agencies working under the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission operating in Shan since 2016, and coordinates closely with local organisation Meikswe Myanmar (Friends of Myanmar) as the first line in the state's emergency response programme (DRC, 2021). The DRC works to reach people trapped in conflicts and emphasises the importance of logistics in conflict zones, where roads are often damaged and infrastructure is weak, and the DRC, along with its grassroots partners, wants to help prepare local actors for future conflicts as a means to improve people's resilience (DRC, 2021).

While a solid effort is attempting to build community resilience against conflict between ethnic armed groups, improving local resilience is an effective temporary measure as a means of humanitarian relief. However, a sustainable solution cannot be reached without including the interests of local elites and the Myanmar government. At a time when there is political instability in Naypyidaw and Shan militias are fighting each other as well as the Tatmadaw, local agencies and INGOs might not have the capacity to influence larger actors. It may come down to influential regional actors such as China, as discussed later, as well as Japan, India, and ASEAN, which may have an influence over national elites in the country. Once again, humanitarian aid is necessary to prevent further loss of life, but IDPs' reliance on foreign aid for the long term should not be a sustainable peace solution.

For the Rohingyas who are in Bangladesh, the EU has launched a peacebuilding programme for 20,500 youth as a means to improve social cohesion in Cox's Bazar. The EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace social hubs, in collaboration with UNICEF, intends to teach skills to young people related to adaptability, peacebuilding, sports, recreation, and adolescent programmes, since bringing together communities through sports and education is a strong basis for peace (European Commission, n.d.). Parents and religious leaders from both Bangladeshi and Rohingya communities can engage in awareness-raising dialogue as well (European Commission, n.d.). Social cohesion initiatives are important, especially in Bangladesh, where local generosity has been wearing thin over the years of hosting Rohingya refugees. However, as explained above, peacebuilding from international actors alone is not enough for sustainable peace. The situation in Rakhine must be resolved through collaboration with the Myanmar

government. To this point, PDi-Kintha (2019) has mentioned that the Myanmar government has reacted differently to the Rohingya crisis, depending on its department. The Department of Social Welfare encouraged collaboration even if it did not provide much practical support, but other divisions have not been as cooperative, especially if the government suspects any connection with local militias such as the Arakan Army (PDi-Kintha, 2019). Maintaining positive ties with the government appears to be the minimum threshold for international actors to contribute to peacebuilding in Myanmar. This may require the West to tone down its criticism of the Myanmar government's human rights to avoid compromising access to remote areas. To this point, perhaps Asian actors that do not directly criticise a fellow Asian country for human rights abuses may find more favour with the government. This brings us to the next point of Japan, Indian and ASEAN's peacebuilding efforts.

Japan is also a major contributor. As shown in the previous section, Japan has carefully cultivated its relations with the Myanmar government over the years, using democracy as an end goal of economic development. Japan has provided Myanmar with large amounts of ODA over the years in the forms of loans, grants, and technical cooperation, disbursing a total of \$6.8 billion between 2012 and 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016). With the recent outbreak of COVID-19, Japan has ramped up its aid, providing another \$20 million in humanitarian assistance for Myanmar despite the coup, widely condemned by the West, as well as responding to ASEAN's request for \$18.5 million in humanitarian assistance to tackle rising COVID-19 infections as well as food, shelter, and mattress deliveries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022). The question here is whether or not generosity from another Asian country would compel Myanmar to resolve its ethnic problems with underrepresented groups around the country for sustainable peace.

It is evident that Japan has been a major contributor to infrastructure development throughout Myanmar. With Japanese aid, Myanmar has improved the communications network around the capital, Naypyidaw, provided Rakhine with construction equipment, and developed infrastructure in Yangon; and JICA has also been active in waterworks, improving hospitals, building bridges, and providing technical assistance to the Yangon port since 2012 (Alexandra & Lanteigne, 2017). As a top-down initiative, the Japanese government also directly participated in the ceasefire signed between Myanmar and eight ethnic groups, along with the Nippon Foundation from the Japanese private sector, which is interested in helping Myanmar to achieve peace (Alexandra & Lanteigne, 2017). However, despite these efforts and positive relations with the Myanmar government, Japanese NGOs such as the Nippon Foundation have still been

denied access by the government in the past when trying to deliver humanitarian aid. In 2013, the Nippon Foundation attempted to facilitate peace talks between the government and ethnic armed groups but was denied access to Kachin while negotiations between the government and KIO were ongoing (Weng, 2013).

One of the more significant achievements of Japan in terms of hybrid peace can be credited to two men, Imoto Katsuyuki and Sasakawa Yohei, the former being the head of an NGO retrieving human remains and the latter being a special envoy of the Japanese government (Nojima, 2019). Initially, Imoto was unwelcome in Myanmar under President Thein Sein, but Thein Sein also realised Imoto's usefulness as a mediator for his work on the frontlines talking with ethnic minorities and militias, as he could create a venue for the two sides to discuss the benefits of peace (Nojima, 2019). Meanwhile, the Japanese government took an unprecedented step to appoint Sasakawa as its representative, and with the Nippon Foundation as his financial base, he recognised the different interests of various stakeholders in the peace process and did not directly join the talks. Instead, both Sasakawa and Imoto ensured that minority groups did not leave the negotiation table, as the two contributed greatly to Myanmar's ground-breaking ceasefire process between the government and eight ethnic groups (Nojima, 2019).

Concerning the Rohingya crisis, JICA's overseas cooperation agency has made considerable progress in addressing the issue of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. JICA members are assigned to talk to local agencies and people in Cox's Bazar about the refugee situation to increase their awareness of the struggles that the Rohingyas face and persuade locals to be more accommodating to them (JICA Overseas Cooperation Agency, 2013). JICA staff need to build trust with the local government by communicating in the local language, Bengali, and to address the problem of environmental degradation and unemployment due to the influx of refugees JICA staff could secure funds for small-scale infrastructure maintenance in the area (JICA Overseas Cooperation Agency, 2013). Later we will see that Japan has a problem of embracing the Myanmar government's official narrative, such as with the Rohingya crisis. While this has been criticised by activists, it is also an effective measure to uphold non-intervention and foster positive relationships with the government, to allow smoother access of aid and humanitarian relief to grassroots communities.

Another actor that can influence the Myanmar government and generals is India. However, given the light footprint of India's contribution to peacebuilding in Myanmar over the years, one must question whether the Indian approach offers anything concrete to hybrid peace in Myanmar's ethnic conflicts. India's model for peacebuilding is very similar to that of China's developmental peace, and that peacebuilding is linked to



economic development so that there is no separate budget for peacebuilding activities (Choedon, 2021). In practice, India's guiding principles for developmental aid also reflect on its foreign policy of non-alignment, South-South solidarity, and a shared sense of post-colonial sensitivity to state sovereignty (Choedon, 2021). While not high in quantity compared to traditional donors like the OECD countries, Indian aid is said to be valued more for its appropriateness and non-imposing nature (Choedon, 2021). As shown above, it requires positive relations with the Myanmar government, and the generals in particular, for there to be a strong top-down impetus to resolve ethnic conflicts. India maintained this strong relationship with the junta at the end of the Cold War, much to the dismay of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. There are several signs to suggest that India, although interested in the end goal of a stable and democratised Myanmar, may not necessarily contribute to the construction of hybrid peace with regard to Myanmar's ethnic conflicts.

When Myanmar came under international scrutiny for the military coup that overthrew the NLD, India repeatedly stated that Myanmar should exercise restraint against unarmed protestors, request the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD party members, and develop an inclusive national reconciliatory process (Gupta, 2008). However, the official narrative of India did not condemn Myanmar for its actions, as that would have contravened New Delhi's policy of non-intervention. Myanmar's coup did not discourage aid from India, as India's union budget of 2022 allocated approximately \$2.3 billion in foreign aid, mainly given to crisis-hit Myanmar and Taliban-led Afghanistan, when Myanmar had already received around \$80 million from India to tackle the economic pressure caused by the coup and COVID-19 (Mizzima, 2022).

From the Western perspective, such a passive approach from a power like India with perceived influence over the Myanmar junta may be puzzling. For example, the USIP claims that New Delhi should distance itself from the junta, engage the NLD and provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, as such a move would gain the approval of Myanmar citizens and would benefit India in the long term through a show of goodwill (Ambarkhane & Gathia, 2022), although India has its own problems with refugees and an insurgency that finds sanctuary within the borders of Myanmar, such as from the Sagaing region and with Rohingya refugees (Hanghal & Sitlhou, 2021). When members of the Civil Disobedience Movement in Myanmar fled across the border to neighbouring Manipur state in India, the BJP-run local government was ordered to turn away refugees but received massive criticism from local groups for its insensitivity (Hanghal & Sitlhou, 2021). Local CSOs kept relief operations open for refugees, many of whom were children still in their pyjamas and university students, and did not turn away refugees asking for food despite the Indian government's orders (Hanghal & Sitlhou, 2021). There are

elements of local peace by grassroots organisations regarding humanitarian relief; however, the argument remains that the top-down approach is lacking, which means that hybridity is lacking as well.

Finally, I will look at the ASEAN approach. ASEAN is an actor that I have not discussed in the other case studies. It is built on the spirit of non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making, and this sentiment is even stronger than that of India's foreign policy because it is enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be a unified response from the association when there are grave human rights abuses from one of its member states. Each member state responds to the Myanmar issue with a different intensity. Some, like Indonesia, have been more active in trying to help Myanmar to achieve democracy with non-intervention-based strategies since 2011, when Jakarta opened the Institute for Peace and Democracy – an NGO that shared Indonesia's democratisation experiences with Myanmar (Ichihara et al., 2016). Scholars have argued that ASEAN does not have the capacity to tackle human rights issues, while others have noted that ASEAN has proven that it is not prepared to intervene in the domestic affairs of a member state (Barber & Teitt, 2020). If ASEAN cannot come to a consensus on how to handle the highly internationalised Rohingya crisis, then it means that the association will not have the means to tackle less well-known ethnic conflicts in the Kachin and Shan states. Human rights groups from the West have called on ASEAN to exert pressure on Myanmar to address the root cause of the crisis rather than focussing on repatriation, which disregards the lives of the Rohingyas (HRW, 2020). To this point, ASEAN does have the tools at hand for a more robust response, such as through the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). However, the AICHR was created to promote human rights through principles of non-intervention and is bound by the same consensual decision-making process as ASEAN (Barber & Teitt, 2020). Concerning the Rohingya crisis, the AICHR may not have been required to reach a consensus when it merely considered an issue and could have been used to help Myanmar comply with the measures under the International Criminal Court's order (Barber & Teitt, 2020).

#### *7.3.4: Critique of the Practice of Hybrid Peace in Myanmar*

##### Role of CSOs

CSOs in Myanmar have most certainly been gaining capacity over the years in terms of providing political support to the grassroots not covered by the government. Yet, even with such momentum, we must question how much of a difference this local approach is

actually making on the ground. Clapp (2007) observed that CSOs in Myanmar remained underdeveloped and would not be given the chance to grow into a force of change as long as the government wants to control every aspect of people's lives in the country. This is likely to remain true, as the military junta has no intention of relinquishing power despite consistent promises of political reforms over the years. That being said, the Roadmap to Democracy did, perhaps unintentionally, trigger stronger CSO activism around the country, which educated the public in both urban and rural areas on the new constitution (Lidauer, 2012).

Regarding the interest of this dissertation, it is necessary to look at the capacity of CSOs in Myanmar to contribute to the peace processes of conflicts inside the country. The problem with CSOs in Myanmar is that their growth has also created intergroup competition or 'NGO-isation' where groups become detached from citizens (La et al., 2020). There are also signs of growing mistrust between CSOs and the NLD, when many civil society actors feel disappointed by the government's narratives that CSOs are 'spoilers or problem-makers', not to mention that even under the NLD, there is diminishing civic space where critics feel that they are back under the junta's rule (La et al., 2020). Without the chance to grow or develop, and the danger of infighting between NGOs, it may be difficult for civil society in Myanmar to impact the complex and protracted conflicts the country faces. For the few times when the top-down government (mainly the junta) initiative has been successful at negotiating a ceasefire with EOAs, these cannot be sustained if grassroots movements that are geared towards addressing issues of poor human rights and local development are kept weak. CSOs must create NGOs that can create a bottom-up approach that supports government initiatives, though this appears difficult in Myanmar.

There is also the problem of uncivil societies, as shown above with the Rohingya crisis. Instead of being a civic space where local grassroots can rally and demand and end the ethnic persecution of the Rohingyas, uncivil society in Myanmar amplifies the government's ultranationalist narratives where Myanmar people rally against the Rohingyas. Despite the support that Myanmar's CSOs receive from external actors, and the fact that much of the CSO growth is attributed to foreign support (La et al., 2020), CSOs in Myanmar still have a long way to go before they are capable of contributing towards sustainable peace. Regardless of whether a military or civilian government is in power, the treatment of CSOs and the quality of civic space have not significantly improved for civil society actors.

### Hybrid and Local Peace in Kachin and Shan

Both the Kachin and Shan cases share the same shortcoming, as CSOs, as well as faith-based organisations, face the lack of political will from the Myanmar government to deliver a top-down initiative that can lead to sustainable peace. It appears that elites in the Myanmar government are much more interested in focusing on business opportunities in these minority regions during the ceasefire rather than improving local livelihoods, resolving the existing IDP issue or addressing the issue at the heart of self-determination for ethnic minorities.

For the Kachin conflict, the ceasefire established in 1994 was never intended to be a political settlement but merely a truce. Local groups like the KIO that took part in the National Convention were never given the opportunity to discuss issues of ethnic grievances at the top level (Ivanov, 2014). Local groups or their international partners have tried supplementing local authorities and their efforts with humanitarian relief for IDPs, though this was unsustainable, as youth groups became frustrated with the lack of progress in the region even when there was ‘peace’, resulting in violence as the means to make themselves heard.

For the Shan state, an immediate focus should be put on IDPs, considering the diminishing amounts of international aid to the most vulnerable people in the region. As of 2022, most global attention is turned towards the Russo-Ukraine War, so only 6% of the \$826 million necessary aid is funded (Sai, 2022). While the KIO/KIA is somewhat more receptive to local organisations in Kachin, the situation in Shan is much more dire, where locals and local elites must work with the national elites, as well as the Tatmadaw, to negotiate sustainable peace beyond economic incentives. However, due to the scarcity of intermediaries like NGOs, this may be a difficult prospect. The few NGOs that are allowed to operate in the frontier regions of Myanmar have an important role in protecting vulnerable IDPs but a limited role in tackling the root cause of the conflict.

The problem with peacebuilding in the Shan state is the lack of hybridity. Although CSOs such as the SHRF can make international society aware of conflict and human rights abuse, humanitarian aid can only remedy parts of the problem. Grassroots actors and international society cannot be the deciding factor in establishing sustainable peace in regions because once again there is a lack of political will from the top. The USIP (2020) claims that seventy years of peace-making in Myanmar has failed time and time again because the government would always demand that rebels surrender but never offered more beyond rehabilitation and business opportunities. To make matters worse, little change has been seen in the military since the 1950s. The very ceasefires that were supposed to bring peace and stability to the region became an incentive for the Tatmadaw elites, local militia elites, Myanmar business elites and cross-border international actors

to rush for resources like jade and timber (Meehan, 2018). The lack of faith in ceasefires among Shan and Kachin residents is also emphasised by the rise of nationalism in the Tatmadaw, who saw their roles as being to prevent internal fragmentation by neighbouring superpowers, like China and India (Meehan, 2018).

Local militias became intermediaries for firms trying to do business in the politically unstable Shan state because they could not rely on the state to provide adequate protection, whereas local militias themselves established ties with the national government as well as with other private actors when building their businesses (Meehan & Dan, 2022). Some scholars may even claim that the top-down initiative from the government is a model of illiberal peace. The Tatmadaw used ceasefires as a means to shift the balance of power in their own favour while also giving clientelism-based economic concessions to ethnic armed groups, such as by allowing local militias to engage in illegal opium trade in the 1960s (Stokke et al., 2022). This type of ceasefire based on clientelism economies does not solve the core issue (desire for independence and self-determination) of conflict in the Shan and Kachin states because local elites and non-elites are impacted differently, so grievances can emerge and create a relapse into conflict (Stokke et al., 2022).

### The Rohingya Crisis

The problem with the Rohingya response from the Myanmar side is their lack of response. Contrary to the positive responses from Bangladesh and international society in receiving refugees, some analysts argue that there is a clear intent from the Myanmar side in trying to oust the Rohingyas from the Rakhine state, where two years after the exodus, the Myanmar government still calls Rohingyas illegal citizens (Ahmed & Ahmad, 2019).

There is also a sense of nationalism from the Burmese Buddhist majority against minorities in Myanmar in general. Much of this nationalism can be traced back to the British colonial period, when Britain favoured ethnic minorities over most Burmese, many of whom were not allowed to serve in the military, as Britain used ethnic minority soldiers. Many Burmans were also excluded from the economy, as Indian labour was imported to occupy most mills and commerce operations (Akins, 2018). Using nationalism against ethnic minorities and the British, the Burmese reversed their position against underrepresented groups in the country after independence, with U Nu saying that 'minority rights' are a means for imperialists to divide-and-rule over Myanmar and that the country would never achieve unity as long as they keep talking about 'minority rights' (Akins, 2018). The Rohingyas' subjection to persecution for their connection with the British is a direct consequence of Burmese nationalism, with the government viewing

them as ‘illegal Bengali immigrants’ (Akins, 2018). For this reason, the Myanmar public shows little sympathy to Rohingyas and their persecution.

According to Western reports on how locals think about the situation with the Rohingya crisis, many people still refer to the Rohingyas as ‘Bengalis’, and support Suu Kyi in not denouncing their persecution. Muslims in general are seen as a threat to Buddhism, and while there are still some people who desire a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Suu Kyi’s supporters do not show much sympathy for Rohingyas, which, as a result, does not give her an incentive to condemn the military for their actions (Hunt, 2017).

For the reasons listed above, there is little evidence of local CSOs or NGOs acting on behalf of the Rohingyas. Even under Suu Kyi’s democratic government, which could secure considerable funds for humanitarian support, many of Myanmar’s NGOs were based in Yangon, and were mostly staffed by locals who worked in Yangon. The democratic government even interfered in the works of NGOs, and these groups were never allowed to work in remote areas of the Rakhine state even if their jobs were to protect vulnerable people (Ahmed & Ahmad, 2019). Intercommunal hate perpetrates a type of uncivil society regarding groups that are strongly disliked by the majority group. A general lack of CSOs also means that this type of intercommunal hatred created by the state flows down from the top, where the government-spread anti-Rohingya narrative becomes the sole narrative for grassroot communities (Ahmed & Mohiuddin, 2020). Therefore, it will be hard to find any evidence of Myanmar NGOs being given access to the Rakhine state, as the government of Myanmar has become a spoiler against potential peacebuilding measures by local people and the Burmese public are antipathic towards the Rohingyas. Neighbouring Bangladesh and Bangladeshi locals, as well as CSOs, will have to bear the brunt of the responsibility of looking after Rohingya refugees.

The response from Bangladesh is also not without its problems. Bangladesh is a developing country with a large population and does not have the capacity to house the growing number of refugees coming across the Myanmar border. For example, a sudden influx of 700,000 refugees in 2017 heavily outnumbered local residents in the area, putting excess pressure on local infrastructure that was never meant for these many people. The Bangladeshi authorities decided to move refugees out of Cox’s Bazar to a nearby island in the Bay of Bengal but encountered hurdles (Beaubien, 2019). The large number of NGOs and INGOs in Cox’s Bazar also put further stress on the local economy, driving up living costs for the locals, as well as coming into conflict with the government, which wanted to move refugees but could not do so due to the pressure coming from NGOs (Ahmed and Mohiuddin, 2020). A sticking point for the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s

Bazar is that nobody in Bangladesh is thinking seriously about peacebuilding because everybody believes that the Rohingya community will eventually be repatriated to Myanmar (Grossenbacher, 2020). Analysts believe that effective peacebuilding should come through the promotion of social cohesion, and Rohingya women need the most attention, as many of them are still traumatised by the Myanmar military and continue to experience gender-based violence in Cox's Bazar at the domestic level, but the Bangladeshi government seems to have overlooked the issue of social cohesion by providing humanitarian aid instead (Grossenbacher, 2020). Other factors that can disrupt social cohesion include drugs, domestic violence, human trafficking, mental health issues, poverty, and lack of accountability (Grossenbacher, 2020).

Keeping Rohingyas in Bangladesh as refugees is not a sustainable solution for the long term. The only way to ensure a peaceful and sustainable resolution to the Rohingya crisis is repatriation to Myanmar with recognition as citizens. However, nothing suggests that the Myanmar government, or even the local Buddhist residents of Rakhine, are ready for such an endeavour. An alternative strategy is to create more living space for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, such as a previous attempt to move 100,000 people to the Bhasan Char Island in the Bay of Bengal. Concerns have been raised by international organisations such as HRW and Amnesty International, while the Bangladeshi government claims that migration is entirely voluntary (Islam and Siddika, 2021). This was a move to address the overcrowding of Cox's Bazar and the environmental degradation of the region, dismissing claims that the island is unsafe for human residence, but Rohingyas have provided mixed reports on their relocation, with some arguing that there is a lack of services on the island, while others welcomed the move because the island had more space and greater security than the camps back in Cox's Bazar (Islam and Siddika, 2021). Experts argue that there needs to be more accountability in such a process and greater involvement of the UN to prevent cases of forced migration in the future (Islam and Siddika, 2021).

Despite encountering difficulties, Bangladesh has demonstrated a positive sign of hybrid peace where the government is responsive to the concerns of locals in the area, and has worked together with grassroots agencies and international partners to temporarily address the issue. However, even with the generous humanitarian approach from Bangladesh, the government still lacks a refugee education policy and has adopted policies to prevent Rohingyas from obtaining citizenship in Bangladesh (Karim, 2020). To this point, even relocation will not be a sustainable policy for the long term, as it does not solve statelessness – the main issue faced by the Rohingyas back at home in Myanmar. As long as the Myanmar government does not demonstrate the political will for reforms

regarding its Rohingya policy, there is only so much that foreign actors like Bangladesh and INGOs can do to sustain the growing number of Rohingya refugees.

Many Rohingya children are also not educated, and cannot be educated in Bangladesh outside informal programmes offered by locals, creating a lost generation of people who are unable to realise their rights and unable to go to Myanmar to stand for their rights (Karim, 2020). This ties in with the issue of female education mentioned above, but it is not just women and girls who are in need of education: Rohingya children as a whole have been deprived of the chance to learn due to their exodus from Myanmar. Save the Children (2021) claims that up to 700,000 Rohingya children across Asia are being denied basic rights such as education, and these are not just the children in Bangladesh but also those who are still in Myanmar, and those who have fled to other countries like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This is closely related to the issue of statelessness, since basic needs are not even met in the refugee camps. Even surviving the day can be a struggle for the Rohingyas, and this is a more pressing problem that must be addressed before trying to integrate into local society (Ahmed and Mohiuddin, 2020). Moreover, children born in Bangladesh are not given citizenship, creating a sense of alienation and hopelessness in the community (Ahmed and Mohiuddin, 2020).

Based on the above analysis, there are two potential solutions to the Rohingya crisis for which local and international actors can aim. The crisis could be resolved by peaceful repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, where they would be accepted as citizens and treated as equals by the government and locals. Given that there has not been a drastic change in Myanmar's domestic policy in favour of the Rohingyas since the last exodus in 2017, the likelihood of this happening is slim. In 2021, the junta's leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, said that no country would go beyond its own refugee laws to accept refugees, because accepting the Rohingyas, which he refused to recognise as citizens, does not comply with Myanmar's laws (Reuters, 2021d). He added that Rohingyas would be welcome to return to Rakhine if the local Buddhists agreed (Min, 2017).

The second solution is to compel Bangladesh to revise its refugee laws and accept Rohingyas as Bangladeshi citizens. This would also be unlikely, however, as it would require a long legal process inside Bangladesh, in a situation where Rohingyas are already struggling with everyday basic needs. In addition, despite the initial generosity shown by the Bangladeshi government and locals, sources show that the government is beginning to feel frustrated by the standards given by the Rohingyas, which the Bangladeshi side consider as conditions proposed by the West, and instead prefers to work with other stakeholders such as India and China to encourage the Rohingya 'Going Home'



campaign (Hatdash, 2022). Besides, despite the dangers of oppression at home, many Rohingyas would still prefer to return to Myanmar and do not intend to make Bangladesh their home (Hatdash, 2022). Therefore, it may be up to international society and INGOs to help ensure that Rohingyas are treated with dignity upon their return, though this in itself may be a difficult prospect, knowing the Myanmar junta's defiance against international criticism of its human rights violations.

#### Hybrid Peace promoted by International Actors

There are several problems with international actors and foreign aid. Several of these problems have been made clear through the Rohingya crisis. According to a report by PDi-Kintha (2019), a local organisation in Myanmar, on communal anti-Muslim violence, there is a severe lack of local knowledge by both national and international organisations in Rakhine. Not only does this add to the previous criticism of the lack of local knowledge among foreign actors, but also, not being able to coordinate efforts with local actors severely hampers the ability to deliver effective aid to communities in need. The remedy to this problem could include an increase in the number of female members in senior positions, while local organisations must study to overcome the language barrier in Rakhine, international organisations should engage with smaller organisations that are not their usual CSO partners, and both need to be clear on objectives and consult stakeholders on these objectives. Moreover, staff members should be culturally sensitive, and should have effective and transparent channels of communication with local agencies and communities (PDi-Kintha, 2019).

On the peacebuilding efforts of specific actors, Japan has enjoyed success in fostering peace processes but also fell short due to geopolitics in the region. While Japan did not play a direct role in influencing the direction of the ceasefires, it played an important role of linking the top level to the bottom level grassroots – a link that was severed due to years of distrust from fighting. This was successful in moving temporary measures of local peace efforts such as humanitarian relief to more concrete forms of hybrid peace where the government proposes a ceasefire that was acceptable to local ethnic communities. The downside to the Japanese approach is geopolitics, as China acts as a spoiler to peace processes led or backed by foreign entities. For example, senior official at the government-linked Myanmar Peace Center Min Zaw Oo accused China of meddling talks between the government and EAOs that may have resulted in a ceasefire where Japan and the West could participate as observers (Wee, 2015). The growing importance of China for Myanmar is likely to become a sticking point for other international actors that want to work in Myanmar, especially those with geopolitical

competition with China, like Japan and India.

Some human rights activists do not agree with the non-intervention principle employed by many Asian countries, like Japan, regarding the Rohingya crisis. For example, HRW called Japan's response to the Rohingya crisis 'cold-blooded' and compared it to the devil's bargain of Omelas because of Tokyo's abstention from all Myanmar-related resolutions at the UN, criticised Japan's decision to side with the Myanmar government's narrative to not use the term 'Rohingya', and criticised the remarks of Japanese ambassador to Myanmar Ichiro Maruyama, who said that there will be no conflict if there is development (Kasai, 2019).

Defying Western expectations, New Delhi's cautious approach when handling Myanmar is due to the China factor. The harder India presses Naypyidaw on human rights and democratic reforms, the more likely it is that Myanmar will shift towards China following Beijing's expanding economic footprint. The fact that Myanmar is India's gateway to ASEAN means that it must demonstrate that it is capable of managing relations with its neighbours in order for New Delhi to command respect from its ASEAN peers (Gupta, 2008). Therefore, peacefully resolving the ethnic conflict in Myanmar is within India's interest. Whether or not India, under its principles of non-intervention, has the capacity to resolve ethnic tensions with Myanmar is another question, especially because India deems that these problems cannot be resolved by unilateral condemnations, since that will only entrench the junta further and weaken ASEAN's confidence in New Delhi's potential to become a power-balancer in Asia (Gupta, 2008).

India's shortcomings are also made clear through its response to the Rohingya crisis, as New Delhi is clearly less generous than Bangladesh regarding accepting refugees despite the arrival of a decent number. Al Jazeera (2022) recently reported that there are roughly 40,000 Rohingyas in India, but they live in fear of being deported. New Delhi has labelled Rohingya refugees with illegal status and considers them a national security threat (Inzamam & Qadri, 2022). India presents an unfriendly attitude towards Muslim refugees under the BJP's new Citizenship Amendment Act, where New Delhi is selective on which types of people are given refugee status in the country, and the Rohingyas are not one of these groups, but are instead used to prop up the BJP's Islamophobic agenda (Inzamam & Qadri, 2022). Such an attitude from the ruling party of India can seriously hamper its potential as a peacebuilder. Even with regard to ethnic conflicts in Myanmar, India's selective treatment of refugees is unlikely to win it many favours in the eyes of Western analysts, especially when India is supposed to be the largest democracy in Asia that could have brought Western liberal norms into the region by setting an example. Yet, the BJP appears to have brought India in the opposite direction.

Finally, with ASEAN, the problem of trying to make ASEAN take the mantle of regional peacebuilding is that it is not a single entity with a unified agenda in the minds of all member states. While a significant economic actor in the region, it is simply too fragmented to tackle sensitive political issues created by Myanmar like the Rohingya crisis and the 2021 coup. Even within ASEAN, authoritarian countries like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and Brunei, the absolute monarchy, along with liberal actors like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, express deeper concern for Myanmar, while the Philippines and Thailand sit on the fence. Singapore has even suggested that Myanmar's membership should not be taken for granted and needs to be revoked if it continues to behave in ways that would ruin the collective values of the association (Mahaseth & Tulsyan, 2022). Compared to bilateral actors like Japan and India, ASEAN finds it even harder to make concrete contributions to peacebuilding in Myanmar. Ironically, it might even be easier for individual member states to work in liberal peace and promote democratic reforms in Myanmar. However, on a hybrid peace model, that would require the association to demand access to grassroots IDPs or Rohingya refugees from the junta, which is a daunting task for an organisation with non-intervention enshrined in its charter.

Non-intervention from Asian countries can sometimes be an inhibitor to hybrid and even liberal peace. For liberal actors like India and Japan, there is often a struggle to balance the Asian norms of non-intervention and respect of sovereignty with Western liberal norms of democracy and human rights. The West simply cannot expect Asian countries, no matter how liberal, to consistently uphold Western standards for various reasons, such as national security and geopolitics in the region. India's non-intervention approach, which maintains dialogue with the junta, may not be ideal from a hybrid or liberal peace perspective, but it serves its national interests in realising that the junta is there to stay and any attempts to uproot the general's political power, such as robust support for Suu Kyi's NLD, would endanger Indian national security due to the shared border between the two. For example, for years the Tatmadaw have either been incapable or unwilling to crack down against anti-Indian rebels who find sanctuary in Myanmar, except in 2019 when the Tatmadaw overran one of the rebels' main strongholds, which brought significant improvements in bilateral ties between the two, while in return New Delhi did not openly criticise the junta's coup against the NLD two years later (Sun Online Desk, 2021).

Often with Asian actors, the political will from the top elites can be weak and principles of non-intervention prefer to take the government-to-government approach rather than helping the most vulnerable local grassroots. This does not necessarily mean that nothing is done to protect these vulnerable people, as humanitarian relief,

developmental aid, and grassroots engagement have made a difference, such as Japan's efforts. However, these initiatives, no matter how necessary, are unlikely to compel the Myanmar government to change its approach towards ethnic minorities like the Rohingyas, as Asia is a region where regional stability has mostly been maintained through relationships of mutual non-intervention.

## **7.4: Developmental Peace in Myanmar**

### *7.4.1: Theory of Developmental Peace in Myanmar*

These sections are about China's developmental peace and its impact on the Myanmar peace processes. As with all of the previous cases, one should not expect any tangible progress towards democracy when working with China. After all, the theory behind developmental peace is to maintain internal stability through economic development while empowering the ruling government to execute economic policies.

Underdevelopment is one of the root causes of ethnic conflicts, when minorities fear resource exploitation by the national government. China will use the usual narrative of a 'win-win' economic initiative to approach Myanmar, such as some Chinese scholars who have used terms like common destiny of 'community' since ancient times to argue that CMEC is a 'win-win' economic initiative (Zhang, 2020). Furthermore, the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018–2030 under the BRI is also a means to help develop basic infrastructure to attract more foreign direct investments (Zhang, 2020). As China is mainly interested in economic development, it is not in Beijing's interest to see domestic instability, especially in regions near the China-Myanmar border. This also means that China puts strong emphasis on mediation, conflict resolution, and of course, peacebuilding in the country.

### *7.4.2: Critique of the Theory of Developmental Peace in Myanmar*

In theory, China's economic approach, based on non-intervention is unlikely to be capable of resolving conflicts in Myanmar. Evidence presented by Japan and India already shows that non-intervention is not effective in motivating the Myanmar government to pursue any meaningful reforms that would support the country's democratisation process or put more emphasis on self-determination for minorities. While China may have more perceived influence over the Myanmar government, it is questionable how much more influence Beijing may have on the Tatmadaw compared to, for example, India.

This returns us to the question of Sino-centrism. China's maintenance of stability

in Myanmar is aimed at consolidating its economic gains in Myanmar, while also working more closely with the Myanmar elites to gain an advantage over regional rivals like Japan and India. The advantage that China does have over its regional rivals, as shown later, is its influence over certain ethnic armed groups like the UWSA. That being said, simply having influence over one group does not mean that Beijing is adept at tackling ethnic conflicts on a larger scale, as China's development of the Kachin region has caused considerable controversy with local authorities and grassroots.

With all that said, both the Myanmar government and various ethnic groups would generally agree that Beijing plays a constructive role in conflict resolution in Myanmar (USIP Senior Study Group, 2018). However, Myanmar still has to resist China's influence, fearing its size and proximity, as well as the fact that developmental projects are often carried out without consideration for the benefits of locals and the environment (USIP Senior Study Group, 2018). This section will analyse the impacts of China's developmental peace on the ground and how it fares against existing peacebuilding measures adopted by other actors.

#### *7.4.3: Practice of Developmental Peace in Myanmar*

##### China–Myanmar Relations, and Relations with Ethnic groups

Compared to the relatively stable Pakistan and Sri Lanka, China's relationship with Myanmar is much more volatile, resembling Afghanistan, albeit to a lesser extent. Like the previous cases discussed in this dissertation, China took a sharp turn towards reproachment after the West disengaged since the outbreak of the Rohingya crisis in 2017. For China, Myanmar's strategic location in the Bay of Bengal is an adequate reason for Beijing to develop a close relationship. Like Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Myanmar is one of China's few entry points to the Indian Ocean, and the construction of the Kyaukphyu port in southern Rakhine state serves a geopolitical purpose. Myanmar's strategic importance to China has only become more significant over the years since 1988 for its role as a land bridge to the Indian Ocean (Steinberg, 2012). There is also a security dimension to China's interest in Myanmar. Two of Myanmar's frontier states – Kachin and Shan – have seen heavy fighting recently, and this violence often spills over, threatening Chinese civilians living near the China-Myanmar border. For example, in 2015, eight people were injured in a blast near Myanmar's border in the Kokang region, which came just several months after a bomb dropped by the Myanmar Air Force killed five Chinese nationals (Mudie, 2015). This gives Beijing more than enough political incentives to ensure that Myanmar is a stable country, as well as economic incentives for China to continue with

its alleged 'string of pearls' strategy. That being said, it is important to take note that despite their perceived closeness, the military junta's generals have never fully trusted China due to Beijing's interference in Myanmar's civil war in the 1980s (Steinberg, 2012).

One important point to note is that although China does not contribute to Myanmar's democratisation process, it would prefer the NLD to remain in power, as the civilian government is much easier to work with as opposed to the military junta (Huo & Cui, 2019). During his many visits to Myanmar, Xi Jinping trod a fine line between the NLD and the military, meeting with Suu Kyi eight times and general Min Aung Hlaing four times, with most meetings trying to address ethnic conflicts in the country (Zhang, 2020). A democratic Myanmar is potentially more stable and predictable as opposed to an autocratic junta, with China's focus being on how to tackle the contingent issue of ethnic armed forces. China has been relatively successful in gaining the trust of both Myanmar governments in becoming a stakeholder in Myanmar's peace processes despite the peculiar relationship between Beijing and the junta.

Beijing occupies an important role as the intermediary between the Myanmar government and local militias, being one of the very few actors that have the capacity to bring both sides to the negotiation table. For example, during the period in 2013 when conflict intensified in Kachin, Beijing appointed Wang Yingfan as the first special envoy for Asian affairs to mediate between the KIA and Tatmadaw, representing some of China's early signs to show its desire to become a stakeholder in peace (Li, 2020). Wang was also one of the 39 representatives who oversaw the Union Peacemaking Work Committee and the KIO delegation's peace process talks in Myitkyina, where both sides agreed to form a conflict mediation team as well as to coordinate with each other more closely for future meetings between representatives (Relief Web, 2014).

In 2017, Xi Jinping also responded to a formal appeal from Aung Sang Suu Kyi and dispatched special envoy Sun Guoxiang to persuade various militias to attend the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Panglong Union Peace Conference (Li, 2020). Sun's public visits to Myanmar's minority areas have become much clearer recently, as he regularly visits the United Wa State Army, the biggest militia on the China-Myanmar border, often bringing gifts to the UWSA leaders before the Chinese spring festival (Li, 2020). Of course, China's influence over these ethnic armed groups is not taken for granted within the Myanmar government. There are viewpoints in the Tatmadaw that suggest that China is in fact an obstacle to the resolution of armed conflicts because Beijing indirectly prolongs peace processes (Li, 2020), and there are good reasons for this concern.

In 2017, China helped the UWSA to set up the seven-member Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, which replaced the previous Thailand-based

alliance after several members signed a ceasefire with the government (Linter, 2019). While managing to secure support from the committee to the BRI, there were also reports that special envoy Sun had managed to convince the committee to avoid Western peacebuilders, claiming that China was the only party that could mediate existing negotiations, and China effectively uses the committee as a ‘stick’ when negotiating with the government (Linter, 2019).

For the Myanmar government and the Tatmadaw, as much as they distrust China for its political and economic penetration, they need Beijing’s influence and support in resolving ethnic conflicts. The Tatmadaw realises the inconvenient truth that it is incapable of eliminating ethnic militias, but the opposite stands true as well, since militias do not have the resources to sustain a long-term struggle against the Tatmadaw, effectively locking the two sides into a stalemate (Sun, 2019). As China’s special envoys have demonstrated their ability to bring militias to the negotiation table, Beijing is also not completely interested in resolving conflict for Myanmar as yet, wanting to keep this ability as influence to remain engaged in Myanmar, at least for the short term. Experts such as Yun Sun (2019) believe that in the long term, economic initiatives such as CMEC would gradually weaken ethnic militias’ desire to fight, as their struggles are rooted in economic interests, fearing that the Myanmar government or the Tatmadaw’s exploitation of local resources will mean that locals will lose their livelihoods. In this sense, even with the political implications, China has demonstrated its ability as a strong mediator between the different stakeholders in Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts.

#### CMEC and Economic Development

Part of the cause of conflict in Myanmar’s ethnic regions comes from the fear from underrepresented groups that local resources will be exploited by the government. Therefore, an economic approach would be a reasonable solution towards sustainable peace in the country. However, the previous case of Pakistan shows that the economic approach adopted by China is not effective in resolving tensions with ethnic minorities, and if anything, may even worsen the situation. While the framework for sustainable peace existed for CPEC in Pakistan, the initiative was mismanaged by China and Pakistan and was not implemented in ways that would benefit locals. The question thus arises of how Chinese initiatives in Myanmar, like CMEC, would be any different.

When talking about Chinese investment in Myanmar, one cannot ignore the Myitsone Hydropower Project in Kachin, because it is one of the more controversial projects among the groups. The Myitsone dam has always been an unpopular project among locals in the area, who have often been at odds with the Chinese companies trying

to build the dam. Strictly speaking, the Myitsone dam is not a part of the BRI, as the project itself began long before Xi Jinping took power. Originally outlined in 2001, the Myitsone dam is a joint project between the Chinese Power Investment Corporation (CPI) and Burma's Asia World Company that is expected to generate 3,600 to 4,100 MW of electricity worth \$500 million annually, but at the time, local NGO the Kachin Development Network Group estimated that the dam reservoir could cover up to 766 square kilometres and displace up 15,000 people, in addition to several roads, bridges and cultural sites that would be inundated. The dam construction has also brought an influx of 20,000 Chinese workers, which further agitated the locals, with groups such as local groups such as the Rural Reconstruction Movement Organisation and Kachin Public Youth Organisations submitting over 4,100 signatures of locals opposing the project and forwarded this petition to the Chinese government, but it was never given to the government of Myanmar (The Guardian, 2011).

As early as 2007, shortly after the ground-breaking ceremony, 12 Kachin leaders sent an appeal letter to Senior General Than Shwe, asking him to halt the construction of the dam, and the KIO sent letters to ask the Chinese authorities to halt dam projects in Myitsone and other areas (GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, 2012). In 2010, an unprecedented bombing incident occurred in the Asia World Company building in Myitsone that killed four people and injured twelve, most of whom were Chinese workers (Burma Partnership, 2010). The CPI evacuated 300 workers to Myitkyina, and nobody claimed responsibility for the incident (Burma Partnership, 2010). Local resistance to a dam resulting in violence is strikingly similar to the Dasu bus blast incident in Pakistan. While nobody claimed responsibility for the attack, it was enough to send a message across that there would be strong local resistance to further construction of the dam. Finally, in 2011, then-President Thein Sein announced the suspension of the Myitsone dam project, a move that gained wide support from the people, which some such as the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin state even said was one step closer to peace and national reconciliation (Kyaw, 2011). Interestingly, Chinese investments, playing an adversary role, brought the grassroots ethnic groups and the Myanmar government closer.

Over the years, China has consistently pressed Myanmar on the Myitsone dam issue. From the Chinese perspective, state media the Global Times, with a stroke of nationalism, blamed the conflict between the KIA and the government as the main obstacle to the dam, and argued that halting the project was a loss for Myanmar locals who would be forced back into poverty, while hinting that Western criticism of environmental degradation had played a role in the decision to suspend the project (Ding, 2013). State media emphasised the role that China could play in ethnic reconciliation



between the KIA and the government, while urging Myanmar to resolve its own differences (Ding, 2013).

Another controversial project is the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which comes with a deep-sea port. As we have seen with Gwadar and Hambantota, China-built ports should always be viewed with some scepticism, and the Myanmar government, at least under the NLD, most definitely took a cautious approach on CMEC commitments. According to a report, while the NLD was in power, it managed to reduce Myanmar's debt to China by 26%, while simultaneously expanding trade with the West as the trade deficit with China shrank (Kawate & Nitta, 2021). Western media reported that Myanmar had been negotiating for smaller deals around Kyaukphyu, fearing a debt-trap. Taking lessons from Sri Lanka and Pakistan, Myanmar officials managed to negotiate the cost down to \$1.3 billion, expressing that they would implement the project step-by-step and phase-by-phase, as opposed to the initially proposed \$10 billion cost (Aung & Lewis, 2018). The Kyaukphyu SEZ attracted immediate controversy among the locals, as the project was awarded to state-owned China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). Consequently, 107 Rakhine CSOs met and wanted the project to be suspended, citing that there was a lack of a transparency with the tender selection process, but they also demanded more welfare for locals and the project to be suspended until the NLD took power (H.T. Aung, 2016). The CITIC consortium is problematic because it is led by six Chinese firms and a Thai company, and the local population is concerned by the fact it is overwhelmingly led by the Chinese due to China's poor image among Myanmar locals. Below is a map that gives an overview of CMEC:



Figure 5: Map of CMEC (Nitta, 2017)

#### 7.4.4: Critique of the Practice of Developmental Peace in Myanmar

##### CMEC and Economic Development

Large-scale infrastructure development does not always benefit the local population as intended. For example, China's attempt to create new livelihoods has not been received in a positive light by the local communities in Kachin concerning the Myitsone dam. Locals who are relocated may be given better facilities like markets, hospitals, sealed roads, and schools in their new villages, but life is still difficult for certain people as they do not have the capacity to make money, since these people grow all their food and never have to buy any when they work as farmers (BBC, 2019). It is often not just the economic motives that are an issue, as locals feel an emotional attachment to the Irrawaddy River in Myitsone because they believe it is the birthplace of the Kachin people (BBC, 2019). Considering the recent coup, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing announced that he intended to restart some stalled hydropower projects, without specifically mentioning which ones are being restarted (Currie, 2021). In staunch defence of their homeland, local resistance to the dam could cause a relapse into conflict.

To make matters worse, the Myitsone dam during the ceasefire years has become synonymous with Burmese colonialism, and this is often a source of local discontent from

the grassroots against the current national government and past governments' discriminatory measures against the Kachin people (Hedström, 2019). Beijing also initially ignored the KIO's request to mediate the conflict, talked directly to the government, which angered the KIO, and only took action when the conflict escalated to the point that Chinese nationals across the border were being threatened, following Chinese interests being side-lined with Japanese and Western entry into the peace process (Hedström, 2019). Choosing dialogue with the Myanmar government over the KIO in itself is nothing wrong, as it is a demonstration of non-intervention. Though this is ironic given how heavily Beijing has intervened in Myanmar's domestic affairs over the years, considering its relationship with groups like the UWSA, it makes no sense to not at least consider the viewpoints of the KIO. Furthermore, local protestors claimed that 90 percent of the electricity produced by the dam would be exported to China and that Myanmar itself would not benefit from this project (Chan, 2019). It is difficult to see the win-win relationship with the Myitsone dam, which represents such a large portion of Chinese investment in the north. China's disregard for local livelihoods and environment has created more tensions, which is counterproductive to the peace and stability that Beijing hoped to create with economic development in the region.

As for the Kyaukphyu SEZ, the problem is the bias against Chinese investment due to the poor image cultivated by China in the eyes of locals. As opposed to Chinese firms, Japanese firms are regarded more positively even if they collaborate with military-affiliated local companies (Yao & Zhang, 2018). One possible reason is that Japanese firms adopt all-inclusive and comprehensive strategies regarding environmental issues in Myanmar, while Chinese companies rely on their own resources to make environmental decisions (Aung et al., 2021). Analysts suggest that Chinese investors need to be aware of their negative image and try to improve on it by carefully selecting the types of local actors with whom they engage, and much more due diligence is required regarding the natural resource sector (Yao & Zhang, 2018). However, there is no evidence to suggest that China is moving in a positive direction with regard to CMEC's investments. According to Myanmar's environmental law, mega-projects like the Kyaukphyu SEZ require a site-wide environmental and social impact assessment, and CITIC has announced that it will choose an independent consultant through a bidding process, but no announcement has been made since then (Lwin, 2020).

Beyond environmental concerns, social impacts for the SEZ have been more pressing concerns for locals in the surrounding areas when CITIC and the Myanmar government encountered the familiar problem of being accused of land grabs. The junta has allegedly seized 250 acres of land from over 70 local farmers to construct the

Kyaukphyu SEZ, with many of these farmers being forcefully evicted from their land (Yan, 2022). Four villages on nearby Maday Island would also be affected by the SEZ, and not much has been happening despite CITIC's pledges to collaborate with local agencies to generate employment (Yan, 2022). As observed in previous cases, problems with land acquisition are rarely adequately addressed in BRI projects: the same is seen with the Kyaukphyu SEZ. To date, there have not been any large-scale protests in Kyaukphyu on the scale seen in Hambantota and Gwadar. However, there have been smaller-scale protests, like one in 2018, when more than 1,000 activists from 17 towns in Rakhine gathered to demand the right to control their own oil and gas resources, while the Arakan Natural Resources and Environmental Network demanded that Rakhine's local government, not Myanmar's central government, control its own resources (Mizzima, 2018). Protests may intensify if environmental concerns are not addressed adequately, fuelling existing grievances against Chinese investments and worsening China's already poor national image among locals in Myanmar.

Generally, the non-transparent nature of the BRI is weakening Chinese developmental peace everywhere and not just in Myanmar. Unlike Pakistan, which regards the Chinese highly, China is distrusted at all levels in Myanmar, especially considering the ambiguity with Chinese promises such as the creation of 100,000 jobs in the Kyaukphyu SEZ when the project has been rushed without regard for locals' way of life (Reuters, 2017). A closer look at the local life under Chinese development would reveal that life has become harder, one local has been rejected 12 times for job applications as Chinese companies continue to bring in Chinese workers rather than hiring locals, despite the Myanmar government's promises to hire locally (Reuters, 2017).

Concerning Chinese workers, companies bringing their own workers is a significant problem in Sri Lanka, where much of the local workforce has gone abroad in search of better wages. This is not the case with Myanmar, as locals struggle to find employment opportunities in Kyaukphyu. As to the case with the Gwadar port and the lack of local Balochis being hired by Chinese companies, it is difficult to tell how many of the 100,000 jobs promised by China are being given to local people in Rakhine due to the lack of insider knowledge. However, there is nearby evidence that suggests that locals do indeed have trouble finding employment in Chinese companies. For example, of the 3000 people living on Maday island, which is the entry point for an oil pipeline, only 47 locals have jobs with Petrochina, which employs double the number of Chinese workers (Reuters, 2017).

China has put in efforts to try to improve its image among locals through a series of public diplomacy. For example, weeks after the dam's suspension, Chinese state media

aired the scene where Myanmar's media delegation was invited to China, as an attempt to improve China's image in the eyes of local media groups (Sun, 2019). China has also used its common roots in Buddhism to attract Myanmar Buddhist groups for friendly exchanges, as well as using a mass campaign known as 'Deep Fraternal Friendship' in Yangon, and integrating social responsibility programs in Chinese SOEs that require them to answer local requests and increase local hires, such that some construction sites have as many as 70% local workers (Sun, 2019). While there is inconsistency between areas, China is acting to remedy these issues to ensure that locals maintain a positive view of Chinese investments.

However, some experts may be optimistic in saying that CMEC can bring economic development and alternative livelihoods for ethnic minorities that will eventually weaken their incentives to fight (Sun, 2019). There is evidence to suggest that this might be wishful thinking. For example, Chinese ambassador Hong Liang claimed that the Muse–Mandalay railway linking the border city Ruili to Mandalay leading to Yangon and Kyaukphyu would promote peace and stability in the north, while others argue that this would provoke even more fighting in the areas because troops would be brought to project areas to provide protection, which would lead to negative sentiments amongst locals (Lwin, 2018). For comparison, the Gwadar port case showed that large number of military personnel were brought in for security reasons, erecting check-posts that restricted local movement and agitating locals.

One could argue that China may be able to use its influence over local militias to not endanger CMEC projects, but in reality, China's influence over these groups is unreliable and inconsistent at best. The UWSA is no puppet of Beijing, considering its reluctance to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the Myanmar government, as well as the KIA's general Gun Maw travelling to the US to ask Washington to play a greater role in Myanmar's peace processes (Lintner, 2019). In other words, ethnic militias may act in China's best interest to not undermine CMEC despite perceived influence. This could also mean that developmental peace in its current state has not managed to help Myanmar to resolve its ethnic conflicts, and Chinese economic development through CMEC is merely a temporary solution, while Beijing fails to consider the non-economic aspects, such as the ethno-nationalist aspects, which China may not fully understand.

### Prospects of Sustainable Peace

China's adamant support for Myanmar and its attempt to use developmental peace have not had a positive effect on the overall peace process in Myanmar. Ethnic conflicts in Myanmar have too long a history and are too protracted for a country like China, which

the Myanmar government and public do not trust, to address. Of course, the narrative of a ‘win-win’ CMEC bringing development and prosperity to the country is also taken with a grain of salt.

Myanmar’s political volatility is also undesirable for China, as in 2021, CMEC encountered an unexpected obstacle when the NLD’s rule came to an abrupt end with a military coup. Beijing prefers working with the NLD, as it had the liberty to pursue a more comprehensive set of foreign policies according to its economic needs (Huo & Cui, 2019). Meanwhile, working with the junta also has a dangerous side because Myanmar has effectively traded economic concessions to China for Beijing’s political support, and neither of these represents a good trade for the Western liberal norms necessary for sustainable peace. Economically, vice senior general Soe Win claims that the Kyaukphyu SEZ will enhance China-Myanmar cooperation, which will create jobs to help the Rakhine state develop (The Irrawaddy, 2021), but locals remain sceptical as to whether or not that is true. The junta has also been pushing for the resumption of several projects around the country that have been halted or suspended by the NLD, such as the Myitsone dam, which was halted due to environmental concerns. Politically, the Myanmar junta, known for its brutality and lack of compassion towards opening fire against unarmed civilians, is highly valued by China.

In exchange, China remained silent on the coup that overthrew the democratically elected NLD, but it also eventually embraced the junta’s propaganda. Some analysts claim that China was misled by junta propaganda when Beijing amplified the Tatmadaw’s position during the coup, praising the military for being the ‘glue’ that keeps the country together and the sole actor capable of solving Myanmar’s political problems (Tower & Clapp, 2021). To this point, state media the Global Times published a bizarre article blaming independence movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as Western NGOs and think tanks, for manipulating public opinion in Myanmar to ‘smear China’ (Bai et al., 2021) – an article likely aimed at China’s domestic audience to justify Beijing’s position of supporting Myanmar amongst international outcry against the junta.

Yet, China fully siding with Myanmar on such narratives will weaken the political will for the Myanmar government to seriously consider its transition to democracy, improve human rights, hold accountable the perpetrators of the Rohingya crisis, and resolve conflicts with EAOs. As Myanmar’s relations with the West worsen, this will only push it more towards Beijing, which could even help to circumvent potential sanctions. For example, China has helped to block any consensus on sanctions against Myanmar in the UN Security Council after the 2021 coup, with the BRI’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank saying that projects would go ahead even if Myanmar

does not return to democracy (Bloomberg News, 2021). With such a guarantee from Beijing, it is difficult to imagine the junta having the political will to make any reforms on issues condemned by the West.

That being said, given the junta's distrust of Beijing due to its domestic interference, Myanmar, like Sri Lanka, has often been on the fence regarding relations with China, trying to strike a balance with other regional actors like India and Japan. Myanmar's decisive embracement of anti-Western sentiments cannot be blamed on China or CMEC, although, China's offer to Myanmar on economic development when the Naypyidaw have little to no intention of resolving domestic conflicts is a potential spoiler to positive sustainable peace on the ground. At the very least, Japan and India both aimed for democracy in Myanmar as an end goal of economic development, but this is not the case with China.

At most, China is an opportunist trying to capitalise on the many years of uneasy relations between Myanmar and the West. This also has nothing to do with whether Myanmar is a junta or a democratically elected state. When the NLD came under fire from international society for its handling of the Rohingya crisis, Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to Myanmar, shaking hands with Suu Kyi when no other countries were ready to retract its criticisms. The NLD praised Xi for understanding the situation in Myanmar more than other countries and welcomed his visit (Mahtani & Diamond, 2020). To shield the Myanmar government from an international outcry on the Rohingya crisis, China, at the security council, never mentioned the term 'Rohingya' in any of its official statements at the UN, following Myanmar's initial narrative that 'Rohingya' people do not exist. Part of this may be due to respecting the principles of non-intervention: something Japan did as well. More importantly, speaking in Chinese, China's delegate Wu Haitao used the term *biluan minzhong*, which translates to 'people evading chaos', to describe refugees who fled to Bangladesh, and called the Rohingya crisis the *ruokaibang wentz*, or the Rakhine problem (UNSC, 2018). This, too, is unlikely to increase the political will from the Myanmar side to take the Rohingya crisis seriously. China's defence of Myanmar is even taken positively by Chinese academics, saying that China's helping hand towards Myanmar can restore faith between the two countries and repair the distrust of the Myanmar people, who have been influenced by China threat theories (Sha, 2020).

China's approach to the Rohingya crisis may even be threatening the greater framework of international peacebuilding. As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of China's motives for peacebuilding is to prevent Western armed intervention, especially regarding implications for concepts such as R2P and human security. Beijing's narrative is Chinese conflict resolution and mediation, that the situation is under control, and that economic

development will create peace in the region. Although the Rakhine state as a whole is poor and underdeveloped due to years of neglect by the government, this is not the only reason why the Rohingyas are being persecuted on their own land.

On the international stage, China has already demonstrated its ability to become a spoiler to just peace for the Rohingyas by defending Myanmar's position in the UN, as well as trying to cut funds to the Myanmar probe into ethnic cleansing, although this attempt was thwarted by other member states (Charbonneau, 2018). In fact, some may even see this as merely a part of China's and Russia's greater attempt to defund every aspect of the UN related to human rights (Charbonneau, 2018). The official narrative provided by China on the Rohingya crisis is that it should not be expanded or internationalised, as foreign minister Wang Yi stated that it is an issue for Myanmar and Bangladesh and that others should not seek to complicate the issue (Reuters, 2018b). The three-step plan to resolve the conflict proposed by Wang has been criticised by Western groups for supporting the Myanmar government to create peace matching Beijing's own interests (Joy, 2019). China's proposed ceasefire is largely irrelevant, as fighting ceased long ago, the repatriation of refugees owes more to a previous agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh signed in 1992 than to China, and finally, classifying the root cause of conflict to be economic underdevelopment does not resolve the issue of citizenship and human rights (Joy, 2019).

China's proposed solution to the Rohingya crisis is an illiberal approach that may serve as a temporary solution but does little to ensure that Rohingyas would be treated with dignity and allowed to become Myanmar citizens upon return. Their blatant defence of Myanmar from allegations of ethnic cleansing asks the worrying question of whether China would provide the same defence to other countries along the BRI if similar issues were to arise. Simply fending off international outcry is not the end goal for Beijing, as Myanmar still needs to be stable to ensure CMEC's safety and maintenance of China's global image. China has effectively removed international efforts to hold the Myanmar military accountable, which could lead to more effective means of peacebuilding for the Rohingyas, and replaced it with Beijing's own version of peacebuilding, which focuses almost solely on economic development while overlooking other factors. While China's approach is supported by the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh (Wang, 2019), some serious questions need to be asked about the potential threat that developmental peace is posing towards international norms such as democracy and human rights.

Furthermore, the Rohingya crisis had a direct impact on the longstanding issue of Uighur repression at home. As Beijing has tried to diminish safe space for dissidents who do manage to escape to neighbouring countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, there



is also an increased risk that China can be held accountable for human rights violations via a third country. For example, although Myanmar is not a member of the ICC, the ICC could expand its judicial powers in Myanmar through acting on behalf of Rohingyas in ICC member state Bangladesh (Lambert, 2022). This is significant considering that many Uighur refugees have been deported from Cambodia and Tajikistan, both members of the ICC, and the Party fears that a similar tactic can be used against them (Lambert, 2022), whereas even Afghanistan has ratified the Rome Statute.

Finally, we return to the question of whether China even has the intention of helping Myanmar to resolve its ethnic conflicts, or whether Beijing, as some scholars say, is simply there to contain the conflict without necessarily trying to establish sustainable peace by addressing root causes (Adhikari, 2021). The strongest evidence suggesting the latter case is the way that China provides arms to both the Myanmar government and ethnic militias, probably to ensure that neither side is capable of defeating the other. A UN Myanmar expert has criticised China, as well as Russia and Serbia, claiming that they provided arms to the Myanmar military despite being fully aware that they would be used to attack civilians – a claim that China has denied (Reuters, 2022b). Zhang Shengqi, the chairman of the Myanmar-Burma Assistance Association, says that it is an open secret that China has been selling weapons to Myanmar for a long time because Beijing sees the whole of Myanmar as a security zone (Mudie, 2021).

Simultaneously, Beijing has also been selling arms to ethnic militias, mainly the UWSA near the China-Myanmar border, and this decision is probably coming from the highest level of decision-makers in Beijing (Lintner, 2021). If China truly sees the whole of Myanmar as a security zone, then it would be counterproductive to arm ethnic militias when it could achieve victor's peace by fully backing the Tatmadaw to defeat these groups. The logical conclusion is that China is not interested in sustainable peace: otherwise it makes no sense to prolong ethnic conflict unless Beijing wants to remain relevant to the Myanmar government by intervening in the country's decade-long ethnic fighting. Just as Lintner (2021) says, Beijing is playing a double game in Myanmar: it does not want peace, but only stability to exploit for geopolitical motives. Developmental peace has not helped Myanmar to resolve any of its existing problems.

## **7.5: Conclusion**

The Myanmar case confirms several emerging trends in China's developmental peace. Developmental peace has not created sustainable peace, and CMEC has not benefitted locals in the way that was put forward by Beijing, which claimed that it would be a win-win relationship. China is merely the latest actor coming to exploit the resources of

minorities: they do this in Kachin in the same way as in Balochistan or Afghanistan, if given the opportunity.

The conflicts in Myanmar usually fall into two categories. At the national level, there is conflict regarding the country's democratic process with the military junta, attracting much discontent over the coup that ousted the NLD. At the local level, there are smaller scale, but protracted and contingent conflicts between ethnic minorities and the government, as well as the Tatmadaw. No peacebuilding model perpetrated by foreign actors has been particularly successful in resolving any of these problems. Even if establishing sustainable democracy has the prospects of resolving many problems that plague Myanmar's society at the moment, Myanmar has had a track history of resisting Western influence, while fellow Asian countries merely set democracy as an end goal with no concrete roadmap, outside economic development, to achieve it.

More importantly, the biggest hurdle towards sustainable peace in Myanmar is its many ethnic conflicts with minorities residing in the frontier region of the country. This is not a problem that can be solved easily because ethnic groups fundamentally do not trust the Burmese majority, and would not do so even if the country were a democracy. Alternative means such as hybrid and local peace have been explored by both local and international actors with some success, but have fallen short due to the lack of political will from the Myanmar government to do anything about the ethnic grievances of underrepresented groups. Local CSOs in Myanmar face many restrictions from the government, but while this has not prevented groups such as the KBC, KWAT and SHRF from providing humanitarian relief and channelling foreign aid, it has not led to a sustainable long-term solution to peace.

International actors like Japan have had more success compared to the West, India, and ASEAN regarding the hybrid approach. Not only has Japan provided large amounts of ODA to support Myanmar's development, thus fostering positive Japan-Myanmar relations, but also Japanese individuals have been central to bringing the government together with the ethnic groups, which led to the historic ceasefire signed in 2015. The non-intervention approach taken by Asian countries, like Japan and India, is unlikely to garner the political will from Myanmar to undertake meaningful reforms towards sustainable peace.

China falls under the same problem. In fact, China's contributions to Myanmar's peace process are quite miniscule. Chinese projects such as the Myitsone dam and Kyaukphyu SEZ have caused more controversy for locals rather than benefits. Although Beijing is conscious of the need to improve its image in Myanmar through public diplomacy and increase Chinese companies' use of local labour, this does not override the

fact that China has made deliberate attempts to prolong the conflict in Myanmar to serve Beijing's geopolitical interests. Letting China handle the peacebuilding situation in Myanmar has serious negative implications for the current model of international peacebuilding practice and has shown that economic development is not the solution to people's deep-rooted ethnic grievances against the ruling elites. Besides, the fact that China is Myanmar's largest trading partner has further lessened the political will of the government to address its domestic conflicts with EAOs and the Rohingya crisis, as well as its transition towards democracy. Myanmar has often been defiant of the West in the past with regard to its human rights record and its transition towards democracy. This problem will only become clearer as China potentially helps Myanmar to circumvent sanctions, reducing the political will from the government to improve civic liberties to appease the West for aid.

As a final note, although no domestic or international actors have made any significant breakthroughs in the peace processes around Myanmar, or in general in any of the conflicts discussed in this dissertation, it is still important to remain engaged with these problems. The least desirable thing is for conflicts to fade into the dark. Conflicts do not disappear on their own, and human suffering does not stop even if no international spotlight is shown. The UN (2014) pledge to 'never again' repeat the mistakes made by the international community despite the Rwanda Genocide should be backed up with credible international action rather than empty words.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion

### 8.1: Summary of the Dissertation

**What impacts are China's developmental peace having on Asian post-conflict societies compared to existing models of peacebuilding, and which peacebuilding model is more likely to create sustainable and positive peace in these post-conflict societies?**

This dissertation is a theory-driven study with two main objectives in mind. Firstly, it aimed to establish the groundwork for China's developmental peace by analysing the impacts of its practice on the ground in four post-conflict Asian societies. Throughout this dissertation, an overwhelming amount of evidence has been presented to suggest that China has not been making a positive impact on the peace processes in post-conflict countries around its periphery. By analysing how existing peacebuilding models address conflicts around China's periphery, we can say that developmental peace does not offer anything drastically different that would be likely to contribute to the creation of sustainable, positive peace. China's peacebuilding model is simply not adept at resolving the conflicts faced by Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, and if anything, top-down economic development has created more division and alienation than unity and peace.

The second objective was to make a qualitative judgement on which peacebuilding model is more likely to create sustainable and positive peace in post-conflict societies based on the evidence collected from four case studies around China's periphery. Liberal and developmental peace are like two polar opposites. In theory, liberal peace aims to build liberal institutions in post-conflict societies where liberal state-building, which includes the use of armed intervention, is a viable tool to achieve the end of a democratic post-conflict society that resembles those of Western democracies. Developmental peace aims to build a stable post-conflict society from economic development while keeping state-building as a domestic affair. At the end of developmental peace, governments usually remain unchanged and peace and stability are maintained by development, largely resembling China's development path in the past. In practice, however, this is not always the case. Evidence from the case studies shows that neither the hard intervention approach from liberal peace nor the non-intervention approach from developmental peace is likely to create sustainable peace in the face of protracted conflicts such as those seen in countries in Asia.

This naturally only leaves one candidate to nominate for the ‘ideal’ model of peacebuilding that is most likely to result in sustainable and positive peace. Hybrid peace takes the balance between liberal and developmental peace. It does not deny the importance of liberal norms like democracy and human rights in the way that China does with developmental peace, but it also does not enforce these norms through heavy-handed methods like sanctions or the threat of armed intervention in the way that the West, particularly the US, does. The hybrid peace model employed by Asian democracies like Japan and India is probably the most effective approach for post-conflict societies in Asia. The balance between government-to-government top-down interactions and a grassroots-focused bottom-up local turn is much more likely to satisfy both ends of post-conflict societies. Furthermore, fellow Asian countries like Japan and India are much more aware of the importance of non-intervention as a crucial aspect that has sustained peace in Asia for many decades. The West, such as the EU, is also adapting, albeit slowly, to the changing realities of Asia, which is another positive sign.

However, this is not to say that hybrid peace is without flaws: like China, Japan and India both share a common Asian trait of non-intervention, which considerably weakens Asian peacebuilding initiatives, as they are unwilling to press a fellow Asian country’s government on issues related to democracy and human rights. The difference is that Japan and India are democracies at home, which puts them in a better position to address liberal norms abroad, even if their focus is on economic development such as building infrastructure. Meanwhile, China is not a democracy, and is in no position, and has no intentions, to promote liberal norms, focusing purely on economic development. One could say that China’s version of developmental peace is development in its purest form, while Japan and India’s version is a hybrid model between liberal peace and developmental peace.

### Pakistan

Three main conflicts plague Pakistan: Kashmir, terrorism in KPK and FATA, and insurgency in Balochistan. In theory, liberal peace was supposed to introduce free and fair elections to Kashmir and to augment democracy within Pakistan to increase the representation of Balochistan, which is severely lacking. However, in practice, we have seen that a top-down imposition of liberal norms by international actors is insufficient to resolve the problem of underrepresentation around the country. This, along with the lack of political will from political elites in Islamabad, has created a difficult situation in trying to establish sustainable peace in these regions, as locals are not usually given a say or the opportunity to resist against top-level actors, like the state, or foreign interveners (in

India's case in J&K). Trying to win the local people's hearts and minds as a part of liberal peace in the northern regions of KPK has also fallen short because of the lack of local knowledge by international donors and the federal government, creating unwanted dependencies on aid.

The lack of political will from Islamabad to resolve conflict also makes it difficult for the hybrid peace model to tackle conflicts. The missing top-down initiative has halted the good progress between local actors seeking to reconcile amongst themselves in Kashmir. The Karwan-e-Aman did not become the bridge that would link the people of separated Kashmir together due to Indo-Pak tensions. However, Pakistan has demonstrated strong hybrid peace measures concerning addressing conflicts in KPK and FATA, employing traditional conflict resolution measures such as the *jirga* for local ownership, as well as top-down initiatives such as riding on the opportunity of US-Taliban talks to integrate the FATA region into Pakistani territory, allowing the coexistence of national law and Sharia law in areas such as Malakand in exchange for the recognition of the Pakistani state by local armed forces.

However, time and time again, Pakistan has proven itself incapable of resolving the conflict in Balochistan, and this is also due to neglect and the lack of political will from the top national elites in Islamabad. The political and economic neglect and exploitation of local resources by the state has given room for radicalisation and nationalism, leading to the rise of violent insurgencies like the BLA. Working with China and adopting CPEC was supposed to address the issue of underdevelopment in Balochistan, though once again we see the issue with the lack of political will from Islamabad to use CPEC as an opportunity to address existing problems in the province. Practice has shown that while economic development is happening, and CPEC has greatly benefited Pakistan by serving as a much-needed alternative to the IMF, as well as becoming a remedy to the country's chronic power shortages, it has not helped Balochis to integrate into Pakistani society, and has made life harder for residents of Gwadar. China also took Pakistan's side on the Kashmir issue and built CPEC on disputed territories in G&B, agitating India. CPEC has left behind many latent conflicts, despite its façade of stability. Credit must be given to China for its positive impact on the economic side, but it must also be criticised for bringing disproportionate benefits, as neither the Pakistani state nor China has shown the political will to make vulnerable people, like the Balochis, the main benefactors of developmental peace.

### Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a poster-child for the failure of liberal peace, and some serious questions

need to be asked as to whether a non-intervention approach focussing on economic development is truly the means to creating sustainable peace in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, this was the method that the Chinese pursued, and the new Taliban government appears keen to have China as a developmental partner, provided that it can solve the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the country.

Throughout Afghanistan's late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century history, the country has been plagued by warfare and instability to the extent that any stable form of government is welcomed by the people. This is also a reason why, despite its corruption and allegations of rigged elections, the Karzai government backed by the US became legitimate in the eyes of the locals. However, the US was unable to help Afghanistan rid itself of its drug problem and failed to get the support of Pakistan, as well as being too focused on counterinsurgency rather than enhancing liberal peace on the ground, created serious problems for the longevity of sustainable peace. In contrast, the Taliban, after being ousted from power, also adapted to the new realities and challenged the Karzai government in Kabul by running shadow governments in Taliban-dominated areas, at times even more effectively than the official government. The Taliban created a hybrid form of local-illiberal peace, which managed to maintain stability in certain parts of the country.

Creating stability does not necessarily mean that there is positive peace. The Taliban is known for their its and its oppression of women, although this is not a concern for China. While China's existing investments in Mes Aynek and Amu Darya have not generated the desired profit for Beijing, with the latter being discontinued, Beijing is still poised to incorporate Afghanistan into the CPEC with the support of Pakistan, although this could be threatened by the West. This will provide Afghanistan with a surge of much-needed economic development, provided that the Taliban can prove that it is capable of providing a stable and secure investing environment. China's developmental peace merely bolsters the Taliban's position without solving problems regarding human rights and women's rights. Without the need to appease the West with credible commitments towards democracy and human rights, as China provides the alternative, it is difficult to imagine that peace will be positive under the Taliban.

### Sri Lanka

The only case in this dissertation without an active armed conflict, Sri Lanka had already suffered from nearly three decades of bloody civil war that created deep rifts between the Sinhalese and Tamils. After the war, the issue of reconciliation was never properly

addressed, as Mahinda Rajapaksa focused on economic development rather than social stability. His successor, Sirisena, also has not properly addressed this issue, despite being much more democratic than Mahinda's regime, which was shifting towards authoritarianism. As expected, Mahinda's brother Gotabaya also merely paid lip-service to the issue of reconciliation when he took power.

Liberal peace has done surprisingly little for Sri Lanka's reconciliation, especially considering that many Western actors disengaged because of the widespread human rights violations perpetrated by both the GoSL and the LTTE at the end of the war. The few that did remain – mainly Asian actors such as Japan, India, and China – have not been keen to press Sri Lanka for reconciliation, believing in economic development and non-intervention. While international actors along with local CSOs and NGOs have made some progress in supplementing the government's lacklustre efforts, a decisive breakthrough is difficult considering that perpetrators of war crimes from both sides continue to serve in government posts. Hybrid and local peace models were mainly effective at empowering grassroots communities, but the political will is once again lacking from the top.

China worked closely with Sri Lanka after the war, being one of the few actors to remain engaged. Working with China is unlikely to provide an incentive for the Sri Lankans to address the issue of ethnic reconciliation. Part of this is because of China's principles of non-intervention, and its view that reconciliation is a domestic affair. There is no evidence to suggest that China is even interested in reconciliation, as Beijing treats the Sinhalese and Tamils as two separate entities and China can gain political influence by supporting either side against the other. There was also a steady rise in Islamophobia in Sri Lanka after the civil war, and this was made worse by China propping up anti-Islam propaganda of the government. In terms of economic development, while roads and infrastructure are helpful, I must return to the discussion of the 'debt trap' and Hambantota, and question whether these projects, many of which are white elephant projects, are truly beneficial for local grassroots or just for China and the Sri Lankan ruling elites. Finally, Sri Lanka is another case where Asian actors – China in particular, but Japan and India as well – have become the alternative to the West regarding foreign aid and development. This also ties into the issue of political will from national elites, where Sri Lanka no longer has to appease the West for aid, as Asian actors are willing to provide the same type of economic concession without the political strings attached.

### Myanmar

The only Southeast Asian case in this dissertation, Myanmar's main sources of instability



are the lack of democracy at the national level and the conflict with ethnic minorities at the local level. Despite the lack of democracy, liberal peace has had little effect in generating sustainable peace in Myanmar, mainly because the Myanmar elites have a track history of resisting Western influence, while Asian actors refuse to push for greater democratisation due to non-intervention. Furthermore, even as a democracy during NLD rule, little has been done about ethnic conflicts, as the government is predominantly Burmese and the Tatmadaw still have powerful influence within the civilian government.

This leaves many domestic CSOs to rise to prominence to deliver aid and humanitarian relief at the local level. While local peace has been established, many of these initiatives are difficult to sustain, due, once again, to the lack of political will from the Myanmar government to address the issue. The problem with China's developmental peace is that the CCP is not interested in helping to mobilise the Myanmar government (both civilian and junta) to promote more sustainable forms of peace, especially between the government and the EAOs. In the case of Myanmar, China cannot even claim non-intervention, as it is already heavily involved in the country's domestic affairs, particularly with EAOs along the Chinese border. The CCP simply does not have the political will, to mobilise the local government's political will to address its problems.

Conflict in Myanmar will not 'fix itself' merely from the presence of economic development. No amount of development in the Rakhine region will compel Rohingyas to return when little has been done in terms of improving citizenship and identity. However, as long as China's national interests are safeguarded by local and national authorities, the CCP will have little incentive to further press the problem. This is negative stability and containment of conflicts, not positive and sustainable peace through ethnic harmony.

A summary of the findings from these case studies can be found on the following page:

Table 3: Summary of Case Studies  
(Made by the author, on the following page)

	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Sri Lanka	Myanmar
Liberal Peace	Strengthening democracy addresses underrepresentation in Kashmir and Balochistan. However, in KPK and FATA, anti-Western extremists prevent the proliferation of liberal norms. Overall, the missing bottom-up approach weakens the WHAM from liberal actors.	There is no bottom-up approach in Afghanistan. Mission creep diminished the political will from the US to help the Afghan government with corruption, reliance on foreign aid and drugs. Failed liberal state-building paved the way for the Taliban's return.	International mediation did not secure a political resolution to the civil war. Sri Lanka is already a democracy with free and fair elections, but Sinhalese majoritarian politics prevents further political will to pursue reconciliation for positive peace.	Democracy is a way to build sustainable peace, but is difficult to achieve because the military influence is too strong. Democracy also does not resolve conflicts with the EAOs or the Rohingya crisis.
Hybrid Peace (Local Peace)	Coexistence of laws and the embracement of the <i>jirga</i> as well as empowering women are all effective hybrid peace measures. However, there is no political will and no top-down approach from the Pakistani state towards Kashmir and Balochistan.	Taliban local peace operates parallel to the Afghan government as they compete for governance. Illiberal local peace perpetrated by the Taliban is unlikely to create sustainable positive peace, as human rights and women's rights are constantly violated.	There is a lack of political will to address the reconciliation problem, but local CSOs, supported by international actors, supplement decently for the relatively weak top-down approach. INGOs may be too strong relative to local NGOs, causing complications with the government.	Local CSOs can become bridge-builders between local authorities (KIO) and the government. Uncivil societies can become spoilers for violent conflicts like the Rohingya crisis.

<p>Developmental Peace</p>	<p>CPEC contributes greatly to resolving local energy problems. However, it is also mismanaged by China and Pakistan, where already marginalised groups are further alienated, such as the Balochis in Gwadar. Does not generate the political will to deal with the problems in Balochistan.</p>	<p>China works well with Pakistan and intends to bring CPEC to Afghanistan as China approaches the Taliban. However, two illiberal actors working together does not create positive peace, and it does not generate the political will for the Taliban to improve on civil liberties.</p>	<p>Reconciliation is a ‘domestic affair’, and China, under principles of non-intervention, will not generate the political will for reconciliation. If anything, China is a good escape for Sri Lanka under pressure to reconcile by international society. However, it must beware of ‘debt traps.’</p>	<p>The ‘win-win’ narrative on projects like the Myitsone dam have met local resistance, as the locals have the most to lose from Chinese development as the state profits. There is little need to improve civil liberties when working with China, and of course, no political will to address conflicts with EAOs or the Rohingya crisis</p>
--------------------------------	---	---	--	--

## **8.2: Contributions to the Existing Literature**

This dissertation contributes to the existing literature on international peacebuilding by highlighting the traits of China's developmental peace, as well as how it is similar to or different from existing models such as liberal and hybrid peace. As an emerging actor, China's contributions to international peacebuilding are relatively underexplored, mainly due to the fact that the CCP has never made it clear that they intend to undertake a greater role in peacebuilding. This can be seen from the lack of official narratives concerning peacebuilding, and the lack of official documents on Beijing's peacebuilding policy. As more emerging actors from non-Western countries join the cause of international peacebuilding, the era of dominance of Western liberal peace may be coming to an end. This does not mean that liberal peace becomes irrelevant, but it does mean that more emerging actors will be willing to present unique models of peacebuilding that do not always uphold liberal norms, and China's developmental peace is merely one of the many new models to come.

Specifically, this dissertation is an important piece of English literature that covers the relatively understudied model of China's developmental peace. There are some existing studies, on developmental peace, such as the works of He (2014, 2019, 2021) and Wang (2017), but this dissertation expands on existing works by separating theory and practice, making contributions to both spectrums in understanding developmental peace. Theory-wise, it expands on He's (2014) pillars of developmental peace with additional traits, such as China's win-win narrative and the desire to edge out local rivals (Japan and India) in Asia to establish Sino-centrism. Concerning the win-win narrative specifically, one needs to remember that China proclaims itself as a developing country that works together with other developing countries under a South-South cooperation framework. This means that Beijing, too, desires to gain or profit from the infrastructure built by the Chinese initiative, perhaps more so than the local government or people.

Practice-wise, one of the main discoveries from the case studies is that political will from the local government is the key to bringing sustainable peace to protracted conflicts. This may appear obvious, but in the cases of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar it is evident that no amount of economic development has generated the political will from the national elites of these countries to address problems at the grassroots level, with regard to the marginalisation of locals in Balochistan, reconciliation between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and an end to armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and EAOs. Pressing these countries to improve democracy and human rights, or threatening them with sanctions, in the case of Myanmar, is also counterproductive to generating political will.

The means to mobilise the political will of local governments to address problems at the grassroots level must be given greater attention in future peacebuilding literature. This is particularly important, as no existing models of peacebuilding have been particularly effective at doing so. However, there are potentially many more forthcoming models of peacebuilding from emerging actors, like India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Brazil. Scholars and policymakers in the relevant fields must learn from the shortcomings of China's developmental peace, as well as existing liberal and hybrid peace models, to strike a more effective balance between economic development, sovereignty, and civil liberties for grassroots towards positive sustainable peace.

Other than the issue of political will, the other major discovery in this dissertation is that China's developmental peace and the BRI are doing some good, but much more harm on the ground. As this dissertation is a qualitative review of developmental peace, I do not attempt to quantify how much good or harm is being done. This also does not invalidate the claim that sustainable peace is closely related to economic development. This linkage between peace and development stands true no matter how much potential harm the BRI has done to local grassroots and civil liberties in the country. What it does show is that illiberal economic development merely creates negative peace, which brings us back to the point of the universality of liberal norms. Although not directly related to the research question, this dissertation also proves the necessity of liberal norms. We see that in theory, liberal peace often offers the solution to protracted conflicts, though in practice these solutions are difficult to achieve. This is also related to an argument by Paris (2010), in that it is not always about finding alternatives to liberal peace, but about the means to improve the model. In the end, China's developmental peace, devoid of all liberal norms, has not proved itself to be more capable of creating sustainable peace in post-conflict countries than existing models.

### **8.3: Limitations to Research**

As emphasised in the introduction, the arguments made in this dissertation are only applicable in Asia. China's global outreach is far beyond its immediate periphery of Asia. While developmental peace in Africa may share some traits, I do not attempt to make a comparison of the regional differences in Chinese peacebuilding, as this is not within the scope of this dissertation. Of course, with case studies, it is difficult to generalise. Even in the Asian region, this dissertation has merely singled out the four most impactful cases in China's periphery for its analysis of developmental peace and the BRI. The BRI is not limited to the above four cases, as other countries like Cambodia, Laos and Bangladesh may all provide their own unique cases.

An unfortunate aspect when writing is that COVID-19 limited travel around the world, which has caused a lack of fieldwork in this dissertation. While there is no shortage of resources on the Internet, there are still some specific questions to be answered, such as what types of people are being employed in what positions on Chinese projects, and what is the employment ratio between local and Chinese workers. However, considering the non-transparent nature of the BRI and the lack of insider connections, there are doubts as to whether such specifics can be uncovered at all.

#### **8.4: Future Recommendations**

Throughout this dissertation, we have seen the good and the bad, the successes and failures of various peacebuilding models. While no singular model has been particularly successful in resolving any of these conflicts, each model has certain elements that are useful for tackling certain issues. The ‘ideal’ peacebuilding model, in practice, is often a combination of the elements from different models. From the perspective of a Western scholar, I would like to make the following recommendations concerning improving the current theories of international peacebuilding. These are also points that have not been fully explored in the dissertation and should be topics for future research:

1. Find the means to generate political will.
2. Greater attention from alternative Asian actors.
3. Compromise on democracy but not on human rights.

##### Find the means to generate political will

A consistent problem in trying to establish sustainable peace in post-conflict societies is that there is often not enough political will from the elites to address the grassroots problem. Many developing countries have prioritised economic development strategies, which aim to empower most society by raising standards of living, with better employment opportunities, higher income jobs and better livelihoods. Basic infrastructure built in the process of development is a public good that benefits large portions of the society. Prioritising development in itself is not the issue.

Within development, there is always a small group of minorities that are left behind, with the ruling elites having little to no incentive to improve life for them. In Pakistan, this group comprises the Balochis; in Sri Lanka, the Tamils and Muslims, and in Myanmar, residents of Kachin, Shan, Rakhine (Rohingya) and other minorities. Interestingly, in Afghanistan, the entire country could fall into this trap of no political will from the top. Local civil societies, such as NGOs and their international counterparts, can

remedy this problem temporarily, but the initiative must still come from the top-level political elites to incorporate the formerly marginalised groups as beneficiaries of economic development.

Sanctions cannot generate political will; if anything, they are ineffective and counterproductive, as they only push agitated illiberal governments like Myanmar towards equally illiberal actors like China, where Beijing is more than happy to help circumvent Western sanctions. For liberal actors in the West, rather than punishing Asian governments for human rights violations, it is important to have a flexible model of dialogue and maintain channels of engagement. For INGOs, working together with their local NGO counterparts in raising awareness in society about the situation on marginalised communities, whether it is through social media platforms or other means, is an important step to ensure that less-reported conflicts like the situation in Balochistan are not forgotten. This approach may be reasonable in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, where media are relatively free, though it may fall short in Afghanistan and Myanmar, where media can be heavily regulated.

For alternative Asian actors like Japan and India, it is important to not fall into the trap of competing for influence in a third country with China with economic investments. China is a much larger economy and an authoritarian country that can quickly mobilise domestic resources and send them abroad – something that may take much longer in democracies. Instead, it is better to appeal to the strong suits of India and Japan, such as India's kinship and culture towards Sri Lanka, or the transparency and accountability of Asian democracies like Japan. India, in particular, is in a good position, having housed the Dalai Lama since his exile from Tibet in 1959: a powerful symbol that can connect India with the Buddhists of Sri Lanka and Myanmar. In practice, this may be difficult, as Sri Lanka has previously rejected an official visit by the Dalai Lama for fear of angering China (Reuters, 2015).

#### Greater Attention to Alternative Asian Actors

Just like the phrase 'African problems need African solutions,' Asian problems also need Asian solutions. Contrary to narratives of non-intervention, it is Asian regional actors who have the largest influence over their fellow Asian neighbours. Japan is a traditional actor that has been on the peacebuilding scene for many years, but countries like India and Indonesia are emerging actors, still with premature models of peacebuilding. Perhaps it will be helpful to explore the coordination between Asian actors in the field of peacebuilding. Due to geopolitics, cooperation between China and Japan or India is unlikely, but there is little to prevent greater coordination, such as between Japan and

India, India and ASEAN, or Japan and ASEAN, which combines the experiences of traditional actors with new concepts from emerging actors.

Stronger coordination between the West and Asia is also possible in this regard. The Group of 7, of which Japan is a part, has announced the Build Back Better World as an alternative to China's BRI, with a particular focus on transparent infrastructure partnership, aiming to narrow the development gap faced by developing countries by 2035 (Holland & Faulconbridge, 2021). More infrastructure coordination as such needs to happen between developed democracies and rising democracies in Asia, with developed Asian democracies like Japan, South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan serving as bridge-builders between the East and the West. Collective action through shared values of liberal norms should become the incentive, as well as the political will for greater coordination between countries that become suspicious, or even feel threatened by China, and work with the West, or Japan, and other Asian actors to extend the rule of law, human rights, and even improve democracy in the process.

#### Compromise on Democracy but not on Human Rights

For Western actors, it is time to compromise on liberal peace. As the evidence above has shown, liberal state-building has too many hurdles to be sustainable, and in practice, foreign-induced governments are difficult to sustain. The collapse of the US-backed Afghan government after two decades of American state-building is a prime example. The West should accept that while in theory, all countries can embrace liberal democracy, in practice many are incapable of that transition due to a wide variety of factors far beyond the West's capacity to influence them.

To this point, democracy does not have to be a universal norm, but there should be no compromise on human rights. For example, the new Taliban government may still not include women in the parliament, but at least the Taliban has learnt to include minorities. Asset freezes and sanctions will not improve the relations between the West and the Taliban; they will not make the Taliban decide overnight that girls and women need education; and most importantly, they will not improve the already poor humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, but might even become counterproductive as they push Afghanistan towards illiberal states like China. It is time for liberal and illiberal states to both commit towards nurturing a transformative relationship amongst each other on the international stage. The release of frozen Afghan funds proportional to the progress being made towards human rights is necessary, as every relationship begins with goodwill from one side. This can also apply to foreign aid, which will be useful to engage with Myanmar, repair relations with Pakistan, and foster better relations with Sri Lanka.



As a final point that combines the three recommendations, there is a need to create a type of hybrid peace 2.0 where there is greater collaboration between the East and West using economic developmental as the incentive to generate political will and influence stubborn local elites that are unwilling to otherwise introduce meaningful reforms. Throughout this dissertation, we have seen that post-conflict societies are usually LAO societies. Political will can be generated when the elites realise their interests can be protected even in the process of reforms, but at the same time convinced that the use of force will bring certain 'consequences' that would undermine their 'rent'. For such a 'carrot and stick' approach to be viable, strong Western negotiators must accompany Asian negotiators like Japan and India that has already created a positive relationship with the political elites of Sri Lanka or Myanmar. A similar approach can be done with Pakistan with its relationship with China, as well as a joint effort between China, Pakistan, India and the West to address the Taliban Afghanistan. Though in practice this is difficult as China has firmly stood against the proliferation of liberal norms on the ground with developmental peace. At the same time, the exclusion of China in the process will only exacerbate geopolitical tensions in Asia, due to Sino-centrism. Means of collaboration between the East and West, or between China, Japan and India under a regional framework must be explored in the future as well.

## Bibliography

- Aamir, A. (2022, February 15). *Pakistan on high alert following Baloch attacks on security posts*. Nikkei Asia. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Pakistan-on-high-alert-following-Baloch-attacks-on-security-posts>
- Abb, P. (2018, December 24). *China's emergence as a peacebuilding actor: From 'peaceful development' to 'developmental peace'?* University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/12/24/chinas-emergence-as-a-peacebuilding-actor-from-peaceful-development-to-developmental-peace/>
- Abb, P. (2021). From 'peaceful rise' to peacebuilder? How evolving Chinese discourse and self-perceptions impacts its growing influence in conflict societies. *Journal of Contemporary China* 30(129), 402-416.
- Abbas, R. (2020). 'Silence got us nowhere. We need to speak up': One woman's anguish and outrage over her sister's disappearance and the millions of others into the concentration camp network in Xinjiang, China. *Index on Censorship*, 49(3), 14-16.
- Adaderana. (2020, October 9). *President says he wants to prove Hambantota Port is not a Chinese 'debt trap'*. Adaderana. <http://www.adaderana.lk/news.php?nid=67971>
- Abid, M., & Ashfaq, A. (2015). CPEC: Challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. *Pakistan Vision*, 16(2), 142-169.
- Accord. (2020, May 8). *The six principles of adaptive peacebuilding*. Conflict and Resilience Monitor. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-six-principles-of-adaptive-peacebuilding/>
- Adelphi Papers. (1995). The balance of power in Asia. *The Adelphi Papers*, 32(295), 10-16.
- Adhikari, M. (2021). Peacebuilding with 'Chinese characteristics'? Insights from

China's engagement in Myanmar's peace process. *International Studies Review*, 23, 1699-1726

- AFP. (2020, November 6). *US Removes shadowy group from terror list blamed by China for attacks*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/06/us-removes-shadowy-group-from-terror-list-blamed-by-china-for-attacks>
- Afzal, M. (2021, January 15). *Terrorism in Pakistan has declined, but the underlying roots of extremism remain*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/>
- Agrawal, S. (2022, January 22). *Pakistan is paying the price for Dasu attack that killed Chinese workers - \$11.6 million*. The Print. <https://theprint.in/go-to-pakistan/pakistan-is-paying-the-price-for-dasu-attack-that-killed-chinese-workers-11-6-million/810221/>
- Ahmed, A. (2016, July 20). Who said what about Kashmir in the last one year. *Dawn*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1270329>.
- Ahmed, G.M.S., & Elahi, F. (2016, September 16). *The Rohingya crisis: A view from Bangladesh*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/rohingya-crisis-view-bangladesh/?location=bangladesh&theme=human-rights>
- Ahmed, I.A.I. (2019). The Merowe Dam in Northern Sudan: A case of population displacement and impoverishment. In J.D. Schmidt, L. Kimathi, & M.O. Owiso (Eds.) *Refugees and forced migration in the Horn and Eastern Africa* (pp.131-153). Springer.
- Ahmed, K., & Mohiuddin, H. (2020). *The Rohingya crisis*. Lexington Books.
- Ahmed, M., & Baloch, A. (2015). Political economy of Balochistan, Pakistan: A critical review. *European Scientific Journal*, 11(14), 274-293.
- Ahmed, M.Z., & Ahmad, A. (2019). Reclaiming fate of Rohingya refugees: Role of

local and international NGO's. *International Non-Governmental Organisations Congress – NGO '19* (2019): 1-14.

- Ahmed, Z.S. (2022). The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan and Pakistan's non-traditional security challenges. *Global Policy*, 13, 125-131.
- Ahmed, Z.S. (2010, July 15). *Peace in Kashmir: The work of PFP in AJ&K*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/peace-in-kashmir-the-work-of-pfp-in-ajk/?location=india&theme=>
- Ahmed, Z.S., Hanif, A., & He. B. (2021). China's soft power in Pakistan: The representation of the China-Pakistan economic corridor in local newspapers. *East Asian Policy*, 13(4), 5-18.
- Akhtar, N. (2020, January 30). *China is the most reliable and 'all weather friend' of Pakistan*. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. <http://cpecinfo.com/china-is-the-most-reliable-and-all-weather-friend-of-pakistan/>.
- Akebo, M., & Bastian, S. (2021). Beyond liberal peace in Sri Lanka: Victory, politics, and state formation. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 16(1): 70-84.
- Akhtar, F., & A. Ranjan. (2021, October 12). *Afghanistan's education sector: Prospects under Taliban rule – analysis*. Eurasia Review. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/12102021-afghanistans-education-sector-prospects-under-taliban-rule-analysis/>
- Akhtar, N. (2008). Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. *International Journal on World Peace*, 25(4), 49-73.
- Akhtar, N., Khan, H.U., Jan, M.A., Pratt, C.B., & Ma, J. (2021). Exploring the determinants of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its impact on local communities. *Sage Open*, 2021, 1-16.
- Albert, E., & Maizland, L. (2020, January 23) *The Rohingya crisis*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis#chapter-title-0-7>

- Alexandra, L.A., & Lanteigne, M. (2017). New actors and innovative approaches to peacebuilding: The case of Myanmar. In C.T. Call & C. De Coning (Eds.) *Rising Powers & Peacebuilding* (pp. 191-242). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Al Jazeera. (2016, November 29). *Taliban offer 'security' for copper, gas projects*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2016/11/29/taliban-offer-security-for-copper-gas-projects/>
- Al Jazeera. (2018, May 24). *Pakistan parliament passes landmark tribal areas reform*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/5/24/pakistan-parliament-passes-landmark-tribal-areas-reform>
- Al Jazeera. (2019, September 4). *India revokes Kashmir's special status*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/4/india-revokes-kashmirs-special-status>
- Al Jazeera. (2021a, September 2). *Afghanistan: The Taliban to rely on Chinese funds, spokesperson says*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/2/afghanistan-taliban-to-rely-on-chinese-money-spokesperson-says>
- Al Jazeera. (2021b, November 10). *India hosts talks on Afghanistan, but no Afghan official invited*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/10/india-afghanistan-talks-pakistan-china-taliban>
- Al Jazeera. (2022, August 25). *'It's a nightmare, everyday': Rohingya in India live in fear*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/25/its-a-nightmare-every-day-crackdown-on-rohingyas-in-india>
- Ali, I. (2018). *Mainstreaming Pakistan's federally administered tribal Areas: Reform initiatives and roadblocks*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/sr-421-mainstreaming-pakistan-federally-administered-tribal-areas.pdf>
- Ali, K.M., & Paracha, S.A. (2019). Portrayal of Balochistan's terrorism in national and regional press: A critical discourse analysis of English and Urdu newspapers.

*International Journal of Applied Research*, 5(12), 46-51.

Ali, G. (2020). China-Pakistan cooperation on Afghanistan: Assessing key interests in implementing strategies. *The Pacific Review*, 35(3), 1-23.

Ali, M. (2003, December 24). *The rise of Pakistan's army*. BBC.  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/3227709.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3227709.stm)

Allana, A. (2010, November 24). *India saddened me...let's talk now: Suu Kyi*. Indian Express. <https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/india-saddened-me-lets-talk-now-suu-kyi/>

Alparone, D. (2021, July). *The Norwegian conflict management approach in Sri Lanka: The limits of weak mediation & bias*. SDAFA.  
<https://www.sdafa.co.uk/the-norwegian-conflict-management-approach-in-sri-lanka-the-limits-of-weak-mediation-bias>

Ambarkhane, S., & Gathia, S.J. (2022, May 10). *Over a year later, Myanmar's military coup threatens India's national security*. United States Institute of Peace.  
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/over-year-later-myanmars-military-coup-threatens-indias-national-security>

ANI. (2019, August 3). *CPEC will leave thousands jobless in Gilgit-Baltistan: Analyst*. Big News Network. <https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/261947373/cpec-will-leave-thousands-jobless-in-gilgit-baltistan-analyst>

Amin, M. (2017, Jan 7). *The story behind China's long-stalled mine in Afghanistan*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-story-behind-chinas-long-stalled-mine-in-afghanistan/>

Aneez, S. (2018, August 24). *China aims to build houses, roads in Sri Lanka north to extend sway*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sri-lanka-china-idUKKCN1L90VH>

Annan, K. (2004). *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. United Nations, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/>

documents/hlp\_more\_secure\_world.pdf

ANI. (2021). *No electricity in 64 per cent area of Balochistan, states report*. ANI News. <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/no-electricity-in-64-per-cent-area-of-balochistan-states-report20210924193644/>

Arab News. (2021, December 9). *No Chinese military bases in port city of Gwadar – Pakistan NSA*. Arab News. <https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1984056/pakistan>

Ariyaratne, V. (2015, June 4). *A discussion with Vinya Ariyaratne, General Secretary, Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya Movement*. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-vinya-ariyaratne-general-secretary-sarvodaya-shramadana-sangamaya-movement>

Arulthas, M. (2018, October 11). *The failed promises of reconciliation in Sri Lanka*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-failed-promise-of-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka/>

Ashizawa, K. (2014). Japan's approach to peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 9(3), 1-16.

Asia Foundation (2012). *Values 4 all – shared values*. Asia Foundation Sri Lanka. <http://www.values4all.lk/en/values>

Asian Development Bank. (2015). *Civil society briefs: Myanmar*. Asian Development Bank. <http://themimu.info/MNGOs>

Asian Development Bank. (2021). *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa cities improvement project: Summary poverty reduction and social strategy*. Asian Development Bank. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/51036-002-sprss.pdf>

Associated Press of Pakistan. (2016). *CPEC to create employment opportunities for Baloch youth: Jam Kamal*. Associated Press of Pakistan. <https://www.pakistanpoint.com/en/story/14563/cpec-to-create-employment-opportunities-for-baloch-yout.html/>

- Askouri, A.K. (2004, September). *The Merowe dam: Controversy and displacement in Sudan*. Forced Migration Review. <https://www.fmreview.org/return-reintegration/askouri>
- Aung, H. (2007, August). *Burma's rigged road map to democracy*. The Irrawaddy. [https://web.archive.org/web/20100825143347/http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art\\_id=8052](https://web.archive.org/web/20100825143347/http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=8052)
- Aung, H.L. (2016, January 8). *Rakhine locals to dispute SEZ tender*. Myanmar Times. <https://www.mmtimes.com/business/18388-rakhine-locals-to-dispute-sez-tender.html>.
- Aung, T.S., Overland, I., & Vakulchuk, R. (2021) Environmental performance of foreign firms: Chinese and Japanese firms in Myanmar. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 312, 1-15.
- Aung, T.T. (2017, August 28). *Muslim community condemns Rakhine violence*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/muslim-community-condemns-rakhine-violence.html>
- Aung, T.T., & Lewis, S (2018, November 8). *Myanmar agrees smaller deal for China-backed port after 'debt trap' concern*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-china-port-idUSL4N1XJ2Z7>.
- Aung Z. (2017, Oct 16). *Of pomp and peace*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/of-pomp-and-peace.html>.
- Avis, W. (2016, September 22). *Drivers of conflict in the Swat Valley, Pakistan*. GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/58592f2fed915d0aeb0000e0/HDQ1398.pdf>
- Baek, S.W. (2007). Does China follow 'the East Asian development model'? *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 35(4), 485-498.



- Bai, Y., Li, S. Wang, L., & Dan, J. (2021, February 23). *Shendu miandian bianjuzhong, shei zai beihou zaoyao mohei zhongguo?* [Deep analysis: Who is creating rumors to smear China during Myanmar's coup?]. Huanqiu Wang [global Times]. <https://world.huanqiu.com/article/422etH2Mtn5>
- Balasooriya, A. (2012). Towards positive peace: Government of Sri Lanka's post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. *Journal of International Development and Cooperation*, 18(3), 17-30.
- Bali, P., & Akhtar, S. (2017). Kashmir line of control and grassroots peacebuilding. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, 410, 1-17.
- Ball, P., & F. Harrison. (2018). How many people disappeared on 17-19 May 2009 in Sri Lanka? *International Truth and Justice Project*, 1-9
- Baloch, S.M. (2021, November 11). *'It's our lifeline': The Taliban are back but Afghans say opium is here to stay*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/nov/11/its-our-lifeline-the-taliban-are-back-but-afghans-say-opium-is-here-to-stay>
- Balochistan Point. (2014, November 2). *Winning hearts and minds of Baloch is the only solution: Siraj Ul Haq*. Balochistan Point. <http://thebalochistanpoint.com/winning-hearts-and-minds-of-baloch-is-the-only-solution-siraj-ul-haq/>
- Barber, L. (2020, May 8). *China's response to Sudan's political transition*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/05/chinas-response-sudans-political-transition>
- Barber, R., & Teitt, S. (2020). The Rohingya crisis: Can ASEAN salvage its credibility? *Survival*, 62(5), 41-54.
- Bargues-Pedreny, P., & Randazzo, E. (2018). Hybrid Peace Revisited: An Opportunity for Considering Self-governance? *Third World Quarterly*, 39(8), 1543-1560.
- Bashir, F., & Khan, M.R.U. (2021). Revocation of Kashmir special status in Indian

- Constitution: Distortion of Simla agreement. *Dialogue (1819-6462)*, 16(3), 1-10.
- Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The Qualitative Report*, 13(4), 544-559.
- Bazaz, P.N. (2005). *Kashmir in crucible*. Gulshan Publisher.
- BBC. (2007, October 2). *The hardship that sparked Burma's unrest*. BBC.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7023548.stm>
- BBC. (2011, February 20). *Libya: Anti-Gaddafi protests spread to Tripoli*. BBC News.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12520366>
- BBC. (2014, March 1). *Afghan notebook: Illiterate army*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26358814>
- BBC. (2017, May 26). *Why so Many Sri Lankans are learning Chinese*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/business-40052138>
- BBC. (2018, November 3). *Karachi attack: China consulate attack leaves four dead*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46313136>
- BBC. (2019a, February 19). *Pulwama attack: Pakistan warns India against military action*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-47290107>
- BBC. (2019b, April 28). *Sri Lanka attacks: What we know about the Easter bombing*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48010697>
- BBC. (2019c, July 27). *Aung Sang Suu Kyi's Myanmar dam dilemma with China*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48857781>
- BBC. (2020, June 29). *China forcing birth control on Uighurs to suppress population, report says*. BBC.  
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-53220713>
- BBC. (2021a, July 14). *Chinese engineers killed in Pakistan Bus Blast*. BBC.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57837072>

- BBC. (2021b, September 9). *China offers \$31m in emergency aid to Afghanistan*. BBC. [bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-58496867](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-58496867)
- BBC. (2021c, December 6). *Aung San Suu Kyi: Myanmar democracy icon who fell from grace*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11685977>.
- BBC. (2022, January 10). *Crisis-hit Sri Lanka asks China to restructure its debt*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-59932551>
- Beanbien, J. (2019, April 15). *Bangladesh struggles to cope with pressures of Housing 1 million Rohingya refugees*. NPR. <https://www.npr.org/2019/04/15/710256666/bangladesh-struggles-to-cope-with-pressures-of-hosting-1-million-rohingya-refuge?t=1659376900827>
- Beckley, M., Horiuchi, Y., & Miller, J.M. (2018). America's role in the making of Japan's economic miracle. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 18(2018), 1-21.
- Bennett, N. (2011). *Civil-military principles in the Pakistan flood response*. Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN). <https://odihpn.org/magazine/civil-military-principles-in-the-pakistan-flood-response/>
- Berdal, M., & Zaum, D. (2013) Introduction. In M. Berdel & D. Zaum (Eds.) *Power after peace: The political economy of post-conflict state building*. Routledge.
- Bergen, P. (2021, August 1). *Five myths about Osama Bin Laden*. The Washington Post. 2021. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/osama-bin-laden-myths/2021/07/30/0d193194-eff0-11eb-bf80-e3877d9c5f06\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/osama-bin-laden-myths/2021/07/30/0d193194-eff0-11eb-bf80-e3877d9c5f06_story.html)
- Berry, P.A. (2018). From London to Lashkar Gah: British counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan (2001-2003). *The International History Review*, 40(4), 713-731.
- Best, R. (2022, April 29). *China's intervention during 2015 stock market crash*. Investopedia. <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022716/4->

consequences-government-intervention-chinas-markets.asp

Beetham, D. (2009). Democracy: Universality and diversity. *Ethics & Global Politics*, 2(4), 284-296.

Bhat, N.A., & Kaur, R. (2019). Peace building and trust with democracy in Jammu and Kashmir: A historical perspective. *History Research Journal*, 5(5), 1497-1507.

Bijlert, M. (2011, June 13). *What the US senate's report on Afghanistan does and doesn't say*. Afghanistan Analysts Network. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/what-the-us-senates-report-on-afghanistan-does-and-doesnt-say/>

Bindi, I.T., & Tufekci, O. (2018). Liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: A critical exploration. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 53(8), 1158-1172.

Biziouras, N. (2014). Divided leaders, critical masses, and the escalation of interethnic violence. *Democracy and Security*, 10(1), 52-72.

Blank, J. (1999, November). *Kashmir: Fundamentalism takes root*. Foreign Affairs. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1999-11-01/kashmir-fundamentalism-takes-root?check\\_logged\\_in=1](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1999-11-01/kashmir-fundamentalism-takes-root?check_logged_in=1)

Bloomberg News. (2021, June 10). *China boosts support for Myanmar army, countering U.S. sanctions*. Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-09/china-boosts-support-for-myanmar-army-countering-u-s-sanctions?leadSource=verify%20wall>

Bremer, P.L. III. (2004, September 8). *Iraq's path to sovereignty*. Frontline. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/documents/bremerplan.html>

Brinkley, T. (2013). Money pit – the monstrous failure of US aid to Afghanistan. *World Affairs*, 175(5), 13-24.

Bristow, M. (2008, February 13). *China's dilemma over Darfur*. BBC.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7242725.stm>.

- Brockmeier, S., Kurtz, G., & Junk, J. (2014). Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsibility to protect. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 14(4), 429-460.
- Borger, J. (2021, December 9). 'An urgent matter': Biden warns democracy is under threat at summit. *The Guardian*.  
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/09/joe-biden-summit-for-democracy>
- Bose, S. (1997). *The challenges in Kashmir: Democracy, self-determination and just peace*. Sage.
- BRACE. (2020). *Brace programme outcomes & output*. Balochistan Rural Development & Community Empowerment Programme,  
<https://brace.org.pk/programme/>
- Brenner, D., & Schulman, S. (2019). Myanmar's top-down transition: Challenges for civil society. *IDS Bulletin*, 50(3), 17-36.
- Brown, V.F. (2018, January 5). *Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US find it so hard to induce change*. Brookings.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/>
- Brown University (2022). *Costs of war*. Watson Institute International & Public Affairs.  
<https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022>
- Brook-Smith, R. (2014, October 16). *Building peace through education in Pakistan*. Gandhara.  
<https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistan-peace-education/26640583.html>
- Bokhari, F., Stacey, K., & Feng, E. (2018, August 6). *China courted Afghan Taliban in secret meetings*. Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/66b0906a-993d-11e8-9702-5946bae86e6d>

- Burma Partnership. (2010, April 17). *Four killed, 12 injured in bomb blasts in Irrawaddy-Myitsone dam site*. Burma Partnership.  
<https://www.burmapartnership.org/2010/04/four-killed-12-injured-in-bomb-blasts-in-irrawaddy-myitsone-dam-site/>
- Bush, G. Sr., & B. Scowcroft. (2011). *A world transformed*. Vintage Books.
- Bush, K.D. & Saltarelli, D. (2000). *The two faces of education in ethnic conflict*. UNICEF.  
<https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/insight4.pdf>
- Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. (2021, March 25). *Compilation of statements by H&M, Nike, GAP, Uniqlo, Adidas, Zara and New Balance on sourcing Xinjiang cotton*. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre.  
<https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/heres-what-foreign-brands-have-to-say-about-xinjiang/>
- Business Insider. (2017, December 29). *India trying to hamper CPEC through Afghanistan but won't succeed: Pakistan*. Business Insider.  
[https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/india-trying-to-hamper-cpec-through-afghanistan-but-won-t-succeed-pakistan-117122900477\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/india-trying-to-hamper-cpec-through-afghanistan-but-won-t-succeed-pakistan-117122900477_1.html)
- Butler, D.M., & Wheeler, T. (2012). *China and conflict-affected states – between principle and pragmatism*. Saferworld.  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a9a40f0b652dd0007ee/FA-B-Chinas-approach.pdf>
- Byrd, W.A. (2016). The perils of holding elections in a limited access order: analysis of Afghanistan's experience in 2014. *Conflict, Security & Development* 16(6), 521-540.
- Byrd, W.A. (2017). Reviving commercial development of Afghanistan's Aynak copper resource. *USIP Peace Brief*, 233, 1-5.
- Cai, P. (2017, March 22). *Understanding China's belt and road initiative*. Lowy

Institute. [https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-china-s-belt-road-initiative#\\_edn6](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-china-s-belt-road-initiative#_edn6)

Callahan, W.A. (2015). Identity and security in China: The negative soft power of the China dream. *Politics*, 35(3-4), 216-229.

Cardozo, M.T.A.L. (2008). Sri Lanka: In peace or in pieces? A critical approach to peace education in Sri Lanka. *Education and Development Working Paper*, 4, 1-36.

Carnerero, C.A. (2019, October 21). *(C)overl Islamophobia: The aftermath of the Sri Lankan Easter attacks*. Open Democracy. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/covert-islamophobia-aftermath-sri-lanka-easter-attacks/>

Carr, T. (2018). *Supporting the transition: Understanding aid to Myanmar since 2011*. The Asia Foundation. [https://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/assessment\\_file\\_attachments/Understanding\\_Aid\\_to\\_Myanmar\\_Since\\_2011\\_-\\_Asia\\_Foundation\\_2018.pdf](https://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/assessment_file_attachments/Understanding_Aid_to_Myanmar_Since_2011_-_Asia_Foundation_2018.pdf)

Carrai, M. (2019). China's malleable sovereignty along the belt and road initiative: The case of the 99-year Chinese lease of Hambantota Port. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 51(4), 1061-1100.

Cassini, J., Graf, W., Kramer, G., Nicolescou, A., & Temt, C. (2008). Post-tsunami reconstruction and beyond: A conflict-sensitive approach to rebuilding homes and communities in Sri Lanka. *IICP Working Paper 2*.

CGD. (2013, September). *Aid to Pakistan by the numbers*. Center for Global Development. <https://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers>

CGTN. (2022, March 19). *Experts refute rumors of 'China Debt trap' in Sri Lanka*. CGTN. <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-03-19/Experts-refute-rumors-of-China-debt-trap-in-Sri-Lanka-18wKMKutKJG/index.html>

Chakma, B. (2014). Liberal peace and South Asia. *India Quarterly*, 70(3), 187-205.

- Chaguan. (2021, August 21). *China is happy to see America humbled in Afghanistan*. The Economist. <https://www.economist.com/china/2021/08/21/china-is-happy-to-see-america-humbled-in-afghanistan>
- Chambers, S., & J. Kopstein. (2001). Bad civil society. *Political Theory*, 29(6), 837-865.
- Chan, T. (2019, February 8). *Thousands protests against Myitsone Dam in Kachin*. Myanmar Times. <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/thousands-protest-against-myitsone-dam-kachin.html>
- Chandler, D. (2007). The security-development nexus and the rise of ‘anti-foreign policy’. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 10, 362-386.
- Chandler, D. (2009). *Hollow hegemony*. Pluto.
- Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’. *Review of International Studies*, 36(1), 137-155.
- Chang, D.W. (1988). *China under Deng Xiaoping: Political and economic reform*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Changezi, A.R., & Tareen, M.A. (2017). State of civil society organisations in Balochistan (2016-17). *Pakistan Perspectives*, 22(2), 87-97.
- Channel 4. (2021, April 26). *Blame Russia and China for Sri Lanka failure, not UN’s ban*. Channel 4 News. <https://www.channel4.com/news/blame-russia-and-china-for-sri-lanka-failure-not-uns-ban>
- Charbonneau, L. (2018, December 24). *UN members thwart China’s bid to gut funds for Myanmar probe*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/24/un-members-thwart-chinas-bid-gut-funds-myanmar-probe>
- Chaudhury, D.R. (2021, June 22). *Pakistan: A soft prey to Chinese cultural diplomacy*.



The Economic Times.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-a-soft-prey-to-chinese-cultural-diplomacy/articleshow/83743592.cms?from=mdr>

Chaudhury, D.R. (2022, May 7). *India to step up assistance as Sri Lanka stares at bankruptcy*. The Economic Times.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/india-to-step-up-assistance-as-sri-lanka-stares-at-bankruptcy/articleshow/91389169.cms>

Chaudhry, S.A., & Wazir, M.A.K. (2012). Peacebuilding in federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan: Conflict management at state level. *Tigah Journal of Peace and Development*, 2, 124-148.

Chaudhuri, R., & S. Shende. (2020). Dealing with the Taliban: India's strategy in Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal. *Carnegie India*, 20, 1-42.

Chellaney, B. (2009, June 8). *China aided Sri Lanka bloodbath*. The Economic Times.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/china-aided-sri-lanka-bloodbath/articleshow/4629473.cms?from=mdr>

Chen, X. (2021, September 24). 'Chenxu dashi zai renquan lishihui di 48 jie huiyi yitier yibanxing bianlun zhong de fayan [Statement by Ambassador Chen Xu at the UNHRC 48<sup>th</sup> Session General Debate Agenda Item 2]. *zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhu lianheguo rineiwa banshichu he ruishi qita guoji zuzhi daibiaotuan* [Permanent mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations office at Geneva and other international organizations in Switzerland]. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/chn/zgyllhg/t1907136.htm>

Chief Minister's Policy Reform Unit. (2015, May). *China-Pakistan economic corridor – the route controversy*. Government of Balochistan.

China Story. (n.d.). *The China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC)*. The China Story. <https://www.thechinastory.org/yearbooks/yearbook-2017/chapter-2-the-belt-and-road-initiative-how-to-win-friends-and-influence-people/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-cpec/>

- China Global Investment Tracker. (2022). *Worldwide Chinese investments & construction (2013-2021)*. AEI.  
<https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>
- China Power Team. (2017, May 8). *How will the belt and road initiative advance China's interest?* China Power. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/>
- China Press. (2021, October 18). *Taliban yao zhongguo touzi guo baiyi zhongguo: keyi! Dan you yige tiaojian! [Taliban wants China to invest over ten billion, China: We can! But under one condition.]* China Press.  
<https://www.chinapress.com.my/20211018/%E5%A1%94%E5%88%A9%E7%8F%AD%E8%A6%81%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%8A%95%E8%B5%84%E8%BF%87%E7%99%BE%E4%BA%BF-%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%BC%9A%E5%8F%AF%E4%BB%A5%E7%BC%81%E4%BD%86%E6%9C%89%E4%B8%80%E4%B8%AA%E6%9D%A1/>
- Choedon, Y. (2021). India's engagement in development and peacebuilding assistance in the post-conflict states: An assessment. *Policy and Practice Reviews*, 3, 1-12.
- Chung, C. (2002). China's 'war on terror' – September 11 and Uighur separatism. *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4), 8-12.
- Clapp, P. (2007). Building democracy in Myanmar. *United States Institute of Peace Working Paper*, 2, 1-77.
- Coburn, N. (2009). Losing legitimacy? Some Afghan views on the government, the international community, and the 2009 elections. *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit*, 1-11.
- Coburn, N., and A. Larson. (2009) Voting together: Why Afghanistan's 2009 elections were (and were not) a disaster. *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series*, 1-20.
- Commissione Europea. (2016, June 1). *The European Union and Myanmar: Special*

- partnership for democracy, peace and prosperity*. European Commission. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO\\_16\\_2010](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO_16_2010)
- Cohen, D. (2014, May 23). *'Development is the key to peace': Chinese leaders discuss future of Asia*. The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/development-is-the-key-to-peace-chinese-leaders-discuss-future-of-asia/#.Vt8mGIwrK3c>.
- Cohen, R., & Deng, F.M. (1998). *Masses in flight – The global crisis of internal displacement*. Brookings Institution Press.
- Cohen, S.P. (2000). *India and America: An emerging relationship*. [Paper presentation]. Conference on The Nation-State System and Transnational Forces in South Asia, Kyoto, Japan.
- Collins, A.E.E., & Thiessen, C. (2020). A grounded theory of local ownership as meta-conflict in Afghanistan. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 55(2), 216-234.
- Colombo Telegraph. (2020, April 30). China spearheads anti-Muslim propaganda campaign in Sri Lanka amid coronavirus fears. *Colombo Telegraph*. <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/china-spearheads-anti-muslim-propaganda-campaign-in-sri-lanka-amid-coronavirus-fears/>
- CommonLII. (1956). *Sri Lanka consolidated acts*. Commonwealth Legal Information Institute. [http://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num\\_act/ola33o1956180/longtitle.html](http://www.commonlii.org/lk/legis/num_act/ola33o1956180/longtitle.html)
- Conciliation Resources. (2015, June). *Award-winning film shows trade in Kashmir building peace*. Conciliation Resources. <https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/award-winning-film-shows-trade-kashmir-building-peace>
- Connah, L. (2020). US intervention in Afghanistan: Justifying the unjustifiable? *South Asia Research*, 41(1), 70-86.
- Cooper, N., Tuner, M., & Pugh, M. (2011). The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris. *Review of International Studies*, 37(4),

1995-2007.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2022). *Global conflict tracker: Conflict between India and Pakistan*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan>

Coyne, C.J., Blanco, A.R.H., & Burns, S. (2016). The war on drugs in Afghanistan. Another failed experiment with interdiction. *The Independent Review*, 21(1), 95-119.

CPEC Authority (n.d.). *CPEC projects progress update: Social and economic development under CPEC*. Ministry of Planning, Development, & Special Initiatives. <http://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update>

CPIC. (n.d.). *China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC)*. China Pakistan Investment Corporation. <https://www.cpicglobal.com/about-cpic/>

Crabtree, J. (2019, November 18). *South Asia's turn to illiberal democracy*. Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/11/south-asias-turn-illiberal-democracy>

Cramer, C. (2021, March 17). *A road to reconciliation in Sri Lanka*. The Asia Foundation, <https://asiafoundation.org/2021/03/17/a-road-to-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka/>

Crossette, B. (2001, May 20). *Taliban's ban on poppy a success, U.S. aides say*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/20/world/taliban-s-ban-on-poppy-a-success-us-aides-say.html>

Cui, T. (2011, June 2). *From commitment to concerted action*. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t827392.htm>.

Curtis, J., Gill, J., & Walker, N. (2021, March 18). *The UK's commitment to reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka*. House of Commons Library. <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research->

briefings/cdp-2021-0015/

Daily Times. (2016, December 31). *India violates ceasefire yet again*. Daily Times.

<https://dailytimes.com.pk/37521/india-violates-ceasefire-yet-again/>

Daily Times. (2017, August 9). *Pakistan summons Indian DHC over ceasefire*

*violations*. Daily Times. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/121617/pakistan-summons-indian-dhc-over-ceasefire-violations/>

Daily Times. (2019, April 9). *Sanjrani lauds Japanese support for development projects, uplift of balochistan*. Daily Times.

<https://dailytimes.com.pk/374633/sanjrani-lauds-japanese-support-for-development-projects-uplift-of-balochistan/>

Daily Times. (2021, March 30). *Baloch demand respect, employment & inclusive governance*. Daily Times. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/740078/baloch-demand-respect-employment-inclusive-governance/>

*Dangdai nengyuan* [Modern Energy]. (2022, April 1). *Afuhan ge linguo zhua changyi: Zhongfang zhichi zhongqi shishi touzi yilang yuan tigong nvxing fuquan peixun* [Afghanistan Neighbors Joint Initiative: China supports investments of Chinese companies, Iran willing to provide training for female talents]. *Dangdai nengyuan* [Modern Energy]. <http://www.timeny.cn/kantianxia/32019.html>

Dastgir, G., Kawata, K., & Yoshida, Y. (2017). Effect of forced relocation on household income and consumption patterns: Evidence from the Aynak copper mine project in Afghanistan. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 54(11), 2061-2077.

Davies, S.E., & True, J. (2017). When there is no justice: Gendered violence and harm in post-conflict Sri Lanka. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 21(9), 1320-1336.

Dawn. (2004, March 3). *Musharraf warns against failure of Wana operation*. Dawn. <https://web.archive.org/web/20131203181950/http://dawn.com/news/392654/m>

usharraf-warns-against-failure-of-wana-operation

Dawn. (2016, August 12). *15,000 troops of special security division to protect CPEC projects, Chinese nationals*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1277182>

Dawn. (2017, June 24). *US bill seeks to revoke Pakistan's major ally status*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1341421>

Dawn. (2018a, December 5). *Minister promises 20,000 jobs to Baloch youths*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1449499>

Dawn. (2018b, March 4). *Call for Release of Chinese wives of GB men in Xinjiang*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1393081>

Dawn. (2020a, August 4). *In Landmark move, PM Imran unveils 'new political map' of Pakistan* Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1572590>

Dawn. (2020b, May 30). *In a first, ship with fertilisers for Afghanistan berths at Gwadar Port*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1560347>

Dawn. (2021, January 28). *Japan to provide \$4.57m grant to help procure polio vaccine*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1604049>

Dawn. (2022a, February 20). *Corps commander attends tribal jirga in Pishin*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1676057>.

Dawn. (2022b, February 18). *Fresh wave of disappearances alarms HRCP*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1675714>.

Deccan Chronicle. (2019, September 12). *There has never been democracy in Balochistan: BHRC vice chief Hamdam*. Deccan Chronicle. <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/world/europe/120919/there-has-never-been-democracy-in-balochistan-bhrc-vice-chief-hamdam.html>

De Alwis, M. (2010). The 'China factor' in post-war Sri Lanka. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 11(3), 434-446.

- De Coning, C. (2018). Adaptive peacebuilding. *International Affairs*, 94(2), 301-317.
- Deekeling, A., & Simangan, D. (2021). Bridging gaps: From a descriptive to a practical mid-space actor typology? In Y. Uesugi, A. Deekeling, S.S. Umeyama, & L.M. Colbert (Eds.). *Operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 59-80). Palgrave MacMillan.
- De Mel, N. (2021). Actants and fault lines: Janakaraliya and theatre for peace building in Sri Lanka. *Theatre Research International*, 46(1), 39-52.
- Department of External Resources. (2021) *Foreign financing disbursements 2021*. Sri Lanka Department of External Sources.  
[http://www.erd.gov.lk/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=94&temid=216&lang=en](http://www.erd.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&temid=216&lang=en)
- Destradi, S. (2012). India and Sri Lanka's civil war: The failure of regional conflict management. *Asian Survey*, 52(3), 595-616.
- DeVotta, N. (2009). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the lost quest for separatism in Sri Lanka. *Asian Survey*, 49(6), 1021-1051.
- DeVotta, N. (2021a). The genesis, consolidation, and consequences of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. In N. Rouhana & N. Shalhoub-Kevorkian (Eds.), *When politics are sacralized: Comparative perspectives on religious claims and nationalism* (pp. 187-212). Cambridge University Press.
- DeVotta, N. (2021b). Sri Lanka: The Return to ethnocracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 32(1), 96-110.
- Dhammaudaya-viharaya. (n.d.). *Suriranka seikatsu hinkonsha shien katsudou* [Aid Activities for Impoverished Sri Lankans]. *Kouboushouja* [Dhammaudaya-viharaya]. <https://koubousyouja.org/%E3%82%B9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%A9%E3%83%B3%E3%82%AB%E7%94%9F%E6%B4%BB%E5%9B%B0%E7%AA%AE%E8%80%85%E6%94%AF%E6%8F%B4%E6%B4%BB%E5%8B%95/>

- Diez, T., Stetter, S., & Albert, M. (2001). Europe as a discursive battleground: Discourse analysis and European integration studies. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 36(1), 5-38.
- Ding, G. (2013, September 12). *What way forward for Myitsone dam?* The Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/810609.shtml>.
- Dodge, T. (2013). Intervention and dreams of exogenous statebuilding: The application of liberal peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *Review of International Studies*, 39, 1189-1212
- Dodge, T. (2021). Afghanistan and the failure of liberal peacebuilding. *Survival*, 63(5), 47-58.
- Dodge, T., & Redman, R. (2011). *Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond*. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Dollar, D. (2020, October 1). *Seven years into China's belt and road*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/10/01/seven-years-into-chinas-belt-and-road/>
- Donais, T., & Knorr, A.C. (2013). Peacebuilding from below vs. the liberal peace: The case of Haiti. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 34(1), 54-69.
- Dotani, J. (2013, August 18). *Update 1- Missing refinery deal halts landmark China-Afghan oil project*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-china-idUSL4N0GJ05G20130818>
- Dou, E. (2021, November 17). China's Xinjiang cotton is banned in the U.S. but still making it to the store shelves, report says. Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-xinjiang-cotton/2021/11/17/fcfe320e-37a3-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-xinjiang-cotton/2021/11/17/fcfe320e-37a3-11ec-9662-399cfa75efee_story.html)
- Doyle, M.W. (1983). Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(3), 205-235.



- Doyle, M.W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *The American Political Science Review*, 94(4), 779-801.
- DRC. (2021, August 6). *Myanmar: Responding to humanitarian needs in northern Shan state*. Danish Refugee Council on Relief Web.  
<https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-responding-humanitarian-needs-northern-shan>.
- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A.M., & Tierney, M.J. (2017). Aid, China and growth: Evidence from a new global development finance dataset. *Aid Data*, 46, 1-65.
- Du Rocher, S.B. (2012). The European Union, Burma/Myanmar and ASEAN: A challenge to European norms and values or a new opportunity? *Asian Europe Journal*, 10, 156-180.
- Du Rocher, S.B., & Heiduk, F. (2021). *Can Europe make a difference in Myanmar?* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/can-europe-make-a-difference-in-myanmar/>
- DVB. (2011, July 8). Kachin army ambush leaves 30 dead. DVB English.  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150219172856/http://www.dvb.no/news/kachin-army-ambush-leaves-30-dead/16494>
- Economic Research Service. (2022, August 5). *U.S. agricultural trade data update*. U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
<https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foreign-agricultural-trade-of-the-united-states-fatus/u-s-agricultural-trade-data-update/#Latest%20U.S.%20Agricultural%20Trade>.
- Economic Times. (2012, October 2). *India launches Rs 1,300 Crore housing project in Sri Lanka*. Economic Times.  
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-launches-rs-1300-crore-housing-project-in-sri-lanka-for-tamils/articleshow/16642108.cms?from=mdr>

- Economic Times. (2014, January 5). *China's GDP growth in 2013 set to be weakest since 1999*. Economic Times. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/chinas-gdp-growth-in-2013-set-to-be-weakest-since-1999/articleshow/28439530.cms?from=mdr>
- Economic Times. (2015, December 15). *Sri Lankan government's reconciliation with Tamils an example to world: US*. Economic Times. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sri-lankan-governments-reconciliation-with-tamils-an-example-to-world-us/articleshow/50188904.cms?from=mdr>
- Economist. (2021, September 18). *A journey from Kabul to Kandahar*. Economist. <https://www.economist.com/asia/a-journey-from-kabul-to-kandahar/21804759>
- Economy, E.C. (2022). *The world according to China*. Polity.
- Egnell, R. (2010). Winning 'hearts and minds'? A critical analysis of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. *Civil Wars*, 12(3), 283-303.
- Egreteau, R. (2011). A passage to Burma? India, development, and democratization in Myanmar. *Contemporary Politics*, 17(4), 467-486.
- EIU. (2021). Democracy index 2021: The China challenge. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2021, 1-85.
- Eikenberry, K.W. (2013). The limits of counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan: The other side of the COIN. *Foreign Affairs*, 92(5), 59-74.
- Elahi, K.M. (1987). The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: Historical perspectives and consequences. In J. Rogge (Ed.) *Refugees: A third world dilemma*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Ellgee, A. (2010, September 28). *Refugees recall 'Saffron Revolution'*. The Irrawaddy. [https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art\\_id=19574](https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=19574)

- Ellis, C.D. (2021, September 16). *The Afghanistan-China belt & road initiative*. Silk Road Briefing. <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2021/08/17/the-afghanistan-china-belt-road-initiative/>
- Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka. (2021, June 22). *Overview of Japan's economic cooperation to Sri Lanka*. Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka. [https://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr\\_en/00\\_000038.html#Overview](https://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/00_000038.html#Overview)
- Esteban, M. (2016). The China-Pakistan corridor: A transit, economic or development corridor. *Strategic Studies*, 36(2), 63-74.
- Ethnic National Council of Burma. (1947). *Panglong agreement*. Ethnic National Council of Burma. [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM\\_470212\\_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_470212_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf)
- EurAsian Times Desk. (2020, March 6). *Musharraf's 'four point formula' the best way of resolving Kashmir dispute: Washington Post*. EurAsian Times <https://eurasianimes.com/musharrafs-four-point-formula-the-best-way-of-resolving-kashmir-dispute-washington-post-report/>
- European Commission. (n.d.). *Launching of EU-IcSP social hubs for Rohingya and Bangladeshi adolescents*. European Commission Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. [https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/stories/launching-eu-icsp-social-hubs-rohingya-and-bangladeshi-adolescents\\_en](https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/stories/launching-eu-icsp-social-hubs-rohingya-and-bangladeshi-adolescents_en)
- European Union. (2016, March 15). EU – Sri Lanka development cooperation. *European Union*. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO\\_16\\_810](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_16_810)
- Ezrati, M. (2021). *China's apparent strengths are really weaknesses*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2021/03/18/chinas-apparent-strengths-are-really-weaknesses/?sh=873dc9752264>.
- Eysenck, H.J. (1976). *Case studies in behaviour therapy*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

- Fairbank, J.K. (1968). *The Chinese world order*. Harvard University Press.
- Fani, M.I. (2009). The Indo-US strategic partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan. *Pakistani Vision*, 10(2), 132-159.
- Fazal, S. (2022, February 19). *Balochistan continues to suffer from electricity shortage*. The Baloch News. <https://www.thebalochnews.com/2022/02/19/balochistan-continues-to-suffer-from-electricity-shortage/>
- Fazil, M.M. (2010). Japan's peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka: Consolidation of peace and nation-building. In D. Hearth, K. Høglund, M. Schulz, & K.T. Silva (Eds.) *Post-War Reconstruction in Sri Lanka: Prospects and Challenges* (pp. 95-124). International Centre for Ethics Studies.
- Feldshuh, H. (2018, September 28). *How China sidelines NGOs*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-china-sidelines-ngos/>
- Fernando, S. (2020, June 27). 'Karuna should be charged for war crimes' Former ICC's Trial Attorney. Daily Mirror Sri Lanka. <https://www.dailymirror.lk/hard-talk/Karuna-should-be-charged-for-war-crimes-former-ICCs-trial-attorney/334-190777>.
- Fernando, U., & Hilhorst, D. (2006). Everyday practices of humanitarian aid: Tsunami response in Sri Lanka. *Development in Practice*, 16(3), 292-302.
- Feyyaz, M. (2016). Winning hearts and minds in Pakistan's tribal areas: Personal recollection of a peace-building effort with the Taliban. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 10(3), 53-58.
- Fingar, T. (2016). *The new great game: China and south and central Asia in the era of reform*. Stanford University Press.
- Finnigan, C. (2019, February 6). *Long read: Why has Sri Lanka's transitional justice process failed to deliver?* LSE. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/02/06/long-read-why-has-sri-lankas->

transitional-justice-process-failed-to-deliver/

- Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 12(2), 219-245.
- Foot, R. (2016). *The state, development and humanitarianism: China's shaping of the trajectory of R2P*. Oxford Handbooks Online. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.50
- Foster, K. (2019, December 5). *The new road to conflict: Geopolitics of the Wakhan Corridor*. Harvard International Review. <https://hir.harvard.edu/wakhancorridor/>
- France24. (2021, August 19). *Taliban vow to ban heroin, but can they survive without it?* France24. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210819-taliban-vow-to-ban-heroin-but-can-they-survive-without-it>
- Francis, K., & Hussein, A. (2020, February 8). *India asks Sri Lanka to resume Tamil reconciliation process*. ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/india-asks-sri-lanka-resume-tamil-reconciliation-process-68845908>
- Fravel, M.T. (1996). China's attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1989. *Asian Survey*, 36(11), 1102-1121.
- Framer, L. (2019, November 14). *Sri Lanka's front-runner strikes fear among Tamils who blame him for disappearances*. NPR. <https://www.npr.org/2019/11/14/778638245/sri-lankas-front-runner-strikes-fear-among-tamils-who-blame-him-for-disappearance>
- Freedom House. (2022a). *Freedom in the world 2022: Pakistan*. Freedom House <https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2022>
- Freedom House. (2022b). *Freedom in the world 2022 – Sri Lanka*. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sri-lanka/freedom-world/2022>

- Freedom House. (2022c). *Freedom in the world 2022 – Myanmar*. Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-world/2022>
- Freeman, C., & Stephenson, A. (2022, August 2). *How should the U.S. respond to China's 'global security initiative?* United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/how-should-us-respond-chinas-global-security-initiative>.
- Foreign Assistance. (2022, April 22). *Foreign assistance Sri Lanka, 2021*. Foreign Assistance. <https://foreignassistance.gov/aid-trends>
- Fu, X. (2019). *Zhongguo ruhe yingdui 'hou chejunshidai' de afuhan bianju* [How can China respond to changes in 'post-withdrawal' Afghanistan?]. *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, 7, 20-21
- Fung, C.J. (2016, June 8). *China and the responsibility to protect: From opposition to advocacy*. USIP Peace Brief. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>
- Galtung, J. (1976). *Peace, war and defense: Essays in peace research vol. II*. Ejlers.
- Galtung, J., & Fischer, D. (2013). *Johan Galtung: Pioneer of peace research*. Springer.
- Ganeshalingam, K.T. (2016). China's larger geopolitical strategy of the Hambantota Port project of Sri Lanka. *International Multidisciplinary Research Journal*, 6(2), 42-51.
- Ganguly, M. (2020, June 23). *Sri Lanka investigates rebel leader turned politician*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/23/sri-lanka-investigates-rebel-leader-turned-politician>
- Ganguly, S. (2018). Ending the Sri Lankan civil war. *Daedalus*, 147(1), 78-89.
- Ganon, K. (2021, September 14). *Minister pledges Taliban govt won't allow militant attacks*. AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-cabinets-taliban-militant-groups-3652ae786079637a56a4edff5063fe5f>

- Gardener, H. (2009, June 9). *China's aid revealed in Sri Lanka's victory parade*. Nationals News. <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/china-s-aid-revealed-in-sri-lanka-s-victory-parade-1.556125>
- Garver, J. (2004). China's Kashmir policies. *India Review*, 3(1), 1-24.
- Gat, A. (2005). The democratic peace theory reframed: The impact of modernity. *World Politics*, 58(1), 73-100.
- George, A., & Gunaweera, H. (2018, October). *India-Sri Lanka development cooperation: With special focus on Indian Housing project for internally displaced persons*. Oxfam India. <https://www.oxfamindia.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/RR%20ISDG%20India%E2%80%93Sri%20Lanka%20Development%20Cooperation%20with%20a%20Special%20Focus%20on%20Indian%20Housing%20Project.pdf>
- George, A.L. & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press.
- GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. (2012). Chronology of Myitsone dam at the confluence of rivers above Myitkyina. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31(1), 141-143.
- Global Data Lab (n.d.). *Human development indices (5.0): Pakistan*. Global Data Lab. [https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest\\_real=0&colour\\_scales=global](https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/PAK/?interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest_real=0&colour_scales=global)
- Global Times. (2021a, November 30). *Protests in Gwadar Against Chinese fishing trawlers is 'fake news': FM*. The Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1240286.shtml>
- Global Times. (2021b, July 21). *Kaipusheng dasu shuidian xiangmu banche baozha shijianhou, bajisitan junfang xiang zhongfang biaotai [Pakistan Army statement after the KPK Dasu hydropower project bus blast]*. Baidu.

<https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1705854992742817827&wfr=spider&for=pc>

- Global Times. (2021c, September 10). *The Brightness Action Programs undertaken abroad—Chinese doctors dedicated to helping foreign patients with cataract*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1233915.shtml>
- Global Times. (2022a, July 31). *CPEC truly transformative for Pakistan: Pakistani senator*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1271815.shtml>.
- Global Times. (2022b, January 16). *Phase-II of CPEC, flagship BRI project much broader in scope: Pakistan ambassador to China*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246043.shtml>
- Ghadiri, S.T. (2010). SNTV in Afghanistan: Is there a better option? *Res Publica – Journal of Undergraduate Research*, 15, 85-91.
- Giustozzi, A. (2012). Hearts, minds, and the barrel of a gun: The Taliban's shadow government. *PRISM*, 3(2), 71-80.
- Goldsmith, B.E. (2007). A liberal peace in Asia? *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(1), 5-27.
- Goodhand, J. (2008). Corrupting or consolidating the peace? The drugs economy and post-conflict peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(3), 405-423.
- Goodhand, J., & Mansfield, D. (2010). Drugs and (dis)order: A study of the opium trade, political settlements and state-making in Afghanistan. *Crisis States Working Paper Series*, 83, 1-48
- Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2010). Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. *Disasters*, 34, 78-102.
- Goodhand, J., & Walton, O. (2009). The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in Sri Lankan peace process. *Journal of Intervention and*



*Statebuilding*, 3(3), 303-323.

- Goodman, M.B., & Sutton, T. (2015, March 17). *Tackling corruption in Afghanistan: It's now or never*. Center for American Progress.  
<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tackling-corruption-in-afghanistan-its-now-or-never/>
- Gov.uk. (2012, December 20). *Burma: Further humanitarian support for Kachin state*. Gov.uk. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/burma-further-humanitarian-support-for-kachin-state>
- Government of India. (2004). *Panchsheel*. External Publicity Division Ministry of External Affairs.  
[https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191\\_panchsheel.pdf](https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf).
- GRAIN. (2019, February 17). *The belt and road initiative: China agribusiness going global*. GRAIN. [https://grain.org/en/article/6133-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinese-agribusiness-going-global#\\_ftn4](https://grain.org/en/article/6133-the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinese-agribusiness-going-global#_ftn4)
- Grare, F. (2022, January 5). *Corridor to nowhere: The Gwadar protests and the Pakistan-China relationship*. European Council on Foreign Relations.  
<https://ecfr.eu/article/corridor-to-nowhere-the-gwadar-protests-and-the-pakistan-china-relationship/>
- Gravers, M. (2019, March 8). *Myanmar nationalism: The monks, the military and the Muslims*. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/03/08/myanmar-nationalism-the-monks-the-military-and-the-muslims/>
- Green, P., & Ward, T. (2019). *State crime and civil activism: On the dialectics of repression and resistance*. Routledge.
- Greenfield, C. (2021, September 27). Pakistan discussing expansion of CPEC to Afghanistan – Ambassador. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-discussing-expansion-cpec-afghanistan-ambassador-2021-09-27/>

- Gries, P.H. (2005). *China's new nationalism: Pride, politics, and diplomacy*. University of California Press.
- Groeneveld-Ssavaaar, M., & Vuković, S. (2011). Terror, muscle and negotiation: Failure of multiparty mediation in Sri Lanka. In I.W. Zartman & G.O. Faure (Eds.) *Engaging extremists: Trade-offs, timing and diplomacy* (pp.105-135). United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Grossenbacher, A. (2020). *Social cohesion and peacebuilding in the Rohingya refugee crisis in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh*. KOFF Swiss Platform for Peacebuilding. [https://koff.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user\\_upload/2021CaseStudyBangladesh.pdf](https://koff.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/2021CaseStudyBangladesh.pdf)
- Guardian. (2006, December 5). *Musharraf offers Kashmir 'solution'*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/05/pakistan.india>
- Guardian. (2020, January 14). *US embassy cables: How Rangoon office helped opponents of Myitsone Dam*. The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/us-embassy-cables-myitsone-dam-document>
- Gunia, A. (2022, January 12). *China is finding fewer reliable sources of coal. That could be bad news for the climate*. Times. <https://time.com/6133129/china-coal-imports-indonesia-ban/>
- Gunter, J. (2021, August 27). *Afghanistan's Uyghurs fear the Taliban, and now China too*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-58342790>
- Gupta, A.K., & Rao, K.K. (2003). Kashmir and Islamic fundamentalism in India. *Pakistan Horizon*, 56(3), 29-45.
- Gupta, I. (2021, November 12). *Buddhist nationalism and burgeoning alignments: Sri Lanka's transitional justice dilemma*. Stimson. <https://www.stimson.org/2021/buddhist-nationalism-and-burgeoning-alignments-sri-lankas-transitional-justice-dilemma/>

- Gupta, R. (2008). The Myanmar conundrum: The way forward for India. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, 3(2), 51-67.
- Habibullah, W. (2008). *My Kashmir: Conflict and the prospects for enduring peace*. United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Haider, M. (2021, July 2). *Poverty overall decrease in Pakistan*. The International News. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/858173-poverty-overall-decreases-in-pakistan>
- Haidar, S., & Srinivasan, M. (2021, March 6). *India, Japan cool to Colombo offer of new port project*. The Hindu. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-japan-cool-to-colombo-offer-of-new-port-project/article34007699.ece>
- Haider, Z. (2005). Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port. *Politics & Diplomacy*, 6(1), 95-103.
- Hali, S.M. (2018, April 13). *Water scarcity in Balochistan*. Daily Times. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/250988/250988/>
- Hamm, B.I. (2001). A human rights approach to development. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23, 1005-1031.
- Hamrin, C.L. (1987). Conclusion: New trends under Deng Xiaoping and his successors. In M. Goldan, T. Cheek, & C.L Hamrin (Eds.) *China's intellectuals and the state: In search of a new relationship* (pp. 254-275). Harvard College.
- Hanghal, N., & Sitlhou, M. (2021, May 11). *Manipuris help Myanmar refugees, ignoring BJP order to 'politely' turn them away*. Article 14. <https://www.article-14.com/post/manipuris-help-myanmar-refugees-ignoring-bjp-order-to-politely-turn-them-away>
- Haniffa, F. (2021, April 12). *What is behind the anti-Muslim measures in Sri Lanka?* Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/4/12/what-is-behind-the-anti-muslim-measures-in-sri-lanka>

- Hansler, J. (2018). *Trump requests Pakistan's help on Afghan peace after Twitter tirade*. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/03/politics/trump-khan-letter/index.html>.
- Hasnat, S. (2009). Pakistan's strategic interests, Afghanistan and the fluctuating U.S. strategy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 63(1), 141-155.
- Hasan, A.D. (2016). *Balochistan: Caught in the fragility trap*. USIP Peace Brief 207, 1-7.
- Hassan, I.U. (2019, December 18). *Karwan-e-Aman fades into oblivion: India, Pak, quietly rolls back cross-LoC peace bus*. The Kashmir Monitor. <https://www.thekashmirmonitor.net/karwan-e-aman-fades-into-oblivionindia-pak-quietly-rolls-back-cross-loc-peace-bus/>
- Hassan, Y.U. (2020). China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) and questions on Pakistan's economic stability. *Strategic Analysis*, 44(2), 137-152.
- Hargreaves, C., Karlsson, M., Agrawal, S., Hootnick, J., & Tengtio, K. (2013). International dimensions of the Sri Lankan conflict. *Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of St. Andrews*. [https://www.academia.edu/download/13998804/sri\\_lanka\\_international\\_dimensions-1.pdf](https://www.academia.edu/download/13998804/sri_lanka_international_dimensions-1.pdf)
- Hashim, A.S. (2013). *When counterinsurgency wins: Sri Lanka's defeat of the Tamil Tigers*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hatdash, K. (2022, Jun 16). *Why is Bangladesh encouraging refugees to start a 'going home' campaign?* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/why-is-bangladesh-encouraging-rohingya-refugees-to-start-a-going-home-campaign/>
- He, J. (2017). *Zhongguo yu afuhan jingmao hezuo de xianzhuang, wenti yu duice* [Current situation of China Afghanistan trade, problems and solution]. *Guoji Yanjiu Cankao [International Research Reference]*, 5, 7-12.
- He, J. (2018). *Afghan qiyou guoji hezuo de jiyu he fengxian* [Opportunities and risks of international oil & gas cooperation in Afghanistan]. *Guojihua jingying*

[*International Operations*], 6, 55-59.

He, Y. (2014). *Guifan jingzheng yu hubu – yi jianshe heping wei li* [Norm competition and complementation: A case study on peacebuilding]. *Shijie guanxi lilun [World Economics and Politics]*, 4, 105-121.

He, Y. (2019). China rising and its changing policy on UN peacekeeping. In C. de Coning & M. Peters (Eds.) *United Nations peace operations in a changing global order* (pp. 253-276). Springer.

He, Y. (2021). 'A tale of two 'peaces': Liberal peace, developmental peace, and peacebuilding. In C.J. Fung, B. Gehrmann, R.F. Madenyika & J.G. Tower (Eds.) *New paths and policies towards conflict prevention* (pp. 42-53). Routledge.

Hedström, J. (2019). Myanmar in transition: China, conflict, and ceasefire economies in Kachin State. *Swedish Institute of International Affairs*, 4, 1-25.

Hedström, J., & Olivius, E. (2021). The politics of sexual violence in the Kachin conflict in Myanmar. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 23(3), 374-395.

Heiduk, F., & Sakaki, A. (2019). Introduction to the special issue – China's initiative: The view from East Asia. *East Asia*, 36(1), 93-113.

Hettne, B. (2010). Development and security: Origins and future. *Security Dialogue*, 41(1), 31-52.

Hevia, J.L. (2003). Review: Opium, empire, and modern history. *China Review International*, 10(2), 307-326.

Hillman, J.E. (2018, April 3). *How big is China's belt and road?* Center for Strategic & International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road>

Hindustan Times. (2017, May 7). *Pakistan violated ceasefire daily in 2015 and 2016:*

Govt. Hindustan Times. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistan-violated-ceasefire-daily-in-2015-2016-govt/story-KvFj34gcN3mUMezdUKMLcK.html>

Hira, N.P.S. (2019, September 6). *Focus on winning hearts, minds in Kashmir*. The United Service Institution of India, <https://usiofindia.org/publication/news/focus-on-winning-hearts-minds-in-kashmir/>

Hirono, M. (2011). China's charm offensive and peacekeeping: The lessons of Cambodia – what now for Sudan? *International Peacekeeping*, 18(3), 328-343.

Hirono, M. (2019, January 15). *China and peacekeeping*. Oxford Bibliographies. <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0168.xml>.

Hirono, M., Jiang, Y., & Lanteigne, M (2019). China's new roles and behaviour in conflict-affected regions: Reconsidering non-interference and non-intervention. *The China Quarterly*, 239, 573-593.

Hissey, I. (2019, December 17). *Investing in Chinese state-owned enterprises*. Factset. <https://insight.factset.com/investing-in-chinese-state-owned-enterprises>.

Ho, E.L.E. (2018). Interfaces and politics of humanitarianism: Kachin internal displacement at the China-Myanmar border. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 31(3), 407-425.

Hogg, C.L. (2011, October 11). *Sri Lanka: Prospects for reform and reconciliation*. Chatham House Asia Programme Paper. [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1011pp\\_srilanka\\_0.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1011pp_srilanka_0.pdf)

Höglund, K., & Svensson, I. (2009). Mediating between tigers and lions: Norwegian peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka's civil war. *Contemporary South Asia*, 17(2), 175-191.

Höglund, K., & Orjuela, C. (2012). Hybrid peace governance and illiberal

peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. *Global Governance*, 18(1), 89-104.

Holbig, H., & Gilley, B. (2010). Reclaiming legitimacy in China. *Politics & Policy*, 38(3), 395-422.

Holland, S., & Faulconbridge, G. (2021). *G7 rivals China with grand infrastructure plan*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-counter-chinas-belt-road-with-infrastructure-project-senior-us-official-2021-06-12/>

Horowitz, D. (2003). The cracked foundations of the right to secede. *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), 5-17.

HRW. (2009, September). *Japan break silence on Sri Lanka rights abuses*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/22/japan-break-silence-sri-lanka-rights-abuses>

HRW. (2010a, July 11). *Sri Lanka: Protests against UN echo anti-justice campaign*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/11/sri-lanka-protests-against-un-echo-anti-justice-campaign>

HRW. (2010b, March 10). *Sri Lanka: End witch hunt against the media and NGOs*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/10/sri-lanka-end-witch-hunt-against-media-and-ngos>

HRW. (2010c, Nov 13). *Burma: Chronology of Aung San Suu Kyi's detention*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/13/burma-chronology-aung-san-suu-kyis-detention>

HRW. (2010d, April 29). *State control and civil society in Burma after Cyclone Nargis*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/04/28/i-want-help-my-own-people/state-control-and-civil-society-burma-after-cyclone>

HRW. (2011a, July 13). *Pakistan: Upsurge in killings in Balochistan*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/13/pakistan-upsurge-killings-balochistan>

- HRW (2011b, December 21). *Burma: Ensure aid access in Kachin State*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/21/burma-ensure-aid-access-kachin-state>
- HRW. (2019, September 15). *China: Xinjiang children separated from families*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families>
- HRW. (2020, June 26). *ASEAN: Overhaul regional response to Rohingya crisis*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/26/asean-overhaul-regional-response-rohingya-crisis>
- Huang, D., Li, D., & Huang, T. (2016). Analysis of public opinion about China-Pakistan economic corridor. *Journal of Applied Sciences*, 16(6), 286-292.
- Husain, I. (2018). *CPEC & Pakistani economy: An appraisal*. Centre of Excellence for CPEC.
- Hussain, M., & Jamali, A.B. (2019). Geo-political dynamics of the China-Pakistan economic corridor: A new great game in South Asia. *China Political Science Review*, 4, 303-326.
- Hussein, S. (2020, September 17). *G-B to be made province soon*. Tribune. 2020. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2264380/1&fbclid=IwAR0zTCRVytjT1V6rrolDpDePnhWqwavULY9I8SGTfy6WsOgJjvM5B5vApFU>
- Hunt, K. (2017, September 20). *How Myanmar's Buddhists actually feel about the Rohingya*. CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/19/asia/myanmar-yangon-rohingya-buddhists/index.html>
- Huo, Q., & H. Cui. (2019). *yidaiyilu'kuangjia xia zhongmian jingji zoulang jianshe de nandian ji duice* [Challenges and countermeasures for China–Myanmar economic corridor under the belt and road framework]. *Kaifa Yanjiu* [Research



on Development], 6, 98-103.

- Hyder, K. (2017, April 24). *Pakistan's fishermen oppose Gwadar relocation*. Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2017/4/24/pakistans-fishermen-oppose-gwadar-relocation>
- IANS. (2021, May 31). *Hambantota port: Tamil Nadu police on alert over probable protests*. Business Insider. [https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/hambantota-port-tamil-nadu-police-on-alert-over-probable-protests-121053100342\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/hambantota-port-tamil-nadu-police-on-alert-over-probable-protests-121053100342_1.html)
- Ibrahim, Y. (2020, February 5). *What kind of government do Afghans want?* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/what-kind-of-government-do-afghans-want/>.
- Ichihara, M. (2015, January 22). *Japan's faltering support for Burmese democracy*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/431828/japans-faltering-support-for-burmese-democracy/1402877/>
- Ichihara, M., Sahoo, N., & Erawan, I.P. (2016, October 19). *Asian support for democracy in Myanmar*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/10/19/asian-support-for-democracy-in-myanmar-pub-64875>
- ICISS (2001). *The responsibility to protect*. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>
- Ikpe, E., Alao, A., & Nyokabi, K. (2021). *Beyond liberal institutions (re)building: Conversations on peacebuilding and statebuilding in Sierra Leone*. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 21(4), 431-453.
- ILO. (2016). *The skills gap in four industrial sectors in Sri Lanka*. International Labour Organization. [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-colombo/documents/publication/wcms\\_359346.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-colombo/documents/publication/wcms_359346.pdf)

- Indian Express. (2009, November 21). *Ex-Afghan governor admits to helping Taliban*. The Indian Express. <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/exafghan-governor-admits-to-helping-taliban/544504/>
- Indian Express. (2020, October 27). *2+2 Dialogue: India, US sign crucial agreement on geo-spatial intelligence*. The Indian Express. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-us-22-dialogue-beca-pompeo-esper-rajnath-jaishankar-6897216/>
- Indian Navy. (2009). *Indian maritime doctrine*. Naval Strategic Publication. <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/indian-maritime-doctrine-2015-version>
- International Crisis Group. (2001a, December 7). *Myanmar: The military regime's view of the world*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-military-regimes-view-world>
- International Crisis Group. (2001b, December 6). *Myanmar: The role of civil society*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-role-civil-society>
- International Crisis Group. (2005, July 21). *Afghanistan elections: Endgame or new beginning?* International Crisis Group <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-elections-endgame-or-new-beginning>
- International Crisis Group. (2011, July 18). *Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than ever*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/reconciliation-sri-lanka-harder-ever>
- International Crisis Group. (2017, July 10). *China's foreign policy experiment in South Sudan*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreign-policy-experiment-south-sudan>
- International Crisis Group. (2018, June 29). *China-Pakistan economic corridor: Opportunities and risks*. International Crisis Group.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/297-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-opportunities-and-risks>

International Crisis Group. (2022a, February 14). *Women and peacebuilding in Pakistan's north west*. International Crisis Group.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/321-women-and-peacebuilding-pakistans-north-west>

International Crisis Group. (2022b, January 12). *Myanmar's coup shakes up its ethnic conflicts*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/319-myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-conflicts>

Inzamam, Q., & Qadri, H. (2022, April 29). India abandons the Rohingyas. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/29/india-rohingya-refugees-myanmar-deportation/>

IOM. (2012, July 12). *Japan, IOM back psycho-social project for reconciliation in northern Sri Lanka*. IOM UN Migration. <https://www.iom.int/news/japan-iom-back-psycho-social-project-reconciliation-northern-sri-lanka>

Iqbal, A. (2021, February 11). *No change in US policy on Kashmir, says state dept*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1606744>

Iqbal, Z. (2013, September 13). *Local peacebuilders demand an end to conflict in Kashmir*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/local-peacebuilders-in-kashmir-demand-an-end-to-conflict/?location=india&theme=culture-media-advocacy>

IRIN. (2015, January 28). *Sri Lanka's NGOs Test Limits of New Freedoms*. IRIN. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/54cb5e2c4.html>.

Irrawaddy. (2021, August 6). *Myanmar junta pushing ahead with China-backed Kyaukphyu SEZ and Port*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-pushing-ahead-with-china-backed-kyaukphyu-sez-and-port.html>

- Islam, M.D. & Siddika, A. (2021). Implications of the Rohingya relocation from Cox's Bazar to Bhasan Char, Bangladesh. *International Migration Review* 56(4), 1195-1205.
- Ivanov, S. (2014, April 15). *Kachin State (Myanmar) and its long road to peace*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/kachin-state-myanmar-long-road-peace/?location=myanmar&theme=>
- Jackson, A. (2018a). Life under the Taliban shadow government. *Overseas Development Institute*, 1-32.
- Jackson, A. (2018b, September 12). *The Taliban's fight for hearts and minds*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/the-talibans-fight-for-hearts-and-minds-afghanistan/>
- Jackson, R. (2005). Security, democracy and the rhetoric of counter-terrorism. *Democracy and Security*, 1(2), 147-171.
- Jagger, S. (2018). Developing civil society in the non-state sphere: Welfare and rights-based organisation associated with ethnic armed groups in Myanmar. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 29(2), 316-343.
- Japan Development Assistance. (2007). *Japan's official development assistance for Pakistan*. Japan ODA. [https://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/office/others/c8h0vm0000brl8b8att/oda\\_brochure.pdf](https://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/office/others/c8h0vm0000brl8b8att/oda_brochure.pdf)
- Japan Platform. (2019) *About Japan Platform*. Japan Platform. [https://www.japanplatform.org/lib/data/JPF\\_en.pdf](https://www.japanplatform.org/lib/data/JPF_en.pdf)
- Japan Platform. (2012). *Suriranka hokubu jindou shien* [North Sri Lanka humanitarian aid]. Japan Platform. <https://www.japanplatform.org/programs/srilanka/>
- Jain Commission Report. (1997, August). *Assassination of Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duriappah. Four youths, including Velupilla Prabhakaran, claims responsibility*. Pact. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150216194934/http://>

/pact.lk/27-july-1975/

- Jamal, S. (2021, December 17). *Pakistan: Gwadar fishermen end month-long protest after government accept demands*. Gulf News. <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-gwadar-fishermen-end-month-long-protest-after-government-accepts-demands-1.84462294>
- Jarstad, A.K., & Belloni, R. (2012). Introducing hybrid peace governance: Impact and prospects of liberal peacebuilding. *Global Governance*, 18, 1-6.
- Jarstad, A.K., & Olsson, L. (2012). Hybrid peace ownership in Afghanistan: International perspectives of who owns what and when. *Global Governance*, 18(2012), 105-119.
- Javaid, A. (2021, August 17). *Afghan-India friendship dam: Why Taliban seized control of the dam?* Jargan Josh. <https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/afghan-india-friendship-dam-1629204128-1>
- Javaid, U. (2010). Concerns of Balochistan: Effects and implications on federation of Pakistan. *Journal of Political Studies*, 17(2), 113-125.
- Janjua, H. (2022, February 16). *Pakistan: Militant attacks in Balochistan put pressure on China's infrastructure plans*. DW. <https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-militant-attacks-in-balochistan-put-pressure-on-chinas-infrastructure-plans/a-60796264>
- Jayasinghe, U. (2022, August 16). *Chinese military ship docks at Sri Lankan port despite Indian concern*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-military-survey-ship-docks-sri-lanka-port-2022-08-16/>
- JBIC. (2003, Aug). *Conflict and development: Roles of the JBIC*. Japan Bank for International Cooperation. [https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/IFIC\\_and\\_JBICI-Studies/jica-ri/publication/archives/jbic/report/paper/pdf/rp24\\_e.pdf](https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/IFIC_and_JBICI-Studies/jica-ri/publication/archives/jbic/report/paper/pdf/rp24_e.pdf)
- Jha, P.S. (1996). *Kashmir 1947: Rival versions of history*. Oxford University Press.

- JICA. (2008, March). *Suriranka koku torincomari ken jyumin sankagata nougyou nouson fukkou kaihatsu keikaku chukan hyouka chousa houkokusho* [Sri Lanka Trincomalee District Local Participation Type Rural Agriculture Rehabilitation Project Mid-term Report]. JICA.  
[http://open\\_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11888583\\_01.pdf](http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11888583_01.pdf)
- JICA. (2011, November). *Suriranka minshu shakai shugi kyowakoku Jafuna ken fukkou Kaihatsu sokushin keikaku purojekuto* [Projects Facilitating Rehabilitation and Development in Jaffna District of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka]. JICA.  
[https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/360/360/360\\_120\\_12047221.html](https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/360/360/360_120_12047221.html)
- JICA. (2012, December 18). *Promoting Myanmar economic reform by development and appropriate implementation of laws*. Japan International Cooperation Agency. <https://www.jica.go.jp/myanmar/english/office/topics/press121218.html>
- JICA. (2017, July 7). *Rural infrastructure development project in emerging region (RIDEP)*. Japan International Cooperation Agency.  
<https://www.jica.go.jp/srilanka/english/activities/index.html>
- JICA Overseas Cooperation Agency. (2013). *UNV keiken repouto* [UNV Experience Report]. *JICA kaigai kyouryokutai* [JICA Overseas Cooperation Agency].  
[https://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/obog/career\\_support/unv/unv\\_report/report8.html](https://www.jica.go.jp/volunteer/obog/career_support/unv/unv_report/report8.html)
- Johnson, C. (1982). *MITI and the Japanese miracle*. Stanford University Press.
- Johnson, N. (2006). The challenge of pluralism: Sarvodaya's inclusive approach to development and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 2(3), 93-108.
- Johnson, T.H. (2013). Taliban adaptation and innovation. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 24(1), 3-27.
- Jones, K. (2009, January 12). *Washington's criminal role in the Sri Lankan state's*

- anti-Tamil war*. World Socialist Web Site.  
<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/01/pers-j12.html>
- Jones, S.G. (2009). *In the graveyard of empires: America's war in Afghanistan*. W.W. Norton.
- Joshi, M., Lee, S.Y., & Mac Ginty, R. (2014). Just how liberal is the liberal peace? *International Peacekeeping*, 21(3), 364-389.
- Joy, A. (2018). Understanding China's response to the Rakhine crisis. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, 419, 1-6.
- Kachin Women's Association Thailand. (n.d.). *What we do*. Kachin Women's Association Thailand. <https://kachinwomen.com/about-us/>
- Kakar, Z. (2020). *Civil Society, Ulema, Media role in peacebuilding discussed*. BRSP. <https://brsp.org.pk/civil-society-ulema-media-role-in-peacebuilding-discussed/>
- Kakar, S., & Saleem, M. (2021). *Development: Balochistan's missing poor*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1657959>
- Kagawa, M. (2020). Roles of rebel gatekeepers in mid-space peacebuilding: A case study of Bangsamoro. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), *Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia* (pp.61-87). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kalim, I. (2016). Gwadar Port: Serving strategic interests of Pakistan. *South Asian Studies*, 31(1), 207-221.
- Kanagarathnam, J. (2019). Sri Lanka reconstruction and reconciliation: a special reference to northern province. *International Academic Journal of Social Sciences and Education* 2(2), 53-59.
- Kandambi, S.U. (2020). A study on teaching Chinese culture in higher education institutes in Sri Lanka. *European Journal of Foreign Language Teaching*, 4(4), 169-182.

- Kanwal, S., Pitafi, A.H., Malik, M.Y, Khan, N.A., & Rashid, R.M. (2020). Local Pakistani citizens' benefits and attitudes toward China-Pakistan economic corridor projects. *SAGE Open*, 10(3), 1-16.
- Kaplan, S. (2013, April). *Power and politics in Pakistan*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/163808/07f02d6b2e01427f1eceedc9cf4f4e14.pdf>
- Kappler, S., & Richmond, O. (2011). Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Resistance or emancipation? *Security Dialogue*, 42(3), 261-278.
- Karakoram International University. (2018). *USAID celebrates spring in Gilgit Baltistan*. Karakoram International University. <https://www.kiu.edu.pk/news/usaidd-celebrates-spring-in-gilgit-baltistan>
- Karim, M.S.U.F. (2020). No education – lost generation: The right to education of stateless Rohingyas in Bangladesh. *HL-Senteret Minority Network Policy Brief*, 4, 1-7
- Karimi, A.M. (2020). Moving away from foreign aid: A case study of Afghanistan. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*, 105639, 1-64.
- Kartha, T. (2021, July 26). *How elections happen in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Time to take the lid off the biggest scam*. The Print. <https://theprint.in/opinion/how-elections-happen-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir-time-to-take-lid-off-the-biggest-scam/702425/>
- Karlsrud, J. (2019). From liberal peacebuilding to stabilization and counterterrorism. *International Peacekeeping*, 26(1), 1-21.
- Kasai, T. (2019, June 20). *Japan's cold-blooded approach to the Rohingya crisis*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/20/japans-cold-blooded-approach-rohingya-crisis>
- Kashmir Observer. (2017). *CPEC and the resolution of Kashmir dispute*. Kashmir Observer. <https://kashmirobsvr.net/2017/05/30/cpec-and-resolution-of->



kashmir-dispute/

Kawate, I., & Nitta, Y. (2021, February 7). *Myanmar's debt to China decreases to 26% under ousted Suu Kyi*. Nikkei Asia.

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/Myanmar-s-debt-to-China-decreases-26-under-ousted-Suu-Kyi>

Kazmin, A., Parkin, B., & Manson, K. (2021, August 15). *Low morale, no support and bad politics: Why the Afghan army folded*. Financial Times.

<https://www.ft.com/content/b1d2b06d-f938-4443-ba56-242f18da22c3>

Katzman, K., & Thomas, C. (2017). *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and U.S. policy*. Congressional Research Services.

<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL30588>

KBC Kachin. (2019). *About the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC)*. KBC Kachin.

<https://www.kbckachin.org/about/>

Keethaponcalan, S.I. (2019). *Post-war dilemma of Sri Lanka: Democracy and Reconciliation*. Routledge.

Keethaponcalan, S. I. (2020). Asian peacebuilding: Theory and practice. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), *Hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 15-31). Palgrave Macmillan.

Khan, H. (2019, April 1). *Why won't the Taliban talk to the Afghan government?*

Gandhara. <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/why-won-t-the-taliban-talk-to-the-afghan-government-/29854935.html>

Khan, I. (2004, March 19). *Al Zawahiri believed surrounded: Intensity of resistance indicates presence of high-value target, says Musharraf*. Dawn.

<https://archive.ph/20130702065607/http://archives.dawn.com/2004/03/19/top2.htm>

Khan, A. (2011). FATA: Voice of the unheard – path-dependency and why history matters. *Strategic Studies*, 31(1/2), 40-74.

- Khan, K.S., & Nyborg, I.L.P. (2013). False promises, false hopes: Local perspectives on liberal peace building in north-western Pakistan. *Forum for Development Studies*, 40(2), 261-284.
- Khan, N. (2019a, April 1). *World Bank suspends \$200m Balochistan water project for 30 days*. Arab News.  
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1475431/pakistan#:~:text=KARACHI%3A%20The%20World%20Bank%20has,health%20indicators%20in%20the%20country.>
- Khan, N. (2019b, July 24). *Chinese study center launched in Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province*. Arab News.  
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1529786/pakistan.>
- Khan, O.F. (2021, September 22). *Taliban expanded cabinet to include non-Pashtuns, but still no women*. Times of India.  
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/taliban-expand-cabinet-to-include-non-pashtuns-but-still-no-woman/articleshow/86414721.cms>
- Khan, S. (2018a). Geostrategic policies and their impact on human security: Lessons from Pakistan's peacebuilding approach to Afghanistan. In A. Mulakala (Ed.) *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Asia: Lessons in South-South Cooperation* (pp. 64-87), Korea Development Institute.
- Khan, S. (2018b). *Skepticisms in Gilgit-Baltistan over China-Pakistan economic corridor*. DW. <https://www.dw.com/en/skepticism-in-gilgit-baltistan-over-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/a-42010956>.
- Khan, Z.A. (2019, June 24). *Gilgit-Baltistan at the crossroad of CPEC: Part I*. Pamir <https://pamirtimes.net/2019/06/24/gilgit-baltistan-at-the-crossroad-of-cpec/>
- Khosa, S. (2010, June 22). *Exploitation of resources in Balochistan*. Dawn.  
<https://www.dawn.com/news/867410/exploitation-of-resources-in-balochistan>
- Kim, S.W., Fidler, D.P., & Ganguly, S. (2009). Eastphalia rising? Asian influence and the fate of human security. *World Policy Journal*, 26(2), 53-64.

- King, G., Keohane, R.O. & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton University Press.
- King, I. (2022, April 19). *Sri Lanka has never defaulted on its debt. Is that about to change?* Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/sri-lanka-has-never-defaulted-on-its-debt-is-that-about-to-change-12593790>
- Kironska, K., & Garlick, J. (2022, October 14). *Pakistanis perceive China as their 'best friend'*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/pakistanis-perceive-china-as-their-best-friend/>
- Knuth, R. (2006, August). *Destroying a symbol: Checkered history of Sri Lanka's Jaffna public library*. IFLA 2006 Seoul. <https://tamilnation.org/indictment/rebecca.pdf>
- Krampe, F. (2013). The liberal trap – peacemaking and peacebuilding in Afghanistan after 9/11. In M. Eriksson & R. Kostic (Eds.) *Mediation and liberal peacebuilding: Peace from the ashes of war?* (pp. 57-75). Routledge.
- Kronstadt, K.A. (2010). *Pakistan: Key current issues and developments*. Congressional Research Services. <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R41307.html#:~:text=Current%20top%2Dtier%20U.S.%20concerns,rights%20protection%3B%20and%20economic%20development>
- Kullab, S. (2022, March 28). *China eyes investment in Afghanistan's Mes Aynak mines*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/china-eyes-investment-in-afghanistans-mes-aynak-mines/>
- Kurtenbach, S. (2010). Why is liberal peacebuilding so difficult? Some lessons from Central America. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 88, 95-110.
- Kux, D. (2001). *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted allies*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Kyaw H.M. (2011, October 9). *Government backs down following widespread public protests over dam project at Myitsone*. The Myanmar Times.  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20111006061636/http://mmtimes.com/2011/news/595/news59501.html>
- Kyi, K. (2003). *Road map to democracy in Myanmar*. Myanmar Government  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20101024033536/http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/Perspective/persp2003/8-2003/map.htm>
- La, R., Khin, S.N., Pianchupat, N., & Beyerle, S. (2020). *Nonviolent action in Myanmar: Challenges to civil society and donors*. United States Institute of Peace.  
[https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/20200918-sr\\_483-nonviolent\\_action\\_in\\_myanmar\\_challenges\\_and\\_lessons\\_for\\_civil\\_society\\_and\\_donors-sr.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/20200918-sr_483-nonviolent_action_in_myanmar_challenges_and_lessons_for_civil_society_and_donors-sr.pdf)
- Lam, P. (2004). Japan's peace building diplomacy in Sri Lanka. *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 21(2), 3-17.
- Lambert, R. (2022, January 18). *Hidden parallels: The impact of Beijing's policies on the Rohingya crisis*. Wilson Centre Asian Dispatches.  
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/hidden-parallels-impact-beijings-policies-rohingya-crisis>
- Lanteigne, M., & Hirono, M. (2012). Introduction: China and UN peacekeeping. In M. Lanteigne & M. Hirono (Eds.) *China's evolving approach to peacekeeping* (pp. 1-14). Routledge.
- Large, D. (2008). China & the contradictions of 'non-interference' in Sudan. *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(115), 93-106.
- Larson, A. (2021). Democracy in Afghanistan: Amid and beyond conflict. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, 497, 1-28.
- Lau, J. (2021, September 3). *Beijing is having trouble selling its citizens on a partnership with the Taliban*. Quartz. <https://qz.com/2053780/beijing-tries-to->

sell-its-citizens-on-a-partnership-with-the-taliban/

Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lederach, J. P. (2005). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. New York.

Lederach, J.P., & Appleby, R.S. (2010). Strategic peacebuilding: An overview. In D. Philpott & G.F. Powers (Eds.) *Strategies of peace – Transforming conflict in a violent world* (pp. 19-44). Oxford University Press.

Lee, R. (2019). Extreme speech in Myanmar: The role of state media in the Rohingya forced migration crisis. *International Journal of Communication*, 13, 3203-3224.

Lee, S.Y. (2020). Roles of religious leaders as bridge-builders: A case study of Cambodia. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), *Hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 89-114). Palgrave Macmillan.

Leeuwen, M.V., Nindorera, J., Nzweve, J.L.K., & Corbijn, C. (2020). The ‘local turn’ and notions of conflict and peacebuilding – Reflections of local peace committees in Burundi and Eastern DR Congo. *Peacebuilding*, 8(3), 279-299.

Lewis, D. (2010). The failure of a liberal peace: Sri Lanka’s counter-insurgency in global perspective. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10(5), 647-671.

Lewis, D. (2019). Humanitarianism, civil society and the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. *Third World Quarterly*, 40(10), 1884-1902.

Li, C. (2016, November 23). *Yidaiyilu tuidong siluxiaoyuzhong fazhan* [Belt and Road promotes development of Silk Road small languages]. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi* [The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China]  
<http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31215/Document/1520380/1520380.htm>

- Li, D. (2021). How to understand the peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road Initiative. In C.J. Fung, B. Gehrman, R.F. Madenyika & J.G. Tower (Eds.) *New paths and policies towards conflict prevention* (pp. 101-114). Routledge.
- Li, J. (2020, September 2020). *China's conflict mediation in Myanmar*. Stimson. <https://www.stimson.org/2020/chinas-conflict-mediation-in-myanmar/>.
- Liao, W. (2009, July 10). *China's black cat, white cat diplomacy*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/10/chinas-black-cat-white-cat-diplomacy/>.
- Lidauer, M. (2012). Democratic dawn? Civil Society and elections in Myanmar. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31(2), 87-114.
- Linter, B. (2019). The United Wa State army and Burma's peace process. *United States Institute of Peace*, 147, 1-28.
- Lintner, B. (2020). Peaceworks: Why Burma's peace efforts have failed to end its internal wars. *United States Institute of Peace*, 169, 1-32.
- Lintner, B. (2021). *The Wa of Myanmar and China's quest for global dominance*. NISA Press.
- Liu, L. (2019). 'Yidaiyilu' beijing xia afuhan anquan fengxian yanjiu [Security risks in Afghanistan in the context of the 'belt and road initiative']. *Xinjiang daxue xuebao [Journal of Xinjiang University]*, 47(6), 57-62.
- Liu, T., & Zhang, H. (2014). Debates in China about the responsibility to protect as a developing international norm: A general assessment. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 14(4), 403-427.
- Liu, X., & Guo, Y. (2021, February 8). *Gwadar, a commercial port, to receive port calls by ships of different navies: Pakistan navy chief*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1215247.shtml>
- Liu, Z. (2018). *Zai zhongdong tuijin 'yidaiyilu' jianshe de zhengzhi he anquan fengxian ji yingdui [The political risks and security threats of the belt and road*

*construction in the Middle East and countermeasures*]. *Guoji guancha* [International Review], 2, 36-50.

Lorch, J. (2006). Civil society under authoritarian rule; The case of Myanmar. *Südostasein Aktuell*, 26(3), 54-88.

Lowinger, P. (2009). The solution to narcotic addiction in the People's Republic of China. *The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse*, 4(2), 165-178.

Loyn, D. (2013, April 15). *Afghan farmers return to opium as other markets fail*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22150482>

Luhmann, N. (1990). *Essays on self-reference*. Columbia University Press.

Lwin, N. (2018, October 31). *Analysis: Muse-Mandalay railway agreement with China raises debt, conflict fears*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/analysis-muse-mandalay-railway-agreement-china-raises-debt-conflict-fears.html>

Lwin, N. (2020, August 10). *China's strategic port project moves step closer to reality as Myanmar OKs joint venture*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/chinas-strategic-port-project-moves-step-closer-reality-myanmar-oks-joint-venture.html>

Mac Ginty, R. (2008) Indigenous peacemaking versus the liberal peace. *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 43(2), 139-163.

Mac Ginty, R. (2010a). Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-building in Afghanistan. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 10(4), 577-598.

Mac Ginty, R. (2010b). Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace. *Security Dialogue*, 41(4), 391-412.

Mac Ginty, R., & O.P. Richmond. (2007). Myth or reality: Opposing views on the liberal peace and post-war reconstruction. *Global Society*, 21(4), 2007.

- Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. (2016). The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: A reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding. *International Peacekeeping*, 23(2), 219-239.
- Macias, A. (2021, August 10). *Biden says Afghans must 'fight for themselves' as Taliban advances, does not regret U.S. withdrawal*. CNBC. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/10/biden-says-afghans-must-fight-for-themselves-as-taliban-advances.html>
- Magnay, D. (2021, August 31). *Afghanistan: 'corruption from day one' – Afghan colonel now in hiding on who he blames for return of the Taliban*. Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/afghanistan-corruption-from-day-one-afghan-colonel-now-in-hiding-on-who-he-blames-for-return-of-the-taliban-12394903>
- Mahaseth, H., & Tulsyan, A. (2022). The Myanmar coup and the role of ASEAN. *SSRN*, 2022, 1-15.
- Mahtani, S., & Diamond, C. (2020, January 17). *When Xi met Suu Kyi: China embraces Myanmar as Western nations pull back*. The Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/when-xi-met-suu-kyi-china-embraces-myanmar-as-western-nations-pull-back/2020/01/17/04dfc4b6-373c-11ea-a1ff-c48c1d59a4a1\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/when-xi-met-suu-kyi-china-embraces-myanmar-as-western-nations-pull-back/2020/01/17/04dfc4b6-373c-11ea-a1ff-c48c1d59a4a1_story.html)
- Maini, T.S., & S. Sachdeva. (2017, November 14). *China faces increasing competition in Myanmar*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-faces-increasing-competition-in-myanmar/>
- Maizland, L. (2022, January 31). *Myanmar's troubled history: Coups, military rule and ethnic conflict*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#chapter-title-0-3>
- Malik, A.A. (2021a, April 24). *KP govt finalises 13 projects for Pak-China*.



- International – The News. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/825070-kp-govt-finalises-13-projects-for-pak-china-10th-jcc-meeting>
- Malik, A.A. (2021b, July 18). *Dasu Dam project: Employment termination notification cancelled*. International - The News. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/865873-dasu-dam-project-employment-termination-notification-cancelled>
- Malik, M.S. (2019, November 30). *CPEC special economic zones to create 575,000 direct jobs in Pakistan*. China.org.cn. [http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-11/30/content\\_75463827.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-11/30/content_75463827.htm)
- Malik, F.H. (2019). *Balochistan: A conflict of narratives*. Saiyid Books.
- Mamiya, C. (2009). *Karachi water supply improvement project*. Kaihatsu Management Consulting Field Survey. [https://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2008\\_PK-P40\\_4\\_f.pdf](https://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2008_PK-P40_4_f.pdf)
- Mangi, F. (2022, September 2). *China's funding to Pakistan standing at 30% of foreign debt*. Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-02/china-s-funding-to-pakistan-stands-at-30-of-foreign-debt?leadSource=verify%20wall>.
- Manish & Kaushik, P. (2019). CPEC, Afghanistan and India's Concerns. *India Quarterly*, 75(2), 253-261.
- Mann, Z. (2013, September 6). *Recalling monk beatings that sparked the Saffron Revolution*. The Irrawaddy, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/recalling-monk-beatings-that-sparked-the-saffron-revolution.html>
- Mansfield, D. (2005). *Pariah or poverty? The opium ban in the province of Nangarhar in the 2004/05 growing season and its impact on rural livelihood strategies*. PAL Management Unit, New Duramsal, Rigisha Mohad Khan.
- Mansfield, D. (2008). Resurgence and reductions: Explanations for changing levels of opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor in 2005–2007. *A report for*

*AREU's Applied Thematic Research into Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy.*

- Marantidou, V. (2014). Revisiting China's 'string of pearls' strategy: Places 'with Chinese characteristics' and their security implications. *Pacific Forum CSIS*, 14(7), 1-31.
- Markar, F.B. (2016, January 7). *Unlocking the potential of youth – UNDP in Sri Lanka*. United Nations Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth. <https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2016/01/unlocking-the-potential-of-youth-undp-in-sri-lanka/>
- Marty, F.J. (2018, April 25). *Project to exploit Afghanistan's giant copper deposit languishes*. China Dialogue. <https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/10577-project-to-exploit-afghanistan-s-giant-copper-deposit-languishes/>
- Maung, A.M. (2011). *In the name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China policy since 1948*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Mayilvaganan, M. (2012). Engaging post-LTTE Sri Lanka: India's policy options. *India Quarterly*, 68(1), 17-28.
- McDoom, O. (2008, February 24). *China presses Sudan over Darfur peacekeepers*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-idUSL2454337120080224>.
- McDonald, K., Bosshard, P., & Brewer, N. (2008). Exporting dams: China's hydropower industry goes global. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 90: 294-303.
- Meehan, P. (2018). Peacebuilding amidst war in northern Myanmar. *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, 4, 34-41.
- Meehan, P., & Dan, S.L. (2022). Brokered rule: Militias, drugs, and borderland governance in the Myanmar-China borderlands. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, (2022), 1-23.

- Mendez, Z.H. (2020). Repression and revolt in Balochistan: The uncertainty and survival of a people's national aspirations. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, 3(3), 43-61.
- Mengal, S. (2016). CPEC route controversy: Problems and opportunities. *Balochistan Review*, 35(2), 23-30.
- Menocal, A.R., Denney, L.S., & Geddes, M. (2011). *Informing the future of Japan's ODA*. JICA: The Overseas Development Institute.  
<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/141036/7363.pdf>
- Mierzejewski, D., Kowalski, B. & Jura, J. (2022). The domestic mechanism of China's vertical multilateralism: the FOCAC and the 16+1 format case studies. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 1-17.
- Miklian, J. (2014). The past, present and future of the 'liberal peace'. *Strategic Analysis*, 38(4), 493-507.
- Miller, M.C. (2021, August 25). *Pakistan's support for the Taliban: What to know*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/article/pakistans-support-taliban-what-know>
- Millar, G. (2014). Disaggregating hybridity: Why hybrid institutions do not produce experiences of peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(4), 501-514
- MIMU. (2017, February 2017). *A snapshot of INGOs in Myanmar and INGO Forum Myanmar*. Myanmar Information Management Unit.  
<https://themimu.info/INGOs>.
- Min, T.A. (2017). *Rohingya refugees can return to Myanmar if 'real citizens' accept them, military chief says*. Radio Free Asia. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingya-refugees-can-return-to-myanmar-if-real-citizens-accept-them-military-chief-says-11162017163126.html>
- Min, W., & Myat, T. (2021, February 4). *Myanmar state counsellor and president*

*charged, detained for more weeks.* Myanmar Times.  
<https://www.mmmtimes.com/news/myanmar-state-counsellor-and-president-charged-detained-2-more-weeks.html>

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (2022, Jan 27). *2021 nian woguo nongchanpin jinchukou qingkuang* [China Agriculture Products Import and Export Situation 2021]. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nongye nongcunbu* [Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China].  
[http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztl/nybrl/rlxx/202201/t20220127\\_6387781.htm](http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztl/nybrl/rlxx/202201/t20220127_6387781.htm)

Ministry of Commerce. (2021, November 22). *Jizhe ganshou 'yidaiyilu' jianshe gei sililanka beibu diqu dailai de xin bianhua* [Reporters Experience New Changes Brought to Northern Sri Lanka by the BRI]. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shangwubu* [Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China].  
<http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/fwydy/zgzx/202111/20211103219618.shtml>

Ministry of External Affairs of India. (2004). The Jammu and Kashmir issue. *Ministry of External Affairs of India*.  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20080616161619/http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmir-issue.htm>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2021, February 22). *A people-centred approach for global human rights progress*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China  
[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1855685.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1855685.shtml).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2022, March 31). *Disanci afuhan linguo waizhang lianhe shengming* [Joint Statement at the Third Foreign Ministers' Meeting Among the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan.] *Waijiaobu* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs].  
[https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjzbhd/202203/t20220331\\_10658211.shtml](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjzbhd/202203/t20220331_10658211.shtml)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (1997, March). *Japan's position regarding the situation in Myanmar*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,  
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/myanmar/myanmar.html>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2006). *Evaluation of Japan's peacebuilding*

*assistance policy: A case study: Afghanistan*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2005/text-pdf/afghanistan.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2009, May 1). *Suriranka ni okeru kokunai hinanmin ni taisuru kinkyuu mushou shikin kyouryoku* [Emergency Grant Aid for IDPs in Sri Lanka]. *Gaimushou* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan]. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/21/5/1191361\\_1097.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/21/5/1191361_1097.html)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2015). *Japan's assistance in Afghanistan: Towards self-reliance*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000019264.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016). *Japan's ODA to Myanmar by fiscal year*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000142547.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2022, February 8). *Humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e\\_000256.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000256.html).

Minorities at Risk Project. (2004). *Chronology for Kachins in Burma*. Refworld. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f387014.html>.

Mir, A. (2022, May 4). *Pakistan's Twin Taliban Problem*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/pakistans-twin-taliban-problem>

Mishra, S. (2021, August 19). *What's going to happen to Afghanistan's untapped wealth worth \$1 trillion?* The Independent. <https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/afghanistan-minerals-lithium-mining-taliban-b1905169.html>

Miyahara, N. (2021, September 29). *Dealing with Taliban-led Afghanistan: Choices for Japan and the world*. Sasakawa Peace Foundation. [https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/miyahara\\_04.html](https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/miyahara_04.html)

- Mizzima. (2012, June 15). *Shan group issues statement on conflict resolution*. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/shan-group-issues-statement-conflict-resolution>.
- Mizzima. (2018, November 28). *Activists protest resource control in Rakhine state*. Mizzima. <https://mizzima.com/article/activists-protest-resource-control-rakhine-state>
- Mizzima. (2022, February 7). *India maintains aid level to Myanmar*. Mizzima. <https://mizzima.com/article/india-maintains-aid-level-myanmar>
- Mohammad, W. (2020, February 7). *List of international NGOs operating in Pakistan*. Pakwired. <https://pakwired.com/list-international-ngos-operating-pakistan/>
- Mohanty, S.K., & Mahanty, J.N. (2022). The ‘Moderate Taliban’ theory: Indian dilemma. *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, 5(1), 47-58.
- Moramudali, U. (2020, January 1). *The Hambantota port deal: Myths and realities*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/>
- Mudie, L. (2015, May 5). *Eight Chinese nationals injured in blasts near Myanmar border*. Radio Free Asia. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/eight-chinese-nationals-injured-in-blasts-near-myanmar-border-05152015125230.html>
- Mudie, L. (2021, Feb 18). *Chinese companies supplying arms, military equipment to Myanmar: Group*. Radio Free Asia <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/supplying-02182021091648.html>.
- Müller, M. (2007). Motivation of politicians and long-term policies. *Public Choice*, 132(3-4), 273-289.
- Muller, N. (2019, January 9). *Rajapaksa’s town: A visit to Hambantota*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/rajapaksas-town-a-visit-to-hambantota/>
- Mulvenon, J. (2009). Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘new historic missions’. *China*

*Leadership Monitor*, 27, 1-11.

- Murtazashvili, J. (2022, May 17). *China's activities and influence in south and central Asia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/17/china-s-activities-and-influence-in-south-and-central-asia-pub-87146>
- Myanmar Now. (2021). *Japan considering ODA freeze to Myanmar*. Myanmar Now.  
<https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/japan-considering-oda-freeze-to-myanmar-after-activist-pressure>
- Nabeel, F. (2017, December 23). *Restoration of peace in Balochistan*. Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research. <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/restoration-peace-balochistan/>
- Nahzat, E. (2020). Electoral systems in a divided society: The case of Afghanistan. *Kardan Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 3(1), 91-104.
- Nakanishi, Y., & Osada, N. (2016, March). *The 2015 Myanmar general election: A historic victory for the National League of Democracy*. IDE-Jetro.  
[https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201601\\_osada.html](https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/201601_osada.html)
- Nathan, A.J., & Scobell, A. (2012). *China's search for security*. Columbia University Press.
- National Defense University (NDU). (2015). Regional stability and lesson learned in regional peace building. *National Defense University Royal Danish Defense College Post Seminar Report Oct 22-23*: 1-70.
- News18. (2021, August 26). *'Parl building can be used for Islamic shura': What next for 'India's Gift' as Taliban shun Western-style democracy*. News18.  
<https://www.news18.com/news/india/parl-building-can-be-used-for-islamic-shura-what-next-for-indias-gift-as-taliban-shun-western-style-democracy-4129415.html>
- Nazeer, T. (2022, April 20). *Sri Lanka's protests transcend ethnic, religious divisions*.

- The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/sri-lankas-protests-transcend-ethnic-religious-divisions/>
- NDTV. (2021, February 26). *China defends Sri Lanka's human rights record at UN Human Rights Council*. NDTV. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-defends-sri-lankas-human-rights-record-at-un-human-rights-council-2379620>
- Nebehay, S., & Pal, A. (2021, March 23). *Sri Lanka faces U.N. scrutiny over civil war crimes*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-rights-un-idUSKBN2BF1DF>
- Nemoto, K. (2007). Between democracy and economic development: Japan's policy towards Burma/Myanmar then and now. In N. Ganesan & Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Eds.) *Myanmar - state society and ethnicity* (pp: 96-108). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- News of the Communist Party of China. (n.d.). *Deng Xiaoping tongchi 'heimao baimao lun' beijing de gushi* [Background Story of Comrade Deng Xiaoping's 'Black Cat White Cat Theory']. *Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen* [News of the Communist Party of China] <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/85037/8530953.html>.
- Nissen, A. (2009). Troublesome peace making: How American views on terrorism affected Norwegian mediation in Sri Lanka, 2000-2009. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 29(3), 522-542.
- Nitta, Y. (2017, December 2). *Myanmar and China to cooperate on economic corridor*. Nikkei Asia. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Myanmar-and-China-to-cooperate-on-economic-corridor>
- Nojima, T. (2019, August 21). *Two Japanese supporting peace efforts within Myanmar's ethnic minorities*. Nippon.com. <https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-topics/c06204/two-japanese-supporting-peace-efforts-with-myanmar%E2%80%99s-ethnic-minorities.html>
- Noormal, A.N. (n.d.). Root causes of conflict in Baluchistan, Pakistan. *Beyond*



*Intractability*. <https://www.beyondintractability.org/library/root-causes-conflict-baluchistan-pakistan>

Norad. (2011). *Pawns of peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. Norad Evaluation Department. <https://www.oecd.org/countries/srilanka/49035074.pdf>

North, D.C., Wallis, J.J., Webb, S.B. & Weingast, B.R. (2012, March 10). *Limited access orders: Rethinking the problems of development and violence*. Stanford University. [https://www.ioea.eu/pdf/textes\\_2009/NorthWallisWebbWeingast\\_LimitedAccessOrders.pdf](https://www.ioea.eu/pdf/textes_2009/NorthWallisWebbWeingast_LimitedAccessOrders.pdf)

Nye, J.S. Jr. (2019). The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump. *International Affairs*, 95(1), 63-80.

Oberson, J. (2002). *Khans and warlords: Political alignment, leadership and the state in Pashtun society*. University of Berne.

O'Donnell, L. (2014, March 20). *China's MCC turns back on US\$3bn Mes Aynak Afghanistan mine deal*. South China Morning Post. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1453375/chinas-mcc-turns-back-us3b-mes-aynak-afghanistan-mine-deal>

O'Gorman, E. (2011). *Conflict and development: Development matters*. Zed Books.

OECD. (2004). *Fair and equitable treatment standard in international investment law*. OECD Publishing. [https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004\\_3.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf)

Ostry, J.D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? *Finance and Development*, 52(2), 1-4.

Orakzai, S.B. (2015). Neo-liberal peacebuilding in Libya. In J.I. Lahai & T. Lyon (Eds.) *Sketching the path to reconciliation, in African frontiers: Insurgency, governance and peacebuilding in postcolonial states* (pp. 143-156). Routledge.

- Orjuela, C. (2003). Building peace in Sri Lanka: A role for civil society. *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(2), 195-212.
- Orjuela, C. (2005a). Dilemmas of civil society aid: Donors, NGOs, and the quest for peace in Sri Lanka. *Peace and Democracy in South Asia*, 1(1), 1-12.
- Orjuela, C. (2005b). Civil society in civil war: The case of Sri Lanka. *Civil Wars*, 7(2), 120-137.
- Pakistan Army (2010). *Azad Kashmir Regiment*. Pakistan Army Web Portal.  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100404144319/http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=159&rnd=460>
- Pakistan Ministry of Finance. (2010). *Special section 1: Cost of war on terror for Pakistan economy*. Economic Survey 2010-11.  
[https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey\\_1011.html](https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1011.html)
- Pant, H.V. (2021, December 24). *India cannot take a black-and-white approach to Myanmar*. Observer Research Foundation.  
<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-cannot-take-a-black-and-white-approach-to-myanmar/>
- Pang, X. (2013). *Xinxing yuanzhuguo de 'xing'yu 'xin' – chuizhi fanshi yu shuiping fanshi de shizheng bijiao yanjiu* [Horizontal paradigm vs. vertical paradigm: Fundamental differences between emerging and traditional foreign development aid]. *Guoji zhengzhi jingjixue [International Politics and Economics Study]* 5: 31-54.
- Pape, R. (2009, May 21). *Tamil Tigers: Suicide bombing innovators*. NPR.  
<https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104391493&t=1651169197070>
- Parashar, S. (2014, November 4). *Chinese submarine docking in Sri Lanka 'inimical' to India's interests: Govt*. Times of India.  
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinese-submarine-docking-in-lanka>

inimical-to-indias-interests-govt/articleshow/45025487.cms

Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. *International Security*, 22(2), 54-89.

Paris, R. (2004). *At war's end*. Cambridge University Press.

Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding. *Review of International Studies*, 36(2), 337-365.

Parliament UK. (2020). *Chapter 5: The Taliban and other security issues*. Parliament UK.  
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5801/ldselect/ldintrel/208/20808.htm>

PDi-Kintha. (2019). *International and national organisations in central Rakhine state: Collaboration and perspectives*. PDi-Kintha peace & Development Initiative.  
[https://www.kintha-pdi.org/sites/kintha-pdi.org/files/publication-docs/19-09-30\\_final\\_international\\_and\\_national\\_collaboration\\_report\\_pdi.pdf](https://www.kintha-pdi.org/sites/kintha-pdi.org/files/publication-docs/19-09-30_final_international_and_national_collaboration_report_pdi.pdf)

Peace Direct. (2019, July 10). *Local peacebuilding: What works and why*. Peace Direct.  
<https://www.peaceinsight.org/reports/whatworks>.

Peace Insight. (2016a, October). *Sarvodaya*. Peace Insight.  
<https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/sl-sarvodaya/?location=sri-lanka&theme>

Peace Insight. (2016b, October). *Saviya development foundation (SDF)*. Peace Insight.  
<https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/sdf/?location=sri-lanka&theme>

Peace Insight. (2016c, August). *Janakaraliya*. Peace Insight.  
<https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/janakaraliya/?location=sri-lanka&theme>

Peace Insight (2018a, December). *Kachin women's association of Thailand (KWAT)*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/kwat/?location=myanmar&theme>.

- Peace Insight. (2018b, December). *Shan human rights foundation (SHRF)*. Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/shrf/?location=myanmar&theme>.
- Peace Women. (2002, May 1). *License to rape: The Burmese military regime's use of sexual violence in the ongoing war in Shan State*. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. <https://www.peacewomen.org/node/89660>
- PEARL. (2016, April 20). *Withering hopes: Historic window of opportunity for reconciliation will close if Sri Lanka fails to act on accountability and militarization*. People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL). <https://pearlaction.org/2016/04/20/press-release-withering-hopes-pearl-report-on-the-current-situation-in-the-north-east-of-sri-lanka/>
- Pekkanen, R. (2004). After the developmental state: Civil society in Japan. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 4, 363-388.
- Pence, M. (2018, October 4). *Remarks by Vice President Pence on the administration's policy towards China*. The Hudson Institute. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/>
- Pepinsky, T., & Weiss, J.C. (2021, June 11). *Clash of systems? Washington should avoid ideological competition with Beijing*. Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-11/clash-systems>
- Perera, A. (2022, May 11). *Why are Sri Lankans protesting in the streets?* BBC. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-61028138>
- Peris, V. (2001, May 30). *Two decades after the burning down of the Jaffna library in Sri Lanka*. World Socialist Web Site. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/05/sri-m30.html>
- Peiris, D. (2011, September 8). *Could youth-led reconciliation put Sri Lanka back on the map?* World Bank Blogs.

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/could-youth-lead-reconciliation-put-sri-lanka-back-map>

Pepper, M. (2018). Ethnic minority women, diversity, and informal participation in peacebuilding in Myanmar. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 13(2), 61-75.

Peter, T.A. (2015, February 2). *Paved roads a positive legacy of Afghan war. But who fixes potholes?* The Christian Science Monitor.

<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2015/0202/Paved-roads-a-positive-legacy-of-Afghan-war.-But-who-fixes-potholes>

Petersen, A. (2013, May 21). *China's strategy in Afghanistan*. The Atlantic.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/chinas-strategy-in-afghanistan/276052/>

Peterson, J.H. (2012). A conceptual unpacking of hybridity: Accounting for notions of power, politics and progress in analyses of aid-driven interfaces. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 7(2), 9-22.

Petrie, C., & South, A. (2014). Development of civil society in Myanmar. In F. Ytzen, & M. Gravers (Eds). *Burma/Myanmar-Where Now?* (pp. 86-94). NiAS Press.

PGIE. (2019). *The 'theatre of reconciliation': Potentials, tensions and practices*.

Postgraduate Institute of English.

[https://www.britishcouncil.lk/sites/default/files/peace\\_and\\_beyond\\_the\\_theatre\\_of\\_reconciliation.pdf](https://www.britishcouncil.lk/sites/default/files/peace_and_beyond_the_theatre_of_reconciliation.pdf)

Piccolino, G. (2019). Local peacebuilding in a victor's peace. Why local peace fails without national reconciliation. *International Peacekeeping*, 26(3), 354-379.

Premaratna, N. (2012, August 7). *Civil society as a space for dissent in Sri Lanka*.

Peace Insight. <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/civil-society-dissent-sri-lanka/?location=sri-lanka&theme=culture-media-advocacy>

Price, G. (2021, September 10). *Why Afghan nation-building was destined to fail*.

Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/why-afghan-nation-building-was-always-destined-fail>

Pogodda, S., & Huber, D. (2014). India's peacebuilding between rights and needs: Transformation of local conflict spheres in Bihar, North-East India and Jammu and Kashmir. *International Peacekeeping*, 21(4), 443-463.

Poppelwell, R. (2019). Civil society, hybridity and peacebuilding in Burundi: Questioning authenticity. *Third World Quarterly*, 40(1), 129-146.

PTI The Hindu. (2021, September 23). *Gotabaya for reconciliation through domestic institutions*. The Hindu. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/gotabaya-for-reconciliation-through-domestic-institutions/article36639269.ece>

Pradhan, S.K. (2018). Struggle for democracy in Myanmar: Response of neighbours, United States and ASEAN. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 11-12(1), 228-241.

Pugh, J. (2005). Democratic peace theory: A review and evaluation. *CEMPROC Working Paper Series*, 2005, 1-21.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone*. Simon and Schuster.

PTI. (2022, May 6). *China, Pak discusses steps to strengthen security for Chinese citizens in Pakistan, speed up CPEC projects*. The Print. <https://theprint.in/world/china-pak-discuss-steps-to-strengthen-security-for-chinese-citizens-in-pakistan-speed-up-cpec-projects/958583/>

Qin, J. (2018, August 7). *The belt and road initiative: Win-win cooperation and common development*. CGTN. [https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414f33457a4d79457a6333566d54/share\\_p.html](https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d414f33457a4d79457a6333566d54/share_p.html).

Qin, Y., & Wei, L. (2017). *Xinxing quanqiu zhiliguan yu 'yidaiyilu' hezuo Shijian* [The practice and cooperation between a new type of global governance with

‘one belt one road’]. *Waijiao Pinglun (Waijiao xueyuan xuebao) [Foreign Affairs Review (Journal of Foreign Affairs College)]* 7: 1-14.

Radio Mashaal. (2021, July 2). *Pakistani army warns of blowback in crackdown on Afghan Taliban*. Gandhara. <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistani-army-warns-of-blowback-in-crackdown-on-afghan-taliban/31338249.html>

Rahman, F. (2007). Pakistan’s evolving relations with China, Russia and Central Asia. In A. Iwashita (Ed.) *Eager eyes fixed on Eurasia – Russia and its neighbors in crisis* (pp. 211 – 229). Slavic Research Center.

Rafiq, A. (2021, Dec 14). *Pakistan wanted Gwadar to be the next Singapore. China’s role didn’t help*. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/14/pakistan-gwadar-port-protests-china-belt-and-road-cpec/>

Rajkopal, P. (2019). *The Sarvodaya movement: Holistic development and risk governance in Sri Lanka*. Taylor & Francis.

Rajesh, V. (2010). Sectarian socialism: The politics of Sri Lanka’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). *Modern Asian Studies*, 44, 567-602.

Ramachadran S. (2004, March 26). *Who’s behind the LTTE Split?* Asia Times Online. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040402065208/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/FC26Df04.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20040402065208/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC26Df04.html)

Ramesh, A. (2011, November). *Evaluation report: UNDEF supported project in Sri Lanka*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. [https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/sri\\_lanka\\_-\\_udf-08-262-srl\\_-\\_evaluation\\_report.pdf](https://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/sri_lanka_-_udf-08-262-srl_-_evaluation_report.pdf)

Raza, H. (2017, May 13). *Equal representation of Balochistsan in senate does not troubleshoot the negligible representation of Balochistan in National Assembly – Abdul Wahid Baloch*. Balochistan Voices. <https://www.balochistanvoices.com/2017/05/equal-representation-balochistan-senate-not-troubleshoot-negligible-representation-balochistan-national->

assembly-abdul-wahid-baloch/

Reale, H., Bingham, E., & Greenberg, K. (2020, July 12). *Where does China get its oil?* Energy Policy. [https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Where%20Does%20China%20Get%20Its%20Oil\\_%20-%20The%20Wire%20China.pdf](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/Where%20Does%20China%20Get%20Its%20Oil_%20-%20The%20Wire%20China.pdf)

Relief Web. (2005, May 24). *Sri Lanka: Creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)*. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-creation-sri-lanka-monitoring-mission-slmm>

Relief Web. (2014, May 14). *UPWC, KIO agree to form conflict mediation team as part of first phase of implementing joint monitoring mechanism*. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/upwc-kio-agree-form-conflict-mediation-team-part-first-phase-implementing-joint>.

Ren, X. (2016). Human security: China's discourses and experience. *Journal of Human Security*, 12(1), 112-120.

Reuters. (2010, June 25). *Afghan mineral wealth put at \$1-3 trillion – minister*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-mining/afghan-mineral-wealth-put-at-1-3-trillion-minister-idUKLDE65O0FS20100625>

Reuters. (2015, April 2). *Sri Lankan government unlikely to allow Dalai Lama visit – official*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-dalailama-idUSKBN0MT1K920150402>

Reuters. (2017, June 9). *China's \$10 billion strategic project in Myanmar sparks local ire*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-sez-idUSKBN18Z327>

Reuters. (2018a, July 2). *Sri Lanka to shift naval base to China-controlled port city*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-port-idUSKBN1JS22H>.

Reuters. (2018b, September 28). *China says Rohingya issue should not be*



'internationalized'. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-china-idUSKCN1M8062>

Reuters. (2020, April 22). *Clashes Across Afghanistan kill dozens of security force members, militants*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attacks-idUSKCN2242L0>

Reuters. (2021a, August 27). *China's total arable land shrinks nearly 6% from 2009-2019 – survey*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-total-arable-land-shrinks-nearly-6-2009-2019-survey-2021-08-27/>.

Reuters. (2021b, Aug 19). *Trucks rolling across Afghanistan border as trade resumes*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/trucks-rolling-across-afghanistan-border-trade-resumes-2021-08-19/>

Reuters. (2021c, August 20). *Taliban's return clouds plan for Afghan resource projects*. Euro News. <https://www.euronews.com/2021/08/20/us-afghanistan-conflict-china-commodities>

Reuters. (2021d, May 24). *Myanmar junta leader casts doubt on return of Rohingya*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-leader-casts-doubt-return-rohingya-2021-05-24/>

Reuters. (2022a, March 30). *China hosts Russia, U.S. officials for talks on Afghanistan*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-hosts-russia-us-officials-talks-afghanistan-2022-03-30/>

Reuters. (2022b, February 23). *U.N. Myanmar expert says junta using new Russian, Chinese arms against civilians*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-myanmar-expert-says-junta-using-new-russian-chinese-arms-against-civilians-2022-02-22/>.

Richmond, O.P. (2006). The problem of peace: Understanding the 'liberal peace'. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 6(3), 291-313.

Richmond, O.P. (2009). A post-liberal peace; Eirenism and the everyday. *Review of*

*International Studies*, 35, 557-580.

- Richmond, O.P. (2011). *A post-liberal peace*. Routledge.
- Richmond, O.P. (2013). Failed statebuilding versus peace formation. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(3), 378-400.
- Richmond, O.P. (2014). Dilemmas of a hybrid peace: Negative or positive? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(1), 50-68.
- Richmond, O.P. (2017). The paradox of peace and power: Contamination or enablement? *International Politics*, 54, 637-658.
- Richmond, O.P. (2022). What is an emancipatory peace? *Journal of International Political Theory*, 18(2), 124-147.
- Richmond, O.P., & R. Mac Ginty. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5), 763-783.
- Richmond, O.P., & R. Mac Ginty. (2015). Where now for the critique of the liberal peace? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(2), 171-189.
- Richmond, O.P., Björkdahl, A., & Kappler, S. (2011). The emerging EU peacebuilding framework: Confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24(3), 449-469.
- Richmond, O.P., & Tellidis, I. (2012). The complex relationship between peacebuilding and terrorism approaches: Towards post-terrorism and post-liberal peace? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1), 120-143.
- Richmond, O.P., & Tellidis, I. (2014). Emerging actors in international peacebuilding and statebuilding: Status quo or critical states? *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 20(4), 563-584.
- Rickard, S. (2020). Gender, agency and decision making in community engagement: Reflections from Afghanistan's Mes Aynak mine. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 7, 435-445.

- Riphenburg, C.J. (2007). Electoral systems in a divided society: The case of Afghanistan. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(1), 1-21.
- Risen, J. (2007, May 16). *Poppy fields are now a front line in Afghan war*. New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/world/asia/16drugs.html#:~:text=Farmers%20growing%20poppies%20in%20Taliban,for%20the%20insurgents%2C%20officials%20say>
- Rizvi, H.A. (2017, October 8). *The search for a new foreign policy*. Tribune. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1525623/search-new-foreign-policy>
- Roberts, M. (1989). Apocalypse or accommodation? Two contrasting views of Sinhala-Tamil relations in Sri Lanka. *Journal of South Asia Studies*, 12(1), 67-83.
- Rolland, N. (2017). China's 'belt and road initiative': Underwhelming or game-changer? *The Washington Quarterly* 40(1): 127-142.
- Rosato, S. (2003). The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 585-602.
- Royal United Services Institute (2005, February 1). *Chinese peacekeepers to Haiti: Much attention, more confusion*. RUSI. <https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion>.
- Ruan, Z. (2012). Responsible protection: Building a safer world. *China International Studies*, May/June 2012, 19-41.
- Rubin, B.R.R. (2004). Crafting a constitution for Afghanistan. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(3), 5-19.
- Rubin, B.R.R. (2020). *Afghanistan – what everyone needs to know*. Oxford University Press.

- Ruwanpathirana, T. (2020, February 27). *Sri Lanka: Withdrawal from UN commitments require robust response by Human Rights Council*. Amnesty International <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/sri-lanka-withdrawal-from-un-commitments-requires-robust-response-by-human-rights-council>
- Ruwanpura, K.N. (2016). Post-war Sri Lanka: State, capital and labour, and the politics of reconciliation. *Contemporary South Asia*, 24(4), 351-359.
- Ruwanpura, K.N., Rowe, P., & Chan, L. (2020). Of bombs and belts: Exploring potential ruptures within China's belt and road initiative in Sri Lanka. *The Geographic Journal* 186: 339-345.
- Sabaratnam, M. (2013). Avatars of eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace. *Security Dialogue*, 44(3), 259-278.
- Sacks, D. (2021, August 24). *Why major belt and road investments are not coming to Afghanistan*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-major-belt-and-road-investments-are-not-coming-afghanistan>.
- Sai, W. (2022, March 28). *Humanitarian aid for displaced people in Shan State*. Mizzima. <https://mizzima.com/article/humanitarian-aid-displaced-people-shan-state>
- Saikal, A. (2002). Afghanistan after the loya jirga. *Survival*, 44(3), 47-56.
- Sajid, I. (2020, August 18). *CPEC transforms Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan*. AA. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/cpec-transforms-pakistans-remote-gilgit-baltistan/1945160>
- Sajid, I. (2021, September 15). *Pakistan, Afghanistan trade soars following Taliban takeover*. AA. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-afghanistan-trade-soars-following-taliban-takeover/2365139>
- Save the Children. (2021, June 17). *Strained, stateless & detained: 700,000 Rohingya children are denied basic rights across Asia*. Save the Children.

<https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/stranded--stateless---detained--700-000-rohingya-children-are-de>

Scambary, J., & Wassel, T. (2018). Hybrid peacebuilding in hybrid communities: A case study of East Timor. In J. Wallis, L. Kent., M. Forsyth. S. Dinnen, & S. Bose (Eds.) *Hybridity on the ground in peacebuilding and critical conversations* (pp: 181-199). ANU Press.

Satkunanathan, A. (2021, Nov 30). *Deradicalisation regulations stoke more radicalisation*. East Asia Forum.  
<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/11/30/deradicalisation-regulations-stoke-more-radicalisation-in-sri-lanka/>

Sareen, S. (2021, July 22). *Pakistan's Pashtun problem*. Chanakya Forum.  
<https://chanakyaforum.com/pakistans-pashtun-problem/>

Sarjoon, A., Yusoff, M.A., & Hussin, N. (2016). Anti-Muslim sentiments and violence: A major threat to ethnic reconciliation and ethnic harmony in post-war Sri Lanka. *Religions*, 7(125), 1-18.

Schaffer, H.B., & Schaffer, T.C. (2011). *How Pakistan negotiates with the United States – Riding the roller coaster*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Schons, M. (2022). *The Durand Line: A historic, disputed border separates Afghanistan and Pakistan*. National Geographic.  
<https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/durand-line>

Selth, A. (2008). Burma's 'Saffron Revolution' and the limits of international influence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 62(3), 281-297.

Sen, A. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. *Journal of Democracy*, 10(3), 3-17.

Senadhira, S. (1989). *Appendix II: The cyanide drama that brought 'Referee Rajiv' into the ring*. UTHR. <https://www.uthr.org/BP/volume2/AppendixII.htm>.

Senanayake, H. (2021). Religion, religious textbooks and territorialisation of Sinhala

- Buddhist ethno-nationalism in Sri Lanka. *Open Political Science*, 4, 300-305.
- Selvakumar, B. (2021, March 18). *How Britain was complicit in Sri Lankan war crimes*. Tribune. <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/03/how-britain-was-complicit-in-sri-lankan-war-crimes>
- Sha, S. (2020). 'Yidaiyilu' beijing xia zhongmian jingji zoulang de SWOT fenxi [SWOT analysis of CMEC under the belt and road initiative]. *Jingji yanjiu daokan [Economic Research Guide]*, 31, 119-121.
- Shah, A. (2021, August 13). *What will happen to Afghanistan and Pakistan's uneasy border*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/13/what-will-happen-to-afghanistan-and-pakistan-s-uneasy-border-pub-85152>
- Shah, A.R. (2018). How does China-Pakistan economic corridor show the limitations of China's 'One Belt One Road'? *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies*, 5(2), 378-385.
- Shah, K.M. (2022, Jan 13). *The Gwadar protests: Balochistan stands up for its rights*. Observer Research Foundation. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-gwadar-protests-balochistan-stands-up-for-its-rights/>
- Shah, M.Q. (2021, October 26). *What did billions in aid to Afghanistan accomplish? 5 questions answered*. The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804>
- Shahryar, F. (2018, February 15). *UNICEF & EU supported Balochistan basic education program brings girls back to school*. UNICEF. <https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/stories/unicef-eu-supported-balochistan-basic-education-program-brings-girls-back-school>.
- Shafiq, M., Azhar, A., Rafiq, T., & Rafiq, N. (2018). Effectiveness of CPEC on the economy of Balochistan: A common man point of view. *Balochistan Review*, 38(1), 51-60.

- Shams, S. (2013, April 22). *The dilemma of Pakistan's liberal pashtuns*. DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-dilemma-of-pakistans-liberal-pashtuns/a-16762303>
- Shastri, A. (1990). The material basis for separatism: The Tamil Eelam movement in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 49(1), 56-77.
- Sharma, N., & Chaudhury, R. (2015, December 18). *PM Narendra Modi to inaugurate India-made Afghanistan parliament building*. The Economic Times. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-to-inaugurate-india-made-afghanistan-parliament-building/articleshow/50226159.cms?from=mdr>
- Shepard, W. (2017, Jan 8). *Violent protests against Chinese 'Colony' in Sri Lanka rage on*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/01/08/violent-protests-against-chinese-colony-in-hambantota-sri-lanka-rage-on/?sh=302c59b513dd>
- Shepard, W. (2018, Januar 29). *China and Japan's 'New Great Game' intensifies in Myanmar*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2018/01/29/china-and-japans-new-great-game-intensifies-in-myanmar/?sh=7e128fda5ab2>
- Shi, B. (2014). 'Ren de anquan' yu guojia anquan ['Human Security' and National Security]. *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, 2, 85-110.
- Shih, G. (2017, December 23). *AP exclusive: Uighurs fighting in Syria take aim at China*. AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/syria-ap-top-news-riots-international-news-china-79d6a427b26f4eeab226571956dd256e>
- Shneiderman, S., & Tilin, L. (2015). Restructuring states, restructuring ethnicity: Looking across disciplinary boundaries at federal futures in India and Nepal. *Modern Asian Studies*, 49(1), 1-39.
- SHRF. (n.d.). *About us*. Shan Human Rights Foundation. <https://shanhumanrights.org/about-us/>.
- SHRF. (2017, August 30). *Shan State IDPs/refugees*. Shan Human Rights Foundation.

<https://shanhumanrights.org/shan-state-idps-refugees/>

- Silva, K.T. (2016). Gossip, rumor, and propaganda in Anti-Muslim campaigns of the Bodu Bala Sena. In J.C. Holt (Ed.) *Buddhist extremists and Muslim minorities – Religious conflict in contemporary Sri Lanka* (pp. 119-139). Oxford University Press.
- Sial, S. (2007, June 26). *Pak-US – A balance sheet of relations*. Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). <https://www.pakpips.com/article/1619>
- Sina. (2003, December 16). 'Dongtu' fanxia leilei zuixing women biewuxuanze (tu) ['East Turkestan' commits various crimes, leave us with no other choice (Picture)]. Sina.com. <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-12-16/05591350086s.shtml>
- Sinha, S. (2017). Rising powers and peacebuilding: India's role in Afghanistan. In C.T Call & C. de Coning (Eds.) *Rising power and peacebuilding: Breaking the mold?* (pp. 129-165): Palgrave Macmillan.
- Singh, P.K. (2017). Peacebuilding through development partnership: An Indian perspective. In C.T. Call & C. De Coning (Eds.) *Rising powers & peacebuilding* (pp. 69-92): Palgrave Macmillan.
- Singh, S.P. (2010). Afghan factor in reviving the Sino-Pak Axis. In M. Laurelle, J.F. Huchet, S. Peyrouse, & B. Balci (Eds.), *China and India in Central Asia: A new "great game"?* (pp. 81-93). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shinn, D.H. (2009). China and the conflict in Darfur. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 16(1), 85–100.
- Siddiqa, A. (2020, Jan 21). *Pakistan's hybrid 'civilian-military' government weakens democracy*. East Asia Forum <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/21/pakistans-hybrid-civilian-military-government-weakens-democracy/>
- Siddiqui, N. (2020). *Alice Wells' remarks another doomed attempt to defame Sino-Pak*



- relations: Chinese embassy*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1558763>
- Simons, C., & Zanker, F. (2014). Questioning the local in peacebuilding. *DFG Working Paper Series, 10*, 1-21.
- Singh, S. (2012). China's Kashmir policy. *World Affairs, 16*(2), 100-112.
- Smith, C.Q. (2020). Liberal and illiberal peace-building in East Timor and Papua. *Conflict, Security and Development, 20*(1), 39-70.
- Smith, C.Q., Waldorf, L., Venugopal R., & McCarthy, G. (2020). Illiberal peace-building in Asia: A comparative overview. *Conflict, Security & Development, 20*(1), 1-14.
- Snedden, C. (2012). *The untold story of the people of Azad Kashmir*. Hurst.
- Snyder, J. (2000). *From Voting to Violence – Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Soeya, Y. (2005). Japanese security policy in transition: The rise of international and human security. *Asia-Pacific Review, 12*(1), 103-116.
- Sohel, M.S. (2017). The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar: Origin and emergence. *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2*, 1007-1018.
- Sonia, D. (2022). Analysing the Sri Lankan civil war through the lens of conflict resolution theory. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe International Relations, 2*(2), 3-13.
- Sood, R. (2021, November 23). *Redefining India's role in Afghanistan*. ISAS Insights [https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/redefining-indias-role-in-afghanistan/#\\_ftn3](https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/redefining-indias-role-in-afghanistan/#_ftn3)
- Sorensen, B.R. (2008). The politics of citizenship and difference in Sri Lankan schools. *Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 39*(4), 423-443.

- South, A. (2018). 'Hybrid governance' and the politics of legitimacy in the Myanmar peace process. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48(1), 50-66.
- South Asian Blog. (2014, August 14). *The demographics of Sri Lanka*. South Asian Blog. <https://southasiablog.wordpress.com/2014/08/18/south-asias-lebanon-the-demographics-of-sri-lanka/>
- Sri Lanka Task Force. (2021, July 5). *China's oppression of Muslims could be influencing Sri Lanka*. Justice For All. <https://www.justiceforall.org/sri-lanka-task-force/chinas-oppression-of-muslims-could-be-influencing-sri-lanka/>
- Sri Lanka Ministry of Education. (2008). *National policy and a comprehensive framework of actions*. Social Cohesion and Peace Education Unit Ministry of Education. <https://moe.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/NATIONAL-POLICY-AND-A-COMPREHENSIVE-FRAMEWORK.pdf>
- Srinivasan, C. (2022, May 4). *Sri Lanka foreign reserves dip below \$50 million, minister waves red flag*. Hindustan Times. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/sri-lanka-news-minister-hails-india-s-help-as-reserves-dip-to-record-low-101651667395368.html>
- Spears, I.S. (2012). The false promise of peacebuilding. *International Journal*, 67(2), 295-311.
- Spencer, J. (2002). *Sri Lanka: History and the roots of conflict*. Routledge.
- Stangarone, T. (2013). the U.S.-South Korea economic relationship. *Association for Asian Studies*, 18(3), 53-55.
- State Council of the People's Republic of China. (1964). *Zhongguo he Bajisitan Lianhe Gongbao* [China and Pakistan Joint Communiqué]. *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao* [State Council of the People's Republic of China Communiques], 29(3), 81-100.
- State Council of People's Republic of China. (2021, July 28). *Wangyi huijian afuhan taliban zhengzhi weiyuanhui fuzeren balladeer* [Wang Yi Meets Taliban Co-

Founder Baradar]. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo Zhongyang renmin zhengfu* [State Council of People's Republic of China].  
[http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2021-07/28/content\\_5627982.htm](http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2021-07/28/content_5627982.htm)

State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2016, April 18). *Xinjiang tuijin zhongba jingji zoulang jianshe* [Xinjiang Promotes the Construction of CPEC]. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi* [State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China]. <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/8/2/Document/1474637/1474637.htm>

Steinberg, D. (2006). *Turmoil in Burma: Contested legitimacies in Myanmar*. EastBridge.

Steinberg, D. (2012). On China-Myanmar relations. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31(1), 3-6.

Stewart, P., & Ali, I. (2018, September 1). *Exclusive: Pentagon cancel aid to Pakistan over record on militants*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-military-exclusive-idUSKCN1LH3TA>

Stokes, J. (2020). China's periphery diplomacy: Implications for peace and security in Asia. *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, 467, 1-24.

Stokke, K., Kham, K.K.M., Nge, N.K.L, & Kvanvik, S.H. (2022). Illiberal peacebuilding in a hybrid regime. Authoritarian strategies for conflict containment in Myanmar. *Political Geography*, 93(3),1-14.

Stratford, C. (2022, January 3). *Sri Lanka's Tamils fear discrimination under new president*. Tamil Guardian.  
<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/%E2%80%98sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-tamils-fear-discrimination-under-new-president%E2%80%99>.

Subedi, D. (2022). The emergence of populist nationalism and 'illiberal' peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. *Asian Studies Review*, 46(2), 272-292.

Subramanian, N. (2021, December 17). *Beijing bares it in Jaffna, warms up to Tamils*

- in Sri Lanka*. The Indian Express.  
<https://indianexpress.com/article/india/beijing-bares-it-in-jaffna-warms-up-to-tamils-in-sri-lanka-7676867/>
- Subramanian, N. (2022, April 11, 2022). *Anger in Mahinda Rajapaksa stronghold: Voted for them, see what they did*. The Indian Express.  
<https://indianexpress.com/article/world/sri-lanka-economic-crisis-anger-in-mahinda-rajapaksa-stronghold-voted-for-them-see-what-they-did-7863080/>
- Suleman, M. (2018, July 21). *Democracy in Balochistan is an illusion*. The Balochistan Point: Voice of Nation.  
<http://thebalochistanpoint.com/democracy-in-balochistan-is-an-illusion/>
- Sun, J. (2021, July 14). *Taliban zhudong shihao, zhongguo xuyao yige zenyang de afuhan* [Taliban proactively shows good intentions, what kind of Afghanistan does China need?]. *Zhongdong guancezhe* [Middle East Observer].  
[https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao\\_13576492](https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_13576492)
- Sun, Y. (2012). Syria: What China has learned from its Libya Experience. *Pacific Bulletin*, 152, 1-2.
- Sun, Y. (2019, October 15). *Peace through development: China's experiment in Myanmar*. Frontier Myanmar. <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/peace-through-development-chinas-experiment-in-myanmar/>
- Suryanarayan, V. (2017, May 18). *Democracy in Myanmar and India's dilemma*. The New Indian Express <https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/may/18/democracy-in-myanmar-and-indias-dilemma-2303852.html>
- Suvorova, A. (2015). *Benazir Bhutto: A multidimensional portrait*. Oxford University Press.
- Swaine, M.D. (2012). Chinese views of the Syrian conflict. *China Leadership Monitor*, 39(2), 1-26.
- Swaine, M.D. (2014). Chinese views and commentary on peripheral diplomacy. *China*

*Leadership Monitor*, 44(1), 1-43.

Swarajya (2021). *Sri Lanka: Chinese Mandarin replaces Tamil on sign boards, Lankans express fears of China's cultural hegemony*.  
Swarajya <https://swarajyamag.com/insta/sri-lanka-chinese-mandarin-replaces-tamil-on-sign-boards-lankans-express-fears-of-chinas-cultural-hegemony>

Tamil Global News. (2018, June 26). *Why the Indian Government as well as the Tamil National Alliance objects to the Chinese housing project in the North and east of Sri Lanka*. Global Tamil News.  
<http://globaltamilnews.net/english/why-the-indian-government-as-well-as-the-tamil-national-alliance-objects-to-the-chinese-housing-project-in-the-north-and-east-of-sri-lanka/>

Tamil Guardian. (2018a, September 26). *Sirisena rejects 'foreign influence' at UNGA*.  
Tamil Guardian. <https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sirisena-rejects-foreign-influence-unga>

Tamil Guardian. (2018b, October 19). *Sri Lanka reverses China's Jaffna housing contract and awards deal to India*. Tamil Guardian.  
<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/sri-lanka-reverses-china%E2%80%99s-jaffna-housing-contract-and-awards-deal-india>

Tamil Guardian. (2020a, May 22). *Remembering the 1958 pogrom*. Tamil Guardian.  
<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/remembering-1958-pogrom>.

Tamil Guardian. (2020b, July 3). *Chinese investments and the BRI in Sri Lanka – Chatham House*. Tamil Guardian.  
<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka-%E2%80%93-chatham-house>

Tamil Guardian. (2021, December 24). *Friend or foe? China ventures into the Tamil homeland*. Tamil Guardian. <https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/friend-or-foe-china-ventures-tamil-homeland>

Tanaka, H. (2011). *Nihon no afugan shien ha nani wo imi shite iru no ka* [What meaning

- does Japan's aid to Afghanistan hold?]. *Nihon souken* [Japan Research Institute].  
<https://www.jri.co.jp/file/report/tanaka/pdf/5407.pdf>
- Tarar, M. (2021, October 31). *In conversation with Hina Rabbani Khar*. T-Magazine.  
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2326940/in-conversation-with-hina-rabbani-khar>
- Talentino, A.K. (2005). *Military intervention after the Cold War: The evolution of theory and practice*. Ohio University Press.
- Tang, X., & Zhang, Z. (2016). *Zhongguo dui zhoubian 'yidaiyilu' yanxian guojia de gongong waijiao* [An analysis on China's peripheral public diplomacy to countries involved in the construction of the 'One Belt One Road']. *Jiaoxue yu yanjiu [Education and Research]* 6: 50-58.
- Tatchell, P. (2010, April 27). *The Baloch people have a right to self-determination*. Open Democracy. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/baloch-people-have-right-to-self-determination/>
- Taylor, R.H. (2015). *General Ne Win: A political biography*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Teitt, S. (2008). China and the responsibility to protect. *Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*, 19, 1-28.
- Telford, J., Cosgrave, J., & Houghton, R. (2006). *Joint evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis report*. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, <https://www.alnap.org/help-library/joint-evaluation-of-the-international-response-to-the-indian-ocean-tsunami-synthesis>
- The News. (2015, July 26). *Govt proposes 29 industrial parks, 21 mineral zones under CPEC*. The News.  
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/13780-govt-proposes-29-industrial-parks-21-mineral-zones-under-cpec>
- Thalpawila, O.N. (2014). India-Sri Lanka relations: In post civil war era in Sri Lanka. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 2(1), 9-14.

- Thant, M.U. (2019). *The hidden history of Burma: Race, capitalism, and the crisis of democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. W.W. Norton.
- Thomas, R.G.C. (2000). *Faultline Kashmir*. Brunel Academic Publishing Ltd.
- Thomas, T. (1998). In the Supreme Court of India criminal appellate jurisdiction. *Supreme Court of India*,  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20111102222525/http://cbi.nic.in/dop/judgements/thomas.pdf>
- Thompson, M. (2015, May 28). *How disbanding the Iraqi Army fueled ISIS*. Times.  
<https://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/>
- Tower, J., & Clapp, P.A. (2021, June 8). Myanmar: China, the coup and the future. *United States Institute of Peace*.  
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/myanmar-china-coup-and-future>.
- Thiranagama, S. (2013). Claiming the state: Postwar reconciliation in Sri Lanka. *Humanity*, 4(1), 93-116.
- Times of India. (2021, September 5). *Ex-diplomats on India's Afghanistan strategy amid Pakistan-China power play*. The Times of India.  
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ex-diplomats-on-how-india-should-handle-afghan-situation-amid-pak-china-power-play/articleshow/85948775.cms>
- Tortajada, C., & Zhang, H. (2021). When food meets BRI: China's emerging food silk road. *Global Food Security*, 29, 1-13.
- Tønnesson, S. (2017). *Explaining the East Asian peace*. NISA Press.
- Tønnesson, S. Aung, N.L., & Nilsen, M. (2019). Will Myanmar's northern alliance join the peace process? *PRIO Policy Brief*, 2, 1-4.
- Tractebel. (2021, June 7). *Construction of South Asia's Longest Water Tunnel Begins*.

- Tractebel Engie.  
<https://tractebel-engie.com/en/news/2021/construction-of-south-asia-s-longest-water-tunnel-begins>
- Trager, F.N. (1963). The failure of U Nu and the return of the armed forces in Burma. *The Review of Politics*, 25(3), 309-328.
- Tran, M., & Gabbatt, A. (2010, March 16). *Profile: Former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/16/general-sarath-fonsekaprofile>
- Tribune. (2018, January 10). *China rejects speculations of military bases in Gwadar*. Tribune. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1604988/china-rejects-speculations-military-base-gwadar>
- Tribune. (2019, January 8). *CPEC to create 700,000 more jobs in Pakistan*. Tribune. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1884057/cpec-create-700000-jobs-pakistan>
- Tribune. (2021, October 30). *CPEC projects shall be completed on time: G-B CM*. Tribune. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2327044/cpec-projects-shall-be-completed-on-time-g-b-cm>.
- Trócaire (2021, June 25). *Kachin state in ruins 10 years on from collapsed ceasefire*. Relief Web. <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-s-kachin-state-ruins-10-years-collapsed-ceasefire>.
- TRT World. (2022, July 21). *China aims for bigger role in Horn of Africa security*. TRT World <https://www.trtworld.com/africa/china-aims-for-bigger-role-in-horn-of-africa-security-58190>.
- Tully, J. (2008). Modern constitutional democracy and imperialism. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 46(3), 461-493.
- Turland, J. (2021, September 29). *Coal shortages force blackouts across China*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/coal-shortages-force-blackouts-across-china/>.



- Tzang, Y. (1990). *Ne Win's Tatmadaw dictatorship*. University of British Columbia.
- Uesugi, Y. (2020). Introduction. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.) *Hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 1-14). Palgrave MacMillan.
- Uesugi, Y. (2022). Controlling violence by the dominant coalition: a comparison study of the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar. In M.S. Cogan & H. Sakai (Eds.) *Alternative perspectives on peacebuilding: Rethinking peace and conflict studies* (pp. 187-209). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Uesugi, Y., & M. Kagawa. (2020). A typology of mid-space local bridge-builders. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), *Hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 37-60). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Uesugi, Y., & A. Deekling, A. (2020). Japan's peacebuilding and mid-space actors: A bridge between the west and the rest. In Y. Uesugi, A. Deekling, S.S. Umeyama & L.M. Colbert (Eds.) *Operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 159-186). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Uesugi, Y., Deekeling, A., & Ingstedt, A. (2021). a brief sketch of hybrid peacebuilding. In Y. Uesugi, A. Deekeling, S.S. Umeyama & L.M. Colbert (Eds.) *Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 21-35). Palgrave MacMillan.
- Ul-Islam, F. (2021). China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. *Zenodo*, 7(10), 45-56.
- Ullah, A.A., & Chatteraj, D. (2018). Roots of discrimination against Rohingya minorities: Society, ethnicity and international relations. *Intellectual Discourse*, 26(2), 541-565.
- Umrani, A.M. (2019, December 2019). *CPEC has not benefited people of Balochistan*. Balochistan Voices. <https://www.balochistanvoices.com/2019/12/cpec-has-not-benefited-people-of-balochistan/>
- UNDP. (n.d.) *NGOs and CSOs: A note on terminology*. United Nations Development

Programme. <https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/cn/UNDP-CH03-Annexes.pdf>

UNDP. (2021). *Economic instability and uncertainty in Afghanistan after August 15*. United Nations Development Programme. <https://www.undp.org/publications/economic-instability-and-uncertainty-afghanistan-after-august-15>.

UNDP Pakistan. (2016, June 20). *Pakistan's new poverty index reveals that 4 out of 10 Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty*. UNDP <https://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/06/20/pakistan-s-new-poverty-index-reveals-that-4-out-of-10-pakistanis-live-in-multidimensional-poverty.html>

UNESCO. (2010, February 10). *Education under attack 2010 – Afghanistan*. Refworld. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b7aa9e6c.html>

UNESCO. (2016, October 30). *Internet and the radicalization of youth: Preventing, acting, and living together*. UNESCO. <https://en.unesco.org/ConfQcUNESCO/home>.

UN Human Rights Council (2009). *Report of the Human Rights Council on its eleventh special session*. United Nations General Assembly. A/HRC/S-11/2.

UNICEF. (2021, November 24). *Balochistan launches education programme supported by European Union and UNICEF*. United Nations Children's Fund. <https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/press-releases/balochistan-launches-education-programme-supported-european-union-and-unicef>

UN News. (2016, September 1). *In Sri Lanka, UN chief highlights key role of young people in building peace and sustainable development*. United Nations. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/09/537992-sri-lanka-un-chief-highlights-key-role-young-people-building-peace-and#.V8mMXPkrK70>

UNPO. (2015, October 16). *Gilgit-Baltistan: Japanese support helps farmers' income increase*. Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization.

<https://unpo.org/article/18644>

UNPO. (2016, November 18). *Greater Balochistan: How and why political and economic marginalisation should be brought to an end*. Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization. <https://unpo.org/article/19647>

UN Peacekeeping. (n.d.). *India – Pakistan, background*. United Nations. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombackgr.html#six>

UN Peacekeeping. (2021a). *Troops and police contributors*. United Nations. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

UN Peacekeeping. (2021b). *How are we funded*. United Nations. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>

United Nations. (n.d.a). *Peace, dignity, equality, on a healthy planet*. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/peace-and-security>.

United Nations. (n.d.b). *Civil society*. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/civil-society/page/about-us>

United Nations. (2014, Jan 15). Repeating ‘Never Again’ after atrocity ‘a sign of continued failure’, Deputy Secretary-General says at Event on Rwanda genocide. United Nations, <https://press.un.org/en/2014/dsgsm736.doc.htm>.

United Nations. (2022). *Thematic review on local peacebuilding*. United Nations Peacebuilding. <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/local-peacebuilding-2022>.

UNSC. (2017, August 28). *Anquan Lishihui 8333 ci huiyi, Miandian jushi* [Security Council 8333<sup>rd</sup> Meeting, the situation in Myanmar].” *Lianheguo Anquan Lishihui [United Nations Security Council]*. S./PV.8333.

UNSC. (2022, January 26). *With Afghanistan ‘hanging by a thread’, security council delegates call on Taliban to tackle massive security, economic concerns, respect women’s equal rights*. United Nations Security Council. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14776.doc.htm>

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. (n.d.). *What is human security?* United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.

<https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/>

UN Women. (2021, September). *Young women lead peacebuilding efforts in the Rohingya community in Cox's Bazar*. UN Women.

<https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2021/UN-Women-impact-story-Bangladesh-Young-women-lead-peacebuilding-efforts-en.pdf>

USAID. (2021, November 19). *USAID – Afghanistan – education*. USAID.

<https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education>

USAID. (2022a, February 18). *Pakistan reading project Gilgit-Baltistan 2013-2017*.

USAID. <https://data.usaid.gov/Basic-Education/Pakistan-Reading-Project-Gilgit-Baltistan-2013-201/c9ga-bvkq>

USAID. (2022b, May 5). *Increased demand and engagement for accountability*.

USAID. <https://www.usaid.gov/sri-lanka/increased-demand-and-engagement-accountability>

USAID. (2022c, May 5). *Social cohesion and reconciliation*. USAID.

<https://www.usaid.gov/sri-lanka/social-cohesion-and-reconciliation>

USC. (2007, March 10). *Joint press communique of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, March 10, 2007*. USC

US-China Institute,

<https://china.usc.edu/joint-press-communique-peoples-republic-china-and-democratic-socialist-republic-sri-lanka-march-10>

U.S. Department of State. (2019, July 2). *Terrorist designations of Balochistan*

*Liberation Army and Husain Ali Hazzima and amendments to the terrorist designation of Jundallah*. U.S. Department of State. [https://2017-](https://2017-2021.state.gov/terrorist-designations-of-balochistan-liberation-army-and-husain-ali-hazzima-and-amendments-to-the-terrorist-designations-of-)

[2021.state.gov/terrorist-designations-of-balochistan-liberation-army-and-husain-ali-hazzima-and-amendments-to-the-terrorist-designations-of-](https://2017-2021.state.gov/terrorist-designations-of-balochistan-liberation-army-and-husain-ali-hazzima-and-amendments-to-the-terrorist-designations-of-)

jundallah/index.html.

- U.S. Department of State. (2021, January 20). *Major non-NATO ally status*. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/>
- USIP China Myanmar Senior Study Group. (2018, September 14). China's role in Myanmar's internal conflict. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/chinas-role-myanmars-internal-conflicts>.
- USIP China-South Asia Senior Study Group. (2020, December 16, 2020). China's influence on conflict dynamics in South Asia USIP. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/12/chinas-influence-conflict-dynamics-south-asia>
- Vendrell, F. (2012, April 18). *What went wrong after Bonn?* Middle East Institute. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/what-went-wrong-after-bonn>
- Verjee, A. (2016, December 22). *Explaining China's involvement in the South Sudan peace process*. Lowy Institute. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/explaining-china-s-involvement-south-sudan-peace-process>
- Vijayakumar, N. (2021, August 2). *Transforming the digital divide of local governments*. UNDP. [https://www.lk.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/blog/2021/Transforming\\_the\\_Digital\\_Divide\\_of\\_Local\\_Governments.html](https://www.lk.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/blog/2021/Transforming_the_Digital_Divide_of_Local_Governments.html)
- Wagner, K.A. (2019). *Peace education studies and post-conflict Sri Lanka*. Harvard Extension School.
- Waldman, M. (2010). The sun in the sky: The relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents. *Crisis States Discussion Papers, 18*, 1-27.
- Walter, B.F. (2010). Conflict relapse and the sustainability of post-conflict peace. *World Development Report, 2011*, 1-40.
- Wallis, J. (2017). Is 'good enough' peacebuilding good enough? The potential and

- pitfalls of the local turn in peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. *The Pacific Review*, 30(2), 251-269.
- Wallis, J., Kent, L., Bose, S., Dinnen, S., & M. Forsyth. (2018). Introduction. In Wallis, J., L. Kent, S. Bose, S. Dinnen & M. Forsyth (Eds.) *Hybridity on the ground in peacebuilding and critical conversations* (pp. 1-18). ANU Press.
- Wallis, J., & Richmond, O. (2017). From constructivist to critical engagement with peacebuilding: Implications for hybrid peace. *Third World Thematics*, 2(4), 1-24.
- Walton, O., & Thiyagaraja, W. (2020). Liberal and illiberal peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. In O.P. Richmond & G. Visoka (Eds.), *The Palgrave encyclopedia of peace and conflict studies*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Walton, O., & Saravanamuttu, P. (2011). In the balance? Civil society and the peace process 2002-2008. In J. Goodhand, J. Spencer & B. Korf (Eds), *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the peace trap?* (pp. 183-200). Routledge.
- Wang, A. (2021, August 25). *China, the Taliban and the threats from illegal drug trade*. South China Morning Post.  
<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3146233/china-taliban-and-threats-illegal-drug-trade>
- Wang, S. (2022). New progress and the role of China in the Afghan peace process. In Y. Guo & J. Miao (Eds.) *Preventative diplomacy, peacebuilding and security in the Asia-Pacific* (pp. 229-248). World Scientific Publishing Company.
- Wang, T. (2019, August 14). *Keshimier zhengduan, zhongguo banyan shenme jiaose* [What role does China play in the Kashmir conflict?]. *Zhongguo Nanhai Yanjiuyuan* [National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCS)].  
<http://www.nanhai.org.cn/info-detail/26/8215.html>
- Wang, X. (2017). Developmental peace: Understanding China's Africa policy in peace and security. In C. Alden, A. Alao, C. Zhang, & L. Barber (Eds.) *China and Africa: Building peace and security cooperation on the continent* (pp. 67-82).

Palgrave Macmillan.

Wang, Y. (2021, September 8). *Wang Yi attends first foreign ministers' meeting on the Afghani issue among the neighboring countries of Afghanistan*. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America.  
<https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zgyw/t1905753.htm>

Wangyi. (2021, December 19). *Afghan yu zhongguo weiyi jierang de wahan zoulang, weishenme meiyou xiuzhu gonglu?* [Why are no roads being built in the Wakhjir Pass, the only connection between Afghanistan and China?] 163.com. <https://www.163.com/dy/article/GQPM29MA0543AUJD.html>

Wang, Z. (2019). *Miandian 'luoxingya wenti' de chonggou yu jiegou* [Myanmar's 'Rohingya issue': Reconstruction and deconstruction]. *Dongnanya yanjiu [Southeast Asia Research]*, 2, 52-67.

Wardak, A., & Hamidzada, H. (2012). The search for legitimate rule, justice and dural peace: Hybrid models of governance in Afghanistan. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 7(2), 79-88.

Waterman, S. (2013, March 27). *Heavy price: Pakistan says war on terror has cost nearly 50,000 lives since 9/11*. Washington Times.  
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/27/heavy-price-pakistan-says-war-terror-has-cost-near/>

Wee, S. (2015, October 9). *Myanmar official accuses China of meddling in rebel peace talks*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-china-idUKKCN0S22VZ20151008>

Wei, L. (2020). Developmental peace in East Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific. *International Affairs*, 96(1), 189-209.

Weidmann, N.B., & Callen, M. (2013). Violence and election fraud: Evidence from Afghanistan. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43, 53-75.

Weiss, T.G. (2012). On R2P, America takes the lead. *Current History*, 2012, 322-324.

- Weisman, S.R. (1987, June 5). *India airlifts aid to Tamil rebels*. New York Times.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/05/world/india-airlifts-aid-to-tamil-rebels.html?sec=health&n=Top%2FNews%2FWorld%2FCountries+and+Territories%2FIndia>
- Weng, L. (2013, March 14). *Nippon foundation says aid to Kachin blocked*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nippon-foundation-says-aid-to-kachin-blocked.html>
- Wibsono, A.N. (2019). China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' in Sri Lanka: Debt diplomacy in Hambantota port investment. *Mandala*, 2(2), 222-245.
- Widmalm, S. (1997). The rise and fall of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. *Asian Survey*, 37(11), 1005-1030.
- Wijayasiri, J., and N. Senaratne. (2018). China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Sri Lanka. *Juridicas de la UNAM*, 373-401.
- Williams, D. (2000). Aid and sovereignty: Quasi-states and the international financial institution. *Review of International Studies*, 26, 557-573.
- Williamson, J. (1990, November 1). *What Washington means by policy reform*. Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
<https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/what-washington-means-policy-reform>
- Wilsey, T.W. (2021, August 18). *Why did the Afghan army evaporate?* Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).  
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-did-afghan-army-evaporate>
- Wilson, C. (2020). Illiberal peacebuilding in India and Indonesia: The dangers of the hybrid approach. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), *Hybrid peacebuilding in Asia* (pp. 115-138). Palgrave MacMillan.



- Winchester, M. (2017, August 28). *Birth of an ethnic insurgency in Myanmar*. Asia Times. <https://asiatimes.com/2017/08/birth-ethnic-insurgency-myanmar/>
- WION Web Team. (2021). *'Exclusive' Gwadar protesters threaten to stop CPEC work if govt fails to fulfil their demands*. WION. <https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exclusive-gwadar-protesters-threaten-to-stop-cpec-work-if-govt-fails-to-fulfil-their-demands-431227>
- Wirsing, R.G. (1994). *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir dispute*. Macmillan.
- WITS. (2020). *China food imports by country in US\$ thousand 2020*. World Integrated Trade Solution. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CHN/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Import/Partner/by-country/Product/Food>
- WITS. (2020). *Myanmar trade*. World Integrated Trade Solution. <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/MMR>
- Wolf, S.O. (2016). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its impact on Gilgit-Baltistan. *South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF) Focus*, 25, 1-21.
- Woodward. B. (2002). *Bush at war*. Simon & Schuter.
- Woodward, S.L. (2013). The IFIs and post-conflict political economy. In M. Berdal & D. Zaum (Eds.) *The political economy of state building - Power after peace* (pp. 140-157). Routledge.
- Worden, S., & Ahmadi, B. (2021, April 22). *Democracy is the Afghan Government's best defense against the Taliban*. United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/democracy-afghan-governments-best-defense-against-taliban>
- World Bank. (2019). *Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Afghanistan*. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=AF>
- World Bank. (2020). *International tourism, receipts (current US\$) – Sri Lanka*. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.CD?locations=LK>

- World Bank. (2021). *GDP growth (Annual &) – China*. World Bank.  
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2021&locations=CN&start=1987>
- World Health Organization. (n.d.). *Health systems – Afghanistan*. World Health Organization Regional office for the Eastern Mediterranean.  
<http://www.emro.who.int/afg/programmes/health-system-strengthening.html>
- Worldometer. (2016). *China coal*. Worldometer.  
<https://www.worldometers.info/coal/china-coal/#coal-production>.
- World Watch Monitor. (2016, January 27). *Minorities fear backlash over Sri Lanka's proposed new constitution*. World Watch Monitor  
<https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2016/01/minorities-fear-backlash-over-sri-lankas-proposed-new-constitution/>
- Xi, J. (2015, April 21). *Xi Jinping zai bajisitan yihui de yanjiang (quan wen)* [Xi Jinping Speech at the Parliament of Pakistan (Full Text).] *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhu oumeng shituan* [Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union]. [http://www.chinamission.be/chn/zt/xjp15bjst/201504/t20150421\\_8433158.htm](http://www.chinamission.be/chn/zt/xjp15bjst/201504/t20150421_8433158.htm)
- Xi, J. (2017, May 14). *President Xi's speech at opening of Belt and Road forum, May 14, 2017*. USC US-China Institute. <https://china.usc.edu/president-xis-speech-opening-belt-and-road-forum-may-14-2017>.
- Xiao, Z. (2021). *Sililanka zhuanjia yanzhong de 'yidaiyilu': dailai shishi zaizai de fuli* [The Belt and Road initiative in the eyes of Sri Lankan experts: Brought tangible benefits]. *Silu baike [Silk Road Encyclopedia]*, 9, 35-38.
- Xinhua. (2013a, October 25). *Xij Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua* [Important Speech by Xi Jinping at the Peripheral diplomacy Work Conference]. *Xinhua wang* [Xinhua Net].  
[http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c\\_117878897.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm).

- Xinhua. (2013b, October 28). *Sri Lanka opens second China funded highway*. Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/820737.shtml>
- Xinhua. (2019). *China on behalf of 139 countries calls for full realization of right to development at the UN*. Xinhua.net. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/14/c\\_138390990.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/14/c_138390990.htm)
- Xinhua. (2022a, April 23). *Global security initiative offers China's solutions, wisdom*. Xinhua.net. <https://english.news.cn/20220423/66511d44ca634963b03dfd5120a115ef/c.html>
- Xinhua. (2022b, August 12). *China, South Sudan start implementation of key projects under FOCAC*. Xinhua.net. <https://english.news.cn/africa/20220812/c3c9888fe5d24721b8b4811de02d0d2a/c.html>
- Xue, L. (2018). China's development-oriented peacebuilding strategy in Africa. In C. Alden, A. Alao, C. Zhang & L. Barber (Eds.) *China and Africa* (pp. 83-99). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yan, X. (2016). Political leadership and power redistribution. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 9(1), 1-26.
- Yan, N. (2022, September 13). *China-backed port in western Myanmar depriving locals of land and jobs*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/china-backed-port-in-western-myanmar-depriving-locals-of-land-and-jobs.html>
- Yao, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2018). Public perception of Chinese investment in Myanmar and its political consequences: A survey experimental approach. *International Growth Centre Policy Brief*, 2018, 1-5.
- Ye, N. (2019, September 18). *No peace in Myanmar without sacrifices: Kachin Christian chief*. The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/no-peace-myanmar-without-sacrifices-kachin-christian-chief.html>

- Ye, M.H. (2022, January 26). *Myanmar's military knows only the language of force.* The Irrawaddy. <https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-military-knows-only-the-language-of-force.html>
- Yew, L.T. (2021, October 30). *China will not be the first to recognise Taliban government, scholar says.* Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-not-be-first-recognise-taliban-government-scholar-says-2021-10-27/>
- Yin, Y. (2021, August 31). *China's agricultural expertise could help Afghanistan once conditions permit: Insiders.* Global Times. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1232984.shtml>
- Yousaf, F., & Furrukhzad, S. (2020). Pashtun jirga and prospects of peace and conflict resolution in Pakistan's 'tribal' frontier. *Third World Quarterly*, 41(7), 1200-1217.
- Yu, S., & Mitchell, T. (2021, June 28). *The Communist Party at 100: Is Xi Jinping's China on the right track?* Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/faf2226b-be95-4c52-a10b-653f3137b90d>.
- Yuan, X. (2022). The Chinese approach to peacebuilding: contesting liberal peace? *Third World Quarterly* 43(7), 1798-1816.
- Yuan, Z., Li., Z., & Zhufu, X. (2016). *Zhongguo yu guoji renquan guifan chongsu* [China and the reconstruction of international human rights norm]. *Zhongguo shehui kexue [China Social Science]*, 7, 189-203.
- Yusuf, M.W. (2010). The U.S.-Pakistan relationship and finding an end state in Afghanistan. *CTC Sentinel*, 3(9), 8-14.
- Zafar, T. (2022, May 14). *AJK a sensitive region: Difficult for lent officers to win hearts and minds of the masses: AJK Prime Minister.* Pakistan News International. <https://pni.net.pk/en/kashmir-news/ajk-a-sensitive-region-difficult-for-lent-officers-to-win-hearts-and-minds-of-the-masses-ajk-prime->

minister/

- Zaidi, S.M.S., & Ahmad, A. (2021). From friend to foe: Post 9/11 Pakistan-US relations: A realist perspective. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 20(10), 1-17.
- Zakaria, F. (1994). Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. *Foreign Affairs*, 73, 109-126.
- Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), 22-43.
- Zakaria, R. (2016, May 11). *A women's jirga*. Dawn. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1257618>.
- Zang, Y., & Sun, X. (2021, December 22). *8<sup>th</sup> Chinese peacekeeping infantry battalion to South Sudan completes rotation*. Ministry of National Defense, the People's Republic of China. [http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2021-12/22/content\\_4901564.htm](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2021-12/22/content_4901564.htm).
- Zartman, I.W. (2001). The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments. *Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1(1), 8-18.
- Zhang, G. (2021). "A community of shared future for mankind" and implications for conflict prevention. In C.J. Fung, B. Gehrman, R.F. Madenyika & J.G. Tower (Eds.) *New paths and policies towards conflict prevention* (pp. 129-138). Routledge.
- Zhang, J. (2021, June 22). "*Zhangjun dashi zai anlihui afuhan wenti shipin gongkaihui shang fayan* [Ambassador Zhang Jun's Speech on Afghanistan Problem at Virtual Conference of Security Council]. *Zhonghuarenmingongheguo changzhu lianheguo daibiaotuan* [Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN]. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/chn/hyyfy/t1885882.htm>
- Zhang, J. (2022, August 29). *Remark by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan*. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, <http://un.china->

mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202208/t20220830\_10757423.htm

- Zhang, T. (2020). *Houjunren shidai miandian de 'shuangtou zhengzhi' ji qi waijiao yingxiang* [Diarchy of Myanmar in post-military era and its foreign effects]. *Dongnanya yanjiu [Southeast Asia Research]*, 1, 33-68.
- Zhang, W. (2021, November 4). *Zhang Wenmu: Zhongguo de nengyuan anquan yu kexing zhanlue* [China's Energy Security and Viable Strategies]. *Guoji nengyuan wang [In-En.com]*. <https://m.in-en.com/article/html/energy-2309091.shtml>.
- Zhang, X. (2018, March 28). *Afuhan jingji xingshi ji rongyu 'yidaiyilu' zhanlue de tiaozhan* [Economic situation of Afghanistan and challenges to its participation of 'One Belt One Road']. *Guojia Xinxi Zhongxin [State Information Center]* <http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/456/8921.htm>
- Zhang, Y. (2016). *Biluzhi fenlizhuyi shili dui zhongba jingjizoulang de kanfa jiqi chengyin* [How do Balochistan separatist forces view China-Pakistan economic corridor and why]. *Nanya yanjiu [South Asia Research]*, 2, 24-43.
- Zhang, Y. (2020). *Zhongmian mingyun gongtongti jiqi shifan yiyi* [The Meaning Behind China and Myanmar's Community of Common Destiny]. *Dangdai shijie [Contemporary World]*, 5, 60-64.
- Zhao, H. (2013). China's Afghan policy: The forming of the 'March West' strategy. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 27(2), 1-29.
- Zhao, L. (2011). Two pillars of China's global peace engagement strategy: UN peacekeeping operations and international peacebuilding operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(3), 344-362.
- Zhao, Y. (2021, April 19). *China to strengthen BRI cotton cooperation*. China Daily. <https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202104/19/WS607cd5e0a31024ad0bab6557.html>
- Zhen, L. (2020, November 6). *China accuses US of double standards as it drops ETIM*

*from terrorist list.* South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3108846/china-accuses-us-double-standards-it-drops-etim-terrorism-list>

Zhou, L. (2022, August 28). *Chinese businesses make headway in Afghanistan despite Beijing's cautious approach to Taliban.* South China Morning Post.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3190469/chinese-businesses-make-headway-afghanistan-despite-beijings>